Development and Psychopathology, 7(1995), 1-10

Copyright © 1995 Cambridge University Press

Printed in the United States of America

Emotions and emotion regulation in

developmental psychopathology

DANTE CICCHETTI, 0 BRIAN P. ACKERMAN,*

AND CARROLL E. IZARD*
"Mt. Hope Family Center, University of Rochester, Department of Psychology; and
b
University of Delaware, Department of Psychology

Abstract
The understanding of emotions possesses important implications for elucidating normal as well as abnormal
development. The contributions that the emotions have made for enhancing our understanding of
psychopathology have been evident throughout history. In this article, an overview of the historical links
between the emotions and psychopathology is presented. Despite its rich history, much contemporary theory
and research on emotions has been conducted primarily within a nonpathology perspective. In recent decades,
investigators have become more interested in examining the role and development of the emotions in atypical
populations. It has been argued that the modularity of the emotions system requires a developmental model of
emotion regulation.

The investigation of the emotions has im- tions relate to other domains of the human
portant implications for understanding nor- mind such as biology, cognition, social cog-
mal and abnormal development (Hesse & nition, language, representation, and moti-
Cicchetti, 1982; Izard & Harris, in press), vation, will we be able to specify the condi-
One of the theoretical consequences of the tions necessary to effect particular changes
examination of normal emotional develop- in the emotional domain. Additionally, the
ment is that it highlights the need to con- study of abnormal populations can enhance
struct a model that can distinguish between our understanding of some of the processes
well-adjusted and abnormal emotional de- involved in normal emotional development,
velopment. Moreover, the theoretical and As Bleuler (1924, p. 117) noted, affectivity
practical import of the investigation of
emotional development is also critical with . . , assumes a prominent role in psychopathol-
respect to the formulation of an integrated ogy generally, even in slight deviations, not only
theory of development. Thus, only if we on account of its own morbid manifestations,
possess information about how the emo- but even more because in disturbances in any
sphere, it is the affective mechanisms that first
create the manifest symptoms.
Dante Cicchetti's work on this project was supported
by grants from the National Institute of Mental Health „,, *•!.*• r *• * u
T h e
(MH 45027) and the Spunk Fund, Inc. Brian Acker- contribution of emotion to psycho-
man's work was supported by Grant No. 93-1548-93 pathology has been investigated throughout
from the William T. Grant Foundation. Carroll Izard's history (Mora & Brand, 1970). For exam-
work for this paper was supported by NSF Grant No. p l e , writing in the fourth century B.C.,
SBR-9108925. Hippocrates viewed madness in relation to
Address correspondence and reprint requests to: ., . . .. r ., - , ... ,
the
Dr. Dante Cicchetti, Director, Mt. Hope Family Cen- interaction of the four bodily humors
ter, 187 Edinburgh St., Univ. of Rochester, Rochester, - b l o o d , black bile, yellow bile, and
NY 14608. phlegm—that resulted from the combina-
1
2 D. Cicchetti, B. P. Acker man, and C. E. hard
tion of the four basic qualities in nature—
heat, cold, moisture, and dryness. Corre-
sponding temperaments—sanguine, chol-
eric, melancholic, and phlegmatic—were
used to classify people's emotional orienta-
tion (cf. Jackson, 1986). This conceptual-
ization of madness represented a radical
move away from a belief in supernatural
causation of mental disorders and a step to-
ward a more medical scientific under-
standing.
Aristotle, also in the fourth century
B.C., was the first individual to postulate
that the effective treatment of mental illness
rested upon the release of repressed emo-
tions or passions. The first philosopher to
write detailed descriptions of the passions
was Cicero. In Tusculanae Disputationes,
written in the first century B.C., Cicero
considered "libido" (violent desire) to be the
strongest passion. Cicero was the first to
utilize the term libido in a psychological
sense and believed that' excessive perturba-
tion could cause diseases of the soul that re-
suited from errors in judgment. Contrary to
the Stoic dogma of the time that psychologi-
cal disturbances resulted from defects of
reason, the Roman physician, Galen, in the
second century A.D., believed that psycho-
logical health depended upon the proper
balance of the rational, irrational, and lust-
ful parts of the soul. St. Augustine was per-
haps most well known for his writings on
religious themes, he also placed much em-
phasis on the passions in his work in the
fifth century A.D. St. Augustine accepted
Cicero's classification of the four main pas-
sions as desire, fear, joy, and sorrow and
believed, likewise, that these passions could
be moderated by reason.
Thomas Aquinas, writing in the 13th
century, stressed the body-mind unity and a
biological foundation of psychopathology.
Aquinas argued that the soul could not be-
come sick; rather he believed that insanity
was a somatic disturbance. Aquinas attrib-
uted mental disturbance to the deficient use
of reason, resulting either from an interfer-
ence of the passions or a dysfunctioning in
the body. The view that the emotions repre-
sented an important internal force that
when not regulated by reason could lead to
melancholia through the mediating bodily
actions, had begun to gain ground by the
16th century. Against the backdrop of the
widespread belief in the role of the super-
natural and the occult, Richard Burton,
writing in the 17th century, argued in A nat-
omy of Melancholy (1621/1948), that emo-
tional factors such as jealousy, solitude,
fear, poverty, unrequited love, and exces-
sive religiosity played a key role in insanity.
The emphasis on reason and the disdain
for irrationality, which characterized the
18th-century age of enlightenment, was re-
fleeted in attitudes toward the mentally ill,
who were regarded as objects of ridicule,
The physician Phillippe Pinel, best known
for releasing the mentally ill from their
chains, stressed the importance of predispo-
sition, in particular concerning the role of
the passions to the development of mental
illness. According to Pinel, the passions or
emotions were considered the link between
mind and body. Building upon Aristotle's
belief that a balance of the passions was a
prerequisite to good mental health, Pinel's
conceptualization of treatment involved the
doctor's control of the patients' will with his
gaze and placing them in a structured envi-
ronment. Following Pinel, Jean Etienne
Esquirol dominated the early 19th-century
psychiatric movement and placed strong
emphasis on the role of emotions in the eti-
ology of mental illness,
Kraepelin, writing in the early 20th cen-
tury, also stressed the role of emotion in the
development of schizophrenia and its rela-
tionship to the activities of the intellect and
volition. In Lectures on Clinical Psychiatry,
Kraepelin (1904) vividly portrayed the lack
of emotional response often characteristic
of schizophrenics: "There is no sign of emo-
tional dejection, such as one would expect
from the nature of his talk, and the patient
remains quite dull throughout, experiencing
neither fear nor hope nor desires" (p. 23).
Moreover, schizophrenia was characterized
by a loss of the "inner unity" among emo-
tion, cognition, and the will (Kraepelin,
1921/1987). Noting the schizophrenic's ten-
dency to cry or to laugh without apparent
Emotions and emotion regulation
reason, Kraepelin argued that without this
underlying organization and integration,
emotions did not correspond to ideas. Ac-
cording to this view, emotion and cognition
were seen as products of an underlying asso-
ciational or connective process without
which their normal integration was not pos-
sible.
Bleuler, also in the early 20th century,
placed much emphasis on the role of affec-
tivity in the symptomatology of schizophre-
nia (1911/1950). Noting that emotional de-
terioration stands in the forefront of the
clinical picture of schizophrenia, Bleuler
pointed out that the disappearance of the
affects signaled that an "acute curable psy-
chosis" had become "chronic." According
to Bleuler, affective indifference character-
ized schizophrenia. Although in milder
cases and in the beginning of the disease
there might be an affective oversensitivity,
there is a lack of depth to the affect. Bleuler
further noted the diagnostic power of the
particular type of affect shown in acute
episodes of the disease. He contrasted the
deeply felt affective expression of the
manic-depressive patient with the superfi-
cial, melodramatic, and disunifying aspects
of affectivity in schizophrenia. Unlike the
manic depressive whose emotional lability
and thought content are linked together (see
also Kraepelin, 1921/1987), the affective
mood of the disturbed schizophrenic does
not parallel the changing content of
thought. Whatever affect is present in the
schizophrenic is not, according to Bleuler,
in response to thoughts but is rather an ab-
normal basic state of affectivity. This un-
derlying affective rigidity can invest the ex-
pressions of an entire range of moods. For
example, Bleuler observed that schizo-
phrenics seem to laugh and cry with the
same affective expression.
Bleuler (1911/1950) viewed schizophre-
nia in terms of a breakdown in the rela-
tionship between affect and cognition. He
attributed the distortions of logic character-
istic of schizophrenic thought to the way in
which affectively charged associations be-
come substituted for logical operations. As
Bleuler (1924) noted, "the influence of the
3
affects on the associations produces delu-
sions, systematic splittings of personality,
and hysteroid twilight s t a t e s . . . " (p. 117).
Bleuler believed that when logical reasoning
weakened, the influence of the affects be-
came stronger. As a result, with the disinte-
gration of the association pathways, the af-
fects could connect any material to the
split-off complexes of ideas so that any re-
maining logic served the affective needs,
In his important work on the clinical de-
scription of psychopathy, The Mask ofSan-
ity, Cleckley (1937/1976) argued that one of
the central characteristics of this disorder
involved an elimination or an attenuation
of affect. Although the expression of emo-
tions appears to be normal in psychopathy,
in fact, the psychopath does not really feel
the emotions that are being expressed. The
psychopath merely pantomimes emotions,
Without the ability to feel deeply, the psy-
chopath lacks a sense of value and sound
judgment. Cleckley believed that this mim-
icry of truly felt emotion was paralleled in
the cognitive domain. The psychopath ap-
pears to have perfectly normal logical
thought processes, but the psychopath is
only superficially imitating these functions,
These defects in both emotion and reason-
ing contribute to the disorder that occurs at
deep levels of personality integration and
prevent experience from becoming ade-
quately meaningful to the psychopath,
Thus there has been a long and rich his-
tory of the role that emotion-cognition dis-
equilibrium plays in the unfolding of psy-
chopathology. Several themes are present in
the earlier views on the role of emotion in
psychopathology. One theme suggests a
dysregulating, negative role for the emo-
tions. According to this view, psychopath-
ology is conceptualized as the result of unre-
strained emotions. A second theme revolves
around the regulating role of reason. Rea-
son is seen as the check by which the emo-
tions can be kept under control. From this
viewpoint, psychopathology is understood
as resulting from deficits in reason that
allow the emotions to become unrestrained
in a fashion that is deleterious to the indi-
vidual. A third, albeit less frequent theme
4 D. Cicchetti, B. P. Ackerman, and C. E. Izard
found in the work of Aristotle is that psy-
chopathology, which results from the im-
balance between cognition and emotion,
can best be helped by the release of the emo-
A r- i *u *u • The emotions system
tions. A final theme concerns the way in
which many of these earlier theorists viewed
emotion and reason (cognition) as two very
distinct domains.
Despite the attention directed to the emo-
tions by early systematizers in psychopath-
ology, and the fact that psychiatrists, clini-
cal psychologists, and social workers often
describe problems of adjustment and cate-
gories of psychopathological disorders as
emotional disorders, much of contempo-
rary theory and research has examined the
emotions from a predominately nonpathol-
ogy perspective. During the past few de-
cades, however, a growing number of re-
searchers have sought to understand the
role and development of emotion in atypi-
cal populations, including Down syndrome
(Cicchetti & Sroufe, 1978), Williams syn-
drome (Reilly, Klima, & Bellugi, 1990), au-
tism (Baron-Cohen, Tager-Flusberg, &
Cohen, 1993; Hobson, 1992, 1993), child
maltreatment (Cicchetti &Toth, in press-a),
depression (Davidson, 1994; Hooley, 1986;
Izard & Harris, in press; Watson, Clark, &
Carey, 1988), bipolar illness (Cicchetti &
Toth, in press-b), schizophrenia (Walker,
Grimes, Davis, & Smith, 1993), and person-
ality disorder (Malatesta & Wilson, 1988).
Additionally, scientists interested in the de-
terminants of resilient functioning likewise
have focused some of their efforts on the
emotions (Cicchetti, Rogosch, Lynch, &
Holt, 1993; Werner & Smith, 1992). More-
over, researchers have begun to utilize "ex-
periments in nature" such as autism, child
maltreatment, and Down syndrome to elu-
cidate our understanding of the role that
emotional processes play in the organiza-
tion of normal development (Cicchetti, in
press; Cicchetti & Sroufe, 1978; Hobson,
1990; Tager-Flusberg, 1994). In particular
much of the work on atypical populations
has played a prominent role in demonstrat-
ing that emotions are not merely epipheno-
mena of cognition or language but comprise
their own separate developmental system
(Izard, 1993).
„,,
^
The central function of the emotions system
is to motivate and organize behavior. The
system is composed of separable compo-
nents involving dedicated neural processes,
expressive behavior, and subjective experi-
ence or feeling states. Although the emo-
tions system and cognitive system are highly
interactive and have reciprocal causal rela-
tions, each system has a degree of indepen-
dent functioning (cf. Cicchetti & Hesse,
1983; Cicchetti & Pogge-Hesse, 1981; Le-
Doux, 1989; Sroufe, 1979; Zola-Morgan,
Squire, Alvarez-Royo, & Clower, 1991).
The independence is greatest in early
childhood and declines thereafter as system
intercoordination increases. From this per-
spective, a central aspect of emotion regula-
tion is the intercoordination of the emo-
tions and cognitive systems. Regulation
failures involve problems of intersystem
communication, and dysregulation involves
affective-cognitive products that are mal-
adaptive to particular situations (Cicchetti,
Ganiban, & Barnett, 1991; Cicchetti &
Toth, in press-b).
One theoretical reason for treating the
emotions system as separable in childhood
is that it meets criteria for modularity (cf.
Fodor, 1981). A system is modular, in gen-
eral, if humans are biologically predisposed
to abstract and respond to system input in
highly specific ways. Among the key proper-
ties of modules are encapsulation, hard wir-
ing, fast processing, and organization. En-
capsulation describes the restricted access of
one module to another, such that, for in-
stance, the emotions systems is activated by
sources other than the cognitive system, and
vice versa. In meeting this criterion, Izard
(1993) has shown that emotions are activated
by neural, sensorimotor, and affective pro-
cesses, as well as cognitive processes. The in-
put to the emotions system comes in the form
of cellular information in enzymes and
genes, organismic information based on
Emotions and emotion regulation
physiological drive states, biopsychological
information from appraisal of biologically
prepared stimuli, and cognitive representa-
tions. Conversely, abundant evidence shows
that the emotions system has a causal influ-
ence on cognitive interpretations and pro-
cesses, independent of the influence of cog-
nitive appraisals on emotions.
The hard-wiring criterion requires that a
modular function be associated with dedi-
cated, localized, and innate neural struc-
tures. The result is that some functions are
innate or appear early in development and
are not assembled through experience,
These neural structures mediate the fast
processing of information to the system in
that the dedicated module needs to consider
only a small portion of the stimulus input to
be activated.
The evidence for hard wiring is that the
neural activation of emotion can be medi-
ated by structures that have functions spe-
cific to the emotions system. LeDoux (1987,
1992) showed, for example, that emotions
can be activated by a dedicated thalamoa-
mygdala pathway that can operate inde-
pendently of the neocortex and cognitive
processes. He argued that the amygdala
functions as an emotional computer that
evaluates the affective significance of stim-
uli and transmits the sensory data to struc-
tures in the brain stem central gray matter
and the hypothalamus. Efferent activity
from these structures activates emotional
behavior (e.g., freezing) and emotion ex-
pression (facial patterning, autonomic ner-
vous system activity), respectively. In ef-
feet, this combination of sensory input,
evaluative processing and efferent activi-
ty transforms affective information into
emotion responses. For emotion activated
through the thalamoamygdala pathway, the
transformation is fast, occurs early in per-
ceptual processing, and occurs prior to cog-
nitive processes involved in fine discrimi-
nation, recognition, categorization, and
comparison of objects or events. Similarly,
Izard and colleagues (Izard, 1977; Izard &
Harris, in press; Izard & Malatesta, 1987)
have provided evidence that the neural com-
5
ponent (as evidenced in emotion expres-
sions) is present at birth for some of the ba-
sic emotions and for several others by 6 or
7 months. Ekman (1972) and Izard (1971)
also showed that emotion expressions are
not only privileged phylogenetically and on-
togenetically (i.e., early onset in infancy),
but also have a component that is invariant
across human cultures and can be elicited
from infants by noncognitive processes
(e.g., by sensory, affective information
such as tastes and pain). The responses and
expressions seem preadapted and not as-
sembled through experience. Thus, both an-
imals and human infants show rapid and
species-specific displays and emotional be-
havior to some environmental stimuli,
The organization criterion is the systemic
aspect of modular functioning. Organiza-
tion requires discrete aspects of a system
that function both separately and in combi-
nation with other aspects. A further re-
quirement of an open and developing sys-
tern is that organizational characteristics
show both stability and change over time,
Differential emotions theory (Izard, 1989;
Izard & Ackerman, in press) describes basic
or primary emotions such as interest, joy,
sadness, anger, and fear, that each have an
early onset, unique activation thresholds in
the individual, distinct and invariant moti-
vational properties (e.g., interest always
motivates exploration), and are associated
with unique expressive signs or signatures,
Certain emotions are basic because they re-
quire no cognitive construction for activa-
tion or expression. For example, anger in an
infant is associated with unique facial ex-
pressions that can be reliably identified by
3 or 4 months-of-age and that are reliably
associated with appropriate stimulus events,
A motivational function of anger is to in-
crease sensitivity to frustrating events or ob-
stacles to goal-oriented behavior, trigger as-
sertive thought, and energize or intensify
actions toward the source of provocation,
Similarly, cycles of interest and joy moti-
vate play behavior, as suggested by the de-
creased level and quality of play shown by
depressed children and the clinical evidence
6 D. Cicchetti, B. P. Ackerman, and C. E. Izard

in depression of loss of interest (Blumberg others (cf. Campos, Campos, & Barrett,
& Izard, 1986). 1989). Even strong and intense emotions are
These discrete emotions are stable over not necessarily maladaptive. Emotions may
time in that the basic quality of the feeling become maladaptive in two situations. One
state is stable and motivates the same type is when emotions are unconnected to cogni-
of behavior across situations and time. Yet tive or affective-cognitive control structures
the discrete emotions also contribute to sys- or are connected to cognitive processes and
tem reorganization with development in the actions that are situationally inappropriate,
further specification of emotional states In the latter case it is the cognitive appraisal
and the formation of patterns or complexes and behavior that are maladaptive, not
of emotions and the emergence of more the emotion. Affective-cognitive structures
complex and social emotions such as con- also may become developmentally embed-
tempt, shame, and guilt that have cognitive ded and serve as the basis for generating
prerequisites. Each emotion tends to form other maladaptive structures. The other sit-
stable and discrete links to other emotions uation may involve emotional flooding,
in the development of complex assemblies, where an emotion overwhelms control
In such a stable pattern, two or more emo- structures and strategies. In Wakefield's
tions occur either simultaneously or alterna- terms (1922a, 1922b), this situation repre-
tively (Izard, 1972, 1992). A good example sents "harmful dysfunction," in that an evo-
is the sadness-anger-shame pattern that lutionary control mechanism cannot per-
characterizes depression (Blumberg & form its natural function.
Izard, 1985, 1986; Izard, 1977). Fourth, connections and communication
Conceptualizing emotions in childhood between the emotions and cognitive systems
as discrete aspects of a developing system are indeed likely to play a major role in
has several important implications for the most forms of adult psychopathology.
historical themes described in the previous However, inadequate intersystem commu-
section. First, emotions are always present nication may result from a variety of prob-
and do not simply reflect emergency states, lems involving both regulation and dys-
The focus of psychopathologists on "nega- regulation. Fifth, defective intersystem
tive" emotions deemphasizes the adaptive communication cannot be fully conceptual-
value of positive emotions and of negative ized or understood without understanding
emotions of moderate intensity (mild anger and describing the development of intersys-
to support constructive self-assertiveness) tem communication and affective-cognitive
and devalues the emotional content of all control structures in children developing
daily activity. Second, the specific emotions normally and abnormally (cf. Cicchetti,
associated with maladaptive behavior pat- 1990). Intersystem communication and
terns need to be identified. The problem control structures enable emotion regula-
cannot reflect dysregulation of negative tion.
emotion because negative emotion is not
unidimensional. Emotions occur separately _, . d.
t.l4. , r ,. Emotion regulation
and in clusters and patterns of discrete emo-
tions, and identification of the discrete Emotion regulation is critical both in ini-
emotions motivating behavior provides tiating, motivating, and organizing adap-
more theoretical precision and explanatory tive behavior, and in preventing stressful
power than constructs that homogenize levels of negative emotions and maladaptive
emotions. behavior. Although most instances of be-
Third, emotions represent evolutionary havior problems and psychopathology in
distillates that have inherently adaptive fea- childhood involve aspects of emotion regu-
tures. Emotion as a feeling state prepares an Iation and dysregulation, theorists have just
organism for action, and expressive dis- begun the work of describing the processes
plays have communicative value to self and of emotion regulation in childhood. Behav-
Emotions and emotion regulation
ioral products are known, some antecedents
in family and maternal interactions have
been described, but little is known about
mediating processes, or processes that are
specific to emotions as a quasi-independent
modular system. As a result, the construct
of emotion regulation is useful as a meta-
phor of balance but is too broad to be useful
as an explanation of behavior. In this arti-
cle, we attempt to describe aspects of the
construct. We believe theory and research
will be facilitated by recognizing that some
regulatory processes are aimed directly at
specific emotions or processes within the
emotions system, whereas others are di-
rected to emotion-cognition and emotion-
action links.
Mechanisms. Regulating an emotion re-
quires control mechanisms or some struc-
ture or strategy that can influence emo-
tional intensity and coordinate emotion and
action. Differential emotions theory de-
scribes four aspects of control mechanisms.
First, control must concern the separable
causes of felt emotion. Thus mechanisms
must develop to regulate neural, sensorimo-
tor, affective, and cognitive inputs to the
emotions system. Even a rough homeostasis
requires, for example, some gating mecha-
nism, such as crying in infancy, to reduce
arousal and shut down perseverative feed-
back cycles.
Second, control structures regulate out-
put of the emotions system as well. These
mechanisms probably reflect the increasing
influence of cognitive processes with devel-
opment, in which case they reflect affective-
cognitive structures. Such structures repre-
sent feedback cycles of reciprocal cause and
control between the emotions and cognitive
systems. In addition, the structures are spe-
cific to particular emotions and blends and
to both specific and generic (i.e., schematic)
cognitive representations of episodic events.
For example, the kinds of social informa-
tion packages examined by Dodge (1991)
and Garber, Braafladt, and Zeman (1991)
for cognitive appraisals of hostile and sad
events represent more generic affective-
cognitive structures. These structures may
be fluid and highly adaptable or more rigid
and stereotyped. Another popular example
is the working model construct of attach-
ment theory (Bowlby, 1969/1982; Brether-
ton, 1985; Crittenden, 1990).
Third, control structures coordinate
emotion and action, which include expres-
sive behavior under voluntary control. The
primary function of the emotions system
may be to motivate behavior, but the moti-
vation must be directed rather than random
to serve organismic goals. If the goal is to
cope with some event or stimulus, the action
may be emotion focused as well as problem
focused.
Fourth, this perspective distinguishes be-
tween problems of emotion regulation and
dysregulation. Dysregulation requires exist-
ing control structures that operate in a mal-
adaptive manner and direct emotion toward
inappropriate (i.e., unconventional) goals.
Most externalizing and internalizing behav-
ioral problems in later childhood reflect the
dysregulation of affective-cognitive struc-
tures and processes. Through social learn-
ing emotions can become connected to devi-
ant cognitive and action strategies, and the
power of emotions is just as great in motiva-
ting deviant behavior as in motivating adap-
tive behavior. In contrast, problems of
emotion regulation concern weak or absent
control structures or structures that are
overwhelmed by disabling emotional in-
puts. In the absence of control mechanisms,
emotions may be disorganizing. Because
control mechanisms develop in childhood,
many behavior problems in early and mid-
dle childhood reflect the weak influence of
regulatory processes. Evidence of develop-
ment is the change from emotional re-
sponses in early childhood that are rela-
tively unpredictable in terms of intensity,
frequency, and duration, to a more unified
and predictable pattern of emotional behav-
ior in middle childhood. Similarly, a failure
to inhibit behavior reflects problems of reg-
ulating emotion-action links rather than an
emotion dysregulation problem.
Functions. An initial requirement of con-
trol of a modular emotions system is inter-
8 D. Cicchetti, B. P. Ackerman, and C. E. Izard
system communication that promotes ac-
cessibility to awareness of feelings, desires,
impulses, and expressive behavior. Emo-
tion information (input) to the self must be
interpreted in relation to existing affective-
cognitive structures. Emotion knowledge of
self and others in identifying feelings and
expressive behavior frames emotion infor-
mation inputs to the self and thus mediates
a monitoring function (cf. Campos, 1994).
Absent or weak intersystem communication
and monitoring results in dissociated emo-
tional and cognitive processes and emo-
tional leaking as in disorders involving
dissociation (Spiegel & Cardena, 1991). Hy-
pervigilance also may be disabling in the re-
verse way in that emotional attention that is
too selective or narrow restricts sampling of
emotional signals and input and allows spe-
cific discrete emotions to dominate commu-
nication channels. Monitoring then serves
modification of emotional inputs and the
coordination of emotion and action.
Processes. The processes of emotion regu-
lation apply to both positive and negative
emotions. Modification includes processes
that: attenuate or deactivate an ongoing
emotion; amplify an ongoing emotion; acti-
vate a desired emotion; and mask or dis-
guise an emotion feeling state. These pro-
cesses facilitate task-oriented behavior in
the face of distracting events and condi-
tions, and avoid or weaken the stress of neg-
ative emotions from failure, loss, and
trauma. Although process-oriented models
are lacking in developmental research, a
good example of an emotion modification
process is the deactivating attachment strat-
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negative emotions aroused by an unrespon-
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adaptive strategies for dealing with predict-
able environments, and they reflect and give
rise to emotion control structures. An un-
predictable environment may be disabling
and disorganizing, then, in part because
children are unable to generate consistent
processes for controlling emotions,
In summary, the modularity of the emo-
tions system calls attention to the need for
a developmental model of emotion regula-
tion. Kopp's (1989) descriptive model of de-
velopmental stages is a good start. Simi-
larly, the construct of emotion regulation
works well as a metaphor for mental bal-
ance (functional intersystem communica-
tion) that is exquisitely sensitive to environ-
mental inputs, not unlike the humoral
model of illness and environmental conta-
gion that dominated through mid-Victorian
English and American medicine (cf. Haller,
1981; Rosenberg, 1992). However, explana-
tory power having to do with descriptions
of discrete structures and pathogenic pro-
cesses is not contained in the model. Most
important, a process-oriented understand-
ing of the development of specific control
mechanisms and how problems of regula-
tion and dysregulation become translated
into aberrant behaviors at different ages is
missing.
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