25R 07montgomery (ds) 12/6/03 7:33 am Page 479

© 2003 Journal of Peace Research,

vol. 40, no. 4, 2003, pp. 479–496
Sage Publications (London, Thousand Oaks, CA
and New Delhi) www.sagepublications.com
[0022-3433(200307)40:4; 479–496; 034292]

Working for Peace While Preparing for War: The

Creation of the United States Institute of Peace*
MARY E. MONTGOMERY
Department of History, University of Maryland

Drawing upon US government and other sources, this article discusses the prolonged debate over
the creation of the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) in the 1980s. In examining the arguments
presented by members of Congress, academicians, the media, religious leaders, and international
observers, this article illustrates how the US government and the presidential administration of
Ronald Reagan created the USIP as a reluctant concession to forces with a more genuine interest in
peace. An overview of the historical initiatives to create a government-sponsored institute for peace
establishes that the campaign is as old as the nation itself. US forays into civil war, national aggran-
dizement, and world wars derailed 19th- and 20th-century progress on the creation of a peace depart-
ment. The academy concept re-emerged after World War II, only to find new competition in the
Cold War. This article also considers the 1981–83 legislative attempts toward a United States Peace
Academy, the work of the resulting exploratory commission, and the ensuing hearings and debate.
The testimony of witnesses before the Commission and during congressional hearings traversed a
wide continuum, from support to derision for the Peace Academy. Would the academy symbolize a
peace commitment to the world community, or suggest that the United States had gone soft, unwill-
ing or unable to win the Cold War? Was the study of peace a cozy yet unviable liberal ideal, or was
peace and conflict resolution studies a meritorious, ‘teachable’ discipline? Did a Peace Academy rep-
resent a positive cost–benefit ratio with regard to US weapons expenditures, or were peace initiatives
no substitute for military deterrence? While these debates ended with the 1984 creation of the USIP,
the backlash of the Reagan administration plagued the institution’s start-up and funding, and sug-
gested that the administration would merely pay lip service to peace, while continuing to prepare for
war. The conclusion provides an overview of the challenges and successes of the USIP since its official
opening in 1986.

Historical Background peace establishment’ for the United States.

Creating a government bureau dedicated to
peace was one of the earliest aspirations of
the drafters of the US constitution. In a 1783
circular to the States, George Washington
commented on the probability of Congress
recommending the creation of a ‘proper
* I would like to thank Rhoda Miller, whose research on
the USIP inspired my own. I also thank Professor Keith W.
Olson for his tireless support. For comment or correspon-
dence regarding this article, I can be reached at
montgom@wam.umd.edu.
Nine years later, Benjamin Banneker
proposed an ‘Office of Peace’, in the first
edition of his ‘Almanack’. Benjamin Rush,
physician and signer of the Declaration of
Independence, published ‘A Plan of a Peace
Office of the United States’ in 1799 (Miller,
1994: 20–21). Nearly identical in sentiment
to Banneker’s work, Rush lamented the
failure of the Constitution to address ‘the
subject of an office of the utmost importance
. . . for promoting and preserving perpetual

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480 j o u r n a l o f P E A C E R E S E A RC H
peace in our country’.1 Discussions over a
national peace agency continued in the 19th
century, but tensions over issues such as
manifest destiny, states’ rights, and slavery
divided organizations that could have
pushed for its creation. A united peace
movement regained momentum in the 20th
century, as the effects of World War I
prompted attempts to stabilize the world
order. This 1920s movement looked to the
United States’ to take a leadership role, but
it was not until the 1930s that Senator
Matthew Neeley of West Virginia submitted
the first congressional proposals to establish
a federal Department of Peace.2 Although
Neeley’s ideas gathered support from fellow
members of Congress, advocacy waned as the
United States’ entry into World War II grew
more probable. The push for a Peace Office
re-emerged after the war, and more than 140
peace department bills appeared in Congress
between 1935 and 1976.3 In the dynamics of
the Cold War, however, none received
significant action. As the United States
worked to encourage a prosperous economy
at home and maintain its power abroad, an
agency for peace remained restricted to the
background of political discussion.4
Still, there were several initiatives that
1 Quoted in To Establish the United States Academy of Peace:
Report of the Commission on Proposals for the National
Academy of Peace and Conflict Resolution to the President of
the United States and the Senate and the House of Represen-
tatives of the United States Congress (Washington, DC: US
Government Printing Office, 1981), p. 45. Hereafter
referred to as Commission Report.
2 Senator Matthew Neeley receives credit for three Depart-
ment of Peace bills in Miller (1994: 22). Commission
Report, p.45, states that Neeley introduced a Department
of Peace bill in 1935. Despite extensive research, I was able
to find only one bill introduced by Neeley, S.776, Bill to
Create an Executive Department of Government to be
known as Department of Peace, 76th Congress, 1st session,
17 January 1939. Congressional Record, Volume 84, Part 1,
3 January 1939 to 6 February 1939 (Washington, DC: US
Government Printing Office, 1939), p. 407.
3 Commission Report, p. 46.
4 For a detailed account of the ideas and activities of the
US peace movement, see DeBenedetti (1980) and Chat-
field (1992). For a useful bibliographical essay, consult
Howlett & Zeitzer (1985).
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volume 40 / number 4 / july 2003
gained attention and served to keep the idea
of a Peace Office alive. In 1955, President
Dwight D. Eisenhower responded to the
pressures of advanced weaponry with the
creation of a cabinet-level post, Special
Assistant to the President for Disarmament.
Eisenhower named then-Minnesota
Governor Harold E. Stassen to the post,
which was widely referred to as the Secretary
of Peace (Miller, 1994: 23). While the
creation of the post illustrates Eisenhower’s
recognition of the complex task of managing
a vast arsenal, the decision was not necessarily
informed by a commitment to peace. In
1961, President John F. Kennedy moved to
create the Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency (ACDA), encouraging those who still
supported peace agency bills to back the
ACDA instead. Those who did so were soon
disenchanted to find that the ACDA, pri-
marily involved in disarmament negotiations,
research, and policy recommendations,
operated unabashedly as an arm of the
Department of State.5
Over time, this disenchantment revived
the concept of an independent Department of
Peace. A rush of peace agency bills ensued,
with those introduced in 1968, by Represen-
tative Seymour Halpern (NY) and Senator
Vance Hartke (IN), at the forefront.6 With
the support of 30 co-sponsors, the
Halpern–Hartke Department of Peace Bill
would have placed the Peace Corps, the
Agency for International Development, and
the ACDA all under the Peace Department
umbrella. In addition to the creation of this
5 United States Congress, House of Representatives, Commit-
tee on Foreign Affairs, Committee Print, Working Draft,
House Report #7328, To Establish a United States Arms
Control Agency: Report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
on H.R. 918, September 12, 1961, 87th Congress, 1st Session
(Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office,
1961). For more on peace advocates’ support of the
ACDA, see Miller (1994: 51–57).
6 Seymour Halpern introduced H.R. 19650, ‘To Establish
a Department of Peace’, on 10 September 1968, 90th
Congress, 2nd session. Vance Hartke introduced its com-
panion legislation, S4019, ‘A Bill to Establish a Depart-
ment of Peace’, on 11 September 1968.
25R 07montgomery (ds) 12/6/03 7:33 am Page 481
Mar y E . Mo n t g o m e r y
omnibus federal agency, the bill also called for
an independent Peace Academy and a Joint
Committee of Congress for Peace and Inter-
national Cooperation. Perhaps most import-
ant, the bills’ primary sponsors spearheaded a
citizen organization to support the legislation,
marking the first concerted grass-roots effort
to lobby for congressional action on a peace
act proposal. The group included such promi-
nent members as Arthur Goldberg, former
ambassador to the United Nations; David
Shoup, former commandant of the United
States Marine Corps; noted journalist and
feminist activist Gloria Steinem; and estab-
lished academician Hans J. Morgenthau.
When US operations in Vietnam, the Water-
gate scandal, and covert US operations in
Latin and South America intervened to derail
the peace academy proposal in three separate
legislative sessions, many of these grass-roots
supporters moved on to create the National
Peace Academy Campaign (N-PAC).7
On the eve of the US bicentennial, wide-
spread disillusionment with the government
gave way to the celebration of US prosperity
and heritage, and ushered in the next sub-
stantial proposal for a peace academy. This
time, Vance Hartke joined with Oregon
Republican, Senator Mark Hatfield, to intro-
duce the appropriately titled George
Washington Peace Academy Act (S.1976).
Buttressed by the newly formed N-PAC, the
Hartke–Hatfield plan advanced farther than
had any previous peace academy legislation.
A citizen lobby, N-PAC worked to persuade
members of Congress to support the legis-
lation, or, in the interim, to create a com-
mission to study the proposal. With the
additional support of Democratic senators
Jennings Randolph of West Virginia and
Spark Matsunaga of Hawaii, the House and
Senate finally authorized the Education
Amendments of 1978, including a provision
7 For a more detailed discussion of citizen group support
for the Department of Peace, and the eventual creation of
N-PAC, see Miller (1994: 25–32).
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C R E AT I O N OF US INSTITUTE OF PEACE 481
authorizing a United States Commission on
Proposals for the National Academy of Peace
and Conflict Resolution.8 Congress appro-
priated $500,000 for operating costs,
enabling the Commission to begin a series of
public hearings in early 1980. Nearly two
hundred years in the making, the creation of
the Peace Academy was finally under way in
1980.
The Peace Academy Commission
The Commission arranged a series of twelve
public hearings at sites from Boston to
Honolulu. In addition to public opinion, the
Commission sought to investigate ‘peace
making theory and techniques; institutions
involved in international peace; the state of
peace research, education and training; and
mechanisms used by the federal government
to respond to unmet needs’.9 Additional
research involved meetings with interest
groups and educators from public and private
sector institutions devoted to peace research,
as well as representatives from the nation’s
war colleges and military academies. Follow-
ing more than 320 hours of hearings and
testimony, the Commission ended delibera-
tion in 1981, and recommended the creation
of a Peace Academy. Suggesting that the
Academy would serve three major functions
– research, education and training, and infor-
mation dissemination – the Commission
report recorded but one dissenting vote, that
of Ohio representative John Ashbrook.10
8 The Commission was created under the mandate of
Public Law 95–561: Education Amendments of 1978,
Title XV – Part B.
9 Commission Report, p. 11.
10 As outlined in PL95–561, the Commission included nine
members, with three being appointed by the President pro-
tempore of the Senate, three by the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, and three by the President. Members of the
Commission included Spark M. Matsunaga, Chairman;
James H. Laue, Vice-Chairman; and Commissioners John
M. Ashbrook, Arthur H. Barnes, Elise Boulding, John R.
Dellenbeck, John P. Dunfey, Dan Glickman, and William F.
Lincoln. For the dissenting view of Commissioner John M.
Ashbrook, see Commission Report, p. 209.
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482 j o u r n a l o f P E A C E R E S E A RC H
According to the Commission Report,
the Academy would pursue its commitment
to research, both at the Academy itself,
through faculty, students, staff, and visiting
scholars in residence, and at other locations
facilitated through Peace Academy grant
support. Research would be multidisci-
plinary, and the Academy would undertake
research requests from federal agencies and
departments, providing these requests
remained within the Academy’s scope and
independence. The Commission proposed
that education and training occur primarily
at the graduate and postgraduate levels, per-
mitting long-term course offerings, as well as
short-term conferences and seminars.
Courses also would be made available to
mid-level corporate professionals, and grants
would be made available to support and
develop undergraduate curricula. The Com-
mission made no determination as to the
power of the Academy to grant degrees,
instead leaving this provision to the later dis-
cretion of the Academy’s Board of Directors.
With regard to information services, the
Academy would strive to develop compre-
hensive bibliographies and abstracts from
published and unpublished US and foreign
sources. The Commission envisioned the
Academy as a clearinghouse of information
from all groups in the peace-learning field.
The Commission further recommended the
publication of newsletters and topic-specific
pamphlets, and the eventual development of
a Peace Academy journal.11
Most important, the Commission
provided for the Academy’s insulation from
the partisanship, bias, and power politics of
government or special-interest interference.
A non-profit educational institution, the
Academy would not be an agency or depart-
ment of the government, and its employees
11 The Commission laid out its organizational and struc-
tural vision for the Peace Academy in section VII of the
Commission Report, ‘To Design The US Academy of
Peace’, Commission Report, pp. 176–188.
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volume 40 / number 4 / july 2003
would not be considered federal employees.
A Board of Directors would be appointed
jointly by the Administration and Legislative
branches. The federal government would
provide core funding, while allowing the
Academy to supplement this base with
private-sector monies, further limiting the
risk of government domination. Overall, the
Commission sought to create an Academy
that would be regarded as intellectually inde-
pendent, and yet a vital and respected
creation of the federal government.
Immediately following the 1981 release of
the Commission’s report, members of
Congress introduced legislation embodying
its recommendations to Congress in 1982,
and again in 1983.12 In both legislative
sessions, the Peace Academy bills produced
additional hearings and provoked consider-
able, often contentious, debate. Arguments
can be grouped succinctly into three
categories: the symbolic, the educational,
and the pragmatic.
Symbolic Arguments
Support for the Peace Academy as a national
symbol was multidimensional. Some regarded
the United States as uniquely qualified to
create a Peace Academy, owing to the prin-
ciples of the Constitution that allow a nation
of ethnically, racially, and linguistically mixed
peoples to be united by democracy. Others
emphasized the peaceful transfer of political
power in the United States as symbolic of its
peaceful heritage. In these highly patriotic
arguments, no other country possessed a
greater propensity toward peace, and therefore
no country was better suited than the United
States to create a Peace Academy.
Hazel Dukes, President of the New York
12 These bills included H.R. 5088 and H.R. 6182, ‘Pro-
posals to Establish a US Academy of Peace’, in the 97th
Congress, 1982; S. 1889, ‘United States Academy of Peace
Act’, 97th Congress, 1982; and S. 564, ‘United States
Academy of Peace Act’, 98th Congress, 1983.
25R 07montgomery (ds) 12/6/03 7:33 am Page 483
Mar y E . Mo n t g o m e r y
State Conference of the NAACP, agreed that
the United States was uniquely qualified to
create a Peace Academy, but not because the
nation could boast a peaceful heritage.
Dukes, who lamented the average US
citizen’s predisposition to solve conflicts
through force and violence, as opposed to
the dignity and justice of more peaceful
means, countered that the Peace Academy
was needed precisely because it would be ‘in
conflict with the American heritage of
violence and war’.13 She supported the Peace
Academy in the hopes that a government
commitment to peace might trickle down
and infiltrate US society at large, reforming
and rejuvenating a tarnished national image.
Robert Muller, Secretary of the United
Nations Economic and Social Council,
echoed Hazel Duke’s plea on an inter-
national scale. ‘The image of the United
States around the world is no longer an
image of hope. . . . It is [of ] a country filled
with pessimism, filled with doubts about the
future.’14 A Peace Academy, Muller sug-
gested, could refute this downtrodden
image, again bringing the US recognition as
a beacon of hope, a positive mentor to the
world. In a statement presented during the
1982 House hearings, Kenneth L. Brown of
the Church of the Brethren, one of the
nation’s principal and historic peace
churches, spoke of the Academy’s ability to
‘symbolize our striving for unity with all
peoples of the world’.15 Brown recognized
the Academy as an expression of the govern-
ment’s willingness to seek new approaches to
old problems. Witnesses like Muller and
13 Commission Report, p. 51.
14 Ibid., p. 25.
15 United States Congress, House of Representatives, Subcom-
mittees of the International Security and Scientific Affairs and
on International Operations of the Committee on Foreign
Affairs and the Subcommittee on Post secondary Education of
the Committee on Education and Labor, Proposals to Estab-
lish a US Academy of Peace, Joint Hearings, 97th Congress,
2nd session, H.R. 5088 and H.R. 6182 (Washington, DC:
US Government Printing Office, 1982), p. 222. Hereafter
referred to as H.R. 5088 Hearing.
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C R E AT I O N OF US INSTITUTE OF PEACE 483
Brown believed that the establishment of a
National Peace Academy would epitomize
the US commitment to peace in the eyes of
the international community. Gunnar
Myrdal, one of the founders of the Stock-
holm International Peace Research Institute
(SIPRI), substantiated this opinion, saying
that the Peace Academy would ‘send signals
around the world that the United States is
concerned to find peaceful alternatives to
conflict. It will have a tremendous impact on
perceptions of your priorities.’16
Questions of perception and image were
exactly what concerned opponents of the Peace
Academy. Commissioner John Ashbrook, the
only dissenting member of the Peace Academy
Commission, disagreed that it would be
possible to isolate the federally created
Academy from the pressure of the government.
Ashbrook believed that the international com-
munity would not understand the intricate
relationship between the Academy and the US
government, and would perceive the Academy
as no more than a ploy in the game of global
diplomacy. Ashbrook was not alone in his
skepticism. Alabama Senator Jeremiah Denton
argued, during 1983 subcommittee hearings,
that ‘people in other countries would justifi-
ably view a US Academy of Peace . . . lavishly
supported by federal dollars, as nothing more
than an instrumentality of the American
government’.17
It appears, however, that this was not the
image Senator Denton, and some other
opponents, feared most. Denton discussed
the Peace Academy as a ‘survival issue’, and
considered its creation to be a signal to the
Soviet Union that the USA was deficient in
16 Taken from a letter to Senator Robert T. Stafford,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Education, Arts and
Humanities of the Committee on Labor and Human
Resources, in United States Congress, Senate, Subcommittee
on Education, Arts and Humanities, Committee on Labor
and Human Resources, United States Academy of Peace Act.
Hearing, 98th Congress, 2nd Session, S.564 (Washington,
DC: US Government Printing Office, 1983), p. 27. Here-
after referred to as S. 564 Hearing.
17 Ibid., p. 15.
25R 07montgomery (ds) 12/6/03 7:33 am
484 j o u r n a l o f P E A C E R E S E A RC H
its ‘willingness to fight for its own vital inter-
ests’.18 A Peace Academy, in other words,
would send a signal to the USSR that the
United States had gone soft, leaving the
nation vulnerable in a time of communism
and nuclear threat. Throughout his prepared
Senate testimony, Denton capitalized on the
communist fears of the 1980s and the threat
of global nuclear war, while simultaneously
attempting to discredit the peace-studies
field. His references to peace studies, conflict
resolution, and peace itself always appeared
in quotation marks, as if to bring their legit-
imacy into question.19 Senator Denton con-
sidered the Academy supporters at N-PAC to
be proponents of ‘peace at any price’, com-
menting that the peace of a totalitarian com-
munist state was not peace in his mind. He
then questioned the N-PAC commitment to
the greater good, rather than some ‘more
immediate and less commendable goal’.20
Denton’s allusion to communist sympathies
on the part of Academy supporters was ever
present in his congressional testimony.
Attempting to cast doubt on the patrio-
tism of Academy supporters was a popular
ploy of the opposition. According to Duncan
Clarke, a professor at the American Uni-
versity School of International Service, many
Academy supporters believed the Soviet
threat to be ‘vastly overrated’, and viewed the
United States as the principal threat to world
peace.21 Thomas H. Moorer, Admiral, US
Navy (ret.), opposed the Peace Academy on
the grounds that the majority of Americans,
‘with the exception of a small number of
members of assorted communist fronts’,
were already completely devoted to peace.22
18
H.R. 5088 Hearing, p. 51.
19 Senators Dan Quayle (R-IN), Paula Hawkins (R-FL),
Gordon Humphrey (R-NH), John P. East (R-NC), and
Don Nickles (R-OK) followed suit in expressing their
minority views, using quotations marks to reinforce their
contention that peace studies was not a real and definable
discipline.
20 H.R. 5088 Hearing, p. 51.
21 S. 564 Hearing, p. 125.
22 Ibid.
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volume 40 / number 4 / july 2003
Commissioner Ashbrook’s dissent did much
to polarize and politicize the Peace Academy
debates. With ‘hawk’ and ‘dove’ references
peppering his commentary, the congressman
frequently reduced discussion to a dialectic
of ‘liberals’ vs. ‘conservatives’, and the
politics of the ‘left’ and ‘right’. He suggested,
moreover, that the long and unsuccessful
history of Peace Academy legislation pointed
to a lack of acceptance by mainstream US
citizens. Making frequent use of the concept
of power politics, Ashbrook questioned the
‘fear that liberals seem to have with American
power’. In his estimation, the Peace Academy
would likely become ‘a sounding board
for . . . antinationalist, accommodationist
views’. In sum, he denied the need for a
national haven for those ‘who believe that
the way to make peace with the assorted aya-
tollahs and other titled bandits of today’s
world is to grovel’.23
Proponents of the Academy had antici-
pated these attacks. The introduction of the
Commission Report states clearly an emphatic
rejection of ‘any insinuation that peace . . . is
soft and naive’.24 Senator Jennings Randolph
expressed anger, though not surprise, that the
opposition chose to scrutinize the integrity and
patriotism of even the bills’ sponsors.
Randolph addressed the issue of ‘peace as sub-
versive’ in his opening statement, during
hearings on the peace academy bill. ‘Who is to
say that those who wish to dedicate their lives
and energies to peace are somehow dangerous,
whereas we accept fully those who wish to
dedicate their lives and energies to military
service as their way of maintaining peace?’25
Commissioner William Lincoln opted to
respond to criticism at his opponents’ own
level. Outlining the debate in a liberal vs. con-
servative framework, Lincoln maintained that
23 Commission Report. For liberal fear of American power,
see p. 215; for groveling and anti-nationalist views, see
p. 209.
24 Ibid., p. 21.
25 S. 564 Hearing, p. 3.
25R 07montgomery (ds) 12/6/03 7:33 am
Mar y E . Mo n t g o m e r y
it is peace that is the conservative idea, ‘if only
because the modern means of war and social
unrest are so radical, so tragic, and so costly in
terms of energy, lives and even money’.26 A
testimony to the power of the hearings,
Lincoln, a professional arbitrator and the
Director of the Center for Collaborative
Planning and Community Services in Water-
town, Massachusetts, had joined the Com-
mission not in favor of the Peace Academy
until the process of Commission hearings
changed his mind. According to Lincoln, the
hearings ‘changed my views from all but
outright rejection . . . to skepticism . . . to
commitment, to fervent advocacy’.27
It was clear to the bills’ sponsors in the
House and Senate that they needed to shift
discussion away from symbolism and image,
if the legislation was to be discussed con-
structively and receive serious consideration.
Representative Dan Glickman went as far as
to change the name of one bill, HR 1249, in
the US House of Representatives. The Com-
mission had recommended the title ‘US
Academy of Peace’, purposely excluding the
term ‘conflict resolution’ so that the word
‘peace’ would stand prominently alone. In
Glickman’s view, the word ‘peace’ would not
be taken seriously, and he wanted not to risk
the Academy being perceived as a nice, yet
pie-in-the-sky, liberal idea. Glickman took
the initiative to reattach the title reference to
conflict resolution, hoping to reinforce the
serious, real-world alternatives offered by this
academic discipline. Senate support also
recognized the need for tangible attributes.
‘A solid justification based upon real need
and likely performance, is prerequisite to
congressional approval and to the expendi-
ture of public monies’, said Senator Jennings
Randolph (Randolph, 1985: 118). One of
the primary supporters of the legislation,
26Commission Report, p. 225.
27
Ibid., p. 217. For brief biographies of William Lincoln
and the other members of the Peace Academy Com-
mission, see Appendix C of Commission Report.
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Page 485
C R E AT I O N OF US INSTITUTE OF PEACE 485
Randolph concentrated on the Academy’s
function as a type of public information
bureau, raising awareness and promoting
dialogue on the issues of peace. Randolph,
and other supporters, looked to the insti-
tution to bring greater legitimacy and visi-
bility to the field of conflict resolution,
particularly in the academic realm.
Educational Goals
The Commission reported peace studies to
be a distinct and definable discipline,
complete with its own literature, courses of
study, professional organizations, and
research methodologies. Affirming that
research on peacemaking techniques was
substantial, the Commission did not,
however, find it to be exhaustive. Witnesses
before the Commission argued convincingly
that the community of diplomatic prac-
titioners had paid little systematic attention
to the field, and that academics therefore
were not routinely translating information
and research into a ready and usable form.
One of the most frequently cited examples
of the gulf between academics and prac-
titioners was the then pressing conflict
between Argentina and Great Britain over the
Falkland Islands. Roger Fisher, professor of
law and director of the Harvard University
Negotiation Project, testified that the Falk-
lands crisis convinced him that professional
training in negotiation, mediation, and
conflict resolution was lacking on the part of
government officials. ‘Secretary [of State]
Haig, when he went back and forth on the
Falklands, was saying, “I am trying to clarify
their positions.” I would flunk a freshman in
my course if he said that.’28 More than a
quibble over semantics, Fisher’s comments
reflected what he viewed as a serious crisis.
Top diplomats were neglecting the most
basic principles of conflict resolution –
28 H.R. 5088 Hearing, p. 80.
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486 j o u r n a l o f P E A C E R E S E A RC H
understanding interests – as opposed to
locking parties into positions. Fisher’s
comments point to one basic conclusion:
researchers were producing guidelines to
conflict resolution that would remain obscure
as long as the US government dismissed their
work as not being viable or effective. A Peace
Academy would fill this chasm between
research and practitioner, by providing an
institution equally accessible to scholars,
analysts, and policymakers in all facets of
international affairs.
Academics from top programs in inter-
national relations joined forces with the
Reagan administration to respond to the criti-
cism of the existing body of work. John Funari,
Dean of the Graduate School of Public and
International Affairs at the University of Pitts-
burgh, referenced the nine-member Associ-
ation of Professional Schools of International
Affairs in making his point that institutions
devoted to teaching peace studies did, in fact,
already exist. Representatives from the
Columbia University School of International
and Public Affairs, the School of Advanced
International Studies at Johns Hopkins Uni-
versity, and the Georgetown School of Foreign
Service all testified in agreement that private
institutions were providing thorough and
excellent conflict-resolution research through
the study of international relations. Edward F.
Welch, Jr., past President of the Naval War
College, testified as to the misperceptions of
the role of war colleges. Though he conceded
that naval strategy and tactics were of primary
importance, he added that war-gaming
naturally required elements of crisis manage-
ment, negotiation, organizational psychology,
and conflict resolution and termination.29
29 Vice Admiral Marmaduke Bayne (ret.), former Com-
mandant of the National War College, first President of the
National Defense University, and counselor to the George-
town University School of Foreign Service, supported this
point with an account of varied curricula, a diverse military
and civilian faculty, and wide-ranging programs offered by
the institutions with which he had been affiliated. S. 564
Hearing, p. 99.
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Clearly, military and private institutions
believed that peace and conflict resolution
was adequately integrated into the academic
community. However, this fact was not in
contention with the findings of the Com-
mission. Never did the Commission state
that established institutions were not com-
pleting research in the peace and conflict
field. The Commission itself reported that ‘at
least 80 colleges and universities offered such
courses’.30 Instead, the Commission sug-
gested that institutions were not sufficiently
correlating and disseminating their accumu-
lated research.
Academicians also complained of what
they foresaw as unfair and unproductive
competition from the Peace Academy. Peter
Krogh, Dean of the Georgetown School of
Foreign Service, worried that the Peace
Academy, by its very creation, would demote
the existing schools to secondary status.31
William Zartman, of the Johns Hopkins
School of Advanced International Studies,
and State Department consultant, con-
sidered the proposed Academy a waste of
resources, claiming it would deflect energy
and talent away from existing schools.
Asserting that the Academy could offer no
new capabilities to the field, Zartman
nonetheless argued simultaneously that it
represented unfair competition. Referring to
the Academy as a ‘federal monolith’,
Zartman feared ‘the stifling and monopoliz-
ing presence of an expensive and uneco-
nomic government giant, with a budget
three times that of an existing school . . . but
with neither the promise of productivity, nor
the status of a university’.32
Stephen Low, Director of the Foreign
Service Institute of the Department of State,
testified during the 1983 Senate hearings as
a representative of the Reagan adminis-
tration. According to Low, should Academy
30 Commission Report, p. 146.
31 H.R. 5088 Hearing, p. 211.
32 S. 564 Hearing, p. 146.
25R 07montgomery (ds) 12/6/03 7:33 am
Mar y E . Mo n t g o m e r y
research wander away from disputes and into
areas such as political or social structures, it
would ‘be duplicating or even competing
with the academic structure in place’.33 It is
difficult to conceive how a Peace Academy
could hope to study disputes without also
investigating both political and social struc-
tures, and Low’s comments represent a State
Department perception that the Peace
Academy was an ‘intrusion on their opera-
tional turf ’ (Foster, 1982: 4). Low’s com-
mentary delivered the Reagan message, that
the federal government was completing suf-
ficient work in the field, and that ‘the
Administration opposes this bill and the
expenditure of funds for the purposes con-
templated’.34
Not all members of the academic com-
munity took offense to the Commission’s
criticism of the current body of research.
Philip E. Jacob, professor emeritus at the
University of Hawaii and a former faculty
member of the Department of Political
Science at the University of Pennsylvania,
agreed with the Commission Report.
Without belittling the upward trend at uni-
versities to offer courses in peace and conflict
resolution, Jacob maintained that this work
was introductory groundwork and could not
be substituted for professional training.
Jacob likened undergraduate course offerings
in peace and conflict to the relationship
between an undergraduate major in political
science and a career in law. ‘These programs
hopefully lay a solid preparatory ground-
work. They do not make a lawyer.’35 Roger
Fisher of Harvard University agreed. Fisher
suggested that the government rejection of a
Peace Academy would be akin to the rejec-
tion of the Manhattan Project because of
pre-existing university physics depart-
ments.36
33 Ibid., p. 50.
34
Ibid.
35 Ibid., p. 36.
36 Ibid., p. 81.
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C R E AT I O N OF US INSTITUTE OF PEACE 487
Even Academy opponents were not
without alternative suggestions, including
Dean Harvey Picker of the Columbia Uni-
versity School of International and Public
Affairs, who tempered his negative remarks
by agreeing with the desired goals of the
Peace Academy. Picker conceded that the
current body of work needed more focused
effort and recognition. He disagreed that the
proposed Peace Academy could fill the void.
Testifying that peace research requires the
multidisciplinary efforts of political scien-
tists, historians, physicists, engineers, and
economists, Picker expressed doubt that the
best scholars would leave their universities to
join the Peace Academy. Instead, he sup-
ported the creation of a federally funded con-
sortium, to oversee and expand the current
research and facilitate information dissemi-
nation. Theodore Eliot, Jr., Dean of the
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at
Tufts University, recommended the creation
of a federal endowment to support peace
studies at private and state institutions. Eliot
suggested that Congress pattern such an
effort on the National Endowment for the
Humanities or National Endowment for the
Arts. Complimenting both the creation and
operation of the NEH and NEA, Eliot com-
mented that a peace endowment could
follow suit by strengthening existing organiz-
ations and effectively spending taxpayer
monies without the duplication of effort a
Peace Academy would create.
Suggestions of a university consortium or
a national endowment for peace did not fall
on deaf ears. Advocates agreed that both were
excellent ideas as a part of the Peace
Academy, as well as being feasible under the
current wording of the legislation. Commis-
sioner Laue highlighted one existing consor-
tium, the Consortium on Peace Research,
Education, and Development (COPRED).
Laue also commented that not one of the
schools of diplomacy or international
relations that came to oppose the Peace
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488 j o u r n a l o f P E A C E R E S E A RC H
Academy, in favor of a consortium or endow-
ment, took advantage of COPRED
membership. On the other hand, the 34
member schools of COPRED, despite being
involved in what could be deemed ‘competi-
tive research’, fully supported the creation of
the Peace Academy.
The Reagan administration, Department
of Education, and Senate leadership, includ-
ing Senator Jeremiah Denton, also champi-
oned increased monetary support of existing
institutions, and suggested accomplishing
this through Title VI of the Higher Edu-
cation Act. Their suggestion seemed logical
at the surface. Rather than spending money
on start-up costs, why not pump funds into
established institutions? Peace Academy
advocates responded rapidly to the quick-fix
alternative of Title VI funding. The 1983
Reagan administration budget recom-
mended cutting Title VI from $19 million to
$8 million, further recommending no
funding for 1984.37 While the adminis-
tration feigned support for existing insti-
tutions to do the work of the Peace Academy,
it simultaneously sought to close them out of
the budget entirely. An angry Jennings
Randolph criticized the administration for
its empty support of Title VI funding.38
Pragmatic
Despite the arguments surrounding national
symbolism, and peace-studies education, the
majority of debates over the creation of the
Peace Academy encompassed neither the
symbolic nor the educational realm. Advo-
cates and detractors debated the position of
the USA in the modern world, and whether
37 Ibid., p. 10.
38 Randolph was further aggravated by the administration’s
use of budget stringencies as an excuse to oppose the Peace
Academy, while concurrently using the power of the execu-
tive order to bypass the legislature and create the ambigu-
ous Institute for Democracy, at a fiscal year 1984 price tag
of $65 million. Federal belt-tightening obviously did not
apply to administration-backed initiatives.
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simple pragmatism dictated the creation of a
Peace Academy.
The Commission convened a seminar of
international affairs experts during the 1980
hearings.39 The panel discussed interdepen-
dence in the areas of economic growth, tech-
nology, energy, environmental quality, and
military capacity, stating that any one of
these issues was ground for a potential
conflict. The panel further discussed growing
populations and closing frontiers, as well as
ethnic, racial, tribal, and religious divisions.
Alan Millett, Director of the Program in
International Security and Military Affairs at
Ohio State University, spoke on the extensive
nature of modern war, noting the numbers
of casualties and deaths produced by violent
conflict since 1945.40 At the same time, the
Commission found that US citizens,
through government, private enterprise, and
voluntary organizations, were becoming
increasingly active on an international scale,
and living as members of the world com-
munity in virtually every corner of the globe.
In sum, the Commission found the positive
aspects of globalization, such as increased
opportunity for US citizens abroad, were
countered by the increase of violence and
conflict worldwide.
Seeking to balance threat and oppor-
tunity, the Commission referred to Einstein’s
insistence on new modes of thinking to keep
nations from the eventual brink of disaster.
To promote this recommended innovation
in the realm of national security, the Com-
mission advised the pursuit of ‘a range of
effective options, in addition to military
capacity’.41 As an additional benefit, the
Commission offered this range of options at
long-term savings in both money and
manpower.
39 For a listing of participants, their titles, and a more
detailed summary of their findings, see Commission Report,
pp. 193–194.
40 Ibid., p. 37–38.
41 Ibid., pp. 16–17.
25R 07montgomery (ds) 12/6/03 7:33 am
Mar y E . Mo n t g o m e r y
The Commission understood the risk of
suggesting alternatives to military might, and
firmly stated that they did not ‘contemplate
a weakening of military and diplomatic
power’.42 Congressional advocates of the
Peace Academy supported military peace-
making options, but recognized them only as
one of many ways to respond to conflict.
Richard Pipes, a Harvard history professor,
explained the continuum of options during
committee hearings in Boston. Pipes
described conflict management, mediation,
and conciliation as low-level techniques,
while reserving police, military or arma-
ments for high-level situations. World
courts, peacekeeping forces, arbitration, and
formal negotiation traversed the mid-level of
the continuum.43 Citing the testimony of
Pipes and other experts, the Commission
suggested that emphasizing an armed com-
ponent, while neglecting other avenues, not
only raises questions about the validity of
unarmed options, but also puts undue
pressure and expectations on the military.
The Commission argued, in effect, that
through available training and resources, the
Peace Academy would provide the United
States with greater national security, by
encouraging it not to rest on its military
laurels. The Commission hoped to create a
Peace Academy with prestige equal to the
other components of the military–industrial
complex.
Greater national security was not the only
benefit the Commission espoused. The
report outlined a myriad of potential savings
associated with the creation of the Peace
Academy. According to its panel of inter-
national affairs experts, the use of force, or
intrusive techniques, creates such intangible
costs as the possible loss of reconciliation
with an opponent. The lost opportunity
could then provoke future episodes of
42 Ibid., p. 61.
43 Ibid., p. 63.
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C R E AT I O N OF US INSTITUTE OF PEACE 489
tension or hostility, resulting in a progres-
sively negative cycle. Often resulting in
costly destruction, force also requires exten-
sive procedural costs in institutional invest-
ments and court backlogs, not to mention
the expenditure of military hardware and the
deployment of personnel. The use of force
could also result in the loss of respect in the
international community, particularly if the
United States expects other countries to
mediate their differences, while reserving the
right to its own use of power and strength. A
policy of ‘do as I say, not as I do’, could prove
costly in terms of international perceptions.
Anticipating a backlash against these
theoretical arguments, proponents simplified
the matter to dollars and cents. Senator
Spark Matsunaga compared the cost of
military deterrence to that of the Peace
Academy, when he calculated the price tag of
a single B-1 bomber to be ten times greater
than the two-year budget of the Academy.
Matsunaga encouraged the Congress and the
Administration to ‘build the B-1 bombers, if
we must, but let’s not build 100; let’s build
99 and save the funds for the one-hundredth,
and we can establish a Peace Academy and
maintain it and operate it for 20 years’.44
Returning to the recent Falklands
example, Representative Dan Glickman
noted that the proposed two-year, $16-
million Academy budget was a negligible
sum when compared to the estimated $2.5-
billion loss that Britain incurred during the
island crisis (Kelly, 1983: 20). Glickman
based his comparison on the idea that a
national Peace Academy would help to create
a context of diplomacy, where tensions
would have a lesser chance of escalation to
the crisis level, as had occurred in the Falk-
lands. By providing this broader and more
stable diplomacy, the Peace Academy would
help to diminish US dependence upon threat
of force, thereby alleviating potential
44 H.R. 5088 Hearings, p. 38.
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490 j o u r n a l o f P E A C E R E S E A RC H
negative costs and ramifications, both
monetary and intangible.
Further calculations compared the price
tag for deterrence to that of the Peace
Academy, per US citizen, per year. The final
estimates of a military cost of $1,360 per
citizen, per year, as opposed to $.05 for a
national Peace Academy, appealed to many
US citizens, both on and off Capitol Hill, as
newspapers across the country began to edi-
torialize about the Peace Academy.45 The
Desert News in Salt Lake City, Utah, sup-
ported the Academy, commenting that ‘the
world spends 2,300 times more for military
purposes than for international peace-
keeping’. The Seattle Post-Intelligence agreed,
‘Surely, if the $21 million for the creation of
a peace academy were to come out of the
defense budget it would scarcely be noticed.’
From the San Francisco Chronicle to the
Chicago Sun-Times and the Baltimore Sun,
the financial considerations of the proposed
legislation attracted notice, bringing the
issue to an increasingly supportive public
(Kelly, 1983: 29–32).
Military brass and congressional oppon-
ents remained unimpressed. Senator Denton
deemed it ‘naive and dangerous’ to propose
that a Peace Academy could be capable of
preventing war, or defusing conflicts such as
the Falklands.46 Naysayers were galled at
what they perceived to be a suggestion that
the military and administration were not
committed to peace. Senate leadership
accused Academy advocates of promulgating
the ‘hawk and dove’ distinction, and faulted
them for assuming the President, military,
and other opponents to be pro-war people.47
Countless witnesses testified as to the peace-
making goals of the Department of State, the
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the
45 These figures were computed based upon a $1.6 trillion
military budget in 1984, and the proposed expenditure of
$23.5 million for the first two years of the United States
Institute of Peace in Mapes (1985: 151–152).
46 S. 564 Hearing, p. 15.
47 Ibid., pp. 12–13.
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volume 40 / number 4 / july 2003
Department of Defense, and the US Agency
for International Development. Admiral
Edward Welch challenged ‘those critics who
hold that war colleges do little more than
teach students how to wage war’. Continu-
ing that ‘peace is especially important to
those who will have to fight in the wars’,
Welch encouraged proud recognition of the
military’s history of maintaining peace.48
Despite these objections, the Peace
Academy was not without military support.
Many advocates touted an impressive record
of military service. The primary sponsor of
Peace Academy legislation, Senator Spark
Matsunaga, was a decorated combat veteran
of World War II. The Academy also enjoyed
the support of N-PAC member David
Shoup, former commandant of the United
States Marine Corps. General Andrew J.
Goodpaster, US Army (ret.), former com-
mandant of the National War College and
Superintendent of the US Military at West
Point, twice offered his written testimony in
support of Academy legislation. Recog-
nizing the relationship between the
Academy and the military to be unnecess-
arily adversarial, Goodpaster wrote of the
widespread failure of the ‘opinion leading
elements’ of government to understand how
peace relates to other fundamental values.
Refusing to view the Peace Academy as a
threat to the established military, Good-
paster’s remarks reveal an understanding
that improved military capacity was not
necessarily dependent upon size. With
regard to the proposed budget, Goodpaster
found that the benefits of the Peace
Academy ‘would more than justify the
expense and effort involved’.49 Goodpaster’s
comments manifest a clear understanding of
the Commission’s finding that a Peace
Academy would serve, not to supplant
military efforts, but to provide a range of
48 Ibid., p. 100.
49 Ibid., pp. 182–86 or H.R. 5088 Hearing, pp. 212–215.
25R 07montgomery (ds) 12/6/03 7:33 am
Mar y E . Mo n t g o m e r y
options ‘as an asset to American military and
diplomatic institutions and policies’.50
Committee Negotiations and the
Battle for Floor Debate
With proposals, arguments, and rebuttals
established, the Senate Committee on Labor
and Human Resources could begin the
negotiation process. Advocates reassessed the
opposition to determine the major points of
contention. The arguments of the academic
community and its claims of unfair com-
petition filtered down to a financial squabble
– competition for private monies and tuition
revenues. The decision to remove language
permitting the Academy to grant degrees
proved difficult, but proponents were
unwilling to allow this stumbling block to
sink the legislation. In return, the issue of
private funding was settled in favor of
Academy supporters. The committee
reported favorably on S. 564 on 27 Septem-
ber 1983, by a vote of 11–6. Advocates then
put the wheels in motion to receive action on
the Senate floor, a goal as yet unachieved by
any initiatives for a Peace Academy.
Congressional advocates unfortunately
underestimated resolve to kill S. 564, and the
battle began. Examination of Senate reports
reveals an opposition primarily directed and
supported by the Reagan administration. In
1982, Peace Academy legislation, S. 1889,
had passed favorably out of committee with
a 10–6 vote. Members of the minority were
Senators Jeremiah Denton, Dan Quayle,
Paula Hawkins, Gordon Humphrey, John
East, and Don Nickles. In outlining their
opposition, these senators faulted the
proposal in three respects, including budget
constraints (reason number two) and existing
research facilities (reason number three.) The
foremost reservation? ‘First, the concept is
opposed by the Administration, including
50 Commission Report, p. 61.
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C R E AT I O N OF US INSTITUTE OF PEACE 491
the office of Management and Budget, the
Department of State, and the Department of
Education.’51 Reasons two and three also
squared with the administration. The
senators regurgitated the administration’s
budget figures and echoed its complaints of
unnecessary duplication of research. Not sur-
prisingly, senators plugged their recommen-
dation for using Title VI mechanisms to
fund existing institutions by proclaiming,
‘Our proposal is supported . . . by the
Administration.’52 More than simply
choosing to agree with the administration,
these senators cited the Reagan adminis-
tration’s opposition as their primary reason
for opposing the bill. All of their secondary
arguments: research by existing programs,
sufficient military capabilities, soft portrayal
of the US image, did nothing but provide
necessary fig leaves for one truth – they
opposed the Peace Academy solely because
the administration opposed the Peace
Academy. Opposition put forth the same line
of argument in 1983, and for Academy advo-
cates, the uphill battle continued.
Savvy Senate leadership pursued other
avenues to bring the measure to the Senate
floor. The seemingly perfect opportunity
presented itself in June 1984, as the Senate
began deliberations on S2723, the Depart-
ment of Defense authorizations for fiscal year
1985. Having already cleared the House, the
notoriously tedious legislation dragged
through the Senate. In the evening of the
tenth full day of Senate consideration, Mark
51 United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Labor and
Human Resources, The United States Academy of Peace:
Report Together with Additional and Minority Views (to
Accompany S. 1889), 97th Congress, 2nd session, S. 1889
(Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office,
1982), p. 16.
52 Ibid., p.17. This reasoning was restated the following
year in a Senate report on S. 564. See United States
Congress, Senate, Committee on Labor and Human Resources,
Senate Report No. 98–244, Establishing the US Academy of
Peace, and for other purposes: report together with additional
and minority views, 98th Congress, 1st session, S. 564
(Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 27
September 1983), pp. 39–47.
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492 j o u r n a l o f P E A C E R E S E A RC H
Hatfield stepped forward to propose Amend-
ment 3270, To Establish a US Academy of
Peace. The Oregon senator justified his
amendment in terms of national security and
defense, claiming that peace education
would serve in both areas. ‘We have been
making decisions about the type and level of
weaponry our nation must develop and
deploy . . . our goal has been a shared one:
Defending the national security of the
United States . . . the maintenance of that
defense is well served by education in the
peaceful means of conflict resolution.’53
The anticipated debate ensued. Just as
Matsunaga and Randolph reiterated their
support for the proposal, Jeremiah Denton
led the opposition, protesting the return to
this ‘age old argument’, complaining in
particular that it had nothing to do with
Department of Defense authorizations.54
The three foremost advocates of the legis-
lation played every card. Frequently referring
to the upcoming retirement of their West
Virginia colleague, Hatfield and Matsunaga
did not hesitate to tug at the heartstrings of
their fellow senators. Formally proposing the
Jennings Randolph Center for International
Peace, as a part of the Peace Academy,
Hatfield reminded the gallery of Randolph’s
40 years of tireless advocacy. ‘The tribute is
an earned one’, praised Hatfield, ‘paid for by
dedication and vision.’55 Protests and
rebuttals continued until well after
midnight. With the late hour taking its
desired toll, a roll-call vote was denied.
Shortly before 4:00 a.m., the Senate ended
deliberations, agreeing to Amendment 3270,
‘To Establish a US Academy of Peace’, by
voice vote.
Future mark-ups made few alterations to
53 ‘Proceedings and Debates of the 98th Congress, 2nd
session, Thursday 21 June 1984: Continuation of Senate
Proceedings of June 20, 1984, Issue No. 85; and Proceed-
ings of 21 June 1984, Issue No. 86. Congressional Record,
130, no. 86 (June 1984), p. S7790.
54 Congressional Record, S7803.
55 Ibid., S7791.
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volume 40 / number 4 / july 2003
the Peace Academy amendment. Its name
changed from ‘academy’ to ‘institute’, and
the Jennings Randolph Center became a
program instead. Overall, the bill survived
remarkably well. On 19 October 1984,
President Ronald Reagan signed HR 5167
into Public Law 98–525, including Title
XVIII, the United States Institute of Peace.
Administrative Backlash
Even by the most conservative standards, the
United States Institute of Peace (USIP) was
over eight years in the making.56 Perhaps
more frustrating than the drawn-out battle
for a mandate were the continued attempts
of the Reagan administration to torpedo the
Institute after its official creation. It was no
secret that the administration disliked the
USIP concept. President Reagan authorized
its creation only because Senate leaders
attached it to defense authorizations, which
the president was certain not to veto.
The first blow came in January 1985, only
three months after the signing of PL 98–525.
Although Congress had appropriated $6
million for the first-year operations of the
Institute and $10 million for second-year
expenses, Reagan deferred funding entirely.
Congress later forced the President’s hand on
the issue, approving a budget provision in
conference. President Reagan signed supple-
mental appropriations into law in August
1985, unfortunately providing only $4
million for the first two years of the USIP,
less than one quarter of the originally appro-
priated funding.
President Reagan also failed to comply
with a requirement to submit 11 names
for membership on the USIP Board of
56 S. 1976, proposed by Hatfield in the 94th Congress, is
frequently referred to as the most direct root of the USIP.
One could, of course, make a case that the modern fight
for the USIP began with the Halpern–Hartke proposal in
1968, the first Peace Academy proposal since the dis-
appointment arose over the ACDA. This would mark the
USIP as having entailed more than 16 years of debate.
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Mar y E . Mo n t g o m e r y
Directors by 20 April 1985. On 24 April, 27
senators wrote to remind him of his legal
deadline. Meanwhile, the State Department
proposed 17 amendments to the insti-
tution’s charter. Ranging from staffing limi-
tations to tighter restrictions on the use of
classified information, the amendments
sought to convert the Institute into a small,
grant-giving agency under State Depart-
ment control. None of the amendments was
adopted. Having failed to respond to the
senators’ April letter, Reagan received a
similar communiqué signed by 87 members
of the House on 21 May. Reagan finally
began to send nominations in August, and
by October he had named eight individuals.
Reagan received much criticism for his
nominations. Of this group of white males,
only one had involvement in the USIP
creation process. By November, the Presi-
dent had named the ninth nominee, suf-
ficient for a quorum, and confirmation
hearings began. Congress did not receive the
final two nominations until January 1986,
15 months after Reagan’s legal mandate to
submit nominations.57
Budget difficulties continued to plague
the Institute. Because of its independence
from the executive branch, the Institute
may request appropriations from Congress
different from what is deemed appropriate
in the administration’s budget. In 1987,
Congress appropriated $6 million, in
drastic contrast to the $625,000 eventually
received for 1987. Although Senate leaders
insulated the USIP from the ‘use it or lose
it’ condition that plagues most federal
agencies, it still does not enjoy the luxury of
private funding, as does, for example, the
57 For Senate and House letters and budget difficulties, see
Woldman (1986: 6). For the slow process of nominations
see Woldman (1986: 6), and United States Congress, Senate,
Committee on Labor and Human Resources, Nominations
Hearing, 99th Congress, 1st session, 24 October 1985
(Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office,
1986).
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C R E AT I O N OF US INSTITUTE OF PEACE 493
Smithsonian.58 It is important to remember
that the possibilities for private funding
were eliminated so as to protect the Insti-
tute from having to seek the favor of those
holding the purse strings. The Institute
must, however, periodically trot to Capitol
Hill, budget request in hand, and enter into
the congressional foray to ensure its own
adequate financing. This compromises the
position of the Institute perhaps more than
any possible private-sector pressure that
congressional leaders sought to avoid.59
Conclusion
Ironically, the Peace Academy concept finally
found a home in Department of Defense
authorizations for fiscal year 1985. Buried
beneath MX missile expenditures, strategic
weapons guidelines, and provisions for the
testing of nuclear weapons, a plan for the
peaceable resolution of conflicts waited
quietly to be signed into law.
The story of the USIP is a tragically
appropriate metaphor for the US govern-
ment’s plan for peace. It became necessary to
accept the USIP as an unwanted, but
relatively harmless, by-product of defense
authorizations. In much the same fashion,
countless administrations have paid lip
service to peace, while remaining primarily
concerned with securing the position of US
power and security in the world community.
The Reagan administration stands as a prime
example. While making repeated reference to
a decade of peace, Reagan provoked the
58 To recap, the Institute received $4 million for 1985–86.
Less operating expenses of $300,000 for these start-up
years, the Institute carried over $3.7 million for 1987, and
received an additional $625,000. This provided a total
budget of $4.3 million for 1987. It was primarily the Insti-
tute’s far-sighted and frugal management that guaranteed
sufficient operating funds in this early period. ‘Biennial
Report of the United States Institute of Peace, Submitted to
the Congress and President of the United States, August
1987’.
59 For a discussion of budget-juggling and compromising
positions, see Miller (1990: 168–169).
25R 07montgomery (ds) 12/6/03 7:33 am
494 j o u r n a l o f P E A C E R E S E A RC H
Soviets through a major military buildup,
aimed to intimidate them to the negotiating
table. His misleading rhetoric of a winnable
nuclear war and inflated promises of the
security of SDI (Strategic Defense Initiative)
sought to placate the American people.
Rather than consider the desire of citizens to
find a peaceful and affordable alternative to
force, Reagan stressed military means over
negotiation, expanding both the military and
the deficit in the process. Claiming that
defense should not be a budgetary concern,
and ‘you spend what you need’, President
Reagan approved financing of the costly B-1
bomber, an option President Jimmy Carter
had rejected as being too expensive for an
interim weapon. While Reagan spoke of
bringing freedom and democracy to the
world, he intended to do so through a
renewed commitment to the Truman
Doctrine and a heavily stocked nuclear
arsenal.
The debate over the creation of the
United States Institute of Peace (USIP) must
be understood in the context of national
priorities. It might overstate the case to
suggest that the US government regarded
peace negotiations only as a necessary caveat
of power politics. A devotion to peace must
consist, however, of more than a policy of
peace through strength. ‘Perhaps in the end’,
as the Commission Report suggests, ‘it
becomes a question of values and acceptable
risk.’60 The struggle to create the USIP
displays that a true commitment to peace
was a challenge that the Reagan adminis-
tration, as others before it, was not willing to
accept.
What has become of the USIP? Certainly
the efforts of the Reagan administration
hampered the high expectations proponents
held for the newly created institution, but
has this somewhat stilted beginning drasti-
cally limited the potential of the USIP since
60 Commission Report, pp. 69–70.
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volume 40 / number 4 / july 2003
1984? Some would say yes. As Elise
Boulding, past Secretary General of the
International Peace Research Association
(IPRA) and former Peace Academy Com-
missioner, noted in 1992, many peace
activists, seemingly natural supporters of the
USIP, have criticized the organization as
ineffective. Pointing to the ties between past
members of the USIP Board and US security
operations, the Institute’s detractors have
even alleged the covert involvement of the
Central Intelligence Agency (Boulding,
1992). Critics, referring to the USIP as a
‘who’s who of rightwing academia and
government’, maintained in 1990 that the
conservative bias of the USIP resulted in the
largest number of grants being awarded to
those projects reflecting the ‘policies and pre-
occupations of the Reagan and Bush admin-
istrations’.61 Boulding acknowledges that the
Presidential-appointed Board was ‘an invita-
tion to political bias’, but maintains that no
foolproof alternative exists (Boulding, 1992:
47). Boulding further argues that despite
these flaws and other setbacks, the USIP
indeed participates in significant peace-
building initiatives. There is ample evidence
to support this.
The Institute first opened its doors on 14
April 1986. Focusing initially on its grants
and fellowship program, the USIP awarded
eight Jennings Randolph Fellowships and 50
grants to individuals and institutions in
excess of $1.3 million.62 Funding awards
have increased substantially in the last 15
years. The most recent figures available show
the USIP awarding grants and fellowships in
excess of $4.2 million during fiscal year
2001. From 1986 to 2001, the USIP has
received 6,824 grant and fellowship appli-
cations, requesting over $380 million. The
61 Political Research Associates, The Public Eye
(http://www.publiceye.org/research/Group_Watch/Entrie
s-128.htm); accessed 30 November 2002; last updated
September 1990.
62 ‘Biennial Report . . .’ (see note 58).
25R 07montgomery (ds) 12/6/03 7:33 am Page 495
Mar y E . Mo n t g o m e r y
Institute has approved 1,358 of these appli-
cations, totaling approximately $42 million.
These numbers represent not only a new
level of stability in monies received through
Congressional appropriations, but, more
importantly, a vast growth in the organiz-
ation’s outreach and support of peace
research and activities. Many outstanding
scholars, whose groundbreaking work pro-
gressed through USIP funding, acknowledge
this support. An excellent example of this is
the series of nine studies exploring how
democracies use intervention as an instru-
ment of foreign policy, undertaken by
Margaret G. Hermann & Charles W. Kegley,
Jr.63
In 1988, the USIP, working to fulfill its
mandate to develop research and disseminate
information in the field of peace learning,
created the Research and Studies Program.
This program brings together experts from
academia and the policymaking community
to draft working papers, produce published
reports, organize public seminars, and work
to bridge the gap between peacemaking
theory and practice. Fiscal year 1991 saw the
creation of the USIP press, responsible for
the publication of groundbreaking studies in
the field of peace and conflict resolution
studies. Over 150 colleges and universities
have adopted USIP publications for class-
room use. In particular, Managing Global
Chaos (1996), which explores a range of tra-
ditional and newly emergent conflict and the
methods for their resolution, has been
adopted at 60 institutions. In 2001, the
USIP published 5 books; 32 reports, includ-
ing 10 electronic versions; and 6 issues of the
Peace Watch newsletter with a subscriber list
of more than 18,000.64 With the addition of
63 One of these studies was published in Journal of Peace
Research; see Kegley & Hermann (1996). For a further con-
tribution on the same subject, see Hermann & Kegley
(2001).
64 USIP budget and program statistics after 1987 taken
from United States Institute of Peace, ‘Budget Request
Fiscal Year 2003’, February 2002.
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C R E AT I O N OF US INSTITUTE OF PEACE 495
educational seminars for university faculty;
week-long institutes for secondary school
teachers; training programs for international
diplomats; essay contests for high school
students; and grants and fellowships for
fledgling as well as established scholars, there
is little doubt the USIP is working to nurture
a broad-based community. Research at the
Institute also strives for diversity. Current
projects focus on Palestinian–Israeli legal
dialogue; issues of national reconciliation in
drafting constitutions in Africa; collective
memory and state terrorism in South
America; and international law and the
media in central Asia.
In 1992, Congress amended the basic law
that created the USIP, to allow the Institute
to raise private monies to fund construction
of a permanent facility. In 1995, a parcel of
federal land was made available to the Insti-
tute for this facility, to be located at the
northwest corner of the national mall. USIP
supporters see this as further evidence of a
growing Congressional support for the USIP,
and a testimony to its accomplishments and
relevance. Despite early setbacks and linger-
ing skepticism, the United States Institute of
Peace continues to bring together scholars
and practitioners seriously concerned with
peace, to exchange ideas and information. In
so doing, the USIP has expanded the peace
community and continues to fulfill the core
intentions of its founders.
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Foster, Gregory D., 1982. ‘The Attainment of
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MARY MONTGOMERY, b. 1968, MA
(University of Maryland, 1994); PhD candi-
date, Department of History, University of
Maryland; current main interest: US relation-
ship to European decolonization in Africa.
Dissertation: ‘The Eyes of the World Were
Watching: Ghana, Great Britain and the
United States, 1957–1966’.