Name: Nur Angghraini Aqlili binti Kamaruhizam

Student ID: 201927852

Question 1:

The question is whether Kamaruddin has the right to file a judicial review based on
violations of natural justice.

Disclosure of Evidence can be described as any information supported by public

authorities being made available to individuals affected, as well as the committee's
evidence being made available to those affected.

Disclosure of Evidence can defined all information backed up by public authorities

must be provided to those who are impacted, and the committee`s evidence must be
made available to those who are affected. Furthermore, the person who has been
affected must be aware of the facts provided and remarks made that have an influence
on him or her. All evidence involving the impacted individual, whether written or oral,
must be made automatically identifiable under NJ law. It is intended to provide him the
chance to comment, criticize, explain, or argue the matter in self-defense. Following
that, under the theory of public interest privilege, materials that would be damaging to
the public interest if disclosed may be kept from the accused. For example, in some
situations of drug trafficking or other significant misconduct, the name of the informers
should not be publicized. Furthermore, a document is protected under the Official
Secrets Acts or has been deemed "sulit" or "terhad" by the authorities. For example, see
Phang Moh Shin v Comm. of Police [1967] 2 MLJ 186. The fact that the inquiry officers
had access to his files, services sheet, personal record, investigation paper, and
materials relevant to his actions was never mentioned to PMS throughout the
investigation. And they determined that there was a breach of NJ. The dismissal order
was reversed because he was not given the opportunity to explain the contents of the
papers. Furthermore, hearing cross examination may have defined that the person
being examined has the right to cross-examine witnesses and dispute the case.
However, if the hearing processes are not conducted orally, this privilege is not part of
Natural Justice. They are the subjects of cross-examination. To begin, to gather
information about the facts at hand or pertinent to the issue, and to cast doubt on the
truth of the in-chief evidence provided against the party requesting cross-examination.
Following that, it is feasible to utilise cross-examination to secure information. As part of
the right to self-defense, the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses should be allowed
where appropriate. If rejecting cross-examination would result in an unjust conclusion in
all of the circumstances of the case, it must be permitted. For example, in Phang Moh
Shin v Comm. of Police [1967] 2 MLJ 186, Phang Moh Shin was refused the ability to
cross-examine all prosecution witnesses, leading in NJ rejection.

Next, personal bias might be characterised as the adjudicator's inclination to

judge in favour of or against one of the parties involved in the procedures before him.
When a decision maker has a personal relationship with one of the parties, there is a
possibility that the decision will not be based simply on the merits of the case as
addressed during the hearing. Instead of determining whether or not there was actual
prejudice against the petitioner, the standard is "whether or not there is a genuine
probability of bias in the circumstances of the case." As a result, rather than focusing on
the facts of the case, the court will assess if there is a likelihood of personal bias.
Following that, personal or non-financial prejudice might manifest itself in a variety of
ways. First, the adjudicator's family or personal relationship with any of the parties to the
proceedings, or friendship with any of them. The adjudicator then has to deal with the
matter. Furthermore, personal hatred or antagonism between the decision maker and a
party or his counsel may generate the appearance that justice is not being served or is
not being carried out. When there is a serious risk that a hearing would be unfair, the
adjudicator is barred from hearing the matter. For instance, in AK Kraipak v Union of
India AIR 1470 SC 150, a Selection Board was constituted to choose state personnel
for the Indian Forest Service. The Acting Chief Conservator of Forests, who also sat on
the Selection Board, was one of the candidates. Furthermore, the nomination of a
Commissioner to investigate the scheme's merits may create concerns that justice will
be denied. The order was eventually revoked.

By applying the laws to the problem, we can see that Kamaruddin's Natural
Justice has been violated. To begin with, he only ever received a call alerting him that
he would be going before the Disciplinary Board on December 3rd, 2021, three days
after tweeting about Encik Samad's activities. As far as we can see, this is inadequate
notice because he was not given enough time to prepare for his case and was not given
the option to postpone the hearing. Dixon v Commonwealth [1981] 3 ALR 289 is an
example of a decided case that we may apply, in which the court stated that a person
must be informed of the accusations to which he must reply, as well as the substance of
the charges if they are being used against him. Kamaruddin has the right to know
whatever he needs to know before to or during the hearing. However, when he enquired
as to why he needed to come before the Disciplinary Board, the officer-in-charge
refused to explain. We can conclude from this that there has been a disclosure of
evidence or information in this instance. This is demonstrated in the previously decided
case of Phang Moh Shin v Comm, Of Police [1967] 2 MLJ186, where the inquiry officers
had key files for the hearing but never revealed them to Phang Moh Shm. The court
decided that there had been a violation of Natural Justice since he was not given an
opportunity to explain the contents of the papers, and the dismissal judgement was
overturned. He was denied the ability to cross-examine witnesses when the hearing
panel declined his request to summon them to testify. Moh Shin v. Comm. Police [1967]
MLJ 186, Phang Moh Shin was denied the chance to cross-examine all prosecution
witnesses, which amounted to a violation of his right to Natural Justice. Then, in this
circumstance, we may see the feature of personal bias. Mr. Samad presided over the
proceedings. We may foresee that there will be personal prejudice in this case due to
Mr. Samad's involvement, which will push him to prioritise himself above the issue. A
previously decided case is AK Krainak v Union of India AIR 1470 sc 150, in which a
selection board was formed to appoint state service workers for the Indian Forest
Service. The Acting Chief Conservator of Forests was one of the candidates, and he
also served on the selection committee. The court held that appointing a Commissioner
to evaluate the scheme's merits may imply that justice was not being served, hence the
verdict was overturned. Kamaruddin, however, has the option of filing a certiorari appeal
to reverse the judgement. In Badat Drani V Tan Kheat [1953] MLJ 67, for example, the
High Court refused to grant certiorari to annul a Rent Board ruling since the petitioner
may appeal the Board's decision to the High Court.
 In conclusion, Kamaruddin can seek review to overturn the panel court's ruling
since it violates his Natural Justice.
Question 2:
The issue here is whether Dr. Mendoza may challenge the selection that was
made with the help of the Higher Education Minister.

For the difficulty of the ouster clause. The abolition clause is a presumption that
Parliament does presently not plan to deny humans entry to the advanced courts unless
there are clear indications to the contrary. As a result, a public body or administrator
must now verify that the subsidiary legislation is not violated in order for the courts to
conduct any judicial review. For example, the subsidiary legislation must no longer
include any clause that precludes any involvement by the courts, unless the Parent Act
under which the subsidiary law is based specifically allows the exclusion of the courts.
In the case of Chester v Bateson, a statute was broken by utilising a local government
inside the UK attempting to evict tenants of certain houses if it was proven they had
been hired in work associated with battle fare items. The tenants were prevented from
bringing the issue to the courts of regulation because they needed the Minister's
permission first. The petitioner filed the action in court to challenge the removal of the
courthouse docket provision from the statute. The courtroom ruled that such a
"excessive incapacity may be inflicted most effectively by using direct enactment of the
legislature itself" and that "such a grave invasion of the proper of all subjects is now no
longer expected to be executed with the aid of using the legislature to be executed with
the aid of using a branch order." In accordance with the preceding rule, the Higher
Education Minister is responsible for enforcing laws three and five of the Parent Act. In
each public institution, the law is more closely connected with the software of the
professor function. One of the policies enacted with the help of the Higher Education
Minister is legislation three, which states that no enchantment is permitted, implying that
every law enacted must be venture able and that no law may be enacted that cannot be
ventured. In this case, the better training minister sets a subsidiary rule that cannot be
ventured, implying that the legislation may be ventured. Subsidiary regulation is no
longer widely studied since this law is thought to be risky.

The second issue is unreasonableness. Unreasonableness is a case in which

you might assign the legitimacy of the Subsidiary rule on the grounds that it is far
unreasonable. As to what is affordable, the Chief Judge, Lord Russell of Killowen, said
in the case of Kruse v Johnson as a guideline. In the case of Arlidge v Islington
Corporation, a legislation was enacted that required all landlords of accommodations
houses to smooth their accommodations homes in April, May, and June of each year.
The use of regulation became questioned since it caused landlords to break their
contractual commitments to their renters. As a result, it was deemed unreasonableness
and unconstitutional. Unreasonable subsidiary regulations may be construed as a
violation of the equality requirement of Article 8(1) of the Federal Constitution, as seen
in an Indian case.

In applying to the preceding rule, the Higher Education Minister enacted

regulation five, which states that applications from a single man or female for the
position have precedence. Dr. Mendoza, who just married, is eligible for the lecturer
position but has been denied by the Higher Education Minister since the legislation that
has been written or produced requires him to remain single. The statute must then be
declared null and invalid since the law is irrational if the public college merely gives
preference to unmarried men and women. The law that was enacted is unconstitutional
because it is unreasonableness.

Next is procedural ultra vires. Noncompliance with clear required methods may
be grounds for procedural extremely vires. As a result, subsidiary legislation enacted
without complying with the mode mounted with the assistance of the decide act may
render the subsidiary law enacted ultra vires if the manner broken is mandatory.

In Howard v Bodington (1977) 2 PD 203, the judge emphasized the importance of

methods in the creation of subsidiary law. As a result, whether the manner is mandatory
or advisory must be determined.

In accordance with the preceding guideline, each law that has been drafted must
have approval from each of the professors. According to the query, the Higher
Education Minister drafted the law without consulting with professors, implying that the
Higher Education Minister did not conduct a thorough examination. The statute that was
not examined in the required manner shall be declared void since the requirement was
not met. Then the law is null and invalid.
 In conclusion, Dr. Mendoza might project the choice of Higher Education
Minister underneath the ouster clause, unreasonableness, and procedural ultra vires.