De Leon v.

CA

Facts: Jose Vicente De Leon and petitioner Sylvia Lichauco De Leon were
united in wedlock. A child named Susana L. De Leon was born from this
union. A de facto separation between the spouses occured due to
irreconcilable marital differences, with Sylvia leaving the conjugal home.
Sylvia went to the United States where she obtained American citizenship.

Sylvia filed with the Superior Court of California, County of San Francisco, a
petition for dissolution of marriage against Jose Vicente. Sylvia also filed
claims for support and distribution of properties. It appears, however, that
since Jose Vicente was then a Philippine resident and did not have any
assets in the United States, Sylvia chose to hold in abeyance the divorce
proceedings, and in the meantime, concentrated her efforts to obtain some
sort of property settlements with Jose Vicente in the Philippines.

Sylvia succeeded in entering into a Letter-Agreement with her mother-in-

law, private respondent Macaria De Leon. It includes:

To deliver with clear title free from all liens and encumbrances and
subject to no claims in any form whatsoever the following properties.

To give monthly support payable six (6) months in advance every year
to any designated assignee of the wife for the care and upbringing of Susana
Lichauco de Leon.

To respect the custody of said minor daughter as pertaining exclusively

to the wife.

Obligations of the Wife: (a) To agree to a judicial separation of property in

accordance with Philippine law, (b) to amend her complaint in the United
States before the Federal Court of California, U.S.A. entitled "Sylvia Lichauco
de Leon vs. Jose V. de Leon" in a manner compatible with the objectives of
this herein agreement

Sylvia and Jose Vicente filed before the then Court of First Instance of Rizal a
joint petition for judicial approval of dissolution of their conjugal
partnership.

After ex-parte hearings, the trial court issued an Order approving the petition.

Sylvia moved for the execution of the above-mentioned order. However, Jose
Vicente moved for a reconsideration of the order alleging that Sylvia
made a verbal reformation of the petition. While the said motion for
reconsideration was pending resolution, Macaria filed with the trial court a
motion for leave to intervene alleging that she is the owner of the
properties involved in the case.

Macaria, assisted by her husband Juan De Leon, filed her complaint in

intervention. She assailed the validity and legality of the Letter-
Agreement which had for its purpose, according to her, the termination
of marital relationship between Sylvia and Jose Vicente.

Trial court rendered judgment, declaring the letter-agreement null and void.
Judgment is likewise rendered affirming the order of the Court declaring the
conjugal partnership of the spouses Jose Vicente De Leon and Sylvia
Lichauco De Leon DISSOLVED; and adjudicating to each of them his or her
share of the properties and assets of said conjugal partnership in accordance
with the agreement embodied in paragraph 5 of the petition, except insofar as
the adjudication to petitioner Sylvia L. De Leon of the properties belonging to
and owned by Intervenor Macaria De Leon is concerned.

Sylvia appealed.

Issue: whether or not the Letter-Agreement is valid.

Held: NO. Sylvia insists that the consideration for her execution of the
Letter-Agreement was the termination of property relations with her
husband. Indeed, Sylvia and Jose Vicente subsequently filed a joint petition
for judicial approval of the dissolution of their conjugal partnership, sanctioned
by Article 191 of the Civil Code. On the other hand, Macaria and Jose Vicente
assert that the consideration was the termination of marital relationship.

Court sustained the observation of the Trial Court: the parties contemplated
not only to agree to a judicial separation of property of the spouses but
likewise to continue with divorce proceedings , the parties clearly
contemplated not only the termination of property relationship but
likewise of marital relationship in its entirety. Furthermore, it would be
safe to assume that the parties in Exhibit 'E' not having specified the particular
relationship which they wanted to peacefully and amicably terminate had
intended to terminate all kinds of relations, both marital and property.
Furthermore, there is merit in concluding that the consideration by which
Intervenor executed Exhibit 'E' to 'E-2' was to secure freedom for her son
petitioner Jose Vicente De Leon, especially if Exhibit 'R'-Intervenor, which is
(sic) agreement signed by petitioner Sylvia to consent to and pardon Jose
Vicente De Leon for adultery and concubinage (among others) would be
considered.

The Court, therefore, finds and holds that the cause or consideration for
the intervenor Macaria De Leon in having executed Exhibits 'E' to 'E-2'
was the termination of the marital relationship between her son Jose
Vicente De Leon and Sylvia Lichauco de Leon.

The court is of the considered opinion and so holds that intervenor's

undertaking under Exhibit 'E' premised on the termination of marital
relationship is not only contrary to law but contrary to Filipino morals
and public Policy. As such, any agreement or obligations based on such
unlawful consideration and which is contrary to public policy should be
deemed null and void.
Alipio v. CA

Summary: The question for decision in this case is whether a creditor can
sue the surviving spouse for the collection of a debt which is owed by
the conjugal partnership of gains, or whether such claim must be filed in
proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the decedent. The trial court
and the Court of Appeals ruled in the affirmative. We reverse.

Facts: Romeo Jaring was the lessee of a 14.5 hectare fishpond. The lease
was for a period of five years. He subleased the fishpond, for the remaining
period of his lease, to the spouses Placido and Purita Alipio and the spouses
Bienvenido and Remedios Manuel. The stipulated amount of rent was
P485,600.00, payable in two installments of P300,000.00 and P185,600.00.

The first installment was duly paid, but of the second installment, the
sublessees only satisfied a portion thereof. Despite due demand, the
sublessees failed to comply with their obligation, so that private respondent
sued the Alipio and Manuel spouses for the collection of the said amount
before the Regional Trial Court. In the alternative, he prayed for the rescission
of the sublease contract should the defendants fail to pay the balance.

Purita Alipio moved to dismiss the case on the ground that her husband,
Placido Alipio, had passed away. She based her action on Rule 3, §21 of the
1964 Rules of Court which then provided that "when the action is for
recovery of money, debt or interest thereon, and the defendant dies
before final judgment in the Court of First Instance, it shall be dismissed
to be prosecuted in the manner especially provided in these rules."

This provision has been amended so that now Rule 3, §20 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

When the action is for the recovery of money arising from contract, express or
implied, and the defendant dies before entry of final judgment in the court in
which the action was pending at the time of such death, it shall not be
dismissed but shall instead be allowed to continue until entry of final
judgment.

The trial court denied petitioner’s motion on the ground that since petitioner
was herself a party to the sublease contract, she could be independently
impleaded in the suit together with the Manuel spouses and that the
death of her husband merely resulted in his exclusion from the case.
The Manuel spouses failed to file their answer. For this reason, they were
declared in default.

The lower court rendered judgment after trial, ordering petitioner and the
Manuel spouses to pay private respondent the unpaid balance.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals on the ground that the trial court
erred in denying her motion to dismiss. The appellate court dismissed her
appeal.

Issue: whether a creditor can sue the surviving spouse for the collection of a
debt which is owed by the conjugal partnership of gains

Held: NO. The Court held that a creditor cannot sue the surviving spouse of a
decedent in an ordinary proceeding for the collection of a sum of money
chargeable against the conjugal partnership and that the proper remedy is
for him to file a claim in the settlement of estate of the decedent.

Ratio: Petitioner’s husband died more than ten months before private
respondent filed the collection suit in the trial court. This case thus falls
outside of the ambit of Rule 3, §21 which deals with dismissals of collection
suits because of the death of the defendant during the pendency of the case
and the subsequent procedure to be undertaken by the plaintiff. As already
noted, Rule 3, §20 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure now provides that the
case will be allowed to continue until entry of final judgment.

Petitioner and her late husband, together with the Manuel spouses, signed the
sublease contract binding themselves to pay the amount of stipulated rent.
Under the law, the Alipios’ obligation is one which is chargeable against their
conjugal partnership.

When petitioner’s husband died, their conjugal partnership was automatically

dissolved and debts chargeable against it are to be paid in the settlement of
estate proceedings in accordance with Rule 73, 52.

The reason for this is that upon the death of one spouse, the powers of
administration of the surviving spouse ceases and is passed to the
administrator appointed by the court having jurisdiction over the
settlement of estate proceedings.

Second. The trial court ordered petitioner and the Manuel spouses to pay
private respondent the unpaid balance of the agreed rent in the amount of
P50,600.00 without specifying whether the amount is to be paid by them
jointly or solidarily.

Indeed, if from the law or the nature or the wording of the obligation the
contrary does not appear, an obligation is presumed to be only joint.

Clearly, the liability of the sublessees is merely joint. Since the obligation of
the Manuel and Alipio spouses is chargeable against their respective conjugal
partnerships, the unpaid balance of P50,600.00 should be divided into two so
that each couple is liable to pay the amount of P25,300.00.
Gayon v. Gayon

Facts: Pedro Gayon filed said complaint against the spouses Silvestre Gayon
and Genoveva de Gayon, alleging substantially that, on October 1, 1952, said
spouses executed a deed, whereby they sold to Pedro Gelera, for the sum of
P500.00, a parcel of unregistered land therein described including the
improvements thereon, subject to redemption within five (5) years. The said
right of redemption had not been exercised by Silvestre Gayon, Genoveva de
Gayon, or any of their heirs or successors, despite the expiration of the
period. Pedro Gelera and his wife Estelita Damaso had, by virtue of a deed of
sale sold the aforementioned land to plaintiff Pedro Gayon. Plaintiff is now
praying that an order be issued in plaintiff's favor for the consolidation of
ownership in and to the aforementioned property.

In her answer, Mrs. Gayon alleged that her husband, Silvestre Gayon, died
long before the institution of this case. The complaint is fictitious, for the
signature thereon purporting to be her signature is not hers, neither she nor
her deceased husband had ever executed "any document of whatever nature
in plaintiff's favor". Being a brother of the deceased Silvestre Gayon, plaintiff
"did not exert efforts for the amicable settlement of the case" before filing his
complaint. She prayed, therefore, that the same be dismissed and that plaintiff
be sentenced to pay damages.

Lower court issued the order dismissing the case.

Issue: Should the case be dismissed?

Held: NO. Said order is manifestly erroneous and must be set aside. To begin
with, it is not true that Mrs. Gayon "has nothing to do with the land subject of
plaintiff's complaint." As the widow of Silvestre Gayon, she is one of his
compulsory heirs and has, accordingly, an interest in the property in
question.

In her opposition to the aforesaid motion for reconsideration of the plaintiff,

Mrs. Gayon alleged, inter alia, that the "heirs cannot represent the dead
defendant, unless there is a declaration of heirship." Inasmuch, however, as
succession takes place, by operation of law, "from the moment of the death of
the decedent" and "(t)he inheritance includes all the property, rights and
obligations of a person which are not extinguished by his death," it follows that
if his heirs were included as defendants in this case, they would be sued, not
as "representatives" of the decedent, but as owners of an aliquot interest in
the property in question, even if the precise extent of their interest may still be
undetermined and they have derived it from the decent. Hence, they may be
sued without a previous declaration of heirship, provided there is no pending
special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the decedent.
As regards plaintiff's failure to seek a compromise,

Art. 222 of our Civil Code provides:

No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same family

unless it should appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been
made, but that the same have failed, subject to the limitations in article 2035.

Mrs. Gayon is plaintiff's sister-in-law, whereas her children are his nephews
and/or nieces. Inasmuch as none of them is included in the enumeration
contained in said Art. 217 — which should be construed strictly, it being an
exception to the general rule — and Silvestre Gayon must necessarily be
excluded as party in the case at bar, it follows that the same does not come
within the purview of Art. 222, and plaintiff's failure to seek a
compromise before filing the complaint does not bar the same.
Hontiveros v. RTC

Facts: Spouses Augusto and Maria Hontiveros, filed a complaint for

damages against private respondents Gregorio Hontiveros and Teodora
Ayson. In said complaint, petitioners alleged that they are the owners of a
parcel of land Issued pursuant to the decision of the Intermediate Appellate
Court in a land registration case filed by private respondent Gregorio
Hontiveros. Allegedly, petitioners were deprived of income from the land as a
result of the filing of the land registration case; that such income consisted of
rentals from tenants of the land.

In their answer, private respondents denied that they were married and
alleged that private respondent Hontiveros was a widower while private
respondent Ayson was single. They denied that they had deprived petitioners
of possession of and income from the land. On the contrary, they alleged that
possession of the property in question had already been transferred to
petitioners, since then, petitioners have been directly receiving rentals from
the tenants of the land. They also alleged the complaint failed to state a cause
of action since it did not allege that earnest efforts towards a compromise had
been made, considering that petitioner Augusto Hontiveros and private
respondent Gregorio Hontiveros are brothers. Private respondents prayed for
the dismissal of the complaint and for an order against petitioners to pay
damages to private respondents by way of counterclaim.

Petitioners filed an Amended Complaint to insert therein an allegation that

earnest efforts towards a compromise have been made between the parties
but the same were unsuccessful.

In due time, private respondents filed an Answer to Amended Complaint with

Counterclaim, in which they denied, among other things, that earnest efforts
had been made to reach a compromise but the parties were unsuccessful.

Petitioners moved for a judgment on the pleadings on the ground that private
respondents answer did not tender an issue or that it otherwise admitted the
material allegations of the complaint.

The trial court denied petitioners motion. At the same time, however, it
dismissed the case on the ground that the complaint was not verified as
required by Art. 151 of the Family Code and, therefore, it did not believe that
earnest efforts had been made to arrive at a compromise.

Issue: Does Art. 151 apply in this case?

Held: NO. The absence of the verification required in Art. 151 does not affect
the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of the complaint. The
verification is merely a formal requirement intended to secure an assurance
that matters which are alleged are true and correct. If the court doubted the
veracity of the allegations regarding efforts made to settle the case among
members of the same family, it could simply have ordered petitioners to verify
them. As this Court has already ruled, the court may simply order the
correction of unverified pleadings or act on it and waive strict compliance with
the rules in order that the ends of justice may be served.

Moreover, as petitioners contend, Art. 151 of the Family Code does not apply
in this case since the suit is not exclusively among family members. They
argue that since private respondent Ayson is admittedly a stranger to the
Hontiveros family, the case is not covered by the requirements of Art. 151 of
the Family Code.

The Court agrees with petitioners. The inclusion of private respondent Ayson
as defendant and petitioner Maria Hontiveros as plaintiff takes the case out of
the ambit of Art. 151 of the Family Code. Under this provision, the phrase
members of the same family refers to the husband and wife, parents and
children, ascendants and descendants, and brothers and sisters, whether full
or half-blood.

Religious relationship and relationship by affinity are not given any legal effect
in this jurisdiction. Consequently, private respondent Ayson, who is described
in the complaint as the spouse of respondent Hontiveros, and petitioner Maria
Hontiveros, who is admittedly the spouse of petitioner Augusto Hontiveros,
are considered strangers to the Hontiveros family, for purposes of Art.
151.
Facts: Troadio Manalo died intestate on February 14, 1992. He was survived
by his wife, Pilar S. Manalo, and his eleven (11) children. At the time of his
death, Troadio Manalo left several real properties located in Manila and in the
province of Tarlac including a business under the name and style Manalo's
Machine Shop.

On November 26, 1992, herein respondents, who are eight (8) of the surviving
children of the late Troadio Manalo filed a petition of the judicial settlement of
the estate of their late father, Troadio Manalo, and for the appointment of their
brother, Romeo Manalo, as administrator thereof.

The trial court issued an order setting the said petition for hearing, and
directing the publication of the order for three (3) consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation in Metro Manila, and further directing service
by registered mail of the said order upon the heirs named in the petition at
their respective addresses mentioned therein.

The trial court issued an order 'declaring the whole world in default, except the
government," and set the reception of evidence of the petitioners. However,
the trial court upon motion of set this order of general default aside herein
petitioners.

Several pleadings were subsequently filed by herein petitioners, through

counsel, culminating in the filling of an Omnibus Motion seeking; (1) to set
aside and reconsider the Order of the trial court dated July 9, 1993 which
denied the motion for additional extension of time file opposition; (2) to set for
preliminary hearing their affirmative defenses as grounds for dismissal of the
case; (3) to declare that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
persons of the oppositors; and (4) for the immediate inhibition of the presiding
judge.

The trial court issued an order which resolved: (a) To admit the so-called
Opposition; (b) To deny the prayer of the oppositors for a preliminary hearing
of their affirmative defenses as ground for the dismissal of this proceeding ;
(c)To declare that this court has acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the
oppositors ; (d) To deny the motion of the oppositors for the inhibition of this
Presiding Judge; (e) To set the application of Romeo Manalo for appointment
as regular administrator in the intestate estate of the deceased Troadio
Manalo for hearing.

Herein petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the Court of
Appeals.

In their petition for improperly laid (2) the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction
over their persons; (3) the share of the surviving spouse was included in the
intestate proceedings; (4) there was absence of earnest efforts toward
compromise among members of the same family; and (5) no certification
of non-forum shopping was attached to the petition.

The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari in its Resolution.

Issue: whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals erred in upholding the
questioned orders of the respondent trial court which denied their motion for
the outright dismissal of the petition for judicial settlement of estate despite
the failure of the petitioners therein to aver that earnest efforts toward a
compromise involving members of the same family have been made prior to
the filling of the petition but that the same have failed.

Held: NO. Herein petitioners claim that the petition is actually an ordinary civil
action involving members of the same family. It is a fundamental rule that in
the determination of the nature of an action or proceeding, the averments and
the character of the relief sought   in the complaint, or petition, as in the case at
bar, shall be controlling. A careful srutiny of the Petition for Issuance of Letters
of Administration, Settlement and Distribution of Estate belies herein
petitioners' claim that the same is in the nature of an ordinary civil action. The
said petition contains sufficient jurisdictional facts required in a petition for the
settlement of estate of a deceased person such as the fact of death of the late
Troadio Manalo as well as his residence in the City of Manila at the time of his
said death. The fact of death of the decedent and of his residence within he
country are foundation facts upon which all the subsequent proceedings in the
administration of the estate rest.

Herein petitioners argue that even if the petition were to be considered as a

special proceeding for the settlement of estate of a deceased person, Rule
16, Section 1(j) of the Rules of Court vis-à-vis Article 222 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines would nevertheless apply as a ground for the dismissal of the
same by virtue of Rule 1, Section 2 of the Rules of Court which provides that
the 'rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their object and to
assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination of
every action and proceedings.' Petitioners contend that the term "proceeding"
is so broad that it must necessarily include special proceedings.

The argument is misplaced. Herein petitioners may not validly take refuge
under the provisions of Rule 1, Section 2, of the Rules of Court to justify
the invocation of Article 222 of the Civil Code of the Philippines for the
dismissal of the petition for settlement of the estate of the deceased
Troadio Manalo inasmuch as the latter provision is clear enough.

The above-quoted provision of the law is applicable only to ordinary civil

actions. This is clear from the term 'suit' that it refers to an action by one
person or persons against another or other in a court of justice in which the
plaintiff pursues the remedy which the law affords him for the redress of an
injury or the enforcement of a right, whether at law or in equity.

Ratio: It is difficult to imagine a sadder and more tragic spectacle than a

litigation between members of the same family. It is necessary that every
effort should be made toward a compromise before litigation is allowed to
breed hate and passion in the family. It is know that lawsuit between close
relatives generates deeper bitterness than stranger.

It must be emphasized that the oppositors (herein petitioners) are not being
sued. The Petition is a special proceeding and, as such, it is a remedy
whereby the petitioners therein seek to establish a status, a right, or a
particular fact. The petitioners therein (private respondents herein) merely
seek to establish the fact of death of their father and subsequently to be duly
recognized as among the heirs of the said deceased so that they can validly
exercise their right to participate in the settlement and liquidation of the estate
of the decedent consistent with the limited and special jurisdiction of the
probate court.
Facts: Marcelino V. Dario died intestate. He was survived by his wife,
petitioner Perla G. Patricio and their two sons. Among the properties he left
was a parcel of land with a residential house and a pre-school building.

Marcelino Marc and private respondent, extrajudicially settled the estate of

Marcelino V. Dario. Accordingly, TCT No. RT-30731 (175992) was cancelled
and TCT No. R-213963 was issued in the names of petitioner, private
respondent and Marcelino Marc.

Thereafter, petitioner and Marcelino Marc formally advised private respondent

of their intention to partition the subject property and terminate the co-
ownership. Private respondent refused to partition the property hence
petitioner and Marcelino Marc instituted an action for partition before the
Regional Trial Court.

The trial court ordered the partition of the subject property in the following
manner: Perla G. Patricio, 4/6; Marcelino Marc G. Dario, 1/6; and Marcelino
G. Dario III, 1/6. The trial court also ordered the sale of the property by public
auction wherein all parties concerned may put up their bids. In case of failure,
the subject property should be distributed accordingly in the aforestated
manner.

Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the
trial court, hence he appealed before the Court of Appeals, which denied the
same. However, upon a motion for reconsideration filed by private respondent
the appellate court partially reconsidered. In the now assailed Resolution, the
Court of Appeals dismissed the complaint for partition filed by petitioner and
Marcelino Marc for lack of merit. It held that the family home should continue
despite the death of one or both spouses as long as there is a minor
beneficiary thereof. The heirs could not partition the property unless the court
found compelling reasons to rule otherwise. The appellate court also held that
the minor son of private respondent, who is a grandson of spouses Marcelino
V. Dario and Perla G. Patricio, was a minor beneficiary of the family home.

Issue: whether partition of the family home is proper where one of the co-
owners refuse to accede to such partition on the ground that a minor
beneficiary still resides in the said home.

Held: NO. Private respondent claims that the subject property which is the
family home duly constituted by spouses Marcelino and Perla Dario cannot be
partitioned while a minor beneficiary is still living therein namely, his 12-year-
old son, who is the grandson of the decedent. He argues that as long as the
minor is living in the family home, the same continues as such until the
beneficiary becomes of age.
On the other hand, petitioner alleges that the subject property remained as a
family home of the surviving heirs of the late Marcelino V. Dario only up to
July 5, 1997, which was the 10th year from the date of death of the decedent.
Petitioner argues that the brothers Marcelino Marc and private respondent
Marcelino III were already of age at the time of the death of their father, hence
there is no more minor beneficiary to speak of.

Provision: Article 154 of the Family Code enumerates who are the
beneficiaries of a family home: (1) The husband and wife, or an unmarried
person who is the head of a family; and (2) Their parents, ascendants,
descendants, brothers and sisters, whether the relationship be legitimate or
illegitimate, who are living in the family home and who depend upon the head
of the family for legal support.

To be a beneficiary of the family home, three requisites must concur: (1) they
must be among the relationships enumerated in Art. 154 of the Family Code;
(2) they live in the family home; and (3) they are dependent for legal support
upon the head of the family. Moreover, Article 159 of the Family Code
provides that the family home shall continue despite the death of one or both
spouses or of the unmarried head of the family for a period of 10 years or for
as long as there is a minor beneficiary, and the heirs cannot partition the
same unless the court finds compelling reasons therefor. This rule shall
apply regardless of whoever owns the property or constituted the family
home. Article 159 of the Family Code applies in situations where death
occurs to persons who constituted the family home.

Thus, the issue for resolution now is whether Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario
IV, the minor son of private respondent, can be considered as a
beneficiary under Article 154 of the Family Code. (NO)

As to the first requisite, the term "descendants" contemplates all descendants

of the person or persons who constituted the family home without distinction;
hence, it must necessarily include the grandchildren and great grandchildren
of the spouses who constitute a family home. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos
distinguire debemos. Where the law does not distinguish, we should not
distinguish. Thus, private respondent’s minor son, who is also the grandchild
of deceased Marcelino V. Dario satisfies the first requisite.

As to the second requisite, minor beneficiaries must be actually living in the

family home to avail of the benefits derived from Art. 159. Marcelino Lorenzo
R. Dario IV, also known as Ino, the son of private respondent and grandson of
the decedent Marcelino V. Dario, has been living in the family home since
1994, or within 10 years from the death of the decedent, hence, he satisfies
the second requisite.

However, as to the third requisite, Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV cannot

demand support from his paternal grandmother if he has parents who are
capable of supporting him. The liability for legal support falls primarily on
Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV’s parents, especially his father, herein private
respondent who is the head of his immediate family.
Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV is dependent on legal support not from his
grandmother, but from his father.1âwphi1 Thus, despite residing in the family
home and his being a descendant of Marcelino V. Dario, Marcelino Lorenzo
R. Dario IV cannot be considered as beneficiary contemplated under Article
154 because he did not fulfill the third requisite of being dependent on his
grandmother for legal support. It is his father whom he is dependent on legal
support, and who must now establish his own family home separate and
distinct from that of his parents, being of legal age.

There is no showing that private respondent is without means to support his

son; neither is there any evidence to prove that petitioner, as the paternal
grandmother, was willing to voluntarily provide for her grandson’s legal
support. On the contrary, herein petitioner filed for the partition of the property
which shows an intention to dissolve the family home, since there is no more
reason for its existence after the 10-year period ended in 1997.

With this finding, there is no legal impediment to partition the subject

property.