Luz Crispino v.

Anatolia Tansay
G.R. No. 184466 (December 05, 2016)

DOCTRINE:

Doctrine of Finality of Judgments In determining the correct procedural remedy, aggrieved parties must first
ascertain the nature of the decision, order, or resolution they intend to challenge. A final judgment or order,
from which an appeal may be taken, is one that finally disposes of the case and leaves nothing more to be done
by the court (e.g.an adjudication on the merits of the case on the basis of the evidence). In contrast, an
interlocutory order is one that merely resolves incidental matters and does not finally dispose of the case. When
an interlocutory order is issued, the court is still tasked with adjudicating on the merits of the case.

FACTS: 

Respondent Anatolia Tansay, now deceased, was twice widowed. In 1947, Anatolia established her residence in
Oroquieta, Misamis Occidental. There, she met 20-year old Zenaida Capili who was then single. Anatolia took
in Zenaida and treated her as her own child. 

Subsequently, Anatolia and Zenaida moved to Cebu City, where Anatolia acquired a 3,107 sq. m. parcel of land
(Lot No. 1048) known as the Tansay Compound. Anatolia subdivided the compound into three lots: (1) Lot No.
1048-A-1, (2) Lot 1048-A-2, and Lot No. 1048-A-3. In 1957, Anatolia constructed her abode over a portion of
Lot No. 1048-A-3. 

Zenaida eventually got married to Ben Ricaredo Echaves and had several children, among whom are petitioners
Luz Anatolia Crispino and Caridad Echaves. Zenaida and her family lived in Anatolia’s house. Anatolia had a
close relationship with the Echaves family. 

By virtue of two deeds of sale, Anatolia allegedly sold Lot No. 1048-A-1 in favor of Zenaida on July 6, 1981
and Lot No. 1048-A-3 in favor of Luz Anatolia and Caridad on July 11, 1989. 

In 1991, Zenaida returned from abroad and discovered that the titles to the lots were missing from her room
where she had left them. Hence, she filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City for
reconstitution of the certificates of title, which was granted. 

Meanwhile, Anatolia filed Civil Case No. CEB-14547 entitled Revocation of Trust, Declaration of Nullity of
Transfer, and Cancellation of Title before the RTC of Cebu City. 

Zenaida alleged that Anatolia sold Lot No. 1048-A-1 in her favor for PhP 6,170.00. One of Zenaida’s daughters,
Lourdes Behaves de Leon, testified that since 1975, her sisters, Luz Anatolia and Caridad, deposited sums of
money in Anatolia’s bank account for the purchase of Lot No. 1048-A-3. However, Anatolia merely turned over
the sums of money received to Zenaida since she was not in need of money. 

Based on the evidence on record, the trial court found that Zenaida, Luz Anatolia, and Caridad did not pay any
monetary consideration or other valuable consideration for the transfer of the properties in their names. Hence,
the deeds of sale could not have been valid. In addition, the trial court found that Anatolia never intended to sell
the lots despite executing the deeds of sale. Rather, she merely constituted Zenaida, Luz Anatolia, and Caridad
as trustees of the properties. The trial court also questioned Zenaida’s Petition for Reconstitution of Titles
considering that Anatolia presented the Original Certificates of Title of the properties in court. 

Zenaida, Luz Anatolia, and Caridad appealed the Decision before the Court of Appeals. 
During the pendency of the appeal, Anatolia died on August 11, 2001 and was substituted by her only known
heir, Lilian Tan Yap. 

On August 16, 2001, Zenaida, Luz Anatolia, and Caridad filed an Urgent Motion to Remand Records of the
Case for the Re-Opening of Trial. They anchored their motion on an Affidavit (Confirmation of Previous Sales)
allegedly executed by Anatolia after the RTC had rendered its Decision. 

The CA, in a Resolution, denied the Urgent Motion to Remand Records of the Case for the Re-Opening of
Trial. The appellate court considered the same as a motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence
under Rule 53 of the Rules of Court and ruled that the Confirmation of Previous Sales was “not the kind of
newly discovered evidence contemplated by the Rules that would warrant a new trial.” The appellate court also
noted that the petitioners-appellants failed to attach an affidavit of merit as required by the rules and that the
Confirmation of Previous Sales attached to the motion was merely a photocopy. 

On January 24, 2007, the CA rendered a Decision, which affirmed the RTC’s Decision in toto. Zenaida, Luz
Anatolia, and Caridad moved for reconsideration. They assailed, among others, the propriety of the CA’s
Resolution treating their motion to remand as a motion for new trial. Their Motion for Reconsideration was
denied. 

ISSUES: 

1) Whether an interlocutory order may be assailed in an appeal of the appellate court’s decision. 
2) Whether the Court of Appeals’ power to receive evidence is without limit. 

RULING: 

1) Yes. 

A special civil action for certiorari is not the only remedy that aggrieved parties may take against an
interlocutory order, since an interlocutory order may be appealed in an appeal of the judgment itself. In
Investments, Inc. v. Court of Appeals it was held: Unlike a “final” judgment or order, which is appealable, as
above pointed out, an “interlocutory” order may not be questioned on appeal except only as part of an appeal
that may eventually be taken from the final judgment rendered in the case. 

The CA’s Resolution which denied petitioners’ motion to remand was an interlocutory order. It did not finally
dispose of the case because the appellate court still had to determine whether the deeds of sale executed by
Anatolia were valid. Rather than availing of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari under Rule 65, petitioners
opted to wait for the CA to render its decision before challenging the July 25, 2006 Resolution. 

Petitioners did not commit any procedural infirmity in assailing the interlocutory order in an appeal of the CA’s
decision. Though petitioners could have filed a petition for certiorari, they would have been burdened to prove
that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in denying their motion to remand. Moreover, petitioners still
had the option to assail the July 25, 2006 Resolution in an appeal to the CA’s final decision. 

2) No. 

In Republic v. Mupas, the Court held that the power of the CA to receive evidence is qualified by its internal
rules: 

“Under Section 3, Rule 6 of the Internal Rules of the CA, the CA may receive evidence in the following cases:
x x x (b) In appeals in civil cases where the Court grants a new trial on the ground of newly discovered
evidence, pursuant to Sec. 12, Rule 53 of the Rules of Court; x x x 
“This provision qualifies the CA’s power to receive evidence in the exercise of its original and appellate
jurisdiction under Section 9 of BP 129, as amended: 

“Sec. 9. Jurisdiction. – The Court of Appeals shall exercise: x x x The Court of Appeals shall have the power to
try cases and conduct hearings, receive evidence, and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual
issues raised in cases falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant and
conduct new trials or further proceedings. x x x 

“Since Takenaka and Asahikosan filed an ordinary appeal pursuant to Rule 41 in relation to Rule 44 of the
Rules of Court, the CA could only have admitted newly discovered evidence. Contrary to Takenaka and
Asahikosan’s claim, the attachments to the motions are not newly discovered evidence. Newly discovered
evidence is evidence that could not, with reasonable diligence, have been discovered and produced at the trial,
and which, if presented, would probably alter the result.” 

Although the CA has the power to receive evidence pursuant to its expanded powers under Section 9 of BP 129,
this power is not without limit. The CA cannot simply accept additional evidence from the parties. If the
interpretation were otherwise, then there would be no end to litigation. 

Hence, in appeals in civil cases, the CA may only receive evidence when it grants a new trial based on newly
discovered evidence. 

This notwithstanding, the CA cannot accept any kind of evidence in a motion for new trial. A motion for new
trial under Rule 53 is limited to newly discovered evidence. 

The document petitioners seek to present before the appellate court does not fall undee the concept of newly
discovered evidence. 

Newly discovered evidence has a specific meaning under the law. Under Rule 53 of the Rules of Court, the
following criteria must be satisfied for evidence to be considered newly discovered: (a) the evidence could not
have been discovered prior to the trial in the court below by exercise of due diligence; and (b) it is of such
character as would probably change the result. 

The document denominated as Confirmation of Previous Sales was allegedly executed on January 15, 1998,
three years after the RTC rendered its Decision. Hence, it could not have been discovered by petitioners prior to
trial by the exercise of due diligence. 

However, the document is not of such character that would probably change the lower court’s judgment. The
nature of the deeds of sale executed would not have been affected even if the Confirmation of Previous Sales
was admitted in evidence since the validity of a contract is determined by law and not by the stipulation of the
parties. Furthermore, the CA can determine whether the deeds of sale were valid independent of said document.
Thus, the CA correctly denied petitioners’ motion to have the Confirmation of Previous Sales admitted in
evidence.