PEACE RESEARCH AND POLITICS*
By
HERMAN SCHMID
University of Lund
1. Introduction
Peace research began to emerge as a
scientific discipline towards the end of
the Cold War. It grew up as a response
to a certain political situation, fixed in
time and space, alongside with other
related efforts like the Pugwash movement
and the ’new’ peace movement (CND,
etc). It was built by people with a political
concern. The East -West arms race,
dramatized by the rapid development of
a nuclear capacity to kill and overkill, had
to be brought under control and the di-
vided world integrated in order to save
humanity: so it was felt by the young
generation of the late ’fifties. The at-
titudinal polarization in political life,
which only allowed thinking in terms of
black and white, had led to a general
disgust with politics and politicians.
Science was seen as the road to a better
world.’
This problem-oriented nature of peace
research was strongly emphasized in all
definitions of peace research. Peace re-
search was nothing for pure academicians;
it aimed at useful knowledge which could
be applied to current problems of war
and want and peace and plenty. Although
applied science was nothing new, the
unusually strong political motivation be-
hind peace research made for resistance
from the established scientific and political
institutions. This in turn forced peace
researchers to formulate the applied
nature of peace research more precisely.
The formula found was that peace research
is research on the conditions of war and
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peace,.3 But this formulation to some ex-
tent left the problem open. It was obvious
that peace research was also intended to
be research for peace, and chose its subjects
accordingly. Thus peace research could
be characterized both in terms of a
problem area and in terms of a value
orientation.
Ten years have passed since then. The
political situation - or perhaps rather
the political perspectives and the political
climate - have changed. In this new
situation I for one feel a need to re-
examine the assumptions upon which
peace research is based. Galtung, in a
recent paper, invites his readers to partici-
pate in a discussion about the weaknesses
of peace research.4 Much of this article
can be seen as a response to that invi-
tation.
The first part of the article will be de-
voted to the applied aspects of peace re-
search ; in the later part, peace research
definitions of peace and conflict will be
discussed. I have chosen to be rather
sparse with documentation for several
reasons. First, I have no ’hard data’, but
have had to rely on examples and quota-
tions for illustration. More important has
been, perhaps, that this article is directed
to a public of peace researchers who can
assess the empirical validity of my argu-
ments on the basis of their own experience
with the field. Finally, this article by and
large will omit the epistemological prob-
lems of peace research, not because they
are unimportant, but because they de-
serve a separate article.
218
2. Applied science : types of control
All science aims at control: physical
science at control of physical nature,
biological science at control of biological
nature, etc. Social science aims at control
of human society or parts thereof. The
more applied or problem-oriented
science is, the more direct and visible is
this controlling function.
First let us distinguish types of control
in terms of social space. Two dimensions
will be used. The first is internal - external
control. By this we mean that decision-
makers (D) can use scientific knowledge
to control the system in which they are
decision-makers, i.e. their ’own’ system,
and they can use it to control the milieu
that surrounds their own system. The
second dimension is that of vertical hori-
zontal control. Decision-makers (D) may
want to control elements below or above
themselves in the social hierarchy, or they
may want to control systems on the same
level as their own. These two dimensions
combined give three possible types of
control, internal vertical control (1), external
horizontal control (2), and external vertical
control (3), as shown in Figure 1.
An example of the type 1 control is
when organization initiates a study
an
of its membership, or the industrial
management initiates a study of ab-
senteeism, or the government appoints
a fact-finding committee on unemploy-
ment. This type of research is by far
the most common in social sciences
today.
The second type of control
Figure 1. Three types of social control.
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exemplified by the security research
carried out behalf of national
on
governments with the aim of predicting
the behavior of other nations, or re-
search initiated by a firm to investigate
the resources and intentions of other
firms in the same branch.
The third type of control is not very
a
common, and the research connected
with it is often not even deemed worthy
of the name of science. It may be a
political or cultural minority group
which initiates critical studies of es-
tablished institutions, often of a ’reveal-
ing’ nature.
The three types of control need different
types of social research, and the differences
have been extensively dealt with else-
where.5 Here I will only mention that
the three types of research seem to need
- and to develop different kinds of theory.
The typical type 1 theory is the theory of
integration: conflict resolution theory,
theory of balance, theory of social control,
theory of administration, etc. The type 2
theory can be called theory of competition,
and includes, for example, game theory
and theory of regulated conflict. Type 3
is so underdeveloped that it hardly has
any theory of its own, but its theory would
have to be a theory of polarization. Closest
to such a theory are certain types of
political theories of revolution.
It is relatively easy to characterize
peace research in terms of this scheme and
also to relate it to those disciplines which
are critical to peace research.
Research on international relations has
can be traditionally been of type 2. Such research
has often been initiated by governments
or their sub-agencies, and consists of
strategic analyses of the behavior of other
nations relative to the situation of one’s
own country. Data collection is done either
in national institutes of international re-
lations or in intelligence organizations.
Policy recommendations have the form,
implicitly or explicitly, of recommenda-
tions to the government. The value behind
this research is to maximize the national
interest.

Peace research came as a reaction to this
type of research. Peace researchers de-
veloped a science aiming at control of
type 1, focussed on the international
system. The peace researcher shall not
side with any of the conflict parties in a
conflict between, say, nations. This does
not mean that he shall take a position which
is the arithmetic mean of the positions
taken by the conflict parties. ’The peace
researcher can not do this because he
claims to represent something new, a
different point of view not seen by the
parties to the conflict.’6 This different
point of view is that of the system in which
the conflict is located. The peace researcher
shall ’try to see the consequences of a
solution certainly not in the light of the
interest of only one of the parties, nor
merely in the light of the interests of the
conflict system (the two or more parties)
as a whole but ... in the light of the
consequences for the total system.17
Peace research aims at control of and
integration of the international system,8
just as most social science has hitherto
aimed at control of and integration of
national systems. This also explains why
peace researchers could do what was
never possible for the nation-oriented
international relationists: draw upon the
wealth of social science theory developed
for the control and integration of the na-
tional system.*9
Today peace research is subjected to
criticism from another angle.1° This article
may serve as a convenient example. Much
of the criticism can be expressed in the
following way: peace research should
neither be of type 1, nor of type 2: it should
be of type 3. It should formulate its prob-
lems, not in terms meaningful to inter-
national and supranational institutions,
but in terms meaningful to suppressed
and exploited groups and nations. It should
explain not how manifest conflicts are
brought under control, but how latent
conflicts are manifested. It should ex-
plain not how integration is brought
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219
about, but how conflicts are polarized to
a degree where the present international
system is seriously challenged or even
broken down.
Since this article mainly concerns peace
research as peace research is and has been,
the subsequent discussion will concentrate
on research of type 1.
3. The manipulation of social systems
A most important factor in applied
research of type 1 is the degree of integra-
tion of the system to be controlled. The
natural scientist studies systems of high
integration, in the sense that what is
functional for one element is usually also
functional for the system as a whole.
Thus, the natural scientist can meaning-
fully assume an identity of interest among
the elements of the studied system.
This assumption of identity of interest be-
comes more dubious, the less integrated a system
is. A physician can assume an identity of
interest among the elements of the human
body, but the psychiatrist, who is to cure
mental systems in which the integration
is too low fcr the system to function
smoothly, may find his situation prob-
lematical. He will have to define some
elements of the personality system as
dysfunctional and others as functional -
and this he can only do on the basis of
some idea about the true nature of the
human being.ll
When we turn to the traditional social
sciences, which study a system much less
integrated than those already mentioned,
the problem becomes acute - not to
mention the magnitude the problem has
for peace research, which studies the inter-
national system. A social system consists
of as many conflicting as cooperating ele-
ments, and each element can think and
feel and decide to some extent indepen-
dently. When the peace researcher wants
to control and manipulate a system of this
kind, he faces a number of problems,
three of which will be discussed here:
220
1. He must have some idea about what
is best for the system as a whole.
He must know what the interests
of the system are and what values
the system should try to maximize.
2. He must assume that what is best
for the system also is best for all
the elements of the system, i.e. he
has to assume an identity of interest.
3. He must be able to find some insti-
tutions or other social actors that
represent the common interest or
want to pursue the common interest
and have the power to apply the
scientific knowledge in social reality.
3.1. Selection of values
The most common and most widely
accepted solution has been to leave the
evaluations to the politicians or to those who
have initiated the research. This approach
was not open for peace research, for the
simple reason that politicians were not,
and by and large, are not interested in
research promoting supranational interests.
Furthermore, peace research was a re-
action against politicians and political
life, and the suspicious attitude of peace
researchers towards at least national
politicians probably made this approach
impossible. The situation may change
gradually if the international superstruc-
ture grows, but we should remember that
the peace research claim of political
neutrality is hardly satisfied by leaving the
evaluations to the decision-makers. ’The
interest of the international system’ can
be interpreted to mean two things. First,
it can mean that all individuals and
groups in this world have common inter-
ests. This ’common interest of mankind’-
interpretation is an expression of an ideal-
istic universalism. While it may sound
nice, it is meaningless and has nothing
to do with social reality. It has very little
to do also with peace research practise,
even if it now and then finds expression in
peace research ethics. 12
The second possibility is to think of the
international system as a structured social
system where the interests of the system
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can be in terms of integration,
expressed
maintenance and tension manage-
pattern
ment, goal attainment and adaption.13
This perspective has been used by theo-
retical sociologists who have tried to
evaluate elements of a system on the basis
of a functionalist analysis, thus deducing
standards of evaluation from the system itself.
As has been frequently pointed out, this
is bound to lead to conservatism.14
Peace researchers have used a third
device. They have selected a consensual value,
namely the value of peace. Later we will
discuss the concept of peace and in what
sense it is consensual; here we need only
to distinguish between negative and pos-
itive peace. Negative peace has to do
with control of the international system;
positive peace has been defined as inte-
gration.16 In other words, control and
integration of the international system are
the values selected by peace research. They
appear suspiciously similar to the values
deduced by the functionalist sociologists:
in fact, these two approaches are only
seemingly different. Peace research wants
to save the international system from con-
flict, violence, and war, and create inte-
gration - and this is precisely what a
functionalist perspective leads to when
applied to the international system.
3.2. The assumption of identity of interest
However the peace researcher solves his
first problem and selects a set of values
to guide his work, he meets his second
problem. He claims to be neutral, ob-
jective, and impartial, as opposed to
political pursuit of values and ideologies.
This claim is based on the assumption of
identity of interest among the elements
of the system studied, as far as peace is
concerned. This assumption was probably
felt reasonable in those days when the
East-West conflict and the fear of a nuclear
world war dominated the political per-
spectives. Today, when conflicts in the
non-European world are in the focus of
our attention, it is easier to reject. Conflicts

and contradictions between nations and
groups seem to have replaced the common
interest of survival as the dominant feature
of the world political arena. Today it
seems more meaningful to say that the
interests of the international system are
very similar to those of the nations with a
good amount of vested interest in the
system, and that they are opposed to the
interests of many other nations and groups.
And as soon as one rejects the assumption
that the peoples of the world have basic
interests in common with the present
international system, it becomes a political
and non-neutral act to support this system
and to manipulate it in accordance with
the needs of the system.
To say that the peace researcher shall
identify himself with the international
system sounds today very abstract, and
peace researchers do not study abstrac-
tions. They study concrete social systems,
and the criterion of system identification
must stand the test of application to con-
crete situations if it is to be seen as ac-
ceptable.
Thus, what would the system identifi-
cation mean in concrete cases? In a class
conflict it would mean that the peace re-
searcher should identify himself with the
interests of the nation. In the Vietnam war
he shall look to the interests of the world,
rather than to those of any of the partici-
pants. To defend his position in this second
case he would have to use his common-
interest argument: the Vietnam war may
escalate into a nuclear war which would
be disastrous for the world as well as
for the Vietnamese. Since positive values
are so clearly controversial16 he would
have to fall back on a negative value,
in this case the avoidance of a common
doomsday. Thus, negative peace, with its
built-in conservative bias, is the only value
which ultimately looks consensual enough to
serve as a basis for the system identification of
the peace researcher. And the problem is that
the doomsday-argument can be used in
any conflict large enough to threaten the
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221
system in which it takes place. If it is not
nuclear annihilation that must be avoided,
it may be the horrors of a civil war be-
tween classes.
3.3. The institutionalization of peace research
The problem is brought to a head when
the third problem is added. Power and
influence are needed to carry out the
policy implications and recommendations
of peace research. The peace researcher
will have to ally himself with those who
have power in the international structure;
this is probably quite feasible. The rich
and powerful nations of the world are also
those most anxious to maintain the inter-
national system. They want it to be kept
under control; they want it to be integrated
because of their vested interest in it.
In other words, peace research has adopted
a system perspective and a value orienta-
tion which is identical with those of the
existing international institutions and
lies very close to those of the rich and
powerful nations.
An idea which well illustrates that
this situation has on the whole been
accepted in peace research is the idea
of peace specialists. As peace research
grows it shall, like all respectable
sciences, produce specialists to stand
at the service of the interests of the
international system. They shall func-
tion as experts for decision-makers on
various levels, and their advice shall
always be guided by the interests of
the international system. Furthermore,
they shall be impartial and politically
neutral, because they shall pursue only
consensual values. In fact, they shall
even turn political problems into
technical ones ! i’
To conclude: it is quite clear that peace
research does not only aim to become a
beacon for mankind in general, it wants to
be institutionalized on the highest levels
of the international system.
It is not surprising that peace research
is heavily concentrated in the United
States and Northern Europe,18 and that
contacts between the International Peace
222
Fig. 2. The
Research Association and for example
UNESCO are very close.19 Neither is it
surprising that quite a few peace research
projects have been financed by grants
from military agencies in the U.S. and
elsewhere, or that peace research so far
has proved unable to establish itself in the
exploited nations of the world.
3.4. Conflict symmetry
Given this background, we may wonder
how it has been possible for peace re-
searchers in their theoretical work to up-
hold both the system identification and the
claim to neutrality at the same time.
The solution is called symmetry: the re-
searcher is supposed to have symmetrical relations
to all conflict actors, that is to collect data
from both (all), to treat them in the same
way, and to evaluate them according
to the same standards etc.2° This ideal
model is shown in Figure 2a.
But obviously this is only an ideal
model. In some cases, for example the
East-West conflict, it might have been
fairly accurate; but how is it possible to
have symmetrical relations to, say, the
United States and the Vietnamese FNL?a
I am not thinking of technical problems
like those of data collection, but of the
problems caused by the dissimilarity
between the United States and the FNL.
It seems that the symmetry problem can
only be solved if the two conflict parties
are fairly similar in resources, methods,
and aims.
What does the peace researcher do if
the two parties are very dissimilar, what
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assumption of symmetry.
does he do in an asymmetrical conflict?a
The answer is simple : he de, fines the conflict
system as symmetrical, he assumes symmetry
between the conflict actors (see diagram
2b). That ’solves’ his problem, because if
symmetrical actors are treated in the same
way, then the relations between the re-
searcher and the two actors are by def-
finition symmetrical (diagram 2 c).
Going through most of what has been
labelled peace research literature, I have
found an abundance of models of sym-
metrical conflict, but no single one where
asymmetry is explicitly built into the
model as a variable. The prisoner’s di-
lemma game and other game theory models
are but one example. In these, the conflict
parties have equal resources, the same
choice of methods, and the same set of goals.
This assumption of symmetry has been
defended on the grounds that ’conflict
dynamics tend to make parties relatively
similar’,21 but it should be pointed out that
symmetrical conflict is exceptional rather
than the standard type of conflict. Thus
most formal conflict models are approx-
imations as far as the symmetry-asymmetry
dimension is concerned - very dangerous
approximations, too, since there are
fundamental differences in conflict dy-
namics between the two types.22 The
practice of assuming symmetry has had
the serious theoretical consequence that
the symmetry-asymmetry dimension is
almost completely overlooked in peace
research and that most formal conflict
models can only be used for a type of
conflict which is very unfrequent.

4. The concept of peace
Since peace research is defined in terms
of the value of peace, an analysis of the
meaning of ’peace’ is essential for a dis-
cussion of the nature of peace research.
Galtung’s earlier mentioned distinction
between positive and negative peace will
be taken as the starting point .23
Negative peace is ’the absence of or-
ganized collective forms of violence’,24 or
the absence of war. It is the kind of peace
envisaged by the ’law and order’-oriented
person; it is easily shown that it leads to
stability thinking. As Galtung has noted,
peace research defined solely in terms of
negative peace ’will therefore easily be
research into the conditions of maintain-
ing power, of freezing the status quo, of
manipulating the underdog so that he does
not take up arms against the topdog.
This concept of peace will obviously be in
the interest of the status quo-powers at
the national or international levels, and
may equally easily become a conservative
force in politics’. 25
This does not mean, however, that
Galtung and other peace researchers reject
the negative definition of peace. It is only
seen as insufficient, as something that has
to be balanced with a more positive peace
concept, and so it is included as part of the
full concept of peace.
The balancing factor, positive peace,
was originally defined by Galtung as
intergration, but in recent publications
he seems to have abandoned this definition,
at least as far as his choice of words is
concerned. He has admitted that ’exactly
what one fills into this concept (positive
peace) is more unclear than is the case
with negative peace’ and ’this is one major
shortcoming of peace research today
The empirical background of the idea
of positive peace probably is that people
often seem to mean more than the mere
absence of war when they speak about
peace. A peaceful world also is something
positive that is valued and wanted in its
own right. The problem only is that there
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223
is absolutely no consensus on this positive
aspect of peace. Not among people
even
with a special concern who are engaged
in collective work for peace is there any-
thing like agreement on what a peaceful
world should be like.27 Thus, positive
peace seems to be an umbrella concept,
devoid of meaning of its own, which people
fill with their own subjective values. These
values are usually political values, and peace
thinking can fruitfully be seen as a function
of general political orientation.
One conclusion can be drawn from this
at once: the fact that everybody is ’for
peace’ should not be taken to mean that
peace is a consensual value. As far as
positive peace is concerned, a statement
like ’I am for peace’ is purely tautological,
because positive peace means something
equivalent to ’the good life’ or ’the best
state of things’.
This character of the concept of peace
raises a number of problems for peace
research.
First, if a scientific discipline that claims
political neutrality is to be defined in terms
of a value, this has to be a consensual one.
It has been argued that this is not nec-
essarily true. Sometimes an analogy with
medicine has been used. Medicine is
oriented towards the value of health, and
this works although there is no completely
satisfactory definition of health. However,
in medicine there is also the distinction
between a positive and a negative aspect of
the value pursued, and just as in peace
research there seems to be a sufficient
amount of agreement on what the negative
part of the value means (freedom from
illness) and very little agreement on the
positive part of the concept (positive
health). The noteworthy thing here is
that medicine almost completely has been
organized around the negative concept of
health and that applied medicine aims at
control of symptoms of illness rather than
at building up the ideal human body.
In other words, medicine is valid as an
analogy only in so far as one limits oneself
224
to a and per-
negative definition of peace,
haps that
not even far, because the anal-
ogy between the body organism and the
human society seems to imply an organis-
mic view of society as almost perfectly
integrated.
It has also been argued that one of the
important tasks of peace research is to
give the concept of peace a more precise
meaning. This can be interpreted to mean
two things. First, it could mean that what
matters is the ’truth’ or theoretical rele-
vance of the definition rather than the
social reality which it is supposed to cover.
This would be a case of scientific idealism.
The other possible interpretation would
be that peace research should affect the
social reality to such an extent that it
created the social basis for some consensual
definition of peace. The extension of this
argument would be that peace research
could turn political problems into technical
problems of social science know-how, and
in the far end of the reasoning we can
dimly see the vision of a society without
conflict or controversy. In other words,
it is a case of scientific utopianism.
Thus our problem remains: the concept
of positive peace is far too diffuse to be
the basis for a definition of a science. Once
it is made precise enough it is clearly
political and controversial in nature. The
basic political values people refer to when
they speak about peace are tied to their
structurally determined interests and will
never be turned into technical problems.
Conflict is immanent in human society
and struggle for power will never be elim-
inated by science.
Only one question remains : how has it
Figure 3
(incompatible goals or values)
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been possible for peace research to function
for ten years on the basis of such a vague
concept of peace? The answer is simple:
peace research has been organized around the
value of negative peace. To explore this theme
further, let us turn to the concept of con-
flict in peace research.
5. The concept of conflict
The relation between ’peace’ and con-
flict has never been made explicit, although
sometimes these are used as some kind of
opposites. At any rate, a negative view
of conflicts goes through peace research
like a scarlet thread. It manifests itself
in what could be called conflict reductionism.
By conflict reductionism I mean a
tendency to define conflict so as to reduce
the frequency, the importance and the
severity of conflicts, thus making them
manageable and possible to control by
manipulation from the decision-making
nucleus of the system.
5.1. The
subjectivistic model of conflict
Although there are in peace research
many different definitions of conflict,
there seems to be a general consensus
about what conflict is. The various def-
initions are all formulated in terms of
incompatible values or goals. In other
words, in peace research as in American
social science in general,29 conflict is
given a subjectivistic definition. I will
choose to discuss Galtung’s conflict tri-
angle, not because it is more open to
criticism than other subjectivistic def-
initions of conflict, but because it so well
represents the research tradition we are
concerned with here.3°
Galtung distinguishes between three
aspects of conflict: the conflict itself (C)
which is defined in terms of incompatible
values or goals between two or more actors,
the conflict behavior (B) and the conflict
attitudes (A) of the actors. As the arrows
in Figure 3 indicate, the three components
are mutually interrelated.
Any of the
three factors may be the starting point for

a conflict to develop. Hostile attitudes may
create hostile behavior and also goal in-
compatibility. Hostile behavior may lead
to hostile attitudes and to goal incompat-
ibility. Goal incompatibility, in turn, may
lead to hostile behavior and hostile
attitudes.
The obvious problem here is how to
distinguish between goals on the one hand
and behavior/attitudes on the other.
The three factors are supposed to be
logically independent in the sense that
there can be conflict behavior and conflict
attitudes without conflict (non-realistic
conflict) ;31 but if there is no conflict be-
havior and no conflict attitudes, how is it
possible to say that there is incompatibility
of goals ?
An example may illustrate this.
Imagine a system consisting of a master
and a slave. The master has defined
the role of the slave, and the slave has
internalized it. The slave may see the
system and the role definition as the
only thinkable one, possibly as given
by God; thus, he does not question its
legitimity. In such a system there is
no conflict behavior. The relationship
between the two is cooperative. There
are no hostile feelings either. The master
is benevolent towards his slave as
long as the slave plays his role in
accordance with the rules. The slave
feels devotion to his master. This is a
construed example, but the principles
it illustrates are well known to be-
havioral scientists.
With a goal definition of conflict
one would have to define this system
as free from conflict. The two actors
conform to rules accepted by both and
there is value consensus between them.
Yet most observers would agree that
there is conflict between the master and
the slave, a latent conflict which is not
manifested in behavior and attitudes.
Obviously, in this model, conflict be-
havior and conflict attitudes are of central
importance. Conflict can be created and
conflict can be solved by manipulation of
behavior and attitudes, and it may be
worthwhile to turn the attention to con-
flict dynamics and conflict resolution.
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225
These phenomena can fruitfully be dis-
cussed in terms of integration and ~bolariza-
tion.
In the subjectivistic model of conflict,
integration refers to all the three aspects
of conflict: attitudinal integration, which
leads to consensus; behavioral integration,
which leads to conformity; and goal inte-
gration. Again, I suspect that goal inte-
gration is not logically independent of the
other forms of integration. Goal integration
must mean that the goals of the conflict
actors are defined subjectively by the
actors so that they are compatible with
each other. These subjective definitions
express attitudes, and they are a part of the
conflict behavior. But for the moment I
will ignore this difficulty and conclude
that integration in this model at any rate
is strongly dependent on the behavioral
and attitudinal levels. Let us say that an
integrated system according to this model
is one where the actors in the system have
compatible goals and where there is
conformity and consensus. Or in other
words, a system free from manifest conflict.
Polarization is in this view the negative
counterpart of integration. Consequently
we can speak of attitudinal, behavioral,
and goal polarization, although again the
last of these sounds strange. There are two
definitions of polarization in peace re-
search. According to the most common,
a polarized system is one where the ele-
ments are divided into two subsystems
with many links within each subsystem
and few links between them. According
to the less common definition, polarization
characterizes a system which is split into
two subsystems with friendly relations
within each subsystem and hostile relations
between the two.
We should note that these two defini-
tions are very different in consequences.
In the first definition, which may be called
the quantitative, polarization becomes a
static situation of separation between two
subsystems with few possibilities of change
and consequently few possibilities of con-
226
flict resolution. When polarization is said weaknesses we must sketch at least the
to ’freeze conflict’, it is this quantitative fundamental principles of an alternative
definition of polarization that lies behind. model.
In peace research, polarization of this kind
seems to have been identified with the
5.2. An objectivistic definition of conflict
Cold War. The second definition, which
In this alternative model, conflict is
may be called the qualitative, portrays conflict of interest. Interest is not seen as
polarization as a dynamic situation with a matter of subjective definition but as
close, hostile, and intense contact between determined by the social structure. In
the actors, as in a civil war, but also with
other words, conflict is given an objectiv-
a high degree of flexibility and many
istic definition. Conflict is incompatible
possibilities of change, indeed even drastic interests built into the structure of the
change.
Both types of system where the conflict is located. A
polarization seem to be class conflict, for example, is not a conflict
regarded dangerous by peace re-
as
because the classes have incompatible
searchers, as something that should be
replaced with integrative mechanisms. goals, fight each other, and hate each
other. It is a conflict because the social
This is not very surprising. Polarization in
structure is such that one class loses what
both cases isthreat to the system. If the
a
the other class wins, and such that ex-
polarization static, it is difficult to re-
is
move. If it is dynamic, it may be removed,
ploitation is profitable. This view of con-
flict is represented in Figure 4.
but it may also be intensified to the point
A comparison with the former triangle
where the system breaks down. Thus, to
shows the considerable differences between
simplify much of this, peace researchers the two models. In the structural conflict
tend to associate integration on the be-
havioral and attitudinal levels with peace- model, the conflict (C) is very clearly
distinct from the conflict behavior (B)
ful relations and absence of conflict, and
and the conflict attitudes (A). C is the
polarization with intensified conflict and central component which leads to or does
violence or, alternatively, with conflict
not lead to B and A. If it leads to B and A,
frozen at an intensive level.
we get a manifest conflict; if it does not,
This view guides the search for conflict
the conflict remains latent. And, according
resolution mechanisms. Resolution of con-
to the definition, if A and B are there,
flict can be initiated at any point in the
C must also be there. Non-realistic conflict
conflict triangle; the general recipe is
is excluded. And the conflict behavior
simple: try to find integrative mechanisms and the conflict attitudes cannot create the
on the behavioral/attitudinal level. This
conflict.
can be done in a number of ways. Most of
them imply manipulation of goal defini- The imagined example of the master
and the slave would according to this
tions which, according to my earlier model be a clear case of a latent con-
arguments, means manipulation of be- flict. If the slave for one reason or
havior and attitudes. Thus a conflict can
be solved through destroying one or both
Figure 4
actors, through brainwashing or ideolog-
ical influence, through reduction of the (structurally determined incompatibility of
goal aspirations of one or both of the actors, interests)
etc.
This whole conflict view is so widely
accepted in peace research as the conflict
view, that in order to lay bare some of its

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another changed his attitudes and his
behavior into those of a revolutionary,
this would with a subjectivistic defini-
tion of conflict mean that he changed
his goal and thereby started the con-
flict ; whereas with an objectivistic
definition we would only say that a
latent, structurally-determined
flict had been manifested in behavior
and attitudes.
Also integration and polarization get a
different meaning within the framework
of the structural model. Integration on the
behavioral and attitudinal level is of little
significance as far as conflict solving is
concerned. Its importance is only negative
in the sense that conformity and consensus
is a hindrance to conflict solving, because
the first step towards conflict solving is the
recognition of the conflict by the conflict
parties. Integration as a conflict solving
process has to do with structure, since the
conflict is built into the social structure.
Conflicts are solved through structural
change only, and an integrated system
is one where the system is structured in
such a way that incompatibilities of interest
are minimized.
What in the former model were conflict
solving mechanisms, are here techniques
by which conflict behavior and conflict
attitudes can be removed, i.e. techniques
by which a manifest conflict can be turned
into a latent one and a latent conflict
can be kept latent.
If conflict solving is a matter of struc-
tural change, how is this brought about?
Here polarization comes in. Polarization
is the mechanism through which a conflict
is manifested on the behavioral/attitudinal
level; it is also the mechanism that threat-
ens the system which makes for the in-
compatibility between the conflict actors.
Thus, whereas in the,former model behavioral!
attitudinal integration was the conflict solving
mechanism, in this model polarization is the
conflict solving mechanism. Through polariza-
tion a conflict is manifested more and more
clearly, through polarization a struggle
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227
starts, through polarization the struggle
escalates either to a point where the power
relations between the conflict actors have
changed so much that a structural change
can be negotiated or to a point where the
system breaks down and is rebuilt with
con-
a new structure.
Clearly the two models are not only
different but rather contradictory.
The interest definition has one obvious
weakness: How does one decide what the
interests are ? One cannot rely on what the
conflict actors think themselves - that
would mean to return to a subjectivistic
definition. I do not know of any satis-
factory solution to the problem; to me, this
is a challenge rather than a reason to
abandon the idea of an interest definition
of conflict.
If one for practical reasons decides to use
the definitions by the actors, this should
be seen as a way of operationalizing an
interest definition. Hence, conflict should
be seen as in Figure 4 instead of as in
Figure 3.
However, my main aim here is not to
argue for a replacement of one conflict
view for another. I have presented the two
views, one of which is adhered to in peace
research, and one which is not, in order to
illustrate how political values color the
terminology and the perspectives of peace
researchers.
To sum up this section: conflict reduc-
tionism in peace research is expressed in
the choice of a goal definition of conflict
which a) leaves out latent conflict, which
is of immense importance for the under-
standing of conflict relationships; b) leads
to a substitution of conflict resolution for
conflict termination on the behavioral/
attitudinal level; and c) focusses attention
on superficial and occasional rather than
on basic and permanent aspects of con-
flict. Conflict as seen in this perspective is
a cataclysm, a sudden outbreak of danger-
ous and often irrational behavior,33 rather
than as an immanent characteristic of
human society.
228
5.3. Conflict reductionism continued
The conflict reductionism is of course
caused by a generally negative view of
conflicts. Conflict in peace research is something
to be ’solved’. No peace researcher has, as
far as I know, studied how to sharpen
conflict relations. While this may at first
seem natural and in accordance with the
general expectations on peace researchers,
I nevertheless maintain my argument
from the preceding section, that this is a
biased view not scientifically warranted.
But the negative view of conflicts can
be more or less qualified. It is generally
agreed in peace research that social change
and social conflict go hand in hand.
Therefore the reformism of peace re-
searchers presupposes some acceptance of
conflict. Thus, in general, large-scale con-
flicts are seen as bad and limited, low-
level conflicts as good and ’creative’ or
integrative. One way of attacking cen-
tralized high-level conflict is to decen-
tralize it down to a large number of small,
limited, and ’creative’ conflicts. This is
done for example through the introduction
of criss-crossing loyalties.
There is also a tendency to see conflicts as
absolute rather than as relative.34 An absolute
conflict is less serious than a relative one,
if there are ways of increasing the total
amount of value. The relative emphasis
on relative vs. absolute conflict is in po-
litical economy an old controversy between
liberals, who argue that the solution of
economic conflicts is to make ’the cake’
bigger, and socialists, who want an equal
distribution of ’the cake’. I am not going
to discuss the arguments in this contro-
versy, but to judge from the class relations
and the political and economic develop-
ment in Western Europe during the twen-
tieth century, it seems as if increasing
the total amount of value is a way of
avoiding behavioral polarization, i.e. a
way of avoiding an attack on the incom-
patibility of class interests.
The emphasis on absolute conflicts
leads to an emphasis on compromise,
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horse-trading and other conflict solving
techniques which presuppose a fixed
amount of value which can be divided
and exchanged. These techniques are often
seen as examples of ’gradualism’, and they
are often said to be more ’realistic’ than
the ’absolutist’ solutions. Sometimes one
can get the impression that peace research
is the science of compromise and gradual-
ism.3s
Finally, a few words ought to be said
about gaming, because game theory models
are in some respects different from the
standard peace research model of conflict.
In gaming the conflict is built into the
structure of the game, instead of being
determined by the subjective goal def-
initions of the actors. In other words,
conflict is objective.
But this does not mean that the peace
research value bias is absent. The structure
of the game conflict is chosen by the re-
searcher and is influenced by his values.
The most popular and well-known of all
the games used by peace researchers is the
so called ’prisoner’s dilemma’. The struc-
ture of this game is such that both parties
can play either cooperatively or antag-
onistically. If no one plays cooperatively,
both lose a little; if one is cooperative and
the other antagonistic, the latter wins
much and the former loses much, if
both play cooperatively, both win a little.36
The game is played with the same players
over a long series of runs. During this
series of runs the parties can interact and
they can learn something. What they
learn is the moral sense of the game: even
if an antagonistic (polarizing) strategy
seems completely rational, it leads to
disastrous consequences for both parties.
Cooperation, mutual trust and confidence,
a sense of gradualism, pay much better.
In fact, the prisoner’s dilemma game
seems to be a laboratory version of the
Cold War situation, where the lesson was:
even if armament may seem most rational
from each actor’s point of view, this is
only an illusion. It turns into escalation

and reduced security. Disarmament pays
much better for both parties in the long
run. - Integration was felt to be needed
in the end of the Cold War period, and the
structure of the prisoner’s dilemma game
is built up so that integration is the only
reasonable strategy.
A second characteristic gaming shares
with other sections of peace research is
the emphasis on behavior and attitudes.
The conflict structure is given, and the
research tries to find out how people
adapt themselves to this structure. Be-
havior aiming at structural change is
doomed to fail.
Thus we are ready to sum up this sec-
tion.
Behind the diffuse concept of peace
we have found a value orientation accord-
ing to which conflict is a negative thing
which should be prevented or, if this is
not possible, should be decentralized or
solved, the sooner the better. To make this
possible, conflict is seen as a matter of
subjective goal definitions which are far
more easy to manipulate than the social
structure.
Integration, cooperation, gradualism,
compromise, and mutual trust are identi-
fied with peaceful relations and are seen
as the road to peace. These positive values
can be summarized into one concept:
non-violence. Hence the positive values of
peace are not sui generis but based on a negative
definition of peace.37
6. Conclusion
Peace research is an applied or ’oriented’
science. An applied science has to be
applied by somebody who has the power
to apply it. In the case of peace research,
this means there must be some kind of
institutionalized link between peace re-
searchers and decision-makers on the
supranational level. Thus, the universalist
ethos of peace research becomes operation-
alized into identification with the interests
of the existing international system, that
is the interests of those who have power
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229
in the international system. So peace re-
search becomes a factor supporting the
status quo of the international power
structure, providing the decision-makers
of the system with knowledge for control,
manipulation and integration of the system.
That is the institutional aspect of peace
research.
The theoretical frame of reference
dominating peace research closely cor-
responds to the institutional needs: the
peace researcher jspecialist is trained in an
ideology of internationalism; he has
learned how to solve conflicts, how to
integrate a system, how to avoid manifest
organized violence, how to prevent major
uprisings against the system; and he be-
lieves that what is good for the system is
in the long run also good for its elements.
His concept of peace is essentially a
negative one, stressing the need for stable
peace,38 and the ’common interest’ he
will have to fall back on is the avoidance
of catastrophe. His positive concept of
peace is not sui generis but a negation of
his negative peace concept. The essence
of peace research is concentrated in the
concepts of control of the international sys-
tem to prevent major breakdowns, and
integration of the international system to
make it more stable.
That is the ideological aspect of peace
research.
The institutional and the ideological
aspects presuppose and condition each
other. To become applied, peace research
must meet the needs of the decision-
makers. To satisfy their concern about
stable peace, peace researchers must ally
themselves with the decision-makers of
the international system.
Given this situation, change ofthe system
can not be advocated by peace research.
Structural change would be a threat to the
power-holders of the international system.
Only adaptive change within the system
is possible.
Finally, why has peace research this
character ?
230
One would be arrived at by
answer
studying peace research as a function of
the situation in which it merged. Another,
but probably rather similar, answer would
be arrived at by studying peace research
as a scientific formulation of pacifism.
Neither will be attempted here. Nor will
I try to propose reforms of peace research.
Reforms would not suffice: a more
drastic change would be needed. In my
opinion, peace research should be changed
into research aiming at control of type 3;
and then it would not be very meaningful
to keep the label of ’peace research’ any
more, given the usual connotations of the
term.

NOTES
* This article is an elaboration of a number of viewpoints I presented during a ’theory week’
at the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, in January 1968 as an introduction to a
discussion on the nature of peace research. Naturally, I owe much to the participants in that
discussion. I am also indebted to the seminar on peace research at the Department of Education
in Stockholm, which invited me to a discussion on peace research, as well as to my colleagues at
Lund University, particularly Marianne Schmid, who has come with stimulating criticisms
and suggestions based on her studies of peace visions among peaceniks.
However, more than anyone else Prof. Johan Galtung of the International Peace Research
Institute, Oslo, has stimulated me to write the present article. He has taught me more social
science than anyone else; had not he inspired me I would never have come into the field of
peace research. Nor am I alone in this situation. It is no exaggeration to say that peace research in
Scandinavia is the creation of this one man; and peace research is probably more developed in
Scandinavia than anywhere else.
This is one reason why this very critical review of peace research is so much based on the
publications by Johan Galtung. Another reason is that Johan Galtung is almost the only one
in the field who has formulated explicitly the assumptions on which peace research is based.
He has seen many of them as problematical, and it is no mere coincidence that he himself opened
the current critical debate on peace research. This article is an attack on a research tradition,
and some of Galtung’s statements are used to illustrate this tradition. I do not claim that the
statements quoted are necessarily representative of his points of view.
1 See
for example Lentz, T. F., Towards a Science of Peace. New York, 1955.
2 See
for example Planene for fredsforskning i Norge. Dokumenter m.m. 1961/62, Institute for Social
Research, Section for Research on Conflict and Peace, Oslo 1962.
3
Midgaard-Naess, Forskning i Fredens og Frihetens Tjeneste, Oslo 1958, discusses this and other
definitions of peace research.
4
Galtung, Johan, Peace Research : Science or Politics in Disguise, PRIO publication 23 - 6,
Oslo 1967 (mimeo). The present article should preferably be read parallel with Galtung’s paper.
5
Schmid, Herman, ’Science and the Control of Social Systems’, American Behavioral Scientist
autumn 1968 (forthcoming).
6
Galtung, op. cit. p. 13.
7 Ibid.
p. 16.
8
According to the definition of peace research given in Editorial, Journal of Peace Research
no 1, vol. 1, 1964.
9
This is further corroborated by the fact that the nation-state is very often used as a model
of the international society in peace research.
10
See for example Forsman, Anders, En revolutionär fredsforskning, Kommentar no 2 1968
(Stockholm).
11
Guntrip, Harry, Healing the Sick Mind, London 1964, pp. 19 ff.
12
One example is the parallel made between the Hippocratic rules for physicians and the
ethos of peace research: both groups are to serve mankind. See Galtung, ’International Programs
of Behavioral Science Research in Human Survival, in Schwebel (ed.), Behavioral Science and
Human Survival, Palo Alto 1965.
13
Johnson, Harry M., Sociology. A Systematic Introduction. New York 1960.
14 A well-known
15
example is Myrdal, Gunnar, An American Dilemma II, New York 1944, p. 1056.
See note 8.

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 231
16 See section 4 of this article.
17
Galtung, Johan, Peace Research : Science or Politics in Disguise, pp. 10 f.
18
Ruge, Mari Holmboe, ’Present Trends in Peace Research’, in IPRA Studies in Peace Research,
Assen 1966, p. 296.
19 See article 4 in the statutes of the International Peace Research
Association, which states
that the IPRA activities will be carried out ’as far as possible in close cooperation with UNESCO’.
20
Galtung, Johan, op. cit. p. 13.
21
Ibid., p. 13 f.
22
See Schmid, Herman, Notes on Asymmetrical Conflict, Dept. of Sociology, University of Lund,
1968, (mimeo).
23 The discussion of the concept of peace will keep so closely to Galtung’s publications that
only in the case of direct quotations will specific references be given.
24
25
Galtung, op.cit., p. 1.
Ibid., p. 2 f.
26
Ibid., p. 3.
27 See
Schmid, Marianne, Peace Visions among Members of Peace Organisations. Dept, of Sociology,
University of Lund, 1968. (Forthcoming as mimeo).
28
Wiberg, Håkan, ’Social Position and Peace Philosophy’, Journal of Peace Research, No 3 1968,
shows that for a sample of politically-active students in Lund, political orientation accounted
for more of the variation in peace philosophy than did social position. Admittedly, the sample
does not have a good dispersion on social position.
29 See
’Conflict, social’ in the old Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, where conflict is seen as the
conscious pursuit of exclusive values.
30
The ’conflict triangle’ was presented by Galtung during a series of lectures at the PRIO
in January 1968. Thus my following discussion is based on an oral presentation of an unfinished
piece of research.
31
Coser, Lewis, The Functions of Social Conflict, Glencoe 1956.
32
’Objectivistic’ is not the same as ’objective’. By objectivistic definition I mean a definition
which is independent of the subjective definitions of the actors.
33
Rapoport has made the distinction between the cataclysmic and the strategic view of conflict.
See IPRA Studies in Peace Research, pp. 78 ff. The cataclysmic view of conflict seems to be natural
for research aiming at control of type 1 (See section 2), whereas the strategic view of conflict
seems to correspond to research aiming at control of type 2.
34
The distinction between absolute and relative conflict was discussed by Galtung during
the theory week mentioned above.
35
Galtung, Johan, Peace Research : Science or Politics in Disguise, p. 13.
36
Rapoport-Chammah, Prisoner’s Dilemma, Ann Arbor 1965.
37
See Schmid, Marianne, op.cit., who points out that the same is true for the peace thinking
of members of peace organisations. Guntrip, op. cit., points out that positive mental health must
be understood as some kind of negation of negative mental health.
38 The
quest for stable peace has been formulated by many: Boulding writes about his belief that
’stable peace is both possible and necessary’ in Dunn (ed), Alternatives to War and Violence, London
1963. SIPRI (Swedish International Peace Research Institute) wrote in its first self-presentation
that it would work for the achievment of ’stable and peaceful international relations’, (undated
mimeo). The list could be made very long.

SUMMARY
This article first traces the origin of peace research and stresses its applied nature.
A model of three types of applied social science is represented and used to distinguish
between international relations of the traditional type, peace research, and what could
be called revolution research. The value problems of a value-oriented discipline are
discussed, with the conclusion that peace research in the final analysis is based on a
negative concept of peace in line with the institutional needs of the power-holders of
the international system.

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232
In the final sections of the article the concepts of peace and conflict are discussed.
It is concluded that the concept of positive peace is devoid of concrete content, and
that conflict by and large is seen by peace researchers as something negative. The
tendency to conflict reductionism is related to the subjectivistic definition of conflict
which characterizes peace research, as well as to the heavy emphasis on conflict resolu-
tion. An objectivistic, structural model of conflict is presented as a contrast.
The article argues that peace research supports the existing social order, and that
this is expressed both in its theory and in its institutional needs of close cooperation with
decision-makers. The article proposes a change of peace research from research for
control and integration of the international system, towards research for liberation and
revolution.

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