Policy Sciences 18 (1985) 241-261

Elsevier Science Publishers B.V., Amsterdam - Printed in the Netherlands 241

Contextual Orientation in Policy

Analysis: The Contribution of
Harold D. Lasswell

DOUGLAS TORGERSON
Administrative and Policy Studies Program, Trent University, Peterborough, Ontario KgJ 7B8,
Canada

ABSTRACT

Criticized for its generally positivist and technocratic orientation, the literature of public policy analysis
has begun to generate proposalsthat would create a convergence between the field and the wider move-
ment for a post-positivist restructuring of social inquiry. Ironically, critics have often focused on "policy
science" as the epitomy of positivism and technocracy, giving little attention to the actual position of the
figure responsible for the term - Harold D. Lasswell. Centering on Lasswell's key concept of contextual
orientation, this article argues that, despite positivist influences, he developed an approach to inquiry and
a proposal for a policy science profession which together clearly transcend positivism and technocracy
- which, indeed, anticipate recent post-positivist proposals. Implications for policy analysis of a project
of contextual orientation are also considered, along with problems in Lasswell'sfocus on professionalization.

I. Policy Analysis and Post-Positivism: The Significance of Lasswell

I n the context o f a d v a n c e d i n d u s t r i a l society, there is a distinct a n d widely n o t e d ten-

d e n c y for p u b l i c policy analysis to b e c o m e v i r t u a l l y a b s o r b e d in narrow, technical
issues. This t e n d e n c y has been especially n o t e d in the case o f efforts to r a t i o n a l i z e
the o p e r a t i o n s o f the a d m i n i s t r a t i v e state, rendering t h e m m o r e fully calculable, con-
trollable, a n d efficient t h r o u g h the a p p l i c a t i o n o f m o d e r n m a n a g e m e n t techniques
[1], U n d e r the sway o f a positivist logic o f inquiry, analysis tends to be g u i d e d b y
a n interest in calculating s o l u t i o n s for specific policy p r o b l e m s - ones which per-
tain, moreover, to strictly delimited frameworks within a p a r t i c u l a r socio-political con-
figuration. A n a l y s i s b e c o m e s Central to a m o d e o f p o l i c y f o r m u l a t i o n a n d i m p l e m e n -

0032-2687/85/$03.30 9 1985 Elsevier Science Publishers B.V.

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tation which is supposed at least to approximate the ideal of an automated mechanism.

Formalized routine predominates, and analytic effort is focused on treating policy
questions in terms of programmed decisions. There is an evident preference for an
automation of decision procedures [2].
Oriented to this technocratic ideal, analysis becomes intimately associated - even
largely equated - with management science. There is, indeed, a name which both
proponents and critics often use to refer to this mode of inquiry: policy science [3].
When the term is thus used, however, little or no attention typically is given to the
person responsible for coining it.
Throughout the post-war period, the late Harold D. Lasswell was a chief propo-
nent of a policy focus in the social sciences. He proposed the development of policy
science - or policy sciences - as an interdisciplinary field to embrace all the social
sciences and to produce knowledge applicable to public problems [4]. In consequence,
Lasswell gained a considerable reputation as a positivist and technocrat [5]. Allegiance
to policy science is, indeed, today readily regarded as a central feature of technocratic
consciousness [6]. Yet there is a certain irony in this, for although Lasswelrs work
reflects some influence of positivism, he developed an approach clearly at odds with
a positivist posture.
Lasswell struck a critical note in drawing attention to what he saw as a widespread
"preference for automation" which would minimize the role of deliberation and judg-
ment in descisionmaking: "Running through much of the modern work that is being
done on the decision process~' Lasswell noted, "is the desire to abolish discretion on
the part of the chooser and to substitute an automatic machine-like routine" (1955:
387). In particular, Lasswell pointed to formal game-theoretic models of rational deci-
sionmaking: "In effect the player becomes a computing machine operating with 'built-
in' rules in order to maximize built-in preferences" (p. 387). Lasswell made it clear
that the analytic project he proposed was founded, in contrast, upon a "preference
for creativity" (p. 389).
Profoundly influenced by Freud and Marx, Lasswell emphasized the importance
of the contextual orientation of policy analysts, both individually and collectively [7].
When he first articulated this principle of contextuality, Lasswell indeed referred ex-
plicitly to the "exposition of the dialectical method" (1965a: 18n) in Luk~ics's History
and Class Consciousness [8], adding that the insights of psychoanalysis provided a
complement to the Marxian dialectic which would aid in understanding "the sym-
bolic aspects of historical development" (p. 19). Here Lasswell proposed a mode of
contextual-configurative analysis whereby, through "an act of creative orientation"
(p. 13), the inquirer could locate himself in an "all-encompassing totality" (p, 12), Lass-
well considered such contextual orientation indispensable to the conduct of rational
inquiry, and he urged the use of contextual-configurative analysis in the development
of a policy science profession [9].
Current developments in the policy literature reflect some disillusionment with the
conventional positivist framework of analysis. Indeed, there have been proposals which
 243

would link policy analysis with the broader movement for a post-positivist restruc-
turing of social and political inquiry. Here explicit attention has been given both to
Jtirgen Habermas's revision of critical theory (see McCarthy, 1978) and to Richard
Bernstein's (1976) important summary of theoretical developments [10].
Central to a post-positivist restructuring of policy analysis would be a critique of
ideology which - by exposing the prevailing technocratic consciousness as being in-
consistent with rational inquiry - would set the stage for a fundamental reorienta-
tion of the field. The ideological character of conventional policy analysis would, in
other words, be recognized through a project of immanent critique - which would
take seriously the (at least tacit) claim of the field to be a form of rational inquiry,
and which would then proceed to unfold the implications of that claim [11].
"Do we n o t . . , discover among social scientists some unwillingness to give promi-
nence to hypotheses that may be widely interpreted as inconsistent with prevailing
ideology?" With this rhetorical question, Lasswell (1961: 112) points to a key prob-
lem in aspiring to rational inquiry. Indeed, the critique of ideology - inasmuch as
it aims at a demystified, "action orienting self-understanding" (Habermas, 1977: 351)
- converges, in principle, with Lasswell's proposal for a project of contextual orien-
tation. The point of such a project, for Lasswell, was in large part to overcome socio-
psychological resistances detrimental to the ideal of policy science as a rational col-
lective enterprise - to use "the contextual principle~' as he once put it, "to remove
the ideological blinders from our eyes" (1976: 220) [12].
As we consider the relevance of post-positivism for policy analysis, then, Lasswelrs
work appears especially significant. Already present in his proposed logic of inquiry
is a reflexive move inconsistent with the positivist ideal of neutral, detached observa-
tion. A post-positivist restructuring of policy analysis would, in other words, involve
a contextual re-orientation of inquiry. Moreover, with his insistence upon contextual
orientation and his simultaneous proposal for a policy science profession, Lasswell
presents - in a uniquely sophisticated formulation - the ideal of policy analysis
as a mode of rational collective inquiry. Indeed, his work at least tacitly reveals -
and thus presents a unique opportunity to assess - the tensions in that ideal.
Lasswell developed a body of work which is diverse, seemingly eclectic. Yet one
can readily discern in Lasswell the three moments typically identified in the post-
positivist restructuring: empirical, interpretive, and critical. This is certainly not to
suggest that Lasswell consciously thought of his work in these terms. Often, indeed,
he seems to project something of a positivist self-image. Still, much of the seeming
eclecticism and tension in his work makes sense as an anticipation, or intimation,
of such a restructuring [13].
According to Bernstein (1976), then, the post-positivist restructuring of inquiry
contains three essential, interrelated moments: empirical, interpretive, and critical
[14]. In positivism, the empirical eclipses the other moments: attention is focused on
predictable regularities in objectified processes. The type of knowledge gained
through this focus, therefore, satisfies a technical interest in control. The restructur-
 244

ing of inquiry does not lose sight of objectified processes, but focuses as well upon
interpreting the intersubjective dimension of human social life. Here one not only
observes from the outside, but also considers human interaction from the perspective
of a participant - of one who is "in on" (Taylor, 1971: 13) the conventionally estab-
lished meaning of things. The interpretive moment thus offers a type of knowledge
which satisfies a practical interest in understanding. The restructuring of inquiry cul-
minates in a critical moment which, incorporating both empirical and interpretive
dimensions, exposes the distortions of psychopathology and ideology which deprive
persons of autonomy and rationality. The critical moment, then, provides a type of
knowledge which satisfies an emancipatory interest in enlightenment - in identify-
ing and dispelling those psychopathological and ideological forces which constrain
or destroy the freedom and reason of a person. Thus the critical moment is essential-
ly reflexive. Hitherto unnoticed influences in the process o f self-formation are
brought to the center of conscious attention, and the individual actively appropriates
these critical insights in the re-formation of his self-understanding.
It would be unnecessarily tedious to demonstrate point by point how Lasswell's
work incorporates the key moments of the post-positivist restructuring. The empiri-
cal with its technical interest in control, the interpretive with its practical interest in
understanding, the critical with its emancipatory interest in enlightenment - all of
these will be seen clearly enough in the course of our discussion to be interwoven
in the fabric of his thought. For the moment, a single passage from Lasswell will suf-
fice to suggest the direction of our discussion:

It is insufficientlyacknowledgedthat the role of scientificwork in human relations is freedom rather

than prediction. By freedomis meant the bringing into the focus of awareness of some feature of the
personalitywhich has hithertooperatedas a determiningfactorupon the choicesmade by the individual,
but which has been operating unconsciously.Once elevatedto the full focus of waking consciousness,
the factor which has been operating "automaticallyand compulsively"is no longer in this privileged
position. The individualis now free to take the factor into considerationin the making of future choices
(1951a: 524).

It would be a simple matter to quote passages in which Lasswell appears as more

of a positivist and technocrat. Those who emphasize this aspect of Lasswell do have
a point, but the point is misconstrued if it obscures those dimensions of Lasswel!
which shatter the positivist framework.
In Lasswell's conception, the policy sciences seek to develop knowledge pertaining
to "two separable though entwined frames of reference": analysis aims at knowledge
both " o f and in" the policy process (1970a: 13). At one moment, the analyst regards
his subject-matter as an objective phenomenon, but this phase alternates with anoth-
er in which the analyst comes to view himself as actively involved in the phenomenon
which he investigates. Inquiry displays both tension and interplay between these mo-
ments; they are distinct yet interwoven, complementary in the ongoing development
and refinement of contextual orientation.
While inquiry is to employ a diverse range of methods, there is to be a fundamen-
 245

tal reliance upon participant-observation (Lasswell, 1971: 58, 74-75). Not all analysts
need to be intimately involved with the policy process, but some must be; this is a
necessary part of a collective enterprise to develop a contextual orientation common
to a community of inquirers.
Present in Lasswell is the idea that knowledge of and in the policy process is not
only a goal of analysis, but also a means of analysis: for such knowledge provides
an orientation to context that is necessary for the conduct of investigation. The ana-
lyst is inevitably an actor, "a participant observer of events Who tries to see things
as they are" (p. 3). Instead of being detached, action and analysis are intertwined in
a process through which the inquirer seeks to make sense of self and world. In this
active posture, the analyst is concerned with locating himself not only in the context
of the immediate field of action, but also within a broader framework, conceived as
a "total configuration" (1965a: 19). The analyst is, to be sure, concerned with details,
but he also proceeds with the principle that "subtle ties bind every part to the whole"
(1971: 2), and works for the discovery of "interdetail connections" and "the gradual
creation of a sense of wholeness" (1965a: 16): "Unless the salient features of the all-
inclusive whole are discerned, details will be incorrectly located.. '.' (p. 4). While Lass-
well holds that the policy sciences are to be concerned with particular problems in
specific arenas of action, he also maintains that the total configuration must be grasped
by the analyst as a relevant object and context of analysis. The development of con-
textual orientation is never finally concluded; it remains unfinished, the continuing
effort of the analyst to make sense of a vast and complex, often bewildering array
of phenomena.
Clearly, Lasswell's conception of policy science provides a sharp contrast to the
narrow conception fostered by the technocratic perspective. Indeed, in Lasswell's view,
the emergence of the policy sciences is a significant development in world history.
The whole enterprise is conceived in terms of an historical commitment which ad-
heres to the Enlightenment ideal of a rational civilization. Lasswell consistently and
explicitly promoted the policy orientation as part of a commitment to a world com-
monwealth which would advance the cause of universal human dignity (e.g., 1951b).

II. The Project of Contextual Orientation

The project of contextual orientation conceived by Lasswell is highly ambitious be-

cause it seeks a knowledge of the whole; at the same time, it is rather modest because
it does not expect complete success. Although presupposed at every moment of anal-
ysis, the whole is never simply given as a fact to be immediately apprehended, but
is contructed through the labor of meticulous research. The conception of the whole
is disciplined, refined, and revised in light of concrete evidence which is continuously
sought out: "The meaning of any detail depends',' in turn, "upon its relation to the
whole context of which it is a part" (Lasswell, 1976: 218). Inquiry, then, never reaches
246

a final conclusion, but creates a condition in which the potential for enlightened ac-
tion is enhanced.
"By what procedures~' Lasswell asks, "can the mind be made most fit for rational
clarity?" The policy analyst, he suggests (1958a: 90), needs to engage in a psychoana-
lytically informed clarification of value judgments [15] linked to a conscious, con-
tinually refined, orientation to the general socio-historical context and the specific
situations in which he acts. Lasswell conceives the rational analyst as one who comes
to terms with an inexhaustibly complex and constantly shifting universe by grasping
it both as an objective configuration and as a context to be penetrated as a subject.
In this effort, one participates as an actor in "situations" and "networks of interac-
tion" (p. 53) comprised of values and meanings "recognized and sustained in the con-
tinuing interplay among participants in the social process" (p. 96).
Psychoanalysis and the ethnographic study of foreign cultures, he argues, are alike
in that, with both, the search is for meanings in an unfamiliar subject-matter; both
call for intensive "intimacy" and attention to a "wider context" than that which is
apparent (1977: 252-253). Yet Lasswell does not restrict such interpretation to the
realm of the unfamiliar. "The world about us~' he remarks, "is much richer in mean-
ings than we consciously see" (p. 36). Noting that analysis of a familiar culture could
give results that appeared obvious and not really worthwhile, Lasswell attempts "to
put the truth paradoxically" in a remarkable exaggeration: "The whole aim of the
scientific student of society is to make the obvious unescapable.. Y (p. 250).
Contextual orientation is predicated upon an "understanding of people" attained
in conjunction with "insight into the Self" (1958a: 96). Insight, for Lasswell, is con-
ceived along psychoanalytic lines as "discovery" by the individual of personal charac-
teristics "ordinarily excluded from the focus of full waking attention by smooth work-
ing mechanisms of 'resistance' and 'repression'" (p. 97). In Lasswell's conception of
the "self-in-context" (1971: 157), the understanding of others and insight into one's
self are necessarily linked since it is through insight that one dispells the force of "anxi-
eties" which inhibit "rationality" (1958a: 97; cf. 1977, Ch. 3). Here, moreover, Lass-
well makes a crucial connection, suggesting that reason presupposes a certain auton-
omy:

The consciousprocessitself may be under the domination of repetitivecompulsionswhich are outside

the awarenessof the thinker. If rationalityincludes the notion of freedomof choiceand hence of free-
dom from obsessionand compulsivity,it is obviousthat rational thinking requiresthe use of appropri-
ate proceduresby means of which the thinkerobtains accessto pertinentfacts about the Self(1958a"92).

Lasswell also stresses the extent to which a'rational analyst depends upon his social
context both for his education and for specific information and ideas about the world;
he depends upon "agencies of enlightenment" (p. 97). Thus Lasswell does not leave
contextual orientation as a task simply for the individual policy analyst, but calls for
a collective cultivation of professional identity (1971, Ch. 7) and advocates an educa-
tional program designed to sensitize policy analysts to self and context (Ch. 8):
 247

It is... impossible for anyone to escape an implicit map of the self-in-context.But the cognitive map
is rarely brought deliberately or fully into the open unless the individual is exposed to an instructional
experiencethat rewards him by bringing the implicit image of reality to the full focus of waking aware-
ness. This is the sense in which policy training operations are designed to influence the content made
available at the focus of attention and to adopt the procedures effectivelyadapted to the task. The
enlightened person is aware of his assumptions about the past, present, and future of himself, his cul-
tural environment, and his natural environment. Our recommendedgoal is to provide undogmatic ac-
cess to inclusive versions of reality, so that the chances are increased that the individual will use his
own capacities of imagination and judgment (pp. 155-156).

To this end, Lasswell offers quite specific suggestions. He particularly recommends

the widespread use of long-range, continuing seminars, composed primarily of small
groups of highly committed members. Lasswell indicates a variety of approaches which
such seminars might employ. One is an "adaptation of the psychoanalytic technique
of free association" in which seminar members actively promote a collective willing-
ness "to encourage and t o l e r a t e . . , the uttering of uncensored suggestions" (p. 150).
Another is the use of an "adversarial p r o c e d u r e . . , to act as an occasional challenge
to established approaches and thoughtways" - for example, by "appointing a devil's
advocate" (pp. 152-153). One of the chief ends of the seminar is to challenge predispo-
sitions - through whatever means, to achieve the "uncovering of previously unrecog-
nized expectations, demands, and identificationsY In this regard, Lasswell exhibits
considerable enthusiasm about these continuing seminars, suggesting the possibility
of a "seminar movement" which could create "global seminar networks" (p. 154).
Lasswell also advocates the development of "self-observation and analysis" through
"individual and small group laboratoriesY Here "'insight training" has particular sig-
nificance because the policy analyst "needs to assess his own role, as a conditioning
factor in any number of situations" (pp. 157-158). Again, Lasswell's touchstone is
psychoanalysis, but he introduces an important caveat: "Traditional psychoanalysis
laid so much emphasis on the 'deeper' motivations that it failed to provide for propor-
tionate, contextual insight into social reality at different levels'.' Lasswell accordingly
suggests adapting the psychoanalytic technique to "reality critique," thereby increas-
ing the individual's awareness of his total institutional context (p. 158; cf. 1976: 168).
The totality which contextual orientation seeks to discern is not a fixed entity. The
analyst focuses on the overall configuration both as a stable form manifest at a par-
ticular moment, and also as a changing pattern in a process of historical develop-
ment (1965a: 4 - 5 ) . The project of contextual orientation, that is, involves a "princi-
ple of temporality" (Lasswell and Kaplan, 1950: xiv). An actor within a changing
context, the analyst adopts a developmental focus and turns to the task of conscious-
ly elaborating a "developmental construct" (cf. Eulau, 1958). The analyst, in other
words, becomes concerned with history.
Lasswell clearly acknowledges a debt to Marx for the concept of the developmen-
tal construct [16]. Yet Lasswell insists that the developmental construct, while draw-
ing upon evidence of historical trends and conditions in order to formulate an image
of an anticipated future, is to be sharply distinguished from any law of historical de-
248

velopment. The aim of analysis, to be sure, is "nothing less than correct orientation
in the continuum which embraces past, present, and future" (1965a: 4). The image
of development which the analyst constructs is one which, nonetheless, remains neces-
sarily tentative and thereby open to revision. No amount of rigorous research on past
trends and present tendencies can eliminate uncertainty. Future events, in particular,
"are partly probable and partly chance" (1971: 11). There is no place for dogmatism.
A developmental construct is, then, a "speculative model" (Lasswell and Kaplan,
1950: xxiii). While anchored in evidence, it necessarily goes beyond the evidence; it
is a product of the imagination (Lasswell, 1947a; cf. 1947b: 32). Yet the imagination
is not to be given completely free play. Lasswell distinguishes between constructs which
we deem probable and constructs which we deem preferable. While preference models
are necessary to identify possible and plausible courses of action, it remains neces-
sary to distinguish what we want to happen or want to achieve from what we really
expect to occur. Failure to do so signals a lapse of rationality - mere wishful think-
ing (1971: 68). The developmental construct is disciplined by evidence and, in partic-
ular, by the "crucial test" of unfolding events: any developmental construct may be
redefined as future potentialities are "actualized in the past and present of participant
observers" (1965a: 13). The purpose of inquiry is not to discover an historical law.
"The essential purpose," as Lasswell puts it, "is to enable the policy analyst, and hope-
fully the decision-maker, to find his way in the complexities of the total situation in
which he operates" (1971: 67).
Our image or images of the future would appear to be warranted expectations, in
Lasswell's view, only to the extent that they are continuously subjected to questioning
and revision. A crucial point following from the logic of Lasswell's position is, more-
over, that there can be no escape into a neutral agnosticism. No certain knowledge
is available, but for all those who act in the policy process (analysts included) there
is no way to avoid at least an implicit contextual orientation - an orientation which
includes a temporal, developmental dimension. Although necessarily tentative and
incomplete, a developmental construct can at least be consciously recognized, dis-
cussed, and judged. By becoming the focus of attention, the temporal dimension no
longer resides in the background of inquiry, but is scrutinized and refined. There is,
in any case, no neutral alternative, only uncritical adherence to conventional notions
[17].

IlL Professional Identity

A project of contextual orientation is an emancipatory project which, by bringing

to the attention of the individual certain key formative influences, serves to reduce
or eliminate their constraints upon his freedom and rationality. Whether Lasswell's
specific proposals are adequate to the reflexive task he sets for them is here beside
the point. What clearly is significant is his deliberate and systematic effort to incor-
 249

porate reflexivity into the process of inquiry. Lasswell recognizes that social regulari-
ties depend upon "meanings" and thus are "subject to change with notice (with in-
sight)"; through the force of "insight" and "awareness~' he suggests, changes in "the
current meaning" can occur which will transform the "context" of action (Lasswell,
1965b: 33 - 34). Pointing to the "great and creative insistence by Freud on the effica-
cy of insight',' Lasswell argues that scientific conclusions about "human interactions"
belong in "a special category":

These results of scientificeffort enablepredictionsto be made of the future. This they havein common
with scientificinformation about events other than human interactions. But knowledgeof interaction
may produce insight and in this way modify future events in ways that result in changing the scientifi-
cally established relationships themselves (1956: 114-115).

Lasswell's whole proposal for a rational policy science ultimately rests upon the ef-
ficacy of insight in fostering enlightenment. Through the ongoing interplay of knowl-
edge of and knowledge in the policy process, moreover, the analyst attains a creative
orientation which renders him a self-conscious actor. Neither fully detached from the
process nor fully immersed in it, the analyst above all requires flexibility as one capa-
ble now of directly participating in the process, now of contemplating it at a distance;
taking nothing in principle as absolutely fixed, rather regarding the process as one
of changing forms which influence actors and are, in turn, influenced by them (cf.
1965a: 4 - 6 , 16-17; 1971, Ch. 2).
The rational policy analyst is, however, to be distinghuished from the typical policy
actor. The analyst is one "whose principal value goal is truth in the sense of enlight-
enment about the policy process and its interaction with the social context.. Y (1974b:
181). Consistent adherence to this goal cannot, of course, simply be assumed in all
actual circumstances; such commitment must be taken, instead, as a matter of princi-
ple. It is a commitment which can be sustained only through a mode of reflexivity
that continuously reasserts the commitment in the face of pressures tending to un-
dermine it. Thus Lasswell warns of "circumstantial" pressures which "appear when
truth is exposed to the threats and temptations of power" (p. 177).
The fact that Lasswell proposed explicit procedures for developing contextual orien-
tation in policy analysis bears witness to the peculiar difficulties in institutionalizing
a genuinely rational mode of policy inquiry. Finding itself in a world of power rather
than truth, the analytic profession confronts the task of fashioning a distinctive com-
municative space where the distorting pressure of circumstances can be successfully
resisted. Here no relevant information is to be withheld from other participants; and
challenging ideas are to be not only considered, but encouraged. The analyst demands
openness from himself and from others who join him in the common project of in-
quiry (1971: 3). The work of the policy science professional thus requires both collec-
tive support and "the life-long cultivation of t h e . . , potential for rationality" (1958a:
97). Contextual orientation is a collective as well as an individual undertaking; it aims,
in particular, at enhancing the rational capacity of a professional community.
250

The obvious "threats and temptations of power" constitute, in this regard, only
part of the problem. Also involved are the identity of the person and that of the col-
lectivity with which he identifies. Personal identity is typically bound to a common
identity through a symbolic medium, through the legends and principles of "myth"
and "ideology" (1958b: 168, 31, 214; cf. Lasswell and Kaplan, 1950: Ch. 6). Collec-
tive symbols, once established, remain remarkably persistent (1958b: 169). However,
the conventional symbols of collective identity cannot be passively accepted by the
professional policy analyst. The very idea of a policy science profession seriously com-
mitted to reason thus entails the development of a "distinctive" professional identity
(1971: 120).
Lasswell, it should be recalled, regarded the emergence of a policy science profes-
sion as a significant development in world history. It is clear that, in his view, the
full contextual orientation of such a profession would constitute one of those events
in intellectual life which have fostered "'breakthroughs'... in the decision processes
of history" (1958b: 190). A project of contextual orientation may be understood, in
large part, as "a quest for identity" during which individuals "loosen the bounds of
the culture into which they are born by becoming aware of it.. ~' (p. 194). The proc-
ess is one, alternately, of "breaking through current stereotypes" and "articulating
key symbols of identity" (p. 193). The development of identity through role playing
(as in Mead) gives way, at this level, to a deliberate testing of personal and collective
identity in relation to social reality. Disclosing a perhaps forgotten past and project-
ing a potential future, the elaboration of a developmental construct, in particular,
involves analysts in a "re-definition" of identity (pp. 194-195). And this re-defini-
tion is itself part of the course of historical development. An adequate developmen-
tal construct, then, must reflexively take into account the objective circumstances
and self-understanding of the analytic profession itself.

IV. Professional Commitment: A Policy Science of Democracy?

Lasswelrs proposal for a contextually oriented policy science profession is, indeed,
grounded in the elaboration of a developmental construct which envisions the intellec-
tual as the central figure in the emerging future - and which identifies a tension be-
tween two dramatically divergent tendencies in the intellectual's role: oligarch versus
democrat.
The emergence of the policy sciences should, according to Lasswell, be viewed in
the context of a political development which he takes to be "distinctive" of the pres-
ent historical period: "the rise to power of the intellectual classY' The contemporary
world, he maintains, is experiencing a "permanent revolution of modernizing intellec-
tuals'.' The prospect of a policy science profession thus appears as part of a fundamental
political transformation. For although power is not necessarily exercised directly by
policy scientists, the contribution of policy science is necessary "to cope with the com-
 251

plexities of large-scale modern civilization" (1968: 185; cf. 1965b).

The entrance of intellectuals into the arenas of power has, Lasswell suggests, given
"new vitality" to discussions of "professional ethics" (1971: 121). In this regard, he
identifies as a "fundamental issue" the question of democracy versus oligarchy: "wheth-
er the overriding aim of policy should be the realization of the human dignity of the
many, or the dignity of the few (and the indignity of the many)" (p. 41). He thus
propels us beyond the narrow bounds of what is conventionally understood as
professional ethics; we clearly enter the realm of normative political philosophy.
Lasswell here explicitly declares a commitment to democracy and the general reali-
zation of human dignity.
Given this commitment, Lasswell regards the historical rise of intellectuals with
some ambivalence. For he can readily envision intellectuals both as performing neces-
sary services for democracy and - especially with the dominance of specialists on
violence - as constituting a "ruling oligarchy" (1968: 186; cf. 1947a: 146 ft.). In Lass-
well's main effort to formulate a developmental construct, indeed, two fundamental-
ly divergent futures are identified as distinct possibilities: (1) a democratic common-
wealth, and (2) a "garrison-police state" (1965b: 37), A "democratically oriented policy
science" (1951b: 11) appears, for Lasswell, to be necessary both to attain a common-
wealth of universal human dignity and to avert the " t h r e a t e n e d . . . regimentation of
a garrison-police state," which - in his most provocative formulation - he envisions
as "a world concentration camp" (1976: 222; cf. 1958b: 197). " I f we are in the midst
of a permanent revolution of modernizing intellectuals;' he maintains, "the succeed-
ing phase obviously depends in no small degree on perfecting the policy sciences that
aid in forestalling the unspeakable contingencies latent in tendencies already more
than faintly discernable" (1965b: 96).
In his earlier work, as he perceived the emergence of disquieting historical tenden-
cies, Lasswell focused on the problems of propaganda and psychopathology in polit-
ical life. He identified improvement in "the methods and the education of social ad-
ministrators and social scientists" as a key to a "preventive politics" which would reduce
the level of social tension and conflict (1977: 203) [18]. Public discussion, he believed,
too often exacerbated rather than resolved political problems (pp. 196-197). Here Lass-
well's concern was apparently not to enlighten the mass of the population, but to
immunize it: to prevent the advent of a tyranny based upon the irrationalities of mass
society. Adopting the use of propaganda in the name of democracy, the "politics of
prevention" would, in effect, be a social technology employed by a benign elite of
"political psychiatrists" (1965a: 19-20, 181; cf. 1977: 189ff.; 1928). Here was Lass-
well in his most technocratic posture (cf. Horwitz, 1962; Bachrach, 1967: Ch. 5).
As he later advocates a policy science of democracy, however, Lasswell perceives
the potential for "the dissemination of insight on a vast scale to the adult popula-
tion" (1976: 196) [19]. Here the project of contextual orientation is not seen as the
preserve of a professional elite, but as a process of enlightenment to be extended to
the population generally. Perhaps related to a shift from an orthodox to a neo-Freudian
252

model of the psyche (cf. Birnbach, 1961: Chs. 7-8), this new outlook views political
participation not necessarily as a symptom of psychopathology but as potentially a
means - in concert with a general project of contextual orientation - of fostering
the development of a "democratic personality" (Lasswell, 1976: Ch. 7; cf. 1951a).
The policy science of democracy proposed by Lasswell is in direct opposition to
the twin threats of "oligarchy" and "bureaucratism" (1971: ll9ff.). Instead of promot-
ing a policy process cloistered in the administrative state, the policy science profes-
sion is ideally committed to the "encouragement of continuous general participation"
(p. 117): "The aim',' Lasswell proposes, "is to subordinate the particular interests of
a profession to the discovery and encouragement of public interest. This implies di-
rect community participation as well as client service" (p. 119).
The essential role of the policy science profession, for Lasswell, is to promote ra-
tionality in the policy process. "The contemporary policy scientist perceives himself...
as a specialist in eliciting and giving effect to all the rationality of which individuals
and groups are capable at any given time" (p. 120). Here reason does not govern soci-
ety from above, but becomes an integral part of democratic politics. Lasswell envi-
sioned the prospect of bridging the gulf between policy experts and citizens "by giv-
ing everyone who is involved in a public controversy an expert who can say whatever
there is to say on his behalff' Doing this "may serve rationality" by bringing informa-
tion otherwise neglected by policy makers "to the focus of attention" (p. 121).
While Lasswell advocates a policy science devoted to the realization of reason,
democracy and universal human dignity, he consistently asserts the positivist view
of the non-rational status of normative judgments. When he promotes a policy science
of democracy, that is, he does so explicitly as a matter of purely personal choice; in
principle, he has no argument to make against a "policy science of tyranny" (1951a:
471n). It is a matter ultimately not of argument, but of opting for one or another
non-rational "political doctrine" (Lasswell and Kaplan, 1950: ix ff., 119 ff.; cf. Lass-
well, 1971: 41-43; 1962).
Despite Lasswell's explicit position, however, it is not difficult to uncover in his work
a subterranean link between reason and norm. The whole project of contextual orien-
tation - and the psychoanalytically informed clarification of value judgments in par-
ticular - is proposed to enhance individual and collective capacities for rationality.
While there can, Lasswell insists, be no question of grounding the "content" of value
judgments, he allows for the possibility of "a procedural.., approach to the ground-
ing of value judgments" (1958a: 90). Not all value judgments, then, need be "arbitrary"
(1968: 182). Here Lasswell is clearly pressing at the positivist boundary.
It is evident, in any case, that the whole prospect of policy analysis as a collective
rational enterprise depends upon the establishment of procedures and institutions ad-
vancing the project of contextual orientation. Consequently, anyone committed to
policy analysis is in principle also committed to creating and maintaining certain so-
cial and political Conditions necessary for collective rationality. Any form of collec-
tive rationality - to make the point generally - presupposes a community of inquir-
 253

ers which is itself a social and political phenomenon. Commitment to the ideal of
this community cannot be abandoned without abandoning commitment to reason
itself [20]. At least implicitly, then, Lasswell makes this same point with regard to
policy analysis. Given that contextual orientation is a necessary condition for policy
analysis as a collective rational enterprise, however, it still remains unclear to what
extent (if any) critical insight must in principle extend beyond the realm of the policy-
analytic profession (cf. Torgerson, 1984: Ch. 8).
Lasswell's early work, as we have seen, was largely congruent with the technocratic
ideal of an insular elite of experts. As he endorses a policy science of democracy, how-
ever, Lasswell advances the prospect that the project of contextual orientation might
expand beyond the professional realm to promote widespread, enlightened participa-
tion in a democratic policy process. Moreover, given the commitment which Lasswell
proposes, the diffusion of insight becomes a responsibility of the policy science profes-
sion. "Policy scientists who are committed to the free man's commonwealth~' Lass-
well goes so far as to say at one point, "find it difficult to believe that anyone who
applies a fully contextual approach can stop short of making a similar commitment"
(1968: 182). In this formulation, Lasswell verges on the proposition that genuine com-
mitment to rational policy analysis cannot be made without also committing oneself
to a democratic polity - that one commitment is tied to the other. Quickly, however,
Lasswell draws back from this idea to concede the great diversity and partial unpre-
dictability of the positions contextually enlightened individuals might take (p. 182;
cf. 1971: 41-43). In another connection, however, he makes a claim which - although
vague - creates further tension with the positivist dichotomy between reason and
norm: "Coercive ideology' he states with a co-author, " . . . is the polar opposite of
ethical rationality as historically understood~' Moreover, coercive ideology is at odds
with principles of rational discourse and indicates "a constriction of spirit far removed
from ethical refinement" (Lasswell and Lerner, 1965: vi; cf. Lasswell, 1965b: 88). It
would appear, then, that a certain case might be made for a policy science of democracy
as against a policy science of tyranny (cf. Taylor, 1973: 157ff.). The tension between
positivist doctrine and Lasswell's position is, at any rate, evident [21].
Lasswr formulation of developmental constructs could no doubt be criticized
from numerous perspectives. His focus on the knowledge and skills of intellectuals,
for example, might well be seen to be exaggerated and to neglect other potent forces
in historical development. Taking his position on its own grounds, however, his pro-
posal for a professional policy science has a plausible rationale. Whichever direction
history takes, in Lasswell's view, intellectuals will be important - and will be involved
in public policy decisions. Hence the contextual orientation and ethical refinement
attained by intellectuals concerned with public policy could conceivably prove sig-
nificant in shaping either a democratic or oligarchical future. Moreover, a develop-
mental construct iself has the potential to enter as a significant factor into the course
of history, altering the way people perceive themselves and orient their activity. "The
act of considering the shape of things to come~' Lasswell remarks, "is itself an event
254

that is not without effect on the ensuing events" (1980: 518). Developmental constructs
can point merely to what we consider a probable course of future events - but can
also help to clarify preferable futures. A developmental construct can thus make a
future prospect more likely simply by focusing attention on it as a goal of action.
Lasswell posits the policy science profession as such a goal.

V. Contextual Orientation and the Mystique of Professionalism

Yet Lasswell's ideal of a policy science profession appears sharply at odds with prevail-
ing tendencies in the development of a professional identity among policy analysts
[22]. This identity currently bears the distinct mark of institutional allegiances - par-
ticularly, of involvements with large private corporations and agencies of the adminis-
trative state. These allegiances serve to reinforce the tendencies - against which Lass-
well warned - toward oligarchy and bureaucratism. Typically, moreover, the conduct
of the policy-analytic professional in these arenas of power is guided by a technocrat-
ic consciousness, generally amenable to these institutions; which is resistant to that
critical insight and moral reflection which Lasswell places at the heart of a project
of contextual orientation. "Attuned to a settled, predefined political reality' it has
been remarked, " . . . p o l i c y science remains effortlessly on the side of the accredited
interests" (Kariel, 1972: 106). Regarding the critique of prevailing institutions to be
a violation of scientific objectivity, professional policy analysts orient themselves to
a mode of inquiry which sanctions conventional "definitions of reality" and promotes
the harmonious integration of individuals within "established systems" of govern-
ment (p. 106).
The typical effect of "professional trainingS' Lasswell once suggested, is to foster
"self deception rather than self analysis" (1977: 37). Indeed, the tendencies we have
noted are not ones of which Lasswell was altogether unaware [23]. "The pitfalls [in
the proposal for a policy science profession] are~' he admits, "numerous and it is to
be predicted that many initiatives will fall short of the goal" (1971: 132). In particu-
lar, Lasswell is acutely aware of the institutional pressures on the intellectual, who
"learns the conditions of survival in the arenas of power" (p. 125). The potential au-
tonomy of a policy science profession is seriously constrained by the realities of pow-
er, by the fact that "intellectuals will find themselves caught in a net of interlocking
interests" (1965b: 91). It is thus important to recognize that - whatever the short-
comings - Lasswell's proposal for the development of a professional identity is in-
tended to foster rationality in policy analysis by providing inquiry with some institu-
tional protection against distortions wrought by political power (cf. 1970b; 1981).
Nonetheless, one must question Lasswell's reliance on professional identity. Given
the general nature of his political commitment and the basic thrust of the develop-
mental construct which he articulates, we must ask whether a professional role -
with all that implies - is really appropriate for a community of rational inquirers
 255

concerned with public policy. For Lasswell, the ideal of the professional involves in-
tegrity, enlightenment, and devotion to public service. However, might professional-
ism not also rule out in advance the possibility that the policy-analytic community
could become committed to a fundamental critique of the established order? Given
prevailing tendences in professionally oriented policy analysis, an affirmative answer
to this question would appear to be a considerable understatement. Indeed, the very
notion of a policy-analytic profession harbors assumptions about the social position
of analysis which militate against a fully developed project of contextual orientation.
Conventional policy analysis, that is, carries with it a deceptive - and self-deceptive
- "professional mystique" (cf. Wolfe, 1970) which reinforces the technocratic gulf
between expert and citizen while fostering the alignment of professionals with the
prevailing administrative institutions [23].
However much the substance of Lasswell's position might violate positivist princi-
ples, he remained sufficiently under the spell of positivism to formulate his policy
science proposal in a way which could easily be twisted - along with his own reputa-
tion - into a technocratic form. Perhaps Lasswell's view of history was too much
fixated upon the vision of an apocalyptic clash between the forces of democracy and
coercive oligarchy for him to take seriously the threat of a more subtle kind of oligar-
chy operating surreptitiously under the beguiling camouflage of technocratic images.
In light of Lasswell, the historical irony of professional policy analysis is that - to
date - it appears to have promoted the technocratic consciousness which pervades
and reinforces the undemocratic dimensions of existing socio-political order. To ad-
vance the project of contextual orientation, moreover, would necessitate a sustained
critique of prevailing technocratic tendencies in professional policy analysis, the pub-
lic exposure of these tendencies, and the redefinition of the analytic community in
a manner which counters the mystique of professionalism.
The advent of post-positivist tendencies in the policy literature contains the prom-
ise of such a reorientation. However, a decisive move in this direction would likely
require considerable care and restraint in involvements with established policy insti-
tutions. Such a move could, indeed, seriously jeopardize relationships with these in-
stitutions. It might become necessary, then, for policy analysis to abandon much of
its applied focus - to set itself off at a critical distance from established policy mak-
ing institutions. Yet we might then ask if we are still talking about policy analysis,
or about some qualitatively different intellectual enterprise. What would appear
jeopardized, in any case, would be the direct participatory dimension of what, in Lass-
well's view, provides the foundation of inquiry: participant-observation [24]. Here,
however, we are perhaps thinking too much of policy analysis as a discrete and cohe-
sive entity. Perhaps we need to focus instead upon the diverse range of inquiries which
we often tend to lump under the heading of policy analysis, examining more con-
cretely the relationships between different intellectual orientations and particular po-
litical interests [25]. Yet when we thus view policy analysis as fractured along distinct
political lines, what seems even more remote is the chance of realizing policy analysis
256

as a c o h e r e n t collective enterprise, as a c o m m u n i t y o f r a t i o n a l i n q u i r e r s all devoted

to critical r e f l e c t i o n a n d u n i n h i b i t e d discourse.

Acknowledgment

T h i s article is a slightly revised v e r s i o n o f a p a p e r p r e s e n t e d at t h e a n n u a l m e e t i n g s

o f the C a n a d i a n Political Science A s s o c i a t i o n , M o n t r e a l , Q u e b e c , M a y 3 1 - J u n e 2,
1985.
Revisions to t h e p a p e r a n d the a u t h o r ' s u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f Lasswell have b e n e f i t e d
f r o m discussions w i t h ' p a r t i c i p a n t s ( m a n y f o r m e r associates o f Lasswell) at the F o u r t h
Policy Sciences S u m m e r Institute, held at the U n i v e r s i t y o f C a l i f o r n i a , Berkeley, M a y
23-25, 1985. F o r i n f o r m a t i o n , ideas, a n d e n c o u r a g e m e n t , g r a t i t u d e is p a r t i c u l a r l y
d u e to W i l l i a m Ascher, G a r r y D. Brewer, R o n a l d D. B r u n n e r , L l o y d Etheredge,
L a w r e n c e Z. F r e e d m a n , E d w a r d G o r d o n , R o d n e y M u t h , W i n s t o n N a g a n , R o b e r t
R u b e n s t e i n , C h a r l e s W. T. Stevenson, a n d A n d r e w W i l l a r d .

Notes

1 There is an extensive literature on this. See, e.g., Tribe (1972), Kramer (1977), Kariel (1972), van Gunste-
ren (1976), Wildavsky (1966), Phidd (1982). For an important case study, see French (1984).
2 On the concept of "programmed decisions" in contrast to "non-programmed decisions," see Simon
(1977: 75-49). On the "preference for automation," see Lasswell (1955: 387).
3 See, e.g., Tribe (1972), Fay (1975), Lewin and Shakun (1976). For an important Lasswellian effort
to distinguish between policy sciences and management sciences, see Dror (1975). Of course, not all
studies relating to public policy are narrowly technocratic. On the diversity of work in policy analysis,
see Bardes and Dubnick (1980), Aucoin (1979),
4 "Sciences are policy sciences when they clarify the process of policymaking in society, or supply data
for the making of rational judgments on policy questions." Lasswell (1976: 120). (The original edition
of this work appeared in 1949.) For an early commentary on Lasswell's policy focus, see Easton (1950).
Lasswell generally used the plural "policy sciences," presumably to emphasize the interdisciplinary
nature of the field. At times (e.g., 1951b: 11), he did use the singular "policy science." In the present
article, the plural and the singular are used interchangeably just as one might speak interchangeably
of "social science" and "social sciences." The term "policy analysis" is used here in quite a broad
sense to refer generally to the full range of approaches to the study of public policy.
5 See, e.g., Germino (1967: 203): "to read Lasswell is definitely to enter the brave new world of scien-
tism." Cf. Horwitz (1962), Crick (1960: Ch. 10).
6 See Fay (1975: Chs. 2-3). Fay's explicit critique of "policy science" as the "political theory" of
"positivist social science" (pp. 13 - 14) bears the clear imprint of Habermas. On the latter's concepts
of the "scientization of politics" and "technocratic consciousness," see Habermas (1971b: 62 - 80,
111 - 115).
7 See, e.g., Lasswell (1971: Ch. 2). Early in his career, Lasswell became immersed in psychoanalytic
theory and practice. He underwent a "didactic analysis" (by Theodore Reik) and practised lay analy-
sis. He relied, moreover, on the technique of the prolonged interview in developing typologies of the
relationship between personality and politics. See Birnbach (1961:177 ff.), Marvick (1977: 27). Also
see Lasswell (1977: esp. 272). (The first edition of this work appeared in 1930; the passage cited is
from "Afterthoughts," first added in the 1960 edition.) Cf. Lasswell (1938, 1956). Despite an indica-
tion to the contrary by Birnbach (1961: 178), Lasswell's involvement in lay psychoanalysis was con-
 257

firmed by Robert Rubenstein and Lawrence Z. Freedman, both former associates of Lasswell, during
informal interviews in Berkeley, California, May 24-25, 1985. The influence of Marx is discussed
by Marvick (1977:27 ff.), and is stressed by Horwitz (1962), who goes so far as to describe Lasswell
as "quasi-Marxist" (p. 243 n. 35). Despite the clear influence of Marx, however, LassweU was cer-
tainly not enamored of Marxism.
8 Lasswell (1965a) was originally published in 1935; he cites the 1923 German edition of Luk~ics. For
the English translation, see Luk~tcs (1971).
9 Lasswell employs both the terms "configurative" and "contextual." Sometimes a certain distinction
seems to be implied (e.g., 1976:217 -218). At least at one point, however, he explicitly indicates that
the terms are synomymous (1958: 187). (The original edition of the latter work appeared in 1936; the
passage cited is in a 1958 Postscript.) Nonetheless, it would not do violence to Lasswell's essential
meaning to employ "con figurative" and "contextual" to refer to the interplay, respectively, between
knowledge o f and knowledge in a process. In the present article, this reference is intended. (Cf. 1970b:
3; 1971: 13.)
10 Of the rapidly growing literature in this vein, see esp. Amy (1984). Cf. Paris and Reynolds (1983),
White (1982), Dryzek (1982), Fischer (1980), Torgerson (1980, 1981, 1984). Also note French (1984:
19-20, 203 n. 1).
11 For an effort along these lines, see Torgerson (1984). On the concept of "immanent critique," see
Held (1980:183 ff., 214 ff.).
12 While Lasswell does not consistently employ the word "ideology" to indicate mystification, he does
frequently use the word in contexts, such as this one, which presuppose a notion of ideological distor-
tion. Cf. Lasswell (1971: 23; 1958: 31,168,214; 1981:111 - 113); Lasswell and Kaplan (1950: Ch. 6).
13 As an interpretation of Lasswell, this article should be viewed less as a final product than as an initial
step. Something completely neglected here, e.g., is the important influence on Lasswell of the Ameri-
can Pragmatists (esp. Dewey). For a helpful survey of the themes and influences in Lasswell's exten-
sive work, see Marvick (1977), who suggests that while Lasswell has long been "out of step" with
dominant trends in social science, his work may now be converging with a growit~g "disenchantment"
with the conventional orientation (pp. 7 - 8). Marvick also includes a useful, though incomplete, bib-
liography (pp. 425-443). Also see the bibliography prepared by Jerry Gaston in Rogow (1969:
407- 443). (A complete, annotated bibliography is currently being prepared at Fordham University
by Rodney Muth and his associates.) Commentators on Lasswell often remark on problems of in-
terpretation created by a difficult style, an unsystematic mode of exposition, and an apparent eclecti-
cism (see, e.g., Eulau, 1958, 1969; Smith, 1969). Lasswell's positivistic self-image is perhaps most clearly
expressed in Lasswell and Kaplan (1950: xiv). Even there non-positivist features are clearly discerna-
ble in his position. Yet one who seeks positivistic tendencies in Lasswell can readily find them. See,
e.g., his emphasis on "manipulation" and "control" (1965b: 4 - 5 , 12-13, 16, 181); his contribu-
tions to "quantitative semantics" (Lasswell et al., 1949); his suggestions for indexing verbal response
to physiological change in the psychoanalytic interview (1977: 293- 294 n. 19); his proposal for ex-,
perimenting with "judicial robots" (1955: 398-399). Cf. the references cited in n. 5 above.
14 On the "technical," "practical," and "emancipatory" interests intrinsic, respectively, to these three
modes of inquiry, see Habermas (1971a: appendix). For conceptions similar to Bernstein's restructur-
ing of inquiry, see Fay (1975), Moon (1975), Giddens (1976).
15 As we shall see, Lasswell's approach largely transcends the limitations of "values clarification" as
a technique in moral education. This is because Lasswell's approach is not only interpretive, but also
critical - hence, guided by an emancipatory interest. For a relevant critique of Lasswell, see Brown
(1976); for a relevant critique of values clarification, see Carter (1984:49 ft., 83).
16 See Lasswell (1971: 67-68). However, he does not so clearly acknowledge a perhaps equal debt to
Weber. See Lasswell and Kaplan (1950: xxiii); Weber (1968: 286-288).
17 Such an uncritical acceptance of the conventional is, of course, not without significance in the policy
process. For some relevant examples, see Torgerson (1980: 16-33, Ch. 7).
18 Lasswell (1977) was originally published in 1930. Cf. n. 7 above.
19 Lasswell (1976) was originally published in 1949. Cf. n. 4 above. Also see Lasswell (1941). Lasswell
focused on the key issue in a posthumous article (1980: 533): "It is apparent.., that information...
may be used by professional manipulators to manage public response. The same information, howev-
er, can be made accessible to participating persons, and can contribute to self-understanding and to
the making of choices to continue or discontinue particular perspectives." The development of Lass-
258

well's theoretical work may be viewed as revolving about the tension between the technocratic and
participatory potentials in policy analysis - and tending progressively toward a more participatory
orientation. In this regard, one particularly important study involving Lasswell as a practising policy
scientist is Rubenstein and Lasswell (1966). Indeed, despite Kariel's pointed critique of technocratic
"policy science" (1972), he elsewhere remarks quite favorably on Rubenstein and Lasswell's work
as a "dramatic illustration of how social science can creatively restructure a prevailing system of pow-
er" to promote " a democratic forum for sharing power" (1969: 137- 138). Cf. Dobyns, Doughty
and Lasswell (1971). It would be useful to have public accounts by Lasswell's former associates of
his work as a practising policy scientist. Cognizant of many difficulties facing efforts to realize the
ideal of rational policy science in the present socio-historical context, Lasswell no doubt worked to
overcome them in his own activities. However successful he might have been at a personal level -
and here the testimony of his associates would be relevant - the point remains that Lasswell's policy
science proposal goes beyond the particular qualities and achievements of any person as an individual.
Lasswell envisioned a transformation at a collective level - first in the character of an analytic profession
and ultimately (if the logic of the participatory potential is to be followed) in the quality of public
life in modern civilization. It is at the collective level that the tensions in his ideal of a professionalized
policy science are apt to become especially apparent. Of course, this does not mean that the personal
example of Lasswell (and others) could not guide collective effort in confronting these inevitable tensions.
20 Central to Habermas, this point is developed in the work of Karl-Otto Apel. See, e.g., Habermas (1970);
Apel (t972, 1980).
21 To explore the significance of this tension would require an excursion - beyond the scope of this
article - into post-positivist developments in metaethics. See, e.g., Apel (1980: Ch. 7), Peters (1973),
Carter (1984).
22 On the professionalization of policy analysis, see Dror (197l), Meltsner (1980), Foster (1981), Beneviste
(1984). In a more critical vein, cf. Jenkins-Smith (1982), Amy (1984), MacRae (1970), Horowitz (1970),
Dye (1978).
23 Cf. Larson (1977: Ch. 12); Lieberman (1970: 7): "inherent in the meaning of professionalism and
the motives of its adherents is the negation of democracy itself, stemming from the incipient belief
that the citizen, like the consumer, is incompetent to make important decisions affecting his life."
24 The crucial problem here is not that policy analysis might lose a focus on application, but that it might
lose opportunities for intimate contact with its subject-matter. Cf. Torgerson (1984: Ch. 7). Needless
to say, financial support for policy-analytic activities could also be seriously eroded.
25 For an attempt to do this with respect to the divergent "technocratic" and "participatory" tendencies
in social impact assessment, see Torgerson (1980, 1981). For a general discussion of differing "mo-
tives and methods" in policy analysis, see Bardes and Dubnick (1980).

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