ARTICLES OF THE DAY

December 11, 2021

TOM FOWDY, RUSSIA TODAY .......................................................................................................................... 2

A.G NOORANI DAWN NEWS ............................................................................................................................ 4

DMYTRO KULEBA, FOREIGN AFFAIRS ............................................................................................................... 6

MEHMIL KHALID, DAILY TIMES ........................................................................................................................ 9

SREERAM CHAULIA, THE DIPLOMAT .............................................................................................................. 11

CATHERINE PUTZ, THE DIPLOMAT ................................................................................................................. 13

SCOTT RITTER, RUSSIA TODAY ....................................................................................................................... 16

BELEN FERNANDEZ, AL JAZEERA .................................................................................................................... 19

 Beware: China’s taking the gloves off over Taiwan
Tom Fowdy, Russia Today
eijing’s had enough of
B
Taipei’s posturing and
the stream of support
being drummed up for Taiwan
across the West. Military
action’s unlikely, but it will
use its economic and
diplomatic muscle to punish
the island’s supporters. It’s
been another busy week on
China-related matters.
Unsurprisingly, in line to
manufacture consent for
America’s and the
Anglosphere world’s
diplomatic boycott of the
Winter Olympics, there’s
been a coordinated
frontloading of anti-China
content from various US
affiliated groups and
organizations. In addition, the
US Congress has sought to
advance a number of anti-
China bills and resolutions.
Most seriously, tensions over
Taiwan are ratcheting up yet
again. Just as President Joe
Biden undertakes his self-
proclaimed “democracy
summit,” which Taipei has
been invited to, Beijing has
been making its furious
opposition known, not just in
words, but with actions, too.
Firstly came the news,
deliberately timed to meet
with yesterday’s opening of
Biden’s summit, that
Nicaragua, currently being
targeted by the US for regime
change, had declared that it
had ended ties with Taiwan
and opened diplomatic
relations with Beijing, with
officials traveling
immediately for a meeting in
Tianjin. The US State
Department responded by
condemning the Central
American nation and
encouraging countries to
expand their ties with Taiwan.
Then, in addition to that, there
were unconfirmed reports
claiming China had outright
cut Lithuania off from its own
supply chain, allegedly
barring international
companies from exporting to
the Baltic state from China.
This is in retaliation for the
opening of a representative
office by Taiwan in Vilnius,
after Lithuania’s ruling
coalition agreed to support
“those fighting for freedom”
on the island.
If this is confirmed, then it is
clear that China is now
“taking the gloves off” when it
comes to Taiwan and is
backing up its words with
serious action. Apart from the
action against Lithuania, it is
also doing other things such as
blacklisting “separatists” and
fining companies who support
Taiwan’s ruling Democratic
Progressive Party (DPP).
Beijing is increasingly
prepared to leverage its
“national power” and
capabilities in more
sophisticated and creative
ways in order to force
countries to respect its
position on the issue, enforce
its red lines and hit back,
while also upping its
diplomatic game.
To do this, China is slowly
developing a more intelligent
and extra-territorial
“sanctions regime”. While not
as extensive, far-reaching or
brutal as America’s, it does
begin to utilize some of the
same concepts which
Washington employs: that is
the capability to force one’s
will upon a country outside of
its sovereign boundaries,
without kinetic action, by
leveraging critical
dependencies upon it.
Beijing’s playbook was never
as simple as a binary choice
between “war or no war” in
seeking to resolve the
“Taiwan problem”. It comes
amid a policy from
Washington which has sought
to increasingly hollow out and
undermine Beijing’s One-
China Policy, as well as
encourage others to do
likewise, but then accuse
Beijing of being the one
moving the goalposts for
hitting back. In a nutshell:
China has had enough.
2020-2021 will almost
certainly be looked back on as
the year China “lost patience”
over Taiwan to the point it was
forced to act. The middle
ground where Beijing
tolerated Taiwan sitting
ambiguously for years has
collapsed. This is a
consequence of the island
being thrust into the
international spotlight not
merely as an unresolved
territorial issue, but as an
active strategic and political
counterweight to try and
contain the rise of China in
Asia, which Taipei’s
leadership has taken
advantage of to pursue an
agenda of formal
independence and rubbish the
idea of reunification.
During this period, Taiwan’s
foreign policy has been
designed to exploit discord
and opposition against Beijing
wherever it can, to garnish
support for itself, put itself in
the spotlight and to expand its
political space, enabled by US
support.
I have repeatedly described
this strategy as “provocation
diplomacy”. Taipei’s leader,
Tsai Ing-wen, has frontloaded
visits of Western legislators
and former politicians to the
island, penned op-eds in
Western newspapers and
made provocative comments
such as confirming there is a
US troop presence on the
island. This public relations
game seeks to make Beijing
appear isolated, frustrated and
helplessly sat on the sidelines
as Taiwan increases its
support, seemingly unable to
do anything about it other than
to protest and snarl or risk a
catastrophic war which, even
if it won, would be a pyrrhic
victory. In taking this gamble,
Tsai’s endgame is to change
the status quo gradually and
slowly escape Beijing’s
political grasp.
In reaction to this, China has
doubled down on the stakes of
reunification, affirmed by
President Xi Jinping himself,
has repeatedly flown more
warplanes near its “airspace
defense identification zone,”
and is now, as of late 2021,
taking more strident actions.
Out of all the Taiwan-related
matters in the past months,
Beijing has probably seen
Lithuania’s act of opening a
“Taiwan representative
office” as the most alarming.
While a visit to the island by a
tedious has-been politician
like former Australian premier
Tony Abbott can be dismissed
as a bad joke, the prospect of
Taipei formally expanding its
ties with countries
sympathetic to it is seen as the
graver threat through the
precedent of which it sets.
Despite Beijing’s protests so
far, Lithuania has seemed
largely undeterred. This has
left China feeling it has to
show the country not a mere
sign of discontent or snub, but
to impose serious and real
costs on the country to make a
point to others, especially in
that same part of Europe, that
they should never consider
doing the same thing.
This has been the primary
motivator of China enhancing
its sanctions policy over
Taiwan. Beijing is hitting
Vilnius where it hurts by
cutting off its supply chain.
Although Lithuania is largely
insular and depends more on
intra-European trade, it
imported $1.34 billion worth
of goods from China last year.
Sanctions could easily force
inflation upwards there by
forcing it to look elsewhere
for critical goods.
International firms are being
made to subtly choose
between the gigantic Chinese
market, of which Xi appears to
be increasingly confident in as
the world’s largest, or the very
much smaller, offending
countries such as Lithuania.
But it’s not just in relation to
this issue either. China’s
fining of the Taiwanese firm,
Far-Eastern Group, over
support for the DPP is the first
example of this strategy being
used against the economy of
Taipei itself, which is heavily
integrated with the mainland.
On another front, China’s
winning over of Nicaragua is
a reminder that Beijing will
continue to hammer away at
the island’s remaining
“official relationships”. While
in practice, the Central
American country, which the
Biden administration has the
knives out for anyway, does
not mean a lot materially to
Taipei, the timing of the move
was deliberately designed to
overshadow its participation
in the “democracy summit,”
as well as deal a jab to the US
in its own backyard.
It’s now the seventh country
to switch sides since Tsai took
office in 2016, which amounts
to a loss of one-third of its
total diplomatic relationships
to Beijing in five years. These
moves usually come in twos
or threes, and Honduras is
likely to be the next, given that
its newly elected leader has
shown interest in doing so.
However, there is ultimately
only one relationship which
matters to Taipei most in the
end, and that is the one which
is still described as informal:
that with the US. It is on this
battleground where Taiwan
will be won or lost. But this
isn’t going to be a physical
war: it is going to be a mutual
war of attrition where each
side strives to undermine the
credibility and political clout
of the other in order to attain
the upper hand.
In doing so, Beijing is
increasingly developing a new
toolbox focused on painful
precision, as opposed to blunt
force. The Lithuania saga and
the Nicaragua breakthrough
are reminders that its One-
China Policy is not a
soundbite, but a deadly
serious aim which will one
day be fulfilled. If countries
push against this redline,
Beijing has every intention to
hit back and leverage
everything it can to make its
position clearly understood.

A.G Noorani Dawn News
T
HE presidents of the
United States and the
Russian Federation,
Joe Biden and Vladimir Putin,
did well to have virtual talks
on Dec 7. But as the phrase
goes, this was only breaking
the ice.
Relations between the two
countries have sunk to their
lowest since the end of the
Cold War in 1999. It is
unlikely that the distrust
between them was dispelled in
the two hours of talk or will be
dispelled at the summit in
person which they both hope
to hold.
The root cause of the problem
is the US feeling of triumph
over a perceived ‘victory’ in
the Cold War and president
George H.W. Bush’ breach of
faith with the Russian leader
Mikhail Gorbachev. He had
consented to Germany’s
reunification even if it
remained a member of Nato
provided that the military
alliance did not spread
eastwards. It did.
In 2009, when, at the
prompting of European states
that had uneasy ties with
Russia, the EU launched the
Eastern Partnership, Moscow
came up with the idea of a
Eurasian economic union,
where Ukraine would have a
focal role. This was a strategic
move by an anxious Russia
that did not want to see its
former components attracted
by Nato or entering the EU
fold, especially in the case of
Ukraine, given its
geographical proximity to
both Russia and the EU. For
all the noise, what do the
gullible ones gain?
US and Nato
The regime change in Ukraine
on Feb 23, 2014, had shaken
Moscow. Just a couple of days
earlier, Ukraine’s president,
who had refused to sign a free-
trade agreement with the EU,
inked a deal with the
opposition for early polls and
reinstatement of a self-defence recognised by
parliamentary system, the aim
being to stop the months-long
bloody protests in Kiev. The
agreement was “brokered by
EU mediators in the presence
of a Russian representative”.
But on Feb 22, the pro-Russia
Ukrainian president fled the
country. An interim president
replaced him. An angry
Russia invaded the country
and annexed Crimea. The so-
called Minsk agreement failed
to establish peace. Once
again, the unusual Russian
build-up in the area has
ignited fears of a major
offensive, with the American
president reportedly warning
Moscow of economic
sanctions. Richard Haass,
president of the Council on
Foreign Relations, told this
writer when he was in
Mumbai, that there was little
debate on Nato’s expansion.
Nato acquired new members
including the Czech Republic,
Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria,
Estonia, Lithuania, Romania,
Slovakia, Slovenia, Albania
and Croatia. The EU had a
smaller list to boast about.
For all this noise, what do
these gullible ones gain?
Article 5 of the North Atlantic
Treaty was signed in 1949,
more than seven decades ago,
in a different context. It reads:
“The parties agree that an
armed attack against one or
more of them in Europe or
North America shall be
considered an attack against
them all; and consequently
they agree that, if such an
armed attack occurs, each of
them, in exercise of the right
of individual or collective
Article 51 of the Charter of the
United Nations, will assist the
party or parties, so attacked by
taking forthwith, individually
and in concert with the other
parties, such action as it deems
necessary, including the use of
armed force, to restore and
maintain the security of the
North Atlantic area.
“Any such armed attack and
all measures taken as a result
thereof shall immediately be
reported to the Security
Council. Such measures shall
be terminated when the
Security Council has taken the
measures necessary to restore
and maintain international
peace and security.” At the
time of the hearings on the
treaty before the Senate’s
Foreign Relations Committee,
the then secretary of state
Dean Acheson was clear that
Article V did not mean that
America would automatically
help the victims of aggression.
He said: “This naturally does
not mean that the United
States would automatically be
at war if one or the other
signatory nation were the
victim of an armed attack. The
obligation of this government
under Article V would be to
take promptly the action it
deemed necessary to restore
and maintain the security of
the North Atlantic area.
 “That decision would, of security of the North Atlantic nothing in the treaty which has
course, be taken in accordance area.” that effect, senator.”
with our constitutional
When Acheson was asked by Clearly then, America’s
procedures. The factors which
a lawmaker: “Is there or is pledge where the treaty is
would have to be considered
there not anything in the treaty concerned will not appear
would be the gravity of the
that pledges us to an automatic credible.
attack and the nature of the
declaration of war in any
action which this government
event?” He replied, “There is
considered necessary to
restore and maintain the
 Don’t Sell Out Ukraine
Dmytro Kuleba, Foreign Affairs
R
ussian President
Vladimir Putin has
issued a stark
ultimatum. In a number of
recent statements, he has
demanded that the United
States make “reliable and firm
legal guarantees” that NATO
will not expand eastward—or
else, his entourage has hinted,
Russia will invade Ukraine.
Coming at a time when Russia
is massing military forces
along the Ukrainian border
and stymieing peace talks to
end the war in the Donbas
region, Putin’s demand seems
to offer a tempting prospect
for the West: in exchange for
merely cementing the
alliance’s status quo, a deadly
European war could come to
an end and a new, even more
devastating conflict could be
avoided.
But it is foolish to think that
providing such a guarantee
would make Putin any less
aggressive. History shows that
pledges of neutrality by
Ukraine or any other country
in the region do nothing to
abate Putin’s appetite; rather,
they feed it. The best way to
respond to such ultimatums is
to ignore them altogether.
What cannot be ignored,
however, are Putin’s
increasingly aggressive
intentions. Not only is a new
large-scale invasion of
Ukraine now on the table;
Putin also hopes ultimately to
rearrange Europe’s security
architecture to the detriment
of the West. For too long, the
West has declined to take
Putin’s ambitions seriously
and responded with delay,
indecision, and weakness. It is
time to meet them with
strength. PUTIN’S POWER
PLAYIt is obvious why
Russia demands that Ukraine
give up its ambitions for
membership in the European
Union and NATO, but it is far
less clear why anyone in the
West should echo these ill-
conceived suggestions. The
people of Ukraine made a
choice in 2013, after
Ukrainian President Viktor
Yanukovych, acting at Putin’s
behest, sought to contravene
public opinion and integrate
the country with Russia
instead of the EU. In
November of that year,
Ukrainians took to the streets
in the so-called Euromaidan
protests. Yanukovych tried to
suppress the demonstrations
with brute force, but he
underestimated the will of
Ukrainians, who responded
with fury, not fear, and
eventually ousted him.
The message could hardly
have been clearer: Ukrainians
have no interest in cozying up
to Russia and will never give
up on integrating with the
West. Putin, however, seemed
not to have learned that lesson.
With his client out of power
and no way to change
Ukraine’s orientation from
within, the Russian president
resorted to violence. In early
2014, Russia invaded
Ukraine, occupied Crimea,
and launched a deadly war in
the Donbas.
Ukrainians will never give up
on integrating with the West.
Russia planned a blitzkrieg
with the ultimate goal of
dividing Ukraine in half and
establishing a puppet state
called Novorossiya in
Ukraine’s eight eastern
regions. But Putin greatly
underestimated Ukrainian
resolve. Tens of thousands of
Ukrainians from all regions
and all walks of life raced to
the frontlines to take up arms
in defense of their country.
They were backed by
hundreds of thousands of
civilian volunteers, ordinary
Ukrainian citizens who
supplied the army with
everything from food to do-it-
yourself armored vehicles. It
became clear that Putin hadn’t
attacked the defenseless state
he had imagined; the
Ukrainian people, however
poorly equipped, were highly
motivated. Putin’s grand
designs quickly fell apart,
leading to a years-long
stalemate on a tiny fraction of
land near the Ukrainian
border. To date, the conflict
has claimed more than 14,000
lives.
The West—the United States,
the European Union, and
NATO—did too little, too
late. It took months and the
deaths of 298 innocent people
on Malaysia Airlines Flight
17, shot down by a Russian
missile in July 2014, before
serious economic sanctions
were imposed. Little by little,
the West isolated Russia and
adjusted its policies. But its
indecisiveness invited more
aggressive actions from
Russia, such as cyberattacks,
election meddling, and
targeted assassinations of
opponents abroad.
In the years after Russia’s
intervention, Ukrainians
doubled down on their choice
to align themselves with the
West. In 2018, they enshrined
the goals of EU and NATO
membership in the Ukrainian
constitution—a strategic
course that is becoming more
popular by the year.
THE FALLACY OF
COMPROMISE Putin has
taken notice of these
yearnings and, perhaps not
surprisingly, is now
suggesting that Ukrainian
neutrality is key to resolving
the crisis. But history gives the
lie to this claim. Back in 2014,
Ukraine was a neutral country,
both on paper and in reality.
Four years earlier, it had
formally put an end to its
ambitions for NATO
membership when it passed a
law clearly stating that it was
a nonaligned country that had
no intention of joining any
military alliance. There was
no nationwide public
discussion of NATO
membership back then, either;
the Euromaidan protests that
began in 2013 centered not on
the military alliance but on
economic and political
integration with the EU. If
neutrality failed to stop Putin
from launching a war in 2014,
it is hard to see why it would
stop him now.
Another ill-advised idea
proposed by some experts is to
pressure Ukraine into one-
sided concessions, granting
compromises that will
supposedly make Putin more
pacific. Namely, Moscow has
long demanded that Kyiv talk
directly to Donetsk and
Luhansk, the two Russian-
occupied regions in the east of
Ukraine. Ukraine has rejected
this demand, and with good
reason: Russia is a party to the
conflict, and we are not going
to let it present itself as a
mediator.
Moreover, history suggests
that giving in to this sort of
demand is unlikely to satisfy
Russia. In 1992, a war
intensified in Moldova’s
Transnistria region, a post-
Soviet conflict that pitted
Russian-led forces against the
government of Moldova.
Even though Russia had
fueled the conflict, it
demanded that the Moldovan
government talk directly to
the breakaway region, with
Moscow playing the role of
mediator. Moldovans agreed
and engaged in a direct
dialogue with Russia’s
proxies in the hope that doing
so would resolve the standoff
and restore their territorial
integrity. In 1994, in another
attempt to end the dispute,
Moldova officially adopted a
neutral policy, declaring that it
wouldn’t seek NATO
membership. The result of
both concessions? A three-
decade-long frozen conflict
with no thawing in sight.
Russian troops and weapons
remain in Transnistria to this
day.
WHAT DRIVES PUTIN
Putin’s calls for a guarantee
concerning NATO expansion
present a dilemma. If the West
gives in, Russia will no doubt
be pleased with its newfound
veto over Ukrainian foreign
policy and NATO decision-
making. If the West rejects its
demands, Russia will be
equally happy, because it will
be able to lay fresh ideological
ground for invading Ukraine
again.
Since 2014, Russia has
legitimized its aggression in
Ukraine by referring to a
promise the West supposedly
made at the end of the Cold
War and then broke.
According to this narrative,
during negotiations over
German reunification in 1990,
U.S. Secretary of State James
Baker pledged to Soviet
President Mikhail Gorbachev
that NATO would never
expand eastward. This
account is a fairy tale, as even
Gorbachev has admitted. But
more problematic for Putin, it
has become stale, which
explains his interest in a new
story line. By having his
current proposal for
guarantees about NATO
rejected, Putin hopes to spin a
much fresher ideological
myth.
The fact that Putin is
searching for a new
ideological justification
concerning Ukraine suggests
that he really is on the verge of
something big: an attempt to
fundamentally rewrite the
post–Cold War security order
in Europe. Having created a
crisis, he hopes to invite U.S.
President Joe Biden to the
negotiating table to solve it.
There, he imagines, the two
leaders will draw new lines
across Europe, partitioning
the continent into new spheres
of influence. Moscow has
fantasized over such a
scenario for years.
WHAT UKRAINE NEEDS
Russia is a master of selling
lies, and its illegitimate
demands for guarantees and
one-sided concessions are just
that. But we don’t have to buy
what we’re being sold—or
even acknowledge the offer.
The West shouldn’t appease
Russia by agreeing to
negotiate over NATO, nor
should it give Russia the
satisfaction of rejecting its
ultimatums. Rather, the West
should simply ignore them,
continuing to hold further
rounds of talks while refusing
to bow to Putin’s ultimatums
on Ukraine and NATO.
Meanwhile, the United States
and its European allies should
strengthen their efforts to
deter Russia. Unlike
appeasement, deterrence has a
successful track record. In the
spring of 2021, for example,
Russia began its massive
buildup along the Ukrainian
border and spouted belligerent
rhetoric threatening to destroy
Ukraine. Ukraine’s partners
signaled staunch support for
Ukraine in public and behind
closed doors, and Moscow
was forced to ease tensions.
Putin is attempting to
fundamentally rewrite the
post–Cold War order in
Europe. The only effective
way forward is the
comprehensive deterrence
plan that Ukraine and its
partners are currently crafting.
The first component is to send
clear political signals to
Moscow. That means making
it plain that Ukraine is part of
the West and a future member
of the EU and NATO and that
Ukraine’s sovereignty and
territorial integrity are non-
negotiable. The second part of
the plan involves
consequences: in the worst-
case scenario of an invasion,
the West will enact severe
sanctions. Crafting these
devastating measures now
could spare the West the need
to apply them later.
The third and final part of the
plan is to deepen military
assistance to Ukraine. We
have our own capable military
forces in Ukraine, and we
don’t expect Western
countries to put boots on the
ground. We do, however, need
more weapons to be able to
defend ourselves. Everything
counts, from ammunition to
medical equipment, but we are
in particular need of air and
missile defenses.
CHOOSING
STRENGTHUkraine’s goal is
simple: peace through
strength. For now, the United
States and its European allies
should talk to Putin to win
time while strengthening
Ukraine to the extent that
Russia will simply have no
feasible military option for
invading it. At that point, it
will be possible to reach a just
peace settlement for the
Donbas and to finally bring
Ukraine into the EU and
NATO.
Both goals may seem distant
now, but in the long term, the
Ukrainian people will have it
no other way. We will not
abandon this course, no matter
how much pressure we face
from Russia—or from our
U.S. or European partners.
When I hear some Western
commentators saying that
NATO’s proximity is a
sensitive issue for Putin, I
have only one question to ask:
Are the lives and future of 44
million Ukrainians not
sensitive, too?
 Gender Discrimination and Poverty
Mehmil Khalid, Daily Times
G
ender disparity in
Pakistan is
widespread owing to
the patriarchal nature of
society and male dominance
in almost all the spheres of
public life. Women in our
country are not encouraged to
make full use of their abilities
and get financially
independent. It has been
reported by various NGOs
that women in rural areas are
forced to marry early so they
cannot seek education and
those who find this
opportunity are not permitted
to get themselves employed
anywhere. The established
notion among the society that
women who are financially
independent become liberal
and outrageous has impeded
them to come forward. Gender
inequality exists in different
dimensions in the country-
health, education,
employment, remuneration,
etc–and has diminished their
capabilities and confined their
existence to home. When
gender inequality increases, it
affects the economic status of
a family. Analysts say that
when there will be a sole
breadwinner in the family and
women will not be allowed to
work independently to
generate income, poverty
increases and economic
prosperity decreases.
Research has shown that
gender disparity is
proportionately linked with
economic disparity. It has
been found that those families
where only men are working
to earn livelihood are
experiencing more poverty as
compared to those where both
are contributing equally. The
prospect of economic
prosperity decreases when the
onus to earn is shifted on a
single member of the family
that enjoys a limited income,
making it difficult to survive
in these times of rising
inflation in the country.
According to World Bank,
poverty rises to over five per
cent in 2020 as over two
million people have fallen
below the poverty line.
Poverty in Pakistan has
increased from 4.4 per cent to
5.4 per cent in 2020, the
World Bank stated. The surge
in crisis has also happened due
to the Covid-19 pandemic that
made millions of people lose
their jobs, dealing with gender
inequality on top of it.
The law of the land clearly
protects a special place for
women by promoting gender
equality.
Analysts maintain that women
who are employed and have
access to income and financial
resources can work far better
than men in promoting the
welfare of their families and
producing livelihoods. It has
been proved through research
that women have a natural
leaning to invest in their
family and children.
Therefore, it is more likely
that financially secure women
will spend on their children’s
education and health and also
strive for female education
and employment. Analysts
say under such circumstances,
there will be more school
enrollment statistics, high
nutrition levels in children,
and increased female
education. While contrarily,
working women who
experience gender gap are
suffering from poor health
conditions and environment,
less food, impoverished
lifestyles that ultimately
create limited opportunities
for their children as well.
Experts say that 60 per cent of
those in the world who go
hungry are females.
The incumbent government,
the critics suggest, is
vehemently working on Ehsas
Programme to alleviate
poverty in the country but the
concerned authorities are not
paying attention to the actual
cause of poverty. They need to
find out that what is it that can
significantly control poverty
in the country. Apart from
giving subsidies and
introducing facilitating cards
to the public, it should be
learnt by the government from
other countries that gender
disparity has become the most
prominent factor that leads to
poverty.
The developed countries in
the world have worked on
ensuring gender equality by
eliminating discrimination
from their country and helped
women play equal roles by
providing them equal
opportunities as compared to
their male counterparts. The
constitution of Pakistan,
analysts say, does provide
equal opportunities to all;
eliminating discrimination
based on sex in all spheres of
life yet there are no formal
strategies present in the
governance to implement it.
Article 25 of the 1973
constitution of Pakistan
ensures special protection for
women and children and
maintains that there will be no
discrimination based on sex in
the country. Critics suggest
that the law of the land clearly
protects a special place for
women by promoting gender
equality. However, no proper
arrangements by the
government have been seen to
execute such laws that uphold
gender equality.
Britta Petersen, director of the
Heinrich Böll Foundation’s
Pakistan office in Islamabad,
states that it will take time for
Pakistan to feel a change from
its old traditions and customs
before it sees any significant
improvement in its affairs.
“The current government is
also trying to improve the
situation of women in
Pakistan. But many of the
problems persist because of
old customs and traditions,”
she said.
“We have accomplished much
more than we expected, but it
will still take time before all
women in Pakistan profit from
that,” Petersen added. “We
must not forget that it wasn’t
that long ago that in Germany
men had to give their approval
if a woman wanted to open up
a bank account,” she pointed but also its economic
out. And just like Germany, a imperatives,” she said.
complete transition in
Pakistan will take some time.
If the government wants to
It has been observed by
alleviate poverty, it needs to
various experts that countries
create a safe and enabling
who strongly monitor gender
environment for women to
equality as a major part of
work. Women form almost
development tend to have
half of the population of the
higher income levels and
country which means if we
several regions have shown
decide to harness their
that creating gender equality
potential by promoting their
has resulted in a poverty
talents and appreciating their
reduction. Realizing that a
contribution, we can make this
strong connection between
country more prosperous than
poverty and gender equality
it would be if the present
exists, the United Nations has
situation continues. Poverty
defined the agenda for all
can be best put to an end when
countries to achieve gender
women are allowed to
equality by 2030. For a
contribute freely without any
developing country like
threat or intimidation. It has
Pakistan whose ranking is
become vital to suppress the
regretfully as low as 151st in
patriarchal codes of conduct
the world, the target seems
so that women can exercise
difficult to achieve. It appears
their rights and gender
that a lot of effort is required
inequality can be controlled.
to bring about reforms that
The government must work
lead to reducing poverty
on improving its Gender Gap
through gender equality.
Index by properly addressing
Former Federal Secretary the factors that are responsible
Rukhsana Shah said that it is for its low ranking. Our
high time the state should country needs a gender-
work towards improving inclusive environment that
conditions for women when makes women and men
especially this factor controls behave alike and paves way
economic welfare. “The state for all to have collective
needs to emerge from its participation in the economic
stupor to stop this shameful development of the country.
slide of half of its population
into the dark ages, considering
not only global requirements
 What Did the Delhi Regional Security Dialogue on Afghanistan
Accomplish?
Sreeram Chaulia, The Diplomat
T
he Delhi Regional
Security Dialogue on
Afghanistan, hosted by
India’s National Security
Adviser Ajit Doval on
November 10, brought
together security czars of
Russia, Iran, and the five
Central Asian nations to
brainstorm on the serious
situation since the Taliban’s
takeover and find ways to
stem instability from spilling
across Afghanistan’s borders.
The “overwhelming
response” which host India
said it received to the
conference owed to the fact
that while the United States
and Europe cut their losses,
exited from Afghanistan, and
curtailed their interest in
shaping its future, countries
located around Afghanistan
don’t have the option of
ignoring it due to the
compulsions of geography
and intertwined history. What
happens in Afghanistan is of
direct consequence to the
regional players and the onus
is squarely on them to contain
the adverse fallout of the
changes there.
Official accounts said the
Delhi Dialogue “exceeded
India’s expectations” by
generating “complete
unanimity” of all eight
attending countries on the way
forward in Afghanistan. The
hard-hitting Delhi
Declaration, where the
participants vowed to “combat
terrorism in all its forms and
manifestations” and
demanded “an open and truly
inclusive government that
represents the will of all the
people of Afghanistan,”
hinted at the formation of a
regional front or coalition to
apply pressure and incentives
on the Taliban and other
armed actors.
For India, convening the Delhi
Dialogue was crucial to prove
its relevance as a problem
solver amid Afghanistan’s
multidimensional crises.
Having been written off for
losing its 20-year-long perch
in Afghanistan once the
Pakistan-backed Taliban
marched into Kabul, India
wanted to demonstrate it still
matters by virtue of being
accepted by most of its
neighbors and near neighbors
as a legitimate coordinator of
shared interests.
The Taliban, who were not
invited by India to the Delhi
Dialogue, nevertheless
commended the conference as
being “in the better interest of
Afghanistan,” implying that
getting India to recognize
their government is key for the
group to break out of
international isolation and
gain wider acceptance.
A Region Divided
Yet it did not go unnoticed
that China and Pakistan
declined India’s invite to
come to the Delhi Dialogue.
Beijing cited “scheduling
difficulties,” with the caveat
that it was “open to meeting
with India over Afghanistan
bilaterally and multilaterally”
in the future. Islamabad,
which has been engaged in a
longstanding competition
with New Delhi to influence
Afghanistan’s politics and
security, critiqued India as “a
spoiler” that “cannot be a
peacemaker” and openly
refused to attend the Delhi
Dialogue. Incidentally, China
did send its special
representative to Islamabad on
November 11 for the “Troika
Plus” dialogue on Afghanistan
involving China, Russia,
Pakistan, and the United
States.
The strategic Sino-Pakistani
axis works in tandem with
some attendees of the Delhi
Dialogue and at cross-
purposes with other attendees.
There have always been clear
geopolitical divisions and
clashing visions among China
and Pakistan on one side, and
India on the other, about
Afghanistan’s future. These
fissures escalated since the
Taliban routed the former
Afghan regime and took
power in Kabul. While no
country has formally
recognized the new Taliban
government, Pakistan and
China are informally a lot
closer and supportive of it
compared to other countries in
the region.
Referring specifically to the
spectacle of rival camps and
parallel diplomatic endeavors,
the secretary of Russia’s
Security Council, Nikolai
Patrushev, remarked during
the Delhi Dialogue that “such
mechanisms should not
complicate the work of each
other but rather complement across the porous border in assist Afghan people as they
each other.” Pakistan. cope with dire shortages of
essentials.
Dialogue Without Action? Apart from exchanging views
and warnings about the The Delhi Declaration’s call
One of the refrains during the
presence and movement of that humanitarian aid “should
Delhi Dialogue was that such
radicalized jihadist extremists, be provided in an unimpeded,
forums must lead to practical
it would be worthwhile if direct and assured manner to
measures against terrorists.
likeminded regional powers Afghanistan” obliquely
There has been no dearth of
can establish joint intelligence referenced the spat between
regional diplomatic conclaves
and military observation India and Pakistan, with the
on Afghanistan for years now.
missions and presence as former requesting overland
But in the context of the
close to Afghanistan’s borders passage of trucks carrying
sudden collapse of the former
as possible. Situating a 50,000 metric tons of
Afghan Republic in August
regional security task force in emergency wheat to
2021, which left most
the Central Asian states, Afghanistan and the latter
countries in the region
which directly border northern stalling.
shocked and rattled, these
Afghanistan, could be
consultations have not been The United Nations has rung
geopolitically invaluable.
powerful in determining alarm bells that 1 million
outcomes. Owing to historical Afghan children could die
sensitivities, Iran will not from starvation this winter. In
From a lay person’s point of
permit the military presence this grave context, the region
view, it looks as if there has
of any foreign country on its should have been unanimous
been a lot of diplomatic
territory. But in light of the and come together to save
summitry but little action that
existential dangers being lives. But given the acute
concretely affected the
faced by Shia minorities geopolitical contestation, the
situation in Afghanistan. The
inside Afghanistan, who have only way of skirting around
litmus test for initiatives like
been attacked relentlessly by logjams is to look for
the “Moscow format” (hosted
ISK after the Taliban captured alternative humanitarian
periodically by Russia) and
power, Tehran would not be rescue pathways that can be
the Delhi Dialogue is to
averse to multilateral military logistically secured and
develop a common framework
coordination mechanisms to underwritten by a regional
to deliver regional public
safeguard itself from the task force or “coalition of the
goods that can mitigate
blowback of Sunni jihadist willing.”
insecurity inside Afghanistan
terrorism from western
and halt it from seeping The Delhi Dialogue lucidly
Afghanistan.
beyond its borders. revealed the geopolitical fault
If a regional coalition against lines that have prevented a
Such dialogues can have a
extremism has even limited unified pan-regional response
tangible impact only if they
aerial and ground power to Afghanistan’s multiple
add up to producing
projection capacities around cascading crises. Yet, if such
regionally agreed governance
Afghanistan, it will convey a dialogues segue into
conditionalities and
warning to terrorist groups actionable military efforts by
modalities for humanitarian
and their sponsors plotting like-minded countries in
assistance, reporting and
attacks that they will face Afghanistan’s surroundings to
sharing information on the
credible and timely constrain terrorists and
Taliban government’s
retaliation. Creating alleviate human suffering,
conduct and administration,
innovative multimodal there is hope for averting the
and tracking activities of the
security agreements in the worst-case scenarios.
Islamic State Khorasan (ISK)
region will also open
and other terrorist fighters
alternative supply routes to
thriving on Afghan soil and
 Central Asia’s Muslim Challenge
Catherine Putz, The Diplomat
I
n a 1982 text, revised in
1990, noted professor of
Russian Area Studies
Michael Rywkin identified
Soviet Muslims, whose
population was rapidly
growing, as “one of the
biggest question marks in the
country’s future.”
The Soviet Union, of course,
did not have much of a future,
but its legacy lives on. As the
cover story of this issue
illustrates, the Soviet legacy is
evident across Asia; but
nowhere is it as tightly woven
into the tapestry of modern
politics as in Central Asia.
Thirty years after the collapse
of the Soviet Union, the
Muslim-majority states of
Central Asia remain deeply
affected by its legacy. Echoes
of the Soviet Union are
evident not just in still-
standing monuments to
Vladimir Lenin (in central
Bishkek, for example, though
moved from the front of the
State History Museum to
behind it in 2003), but more
importantly in the ways the
region’s governments rule and
the ways its people view
government. The modern
independent states of Central
Asia – Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan
– were founded by Soviet-
trained elites, working with
Soviet-style governance
structures, and they still look
to Moscow for guidance and
support. It’s important not to
overstate this influence, and
frequent readers of The
Diplomat will know well my
personal avoidance of the lazy
trope of tying every
development in the region to
the Soviet past. But this is a
special occasion.
In Rywkin’s book, titled
“Moscow’s Muslim
Challenge,” the author cites
the titual problem as dealing
with the ethnically and
religiously distinct republics
in Central Asia. “Practically
unassimilable and indifferent
to most official Soviet values,
the growing masses of Soviet
Muslims present an
inescapable challenge to the
Russian-dominated Soviet
social order,” he argued. The
book is a Cold War artifact, of
course, and should be read as
such. There are racist echos of
its core supposition in
contemporary Europe, where
right-wing politicians
challenge whether Muslims,
from anywhere, can truly
assimilate to European life. In
a strange way, Central Asia
attests largely to the opposite.
In fact, the region struggles
with its own modern “Muslim
Challenge.” Tension between
stridently secular
governments and a Muslim-
majority population
reconnected with the wider
Muslim world has resulted in
shockingly strict rules
surrounding religion
(bordering on the absurd) and
perpetual paranoia about
extremism. Rather than being
“indifferent to most official
Soviet values,” the reality is
that contemporary Central
Asian political structures are
rooted in the Soviet past. This
is most evident in the
awkward relationship
between the state and religion.
A prevailing assumption of
the Cold War era was that
Islam and communism were at
their core mutually exclusive.
Communism was, after all, an
athetistic ideology.
Rywkin put it like this:
Of the two dogmas, the
communist and the Islamic –
both collectivist and
authoritarian, both
encompassing the temporal as
well as the spiritual, both
competing for Soviet
Muslims’ allegiance – the
communist one, being a
Russian import, appears to be
the weaker. In the nationalist-
Muslim-communist triad,
therefore, the communist
element seems the only one
potentially discardable.
This assumption extended to
the West, too.
As scholar Adeeb Khalid
explained in his 2007 book
“Islam After Communism,”
U.S. engagement with the
Islamic forces opposed to the
Soviet 1979 invasion and
occupation of Afghanistan
was undeprined by “doctrinal
principles long held sacred”
that viewed Islam as an
antidone to communism and
“U.S. government agencies
spent considerable effort
drawing attention to Soviet
hostility to religion.” But, he
went on:
The problem is that many
Muslims did not see socialism
and Islam to be so starkly
opposed. Indeed, throughout
the twentieth century, a
substantial current of opinion
in Muslim societies held that
Islam's message was one of
social justice and that
socialism was inherent in
Islam.
Seventy years of Soviet rule
could not undo more than a
thousand years of Islam in
Central Asia; nor has 30 years
of independence undone the
influence of the Soviet Union.
Instead of one or the other
being discarded – as Rywkin
suggested communism would
eventually be in Central Asia
– the result was a melding of
ideologies under the pressures
of momentous, and sudden,
political change.
Most of the modern states of
Central Asia are criticized by
the West for failing to achieve
sufficient freedom of religion,
and while some Christian
denominations – such as
Jehovah’s Witnesses – have
been targeted, the region saves
its harshest repression for
Muslim groups deemed to be
outside the state-sanctioned
“moderate” iteration. The
2021 country reports by the
U.S. Commission on
International Religious
Freedom, for example, cited
mass arrests of Sufi and other
Muslims in Tajikistan ahead
of elections in 2020 and
government systems of
appointing senior Islamic
leaders and providing state-
approved sermons in Turkmen
mosques. Uzbekistan only
recently rescinded a de facto
ban on children being allowed
to attend mosques with their
parents, but continues to ban
new religious texts and
“devoted comparatively less
effort to easing restrictions on
Muslim religious practice” in
comparison to efforts to lift
restrictions on Christian
groups.
Central Asia’s difficulties
with religion are perhaps best
illustrated by Tajikistan, and
Tajikistan’s experience is
deeply colored by the civil
war that broke out shortly
after the collapse of the Soviet
Union. Soviet rule in
Tajikistan, as elsewhere, had
co-opted some local elites at
the expense of others. When
the union collapsed,
Tajikistan’s myriad nodes of
potential power fought over
the right to rule the newly
independent state. The Soviet
apparatchiks won; the
Islamists, aligned with
democrats and Pamiris, lost.
The peace that settled the
Tajik Civil War in 1997,
however, carved out a space,
officially, for the opposition.
It took Tajik President
Emomali Rahmon nearly two
decades to erode the peace
agreement, pushing the
nascent Islamist opposition –
holding just two of 60 seats in
parliament – out of
government in 2015, followed
swiftly by labeling the group
an extremist outfit and
detaining its leaders.
Islam for the autocrats of
Central Asia poses much the
same threat that it did for the
Soviet Union. It is a rival and
attractive organizing force
outside the control of the state;
unless, of course, the state
maintains close control of
religion. Each of Central
Asia’s states, while enshrining
freedom of religion in their
constitutions, maintains either
official bodies overseeing the
practice of Islam in the
country, or extremely close
ties to nominally non-
governmental bodies doing
the same. These bodies – for
example, the Muslim Board of
Uzbekistan, which sits under
the Committee on Religious
Affairs within the Cabinet of
Ministers – either directly or
indirectly inherited the
functions of their Soviet
predecessor, the Spiritual
Administration of the
Muslims of Central Asia
(SADUM).
Central Asia’s relations with
Islam continue to evolve.
Central Asians have greater
ability to explore religion,
though not necessarily
complete freedom to do so.
The region’s governments
have not yet sorted out how to
balance growing demand for
religious freedom by more
conservative and
fundamentalist Muslims with
the risks of allowing
dangerous extremist ideology
to take root and the protection
of other groups.
This was illustrated earlier
this year when a crowd of men
chanting “Allahu Akbar” in
central Tashkent were allowed
by the Uzbek police to assault
a group of K-pop fans whom
they’d been told were LGBTQ
supporters. In a sense, it was
the operationalization of
fundamentalist Islam to
combat other forces the state
deems even more threatening,
with so-called “Western” gay
rights campaigning the
sharpest example. A blogger
at the center of the furor,
Miraziz Bazarov, was shortly
after assaulted and then
arrested (his assailants were
never found), with officials
and other high-profile Uzbek
political figures blaming him
for his own assault given his
support of the LGBTQ
community.
Uzbekistan “does not tolerate
unnatural men and women
(LGBT)! Our holy religion,
Islam, does not allow it,”
Komil Allamjonov, the
chairman of the board of
trustees of the Public
Foundation for Support and
Development of the National
Mass Media, and a former awkward relationship culture and religion –
government official between predominantly inextricably intertwined –
infamously proclaimed on Muslim societies and their without upsetting the balance
Twitter after the incident. devoutly secular of power between the people
governments. What had been and the state?
Thirty years after
Moscow’s Muslim challenge
independence, one of the
has morphed into Central
Soviet Union’s lasting
Asia’s own challenge: How to
legacies in Central Asia is the
embrace the region’s history,
 Biden has successfully solved the Ukraine crisis he manufactured
Scott Ritter, Russia Today
J
oe Biden needed an
agreement with Vladimir
Putin that would help
reduce tensions in Europe
over Ukraine and NATO
expansion. So he
manufactured a crisis as an
excuse for putting a US
position on the table. The
news coming out of Ukraine
was dire – Russia had
mobilized between 95-
125,000 troops along its
border with Ukraine, and US
intelligence agencies were
predicting that an invasion
was imminent. NATO was
panicking, and Vladimir Putin
was insisting that Ukraine
must never be allowed to join
the transatlantic alliance.
Biden, to clear the air with
Putin, agreed to a video
conference with the Russian
President, where he “looked
him in the eye” and warned of
serious consequences,
including unprecedented
economic sanctions and the
threat of deploying additional
US forces to Europe, should
Russia invade Ukraine.
While much of the public
reaction to the Biden-Putin
video conference has centered
on the sanctions threat, it is the
threat to deploy military
forces to Europe which
provides the greatest insight
into the thinking of the Biden
administration when it comes
to Russia today.
First and foremost, the US
threat to reinforce NATO’s
eastern flank is empty, and
everyone knows it. The US
Army is already stretched to
the breaking point by
maintaining the existing
rotation of a single heavy
armored brigade, some 5,000
troops, in Europe. By 2022 the
US is scheduled to complete
the construction of an Army
Prepositioned Stock (APS)
facility in Poland designed to
store a brigade’s worth of
equipment (about 85 battle
tanks, 190 armored combat
vehicles, 35 artillery, and four
armored vehicle launched
bridges along with hundreds
of supporting equipment sets
and pieces). That will reduce
the deployment time for the
assigned brigade from the US
to Poland from the 45 to 60
days associated with shipping
the equipment into a European
port to the four to seven days
needed to fly in the troops and
issue the equipment for
operational employment. But
even with 10,000 troops
backed by 170 tanks, 380
armored combat vehicles, and
70 artillery pieces, the US
Army would be in no shape to
take on a potential Russian
opponent.
Back in the 1980s, the US
military understood the true
nature of Soviet military
capabilities. We studied their
doctrine. At the National
Training Center (NTC), in
Fort Irwin, California, the US
Army created an opposition
force (OPFOR) organized and
equipped to replicate two
Soviet Motorized Rifle
Regiments. “OPFOR
soldiers,” a 1986 article about
training at the NTC noted,
“are thoroughly trained in
Soviet battle tactics for the
purpose of fighting stateside
combat elements as though it
were an actual war,” adding
that the OPFOR soldiers
“dress in Soviet uniforms and
use replicas of Russian
armored vehicles to make
their ‘kills.’ Every move and
action of the OPFOR adheres
to Soviet principles of
armored warfare.”
We had an average of 311,870
troops stationed in Europe per
year between 1986 and 1990.
We had another 250,000
prepared to deploy to Europe
within 10 days. The singular
focus of all these men and
women was to defeat the
Soviet Army in combat.
We had a robust military
attaché program in place at
our Moscow Embassy that
aggressively collected and
reported on Soviet military
capabilities. Attached to the
Soviet Group of Forces,
Germany were 14 US military
officers, assigned to the US
Military Liaison Mission,
whose sole job was to monitor
the Soviet military presence in
East Germany. The Defense
Intelligence Agency
published an annual report,
Soviet Military Power, which
was required reading for all
US military personnel.
The CIA maintained the
Office of Soviet Analysis
(SOVA), where the best and
the brightest resided,
publishing intelligence-based
assessments of Soviet military
capabilities. They were
backed up by the Directorate
for Operations’ Soviet/East
European Division, which
oversaw the CIA’s Moscow
Station, where the most elite
case officers were sent to ply
their trade.
In short, we knew and
understood Soviet military
capabilities, and the threat
they posed.
Today, when it comes to the
Russian Federation, the
United States is flying blind.
At the NTC, the Soviet
OPFOR has been replaced
with a scaled-down version
whose job is to replicate
insurgencies and near-peer
opponents – i.e., nothing at all
what the US military would be
facing if it were to be called
upon to confront Russian
troops in a European ground
war. Russian military doctrine
no longer serves as the
foundation of our own
counter-doctrine; Russia may
very well be training to fight
US and NATO forces, but we
no longer anchor our doctrinal
philosophy on the singular
principle of closing with a
destroying the Russian threat.
For the past 20 years, military
careers have been defined by
the Global War on Terror and,
more importantly, waging
low-intensity conflict in
Afghanistan and Iraq. Every
aspect of the military
establishment, from
recruiting, training, clothing,
equipping, organizing,
deploying, and fighting, was
re-worked to deal with this
new mode of fighting.
Combined arms warfare – the
art of war centered on creating
lethal synergism between
infantry, armor, artillery,
airpower, and intelligence –
was no longer practiced, and
the muscle memory that had
accrued from over three
decades of training atrophied.
Our intelligence services
support that which has been
given priority, and since the
end of the Cold War, Russia
has not been a priority. Once a
reservoir of unmatched talent,
the departments and offices
that once monitored Soviet
military power have all been
disbanded, replaced by
“Eurasian” analysts who treat
Russia as but one part of a
larger intelligence puzzle.
SOVA has been dissolved,
taking decades of institutional
knowledge about all things
Russia along with it.
Our military is no longer
trained, equipped, or
doctrinally prepared to fight a
Russian foe. In a non-nuclear
matchup, the result is all-too
predictable. The military, of
course, is aware of this, and is
gradually working toward
rebuilding this lost capability.
But this will take time and
resources, not simply happen
overnight.
Joe Biden knows this as well,
which is why he has taken
pains, in the aftermath of his
video conference with Putin,
to emphasize that the US
obligation to defend its NATO
allies does not extend to
Ukraine. “The idea that the US
is going to unilaterally use
force to confront Russia
invading Ukraine is not on the
cards right now,” Biden told
the press after his
conversation with Putin. This,
of course, begs the question as
to what Biden hoped to
accomplish by threatening to
deploy more American forces
to Poland and the Baltics in
the first place, especially if the
US is not planning on any
military confrontation with
Russia in the case of a Russian
invasion of Ukraine.
The answer lies in Biden’s
political need to shape
perception, both at home and
abroad. The expectations on
the part of his Democrat allies
is that he would be tougher on
Russia than former president
Trump. This public
pronouncement has boxed
him in considerably,
especially when common
sense policy options must be
put to the side in favor of
posturing. Biden was caught
off guard last April when
Russia mobilized 100,000
troops along its border with
Ukraine, especially when his
military leadership informed
him that there was little the US
could do about it.
The key problem facing the
Biden national security team
on the need to engage Russia
was the fact that any
engagement which considered
Russian concerns would be
seen as a concession. Biden
needed to be seen as operating
from a position of strength. As
such, when Russia conducted
its fall military maneuvers, the
US purposefully exaggerated
what was little more than
internal troop movements in
response to similar NATO
exercises in Poland and the
Baltics, and Ukrainian muscle sign of weakness. However,
flexing along the Donbass by building up a non-existent
front, turning it into an threat (i.e., a Russian invasion
imminent threat that triggered of Ukraine), and then
the current crisis. threatening to dispatch non-
existent troops to eastern
Biden’s threat to deploy
Europe if Russia were to
additional US forces now
invade, Biden can now take
makes sense. First and
credit for being strong in the
foremost – he’s not going to
face of Russian aggression.
do it. Second, Russia is not
Moreover, when Russia
preparing to invade Ukraine,
doesn’t invade (and it won’t,
and Biden knows it. The
unless responding to any
current crisis is being driven
large-scale military
by Ukraine’s ongoing refusal
provocation by Ukraine),
to implement the Minsk
Biden can take credit for
accords when it comes to
making Putin back down.
recognizing the autonomy of
the Donbass region, and its In this context, Jake Sullivan’s
continued military posturing announcement that the Biden
as a mechanism of gaining administration is open to
NATO support for its broad talks with Russia about
ambition to reconquer the the future of European
Donbass and Crimea. security, coupled with Biden’s
announcement that the US
Russia has been insisting that
would not come to the aid of
the US put pressure on
Ukraine in the event of a
Ukraine’s president,
Russian invasion, and a
Volodymyr Zelensky, to
similar announcement by
adhere to the Minsk
Biden that the US would not
agreement, and that the US
support Ukrainian
provide assurances that
membership in NATO for at
NATO would stop its
least 10 years, can be spun as
eastward expansion. Any
responsible actions taken from
move by the US, void of an
a position of strength, instead
additional predicate, would be
of the logical response to
seen by both the American
realpolitik.
domestic audience, and
America’s NATO allies, as a
 Remembering US-backed state terror in El Salvador
Belen Fernandez, Al Jazeera
F
orty years ago, on
December 11, 1981,
one of the worst
massacres in modern Latin
American history commenced
in El Salvador, in the village
of El Mozote and its environs.
Some 1,000 civilians, most of
them women and children,
were slaughtered over a
period of several days by the
Salvadoran military’s elite
Atlacatl Battalion, which had
been trained, funded, and
equipped by the United States.
A Jacobin Magazine tribute
published on the 35th
anniversary of the massacre
recalls some of the gruesome
scenes:
“The soldiers entered the
house and began slashing the
children with machetes,
breaking their skulls with their
rifles and choking them to
death. The youngest children
were crammed into the
church’s convent, where the
soldiers unloaded their rifles
into them.” The bloodbath
took place in the context of El
Salvador’s civil war of 1980-
92, which ultimately killed
more than 75,000 people –
with the vast majority of
atrocities perpetrated by the
right-wing state in
collaboration with
paramilitary outfits and death
squads.
Joining in the collaborative
effort, naturally, was
everyone’s favourite Cold
War superpower to the north,
the US, which throughout the
course of its existential battle
to make the world safe for
capitalism has managed in the
process to destroy countless
human lives.
Between 1980 and 1982
alone, US military aid to El
Salvador soared from $6m to
$82m and would later
skyrocket to more than $1m
per day.
The continued overzealous
funding was made possible in
large part by the
shamelessness with which
officials from the Ronald
Reagan administration lied to
cover up Salvadoran state
terror, including at El Mozote.
The administration also
waged a campaign to discredit
the few journalists intent on
exposing the truth, such as
former New York Times
correspondent Raymond
Bonner, author of Weakness
and Deceit: America and El
Salvador’s Dirty War.
In a new documentary titled
“Massacre in El Salvador”,
Bonner and photographer
Susan Meiselas reflect on the
whole sordid affair in El
Mozote, where they arrived
together in January 1982 to
find a “ghost town” and a
severely traumatised woman
named Rufina Amaya, one of
the sole survivors.
Amaya, whose blind husband
and three daughters – aged
five years, three years, and
eight months – had perished in
the slaughter, would later
recall overhearing a “world’s coolest dictator” – is
conversation between soldiers
of the Atlacatl Battalion:
“‘Lieutenant, somebody here
says he won’t kill children’,
said one soldier. ‘Who’s the
son of a b**** who said that?’
the lieutenant answered. ‘I am
going to kill him.’” Near the
beginning of the “Massacre in
El Salvador” documentary, a
video clip features President
Reagan – a former Hollywood
actor – delivering the
following lines in an
apocalyptic tone better suited
to the silver screen than to
reality: “Very simply,
guerrillas are attempting to
impose a Marxist-Leninist
dictatorship on the people of
El Salvador.”
Never mind that massacring
1,000 civilians is not any way
to go about “saving” them
from the spectre of
communism – or from the
guerrillas’ dangerous attempts
to bring some semblance of
equality and justice to a
country that had long suffered
from the tyrannical rule of an
exceptionally brutal elite.
To be sure, the US has never
had a problem with brutal
right-wing tyranny – as long
as profits keep flowing in
accordance with US interests.
Now, four decades after El
Mozote and nearly three
decades after the official end
of the civil war, the latest
Salvadoran tyrant – President
and Twitter star Nayib
Bukele, who has even
bizarrely self-identified as the
doing a fine job of ensuring
that justice in the country
remains ever elusive.
In addition to blissfully
converting El Salvador into a
Bitcoin dystopia, Bukele has
pursued various other actions
befitting a, well, dictator – like
firing five Salvadoran
Supreme Court judges as well
as the attorney general earlier
this year.
Significantly, he also fired
Judge Jorge Guzmán, who had
been investigating the El
Mozote case since 2016, when
a post-civil war amnesty was
reversed. The amnesty
reversal had opened the
possibility that the
perpetrators of the massacre
might finally be held
accountable for their crimes –
and that people like Maria
Rosario, who lost 24 members
of her family in the rampage,
might obtain the emotional
closure that human beings
generally require in order to
move on with their lives.
And yet responsibility for El
Mozote extends far beyond
the individuals from the
Atlacatl Battalion who
macheted and beheaded their
way through the village and its
surroundings.
The US is also directly
responsible for this as well as
other episodes of state terror
in El Salvador and many other
territories across the world.
Thanks to the perks of
imperial privilege, however,
history and accountability are
simultaneously disappeared –
except, of course, when things
like 9/11 happen, and then the
global populace is
commanded to “never forget”.
The notorious Elliott Abrams,
who was appointed in 1981 as
Reagan’s assistant secretary
of state for human rights and
humanitarian affairs, dutifully
promoted the US version of
“human rights” by denying
that the El Mozote massacre
had ever transpired. Years
later, he would continue to
maintain that the Reagan
administration had enjoyed a
legacy of “fabulous
achievement” in El Salvador.
But while 40 years of
murderous impunity is an
achievement indeed, it is
anything but fabulous.