Safety Management

An Introduction

Author(s)
M.J.M. Houtermans
Risknowlogy, m.j.m.houtermans@risknowlogy.com
Jabeekerstraat 10, NL-6451 CH Schinveld, The Netherlands

Published online at the ISA Safety Division

the use of standards, codes and guidelines and

1. Introduction
The ISO/IEC Guide 51 defines safety as
“freedom from unacceptable risk” [1]. Therefore
in order to manage safety it is necessary to
understand what leads to unacceptable risk.
This understanding can be obtained with the
identification of important process parameters,
their possible deviations from normal conditions,
and consequences of these conditions.
To focus on safety requires a comprehensive
understanding of the manufacturing process. It
is necessary to understand the process in terms
of process parameters and process elements,
which include the necessary hardware and
software that materialize the process. These
process parameters and elements need to be
understood in terms of their relationships and
possible interaction, and how deviations from
the normal quantities, settings, or behavior can
effect the safe operation of the process. To
achieve a safe operating plant, it is necessary to
design a process where possible deviations from
normal conditions can be kept within specific
limits that are dedicated by what is perceived as
acceptable risk.
2. Design for Safety
The “design for safety” concept can be
addressed in two ways. On one hand there is
on the other hand there are detailed safety
analyses. Standards, codes and guidelines
mainly exist because of lessons learned from the
past, usually as a result from accidents.
Standards and codes deal with implementing
requirements for a general process or specific
applications based on existing knowledge, for
example, codes and regulations for pressure
vessels [2] or burner management control
systems [3]. An advantage of the use of codes
and standards is the limited amount of effort to
achieve acceptable safety targets. The trade off
of this approach is that only the minimum safety
requirements are addressed which do not
necessarily cover the acceptable risk of the
specific process.
Safety analyses go beyond standards and codes.
In other words, analysis is useful when there is
a need or desire to explicitly evaluate the risk
associated with the process, even after
compliance with existing standards and codes.
It is acknowledged that implementation of
standards and safety analysis are two
approaches that complement each other and
that actually both should be used [4].
Compliance with the standards and codes
achieves a level of required safety, while
analyses brings safety within the limits of
acceptable risk.

info@risknowlogy.com Copyright  2002 - 2003 Risknowlogy 1

3. Safety Analysis
Safety analysis starts usually with a hazard and
risk analysis. The objective of a hazard and risk
analysis is to identify all hazards and their
associated risk. It identifies what can go wrong
and how it can be prevented or controlled. As
result of this analysis it is possible to reduce the
associated risk to an acceptable level by either
changing the design or adding safety measures
to the design. A hazard and risk analysis can
show that specific hazards are, or are not,
present after code requirements have been
compiled with, that further safety measures are,
or are not, needed, and what the possible
consequence can be if the hazard causes an
accident. The outcome from the hazard and risk
analysis are recommendations to improve the
plant design, incorporate additional safety
measures, or define operation and maintenance
procedures that minimize or control potential
hazards. In other words, the objective of the
safety analysis is to manage process parameters
or elements in terms of their deviations. The
next section will explain how safety is currently
managed in the manufacturing industry.
4. Safety Management
An industrial system can only be safe if all the
individual elements of the system are safe and
interact with each other in a safe manner.
Safety, like quality or profitability, is a basic
property of a system and needs to be addressed
in a way that considers the individual elements,
and their interaction, within the context of the
system. The methods, techniques, and resource
allocation must be coordinated, well planned,
properly justified, and able to address the entire
lifecycle of the system; in synergistic and not
info@risknowlogy.com Copyright  2002 - 2003 Risknowlogy
antagonistic manner with the other basic
properties of the system; in other words safety
has to be carefully managed.
The Department Of Energy in the US has
defined five core functions for safety
management that comprise the underlying
process for any work activity that could
potentially affect the public, the workers, and
the environment. These five core functions are
(see also ) [5]:
1. Define the scope of work – Missions are
translated into work, expectations are
set, tasks are defined and prioritized,
and resources are allocated.
2. Analyze the hazards – Hazards
associated with the work are identified,
analyzed and categorized.
3. Develop and implement hazard controls
– Applicable standards and
requirements are identified and agreed-
upon, controls to prevent/mitigate
hazards are identified, the safety
envelope is established, and controls are
implemented.
4. Perform work within controls –
Readiness is confirmed and work is
performed safely.
5. Provide feedback and continuous
improvement – Feedback information on
the adequacy of controls is gathered,
opportunities for improving the
definition and planning of work are
identified and implemented, line and
independent oversight is conducted, and
if necessary, regulatory enforcement
actions occur.
2
 Project
description
Define
scope
of work

Feedback
Analyze
and
hazards
improve

Develop/
Perform
implement
work
controls

Work
output

Figure 1. Safety Management Work Cycle [5]

5. Conclusions
The underlying attribute of the safety
management functions is the thorough and an
integrated understanding of the process. In
practice the challenge for sound safety
management will therefore deal with having the
right people, with the right knowledge using the
right tools for the company’s situation in place.
If a company is successful in this endeavor it will
be able to make risk-informed business
decisions that enable it to manage safety in an
for the company economically responsible
manner.

References
1. ISO/IEC Guide 51 second edition, draft, 1997.
2. EEC/97/23, Directive Of The European Parliament And Of The Council On The Approximation Of The
Laws Of The Member States Concerning Pressure Equipment, May 1997.
3. EN 298, Automatic gas burner control system for gas burners and gas burning appliances with or
without fans. European Norm EN298.
4. Leveson N.G., Safeware, System Safety and Computers. Addison Wesley, September 1995.
5. Integrated Safety Management System Description, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Version
3.0, February 14, 2000.

info@risknowlogy.com Copyright  2002 - 2003 Risknowlogy 3