RESEARCH & EVALUATION

The Policy Cycle: Democratic Process or Rational

Paradigm Revisited?
Sophia Everett
Director
Intermodal Teaching Program
Victoria University

Discussion on policy-making and of effective policy-making mechanisms is once again

emerging in the policy literature. Much of the debate in the past focused on whether the
method applied in the physical sciences was appropriate for policy and policy-making.
Current debate appears to be reverting to some form of rationalism in so far as good
policy processes are seen to yield the most effective results. This article discusses what
appears to be a revival of rationalism — the process-oriented policy cycle. The article
argues that there is little doubt that effective policy-making requires good process but it
is erroneous to suggest that the content of policy, particularly in the case of contentious
decisions, is derived from the policy cycle itself. It is argued further that the policy cycle
is not a substitute for the actual making of decisions but an administrative and bureaucratic
mechanism for effectively setting in place a process once the difficult decisions have been
made.
Discussion on policy-making and of effective play’ adopts a modification of the concepts of
policy-making mechanisms is emerging once the policy cycle — a normative mechanism for
again in the policy literature. The questions of comprehensive and systematic policy-making
how policies are made, who makes them and where the focus is on process (Bridgman and
what influences are exerted on the policy-maker Davis 1998). Not unlike practitioners in the
periodically occur. For much of the 20th century physical and somewhat later the social sciences
researchers have debated the rationality, or who believed that scientific truth would result
otherwise, of the policy-making process and for from the application of the rigorous scientific
much of that time the rational/scientific model, method, the policy cycle proponents suggest
an essential feature of man’s view of the world that good policy is likely to result from the
and a reflection of the existing paradigm in the application of a rigorous process (Edwards
physical and biological sciences, dominated 2001; Bridgman and Davis 1998).
the debate. Researchers such as Simon (1955) This article discusses debate occurring in
and pluralists such as Lindblom (1959, 1979) recent times on what appears to be a revival of
and Dahl (1961) questioned the validity of this rationalism — the process-oriented policy cycle.
approach arguing that policy-making was too It does so within the background of the rational/
complex to be examined in this manner and scientific paradigm and the debate regarding
much of the ensuing debate in the literature attemp- the appropriateness of that model by researchers
ted to refute the rational/scientific paradigm. such as Simon (1955) and early pluralists such
Current debate, however, appears to be as Lindblom (1959, 1979) and Dahl (1961). The
reverting to some form of the rationalism and in article argues that there is little doubt that effec-
recent policy writings some principles of the tive policy-making requires good process but,
rational decision-making paradigm are evident. it is argued, it is erroneous and simplistic to
Edwards (1998:148) states, for example, that suggest that the content of policy, particularly
while ‘policy-making is not necessarily a purely in the case of contentious decisions, is derived
rational or logical pursuit’ and that ‘electoral, from the cycle itself as suggested by Bridgman
budget and other considerations often come into and Davis (1998:2) and Edwards (2001:4). Rath-
Australian Journal of Public Administration • 62(2):65–70, June 2003
© National Council of the Institute of Public Administration, Australia 2003. Published by Blackwell Publishing Limited
66
er this article argues that the policy cycle is not a
substitute for the actual making of decisions but
an administrative and bureaucratic mechan-ism
for effectively setting in place a process once the
difficult decisions have been made.
The article further presents a case study
which indicates that the outworkings of the
political contest, or the ‘play of power’, in fact
determine the content of policy, whether a
particular issue is on the agenda and whether
the policy will be implemented.
Return to Rationalism?
Policy-making, like other social science dis-
ciplines, was explicable in terms of the rational/
scientific paradigm for the first half of the 20th
century. This prescriptive model was process
oriented comprising a number of logically
ordered sequential steps which comprehensively
canvassed, assessed and compared all options.
The rigorous application of this mechanism en-
sured a ‘rational’ outcome by selecting the most
effective means of achieving an end, breaking
down decision-making into phases, ensuring
comparison of options and providing a single
most appropriate answer (Davis et al. 1993).
The debate over the efficacy of this model,
Davis et al. (1993) indicate, stretches back to
the 1930s when controversy began to surround
the scientific methodological application to the
social sciences when two distinct schools of
thought emerged. Proponents believed that the
scientific model could reduce idiosyncratic
decisions and introduce order, a uniform
method, an element of predictability and an
analytical technique to the apparent chaotic
characteristics of decision-making. Sceptics, on
the other hand, suggested that the inputs to any
major government decision were so complex,
and so contingent, that extensive analytical
techniques could at best only inform decision-
making (1993:160).
The rational/scientific model, despite its
rigidities and restrictions in explaining policy-
making, was consistent with man’s existing
world view as it was believed that ‘an empiric-
ism akin to that used in physics was the best
device for learning political truths’ (Goodin and
Klingemann 1996:559).
The rigidity of the rational/scientific model
was modified by Simon (1955) who, arguing
© National Council of the Institute of Public Administration, Australia 2003
Everett
that politicians and administrators have limited
ability to compare options and may be unable
to identify the ‘correct’ decision, developed a
‘behaviour alternative model’ premised on the
notion of ‘bounded rationality’. Decision-
makers, rather than pursue all objectives and
investigate all options, would sacrifice complete
objectivity in order to satisfy the need for a
speedy and workable solution (Davis et al.
1993). Simon could not completely divorce
himself from the scientific paradigm, however,
for recognising that ‘rational’ man was a myth
he nevertheless measured man’s performance
according to rational criteria. Simon’s (1955)
concept of ‘satisficing’, for example, indicated
the decision-maker’s deviation from the rational
ideal.
Lindblom (1959) suggested further that
policy-making, rather than being a scientific
process, was akin to the ‘science of “muddling
through”, arguing that policy-making was an
inherently political process. He suggested that
policy content and the process of decision-
making was the outcome of ‘a play of power’
which proceeds by interaction and a series of
negotiating steps between groups using a
variety of resources and techniques in order to
reach a solution.
Policy decisions in a democratic system are
carried out not by a single governing body or a
dominant economic elite but by a multiplicity
of participants. Political leaders in the making
of policy are influenced in their choice of action
by pressure groups and other influential forces.
Pluralist theory then rests on the notion of power
which is dispersed. The nature, source and exer-
cise of power have been widely discussed (eg
Lukes 1978, 1986) but Self (1986) has argued
that the ultimate source of power in a democracy
lies with the electorate as political parties
perform the function of aggregating group
interests and will bid competitively for the
support of groups in their efforts to win elections.
In more recent times events leading to
changing philosophies and objectives have
emerged that have impacted on the public
sector. These trends have been driven by govern-
ment — both the administrative and political
arms — and have led to the transformation of
the public sector from the traditional form of
public administration to managerial roles and
solutions being applied to public sector issues.
The Policy Cycle: Democratic Process or Rational Paradigm Revisited?
The Policy Cycle: Rationalism
Revisited
Not surprisingly then we are observing at pres-
ent policy mechanisms in which the adminis-
trator, or the public sector manager, assumes a
more proactive role — a role which has the
semblance of the rational decision-maker.
The proponents of the policy cycle model
point out that ‘policy-making is not necessarily
a purely rational or logical pursuit’ and that
‘electoral, budget and other considerations
often come into play’ (Edwards 2001). While
there is recognition that political and other
subjective elements occur within the process of
the cycle, the focus is on the process per se and
rationality is imbedded in that process — a pro-
cess which consists of a number of systematic
and sequential steps that include issue identi-
fication, policy analysis, policy instruments,
consultation, coordination, decision, imple-
mentation and evaluation (Bridgman and Davis
1998:24). The policy cycle, the authors suggest,
‘brings a system and a rhythm to a world that
might otherwise appear chaotic and unordered’
although the authors indicate that it is a model
— ‘an ideal worth striving for, if not always
attainable’ (1998:2).
Edwards’ (2001:4) modification of Bridg-
man and Davis’ framework also is a model for
policy development but in this case it is not
simply an ideal ‘but a framework found most
useful in practice’ — a model in fact in which
the policy content is the outcome of a complex
process. Edwards (2001) identifies the follow-
ing steps in the development of policy :
• Identify issues
– Problem defined
– Problem articulated
• Policy analysis
– Collect relevant data and information
– Clarify objectives and resolve key
questions
– Develop options and proposals
• Undertake consultation
• Move towards decisions
• Implement
• Evaluate
This model consists of a series of sequential
steps which guides policy development — both
content of policy and process. Indeed, this model
is not dissimilar to the rational decision-making
model questioned by Simon (1955) and Lind-
blom (1959) and other pluralists some 50 years
earlier.
© National Council of the Institute of Public Administration, Australia 2003
67
The policy cycle is a mechanism to help
the public sector manager smooth a complex
policy process and to inject rigour into the
process. To that end Edwards (2001:4) adopts
the approach in order to gain the ‘benefit of
breaking up the policy process into clear steps
in order to manage the complexities of develop-
ing policy in a systematic and rigorous manner’.
Edwards (2001:4) suggests that good
policy development processes will ensure that,
as far as possible, good outcomes emerge. She
indicates that ‘a good policy process is a vital
underpinning of good policy development and,
while good process does not necessarily
guarantee good policy outcome, the risks of bad
process leading to a bad outcome are very much
higher (quoting Michael Keating 1996:63).
While Edwards (2001:4) suggests that
good processes are likely to yield good policy
outcomes it is questionable whether the policy
cycle itself can provide an effective framework
for that. Is it not the case that the policy cycle
proponents confuse ‘good’ policy outcomes
with effective processes? And is it not the case
that good policy outcomes reflect the quality
or ‘goodness’ of the content of that policy and
not merely the process of setting it in place?
Arguably and with the benefit of hindsight
effective processes have set in place poor and
inappropriate policies. Conversely, a ‘good’
policy requires more than an effective process
— good policy requires good content and good
content does not necessarily result from an
effective process.
It is questionable whether the policy cycle
model can resolve highly controversial and con-
tentious issues. It is questionable whether the
policy cycle can replace the ‘play of power’ —
the political contest of determining ‘who gets
what’. Furthermore it is highly questionable
whether the policy cycle can accommodate that
political contest — certainly community con-
sultation will not suffice. Community consulta-
tion fails to address how controversy over
allocation of resources or location decisions are
reached. Indeed, community consultation may
provide little more than a wish list of those con-
sulted and fail to arrive at solutions and concrete
policies.
While community consultation is an impor-
tant part of the policy cycle model, and may
smooth processes once the important decisions
have been made, it does not explain adequately
how contentious decisions are made and it is
68
simplistic to suggest that the content of difficult
policies can be arrived at by adopting this
approach.
While there is little doubt that there are
benefits associated with community consulta-
tion, neither the policy cycle approach nor com-
munity consultation, as outlined by Bridgman
and Davis (1998), can address effectively the
complexity of decision-making and how
particular issues emerge on the political agenda
and the means of their ultimate solution. Indeed,
as Davis et al. (1993) argued, ‘major public
policies are the outcome of a complex round of
negotiation between interests, choices between
values and competition between resources …
there are no single ‘best’ options for any player
in this game, for the ‘best’ outcome depends on
what others do and what deals are possible’.
Everett (1988), in her study on coal trans-
port infrastructure location, indicates that the
content of policy was a result of an intense politi-
cal contest between uncompromising vested
interests where the position of the antagonists
was adopted as part of an election platform in
the impending state government election. It is
unlikely that the most concerted effort at
community consultation and the most rigorous
application of the policy cycle model could
have resolved the controversy surrounding the
following case study and indeed other issues
which become politicised and are consequently
resolved in the political arena.
Case Study: Coal Loading
Infrastructure Location — Port
Botany and Port Kembla
In 1974 a consortium of coal companies
proposed the development of a coal loader as
part of the new Botany Bay port and industrial
complex. The proposal was in response to rapid
growth in NSW export coal following the oil
shock in the early 1970s. At the time NSW coal
was exported through the Port Kembla and
Balmain coal loaders and the Carrington Basin
loader in Newcastle. The capacity of these
facilities was limited, however, and constituted
a constraint on industry growth (Everett 1988).
The Botany Bay development had wide-
spread industry support and that of the appro-
priate government decision-making agencies
including the Maritime Services Board of NSW
and the State Pollution Control Commission.
© National Council of the Institute of Public Administration, Australia 2003
Everett
Formal requirements including an environ-
mental impact statement and subsequent
inquiry had been met and approval was formally
given by the incumbent state government.
In June 1977, however, the Botany Bay
location was formally abandoned and a decision
announced to build a coal loader at Port Kembla
despite the fact that the latter location had some
significant economic and environmental
disadvantages as well as operating restrictions.
These included:
• the cost of the Port Kembla facility
exceeded the proposed Port Botany loca-
tion — $250m compared with approxi-
mately $85m in Port Botany (Everett 1988).
Not only was the Port Kembla option more
costly, unlike the Port Botany option it was
to be funded from the public purse;
• the Port Kembla location required signifi-
cant capital expenditure for associated road
and rail upgrades as well as the Balmain
loader;
• the Port Botany loader was designed to be
environmentally friendly in so far as it had
covered stockpiles and rail only receival
whereas Port Kembla had open stockpiles
and road and rail receival facilities; and
• the Port Kembla location was subject to
draught and tidal restrictions — Botany
Bay could accommodate vessels up to
200 000 dwt 1 while Port Kembla was
restricted to 120 000 dwt.
The ‘Play of Power’
The decision to locate the loader at Port Kembla
was the outcome of an intense political contest
which was seen as ‘the biggest and most con-
certed resident protest Sydney had ever seen’
(Sanders 1984:143). The campaign was cohes-
ive and well coordinated and received favour-
able media coverage. Opponents put forward
environmental and ecological arguments; their
concern about a decline in property values;
traffic congestion, pollution, etc.
The most powerful and effective means of
influencing policy-makers, however, was in
their voting capacity when some 70 local
organisations campaigned against the govern-
ment in a number of marginal seats. The incum-
bent Coalition government appeared unper-
turbed while the Labor Party (ALP) identified
with concerned residents and lobby groups and
pledged that, if elected, it would impose a
The Policy Cycle: Democratic Process or Rational Paradigm Revisited?
moratorium on further development of Botany
Bay and would reassess the entire port develop-
ment program. The ALP was prompted by the
fact that if it was to win government it was crucial
to retain Labor-held marginal seats around
Botany Bay, to win the Liberal-held seat of
Hurstville as well as the Independent-held seat
of the Blue Mountains (Everett 1988:161).
The ALP was elected to office and the Wran
government was installed in 1976 and in accord-
ance with its election promise coal loading
development in the bay ceased and Port Kembla
was subsequently announced as the location
for the new coal loader.
The Policy Cycle, Community
Consultation and Contentious Policy
Content
The case study on the location of coal transport
infrastructure is not an isolated event. Freeway
location, high-rise development and airport
expansion inter alia are all subject to processes
likely to be resolved in the political arena. It is
most unlikely that the case study presented
could have been resolved applying the policy
cycle approach. Replacing the ‘play of power’
with community consultation would have failed
to reach a compromise among a number of
incompatible interests including coal compan-
ies, the incumbent state government, an opposi-
tion party keen to win office and willing to adopt
the opponents’ cause as part of its election plat-
form, trade unions, environmental lobby groups,
as well as voters in a number of key electorates.
The policy cycle approach would appear
to be incapable of resolving most policy issues
steeped in controversy. Indeed Bridgman and
Davis (1998) use Sydney’s new airport location
as a hypothetical case study applying the policy
cycle model. This is perhaps a less than
appropriate choice for a case study applying
the policy cycle model as a major reason for
non-action in this instance over a prolonged
period of time has been the fact that all commun-
ities consulted declined to have the airport in
or near their communities. Clearly, to date the
application of the policy cycle approach has
failed to resolve the issue of Sydney’s airport
location.
Arguably, if policy issues are relatively
straightforward a solution may be reached by
way of consulting with the community and the
© National Council of the Institute of Public Administration, Australia 2003
69
process outlined in the policy cycle. The real
benefit in those instances is the smoothing of
the process and anticipating and/or removing
any perceived obstacles. It is unlikely, however,
that the policy cycle can replace the political
contest, or resolve issues which become conten-
tious and are politicised.
Kane and Bishop (2002:87) further point
out that community consultation, while being
beneficial in some instances, certainly is not
appropriate for universal application as there
are distinct limitations to its application. It
appears unlikely, for example, to constitute a
comprehensive inquiry in which alternative
options are fully considered. Indeed, essential
questions generally raised in these inquiries
concern issues such as whether project X should
or should not proceed. Furthermore, in those
instances orthodox and established interests are
frequently over represented and judgments tend
to be made based on only a narrow range of
factors, and those interests selected for con-
sultation are likely to be those influential ones
capable of influencing the process itself.
Kane and Bishop (2002) argue that there
exists a further likely problem in this approach
— the confusion associated with the nature and
purpose of consultation itself. Undoubtedly
adopting a community consultation approach
creates the illusion of a democratic process. But
there is the tendency to perceive consultation
as an exercise in policy determination by the
public rather than as public input into a process
ultimately decided upon by the elected
decision-makers. The result of this confusion is
a tendency to misunderstand or overestimate
what public consultations can achieve, and a
failure to make a distinction between occasions
when such consultations are useful and
occasions when they must give way to explicit
political contest.
Concluding Comments
There is no doubt that more effective processes
will enhance policy and policy-making but it
is a mistake to see the policy cycle or the ‘policy
development framework’ (Edwards 2000) as
anything other than a mechanism that smooths
a process once decisions have been made, or a
mechanism to handle relatively uncomplicated
matters. This, in one sense, should not come as
a surprise, for, as Vigor (2002) has soundly
70
argued, bureaucrats and public administrators
do not make the paradigm — they implement it
— and in this case the paradigm is government
policy and the focus of the administrator is a
mechanism which smoothly sets this in place.
Not surprisingly then the policy cycle is process
oriented but it is erroneous to confuse this
process with the actual content of decision and
policy-making.
It is naïve, furthermore, to suggest that
policy issues are determined on the basis of
equity and that resources are distributed in a
fair and equitable manner as implied in the
model. Policies and policy directions are a result
of a struggle among stakeholders for resources
and their allocation and distribution is unlikely
to be on the basis of equity — rather these are
likely to be determined by political clout and
expedience.
Arguably some issues can be resolved
applying the policy cycle model but it is crucial
to distinguish between matters that are amenable
to a consultative process and those that have to
be dealt with primarily as power plays. Applying
a policy cycle and community consultation
approach to a contentious issue which is
unlikely to be resolved in any manner other
than by way of a political contest, as is exem-
plified by the attempt to locate Sydney’s new
airport, is likely to lead to failure.
Note
1. Deadweight tonnage — the weight of the vessel
including cargo and bunker.
© National Council of the Institute of Public Administration, Australia 2003
Everett
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