ARTICLES OF THE DAY

December 09, 2021

TOM FOWDY, RUSSIA TODAY ......................................................................................................................... 2

ROBERT INLAKESH, RUSSIA TODAY .................................................................................................................. 4

KELLEY LEE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS ......................................................................................................................... 6

ELIZABETH ECONOMY, FOREIGN AFFAIRS ...................................................................................................... 10

KHURRAM HUSSAIN, DAWN NEWS ............................................................................................................... 19

IMRAN MALIK, THE NATION ......................................................................................................................... 21

BRIAN WONG, THE DIPLOMAT....................................................................................................................... 23

 Nation that has hundreds of overseas military bases says China
isn’t allowed one
Tom Fowdy, Russia Today
A
n oil-rich Gulf state,
traditionally a US
client state, has tilted
towards Beijing,
demonstrating that, to
America’s displeasure, it’s
now increasingly a multipolar
world. A week or so ago, the
United States leaked
accusations to the media that
China was building a “secret
military facility” in the United
Arab Emirates, which they
had put a stop to. How China
managed to pursue what is
described as a “multi-storey
building” in a country that was
not their own without being
detected, beggars belief, yet
the media reported it as fact
anyway.
There has been a spree of
similar stories of late,
accusing Beijing of building
undisclosed or ‘secret’
military facilities, including
one in Cambodia and another
in Equatorial Guinea. The
nation that has hundreds of
overseas military bases
worldwide believes that
Beijing isn’t entitled to a
single one. Besides that, and
on the UAE matter, this adds
to a broader pattern where
Washington appears to be
intent on undermining China’s
relationship with the wealthy
oil monarchy, which sits on a
corner of the Arabian
Peninsula and the Persian
Gulf.
It’s a state that has been an
important ‘strategic partner’
of the US for many years, but
nonetheless is increasingly
warm towards Beijing, putting
it in a tight position as the new
cold war hots up. The Biden
administration had previously
leveraged a sale of F-35s to
the country on the proviso that
the UAE remove China’s
Huawei from its 5G network,
a demand which does not
appear to have yet worked.
Why is the UAE so
strategically important?
Formerly a British
protectorate which came into
existence in the 1970s, the
new state secured its political
survival and prosperity
through a ‘patron-client
relationship’ with the West. In
exchange for backing Western
political objectives in the
Middle East, as well as
providing an abundant supply
of oil, the US and its allies
would provide political
security for the small Emirati
state against those adversarial
towards it, such as Iran or
Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. As a
result, the UAE has literally
served as a ‘military
launchpad’ into the region as
part of a Saudi-led, pro-US
order in the Middle East.
It hosts airbases for the US
and France. It buys weapons
from the US military-
industrial complex, and at
America’s insistence,
normalized ties with Israel in
2020 as part of the Abraham
Accords. The UAE has
become known for its displays
of immense wealth and
grandeur, such as the world’s
tallest building, the Burj
Khalifa in Dubai, all built on
the back of its oil wealth and
its security relationship with
Washington, London, and
Paris.
But the world is changing. As
the world moves slowly
towards electric vehicles and
renewable energy, oil is not
going to be an infinite source
of wealth for the Gulf
monarchies. This has forced
them to consider long-term
strategies of economic
diversification and to develop
revenues from other areas. As
we’ve seen recently in its
remodeling of the Arab
world’s traditional working
week, the UAE has long been
pursuing an effort to develop
itself into a tourist and retail
focused economy and to
become a ‘crossroads of the
world’. But to do so, Abu
Dhabi has placed a
considerable part of its
strategy on ‘turning east’,
building a strong relationship
beyond its traditional patrons,
with China and India.
Despite the move to diversify
from crude exports, the
UAE’s current economic
incentives and look-east
strategy are underlined by the
fact that it already sells more
energy to China than it does to
the US, undercutting
Washington’s traditional
leverage.
In addition, the Emirates are
also part of the Belt and Road
Initiative, have considerable
investments in, and increased
trade with China, and are huge
enthusiasts for Huawei. They
relied on China as their first
port of call for vaccines, and
have frequently supported
Beijing’s position on
Xinjiang. From a strategic
point of view, Emirati leaders
believe there are long-term
political interests and
safeguards in developing ties
with another authoritarian
state which is not dependent
on the West. Across the board,
this means a noticeable tilt
towards China. This
increasingly cozy relationship
is beginning to cross
America’s red lines. The UAE
occupies a strategic position
next to the Gulf of Oman,
which leads into the Indian
Ocean, meaning its political
allegiances are of
consequence to Washington’s
bid to dominate the ‘Indo-
pacific’ against China.
The UAE has also been shying
away from its traditional arms
suppliers too, finding an
appetite, for example, in
China and Russia’s drones.
These developments have
made the US anxious that its
sway over what has been its
longstanding regional ‘client’
is wavering, and this has
started the push-back against
China’s role there.
This has included, as noted
above, the attempt to try and
leverage the sale of F-35s to
the UAE in exchange for
removing Huawei, a deal
which remains unconcluded,
and now the accusation that
Beijing has been attempting to
build a military facility in the
country completely unnoticed.
However, what Washington is Arab monarchy is a partner
underestimating is that a state motivated primarily by its
like the UAE no longer seems own raw interests, not ‘shared
willing to continue with just values’, and has gradually
one strategic client shifted its focus within an
relationship. It wants to find ever-changing geopolitical
political space for itself, with context. It perceives China, as
as many partners as can other countries do, as an
benefit it, and that includes increasingly important partner
variety within the West itself. in political and economic
Hence, amid the F-35 matters.
controversy, President
Even if China cannot replicate
Macron of France swept into
America’s military
the country last week and
importance to the UAE, it is
sealed a deal for the UAE to
quite evident on multiple
buy more than 80 Rafale jets.
fronts that Washington will
The deal was motivated by
have a hard time getting
Macron’s own revenge for the
Beijing’s foothold out of the
AUKUS controversy, in
country. The UAE isn’t a
which the US forced Australia
Western democracy. The US
to abruptly cancel a deal with
can’t use the human rights
France in order to buy its
card, the ‘freedom vs.
nuclear submarines instead.
authoritarian’ stance, and the
Abu Dhabi later denied that
manipulation of civil society,
the deal was to “replace” the
to propagate its agenda as it
American F-35s, but the
has elsewhere. It would need
message to Washington was
to convince Abu Dhabi that
obvious. In the same week, the
China is a physical threat to
UAE then sent a top official to
their national sovereignty and
Iran for talks, heaping more
security, and that isn’t a
bad news on the US. Both
convincing sell; that’s why
stories serve to show
you get silly stories such as
Washington’s hand over the
this one about secret military
country is weakening.
bases.
The US is seeking to drive
Ultimately, Abu Dhabi wants
China out of the UAE, but it’s
regime security and economic
unlikely to work. Washington
diversification, and while
has frequently sought to exert
Washington has been
coercion over its allies and
important to these goals so far,
partners to force them into line
the Emiratis will turn to
on China-related matters,
whoever provides it, be it
mostly by stressing security
France or China. Welcome,
dependencies. In Europe, this
Washington, to a multipolar
has normally worked, and the
world.
assumption has been that the
UAE, long dependent on
American goodwill, would
fall in line too. However, the
 Biden promised to stop the Saudi war machine. He hasn't
Robert Inlakesh, Russia Today
T
he war on Yemen is
worse than ever, but
the US mainstream
media stays silent as the
atrocities continue. Shortly
after he took office, US
President Joe Biden
announced the end of his
country’s support for Saudi
Arabia’s offensive war efforts
in beleaguered Yemen,
vowing to make diplomatic
efforts to end the conflict a top
priority.
Yet, despite these promises,
which saw Biden showered
with praise, his support for
Riyadh has not budged. Ten
months on from his pledge,
Saudi warplanes continue to
shower bombs on
impoverished Yemenis,
whose country is one of the
Arab world’s poorest nations.
Ground fighting around the
northern Yemeni city of
Marib has, in particular,
sparked a humanitarian
catastrophe. In the US media,
there has been a near-blackout
on the war in Yemen since the
Saudi-led coalition began its
lethal bombing campaigns in
2015. The UN predicts that the
death toll will reach 377,000
by the end of this year. In the
past two months alone,
fighting in the oil-rich Marib
region has led to the deaths of
thousands, as well as the
displacement of around
42,000 civilians.
Some focus was placed on the
issue in the media during
Donald Trump’s presidency,
primarily due to the passing of
a bipartisan piece of
legislation in 2019 aimed at
ending American financial
support for the war. Trump
vetoed the legislation in an
effort to continue
Washington’s backing of the
coalition forces, drawing
criticism from across the
political spectrum, but since
Biden took office, any interest
the corporate media had in
covering the war has dropped
significantly.
Yemen has been wracked by
civil wars for decades, but the
current conflict broke out in
March 2015, when the Saudi-
led coalition military
intervened on behalf of the
internationally recognised
government against Houthi
rebels aligned with a former
president, Ali Abdullah Saleh.
Riyadh expected its air power
– mostly British planes
dropping British-made
bombs, flown by British-
trained pilots and maintained
in the kingdom by thousands
of British contractors – to win
the war in five weeks.
Instead, six years on, it’s
estimated that 80% of the
population of 24 million
people who are still alive need
food and assistance, with
many merely a “step away
from starvation.”
The latest fighting flared up in
late February, when Ansar
Allah (‘Supporters of God’),
otherwise known as the
Houthi rebels, launched an
offensive to capture the
resource-rich Marib region,
the last northern stronghold of
the Saudi-backed forces of
President Abdrabbuh Mansur
Hadi. The offensive was seen
as the best strategic option for
Ansar Allah – accused of
being backed by Iran – to
extract greater terms from
Hadi’s forces, after peace
talks deteriorated. With the
Saudi-backed forces – who
have been accused of working
with IS (Islamic State,
formerly ISIS) and al-Qaeda –
losing significant portions of
the Marib governorate, the
Saudi-led air force has lashed
out, bombarding the country’s
capital, Sana’a, and
elsewhere.
It’s impossible to tell the exact
death toll resulting from
airstrikes by Saudi Arabia and
its allies, which include more
than 300 direct strikes by the
US. However, the United
Nations (UN) has declared
that, by deliberately targeting
civilians, war crimes have
been committed by the Saudis.
When the UN Human Rights
Council decided earlier this
year to investigate the extent
to which the Saudi-led
coalition was responsible for
the world’s number-one
humanitarian crisis, Riyadh
used bullying,“incentives, and
threats” to close down the
inquiry and shield it from
accountability.
The “humanitarians” of the
Biden administration, which
promised to end support for
Saudi Arabia’s “offensive
actions,” sealed a $500-
million weapons deal with
Riyadh in October. And US
forces still provide logistical
support for the Saudi-led
coalition, just as US
contractors continue to service
the jets used to bomb Yemen
– all moves condemned by the
likes of progressive Senator
Bernie Sanders (D-VT).
Indeed, along with
Congressman Ro Khanna (D-
CA), Sanders took out a joint
op-ed in The Guardian earlier
this month, urging the Biden
administration to start
“utilizing its leverage to
pressure Saudi Arabia to lift
the blockade on Yemen,
which continues to block fuel
and other essential imports
into the country, pushing
millions of Yemenis toward
the brink of starvation.” It
added: “Lifting the blockade
must happen immediately and
be delinked from final peace
negotiation talks.” These
demands fly in the face of
formally US positions, which
have sought to tie the lifting of
the blockade to a political
solution.
As cruise missiles are fired
into Saudi territory and the
Saudi-dled coalition’s
warplanes carpet-bomb
Yemen’s capital with
Western-made munitions,
what has to be kept in mind
are the broken promises of the
American president. Millions
of Yemenis are near death,
many more have been
displaced in the fighting, yet,
in the United States, not even
this dire state of affairs is
giving the government the
urgency to pursue a rational
foreign-policy approach that
isn’t informed by political
bias and business interests.
It’s almost inevitable that
Marib will fall to Ansar Allah,
so why don’t they delay the
inevitable and use their clout
to pressure Saudi Arabia into
adopting a less aggressive
approach that would protect
the civilians who are being
caught in the crosshairs of the
ongoing battle? This question,
like others involving the
Biden administration’s
foreign policy, can be
answered in the same way: the
US doggedly refuses to accept
that, sometimes, things will
not go its way and it cannot
just blow everything up to
avoid making concessions.
Biden has form for making
false promises on Saudi. He
said on the campaign trail in
2020 he would punish Saudi
Arabia’s Crown Prince
Mohammed bin Salman for
his role in the killing of
journalist Jamal Khashoggi,
but, once in office, refused to
act.
The recent Saudi campaign
against Lebanon, which cost
the latter’s economy millions,
has also passed without any
US intervention. A country
already suffering an economic
crisis, with nearly 80% of its
people living below the
poverty line, Lebanon was
coerced by Saudi Arabia and
its alliance of Persian Gulf
States to accept the forced
resignation of Minister
George Kordahi for comments
he made condemning Saudi’s
war efforts in Yemen prior to
being appointed to a role in
government. As long as the
US refuses to punish or
pressure its allies, its
arguments against other
foreign powers for their
alleged human-rights abuses
will forever continue to lack
weight.
So, was it all a lie that Biden
wanted to end the conflict in
Yemen? If so, why don’t we
hear anything about it on CNN
or MSNBC? The current US
administration is proving
itself to be just as bad as the
previous two, when it comes
to the war on Yemen. For
some Americans, the gentler,
less uncouth language
emanating from the White
House these days may make
them feel better about who
runs their country, but for
Yemenis, it’s doubtful that
much value is attached to the
hollow, politically correct
words of those aiding in the
supply of the bombs and
planes that kill their children.
 The World Needs a Better Strategy for COVID Travel
Restrictions
Kelley Lee, Foreign Affairs
T he emergence
Omicron, the latest
COVID-19 variant of
of
concern, has triggered a flurry
of new travel restrictions
around the globe. Amid fears
of higher transmissibility,
greater virulence, and reduced
vaccine efficacy, governments
worldwide are scrambling to
slow the variant’s spread.
Initial restrictions mostly
targeted countries in southern
Africa, where officials first
raised the alarm about
Omicron, but travel from
other regions has been
curtailed as public health
agencies have identified more
cases. Canada, for example,
recently added Egypt,
Malawi, and Nigeria to its
initial list of seven restricted
states. Hong Kong, for its part,
has banned the entry of
nonresidents from a growing
slate of countries in Africa,
Europe, and North America.
The result of these
measures—imposed almost
two years into the pandemic—
is a renewed sense of
international chaos. Each
government has targeted
different countries according
to widely varying sets of
criteria. Some have banned
entry by foreign citizens
traveling through certain
countries but not nationals
returning from those same
countries. Specific testing and
quarantine requirements for
arrivals from targeted versus
nontargeted countries have
been set that vary across
states. All this diversity points
to a continued lack of
consensus about how best to
mitigate the public health
risks of travel during the
pandemic.
Despite the confusion,
for controlling the spread of
disease, caused avoidable
economic and social harms,
and incentivized states to
conceal public health
however, two years of
information. COVID-19,
experience battling the virus
however, was different. As a
has produced a set of
respiratory infection spread
valuable—if poorly
through the air and carried by
adopted—lessons for how to
asymptomatic people in as
manage travel during the
many as one-third of cases, the
COVID-19 era. Although
disease presented a different
public health agencies such as
problem from past outbreaks.
the World Health
Organization (WHO) initially Globalization also
advised against travel complicated the challenge.
restrictions, evidence gathered Over the past several decades,
during the pandemic has societies have become deeply
shown that these measures can interconnected, and accessible
help control or slow the spread international travel has been
of disease if used an important enabler and
appropriately. Unlike the beneficiary of this
current patchwork of transformation. International
restrictions designed to target tourism, for instance, peaked
Omicron, travel measures can immediately before the
be effective if they are pandemic hit. The
internationally coordinated, combination of a novel
informed by scientific pathogen in a uniquely
evidence, and politically interconnected world limited
transparent. Deployed the usefulness of previous
correctly, border management thinking on travel measures.
can enable international travel
Designing effective COVID-
to continue, albeit at lower
19 travel policies isn’t a lost
levels, in ways that genuinely
cause. To its credit, the WHO
control and mitigate the risk of
has adapted in response to
COVID-19. ROAD TO
changing circumstances.
NOWHEREThe continued
Instead of dismissing
confusion about travel
restrictions entirely, the
restrictions is partly due to the
organization now
ever-evolving nature of
recommends a “risk-based
available evidence on
approach” to international
COVID-19. Upon declaring
travel. Countries should
the outbreak a public health
conduct “systematic and
emergency of international
regular risk assessments,” it
concern in January 2020, the
says, to inform their travel and
WHO advised against travel
border policies. Variables that
restrictions based on evidence
might be considered in these
from previous disease
assessments include local
outbreaks. In the past, such
epidemiological data, travel
measures proved unnecessary
volumes, and public health
capacity.
These new technical
guidelines are undoubtedly a
useful departure from the
WHO’s previous stance. But it
will take time to reach a
scientific consensus that can
inform real-time decision-
making during future
outbreaks. If used correctly,
however, a risk-based
approach would help
determine if travel restrictions
are needed, which variables
are associated with the
greatest travel-related risk,
and which measures should be
applied when. Until then, as
the rise of Omicron has
shown, this gap is often filled
by a recurring cycle of new
variants of concern followed
by international panic.
AN EDUCATION Despite
the current lack of agreed-
upon standards, designing
effective travel policies isn’t a
lost cause. Scientific research
has begun to identify valuable
lessons about border
management during the
pandemic that can be put to
good use. The first is that
timing matters. Evidence
suggests that countries that
moved quickly to restrict
travel at the earliest stages of
the pandemic, such as
Australia, Taiwan, and
Vietnam, successfully
reduced the number of
imported cases of SARS-
CoV-2, the virus that causes
COVID-19. These countries
have also suffered lower
levels of infection and deaths
during the pandemic.
The second lesson, however,
is that timing is only part of
the story. Although evidence
from these countries might
suggest that governments
should restrict travel from
specific high-risk jurisdictions
at the first sign of trouble, the
reality is more complicated.
Unless a state has maintained
testing and quarantine
requirements for all
international arrivals
throughout the pandemic,
targeted action will come too
late. The latest variant is likely
already circulating within a
country’s borders by the time
authorities anywhere identify
and report it. Omicron, for
example, was reported to the
WHO by South Africa on
November 24, but scientists
believe it emerged in early
October. This timeline means
that the variant was already
spreading globally when
researchers identified it, and
its exact origins may not be
southern African.
The third and final lesson is
that the globalized nature of
contemporary travel means
that trying to contain a variant
through targeted travel
restrictions alone is
ineffective. Travelers
regularly transit through third
countries and regions before
arriving at their final
destinations and may not be
forthcoming about their full
itineraries if threatened with
entry restrictions. Travelers
can also simply reroute their
journeys to circumvent any
limitations.
Terms such as “travel bans”
and “border closures” are
therefore misleading. They
suggest that countries can
somehow slam their borders
closed, effectively shutting
out public health risks. In
practice, however,
hermetically sealing a country
off on short notice and for an
extended period of time is
nearly impossible. It is also
rarely necessary if states
deploy effective testing and
quarantine measures.
LEAVING ON A JET
PLANE? With these lessons
in mind, governments must
reframe the problem. Their
goal should be not to hastily
ban arrivals from targeted
countries but to effectively
manage the public health risks
associated with cross-border
movement. A range of proven
measures can help them
accomplish this objective.
For one, governments can
temporarily control who
enters their countries and
under what conditions. States
can identify specific
categories of individuals
permitted to enter (limited by
nationality, purpose, or other
criteria), thereby reducing the
volume of travelers to those
deemed “essential.” This
allows governments to subject
all authorized individuals to
an agreed-upon level of
testing, quarantine, and other
measures shown by emerging
scientific evidence to enable
strong disease surveillance
and prevent onward
transmission. Governments
can implement these measures
prior to travel, at points of
entry, and after arrival.
Restrictions or outright bans
are therefore one tool among a
broader array of options.
By using this more holistic
approach, a small number of
jurisdictions—including
Hong Kong, Israel, New
Zealand, South Korea, and
Taiwan—have maintained
relatively stringent border
management regimes
throughout the pandemic by
testing and quarantining
nearly all international
arrivals. Few exemptions have
been granted. Alongside
monitoring for high-risk
arrivals, these measures are
the gold standard for COVID-
19 travel policies. It is thus no
coincidence that by applying
this approach, Hong Kong and
Israel were among the first
governments outside South
Africa to identify Omicron—
with no onward community
transmission because the
individuals who tested
positive for the variant were
still in monitored hotel
quarantine.
Hermetically sealing a explain
country off on short notice is
nearly impossible. Crucially,
these governments also
integrated their border
management regimes with
domestic public health efforts.
Although some countries
weathered the early stages of
the pandemic by quickly
applying and then sustaining
effective travel measures, the
most successful ones also
rapidly implemented local
testing and contact-tracing
programs, as well as physical
distancing and mask-wearing
guidelines. In other words,
travel measures are not just
about buying time but about
using it wisely to implement
public health protocols.
By contrast, other countries,
such as the United Kingdom
and the United States, have
followed a different playbook.
They implemented testing and
quarantine requirements much
later in the pandemic and
allowed many exemptions.
Under the United Kingdom’s
so-called traffic light system,
for instance, travelers from
“green” and “yellow”
countries—supposedly low
risk—were subjected to
limited or even no testing and
quarantine requirements.
Although the British
government revised these
ratings based on new
information, data gaps and the
virus’s global circulation
made managing risk in this
way a questionable
proposition. Since mid-2021,
moreover, many countries
have lifted testing and
quarantine requirements to
encourage domestic economic
recovery.
Still, it is overly simplistic to
equate stringent travel
restrictions with overall
success in controlling
COVID-19. Many factors
varying health
outcomes across different
countries. Nevertheless, for
this particular pandemic, it is
clear that border management
is one policy area that
governments need to get right.
FLY AWAY Although
research is slowly producing a
set of best practices for
COVID-19 border
management, these measures
clearly come with high
economic and political costs.
These can be direct, through
financial losses incurred by
the travel and tourism sector,
or indirect, by hindering the
free movement of people. The
risk-based approach
advocated by the WHO
recognizes this collateral
damage but offers no obvious
methodology for navigating
the tradeoffs. These are not
purely scientific
considerations, after all, and
each decision invariably
involves complex political
choices about who should
travel and under what
conditions.
At the same time, however,
public health goals can and
should be aligned with other
policy objectives. Poorly
executed travel measures,
such as the current bans
targeting individual states, can
inflict unnecessary economic
and social pain and allow new
variants to spread worldwide.
They also punish countries for
being good global citizens and
encourage governments to
hide rather than share
information—outcomes that
harm everyone. Effective
border management, by
contrast, means enabling
travel to continue, albeit at
lower volumes, in controlled
ways that mitigate risk. The
alternative is chaotic and
piecemeal measures that harm
travelers, the travel industry,
local economies, and public
health.
Observers have often
celebrated New Zealand for
best maintaining this difficult
balancing act. Wellington’s
border management during
COVID-19 has been
consistent over time, applied
equally to all incoming
travelers, and aligned with the
evolving science. And
although critics rightly argue
that some sectors have
incurred substantial costs, the
overall economy has benefited
from avoiding the frequent
lockdowns that bedevil
countries seeking to keep their
borders relatively open.
As a new round of travel
restrictions and bans run their
course, governments around
the world will have another
opportunity to learn from their
mistakes. Regardless of the
political and practical
difficulties they face, leaders
must understand that effective
risk mitigation requires
coordination. They must work
together to harmonize
standards for testing,
quarantine, and vaccine
certification, among other
measures, and to build
consensus around the WHO’s
new risk-based approach. This
will require revising the
WHO’s International Health
Regulations and potentially
agreeing to additional
multilateral legal frameworks.
It will also require individual
countries to invest more in
border capacities if they wish
to keep large numbers of
people moving safely. If,
however, they continue along
their current path, no one will
go anywhere fast.
 Xi Jinping’s New World Order
Elizabeth Economy, Foreign Affairs
X
i Jinping savored the
moment. Speaking
before China’s
annual gathering of nearly
3,000 representatives to the
National People’s Congress in
Beijing in March 2021, the
Chinese president took a post-
pandemic victory lap,
proclaiming that his country
had been the first to tame
COVID-19, the first to resume
work, and the first to regain
positive economic growth. It
was the result, he argued, of
“self-confidence in our path,
self-confidence in our
theories, self-confidence in
our system, self-confidence in
our culture.” And he further
shared his pride that “now,
when our young people go
abroad, they can stand tall and
feel proud—unlike us when
we were young.” For Xi,
China’s success in controlling
the spread of the novel
coronavirus was yet more
evidence that he was on the
right track: China was
reclaiming its historic position
of leadership and centrality on
the global stage. The brief
official history of the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) that
was published the following
month reinforced his
assessment. It claimed that Xi
had brought China “closer to
the center of the world stage
than it has ever been. The
nation has never been closer to
its own rebirth.”
China already occupies a
position of centrality in the
international system. It is the
world’s largest trading power
and greatest source of global
lending, it boasts the world’s
largest population and
military, and it has become a
global center of innovation.
Most analysts predict that
China’s real GDP will surpass
that of the United States by
2030 to make it the largest
economy in the world.
Moreover, as the evolution of
the pandemic has illustrated,
China’s response to global
challenges has profound
implications for the rest of the
world.
Yet even as Xi’s ambition and
China’s global prominence
have become indisputable,
many observers continue to
question whether Beijing
wants to shape a new
international order or merely
force some adjustments to the
current one, advancing
discrete interests and
preferences without
fundamentally transforming
the global system. They argue
that Beijing’s orientation is
overwhelmingly defensive
and designed only to protect
itself from criticism of its
political system and to realize
a limited set of sovereignty
claims. That view misses the
scope of Xi’s vision. His
understanding of the centrality
of China signifies something
more than ensuring that the
relative weight of the
country’s voice or influence
within the existing
international system is
adequately represented. It
connotes a radically
transformed international
order. In Xi’s vision, a unified
and resurgent China would be
on par with or would surpass
the United States. China is the
preeminent power in Asia, and
its maritime domain has
expanded to include control
over contested areas in the
East China and South China
Seas. The United States has
retreated back across the
Pacific to assume its rightful
place as an Atlantic power.
Moreover, the formidable
network of U.S. alliances that
has underpinned the
international system for more
than 70 years is dissolving in
favor of a proposed Chinese
framework of dialogue,
negotiation, and cooperation.
China’s influence also
radiates through the world via
infrastructure ranging from
ports, railways, and bases to
fiber-optic cables, e-payment
systems, and satellites. In the
same way that U.S.,
European, and Japanese
companies led the
development of the world’s
twentieth-century
infrastructure, Chinese
companies compete to lead in
the twenty-first century. Xi
ably uses China’s economic
power to induce and coerce
compliance with his vision.
This shift in the geostrategic
landscape reflects and
reinforces an even more
profound transformation: the
rise of a China-centric order
with its own norms and
values. However imperfectly,
the post–World War II
international order was shaped
primarily by liberal
democracies that were
committed in principle to
universal human rights, the
rule of law, free markets, and
limited state intervention in
the political and social lives of
their citizens. Multilateral
institutions and international
law were designed to advance
these values and norms, and
technology was often used to
bolster them. Yet Xi seeks to
flip a switch and replace those
values with the primacy of the
state. Institutions, laws, and
technology in this new order
reinforce state control, limit
individual freedoms, and
constrain open markets. It is a
world in which the state
controls the flow of
information and capital both
within its own borders and
across international
boundaries, and there is no
independent check on its
power.
Chinese officials and scholars
appear assured that the rest of
the world is onboard with Xi’s
vision, as they trumpet, “The
East is rising, and the West is
declining!” Yet many
countries increasingly seem
less enamored of Xi’s bold
initiatives, as the full political
and economic costs of
embracing the Chinese model
become clear. At the People’s
Congress, Xi exuded the self-
confidence of a leader
convinced that the world is
there for China’s taking. But
his own certainty may be a
liability, preventing him from
recognizing the resistance
Beijing is stoking through its
actions abroad. Xi’s success
depends on whether he can
adjust and reckon with the
blowback. Failing to do so
could lead to further
miscalculations that may end
up reshaping the global
order—just not in the way Xi
imagines.
REUNIFYING THE
MOTHERLANDXi’s path to
a reordered world begins by
redrawing the map of China.
In an October 2021 speech, Xi
asserted, “The historical task
of the complete reunification
of the motherland must be
fulfilled and will definitely be
fulfilled.” Asserting
sovereignty over long-
contested territories—
particularly those Beijing
terms its core interests: Hong
Kong, the South China Sea,
and Taiwan—is Xi’s number
one priority.
Beijing has already dealt with
Hong Kong. In 2020, China
imposed a national security
law on the city that effectively
ended its autonomy under the
“one country, two systems”
governance model that was
put in place in 1997 at the time
of Hong Kong’s handoff from
London to Beijing. In a matter
of months, Beijing
undermined the city’s long-
standing commitment to basic
human rights and the rule of
law and transformed Hong
Kong into just another
mainland Chinese city.
Xi has also made progress in
asserting Chinese sovereignty
in the South China Sea. He has
created and militarized seven
artificial features in the sea
and laid claim to scores of
other islands and stretches of
maritime territory. He
increasingly deploys China’s
powerful navy, newly armed
coast guard, and vast fishing
fleet to intimidate the five
other nations with overlapping
claims—Brunei, Malaysia,
the Philippines, Taiwan, and
Vietnam—and to assert
control in disputed waters.
Throughout the pandemic, Xi
has also taken advantage of
other countries’ distraction to
press additional territorial
claims: for more than 100
days in a row, Chinese vessels
sailed into waters off Japan
and around a number of
contested islands there that
China calls the Diaoyu Islands
and Japan calls the Senkaku
Islands; a Chinese coast guard
vessel rammed and sank a
Vietnamese fishing boat;
Chinese military aircraft flew
over disputed waters claimed
by both China and Malaysia;
and China and India engaged
in their first deadly border
conflict in four decades.
Xi’s path to a reordered world
begins by redrawing the map
of China. No map of China
would be acceptable to Xi,
however, if it did not reflect
mainland Chinese control
over Taiwan. At the 19th Party
Congress, in October 2017, Xi
declared that unification with
Taiwan was one of 14 must-do
items necessary to achieve the
“great rejuvenation of the
Chinese nation.” He has
further underscored the
importance of unification with
his vivid imagery: “People on
both sides of the strait are one
family, with shared blood. . . .
No one can ever cut the veins
that connect us.”
Xi speaks about unification
with Taiwan with increasing
frequency and urgency. He
remains convinced that
Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-
wen is advancing an
independence agenda,
claiming that the island
nation’s “independence
separatism” remains the “most
serious hidden danger to
national rejuvenation.” Since
Tsai came to power, in 2016,
Xi has cut off the long-
established cross-strait
dialogue; dramatically
reduced the number of
mainland tourists permitted to
travel to Taiwan, from 4.2
million in 2015 to 2.7 million
in 2017, contributing to a drop
in the island’s annual tourism
revenue from $44.5 billion to
$24.4 billion; convinced
seven of the 22 remaining
states that formally recognize
Taiwan as the Republic of
China to abandon Taipei for
Beijing; and prevented
Taiwan from participating in
the World Health Assembly
briefings in the early months
of the pandemic. During
Tsai’s 2020 reelection
campaign, CCP hackers also
allegedly spread
disinformation designed to
undermine her. Beijing’s
increasingly threatening
military exercises along
Taiwan’s coast provoke
frequent talk of a possible
Chinese military attack.
Xi’s efforts to intimidate
Taiwan have failed to
convince the island nation to
embrace unification. Instead,
they have produced a backlash
both within Taiwan and
abroad. A greater percentage
of Taiwanese than ever
before—64 percent—favor
independence, and few
Taiwanese retain faith that a
“one country, two systems”
framework could ever work,
particularly in the wake of the
crackdown in Hong Kong. A
growing number of countries
have also stepped up to offer
support to Taiwan. In an
unprecedented policy shift,
Japan asserted in 2021 that it
had a direct stake in ensuring
Taiwan’s status as a behavior has also reenergized
democracy. Several small
European countries have also
rallied to Taiwan’s diplomatic
defense: the Czech Republic,
Lithuania, and Slovakia have
all welcomed the Taiwanese
foreign minister for a visit. For
its part, the United States has
supported a wide array of new
legislation and diplomatic
activity designed to strengthen
the bilateral relationship and
embed Taiwan in regional and
international organizations.
BYE-BYE, MISS
AMERICAN PIE China is
also busy trying to lay the
foundation for the country to
supersede the United States as
the dominant force in the
Asia-Pacific. Describing the
Asia-Pacific as a “big family”
and claiming that “the region
cannot prosper without regional countries through
China” and “China cannot consultation.” Chinese
develop in isolation from the officials have also tried hard
region,” China’s leaders to paint U.S. alliances as
portray the Asia-Pacific as anachronistic relics of the
seamlessly integrated through Cold War and as hostile to
Chinese-powered trade, China.
technology, infrastructure and
Yet Beijing’s military
shared cultural and
assertiveness in the region has
civilizational ties. Xi has been
directly undermined its push
particularly successful in
for leadership. A survey of
cementing China’s position as
Southeast Asian experts and
the regional economic leader.
businesspeople found that less
China is the largest trading
than two percent believed that
partner of virtually all the
China was a benign and
countries in Asia, and in 2021,
benevolent power, and less
the members of the
than 20 percent were
Association of Southeast
confident or very confident
Asian Nations together ranked
that China would “do the right
as China’s top trading partner.
thing.” Nearly half of those
At the end of 2020, Xi
polled believed that China
concluded the negotiations
was a “revisionist power” that
over the Chinese-led Regional
intended to transform the
Comprehensive Economic
region into its sphere of
Partnership, which includes
influence. (In contrast, over
China, ten Southeast Asian
two-thirds of the interviewees
countries, and Australia,
were confident or very
Japan, New Zealand, and
confident that Japan would
South Korea. In a bold gambit,
“do the right thing” by
Xi has also advanced China
contributing to global peace,
for membership in the
security, prosperity, and
Comprehensive and
governance.) China’s
Progressive Agreement for
Trans-Pacific Partnership, the
the Quad partnership, which
Japanese-led free-trade
includes Australia, India,
agreement. This would make
Japan, and the United States;
China the dominant economic
spurred the establishment of a
player in the two most
new trilateral security pact
important regional trade
among Australia, the United
agreements in the most
Kingdom, and the United
economically dynamic region
States; and prompted several
of the world; the United States
European countries, including
would remain sidelined.
France, Germany, and the
China has been less successful Netherlands, along with
in its efforts to position itself NATO, to deepen their
as the region’s preeminent security engagement in the
security actor, a role long Asia-Pacific. Even Philippine
played by the United States. In President Rodrigo Duterte,
2014, Beijing proposed a new who earlier threatened to end
Asian security order managed his country’s alliance with the
by Asian countries. China’s United States and called
defense minister has China “a good friend,” is now
crisscrossed the Asia-Pacific upgrading the Philippines’
region with the message that defense relationship with
countries there “should adhere Washington as he prepares to
to the principle that regional leave office.
issues should be solved by the
THE DRAGON’S BITEXi’s
ambition for Chinese
centrality on the global stage
is exquisitely captured by his
Belt and Road Initiative.
Launched in 2013, the
initiative not only offers a
physical manifestation of
Chinese centrality through
three overland and three
maritime corridors that will
connect China to Asia,
Europe, the Middle East, and
Africa but also evokes
historical memories of the
Silk Road and of Chinese
centrality during imperial
times. In its original
conception, the BRI was a
vehicle for Chinese-led hard
infrastructure development
along the six corridors. Today,
BRI offshoots include so-
called digital, health, and
polar Silk Roads, and all
countries are welcome to
participate.
Unlike traditional
infrastructure investment
supported by multilateral
institutions, such as the World
Bank and the Asian
Development Bank, China is a
one-stop shop. It provides the
financing and the labor and
materials for its projects; in
many instances, it also skips
time-consuming evaluations
of financial risk, processes of
transparent and open bidding,
and assessments of
environmental and social
impacts. It is China’s own
development model gone
global.
The BRI has positioned China
at the center of the
international system, with its
physical, financial, cultural,
technological, and political
influence flowing to the rest of
the world. It is redrawing the
fine details of the world’s
map, with new railroads and
bridges, fiber-optic cables and
5G networks, and ports with
the potential for housing
Chinese military bases. By
one assessment, the BRI now
touches more than 60
countries and has exceeded
$200 billion in Chinese
investment. Some countries,
such as Pakistan, are being
transformed by the BRI, with
energy projects, new roads,
and a massive upgrade of both
its Gwadar port and its digital
infrastructure. Others have
more limited but
overwhelmingly positive
exposure. In Greece, for
example, Chinese investment
in the port of Piraeus has
contributed to making it one
of the top ports in Europe and
among the top 50 in the world.
Brazilian officials and
scholars are excited about the
possibility of the BRI not only
developing infrastructure
projects in their country but
also advancing innovation and
sustainability efforts.
The Belt and Road Initiative
has placed China at the center
of the international system. Xi
has also conceived of the BRI
as a conduit through which
China can transmit its political
and cultural values. In a major
address in October 2017, Xi
advanced China’s
development model as one
worth emulating, and Beijing
now offers an extensive array
of political training programs.
Tanzania, which is a BRI pilot
country for Chinese political
capacity building, has
modeled its cybersecurity law
after that of China and worked
with Beijing to constrain
social media and the flow of
information on the Internet.
The governments of other
countries, such as Uganda,
have been eager recipients of
Chinese technology and
training to help them monitor
and track political opposition
figures. And political parties
in Ethiopia, South Africa, and
Sudan have participated in
CCP training on the structure
of the CCP, CCP-grassroots
relations, and the Chinese
propaganda system. China’s
Digital Silk Road, which
includes undersea cables, e-
payment systems, surveillance
technologies, and 5G
networks, among other digital
connectivity technologies, is
particularly valuable as a
means of transmitting Chinese
political and cultural values.
In Kenya, for example,
Beijing provided not only
satellite television for more
than 10,000 people but also
tens of thousands of hours of
Chinese programming.
Kenya’s airwaves, as well as
those in other parts of Africa,
are now filled with martial arts
films, dramas about life in
China, and documentaries that
promote a CCP political
narrative—such as one
focusing on Japanese
atrocities in World War II—
that have been dubbed into
local languages.
Yet the BRI has become
increasingly bumpy. Although
it can bring the benefits of
China’s infrastructure-heavy
development model, it also
carries with it all the
externalities: high levels of
debt, corruption,
environmental pollution and
degradation, and poor labor
practices. Popular protests
have proliferated throughout
host countries. In Kazakhstan,
citizens have demonstrated
repeatedly against Chinese
mining projects and factories
that pollute the environment
and use Chinese rather than
local labor. Similar protests
have erupted in Cambodia,
Papua New Guinea, and
Zambia. Still other countries,
including Cameroon,
Indonesia, Kenya, and
Pakistan, have reported
problems with corruption in
their BRI projects. And some
countries, such as Azerbaijan
and Mongolia, no longer
expect that the gains from
their BRI projects will ever
exceed the costs. Many
countries have put projects on
hold or canceled them
outright: of the 52 coal-fired
power plants planned for
development through the BRI
between 2014 and 2020, 25
were shelved and eight
canceled. (China’s September
2021 commitment not to build
new coal-fired power projects
abroad suggests that many of
the shelved projects will
ultimately be canceled.) A
2018 study found that 270 out
of the 1,814 BRI projects
undertaken since 2013 have
encountered governance
difficulties; these troubled
cases accounted for 32 percent
of the total value of the
projects.
Beijing itself may be
reconsidering its BRI
commitments. Investment
levels have declined steadily
since 2016, and some of the
presumed political benefits
have not materialized. A
review of the top ten
recipients of BRI investments,
for example, reveals no direct
correlation between the levels
of investment and the
countries’ support for China
on critical issues, such as
Hong Kong, the South China
Sea, and Chinese actions in
Xinjiang. As with China’s
assertiveness on its borders,
the BRI has also stoked a
backlash. It has sparked
competitive initiatives by
Japan and other countries to
offer infrastructure financing
and support with higher
standards and more benefits
for local workforces.
Other efforts to enhance
Chinese cultural influence are
also encountering difficulties.
For example, Xi has
championed the adoption of
Chinese-language and
Chinese cultural offerings
through the establishment of
Confucius Institutes in
overseas universities and
classrooms. For many
educational institutions,
Beijing’s financial support for
these institutes was essential
to their ability to offer
Chinese-language training. As
a result, they proliferated
rapidly. Over time, however,
the more coercive undertone
of the initiative undermined
its early success. In 2011, Li
Changchun, then a member of
the Politburo Standing
Committee, stated, “The
Confucius Institute is an
appealing brand for expanding
our culture abroad. It has
made an important
contribution toward
improving our soft power. The
‘Confucius’ brand has a
natural attractiveness. Using
the excuse of teaching
Chinese language, everything
looks reasonable.” Per
Beijing’s requirements,
contracts between local
academic institutions and the
Confucius Institutes remained
sealed, and the teachers and
the curricula were determined
by Beijing—a concession
most universities would make
for no other outside
partnership. In addition, a few
of the institutes tried to shape
broader university policies
around issues related to China,
warning against hosting the
Dalai Lama, for example. As
scholars and politicians in
Canada, Sweden, the United
States, and elsewhere began to
question the integrity of the
enterprise, the allure of the
institutes dimmed. By 2020,
China had put in place only
slightly more than half the
1,000 Confucius Institutes it
had hoped to establish. And
their impact as a source of soft
power appears to be limited.
In Africa, where China has
established 61 Confucius
Institutes, a survey revealed
that 71 percent of citizens
believe that English is the
most important language for
the next generation to learn;
14 percent selected French,
and only two percent chose
Chinese. And in Kazakhstan,
where the daughter of the
former prime minister has
been an outspoken champion
of China and Chinese-
language study, a public
opinion survey conducted by
the Eurasian Development
Bank revealed that only one in
six Kazakhs view China as a
“friendly country.”
Initiatives such as the BRI and
the Confucius Institutes offer
an attractive vision of Chinese
centrality that has been
somewhat undermined by
unattractive Chinese
governance practices, but
much of Beijing’s effort to
advance Chinese centrality
relies explicitly on coercion.
China’s pandemic diplomacy,
for example, highlighted for
many people the coercive
nature of Chinese efforts to
shape the world around them.
China’s “Wolf Warrior”
diplomats weaponized the
production of personal
protective equipment (PPE)
by threatening to cut off
supplies to countries that
criticized China. They also
went on the offensive to
spread disinformation about
the origins of the virus to
deflect attention from Chinese
culpability. When Australia
called for an investigation into
the origins of the virus,
Beijing slapped restrictions
and tariffs on some of
Australia’s most popular
exports.
China’s use of economic
leverage to coerce
international actors is long
standing and well known.
Beijing threatened the
international airline, retail,
film, and hotel industries with
serious financial
repercussions, for example, if
they did not recognize
Chinese sovereignty claims
regarding Hong Kong, the
South China Sea, and Taiwan
in their published material. In
the wake of the now famous
tweet by Daryl Morey, then
the Houston Rockets’ general
manager, in support of Hong
Kong’s pro-democracy
protests, Chinese stores pulled
Rockets-branded products
from their shelves, and China
Central Television stopped
broadcasting NBA games.
CCTV announced, “We
believe that any remarks that
challenge national
sovereignty and social
stability are not within the
scope of freedom of speech.”
Beijing effectively signaled
that it believed it had the right
to control the speech of any
individual anywhere in the
world. Shortly thereafter,
Beijing expelled several Wall
Street Journal reporters in
response to an opinion piece
the newspaper published with
a title describing China as the
“Sick Man of Asia.” And
perhaps as a sign of how such
policies might evolve, a
government office in Beijing
proposed in 2020 that any
criticism of traditional
Chinese medicine—one of
Xi’s special interests—should
be made illegal.
Chinese coercion is most
effective in shaping the
behavior of individual actors.
Many multinational
corporations eventually
succumb to Chinese pressure
and adjust the way they
conduct business. Some,
however, quietly attempt to
maintain their principles, even
while appearing to acquiesce
to Chinese demands. In the
airline industry, for example,
some airlines have dropped
Taiwan from their websites
but still identify it separately
from mainland China and
quote ticket prices in
Taiwan’s currency instead of
in yuan. Also important,
China has overwhelmingly
failed in its attempts to use its
economic leverage to compel
countries such as the
Philippines and South Korea,
among others, to change their
policies on issues such as
competition in the South
China Sea and the deployment
of the U.S.-made Terminal
High Altitude Area Defense,
or THAAD, missile system.
Beijing also failed in its effort
to short-circuit Canada’s
judicial process concerning
the detention of Meng
Wanzhou, the chief financial
officer of the Chinese
telecommunications firm
Huawei, by imprisoning two
Canadian citizens as political
leverage. Ultimately, Meng
spent almost three years under
house arrest before her case
was settled.
TUGGING ON THE REINS
Chinese centrality on the
global stage emanates
overwhelmingly from its
economic wherewithal—its
position as a driver of global
growth and trade and the
opportunity it affords to other
countries for access to its vast
market. Increasingly,
however, Xi’s initiatives are
raising questions about how
China’s economy will engage
with the rest of the world. His
tenure has been marked by a
series of policies, such as
Made in China 2025, that
enhance government control
and work to insulate the
Chinese economy from
outside competition. In 2020,
Xi articulated an economic
paradigm of “dual
circulation,” envisioning a
largely self-sufficient China
that could innovate,
manufacture, and consume—
all within its own economy. It
would continue to engage
with the international
economy through exports, its
critical supply chains, and
limited imports of capital and
know-how. Within China, Xi
has also significantly
enhanced the control of the
CCP over the decision-
making power of Chinese
companies.
These moves away from
greater economic reform and
opening have introduced a
new set of issues in Beijing’s
relations with the rest of the
world. Many countries no
longer have confidence in the
independence of Chinese
companies from the
government and are now
tightening the access that
Chinese firms have to their
markets and increasing export
controls on sensitive
technologies to Chinese
companies. Beijing’s coercive
use of PPE early in the
pandemic also raised alarm
bells over dependence on
Chinese supply chains,
leading countries to encourage
their companies to return
home or move to friendlier
pastures. The allure of the
Chinese economy as both a
market and a leader in global
trade and investment remains
strong, but Xi’s policies are
diminishing, rather than
enhancing, the type of
consistency and predictability
that economic actors desire
when they consider where to
invest their time and capital,
and they are therefore raising
a new set of challenges for
Xi’s vision of Chinese
centrality.
Xi also seeks to exert greater
control in the existing
international architecture of
global institutions. He has
called openly and repeatedly
for China to lead in the reform
of the global governance
system—to transform the
values and norms that
underpin the international
system to align with those of
China. He and other Chinese
officials argue that the current
rules-based order does not
adequately reflect China’s
voice or that of the developing
world. Instead, it was created
and perpetuated for the
advantage of a small number
of liberal democracies. Xi
wants the values and norms
embedded in these institutions
to reflect instead Chinese
preferences, such as elevating
the right to development over
individual political and civil
rights and establishing
technical standards that enable
state control over the flow of
information.
Xi’s ambition holds little
attraction for much of the rest
of the world. China’s
approach is both tactical and
strategic. Chinese officials are
primed to assert Chinese
national interests even if they
are at cross-purposes with the
interests of the international
institutions in which they
serve. In 2020, the Twitter
account of the International
Civil Aviation Organization,
for example, blocked users
who supported ICAO
membership for Taiwan. In
another instance, Dolkun Isa,
one of the world’s leading
Uyghur activists, was
physically prevented from
speaking before the UN
Permanent Forum on
Indigenous Issues in 2017.
Wu Hongbo, the Chinese
official serving as
undersecretary-general for the
UN Department of Economic
and Social Affairs, later
appeared on Chinese
television to claim
responsibility for blocking
Isa’s appearance, noting, “We
have to strongly defend the
motherland’s interests.”
Similarly, in 2019, the French
newspaper Le Monde reported
that Beijing had threatened to
block agricultural exports
from Brazil and Uruguay if
the two countries did not
support the Chinese candidate
for director general of the
Food and Agriculture
Organization.
Xi is also committed to a long-
term strategy to transform
broader global norms in areas
such as Internet governance,
human rights, and technical
standards in ways that elevate
state control over individual
rights and liberties. In each of
these areas, China has sought
to secure leadership positions
for Chinese officials or other
friendly actors in the relevant
institutions and supporting
committees, flooded meetings
with Chinese participants, and
poured financial resources
into trying to shape the
agendas and outcomes of
policy debates. Over time, the
strategy has paid off. For
example, Chinese proposals
that advocate state control of
the flow of information to
every network-connected
device are under active
development and
consideration at the United
Nations.
Xi has, furthermore, signaled
his intention to lead in the
development of norms in
areas where they are not yet
fully established, such as
space, the maritime domain,
and the Arctic. In the case of
the Arctic, Xi has already
moved aggressively to try to
enhance China’s role in
determining the region’s
future. Despite being 900
miles away from the Arctic
Circle, China has provided
training and financial support
for thousands of Chinese
researchers on Arctic-related
topics, supported joint
research and exploration with
Arctic countries, built a fleet
of state-of-the-art icebreakers,
and funded research stations
in several Arctic countries.
Among the observer countries
to the governing Arctic
Council, China is
overwhelmingly the most
active, hosting scientific
conferences, submitting
papers for review, and
volunteering to serve on
scientific committees. Xi has
attempted to assert China’s
rights in the decision-making
process around the Arctic by
referring to China as a “near
Arctic power” and reframing
the Arctic as an issue of the
global commons,
necessitating negotiations
among a broad array of
countries. But as with other
areas of Chinese foreign
policy, assertiveness here
comes with a price. Although
China has made strides in
inserting itself into the
development of norms around
the Arctic, it has also lost
ground as Arctic countries
have become less inclined to
accept Chinese investment as
the result of concerns over
potential security risks.
Xi’s more activist approach
has also sparked new interest
among many countries in
bolstering the current rules-
based order. Countries have
coalesced, for example, to
prevent UN agencies and
programs from automatically
supporting the inclusion of the
BRI in their mission
statements or initiatives. They
are rallying to support
candidates for leadership in
UN agencies and other
multilateral institutions who
will bring a strong
commitment to openness,
transparency, and the rule of
law. And they are drawing
attention to cases in which
China appears to be unduly
influencing or undermining
best practices, such as the
World Health Organization’s
initial reluctance to address
China’s lack of transparency
during the first month of the
COVID-19 pandemic.
SACRIFICING THE WAR
TO WIN THE
BATTLEChina’s desire to
rearrange the world order is an
ambitious one. The United
States’ leadership on the
global stage, its democratic
alliance system, and the post–
World War II liberal
international order are deeply
entrenched. Still, Chinese
officials argue that the last two
centuries, when China was not
the dominant global economy,
were a historical aberration.
They claim that U.S.
leadership is waning. As He
Yafei, former vice minister of
foreign affairs, has asserted,
“The end of Pax Americana,
or the American Century, is in
sight.” Chinese leaders and
many international observers
express confidence that
Beijing is well along the path
to success. The renowned
Fudan University scholar
Shen Dingli has characterized
China as occupying the
“moral high ground” in the
international community and
acting as “the leading country
in the new era.” Xi himself has
described China’s
rejuvenation as “a historic
inevitability.”
There is reason for Xi’s
optimism. China has clearly
made progress in each of the
dimensions that he has
identified as essential for
reform, and the reputation and
influence of the United States
have been battered by
domestic strife and a lack of
leadership on the global stage.
Yet it appears equally
plausible, if not more so, that
China has won a few battles
but is losing the war. Xi’s
bullish assessment of China’s
pandemic response may
resonate at home, but the
international community
retains vivid memories of
Beijing’s bullying diplomacy,
coercive PPE practices,
military aggression,
repression in Hong Kong and
Xinjiang, and continued
belligerence around
determining the origins of the
virus. Xi wants China to be
“credible, lovable, and
respectable” in the eyes of the
international community, but
his actions have yielded
public opinion polls that
reflect record-low levels of
trust in him and little desire for
Chinese leadership. Many
initiatives to cement Chinese
centrality, such as the BRI, the
Confucius Institutes, and
global governance leadership,
are now sputtering or stalling
as the full economic and
political costs of acquiescence
to Chinese leadership become
clear to the rest of the world.
The international community
might also be forgiven for
wondering what beyond
centrality Xi desires. He has
made clear that he wants
China to play a dominant role
in defining the rules that
govern the international
system. But as the United
States retreated from global
leadership during Donald
Trump’s presidency, Xi
proved unwilling or unable to
step into the United States’
shoes to marshal the
international community to
respond to global challenges
or to serve as the world’s
policeman. China may simply
want to enjoy the rights, but
not the full responsibilities,
that traditionally accrue to the
world’s most important
power.
Xi’s ambition for Chinese
centrality on the global stage
holds little attraction for much
of the rest of the world, and in
the current context of
mounting international
opposition, his outright
success appears unlikely. Yet
if Xi perceives that his
strategy is unraveling, the
result for the international
community could be as
challenging as if he were to
succeed. In recent months, Xi
has alarmed global leaders by
cracking down on China’s
world-class technology sector,
eradicating the last vestiges of
democracy in Hong Kong, and
flexing China’s military
muscles through a hypersonic
missile test. And the potential
looms large for further, even
more destabilizing actions,
such as resorting to the use of
force to unify with Taiwan. Xi
has not articulated a peaceful
path forward for unification
with the island nation, and he
has already demonstrated a
willingness to engage in risky
military behavior in the East
China and South China Seas
and on the border with India.
Faced with significant
international headwinds, Xi
has responded by raising the
stakes. He appears unwilling
to moderate his ambition,
except in areas that do not
compromise his core political
and strategic priorities, such
as climate change. An
optimal—although still
unlikely—outcome would be
for Xi to engage in a series of
internal ongoing and implicit
tradeoffs: claim regional
economic leadership but step
back from military aggression
in the region, take pride in
arresting the spread of
COVID-19 but acknowledge
the weakness of Chinese
vaccine innovation, trumpet
success in eliminating terrorist
attacks in Xinjiang but begin
the process of releasing the
“reeducated” Uyghur
Muslims from the labor
camps. This would enable Xi
to maintain a narrative of
success in advancing Chinese
centrality while nonetheless
responding to the most
significant concerns of the capacity of the world’s
international community. democracies and others to
articulate and pursue their
Whether Xi is able to realize
own compelling vision of the
his ambition will depend on
world’s future, on the other.
the interplay of many factors,
Perhaps most important to
such as the continued vitality
Xi’s success, however, will be
of the Chinese economy and
his ability to recognize and
military and the support of
address the vast disconnect
other senior leaders and the
between what he wants to
Chinese people, on the one
deliver to the world and what
hand, and the ability of the
the world wants delivered
world to continue to resist
from him.
Chinese coercion and the
 The hype and the fury
Khurram Hussain, Dawn News
O
VER the years it has
been my tiresome
privilege to write one
article after another pointing
out all that the government in
power is doing wrong. Having
done this for four successive
governments now, I am
increasingly being asked one
question: what is that you
want? What will make you
happy? What do you want to
see?
It is time to answer this
question, and do so in a simple
and straightforward way
without burdening you, dear
reader, with too many
numbers and data. Anybody is
free to look up the data to
decide whether I am right or
not in what I am about to
describe.
Start with this. Pakistan is a
country that has the
macroeconomic fundamentals
of a middle-income country
(even if barely so) and the
social indicators of a least
developed country. Pakistan’s
GDP, for example, is large in
absolute terms but not large
enough to provide gainful
employment to its growing
army of youth that is
increasing every year. But
beyond jobs, consider that
almost one third of the youth
(those aged between 15 and 29
as per one definition) are
illiterate and only six per cent
of them have more than 12
years of education. In a survey
done by the UNDP a few years
ago, they found that only 39
out of every 100 was actively
working while 57 out of every
100 were not, nor seeking
jobs. Don’t even ask how the
figures went for access to a
library or to a sports facility
(more than 90pc had access to
neither).
I’ll stop with the data here, but
dear reader, do look up how
many children in Pakistan will
either die or suffer from
chronic malnutrition so severe
that by age five their cognitive
abilities are permanently
stunted, and then compare
these numbers with those of
our neighbouring countries in
the region. It is not a pretty
picture. While you’re at it,
compare the number of out-
of-school children in Pakistan,
look at how this number is
growing, and the number that
lack access to clean water. In
terms of GDP per capita we
rank as a lower-middle-
income country, but our infant
mortality rate compares with
countries like Chad,
Mozambique, Niger and so
on, countries whose per capita
income is less than half ours.
There is no sense in raising
your exports on the one hand
while you are busy raising an
army of illiterate and
undernourished youth on the
other.
Now consider that this
country pours more money
into subsidising its exports
than it does into the budget of
its Higher Education
Commission. Over here
exporters and property
developers congratulate the
government while school
teachers have to protest on the
streets for their wages. When
you get a chance, visit any of
the railway stations in
Karachi, Lahore or
Rawalpindi and compare their
condition to the airports in the
same cities. For comparison
take a look at the number of
people who make the train
journey from Karachi to
Multan or Lahore and
compare it with the number
who make the same journey
by air. Who is the state really
serving? What are its
priorities? Over the years, one
thing has become increasingly
clear to me. Never allow any
government to celebrate
success on the
macroeconomic front until it
has demonstrated a clear will
to tackle the problems on the
social side. Never mind the
fiscal or current account
deficits. That’s their job to
control anyway and nobody
should be congratulated for
simply doing their job. Watch
instead the deficits faced by
the young and the youth — the
deficits of school teachers and
access to quality higher
education, to nutrition and
clear water, to security of life
and livelihood, and if these
have not changed then nothing
has changed. There is no sense
in raising your exports on the
one hand while you are busy
raising an army of illiterate
and undernourished youth on
the other. And don’t let
anyone tell you that you
cannot cater to the youth
without the dollars that the
exporters bring. Those dollars
never find their way to serving
the people. An army of youth
who have never known the
thrill of winning in a
competitive sport or the
satisfaction that success in
achieving life’s goals through
hard and focused work brings
will never be an agent of
change or innovation.
For too long we have been
writing and reporting and
analysing the same story over
and over again. This is the
second time I have seen a
government go from
celebrating macroeconomic
indicators like GDP growth
and exports in one year
reduced to invoking
motorcycle sales as a metric of
its success a year or two later.
I don’t want to see this idiotic
story unfold one more time,
but I know that I will.
Today, more than 60pc of the
country is aged below 30 and
four million youths are
entering the working age
every year. The face of the
country is changing rapidly
and this trend doesn’t peak
until 2050, so every year the
country is getting younger and
younger.
Yet how many of our
mainstream political forces
are even aware of this and
trying to connect with this
growing youthful population?
To some extent, Imran Khan
does connect with them, but
for no purpose other than
fanning their passions and
telling them who to hate and
who to blame. His
government has done nothing,
despite their assertions to the
contrary, to try and increase
the state’s investment into
building a better future for
them. The PML-N and PPP
barely connect with
themselves, let alone the new
force that is increasingly
taking over the country. The
only parties connecting with
the youth today are either the
PTM or the TLP, and the
efforts of a very committed
group of youngsters from the
left who still have a long way
to go before their struggle
bears any electoral fruit.
Left to their own devices this
youth will be armed with
nothing but their passions. No
skills, no education, no
dreams, no jobs, no future.
Just a hungry desperate mob
fed on hype and fury. Don’t let
any government get away
with this.

Imran Malik, The nation
U S-India
interests
strategic
objectives converge
splendidly when it comes to
and
countering and containing
China. The US clearly
assesses China as a threat to its
singular position as the global
super power, while India
shares US consternations over
China’s fast expanding
ascendancy in the Indo-
Pacific Region, mainland Asia
and beyond.
The US policy towards Asia
(vis a vis China and India)
seems to be epitomised by two
very emphatic concepts—the
famed Thucydides Trap and
Offshore Balancing. The
Thucydides Trap speaks of an
apparent tendency towards
war when an emerging power
threatens to displace an
existing great power as a
regional or international
hegemon. (Wikipedia).
Through the strategy of
Offshore Balancing the US
exploits favoured regional
powers to check the rise of
(such) a potentially hostile
power.
The US then augments the
strategic capacities and
capabilities of its regional
allies to confront, neutralise
and/or eliminate such,
ostensibly common, threats.
Much to its advantage, the US
tackles such potential threats
from afar, stays in the
background and when the
time comes may intercede to
tilt the balance towards its
ally. Apparently, the
Thucydides Trap helps the US
identify all potential threats to
its interests and the strategy of
Offshore Balancing
Strategic choices
determines the modus
operandi to neutralise them.
Recent history is replete with
instances where the US has
employed this comprehensive
strategy. It exploited and
employed Pakistan to contain
and eventually defeat the
erstwhile USSR in
Afghanistan at a miniscule
cost to itself. Thereafter, it
heartlessly abandoned and
sanctioned Pakistan and
promptly moved to occupy the
then uncontested apex of
global power.
The US’ role during the 1980-
88 Iran-Iraq war followed the
same strategy, neutralising
two potential threats to Israel
in the process. Later, it
employed the KSA-led Gulf
Arabs and Israel to keep Iran
in check. Against China it is
following the same strategy
albeit a multi-pronged one. In
the Pacific Ocean Region
(POR), it has mustered and
arrayed Japan, Australia and
India (QUAD) against it. On
mainland Asia it is exploiting
the historical antagonism
between China and India to
circumscribe the latter’s
evolving sphere of influence
and strategic reach in the
region and beyond. This
defines the contours of the
US’ two-pronged strategy to
contain China in the POR and
on mainland Asia. The US has
clearly chosen India as the
bulwark to contain China on
mainland Asia and to some
extent in the Indian and
Pacific Ocean Regions. It has
nominated India as a strategic
and major defence partner and
has to date signed four
foundational agreements with
it. It has mustered it to its
ranks by exploiting the RSS’,
the ruling BJP’s and PM
Modi’s base and ignoble
instincts and preferences; their
hubris, absolutism,
megalomania, haughtiness
and the Brahmin’s “ordained”
sense of superiority over all
other humans within their own
religion, country and beyond.
However, as a state policy, the
Indian parliament has passed
laws that blatantly violate
human rights, human dignity,
humanity, fair play and
justice. All minorities,
especially Muslims in India
and the Illegally Occupied
Jammu & Kashmir Region
(IIOJ&KR) are being
subjected to these biased,
discriminatory, restrictive and
demeaning laws. All human
rights, freedoms and civil
liberties are being suppressed
by force. UNSC resolutions
are being torn asunder by
India and yet the US and its
allies cannot find it in
themselves to take India to
task on that and similar scores.
Their geopolitical,
geostrategic and economic
interests in India
unfortunately seem to trump
all pretensions to an
essentially rhetorical rules
based international order,
genuine democracy, human
rights, freedoms and liberties
and accountability for all such
dastardly acts by the Indians.
Not surprisingly, in its latest
list of countries violating
religious freedoms, the US has
chosen to turn a blind eye to
India’s horrendous human
rights record and its current
wave of viciously
bludgeoning its helpless
minorities, especially
Muslims, Christians, Dalits
(untouchable Hindus) etc into
servile submission. The
genocide of the Kashmiris
epitomises the Hindutva-
crazed BJP government’s
anti-Muslim/minority
policies. What price
expediency, geopolitics.
Furthermore, the US has a
Countering America’s
Adversaries Through
Sanctions Act (CAATSA), by
which the US sanctions any
country that buys advanced
military technologies and
weapon systems from US
adversaries, namely Russia
and now China. India is
getting the S-400 ABM
system from Russia. Unlike
Turkey which has been kicked
out of the F-35 program for
the same “crime”, a bill has
been tabled in the US
Congress to grant India a
waiver! Does it reflect India’s
clout in the US’ corridors of
power or is it just a pragmatic
pursuit of national interests by
the US? The US is clearly
appeasing India but will not
allow it to back out of
confronting China at any
stage. Does India have the
political will and real military
capacity and capability to
secure US interests, regardless
of the degree of convergence
therein?
A stage will come where
securing primarily US
interests will clash with Indian
interests especially vis a vis
China. Will the Indians then
cross the Rubicon and shed
blood to secure US interests in
the region? Will the US do
likewise? Can India afford a
war with China? Can India
rationally speaking ever
replace China as the most
dominant power in Asia,
regardless of US and its allies’
support? Where will a war
with China leave India and its
ambitions to achieve
dominance in the Indo-
Pakistan sub-continent and
South Asian contexts, much
less of regions beyond? Is this
a prudent and sane Indian
policy? It ought to have drawn
and heeded the right lessons
from the Soviet defeat in
Afghanistan and the US’
policy/conduct thereafter.
India could have opted for
resolving its disputes with its
neighbours, obviated the
frightful two-front war
scenario, joined the BRI-
CPEC, established
connectivity to the GMER,
Europe and CARs through
Pakistan and ended up in a
win-win situation in the
geopolitical, geostrategic and
geoeconomics domains.
Instead, it has chosen to
become the camp follower of
the ruthless US which is not
really known for its chivalry
and magnanimity when its
interests in a particular region
have been secured.
Have both, the US and India,
made the right strategic
choices?
 Chinese People Think China Is Popular Overseas. Americans
Disagree.
Brian Wong, The diplomat
T he Carter Center-RIWI
published a
survey of Chinese
joint
public opinion last month. The
results reveal two significant
findings – the first is that the
attitudes of the Chinese public
(at least, its netizens) toward
the West, specifically the
United States, have
considerably soured in recent
years; the second is that a vast
majority of the Chinese
population remains convinced
that China’s international
reputation is broadly, if not
very, favorable.
These findings must be
situated within the backdrop
of two broader trends. The
first concerns the worsening
perceptions of China across
vast swathes of the global
community. A Gallup poll in
February 2021 suggested that
the percentage of Americans
who viewed China as the
United States’ greatest enemy
surged to 45 percent, doubling
of the 2020 figures.
Unfavorable views of China
have climbed in countries
ranging from Australia, the
Netherlands, to the United
Kingdom, with many
expressing skepticism toward
the Chinese leadership’s
ability to “do the right thing”
internationally.
This particular trend reflects
the souring relations,
escalating tensions, and
increasingly bellicose rhetoric
directed toward each other by
Beijing and Washington. Yet
this fact alone poses less of a
cause for concern, arguably,
than what could be termed a
second-order perceptual
misalignment – many among
the Chinese population are
increasingly convinced that
China is regarded highly
favorably internationally,
notwithstanding the above
poll results and data. The view
that China offers a cogent,
effective, and functional
alternative to the Western
liberal democratic model – to
some extent grounded in
Beijing’s swift and meticulous
responses to the COVID-19
pandemic – has bolstered
domestic convictions that the
Chinese model of governance
is on the rise, as liberal
democracy gradually declines
from its discursive zenith. The
perception that China enjoys
vast international prestige,
then, goes hand-in-hand with
the emotivist-normative
judgment that the “China
Model” (which, in practice,
resembles a work-in-progress
within academic and think-
tank circles, yet is certainly
portrayed as holistic rival to
the “Western Way”) is here to
stay – at least, within Chinese
borders.
Making Sense of Perceptual
Misalignment
How do we make sense of the
perceptual misalignment
between how the Chinese
public believe the country is
perceived overseas, and the
(arguably) tarnished
reputation that the country
possesses abroad?
There is a tempting tendency
on the part of certain
commentators to jump to the
conclusion that the Chinese
public – predictably and
systemically
“brainwashed”
–
“manipulated” by the ruling
regime into
are
or
delusional
thought. Yet this is far too
hasty, unnuanced, and
uncharitable a
characterization – the Chinese
public are not lemmings. To
posit that state engineering
and manipulation of
information is the primary
factor in the perception gap is
ill-backed-up by proof and
evidence. Recent literature
has suggested two significant
trends that are worthy of our
consideration, when reflecting
upon China’s foreign policy,
nationalism, and interactions
between Beijing and the world
at large.
First, the increasing
heterogeneity of the Chinese
public should render us
skeptical of the view that the
Chinese public are shaped
wholly by homogenous forces
– in a top-down manner – as
envisioned by certain popular
accounts. Cheng Li’s seminal
work “Shanghai Middle
Class: Reshaping U.S.-China
Engagement” points to the
rise of an eclectic, open-
minded, progressive middle
class that is equally skeptical
of American hegemony and
authoritarian encroachment.
Shanghai epitomizes the
cosmopolitan, 21st-century
Chinese city, one in which
passionate nationalism is
moderated and enhanced by
attraction to capitalist, open-
market values. Kerry Brown’s
“China in Five Cities”
highlights the versatility and
lucidity of Hong Kong and
Xi’an citizens, who reimagine
and explore their Chinese
identities through the lenses of
Westernized and historically
embedded local cultures,
respectively.
These works highlight the fact
that Chinese citizens –
especially as compared with
the pre-reform and opening
era – are increasingly clued in
and conjoined with the
international pulse. To
suggest that access to free,
open internet remains
impossible would be an
anachronistic judgment – even
despite the fact that many
information resources remain,
of course, de jure restricted.
Returnees from overseas
education and work have
often profound and
experience-informed insights
into “the grass on the other
side.” These points all remind
us to be wary of essentialist
explanations that deprive
citizens – whether grassroots,
entrepreneurial, or wealthy –
of their agency.
Second, Chinese public
discourses concerning foreign
policy are shaped by a
multitude of factors – and not
all of them involve, or are
steered exclusively by the top-
level government (i.e. the
State Council and its
associates). Yu Jie’s recent
briefing to Chatham House
highlights the role played by
provincial-level authorities,
state-owned enterprises, and
other associated local or
provincial actors in shaping
Chinese foreign policy. It is
fair to say that the conjoined
efforts of the Publicity
Department of the Communist
Party, the United Front Work
Department, and the Ministry
of State Security mean many
Chinese citizens are vastly
influenced by state ideology –
yet it would be unfair to
dismiss the room for
provincial and local
contestation over the precise
boundaries of such ideologies
and tenets.
Both points hopefully
elucidate reasons why we
should be skeptical of the
“top-down imposition” story.
The next step in our
exploratory exercise, then, is
to consider the possibility of
alternative explanations at
work here. I suggest that there
are two possible explanations.
The first concerns the organic
ascent in narratives centered
around “self-strengthening,” a
concept which offers both the
normative justification, and
what is widely viewed as the
empirical evidence, for
China’s “return” to its rightful
place at the table
internationally. Self-
strengthening – drawing upon
the imagery of national
strength (hence the Chinese
cybersphere’s invoking of
“qiangguo” or “strong
nation,” as a self-description)
and defiance of “foreign
enemies” – is taken as more
than merely an aspirational
goal; it is equally construed as
what has been occurring over
the past decades, and as what
is likely to continue into the
future decades. Many in the
Chinese public – including the
highly educated and affluent –
are convinced that China has
been working toward
catching, and will soon
overtake, the United States in
raw economic and
strategic/political terms. The
perception that China enjoys
prestige and celebration
abroad, then, could be
interpreted as an organic
byproduct of such confidence
– which could well be
misplaced, but is by no means
fabricated or imposed through
the state apparatus alone.
The second point – one that
Jude Blanchette makes in his
incisive commentary on the
poll results – is that “it’s
important that those of us in
‘the West’ don’t assume that
the world shares our narrative
on Beijing.” To this, I would
add that over the past five
years, perceptions of China
have not declined by much –
and have plausibly improved
– across countries and regions
that are traditionally neglected
by much of the international
commentariat. A plurality or
majority of populations across
all Latin American and
African states view China’s
growing economy as a
positive for their countries.
Mexico, South Africa, Brazil,
Nigeria, and Argentina, as of
2019, recorded double-digit
increases in their populations’
positive ratings of China’s
economic ascent. Few among
these, if any, are traditional
allies to the West – though
they certainly cannot be easily
reduced into being members
of an ostensible “China” bloc.
Hence, if we are to interpret
the way the Chinese netizens
view the international
community as reflecting a
particular segment of the
world’s countries – namely,
countries that have grown to
be more receptive toward
China – then the self-
assessment scores would not,
after all, be so outrageous. The
obvious counterpoint/caveat
here is this: We do not, as of
now, know what a majority of
Chinese netizens construe to
be the international
community; nor, indeed, do
we have sufficient evidence to
conclude that they do or do not
care for the views of the
amorphous “West” – much of
this requires further appraisal
and investigation.
So What Gives? What Now?
There are three upshots to
draw from the above. First,
Beijing needs to take
somewhat seriously the above
misalignment – not because
they are losing international
support from allies that
remain steadfastly committed
to China, but because the
increasing bifurcation
between the Chinese public’s
understanding of the
international community that
matters, and the actual
international community
whose investment, capital,
and interactions with China
have been a primary engine
promulgating its growth
would only be to the detriment
of the country’s population.
Highlighting the hostile
opprobrium from the West
need not mean capitulating to
them – indeed, there could
well be self-interest-centered
reasons for the ruling party
and the population alike to
rally around a more
affirmative, productive
variant of competitive
nationalism, which would
yield positive impetus for
constructive, profound
societal transformations. Yet
in order for pragmatic
policymakers and bureaucrats
to acquire the political capital
to push for moderated and
flexible stances on matters
where compromise can indeed
be sought, the status quo has
to been recognized as
problematic.
Second, those who call for an
explicit counteracting and
reprobation directed toward
Beijing’s state media and
propaganda apparatus in order
to transform “hearts and
minds” on the ground in China
are fundamentally mistaken.
They make the convenient
assumption that animosity Washington-led order are very
toward the West is the product much real. China may not
of party concoction and provide a comprehensive
stimulation, as opposed to alternative or panacea to it, but
genuine grievances that the West is in for a slog, as
Chinese citizens have come to opposed to walkover, when it
cultivate toward what they comes to regaining the hearts
identify as exclusionary, and minds of those alienated
interventionist, and by decades of perceived
condescending rhetoric from neoliberalism and hawkish
their Western counterparts. interventionism.
The reductionist frame – that
The widening perception gap
those who eschew the West
between the Chinese and
and what they have to offer
Western publics is alarming,
must therefore be
but not surprising. The
brainwashed – is unhelpful,
pandemic and the ensuing
patronizing, and inconducive
geopolitical tussles have
toward rehabilitating images
merely amplified pre-existing
of the United States or,
tensions and long-standing
indeed, the much-maligned
resentment; the writing had
Five Eyes, in China. If
always been on the wall. As
Washington is genuinely
China rises, it needs to learn
concerned about its image and
the ropes of navigating a
soft power in China – which it
world that is not necessarily
should be – it would benefit
receptive toward its actions –
from recognizing that painting
especially when couched in
Chinese citizens as an
the trenchant, absolutist
oppressed monolith that lacks
rhetoric that has undergirded
access to free-flowing
its recent statements. China
information, and are hence
must also be wary of
universally ignorant, cannot
conflating what it sees with
possibly serve anyone’s
the full reality – though this is
interests, barring those who
a fact that I believe many in
enjoy infantilizing China in
the bureaucratic and political
their politically charged
system are well aware of. The
rhetoric.
perception gap between the
Third and finally, the China- Chinese public and the
watching community should international community (at
move past focusing least significant segments of
exclusively on the liberal it) is widening, and this alone
West’s attitudes toward is a cause for concern.
China. The perceptions,
Yet concurrently, those in the
judgments, and attitudes of
West who are seeking to
those residing in non-
engage China on dialogue and
Western, or non-liberal
forthcoming exchanges must
democratic states, are equally
continue to do so. An isolated,
important in gauging global
cut-off, and alienated China is
opinion. If those in the
in the interest of neither the
“democratic” world are
country’s 1.4 billion
indeed seeking to revamp
population, nor the world at
their image and render their
large. Ameliorating
brand of liberal democracy
conflicting interests and
once again attractive to folks
incentives requires a basic
beyond their conventional
alignment of understanding.
sphere of influence, then it is
Aligning understanding, in
high time to recognize that the
grievances toward the
turn, behoves tact and
moderation.