The Role of Arab American Advocacy

Groups in Shaping American Foreign

Policy

Lanouar Ben Hafsa

Society

ISSN 0147-2011
Volume 51
Number 5

Soc (2014) 51:513-523

DOI 10.1007/s12115-014-9817-7

1 23
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 Author's personal copy
Soc (2014) 51:513–523
DOI 10.1007/s12115-014-9817-7

SYMPOSIUM: AMERICA IN THE WORLD

The Role of Arab American Advocacy Groups in Shaping

American Foreign Policy
Lanouar Ben Hafsa

Published online: 13 September 2014

# Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014

Abstract This paper aims to offer some insights into the Keywords U.S. foreign policy . Middle East conflict .
ways in which Arab-Americans experience the United States Arab lobby . pro-Israel lobby . 2008 and 2012 U.S. elections
and adjust to its political institutions. It stresses how such a
community still finds it difficult to consolidate its efforts and
Studying American foreign policy poses an interesting chal-
exert pressure on the decision making process. But to gain
lenge. The topic is highly complex and requires analysis of the
national visibility and recognition, they need first to voice its
interplay of many forces: political, economic, military, and
concerns throughout mainstream advocacy groups. In this
ideological. To non-Americans, generally less familiar with its
regard, the term “Arab lobby” is a misnomer as very often it
intricacies, it is imperative to appreciate first the domestic
is used as a shorthand word for the loose coalition of organi-
political context, which shapes its general contours and
zations that seek to improve Arabs’ conditions in the U.S. and
weighs upon its orientations. Much has been written about
to influence American foreign policy in the Middle East.
U.S. policies in the Middle East, especially the factors that
Notwithstanding, this study is meant to highlight the differ-
have determined and shaped the American role in the Arab-
ence between what some termed the informal Arab lobby,
Israeli conflict, as many of the decisions taken in that sense
sponsored by rich oil countries, and the formal Arab
seem to reflect more the influence of special interest lobbying
American lobby, represented today by the Arab American
than the will of the American public in general.
Institute (AAI) and the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination
This paper aims to explore the context, the actors, the
Committee (ADC) and headquartered in Washington D.C.
procedures, the interests and the challenges involved in the
However, while the different components of the pro-Arab
Arab lobbying effort. I intend to gauge the degree of the Arab
lobby cannot represent “the Arabs” as a united political group,
contribution to the decision-making process and to assess the
they have been able to share a common concern: Palestine. In
efficiency of Arab American advocacy groups in promoting
effect, not only the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has always been
an “Arab agenda,” which places the Palestinian question at the
a top priority and a principal focus of the Arab lobby as a
heart of their concerns. It is by no means a paper on American
whole, but it has also been viewed as a tool to measure its
Muslims or Islam, and is partly based on interviews of two
political efficacy. Last but not least, despite the very limited
Washington-based Arab American leaders, Dr. James Zogby,
success achieved by the Arab lobby in its attempts to shape
founder and president of the Arab America Institute, and
American foreign policy (compared to its pro-Israel counter-
Warren David, president of the American-Arab Anti-
part), this study demonstrates that the members of the Arab
Discrimination Committee.1
and Jewish communities in the United States share common
grounds on almost every issue central to Arab-Israel peace and
U.S. policy in the Middle East, on top of them the two-state Quick Facts About Arab Americans
solution (Zogby International, 2007).
The term “Arab American” refers to Americans who trace
their ancestry to one of the 22 Arab-speaking countries, which
L. B. Hafsa (*)
1
Faculty of Human and Social Sciences, University of Tunis, Tunis, This research was conducted in Washington, DC (Nov./Dec. 2012),
Tunisia thanks to a grant I earned from the Center for Maghreb Studies in Tunis
e-mail: anouar_benhafsa@yahoo.fr (CEMAT).
 Author's personal copy
514
Fig. 1 Religious Affiliation of Arab Americans. Source: Arab American
Institute (2012)
are as diverse as Egypt, Lebanon, Morocco, Yemen, Tunisia
and Palestine. Among Arab Americans, more than 80 % are
U.S. citizens. Descendants of earlier immigrants who, since
the 1880s, poured from the Levant (an area encompassing
present-day Syria, Lebanon, Israel/Palestine, Jordan and Iraq),
they have been referred to as Syrians, Syrian-Lebanese,
Arabians, Turks, and especially since 1967 as Arab
Americans. The different names have reflected diversity and
a fluid and changing identity. Their religious composition is as
different as their origins: 63 % are Christian, 24 % are Muslim,
and 13 are Jewish or have no religious affiliation (Fig. 1).2
In the 2010 Census, at least 1.9 million Americans (less than
0.5 % of the overall population) reported an Arab ancestry. Arab
Americans live in all 50 states, though two-thirds are concentrat-
ed in ten states and one-third of the total reside in California, New
York and Michigan. About 94 % of Arab Americans live in
metropolitan areas. Los Angeles, Detroit, New York/New Jersey,
Chicago and Washington, DC are the top five metropolitan areas
of Arab concentration. In Dearborn, Arab Americans make up a
fifth of the population and more than two-fifths of the students
enrolled in public schools (Fig. 2).3
Arab Americans are more educated than other Americans.
Eighty-nine percent have earned at least a high school diploma.
More than 45 % have received a bachelor’s degree or a more
advanced diploma, compared with 28 % of Americans in
general. Eighteen percent of Arab Americans have earned a
post-graduate degree, which is nearly twice the American av-
erage (10 %).4 The higher rates of education are echoed in a
pattern of well-paid jobs. Like the national average, about 60 %
of Arab American adults are in the labor force; and only 5 % are
unemployed. Seventy-three percent work in the managerial,
2
Arab American Institute Foundation (www.aaiusa.org).
3 7
Statistical Source: U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey
3-Year Estimates (2007–2009) and AAI’s research and surveys (www.
aaiusa.org).
4
Ibid.
Soc (2014) 51:513–523
Fig. 2 National Arab Sub-Ancestry. Source: The Arab American Institute
(2012)
professional, technical, sales or administrative fields. Eighty-
eight percent hold posts in the private sector; the other 12 % are
government employees. The propensity of Arab Americans to
own businesses and to serve as professionals translates into a
corresponding median income ($56,331 in 2008) that also
surpasses the national average ($51,369) (Fig. 3).5
Is There an “Arab Lobby”?
Mitchell G. Bard, in his book, The Arab Lobby, claims that “the
Arab lobby in the United States is at least as old as, and perhaps
older than, the Israeli lobby.”6 Yet Isaiah L. Kenen, the founder
of the American Zionist Committee for Public Affairs, denies
that there has been any need for a formal lobby. What he labeled
the “petro-diplomatic complex” has consisted of oil industry,
missionaries, and diplomats, and influences U.S. foreign policy
for Arab Americans.7 In another of Bard’s books, The Water’s
Edge and Beyond, the Arab lobby is defined as “those formal
and informal actors that attempt to influence U.S. foreign policy
to support the interests of the Arab States in the Middle East.”8
He acknowledges that Arab Americans, like any other group,
have the right to pursue their agenda and to present their case to
5
U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey 3-Year Estimates
(2007–2009) and AAI’s research and surveys.
6
Mitchell Geoffrey Bard, The Arab Lobby: The Invisible Alliance That
Undermines America’s Interests in the Middle East (New York: Harper,
Broadside Books, 2010), Int. XIII.
Ibid., p. 181.
Ibid.
8
Bard, The Water’s Edge and Beyond: Defining the Limits to Domestic
Influence on United States Middle East Policy (New Brunswick, N.J.:
Transaction Publishers, 1991), p. 7.
 Author's personal copy
Soc (2014) 51:513–523
Fig. 3 Occupation and Income. Source: Arab American Institute (2012)
the American people and its representatives in the marketplace
of ideas. But he objects to efforts to promote policies that aim to
delegitimize and ostracize Israel.
However, when contacting Arab American organizations to
set up interviews with their representatives for his book, The Arab
Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy, Khalil M. Marrar, a professor at
DePaul University, was dismayed to hear the person on the other
end of the line state that “there is no Arab lobby in Washington,
DC.”9 Even James Zogby, the founder of the Arab American
Institute and one of the most prominent advocates of the
Palestinian cause, asserted in 1982: “There is no Arab lobby.”10
Arab American advocacy groups employ only a handful of agents
on Capitol Hill, in contrast to the highly sophisticated AIPAC.11
Even though lobbying has long been integral to the
American political landscape, the term is misleading.
Defined narrowly, a lobbyist would mean a “person working
to influence government policies and actions.”12 Lobbying
involves more than pressuring members of Congress to adopt
a specific line of conduct. Lobbying encompasses a wide
range of activities, including grassroots organizing, mobiliz-
ing public opinion, advertising, holding press conferences,
reaching out to educational establishments, filing court cases,
contributing to campaigns, meeting with elected representa-
tives, developing favorable perceptions about the groups, and
9
Khalil M. Marrar, The Arab Lobby and US Foreign Policy: The Two-
State Solution (New York: Routledge, 2009), p. 84.
10
–. “Lobbying Public Opinion: The Pro-Arab Lobby and the Two-State
Solution” (paper presented at the Annual National Conference of the
International Studies Association, March 26–29, 2008)
11
Marrar, The Arab Lobby, p. 84.
12
Thomas R. Dye, Politics in America, 4th ed. (Upper Saddle River, NJ:
Prentice-Hall, 2001), p. 294.
515
nurturing constituencies and delivering them during
elections.13
Key Actors in the “Arab Lobby”
The “Petro Lobby” To identify the central components of the
Arab lobby and to trace how it has evolved over time, one
needs first to distinguish between direct and indirect lobbying.
For the former, informal and more straightforward, operates
generally from within the system and aims basically at
influencing the decision-making process. It can, for instance,
direct campaign contributions to favored candidates and try to
defeat those whose views are suspect, or lobby elected repre-
sentatives and members of the executive branch. The latter,
less formal, works principally to mold public opinion in a
variety of ways such as writing books and press articles,
winning to its side well-known chroniclers, discrediting
distorted information, and so forth.
Even though it clearly has two dimensions, foreign and
domestic, the boundaries of the Arab lobby cannot be identi-
fied precisely. The term “Arab lobby” is itself misleading,
insofar as it is very often used as shorthand for the loose
coalition of organizations that actively work to impel
Washington to adopt a more evenhanded position toward the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. So it is by no means a single,
unified movement with a central leadership and a defined
membership. Bard criticizes the behind-the-scenes “machina-
tions” and lack of transparency of “a many-headed hydra that
13
See Kenneth M. Goldstein, Interest Groups, Lobbying and
Participation in America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1999).
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516
is less easily defined and less visible than its counterpart. It has
no central address compared to AIPAC and few consensus
positions.”14
Bard identifies two components of the Arab lobby: the “petro
lobby,” consisting of former U.S. officials, defense contractors,
and oil corporations, hired by Arab oil countries to defend their
national interests; and the “domestic lobby,” comprising a num-
ber of advocacy groups, most headquartered in Washington,
DC, such as the Association of Arab-American University
Graduates (AAUG), the National Association of Arab
Americans (NAAA), the Arab American Institute (AAI), the
American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (ADC), which
pursue a pro-Palestinian agenda. As early as 1951, he writes,
“King Saud of Saudi Arabia asked U.S. officials to finance a
pro-Arab lobby to counter the pro-Israel lobby.”15 What
emerged, he adds, has been a powerful and home-grown lobby
is almost exclusively represented by Saudi Arabia, which is
“engaged in an unprecedented effort to influence U.S. policy
through politics, economics, and academics.”16
The perception that the “petro-diplomatic complex” does the
work for the Arabs and, therefore, not much is required or
expected from the Arab American groups themselves, has been
stressed by other scholars. Steven Emerson once pointed out that
the Arab American Oil Company (ARAMCO), representing
several oil corporations, has “conducted a surreptitious multi-
million dollar campaign to manipulate public opinion and for-
eign policy in the Middle East.”17 As early as 1967, major U.S.
oil companies warned that oil supplies would be jeopardized by
pro-Israel policies, and ARAMCO even urged the U.S. to
support a United Nations resolution to nullify Israel’s unification
of Jerusalem after the Six-Day War.18
In effect, the petro lobby, in the period preceding the oil
embargo in 1973, took advantage of the absence of a reliable
domestic Arab lobby to become the single lobbying force speak-
ing in the name of all Arabs and Muslims. Oil was used as a
potential weapon to influence the American policy on the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. So, because it views the pro-Israel lobby as
its main counterpart, it works to promote counter-lobbying by
trying to apply pressure through highlighting a number of themes
related to U.S. interests. The emphasis is upon support for Israel
as weakening the nation’s ties with the Arab world, plus the
claim that the Arab-Israeli conflict is the root of all problems in
the Middle East. The petro lobby also argues that support for
Israel allowed the Soviet Union and later Muslim extremists to
gain influence in the region to the detriment of U.S. interests, and
provokes anti-Americanism in the Arab and Muslim worlds.
14
Bard, The Arab Lobby, p. 340.
15
Ibid., p. XIII.
16
Ibid., p. 344.
17
Mitchell Bard, “The Influence of Ethnic Interest Groups on American
Middle Eastern Policy,” in Eugene Wittkopf, The Domestic Sources of
American Foreign Policy: Insights and Evidence, 2nd edition (New York:
St. Martin’s Press, 1994), p. 84.
18
Bard, The Arab Lobby, p. 83.
Soc (2014) 51:513–523
The influence of the petro lobby is legitimate; it does not
violate the provisions of the Foreign Agents Registration Act of
1938.19 But supporters of Israel raised concerns, and denounced
such activities as a form of intrusion into domestic affairs.
Representatives of the petro lobby were depicted as mere agents
of a foreign power. In 1974, for example, Senator Thomas
McIntyre (D-NH) asserted that “the influence of Big Oil is far
more insidious, and far more pervasive than the influence of the
Jewish lobby. Oil and influence seep across ideological as well as
party lines, without public approval.”20 Within a few days of
Barack Obama’s inauguration in 2009, Prince Turki al-Faisal, the
Saudis’ former ambassador to the United States, warned: “Unless
the new U.S. administration takes forceful steps to prevent
further suffering Palestinians, the peace process, the U.S.-Saudi
relationship and the stability of the region are at risk.”21
On the whole, while the efforts of the oil lobby are significant,
they are difficult to examine in any consistent manner because of
their secretive and informal character. While no one can deny
that countries like Saudi Arabia have repeatedly pressured
Washington to adopt a more evenhanded position toward the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, those efforts have been conducted by
public relations firms and are based on personal contacts and
networking. Their approach has been top-down, intended to
influence high officials in Congress and the White House.
The Domestic Arab “Lobby” Paradoxically enough, the domes-
tic Arab lobby did not emerge from the Arab Americans’ defend
an “Arab” agenda. Unlike the petro lobby, which is first and
foremost interested in oil and commerce, the domestic Arab groups
are driven above all by an agenda which considers Palestinian
statehood as a key plank of their program. In this respect the 1967
Arab-Israeli war constitutes a turning point in Arab American
history. The war laid bare the extreme partisanship showed by
the American government and media toward the state of Israel, but
also inspired an awakening of a group that became more fully
aware of their identity. Its focus has subsequently been on Arabism
instead of nationhood, such as Syrian, Iraqi, or Egyptian.
Not until the 1970s did Arab Americans become actively
involved in politics. and various baffling factors can explain their
late blooming. Tiny numbers have not prevented fragmentation
along lines of language, ethnicity, cultural background, and
political orientation. Those differences make unity difficult if
not impossible to achieve. Moreover, unlike the pro-Israeli lobby,
which stands to promote and strengthen the U.S. relationship
with a single nation, Arab Americans have originated from
countries that sometimes have conflicting interests and are even
19
According to this Act, foreign countries can monitor U.S. legislations
and regulations and lobby the individuals in government and the
Congress whose decisions impact foreign corporations and foreign coun-
tries, provided that this is conducted by American lobbyists.
20
Near East Report, February 5, 1975.
21
“Saudi Prince Says US ties at Risk over Mideast,” Reuters, January 23,
2009.
 Author's personal copy
Soc (2014) 51:513–523
at war with each other. Jawad George, the executive secretary of
the Palestine Congress of North America, has observed: “The
same things that divide the Arab world divide the Arab American
world.”22 While the different components of pro-Arab lobby
cannot represent “the Arabs” as a united political group, they
have been able to share a common concern: Palestine. In effect,
the Palestinian issue has always been a principal focus of the
Arab lobby, even though only 6 % of Arab Americans, about
70,000 people, are Palestinians.
The first advocacy group which sought to advance an Arab
rather than a regional or national orientation was the
Association of Arab-American University Graduates
(AAUG). Founded in 1967 by Palestinian professors
Edward Said and Hisham Sharabi, it had none of the charac-
teristics of a political lobby. The AAUG dedicated much of its
work to educate Arab Americans and other Americans, and to
inform them of the rich Arab heritage, and especially to get
Arab Americans to talk to each other. One member recalled:
We were never under the illusion that we could create a
counter to the pro-Israel lobby in the country. Some Arab
Americans suffered from this illusion and sought the lar-
gesse of Saudi Arabia and some of the Gulf countries trying
to convince them that they can in fact produce a lobby that
could neutralize the influence of the pro-Israel groups. We
were not convinced of the value of this approach for several
reasons… Many of us felt that our voice would be severely
marginalized no matter how much money we spent… we
did not see ourselves as mouthpieces for corrupt and
dictatorial Arab governments which had hitched their stars
to the rising American empire in the region.23
Only in the early 1970s did the Arab domestic “lobby”
begin to organize itself in a more institutionalized and formal
manner. The first group to engage in direct lobbying efforts
was the now defunct National Association of Arab American
(NAAA).24 Established in 1972, it was the first Arab organi-
zation to officially register as a “lobby” and to form a Political
Action Committee (PAC). “The day of the Arab American is
here,” founder Richard Shadyac boasted, “and the reason is
oil.”25 The NAAA was instituted primarily “to counter the
effects of AIPAC on U.S. politics, particularly at the congres-
sional level.”26 It worked to promote U.S. policies to ensure a
unified and stable Lebanon and proposed the establishment of
22
Amy Kaufman Goot and Steven J. Rosen, eds., The Campaign to
Discredit Israel (Washington, DC: AIPAC, 1983), p. 6.
23
Fouad Moughrabi, “Remembering the AAUG (Association of Arab-
American University Graduates),” Arab Studies Quarterly (Summer-Fall
2007).
24
In 2000, NAAA has merged with the American-Arab Anti-
Discrimination Committee (ADC).
25
Congressional Quarterly, The Washington Lobby, p. 17.
26
Saad Ibrahim, “American Domestic Forces and the October War,”
Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. 4, no. 1 (Autumn 1973), p. 64.
517
a two-state solution to the Israeli Palestinian conflict. NAAA
made its case on the basis of American national interests,
arguing that a pro-Israel policy harms those interests. “If we
are cold this winter,” Peter Tanous, the head of the NAAA,
warned in 1973, “it will be because we have turned our backs
on the Arabs’ plea for peace with justice in the Middle East.”27
At its height in the 1970s, the group counted 200,000 mem-
bers committed to “persuade Congress to revise its overall com-
mitment to Israel.”28 In 1984, the NAAA backed an amendment
introduced by Rep. Nick Joe Rahall (D-WC), one of the few Arab
Americans to serve in Congress, to prevent Israel from using U.S.
military aid for the production of its Lavi fighter plane. The
amendment received only 40 votes. Then, in 1975, the NAAA’s
lobbying efforts were epitomized in a meeting with President
Gerald Ford (and with every subsequent president after that), and
with top government officials.29 However, with few financial
resources, and with little political expertise, the most powerful
Arab lobbying group was ineffective. It ended up losing momen-
tum, and conceded that such efforts have “not been effective in
changing Congressional sentiment on Middle East policy.”30
New blood and new political circumstances altered the direc-
tion and the meaning of Arab American ethnicity, and set in
motion a whole process of entering American politics. Another
major national organization, the American-Arab Anti-
Discrimination Committee (ADC), was formed. According to
its web page, the ADC is “a civil rights organization committed
to defending the rights of the people of Arab descent and pro-
moting their rich cultural heritage.”31 Founded in 1980 by former
U.S. Senator James Abourezk (D-SD), ADC is the largest Arab
American grassroots civil rights organization in the nation. With
headquarters in Washington, DC, this non-profit, non-sectarian
and non-partisan organization has over 40 chapters in 24 states
and members in all 50 states. Open to people of all backgrounds,
faiths and ethnicities, it seeks to “empower Arab Americans,
defend the civil rights of people, promote Arab cultural heritage,
promote civil participation, encourage a balanced U.S. policy in
the Middle East and support freedom and development in the
Arab World.”32 Though primarily geared to promoting the civil
rights of Arab-Americans, the group actively advocates in favor
of Palestinians and highlights the violation of their human rights
under the Israeli occupation. In addition to the immense resources
it engages to combat violence, negative stereotyping and discrim-
ination directed against Arabs and Muslims, ADC pushes for a
more even-handed U.S. policy in the Middle East, calling for the
U.S. to force Israel out of the territories and to freeze settlements.
A fourth group, the Arab American Institute (AAI), was
formed in 1985 by James Zogby, a veteran of political campaigns
27
Kennen, Israel Defense Line, p. 308
28
Ibid.
29
See: Bard, The Arab Lobby, p. 200.
30
Ibrahim, “American Domestic Forces”, p. 64.
31
www.adc.org/about-us/.
32
Ibid.
 Author's personal copy
518
(usually in favor of the Democratic Party). He is the brother of
famous pollster John Zogby. Based in Washington, DC, AAI is a
non-profit and non-partisan national leadership organization,
created to “nurture and encourage the direct participation of
Arab Americans in the political and civic life in the U.S.”33
Representing the policy and community interests of Arab
Americans, the group actively strives to promote Arab
American participation in campaigns and elections.34 AAI also
devotes much of its energy to promote peace between Israelis
and Palestinians, especially the recognition of the Palestinian
right to a viable state founded in territories occupied since 1967.
Anti-Zionist Jewish organizations also indirectly participate in
pro-Arab lobbying efforts. While marginal in terms of number
and influence, they are very often referred to in Arab lobby
campaigns to show that some Jews were also against the creation
of the state of Israel. The American Council for Judaism is one of
them. Founded by Reform rabbis in 1943, it fervently opposes
Jewish statehood. But the most visible today is unquestionably
the ultra-Orthodox Neturei Karta, a small sect whose members
occasionally participate in pro-Palestine events.35
The Role of the Pro-Israel Lobby
In contrast to the salience of the pro-Israel lobby in American
politics, the Arab American capacity to influence policy-making
is insignificant. Several reasons can be offered. First, unlike most
Arab and Muslim countries, where human rights abuses some-
times reach abysmal records, Israel has always been perceived as
a “sister democracy,” sharing Western values of free elections,
freedom of the press, and the rule of the law. Second, Israel has
often been portrayed as a victim, besieged by hostile Arab
neighbors, and bravely fighting to survive in the midst of dicta-
torial regimes. Third, the sense of guilt related to the suffering
inflicted on European Jews during the Second World War,
provides a further argument that could justify why Israel is
positively perceived in American public opinion and why it
deserves U.S. friendship and protection. Fourth, its geo-
strategic location makes it the most “reliable” ally of U.S. in its
“war against terror.”
However, the degree of cultural proximity with Israel and
the United States, the sense of Israelis as people “like us,”
whereas Arabs often seem to belong to an alien civilization,
and cannot justify by themselves the immense influence that
33
www.aaiusa.org.
34
See: Yvonne Haddad, “American Foreign Policy in the Middle East
and its Impact on the Identity of Arab Muslims in the United States,” in
Ernest J. Wilson (ed.), Diversity and US Foreign Policy: A Reader (New
York: Routledge, 2004), p. 249.
35
Americans for Peace Now and J Street are other Jewish organizations
that are pro-Israel, but have found common cause with the Arab lobby,
especially in their opposition to settlements.
Soc (2014) 51:513–523
the pro-Israel lobby has exerted on decision-making in
Washington. The widely recognized organizational abilities
of Jewish groups, their well-trained professional staffs, their
elaborate internal communications network, and especially
their formidable resources can also explain the greater politi-
cal success they have achieved. To Josh Block of AIPAC,
trying to convince Congress of Israel’s position “is like push-
ing at an open door.”36
The immeasurable success of the pro-Israel lobby in shap-
ing foreign policy in the Middle East and in ensuring contin-
ued support to Israel has been the subject of several recently
published studies. Probably the most controversial is The
Israel lobby and the U.S. Foreign Policy by John J.
Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Malt, which triggered a fire-
storm of criticism by pro-Israel groups. Mearsheimer and Malt
argue that the effect of the Israel lobby is enormous: “U.S.
Middle East policy is conducted with Israel’s welfare in
mind… and though there are other interests/lobbies that are
involved in the making of the U.S. foreign policy in the
Middle East, the Israel lobby’s impact in this sense is however,
highly influential compared to other competitors, such as the
oil industry lobby or Arab lobby.”37
Like its Arab counterpart, the pro-Israel lobby draws sup-
port from a penumbra of groups that form its core. It includes
well-known organizations such as the American Israel Public
Affairs Committee (AIPAC), the Anti-Defamation League
(ADL), the Zionist Organization of America (ZOA), the
American Jewish Committee (AJC) and the Conference of
Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations
(CPMAJO), etc. The lobby also relies on the unfettered back-
ing and influence of Christian Zionists who, since the mid-
1970s, have campaigning for the restoration of Jews in
Palestine, seen as the fulfillment of biblical prophecy and a
prelude to the Second Coming of Jesus Christ. With 25
million members worldwide (including 20 million in the
US), 38 Christian Zionists regard U.S. support of Israel as
“an absolute requirement.”39
AIPAC is no doubt the most visible primarily Jewish
American group and the most effective lobbyist organization
involved the Middle East affairs. Registered as a lobby and
funded by private donations, its mission is “to insure close and
consistently strong U.S.-Israeli relations.”40 In 1997 Fortune
magazine named AIPAC the second-most powerful influence
36
Quoted in Glenn Frankel, “A Beautiful Friendship,” Washington Post,
July 16, 2006.
37
John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, The Israel Lobby and US
Foreign Policy (London: Penguin Books, 2007), p. 112.
38
M. Prior, Interview with Marianne Arbogast, “Analysis: America’s
New Christian Zionisr,” BBC News Online (7 May 2002).
39
John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, The Israel Lobby and US
Foreign Policy, pp. 132–137.
40
D. Shipler, “On Middle East Policy,” The New York Times (6 July
1987).
 Author's personal copy
Soc (2014) 51:513–523
group in Washington, DC, behind only the American
Association of Retired Persons.41
Achievements and Limits
In spite of the proliferation of Arab groups attempting to shape
U.S. foreign policy, their actual influence has been rather
modest, and their accomplishments more symbolic than sub-
stantive. Even though countries like Saudi Arabia have re-
peatedly pressured Washington to adopt a different position
toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, their impact on most
aspects of U.S. Middle East policy remains negligible.
According to Mearsheimer and Walt, “Neither Arab govern-
ments nor the vaunted ‘oil lobby’ pose significant counter-
weight to the Israel lobby.”42 Their lack of an indigenous base
of support in the United States, added to the fact that they
themselves do not consider the domestic Arab lobby as trust-
worthy and prefer rather to hire public relation firms and
professional lobbyists to enhance their image and to lobby
for specific arms deals, explain why Arab oil producers exert
only limited influence on the making of U.S. foreign policy.43
U.S. energy companies, whose ultimate goal is to maxi-
mize profits, prefer to concentrate lobbying activities on the
practical dimensions of energy policy, including taxation,
government regulation, and access to potential drilling sites,
rather than policy in the Middle East.44 Nevertheless, petro
lobby efforts have occasionally borne fruit. For instance, when
President Jimmy Carter proposed to sell F-15 fighter planes to
Saudi Arabia, a vivid battle erupted between pro-Israel and
pro-Arab lobbies. Saudi Arabia ended up receiving the planes,
thanks partly, to the campaign mounted by defense and energy
industries arguing from a purely economic standpoint.45 But
their most notable achievement came in 1981 when, despite
AIPAC’s strong opposition, they convinced Congress to ap-
prove the sale of Airborne Warning and Control Systems
(AWACS) to Saudi Arabia. The oil lobby proved more per-
suasive than the pro-Israel lobby, when President Ronald
Reagan agreed to provide Saudi Arabia with five of these
sophisticated radar based electronic surveillance systems.46
Symbolic religious achievements are also worth mention-
ing, as Islam, which has often been viciously depicted by the
American popular media, has moved from the periphery to
equality in official ceremonies, alongside Christian and
41
“AIPAC Listed 2nd Most Powerful Group on Fortune List,” Jewish
News of Greater Phoenix (11 November 1998).
42
John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, The Israel Lobby and US
Foreign Policy, p. 142.
43
See: Bard, The Arab Lobby, p. 189.
44
See: Robert H. Trice, “Domestic Interest Groups and the Arab Israeli
Conflict,” in Said, Ethnicity and U.S. Foreign Policy, pp. 137–138.
45
Bard, “The Influence of Ethnic Interest Groups on American Middle
Eastern Policy,” p. 87–88.
46
Ibid.
519
Jewish faiths. That process of elevation cannot be clearly
attributed, however, to the influence of oil countries which,
according to Bard, “subvert American interests by supporting
terrorism and promoting radical Islamic views on a global
scale.”47 Eid messages, for instance, started with President
George H. W. Bush in 1990, formal Iftar invitations to the
White House were initiated during President Bill Clinton’s
administration, and the crescent was finally added to the
menorah and cross in the White House lawns as part of
Christmas decorations. In 1993 Captain Abdul Rashid
Mohammad was commissioned as the first Muslim chaplain
in the U.S. Army; since then Muslim imams have been invited
to offer invocations and blessings at the inauguration of House
and Senate activities.48
Unlike the foreign lobby, which is interested principally in
oil and commerce, the domestic lobby groups are driven
primarily by the Palestinian question. They believe, as the
director of the American-Arab Relations Committee put it in
1980, that “the road to the liberation of Palestine is through
Washington.” 49 The capacity of the tiny minority of
Palestinian Americans to put their concerns at the center of
their Middle East policy agenda and to win recognition about
the necessity and feasibility of a two-state solution to the
problem has been the greatest success of the domestic Arab
lobby. As they have no real interest in other Arab nations and
do not campaign for human rights in any of these countries,
Arab American organizations do not like the idea of Arab
states, especially the Saudis, interfering in their local affairs. In
this context, Fouad Moughrabi, a prominent member of the
NAAA asserted: “We will not allow ourselves to become
pimps for the Saudis.”50
Ironically, the component of the Arab lobby that should
have the greatest legitimacy, Arab Americans, constitutes its
weakest component. A large array of factors could explain the
various disadvantages that prevent domestic groups from
developing a positive agenda in support of Arab interests
and from gaining mainstream public support. Even though
the lack of support may be partly attributable to negative
stereotypes of Arabs, especially their association with terror-
ism, this cannot by itself explain the relative impotence of the
Arab lobby, which unable to counterbalance the immense
influence of the pro-Israel lobby.
The weakness of the Arab lobby can be illustrated by an
anecdote attributed to President Harry Truman. He responded
to some State Department officials and several chiefs of
diplomatic missions, who advised him to be “prudent” in his
support for the state of Israel in 1948, as follows: “I am sorry,
47
Bard, The Arab Lobby, Introduction XV.
48
See: Yvonne Haddad (ed.), Muslims in the West: From Sojourners to
Citizens (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 177.
49
Michael Lewis, “Israel’s American Detractors-Back Again,” Middle
East Quarterly, December 1997.
50
See: Bard, The Arab Lobby, p. 211.
 Author's personal copy
520
gentlemen, but I have to answer to hundreds of thousands who
are anxious for the success of Zionism. I do not have hundreds
of thousands of Arabs among my constituents.”51 On another
occasion, he declared: “In all my political experience, I don’t
ever recall the Arab vote swinging a close election.”52 Coming
late onto the political scene, Arab American interest groups
have lacked the expertise and sophistication of their Jewish
counterparts. As a consequence, U.S. politicians rarely, if ever,
complain about pressure from an “Arab American lobby” and
have little reason to adjust their behavior to accommodate it.
They presumably have very little to lose politically by
supporting policies favorable to the Jewish state. As one
senator explained, “There’s no countervailing sentiment… If
you vote contrary to the tremendous pressure of AIPAC,
nobody says to you, ‘That’s great.’”53 The failure of Arab
American advocacy groups to develop a positive agenda
could also be explained by their inability to raise money,
cultivate membership, or develop persuasive arguments to
shape U.S. policymaking. Their lobbying efforts can be re-
sumed in attempts to whisper in the ears of policymakers as
their personnel, in addition to attending committee hearings in
Congress, send letters or make telephone calls to candidates
without exerting real pressure on them.
Last but not least, reduced impact and lack of representa-
tion in various decision-making boards could finally be attrib-
uted to less success in reaching prominent positions in acade-
mia, business, and the media. Furthermore, because they come
from diverse countries and backgrounds, and include both
Christians and Muslims, Arab Americans are unlikely to
speak with a unified voice, especially on Middle East issues.
“We can’t represent the Arabs the way the Jewish lobby can
represent Israel,” a former president of NAAA, Joseph
Baroudi, once remarked: “The Israeli government has one
policy to state, whereas we couldn’t represent ‘the Arabs’ if
we wanted to. They’re as different as the Libyans and Saudis
are different, or as divided as the Christian and Moslem
Lebanese.”54
The 2008 and 2012 Elections as Case Studies
The Arab Vote Because Arab Americans are concentrated in
several battleground states, their vote as a group can never-
theless exert a deep impact on American elections. According
51
Quoted in: Mitchell Bard, “The Israeli and Arab Lobbies,” Jewish
Virtual Library, American-Israeli Cooperative (AICE) (2005), p. 5.
(www.jewishvirtuallibrarey.org).
52
Francis O. Wilcox, Congress, the Executive, and Foreign Policy (New
York: Harper and Row, 1971), p. 138.
53
Quoted in John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, The Israel Lobby and
US Foreign Policy, p. 141.
54
See: Sheila Ryan, “Israel Invasion of Lebanon: Background to the
Crisis,” Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. 11, no. 4, Special Issue: The
War in Lebanon (Summer 1982), pp. 23–37.
Soc (2014) 51:513–523
to AAI, 3.5 million Arab Americans live in the U.S., with
substantial representation in at least 55 congressional districts.
About 1.5 million Arab American voters are registered in
large battleground states (Michigan, Ohio, Florida,
Pennsylvania, and Virginia). Arab and Muslim activists’ sup-
port for George W. Bush made the difference in Florida, where
the Republican candidate ended up winning by slightly more
than 500 votes in the final recount. Ninety percent of the
state’s 40,000 Muslims who cast ballots did so for Bush.55
In the 2004 contest, John Kerry, the Democratic candidate,
won the state of Michigan, where half of Arab Americans live,
by 164,400 votes. A substantial part of this difference can be
ascribed to the Arab vote. It represents about 5 % of the vote in
Michigan, and about a percent and a half in Pennsylvania.
Obama won all of the battleground states, where about a third
of Arab Americans live, in 2012.56
In 2008 James Zogby announced that “Arab
Americans have more at stake in the upcoming elections
than ever before: civil liberties, immigrant rights,
Middle East peace–issues that affect lives, our freedom
and security, and the future of our country.” Stressing
the 2008 election-year program “Our Voice, Our Future:
Yalla Vote,” he argued that, because a close contest
between the two candidates could be decided by a small
percentage of voters in several contested states, every
swing constituency counts.57
Arab Americans as a Percent of Overall Voting Population
Michigan 5
Virginia 2
Ohio 1.5–2
Florida 1.5
Pennsylvania 1.5
Source: Based on ZI Analytics, 2012.
The goals of AAI’s Yalla Vote program quickly be-
came the cornerstone of Arab voter mobilization,
starting in 2008 election. The aim was to build a legacy
that would expand the community’s identity and create
a lasting Arab American political coalition. If any con-
clusion is to be drawn about the Arab American in-
volvement in the race, according to Zogby, it is a
political “coming of age” and a rising example of the
Arab American community’s greater political adeptness.
Arab Americans want to prove that they are a complex
constituency and not a single-issue voting bloc. Like all
55
Zogby International conducted an omnibus telephone poll of Arab
Americans nationwide between September 8th and September 13th,
2008.
56
JZ Analytics conducted a survey of 4OO Arab American voters
between 9/8/12 and 9/14/12.
57
Arab American Institute Election Report (2008), Our Voice. Our
Future. (See: www.yallavote.org).
 Author's personal copy
Soc (2014) 51:513–523
ethnic constituencies, Arab Americans are concerned
about myriad issues. This is at least what a 2008
Zogby poll of Arab Americans nationwide reveals.
When asked in an “open-ended question” to name the
two most important predicaments in the 2008 election,
jobs and economy were and away most often men-
tioned. Ninety-three percent of Arab American voters
highlighted these issues. Next came the war in Iraq,
peace and general foreign policy concerns (77 %).
This set of concerns was followed by taxes (66 %),
civil liberties (66 %) and Palestine (49 %).58
A new survey conducted between September 8 and
September 14, 2012 by JZ Analytics shows a continuing
shift away from the Republican Party, a 15 % drop in
support of President Obama from 2008 voters, and a
growing independent base. Since 2002, the percentage
of Arab Americans in the GOP has dropped from 31 to
22 %, while that of Arab Americans who identify with
neither party has grown over the past decade from 14 to
24 %. Zogby attributes the decline in support for
Republicans to George W. Bush’s policies in the
Middle East, and on civil liberties in the U.S.
However, though identification with both parties has
decreased since 2008, in 2012 a majority of Arab
Americans (52 %) favored Barack Obama for the pres-
idency over the Republican candidate, Mitt Romney
(28 %). Arab American Muslims even gave a 75 %
backing to the incumbent and only 8 % to his adver-
sary. In the five swing states where the poll has been
conducted (Florida, Michigan, Ohio, Pennsylvania and
Virginia), Arab Americans number 1.1 million, and
833,000 are eligible voters.59
Once again, the priorities of Arab Americans largely
reflect those of the general population. Asked to name
the most critical issues facing the nation, 82 % of the
respondents cited jobs and the economy as their top
concern, while foreign policy came in a distant second
at 27 %. That was followed by healthcare, the budget,
taxes and education. But unlike other demographic
groups, 57 % of Arab Americans said the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict is “very important” in the way they
vote, and 54 % listed “U.S. outreach to the Arab and
Muslim worlds” as well. Although Obama’s handling of
the Middle East was perceived as inadequate, the
Democratic Party’s backtracking at the national conven-
tion to amend its platform to restore language declaring
Jerusalem the Israeli capital, had little impact on Arab
American views, according to Zogby.60
58
Zogby International, 2008.
59
JZ Analytics, 2012.
60
Ibid.
521
Arab PACs The informal Arab lobby followed a strategy
based on hiring what the New York Times described as
an “elite band of former members of Congress, former
diplomats and power brokers,” paid directly by Arab
governments to promote an American policy that would
cut down aid to the state of Israel. By contrast, pressure
groups such as AAI and the ADC understood that to
gain national visibility, they needed first to voice their
concerns through effective contributions to organized
fund-raising groups, known as Political Action
Committees. Traditionally, Arab Americans participated
as individuals in supporting candidates. But greater po-
litical influence can be exerted if money is channeled
through PACs. Furthermore, as foreign policy which has
long dominated Arab Americans’ agenda has now been
relegated to a secondary position, fighting for civil
liberties has become a rallying cry for the diverse and
complex Arab American community. The role of lead-
ership PACs has thus become crucial not only in raising
funds for candidates, but especially in building coali-
tions with other groups concerned about civil rights,
such as Hispanics, Asians, and African-Americans.
But major fundraising is still the “unconquered frontier” for
Arab American advocacy groups. To take but one example,
during the 2012 election cycle, American Muslim and Arab
American PACs donated only $743,517 to candidates, com-
pared with $1,888,493 contributed by pro-Israel PACs,61 ac-
cording to the Center for Responsive Politics. “Our commu-
nity has huge amounts of money they can spend,” Abed
Hammoud, director of the Arab American Political Action
Committee in Dearborn, remarked. “A local mosque earns
$200,000 in a quick fund-raiser,” he added.62 But evidently
not enough has gone into PACS.
Despite growing frustration that the community has
not been effective in influencing U.S. policy, the
American component of the Arab lobby can claim some
success, as much of its propaganda has now become
accepted in regular discourse about the Middle East
conflict. With regard to the Palestinian issue, while it
is hard to explain America’s failure to pressure Israel
into a final land-for-peace settlement, it is noteworthy
that the two-state solution has become something on
which both the pro-Arab and pro-Israel lobbies may
agree. The domestic Arab lobby does not seek to dele-
gitimize Israel or “to drive a wedge between the U.S.
and its ally,” despite Bard’s accusations. 63 Arab
61
Center for Responsive Politics, 2012. (See Appendices One and Two).
62
Elizabeth Kelleher, Arab-Americans, American Muslims Pump up
Political Influence, Washington File Writer, September 2, 2004.
63
Bard, The Arab Lobby, p. 344.
Debra DeLee and James Zogby, Arab and Jewish Americans See
Eye-to-Eye Says Poll, June 14th, 2007. (www.newropeans-magazine.org/
content/view/5887/45/lang,sp/).
 Author's personal copy
522 Soc (2014) 51:513–523

American groups, especially the most influential (AAI
and ADC), do not even question Israel’s right to exist,
because that right is now endorsed by more than 160
countries across the world. What they question is the
magnitude of U.S. support, especially its unconditional
nature. They want the American government to adopt a
more balanced approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict.
Paradoxically, this moderate stance finds a large echo
among the members of the Arab and Jewish communi-
ties in the U.S., sharing common ground on a number
of issues, including the thorny Middle East conflict. A
poll commissioned by the AAI and conducted by Zogby
International in 2007 gives substance to this claim. The
poll reveals that, despite instability in the region, the
two communities, Arab Americans and American Jews,
still show significant agreement on almost every issue
central to Arab-Israeli peace and U.S. policy in the
Middle East. Strong majorities of both Arab Americans
and American Jews still support the two-state solution
to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Both want an end to
the 40 years of occupation to the West Bank and the
Gaza Strip: two-thirds of American Jews and 89 % of
Arab Americans. But what is striking about the results
is the depth of the agreement. Many responses provided
by the two groups are nearly identical, or at least within
the margin of error of each other. Both communities
strongly support the statement “Israelis have a right to
live in a secure and independent state of their own”
(98 % of American Jews and 88 % of Arab Americans).
Similarly, they staunchly agree with the statement that
“Palestinians have a right to live in a secure and inde-
pendent state of their own” (90 % of American Jews
and 96 % of Arab Americans).
Appendix One
Campaign Contributions Top Pro-Arab PAC’s

PAC 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 Total per PAC
Arab American Leadership PAC $99,329 $24,350 $109,000 $80,500 $57,355 $34,500 $5,000 $410,034
Iranian American PAC $22,500 $64,100 $32,500 $35,000 $154,100
American Task Force Lebanon Policy $41,800 $17,700 $23,100 $5,175 $5,350 $5,250 $4,000 $102,375
Council American-Islamic Relations $350 $7,000 $10,000 $5,500 $22,850
Arab American PAC $10,500 $6,000 $2,000 $18,500
American Muslim Institute $7,500 $2,000 $9,500
Muslim American PAC $9,500 $9,500
Indiana Muslim PAC $2,400 $5,800 $40 $100 $8,340
Americans for a Palestinian State $3,601 $1,150 $950 $5,701
National Assn of Arab-Americans $2,470 $2,470
American League of Muslims $147 $147
Total per year $154,246 $55,550 $143,950 $121,176 $143,755 $80,740 $44,100 $743,517

Source: Center for Responsive Politics (January–August 2012)

PAC Dems Repubs Total

Appendix Two
National Action Committee $164,050 $93,500 $257,550
JStreetPAC $173,535 $0 $173,535
Campaign Contributions Top Pro-Israel PAC’s
CitizensOrganized PAC $74,000 $73,500 $157,500
Northern Californians for Good Government $92,500 $39,500 $132,000
Desert Caucus $60,000 $60,000 $120,000
Florida Congressional Committee $25,000 $81,331 $106,331
Total Amount: $1,888,493
NorPAC $65,033 $40,091 $105,124
PACs Contributing: 26
SunPAC $65,500 $28,500 $94,000
Total to Democrats: $1,209,471 (64 %)
Washington PAC $57,000 $27,500 $84,500
Total to Republicans: $669,022 (36 %)
World Alliance for Israel $54,000 $27,500 $81,500
 Author's personal copy
Soc (2014) 51:513–523 523

National PAC $68,500 $10,000 $78,500 Dr. Lanouar Ben Hafsa is professor of American Studies at the Univer-
sity of Tunis, Tunisia. He received his B.A. degree from the Faculty of
Maryland Association for $67,000 $8,500 $75,500
Letters and Humanities, Tunisia in 1980, M.A. and Ph.D. degrees in
Concerned Citizens
American Studies from La Sorbonne University (Paris IV) in 1987 and
Republican Jewish Coalition $0 $74,000 $74,000
1995 respectively. From 1999 to 2001, he served as Chair of the English
Joint Action Committee for Political Affairs $73,703 $0 $73,703 Department at the University of Kairouan, Tunisia. In 1998, he participated
Bi-County PAC $53,000 $16,000 $69,000 in a Summer Institute Program hosted by New York University on the
Louisiana for American Security $15,500 $33,000 $48,500 theme of Religion in the United States, and in 2004, he has been selected
for a Senior Fulbright scholarship to do research on Arab-Americans at
Americans United in Support of Democracy $17,200 $12,600 $29,800
Center of Arab American Studies (University of Michigan-Dearborn). Dr.
Heartland PAC $21,500 $3,000 $24,500 Ben Hafsa is the author of a number of scholarly publications on Arab-
To Protect Our Heritage PAC $12,000 $12,000 $24,000 Americans and is currently Chair of the English Department at the Uni-
City PAC $12,500 $9,500 $22,000 versity of Tunis.
Americans for Good Government $4,500 $16,000 $20,500
MOPAC $14,000 $0 $14,000
St Louisians for Better Government $12,500 $0 $12,500
Delaware Valley PAC $5,000 $0 $5,000
Allies for Israel $1,250 $3,000 $4,250
National Jewish Democratic Council $700 $0 $700
TOTAL: $1,209,471 $669,022 $1,888,493

Source: Center for Responsive Politics (January–August 2012)