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States of Affairs
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Stanford Encyclopedia Philosophers connect sentences with various different items, such as
thoughts, facts and states of affairs. Thoughts are either true or false in an
of Philosophy absolute sense, never both or neither. A sentence such as “Socrates is
wise” is true (false) in virtue of expressing the true (false) thought that
Socrates is wise. Thoughts are also the contents of propositional attitudes
like belief and desire. For example, John’s belief that Vulcan is a planet is
a relation between him and the thought that Vulcan is a planet. Since there
Edward N. Zalta Uri Nodelman Colin Allen R. Lanier Anderson is no such planet, the thought that Vulcan is a planet cannot be composed
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Editorial Board things, of a way of thinking that purports to latch on to a planet. This so-
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called mode of presentation may be expressed by a definite description
Library of Congress Catalog Data like “the planet between the Sun and Mercury”.
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Some philosophers take it to be obvious that if something is true, there
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wise.
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Facts may be required in the theory of truth-making. States of affairs, by
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Center for the Study of Language and Information contrast, are supposed to pull their weight in the metaphysics of modality.
Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305 According to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, the totality
States of Affairs of states of affairs exhausts the space of possibilities; the totality of states
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Mark Textor of affairs that obtain are the (actual) world. More recently, Alvin Plantinga
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(1974, 44) and Pollock (1984, 52) have posited in their metaphysics of
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 States of Affairs Mark Textor

Before pressing on, a note about terminology: many philosophers follow 4. States of Affairs in the Metaphysics of Perception and Value
Armstrong’s (1993: 429) terminology who uses “states of affairs” to refer 4.1 States of Affairs as the Primary Objects of Perception
to facts. (Armstrong’s book A World of States of Affairs is solely 4.2 States of Affairs in the Metaphysics of Value
concerned with facts.) This article is not devoted to “Armstrongian” states 5. States of Affairs as Complexes
of affairs, but to states of affairs in the sense that is prominent in the work 5.1 States of Affairs as N-Tuples and Wholes
of such philosophers as Husserl, Reinach, Russell (at one time), the early 5.2 Non-Mereological Composition to the Rescue?
Wittgenstein and Plantinga.[1] Hereafter, “states of affairs” is used only for 5.3 Are States of Affairs Ontologically Dependent?
states of affairs that exist whether they obtain or not. 6. The Unity of a State of Affairs
6.1 The Unity-Problem
States of affairs are similar to thoughts. Thoughts are true or false; states 6.2 External Unification
of affairs obtain or not. There are also similarities between facts and states 6.3 Internal Unification
of affairs. Both facts and states of affairs are supposed to be complexes 7. Conclusion
that contain (in a sense to be explained further) objects and properties. Appendix: Historical Background
Bibliography
Does one need states of affairs in addition to facts and thoughts? In order
Academic Tools
to answer this question we need to know what states of affairs are and how
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they contrast and compare with thoughts and facts. We therefore begin by
Related Entries
outlining the theoretical role states of affairs are supposed to play.

1. Introducing States of Affairs

1.1 Talking about States of Affairs
1.2 A Theoretical Role for States of Affairs
2. Thoughts and States of Affairs
2.1 Individuation and Existence Conditions
2.2 States of Affairs and Probabilities
2.3 States of Affairs and Possible Worlds
2.4 States of Affairs and Propositional Attitudes
3. Facts and States of Affairs
3.1 Facts as Truth-Makers and Regress-Stoppers
3.2 Are Facts Just Obtaining States of Affairs?
3.3 Are States of Affairs Just Recombinations of Fact
Constituents?
1. Introducing States of Affairs
1.1 Talking about States of Affairs
Can one base our understanding of what states of affairs are on features of
how we talk about them?
Pollock holds that we normally refer to states of affairs by gerund clauses
such as Kareem Abdul-Jabbar’s being more than seven feet tall or Spiro
Agnew’s being President of Yale University (see Pollock 1984b: 121).
However, while the referents of such gerund clauses seem not to be
propositions—“Kareem Abdul-Jabbar’s being more than seven feet tall is
true” does not sound right—these clauses are referentially flexible. For the

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 States of Affairs
gerund clauses in the following sentences seem to refer to facts or events,
the relata of causal relations and objects of knowledge (the first two
examples are from Pollock 1984b: 122):
Charlie’s eloping with Ginger was surprising.
Mary’s divorcing Charlie caused Charlie’s demise.
Kareem Abdul-Jabbar’s being more than seven feet tall is well-
known.
Now facts may be nothing but states of affairs that obtain and events states
of affairs that obtain at some times and not at others. If this were right, the
gerund clauses above would refer to states of affairs. But we need to get an
independent grip on the notion of states of affairs before settling the
question whether facts and events are a kind of state of affairs. For this
purpose we can neither pick out states of affairs as the things that obtain or
nor say that they are the referents of gerund clauses of the kind considered
above.
Are there predicates that we apply to states of affairs and that are
distinctive of them? States of affairs are said to obtain or not, while
Fregean thoughts are true or false. In contrast, facts exist; a fact cannot be
qualified as obtaining or not obtaining (see Betti 2015: 35). However, it
seems difficult to get a grip on the difference between obtaining and non-
obtaining on the one hand, and truth and falsity on the other. Prima facie,
the state of affairs Socrates’s being wise obtains if, and only if, it is true
that Socrates is wise (see Plantinga 1974: 45–6; see also Betti 2015: 35).
Pollock (1984a: 53) correctly observes that “obtaining and not-obtaining
are truth-like properties”. But why are they just truth-like and not just truth
and falsity under a different label; why can the obtaining of a state of
affairs not be identified with the truth of a thought or proposition?
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Betti proposes that the distinction between obtaining and non-obtaining
states of affairs is an ontological one:
nonobtaining states of affairs have no mode of being (so they
neither subsist nor exist) but they are still objects in their own right
—that is, they are part of the catalogue of the world in their own
right. (2015: 35–6)
If this were right, states of affairs would be more even puzzling than
Meinongian objects that at least subsist. However, false propositions seem
equally to have only a “shadowy” existence:
Time was when I thought there were propositions, but it does not
seem to me very plausible to say that in addition to facts there are
also these curious shadowy things going about such as “That today
is Wednesday” when in fact it is Tuesday. (Russell 1918: 223)
In conclusion: the difference between “is true (false)” and “obtains (does
not obtain)”, does not help us to distinguish states of affairs from other
things. Is there a theoretical role that states of affairs can, but thoughts
(propositions) and facts can’t fill?
1.2 A Theoretical Role for States of Affairs
In order to answer this question, consider a school exercise in probability
(see Kripke 1980: 16). Take two ordinary dice, D1 and D2 , with six sides
each. For each die, there are six possible outcomes of a throw. D1 and D2
are thrown and, on landing, display two numbers. Hence, there are thirty-
six possible outcomes of throwing the dice. Let us now calculate the
probability that the outcome of throwing the two dice is 11. There are only
two outcomes of throwing the two dice in which they show together 11:
either (i) D1 shows 5 and D2 6 or (ii) D1 shows 6 and D2 5. The
probability of the outcome of D1 ’s and D2’s jointly showing 11 is the ratio
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 States of Affairs
between all possible outcomes of D1 ’s and D2’s jointly showing 11 and the
totality of possible outcomes of throwing the two dice: 2/36 = 1/18.
In the calculations we assumed (1):
(1) There are bearers of probabilities: things that are probable or
improbable to a certain degree.
We also assumed that there is a space of possible states of the dice; ways
the two dice might fall. A way the dice might fall exists even if it is not
true that the dice have fallen that way:
(2) The possible states (outcomes) of D1’s and D2’s showing jointly
certain numbers exist whether it is true that they show this number or
false that they do.
The possible states are possible states of objects. D1’s and D2’s Showing 5
is a possible state of the dice, however we describe them or ascribe the
property. This suggests (3):
(3) Possible states are different if they are states of different objects or
constituted by different ways an object can be.
The possible states involved in our exercise have the properties
philosophers take states of affairs to have. States of affairs are probable to
a degree or possible, as stressed by Reinach (1911: 339–40; Künne 1987:
185ff and Forbes 1989: 131 follow Reinach). They are supposed to exist
without obtaining (2) and to have objects and properties as constituents
(3).
(2) distinguishes states of affairs from facts. The fact that Socrates is wise
exists, if, and only if, Socrates is wise. If Socrates is not wise, there is no
fact of him being wise. Hence, the fact that Socrates is wise cannot be a
mere possibility for Socrates; it can, so to speak, only be an actuality. In
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contrast, the state of affairs that Socrates is foolish exists, even if Socrates
is not foolish (see Reinach 1911; Wittgenstein 1918: 2.04, 2.05; Plantinga
1974: 44; Pollock 1984a: 52).
(3) distinguishes states of affairs from thoughts:
[States of affairs] are “about” objects but not in terms of some
mode of representation. States of affairs, in some sense, contain
objects as direct constituents. (Pollock 1984a: 53)
The state of affairs Marilyn Monroe’s being an actress and the state of
affairs Norma Jean Baker’s being an actress, contain, in some sense, the
same objects and properties as constituents in the same order. They are the
same state of affairs under different names. However, I can believe that
Marilyn Monroe is an actress while doubting that Norma Jean Baker is an
actress. Hence, if there are states of affairs, they are not the content of
propositional attitudes like belief; thoughts are. This point leaves open the
possibility that a state of affairs is a set of thoughts that are equivalent in
some respect (see section 2.2).
The model of a space of possible outcomes of a throw of a die gives us an
initial idea of what the distinctive properties of state of affairs are and why
it is plausible to assume that there are any states of affairs. It leaves
questions about the precise nature of states of affairs open. For example,
Wittgenstein (1918: 4.26) argued that only elementary sentences “picture”
states of affairs. An elementary sentence in Wittgenstein’s sense is a
concatenation of simple proper names each of which refers to a simple
object. The names in the elementary proposition are arranged in a way that
can be mapped onto an arrangement of the simple objects named. This
arrangement of objects is the state of affairs pictured by the elementary
sentence. Nothing said so far rules out that states of affairs that involve
some objects and properties (relations) combine to form further complex
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 States of Affairs
states of affairs that have states of affairs as constituents. (Pollock 1984a:
55–6) defines negation, conjunction etc. for states of affairs. For example,
if there is a state of affairs S1 and a state of affairs S2 , their conjunction is
the state of affairs that obtains if, and only if, both S1 and S2 obtain. If one
wants to restrict the space of possible states to combinations of simple
objects, one needs to marshal arguments that show that this and similar
conceptions of complex states of affairs is flawed. (This entry is mainly
concerned with simple states of affairs.)
Similarly, the model of states of affairs as possible outcomes does not rule
out that there are impossible state of affairs. If there is a space of possible
states of the dice, there seems to be a space of impossible states of them as
well. For example, it is impossible for the dice to show 17 or no number at
all (see Rumfitt 2015: 187f for a brief discussion of impossible states of
affairs).
2. Thoughts and States of Affairs
2.1 Individuation and Existence Conditions
Thoughts can be the contents of propositional attitudes. When one says
“There are three things that everyone who works on elementary physics
believes”, one quantifies over things that everyone working in elementary
physics believes: thoughts (see Chisholm 1970: 19). Thoughts are also
truth-value bearers (“There are three truths that everyone who works in
elementary physics believes”). How are thoughts related to states of
affairs? For instance, how is the thought that Socrates is wise related to the
state of affairs Socrates’ being wise?
Prima facie, thoughts are one thing, states of affairs another. Thoughts and
states of affairs differ in their individuation and existence conditions.
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Individuation-conditions: Thoughts are supposed to be the contents of
propositional attitudes like belief and desire. Let “j” be shorthand for a
propositional attitude verb (“desire”, “believe” etc). If one can j that p
without eo ipso j-ing that q (and vice versa), the contents that p and that q
are different. Now I can believe, for instance, that Hesperus shines without
believing that Phosphorus shines. Hence, if thoughts are the contents of
propositional attitudes, the thought that Hesperus shines is different from
the thought that Phosphorus shines. If the thought that Hesperus shines is
different from the thought that Phosphorus shines, thoughts cannot be
logical complexes whose constituents are particulars and properties.
Following Frege, many philosophers therefore take thoughts to be
complexes that are built up out of modes of presentation. Here “thoughts”
only refers to such complexes. Since there are different modes of
presentation of the same particular (property), there can be different
thoughts that concern or are about the same particulars and properties. In
contrast, Hesperus’s shining and Phosphorus’s shining are the same state
of affairs, namely the complex that contains only the planet Venus and the
property of shining. We will see in section 2.4 that not all philosophers
follow Frege’s lead. If one has arguments for a coarse-grained
individuation of the objects of belief, states of affairs may serve as
contents of propositional attitudes.
Existence-conditions: A thought is a complex whose constituents are
modes of presentation that purport to represent objects. Standard accounts
of modes of presentation allow for the existence of modes of presentation
that are empty. Hence, the existence of a thought does not depend on the
existence of the objects it purports to represent. For example, the thought
that Pegasus is a horse exists, although there is no such horse (for defense
and elaboration see Sainsbury 2005: 86–9). This is different for states of
affairs. If a state of affairs is a complex that contains objects and
properties as constituents, it cannot exist if its constituents don’t exist. So
while it is true that Pegasus does not exist, there is no such state of affairs.
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 States of Affairs
This is unproblematic for we have not been given any reason to think that
such a state of affairs obtains or does not obtain. For the same reason
states of affairs that contain contingently existing objects are themselves
contingent existents.
Philosophers often use the notion of a singular proposition. A singular
proposition is supposed to be (i) “directly about” an object and (ii)
evaluable as true or false. Direct aboutness requires that what the
proposition is directly about exists if the proposition exists. If one
combines (i) and (ii) with the plausible assumption that the proposition
that Superman does not exist is singular and true, one arrives at the
conclusion that Superman exists. Similar problems arise for negative
modal existential singular propositions such as the proposition that
Socrates might not have existed. Williamson 2002 argues on the basis of
these problems that everything exists necessarily. Williamson’s modus
ponens is Plantinga’s (1983) and Merricks’s 2015 (chapt. 5) modus tollens:
singular propositions can exist although the object they are directly about
doesn’t.
If one sides with Plantinga and Merricks, one can drive a wedge between
truth and obtaining. We are not compelled to hold that there is a state of
affairs Superman’s non-existing because we have no reason to say that
such a state of affairs obtains or even possibly obtains, while we have a
reason to say that it is true that Superman does not exist. Hence, the
(singular) proposition that Superman does not exist can be true without the
state of affairs Superman’s non-existing obtaining. Obtaining is indeed
only truth-like.
Chisholm held that propositions are those states of affairs such that either
the state of affairs or its negation always occurs (on Chisholm’s notion of
state of affairs, see Kim 1979). But, as we have seen, the truth that
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Superman does not exist cannot be the state of affairs Superman’s non-
existing occurring or obtaining.
2.2 States of Affairs and Probabilities
Reinach (1911: 339) claimed that “states of affairs, and only states of
affairs, can adopt such modalities” as probability and possibility. He had in
mind that an object such as a die cannot be possible or probable. This
seems plausible enough. It is equally plausible that facts are not probable
or possible. However, why can’t thoughts be probable or possible?
Forbes (1989: 130–131) refines Reinach’s idea in taking states of affairs as
the fundamental bearers of modal properties like being possible, necessary
etc. From Reinach we learn that particulars can’t be the bearers of
modality. Fregean truth-values are also unsuited. According to Frege’s
semantics for assertoric sentences, every true (false) sentence, whether
necessary or contingently true (false), refers to the True (the False). Forbes
appeals to our modal intuitions to argue for a better candidate for the
modal value bearer role,
a category of entity not so finely discriminated as thoughts but
more finely discriminated than truth-values, such that sentences
with the same entity in the category as their references are
guaranteed to have the same modal status. (1989: 130)
Let us consider a pair of sentences to illustrate Forbes’s argument for an
entity less discriminating than thoughts and more discriminating than
truth-values. Consider the sentence pairs:
(1) a. Hesperus shines.
b. Phosphorus shines.
(2) a. Hesperus is Hesperus.
b. Hesperus is Phosphorus.
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(1a) to (2b) are all true. Hence, in Fregean terms, they all refer to the True.
Each of these sentences expresses a thought different from all others.
However, the members of each pair have the same modal status that
differs from the modal status of the members of the other pair. (1a) and
(1b) are contingently true; (2a) and (2b) necessarily true. If one lets
sentences stand for or describe states of affairs whose constituents are the
referents of the semantically relevant sentence parts, one can capture this
similarity: (1a) and (1b) ((2a) and (2b)) have the same modal status
because these sentences stand for the same state of affairs (Forbes 1989:
131). In general, sentences that stand for the same state of affairs have the
same modal value. It is then a short step to take states of affairs to be the
primary or fundamental bearers of modal status (1989: 131–2). A sentence
is contingently (necessarily) true if, and only if, it stands for a state of
affairs that contingently (necessarily) obtains.[2]
Can’t facts be the basic bearers of modal status? Take a further sentence
pair:
(3) a. Hesperus has an orbital period of 226 days.
b. Phosphorus has an orbital period of 226 days.
(3a) and (3b) are false, they express different thoughts, yet have the same
modal status: they might have been true. This similarity cannot be
explained by taking them to refer to the same fact; we need states of
affairs.
We can now answer our initial question: Yes, we need states of affairs as
well as thoughts. States of affairs and thoughts have distinct individuation
and existence conditions. Therefore, states of affairs can be the
fundamental bearers of modal properties.
We can strengthen the conclusion by considering ways to dispute it.
Consider all thoughts that represent the same particulars and predicate the
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same properties of them. Let us call these thoughts referentially
equivalent. Vendler proposed that a fact is “an abstract entity which
indiscriminately contains a set of referentially equivalent true
propositions” (Vendler 1967: 711; my emphasis). If we drop the restriction
to true propositions and simplify Vendler’s idea, we can propose that a
state of affairs is a set of referentially equivalent thoughts, whether they
are true or not. The state of affairs Hesperus’s shining is the set of all
thoughts that are about Hesperus and predicate the property of shining to
it.
However, such an approach to states of affairs makes them explanatorily
uninteresting. If we want to explain why (1a) and (1b) ((2a)–(2b)/(3a)–
(3b)) have the same modal profile, appealing to states of affairs in
Vendler’s sense does not allow us to make progress. For instance, saying
that (1a) and (1b) have the same modal profile because they belong to the
set of thoughts that are about Hesperus and predicate the property of
shining to it is at best a partial explanation. For it raises such questions as
“What has belonging to this set to do with possibility?” and “In virtue of
which property has a set of thoughts modal properties”? In contrast, the
assumption that there are states of affairs that are not just a particular kind
of set and that have properties like being possible or being probable can be
independently motivated and is explanatory progress.
2.3 States of Affairs and Possible Worlds
In section 2.2 we used the modal properties of states of affairs to
distinguish them from thoughts. Some philosophers have proposed to use
the connection between states of affairs and modality constructively to
explain what a possible world is.
Lewis (1973: 84) points out that we talk about ways things might have
been. He goes on to label ways every thing might have been “possible
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 States of Affairs
worlds”. If it is possible that something is the case, there is a possible
world in which it is the case. What are, then, possible worlds?
Van Inwagen distinguished between Abstractionist and Concretist
conceptions of possible worlds (see van Inwagen 1986: 185–6; see also
Stalnaker 1986: 121). According to a Concretist conception of possible
worlds such as David Lewis’s, a possible world is the maximal
mereological sum of individuals that are spatio-temporally related and
each such sum is spatio-temporally isolated from all others (see Lewis
1986: 69–70). There are no impossible worlds. The actual world is the
world in which we are located.
According to Abstractionists, possible worlds are abstract objects of some
sort. The exercise in probability calculation from section 1.2 motivates an
Abstractionist proposal in which states of affairs are the basic building
blocks. States of affairs are possible outcomes. Kripke called possible
outcomes “miniature possible worlds”. This suggests an idea of what a
possible world is: it is a maximal state of affairs. Pollock (1984a: 57)
defines possible world therefore as follows:
(PW) w is a possible world if, and only if, w is a nontransient possible
state of affairs and for any nontransient state of affairs S if it is
possible that w and S both obtain, w includes S. (see also Plantinga
1974: 44–6)
A state of affairs w includes a state of affairs S if, and only if, necessarily
if w obtains, S obtains. The actual world is the possible maximal
nontransient state of affairs that obtains.
A state of affairs is transient if, and only if, it obtains at one time and not
another. For instance, the state of affairs Socrates’s not drinking hemlock
obtains at some times, but not at others. Transient states of affairs are only
possible, actual etc. relative to a time. Before 399 BC it was possible that
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Socrates does not drink hemlock, but this is no longer possible after 399
BC. A state of affairs is nontransient if, and only, if it is such that
necessarily if it obtains at one time it obtains at all times. For example, the
state of affairs Socrates’s being hungry on the 15th of April 400 BC at
16:15 is nontransient.
(PW) makes use of modal concepts to define possible world: it must be
possible for S and w to both obtain etc. Hence, this particular
Abstractionist conception of possible worlds does not allow one to explain
modality away; it presupposes it. In contrast, the Concretist conception
promises a definitional reduction of modal concepts. When we talk about
possibility and necessity we quantify over mereological sums of things.
The concept of modality is not required to distinguish between possible
and impossible worlds: there are no impossible ones. Why is (PW), then,
attractive?
First, Forbes (1987: 139ff) argues that the identification of possible worlds
with constructions out of compossible states of affairs solves the problem
of accidental intrinsics (Lewis 1986: 199–201). Let us consider an
intrinsic property of a human being, say me, such as having two hands. I
might have existed without having had two hands. On the concretist
account this implies that there is a possible world in which I have a
different number of hands. But how can one and the same individual have
two as well as fewer/more hands “in different worlds”? If the worlds are
mereological sums that have me as a common part, this seems not
possible. Lewis concludes that the same object cannot be part of different
possible worlds. An object can only be in different possible worlds by
having counterparts in them.
According to counterpart theory, I might have had three hands only in the
derived sense by having counter-parts that have three hands (see Kripke
1980: 45). This does not sit well with the intuition that I strictly and
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 States of Affairs
literally speaking might have had three hands. The identification of
possible worlds with constructions out of compossible states of affairs is
faithful to this intuition. I have different properties in different possible
worlds, if the possible worlds contain different states of affairs that
involve me. One possible world contains the state of affairs MT’s having
three hands; the possible world that is actual contains the state of affairs
MT’s having two hands. The different possible worlds under discussion
don’t overlap, yet the possibilities involve me (see Forbes 1987: 141).
Second, the semantics of counterfactuals. The so-called “Stalnaker-Lewis
semantics” for counterfactuals assumes that a counterfactual such as “If it
were rainy today, I would take an umbrella” is true if, and only if, all of
the closest possible worlds in which the antecedent is true are possible
worlds in which the consequent is true. This semantics for counterfactuals
allows the substitution of logically equivalent sentences in the antecedent
of a counterfactual. For example, if the counterfactual “If it were rainy
today, I would take an umbrella” is true, so is “If it were rainy and windy
today or rainy and not windy today, I would take an umbrella” because “It
is rainy today” and “If it is rainy and windy today or rainy and not windy
today” are true in the same possible worlds. Fine (1975: 453f; 2012: 230f)
argues that the substitution principle should be given up in the light of
puzzling consequences. But certainly one can substitute some sentences in
the antecedent of a counterfactual. Which ones? Fine suggests replacing
Stalnaker-Lewis semantics for counterfactuals with a semantics in which
possible states take pride of place. Instead of a plurality of possible worlds
there is a space of possible states that involve particulars and ways they
can be. Assertoric sentences refer to states of affairs and only those
sentences that refer to the same state of affairs can be substituted in the
antecedent of a counter-factual (Fine 1975: 454).
Fine assumes that “It is rainy”, “It is rainy and windy” and “It is rainy and
not windy” etc. refer to different states of affairs (1975: 454). How can
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this assumption be justified? If we take the idea that states of affairs are
complexes seriously, we can answer this question. Just like other
complexes they can (at least in part) be individuated in terms of their
constituents. The states of affairs S1 and S2 can therefore only be the same
state of affairs if they have the same constituents. This conception allows
for states of affairs that necessarily co-obtain, but differ. For example,
necessarily, the state of affairs that triangle A is equilateral obtains if the
state of affairs that triangle A is equiangular and vice versa. Similarly, the
state of affairs P necessarily obtains if, and only if, the state of affairs
P & (Q ∨ ¬Q) obtains. Yet, these are different states of affairs: they have
different constituents.
This conception of states of affairs as complexes makes them useful for
semantics. If sentences refer to such states of affairs, logically equivalent
sentences can refer to different states of affairs and therefore have
different semantic properties. All tautologies are true in all possible
worlds, yet they can refer to different states of affairs. A number of
semantic theories assume that sentences refer to states of affairs. These
theories provide principles that determine the reference of complex
sentences on the basis of their parts (see Fine 2012: 234; see also Rumfitt
2015: 160–7).
However, if states of affairs are individuated in terms of their components
and their mode of combination, there are for every possible world many
different maximal nontransient states of affairs (for the following see Zalta
1993: 393–4). If the state of affairs P is a possible world, so is
P & (Q ∨ ¬Q) for an arbitrarily chosen possible state of affairs Q. P and
P & (Q ∨ ¬Q) are necessarily equivalent, but, according to our
individuation method, different states of affairs. Hence, there are many
different maximal states of affairs that correspond to the same possible
world and, in particular, to the actual world.
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Zalta (1993) tackles this problem on the basis of his axiomatic theory of
abstract objects. According to him, abstract objects like numbers
exemplify but also encode properties. For example, 1 encodes the
properties that are essential to its identity; to its being the object it is. In
contrast, 1 exemplifies, but does not encode, the property of being the
number of inhabited planets of the solar system. In this system, situations
are those abstract objects that encode state of affairs properties such as
being such that John is to the left of Harry. If a situation is the case, the
state of affairs properties it encodes obtain; the situation makes the
encoded state of affairs property factual. A situation S is a possible world
if, and only if, it is possible that S makes all and only the obtaining states
of affairs properties factual. On the basis of the axioms of his system Zalta
can show that there is a unique actual world.
If one is unwilling to make a distinction between encoding and
exemplifying, but one wants to maintain the identification of possible
worlds with maximal possible states of affairs, one either has to accept
that necessarily equivalent states of affairs are the same or one must
identify possible worlds with sets of necessarily equivalent possible states
of affairs. We already rejected the first option as unfruitful for semantics.
The second option seems to result in a set-theoretic modeling or
replacement of possible worlds, not in a conception of possible worlds
(see Zalta 1993: 394).
2.4 States of Affairs and Propositional Attitudes
Thoughts can’t fulfill the role of states of affairs as the fundamental
bearers of modal properties. Can states of affairs be the contents of
propositional attitudes? Prima facie, the answer is No. We have already
seen that states of affairs are too coarse-grained to be the contents of
propositional attitudes. I can believe that Hesperus is a planet, without
believing that Phosphorus is a planet (and vice versa). Hence, the contents
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of the attitudes differ. But the state of affairs Hesperus’s being a planet is
just the state of affairs Phosphorus’s being a planet. Propositional attitudes
are, at best, mediated relations to states of affairs. For example, a belief
represents a state of affairs if, and only if, the believer assents to a thought
that describes a state of affairs.
Barcan Marcus has challenged this view. She argued that belief is “a
relation between a subject or agent and a state of affairs that is not
necessarily actual but that has actual objects as its constituents” (Barcan
Marcus 1993 [1990]: 240). Her object-centered account of belief identifies
belief with a differential disposition to a state of affairs:
x believes that S just in case, under certain agent-centered
circumstances including x’s desires and needs as well as external
circumstances, x is disposed to act as if S, that actual or nonactual
state of affairs, obtains. (Barcan Marcus 1993 [1990]: 241)
Believing that so-and-so does not require concept possession. For
example, believing that the sun is shining is a differential disposition to
the state of affairs the sun’s shining, however described or presented.
The object-centered account of belief contrasts with mode-of-presentation-
centered or language-centered accounts. The object-centered theory allows
us to take belief-ascriptions to non-linguistic creatures to be literally true.
However, it runs into problems when it comes to assertoric utterances of
sentences containing empty singular terms. According to the object-
centred view, these don’t express beliefs (see Barcan Marcus 1993 [1990]:
247). While the state of affairs a’s being F can exist, although a is not F; it
cannot exist, if either a or being F doesn’t exist. Now take the belief that
Napoleon was French. I satisfy all intuitive criteria for the possession of
this belief. Imagine that we find out that, after all, there was never such a
person as Napoleon. It was all a very elaborate hoax. Then there is no state
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of affairs composed of Napoleon and being French. Hence, although all
intuitive criteria may have told us that I believed that Napoleon was
French, we now find out that I never had that belief. This is counter-
intuitive and artificial.
To sum up: Thoughts and states of affairs are different things. Thoughts
cannot be reduced to states of affairs and the reduction of states of affairs
to sets of referentially equivalent thoughts is unwarranted. We need both
thoughts and states of affairs in order to fulfill different roles.
3. Facts and States of Affairs
3.1 Facts as Truth-Makers and Regress-Stoppers
What are facts and how may they be distinguished from states of affairs?
The Truthmaker-Argument is the main argument for the introduction of
facts (see Armstrong 1997: 115ff). It also yields an understanding of the
main features of facts. The argument can be summed up as follows:
(P1) Every truth must have a truth-maker.
(P2) The best candidates to occupy the truth-maker role are facts.
(C) There are facts.
Armstrong takes (P1) to articulate the following intuitive asymmetry: It is
true that Socrates is wise because Socrates is wise; but Socrates is not
wise because it is true that Socrates is wise (see Armstrong 2004: 4). In
Armstrong’s terminology a truth-bearer is true in virtue of (made true by)
the existence of another entity, a truth-maker. A truth-maker ensures or
guarantees the truth of a truth-bearer. Some authors take this guarantee to
be a form of necessitation: x makes it true that p if, and only if,
necessarily, if x exists, it is true that p.
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This brings us to the second premise of the Truthmaker-Argument. Why
are facts the best candidates for the truth-maker role? Let us work through
some alternatives. Take the thought that Socrates is wise. The existence of
which object necessitates its truth? Socrates can exist without being wise.
Hence, Socrates is not the truth-maker we are looking for.
The last point suggests that only a complex entity that “contains” Socrates
as well as the property of being wise is a candidate for the truth-maker
role. The mereological sum of Socrates and being wise, that is, the whole
that has only Socrates and wisdom as parts, satisfies this condition, yet it
cannot fulfill the truth-maker role. If Socrates and wisdom exist, their
mereological sum exists. Hence, the sum exists whether it is true that
Socrates is wise or not. For similar reasons the set that contains only
Socrates and being wise cannot be the truth-maker of the thought that
Socrates is wise. Armstrong concludes that only the fact that Socrates is
wise that “ties” Socrates and being wise makes it true that Socrates is wise
(see Armstrong 1997: 118).
Armstrong’s conception of truthmaking is controversial (see, for instance,
Restall 1996). I will set its problems aside here and focus on clarifying the
relation between facts and states of affairs. Facts “tie” particulars and
universals. This brings them close to states of affairs that also involve
particulars and universals. What distinguishes them is that the existence of
a fact is supposed to guarantee the truth of a truth-bearer. The existence of
the fact that a is F can only guarantee the truth of the thought that a is F if
one cannot distinguish facts into those that obtain and those that do not
obtain. Saying of the fact that Socrates is wise that it obtains is redundant,
while it is not redundant to say so of the state of affairs Socrates’ being
wise.
Facts are also introduced in order to stop a regress of instantiation. Take
the particular a and the property of being F and assume that they can exist
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independently of each other. Given this assumption, there must be a
relation that “ties” them together to a’s being F. If the required “tie” is a
genuine relation, a regress, usually called Bradley’s regress, ensues: we
need to introduce another relation that ties the first relation to a and being
F, and so on. Facts are supposed to prevent Bradley’s regress (see
Armstrong 1997: 115 and 118; Hossack 2007: 33). How? Relations that tie
particulars and properties together are “explained away” in terms of facts
that contain particulars and properties: if a instantiates F-ness, it does so
because the fact that a is F exists. The existence of this fact guarantees
that a is F. Facts are just instantiations of universals by particulars (see
Armstrong 1997: 119). Hence, we arrive again at the result that the
obtaining/non-obtaining distinction does not apply to facts.
In contrast to facts the obtaining/non-obtaining distinction divides states of
affairs into those that obtain and those that do not obtain (see section 1).
For this reason states of affairs cannot be truthmakers: their existence does
not necessitate the truth of a truth-bearer. The state of affairs Socrates’
being foolish exists in some possible worlds in which Socrates is foolish,
but it also exists in possible worlds in which Socrates is not foolish.
Vallicella reinforces this point:
[Facts] are not to be confused with abstract states of affairs which
either obtain or do not obtain depending on how the world is. The
latter are themselves in need of something in the world that
explains why they obtain. (Vallicella 2000: 237)
3.2 Are Facts Just Obtaining States of Affairs?
States of affairs contain particulars and properties; facts tie them. This
similarity encourages the question whether a fact is nothing but a state of
affairs that obtains (see Horwich 1990: 113 who takes true Russellian
propositions to be facts). On this view the reason why it is redundant to
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say that a fact obtains is that a fact is just an obtaining state of affairs.
However, the identification of facts with obtaining states of affairs creates
problems for the theory of truthmaking. Assume that the fact that Socrates
is wise is just the obtaining state of affairs Socrates’ being wise. The fact is
supposed to make it true that Socrates is wise. But if the fact is just the
obtaining state of affairs Socrates’ being wise, we need in turn something
that explains why the state of affairs obtains. For it seems correct to say
“The state of affairs Socrates’ being wise obtains because Socrates is
wise”, but not “Socrates is wise because the state of affairs Socrates’ being
wise obtains”. Hence, obtaining states of affairs cannot play the same role
as facts. They cannot be truth-makers. The question “Why is it true that
Socrates is wise?” cannot be conclusively answered by saying “Because
Socrates’ being wise obtains”. This answer is in need of a further
explanation of the same type as the one we were originally after.
3.3 Are States of Affairs Just Recombinations of Fact
Constituents?
A non-obtaining state of affairs cannot be a fact. But can every state of
affairs be a recombination of particulars and properties that are combined
in some facts? Combinatorialists answer Yes (see, for example, Skyrms
1981; Armstrong 1989: 45ff; Bigelow 1988; Forbes 1989: 137). This idea
has two main varieties:
Fictionalism: Like ideal gases or frictionless surfaces, possible states
of affairs are (useful) fictions; only facts exist. Assume that a is not F.
There exists no possible state of affairs a’s being F. But there is the
fiction of possible states of affairs according to which there is the state
of affairs a’s being F if, and only if, a and being F are contained in
some facts (see Armstrong 1989: 46 and 49ff and the entry on modal
fictionalism for a detailed overview).
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Representationalism: there are no possible states of affairs, only
representations of possible states of affairs (see Lewis 1986: 146 who
ascribes this view to Skyrms). These representations are set-theoretic
constructs that contain as their members particulars and universals that
occur in some facts. For example, if a’s being F and b’s being G are
both facts, but the sentence “a is G” is false, there is no state of affairs
a’s being G, but there is an ordered-pair that contains a and being G as
its members.
Representationalism raises the question: what distinguishes a (possible)
state of affairs from a mere representation of it? Why is the state of affairs
a’s being G not simply the ordered pair of a and being G? We will come
back to this question in section 5.
4. States of Affairs in the Metaphysics of Perception
and Value
So far states of affairs may seem to be useful theoretical constructs of
philosophical semantics and modal theory. For example, Taylor (1976:
263) introduced a notion of states of affairs that is language relative:
different languages posit different totalities of state of affairs. Are there
reasons to introduce states of affairs independently of theorizing about
language and modality?
4.1 States of Affairs as the Primary Objects of Perception
One answer to this question takes states of affairs to be the things we
directly perceive. Here is an argument from the recent literature that will
get us started in thinking about this view:
While we often speak of perceiving objects alone (a bird, a bush, a
cloud, a star) or properties alone—depending on the purpose of our
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attention or the purpose of our reporting—it does not seem
possible to perceive objects without at least some of their
properties, or to perceive properties without perceiving at least
some instantiations of these properties. (Church 2013: 11)
Church concludes that “perception is always perception of a state of
affairs” (ibid. See also Levinson 2006: 576)
According to this Argument from Perception, perceptual reports such as “I
saw a robin yesterday” are incomplete. What I saw was the state of affairs
of the robin’s being a certain way. I report that I saw a robin because my
attention was focused on the bird.
Some champions of states of affairs want to resist the Argument from
Perception. Husserl (1901: § 28) and Reinach (1911: 341f]) denied that
states of affairs can be perceived. They argued that only particulars, birds,
bushes etc., can be the direct objects of perception. We say “NN saw that a
robin sat on a twig.” But these utterances are supposed to be reports of
judgements that depend on perceptions of particulars. Hence, the existence
of such reports is supposed to be compatible with the claim that states of
affairs can only be the correlates of judgements.
The Argument from Perception indeed needs strengthening. The move
from:
Necessarily, if one perceives x, one perceives a property of x.
to
Necessarily, one perceives (the state of affairs of) x’s having a
property
is not valid. If one sees the robin, it appears distinct from its environment.
The robin can only appear distinct from its environment if one perceives at
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least one property of it. But that one perceives an object in virtue of
perceiving some of its properties does not yet imply that one perceives the
object’s having the property. Consider an analogy: I can only touch an
object if I touch a part of it. But that does not mean that I really touch a
different object: the object’s having the part.
Even if the argument above can be strengthened, the strengthened version
seems only to show that the primary objects of perception are property
instantiations or facts (see Church 2013: 12). Seeing is a factive mental
state. Hence, if I see the robin perching on the twig, and things are as they
visually seem to me, it is a fact that the robin is perching on the twig. At
best the Argument from Perception gives us a reason to believe in facts,
but not in states of affairs.
However, there is an argument in the vicinity of the Argument from
Perception that speaks to the existence of states of affairs. McDowell used
the thesis that we perceive the referents of ‘that’-clauses as a basis for
direct realism:
In a particular experience in which one is not misled, what one
takes in is that things are thus and so. That things are thus and so
is the content of the experience, and it can also be the content of
the judgement if the subject decides to take the experience at face
value […]. But, that things are thus and so is also, if one is not
misled, an aspect of the layout of the world: it is how things are.
(McDowell 1994: 26)
If a particular experience, McDowell argues, does not mislead us, it
discloses the fact that things are thus and so. This very fact can be judged
and will be among the facts that make up the world. So much about
veridical perception. What about non-veridical perception?
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If we assume that veridical and non-veridical perception have a common
factor, states of affairs start to pull their weight in the theory of perception.
Consider two different kinds of non-veridical perception: hallucination
and illusion.
Hallucination: if you visually hallucinate an oasis, you are not mistaken
about something you see: prima facie, there is nothing to see. But even
hallucinations seem to be perceptual awareness of something. Johnston
(2004: 134f) therefore describes visual hallucinations as perceptual
awareness of a complex property (he calls it a “profile”), a way some
things might be, that is not instantiated (at the time).
Illusion: if the stick that is straight looks bent to you, there is something
you see, the stick, but it is not the way it visually seems to you: you see
the stick, but it is not bent. How can one conceptualise such illusions?
Johnston takes his cue from the hallucination case. An illusion is an
improved hallucination: we are aware of a complex property that is in part
instantiated:
Illusion is seeing a particular combined with non-veridical seeing
of the particular as thus and so. When the seeing as is primary in
this way, one is aware of a particular and one is aware of a
complex profile, only part of which is instantiated by the particular.
One also sees the particular as instantiating parts of the profile,
parts that it does not instantiate. (Johnston 2004: 174)
If you experience the straight stick as bent, there is something your
experience is of. This is not only the stick, but something which combines
the stick and being bent: the state of affairs of the stick’s being bent (at a
time). This state of affairs exists, but does not obtain. Your visual
experience has an object, but because the object does not obtain, you
suffer an illusion.
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In sum: states of affairs offer themselves up to systematize the relations
between seeing, visual hallucination and illusion. For instance, one might
suggest the following explications: S’s experience as of a’s being F is S’s
seeing a to be F, if, and only if, the state of affairs of a’s being F obtains
and causes the experience in the right way; S’s experience is an illusion if,
and only if, the state of affairs does not obtain; and the experience is a
hallucination if, and only if, only the state of affairs of a’s being F does not
exist, but its property-part does.
This systematization is based on the assumption that there is a common
factor in seeing and suffering from a visual illusion: both are experiences
of a state of affairs, the only difference is that the states of affairs does not
obtain in the second case. McDowell (see his 1982) and other philosophers
argue that it is a mistake to hold that veridical perception and illusion
involve a common factor. The plausibility of an argument for states of
affairs as the primary objects of perception depends on the defensibility of
the common factor assumption.
4.2 States of Affairs in the Metaphysics of Value
Which things are good for their own sake and without qualification?
Particulars like the Taj Mahal? Properties like Beauty or Justice? Or
something else?
The British philosopher William David Ross was one of the first who
argued that one could make progress with these questions about value by
bringing in the referents of ‘that’-clauses:
Consideration of the question is aided if we adopt the view […]
that what is good or bad is always something properly expressed
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by a that-clause, i.e. an objective, or as I should prefer to call it, a
fact. (Ross 1930: 137)
According to Ross, Justice is not intrinsically good. What is intrinsically
good is that someone or other is just. Rabinowicz and Rønnow-
Rasmussen 2000 argue against Ross’s thesis: sometimes that a is F is good
because a is good. If their arguments are convincing, objectives are not the
only kind of thing that is good/bad for its own sake.
If ‘that’ clauses introduce bearers of intrinsic value, what do these clauses
refer to in ascriptions of value? It seems intuitively implausible to holds
that thoughts are intrinsically good (bad). Thoughts represent how things
might be or not. A representation might have value but its value depends,
at least in part, on what it represents. Hence, thoughts seem not to be
bearers of intrinsic value. Neither facts nor states of affairs represent how
things might be or not. Hence, both are candidates for the role of being
bearers of intrinsic value.
Ross (see above) opted for facts as the bearers of intrinsic value. This view
is defended, among others, by Lemos (1994: 23–5) and Zimmerman
(2001: 51ff) although Zimmerman rejects the “fact” terminology and
prefers to talk about property-exemplifications. Chisholm and Sosa (1966:
244) assumed that states of affairs are bearers of intrinsic value. But they
warned the reader:
Ordinarily, one would not say of any unexemplified state of affairs
(say, that everyone is happy) that it is good, or bad, or better than
some other state of affairs. One might say, instead, that the state of
affairs would be good, or bad, or better than some state of affairs if
only it were exemplified. (ibid.)
This warning is the cue for Zimmerman’s (2001: 47) argument for the
conclusion that property-exemplifications (facts) and not state of affairs
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are value-bearers. If something has an intrinsic value, it has it in all
circumstances. Hence, a state of affairs cannot have final value if it
obtained (were exemplified) and be without value if does not obtain (is not
exemplified). If the value of the state of affairs depended on the state of
affairs’s obtaining, the state of affairs itself would not be the true bearer of
value. The true bearer of value is the object that exists in all and only those
situations in which the state of affairs obtains. The true bearer of intrinsic
value is fact that exists in all and only those situation in which the state of
affairs obtains.
If non-obtaining states of affairs can have intrinsic value, this argument
does not get off the ground. Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen (2000,
401f) outline considerations that support the view that some non-obtaining
states of affairs are intrinsically good (bad). We value (love/like) the state
of affairs of everyone’s being happy. For example, although you know that
this state of affairs does not and probably will never obtain, you like it and
like it more than the obtaining states of affairs. The question at issue
between the fact and the state of affairs view of intrinsic value is whether a
state of affairs is good (bad) because worlds in which it obtains are good
(bad) or whether worlds in which the state of affairs obtains are good (bad)
because the state of affairs is good (bad).
5. States of Affairs as Complexes
In the previous sections we have seen that states of affairs can only play
important explanatory roles if the necessarily co-obtaining states of affairs
are distinct. This gives us a reason to reject Chisholm’s (1976: 118) thesis
that necessarily co-obtaining states of affairs are identical. At the same
time it puts weight on the characterization of states of affairs as
“involving” objects and properties or as composed out of objects and
properties. It seems intuitively plausible that the state of affairs Socrates’s
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being wise involves Socrates and the property of being wise. But in what
way do states of affairs involve particulars and properties?
5.1 States of Affairs as N-Tuples and Wholes
Ordered n-tuples have members. Are states of affairs n-tuples that have
objects and properties as members? Is, for example, the state of affairs
Socrates’s being wise nothing but the ordered pair ⟨ Socrates, being wise⟩?
Plantinga answers NO:
Clearly there are many set-theoretical models of our talk about
states of affairs and individuals. Why pick any of them as more
revealing than the others? (Plantinga 1984: 327)
We can model states of affairs as ordered n-tuples in many different ways.
But there seems no way to decide between ⟨ Socrates, being wise⟩ and
⟨being wise, Socrates⟩ as the right model for the state of affairs. Hence,
the state of affairs is not identical with either ordered pair (see Pollock
1984b: 138).
Some philosophers spell out “involvement” as containment: A state of
affairs is a complex that contains properties and particulars as parts. In
order to assess this proposal, let us first sharpen our understanding of the
part-of relation. It is controversial weather the relation we aim to pick out
with “part-of” is reflexive (everything is part of itself) or not. But it is not
controversial that the relation is transitive (if x is a part of y, and y is a part
of z, x is a part of z) and antisymmetrical (if x is part of y, and y is a part of
x, x is identical to y) (see the entry on mereology, sect. 2 and 3). A further
plausible principle governing our part-of relation is the supplementation
principle: if x is a part of y, there is an object z that is part of y and z does
overlap, that is, have a part in common, with x. The supplementation
principle implies the intuitively plausible view that nothing can have a
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single proper part. The supplementation principle together with the
uncontroversial axioms for the (proper) part-of relation also implies the
more controversial thesis that complex objects with the same parts are
identical (see entry on mereology, 3.2).
The transitivity of part-of immediately gives rise to problems. For
instance, Frege wrote to Wittgenstein:
[If Vesuvius is part of a state of affairs,] it seems that parts of
Vesuvius must also be parts of this fact; the fact will hence also
consist of solidified lava. This does not seem right to me. (Frege
1919: 20; my translation)
If Vesuvius is part of the obtaining state of affairs Vesuvius’s being a
volcano, the state of affairs must by the transitivity of part-of contain the
parts of solidified lava that are parts of Vesuvius. But if the state of affairs
contains the solidified lava as parts, it must have a weight and an extension
etc. However, the state of affairs Vesuvius’s being a volcano is not a thing
that has weight etc.
There are further problems for the view that states of affairs are
complexes. If the state of affairs a’s being F has only a and being F as its
parts (in any plausible sense of “part”), it can only exist at a time at which
a and being F exist (the sum of all my body parts exists only at the time
when all my body parts exist). Hence, the state of affairs a’s ceasing to
exist before b’s starting to exist cannot be a complex containing a and b.
For there is no time when its constituents both exist (see Künne 2003:
122).
The principles for the (proper) part-of relation imply that complexes with
the same parts are identical. But take the state of affairs that Romeo loves
Juliet. If it has Romeo, Love and Juliet as its parts, it is the same as the
state of affairs that Juliet loves Romeo. But intuitively, the state of affairs
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Juliet’s loving Romeo is different from the state of affairs Romeo’s loving
Juliet. On the standard mereological conception of part, particulars and
universals are not parts of states of affairs.
5.2 Non-Mereological Composition to the Rescue?
The last point cuts both ways. Why not say that different complex objects
can have the same parts? Armstrong (1997: 118) answered this question
positively and argued that facts are non-mereological composites. Lewis
has denied that there is room for non-mereological composition (see Lewis
1992: 213; for discussion McDaniel 2009). However, independently of
considerations about states of affairs we allow for different wholes that
share all their parts. For instance, the sentences “John loves Mary” and
“Mary loves John” both consist of the same words “John”, “Mary” and
“loves”, yet they are clearly different sentences.
But our intuitive notion of part does not allow for wholes with only one
part: if something x is part of a whole W, there is a remainder of W that is
not identical with x. To illustrate: If you tell me that this slice is part of
your cake, but there is no distinct, further part of your cake, I will take you
to make joke or to be confused. The remainder principle is implied by the
supplementation principle of mereology, but not the other way around (see
mereology entry, sect. 3.2) Hence, we can draw on the remainder principle
without endorsing the stronger supplementation principle. Now there seem
to be states of affairs that “contain” only one property (see Bynoe 2011
who argues the following point in detail). Bradley’s Regress which was
discussed in section 3.1 seems to show that the state of affairs Socrates’
being wise consists only of Socrates and being wise. There is no relation
that ties them to a state of affairs. Otherwise the question would arise what
relates this relation to Socrates and being wise. Now some properties
instantiate themselves: identity is self-identical. Hence, the state of affairs
identity’s being self-identical obtains. But this state of affairs contains only
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the property of identity. There seems to be no intuitively acceptable sense
of “part” in which such states of affairs have parts.
We are back then to the problem of how to make sense of how a state of
affairs involves properties and particulars. In order to solve it, we need to
find a relation between the state of affairs a’s being F and a and being F
that (i) does not make a and being F parts of the state of affairs, (ii) allows
one to distinguish between necessarily co-obtaining states of affairs, and
(iii) distinguishes the state of affairs a’s being F from other objects that,
intuitively speaking, involve a and being F.
5.3 Are States of Affairs Ontologically Dependent?
Fine (1982: 51–2) has suggested an answer that invokes the independently
motivated idea that the identity of some objects is explained in terms of
the identity of other objects (see also Fine 1995; Bynoe 2011: 99–100; and
Keller 2013: 669). Consider Fine’s example of the singleton of 1. The
singleton of 1 is the set whose sole member is 1. The singleton of 1 is
ontologically dependent on 1 because its identity depends on the identity
of 1. We explain what the singleton is by appealing to 1, but not the other
way around. Similarly, the identity of (atomic) states of affairs is explained
in terms of objects and properties. Fine (1982: 52) takes basic states of
affairs—propositions in his terminology—to be the results of the
application of the operation of predication to particulars and properties.
We say what the state of affairs a’s being F is by saying that it is the result
of predicating being F to a. Hence, the state of affairs a’s being F depends
on predicating being F to a. Complex states of affairs are the result of the
application of such operations as conjunction and disjunction to basic
states of affairs (on Operationalism as a general approach see Fine 2010:
564ff). The notion of predication gives rise to several questions and we
will come back to it in the next section.
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If states of affairs are ontologically dependent on particulars and
properties, we can satisfy the desiderata (i) to (iii):
(i) An object can ontologically depend on other objects without being a
complex that contains these objects as parts. The axis of the earth
ontologically depends on the Earth, but it does not contain the Earth as a
constituent. The assumption that the state of affairs a’s being F
ontologically depends on a and F can therefore solve the problems that
arise for the assumption that it contains a and F. Take for example Frege’s
intuitive argument against the view that states of affairs contain physical
objects like Vesuvius. The state of affairs Vesuvius’s being a volcano
ontologically depends on Vesuvius, but it does not contain it as a part.
Hence, it does not contain the lava parts that are the parts of Vesuvius.
There is no need to ascribe weight etc. to the state of affairs.
Ontological dependence helps us to get around the temporal problems
raised by the logical complex view of states of affairs. While a complex
cannot exist at a time at which some of its parts don’t exist, an object can
ontologically depend on objects that no longer exist. (I ontologically
depend on a particular event, the fertilization of a particular egg by a
particular sperm, although this event is long past.)
(ii) Fine’s proposal suggests that states of affairs are individuated in terms
of the objects and relations in virtue of which they exist:
(Same2) If S1 and S2 are states of affairs, S1 = S2 if, and only if, S1 and
S2 exist in virtue of the same properties predicated of the same
particulars.
This criterion of identity for states of affairs distinguishes between the
necessarily co-obtaining states of affairs Hesperus’s being self-identical
and Socrates’ being self-identical because they ontologically depend on
different things. Hence, they come out as different. In turn, Hesperus’s
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being a planet and Phosphorus’s being a planet come out, as it is
desirable, as the same state of affairs.
(iii) If the state of affairs Hesperus’s being a planet ontologically depends
on Hesperus, it can only exist if Hesperus exists at some time. In contrast,
a thought can exist whether or not the objects it purports to be about ever
existed or will exist. The thought that Pegasus is a horse exists, whether
there is such a horse or not.
The notion of ontological dependence sheds light on the sense in which
states of affairs “involve” particulars and properties: a state of affairs
involves those objects on which it ontologically depends. Consider as a
representative example Richard’s 2013 view of propositions as states of
affairs. He identifies states of affairs with ways for things to be. A way for
things to be is, in turn, identified by the things and the way these things
need to be for the way for things to be to be how things are. A way for
things to be is a property the world might have. The existence of this
property depends on the existence of the properties and particulars we
need to refer to in identifying it. If there is no Eiffel Tower, for example,
there is no way for the Eiffel Tower to be. Hence, states of affairs
ontologically depend on particulars and properties. Richard (2013: 704)
goes a step further by saying that ontological dependence is “a mark of
mereological relations”. Hence, states of affairs should have constituent
structure. But the additional claim that states of affairs are (in some sense)
wholes with parts does not explain more than the ontological dependence
claim. Rather the opposite: it leads to the problems discussed above.
The notion of ontological dependence helps to articulate how states of
affairs are related to particulars and properties. But the ontological
dependence of states of affairs on properties and particulars is not brute. It
is because some properties are predicated of some objects that (i) they
form a state of affairs (ii) such that this state of affairs depends on them
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and can be said to involve them. A fundamental question about states of
affairs concerns then the conditions of predicability. We will come back to
this question in section 6.3.
6. The Unity of a State of Affairs
6.1 The Unity-Problem
If one conceives of a state of affairs as complexes that “contain”
particulars and properties, one needs to answer the unity-question “What
unifies some particulars and properties into one state of affairs?” An
answer to this question should distinguish states of affairs from other
complexes. Frege pressed this point in his letters to Wittgenstein:
Is every connection of objects a state of affairs? Does it not also
depend on how the connection is produced? What is the tie? Can
this perhaps be gravitation, as with the system of planets? Is it [the
system of planets] a state of affairs? (Frege 1919: 20, my
translation)
The solar system consists of the sun and the planets pulled into orbit
around it by gravity. If this does not qualify as a state of affairs then there
must be some relation independent of gravitation that unites the things
involved in a state of affairs. What distinguishes this complex physical
object from the state of affairs the sun’s pulling the planets into orbit by
gravity? If the latter contains the sun and the planets and the pulling-by
gravity relation, the distinction between the states of affairs and solar
system must lie in what unites their elements.
Russell argued that there is no plausible answer to the unity-question for
states of affairs (he called them “propositions”). He explains his main
worry about states of affairs as follows:
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 States of Affairs
Our disbelief in their [propositions’] reality may be reinforced by
asking ourselves what kind of entity a false proposition could be.
Let us take some very simple false proposition, say “A precedes
B”, when in fact A comes after B. It seems as though nothing were
involved here beyond A and B and “preceding” and the general
form of dual complexes. But since A does not precede B, these
objects are not put together in the way indicated in the proposition.
It seems, therefore, that nothing which is actually composed of
these objects is the proposition; and it is not credible that anything
further enters the proposition. (Russell 1913: 109–10; for a detailed
discussion of this argument see Wetzel 1998)
What unifies A, B and the relation of Preceding to the fact that A precedes
B? A’s actually preceding B. What unifies A, B and the relation of
Preceding to the state of affairs A’s preceding B? If A does not precede B,
the unity of the state of affairs cannot consist in A being actually related by
the preceding relation to B.
So far Russell has only shown that the unity of a state of affairs A’s
standing in R to B does not consist in A’s standing in R to B. In addition,
he has imposed a constraint on answers to the unity-question. He says that
it is not credible that there is a unifying element that is not a constituent of
the state of affairs. Russell himself couldn’t find an answer to the unity-
question that met his constraint. Hence, he tried to eliminate states of
affairs.
6.2 External Unification
While Russell does not refute the view that there are states of affairs, he
asks philosophers who believe in them a difficult question. To see the
force of the constraint he imposes on answers to the unity-question
consider a proposal that violates it. External theories develop the
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following general idea (I take the “external/internal” terminology from
Vallicella 2000):
The state of affairs a’s being F exists if, and only if, there is something
distinct from a, being F and a’s being F & it unifies a and being F to
form a’s being F.
Roughly speaking, the external unifier can bring the constituents of states
of affairs together even if they don’t constitute a fact. A psychological
version of the External Theory is proposed in Valicella 2000. According to
him, the external ground of unity is the judging consciousness that brings
about the unity of a state of affairs (Valicella 2000: 252).
Russell, in turn, argued that a mental act cannot unify some things to form
a state of affairs:
Suppose we wish to understand “A and B are similar”. It is
essential that our thought should, as is said, “unite” or “synthesize”
the two terms and the relation; but we cannot actually “unite”
them, since either A and B are similar, in which case they are
already united, or they are dissimilar, in which case no amount of
thinking can force them to be united. (Russell 1913: 116)
Any mental activity seems simply to be unable to create unity where none
obtains already. If I think of a and being F, why should a new complex
object consisting of them come into existence? Russell himself goes on to
suppose that the mind is able to unite A, B and similarity with a logical
form. How the mind can have that ability goes unexplained.
The linguistic version of the External Theory takes states of affairs to be
descripta of sentences that owe their unity to the sentences that describe
them:
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 States of Affairs
The state of affairs a’s being F exists if, and only if, there is a
sentence of a language L (or an extension of L) that concatenates a
singular term referring to a and a general term referring to F. (see
Taylor 1985: 29ff; King 2009: 263)
The linguistic version gives up on the view that states of affairs are
language independent (see King 2009: 259 who concedes this). There is
nothing in our intuitive notion of states of affairs that justifies the
assumption that states of affairs depend for their unity on the existence of
a language in which they are described. For example, there will be a space
of probable outcomes of an event whether there are descriptions of them
or not.
The criticism of the External Theory makes Russell’s constraint on an
answer to the unity-question plausible. States of affairs are conceived of as
sui generis entities that do not owe their unity and hence their identity to
anything else.
6.3 Internal Unification
This brings us to Internal Theories that explain the unity of a state of
affairs merely by appealing to its constituents.
The state of affairs a’s being F exists if, and only if, a or being F or
both unify the state of affairs.
Ramsey describes (but does not endorse) the core of this view when he
says:
[I]n every atomic fact there must be one constituent which is in its
own nature incomplete or connective and, as it were, holds the
other constituents together. (Ramsey 1925: 408)
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For Wittgenstein in his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus there is no
designated connector in a state of affairs. All constituents are incomplete
and mutually complete each other:
In a state of affairs objects fit into one another like the links in a
chain. (Wittgenstein 1918: 2.03; Pears/McGuinness translation)
So far we have only been given a necessary condition for the existence of
a state of affairs. Among the things that enter into a state of affairs there
must be at least one incomplete one. Wittgenstein will require
incompleteness or connectivity of all things that enter a state of affairs.
The notion of incompleteness at work here is difficult to explain. But one
way to develop it is to propose that the incomplete and connecting
elements are functions. For example, the property being F is conceived of
as a function that takes a particular a as argument and maps it to the state
of affairs a’s being F (see Oliver 1992: 91). The problems of the functional
model of states of affairs are manifest in the development of Frege’s work.
Frege 1879 held that sentences stand for what he called “judgeable
contents”, complexes composed of functions and objects. For Frege
predication is the application of a function to an object. Judgeable contents
seem to be nothing other than states of affairs. However, the idea that
states of affairs are complex does not sit happily with Frege’s further idea
that the judgeable content a’s being F is the value of the function F for a
as argument.
Now different functions have the same value for different arguments. For
example, 3 is the value of the function Square root of x for 9 and the value
of the function x + 1 for 2. Which of these arguments and functions is
contained in the value 3? Since there is no principle that singles out one
argument and function as constituting the value, we should abandon either
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the functional model of incompleteness or the idea that states of affairs
have constituents. Later Frege takes the second option:
The references of the parts of a sentence are not parts of the
reference of the sentence. (Frege 1910–14: 87)
Since different functions can have the same value for different arguments,
Frege arrived at the view that a sentence that is either true or false refers to
its truth-value, the True or the False. Every true (false) sentence has the
same referent: the True (the False). States of affairs have no place in the
Fregean theory of reference. The “case study” of Frege shows that the
functional model of incompleteness undermines the very idea that states of
affairs are complexes (for a reply to this argument see Gaskin 2008: 100).
The strategy to explain the unity of a state of affairs by using the notion of
incompleteness either only labels the problem or, if incomplete elements
are taken to be functions, threatens the very idea of states of affairs. Can
one dispense with the notion of incompleteness in an answer to the unity-
question?
The unity-question arises on a conception that takes states of affairs to be
ontologically dependent entities. Take the state of affairs Aristotle’s being
wise. It ontologically depends on Aristotle and being wise. So do the
ordered pair ⟨ Aristotle, being wise⟩ and the mereological sum of Aristotle
and being wise. What distinguishes them? If we follow Fine, the answer
will invoke an operation that “generates” the entities in question. States of
affairs are generated by predication, ordered pairs by another operation.
Now saying that something is predicated of something else sounds as if
the existence of a state of affairs depends on performing an act. But this is
a misunderstanding. Johnston explains:
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[P]redicability guarantees predication. Whenever F-ness is
predicable of a, there will be something that is the predication of
F-ness to a. (Johnston 2006: 684)
All the interesting work is done by the notion of predicability:
The state of affairs a’s being F exists if, and only if, being F is
predicable of a.
When a property (relation) is predicable of some objects will be
determined by a number of principles (or axioms) (Johnston 2006: 685).
For example, particulars are not predicable of other particulars, n-place
properties are only predicable of n particulars. It is part of the nature of the
objects and properties on which a state of affairs ontologically depends
that the properties are predicable of the objects. This brings us to a key
thought of Wittgenstein’s theory of states of affairs. He wrote in the
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus:
2.0123 If I know an object I also know all its possible
occurrences in states of affairs. (Every one of these
possibilities must be part of the nature of the object.)
2.0214 If all objects are given, then at the same time all possible
states of affairs are also given.
The nature of particulars and properties determines whether the second are
predicable of the first or not. Wetzel (1998: 57) fills this suggestion out in
an informative way. An object may be in a range of possible states due to
its capacities. Given that the computer I am writing on belongs to a
particular kind there is a range of possibilities for it to be: it might be
broken, functioning well, be turned off etc. Its capacities and, broadly
speaking, its nature is the “ontological ground of ranges of possible states
of affairs in which [it is a constituent]” (1998: 57). One should add that the
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 States of Affairs
nature and capacities of an object also determine a range of impossibilities
such as the impossibility of my computer’s becoming a sentient being.
However, consider my computer’s being to the left of my lamp. This is a
possibility for my computer, but it is a brute possibility not grounded in its
causal powers. Hence, the range of states of affairs which contain a
particular seems to be broader than the range of states of affairs
determined by its capacities.
If the property being F is predicable of the object a, the state of affairs a’s
being F exists. Hence, states of affairs exist in virtue of the nature of
objects and properties. No unifying relation or operation in addition to a
and being F is required. What distinguishes states of affairs from other
entities which ontologically depend on the same properties and particulars
is that states of affairs exist because the properties are predicable of the
particulars.
This account assumes that if being F is predicable of a, there is a state of
affairs a’s being F that ontologically depends on them. This move carries
the problem posed by states of affairs to the right place: what are the
restrictions on predicability? If one has answered this question, one has
solved the unity problem for states of affairs.
7. Conclusion
Does one need states of affairs in addition to facts and thoughts? Yes, there
seem to be good reasons to posit states of affairs as a sui generis category
of object. If states of affairs are to be useful (i) they must exist even if they
do not obtain and (ii) must involve objects and properties (relations)
directly. (i) is the basic feature that distinguishes states of affairs from
facts; (ii) the basic feature that distinguishes them from thoughts.
Therefore a theory of states of affairs must answer the question how a state
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of affairs can “involve” objects and properties (relations) and combine
them, if the objects don’t exemplify the properties (stand in the relations).
Although there are promising proposals to answer it, this question is still
open.
Appendix: Some Historical Background
Smith (1992: 1103–4) traces state affairs like entities back to Aristotle and
medieval philosophers. Important contributions to the theory of states of
affairs were made in particular in Austro-German Philosophy. Stumpf
(1907: 29–30) claimed that the notion of states of affairs was introduced in
Franz Brentano’s lectures on logic (1870–1885). Brentano distinguished
between a mental act, its content and its object. When I think of Hesperus,
my thinking, the act, has a particular content in virtue of which it is
directed on the planet, the object. In his logic lectures Brentano extended
this distinction to judgements (Brentano 1870ff:13.020 [6]): when I judge
that Hesperus is a planet, my judging has a content and an object: the
object is what is judged (“das Geurteilte”). Stumpf (1907: 30) called the
content of a judgement “Sachverhalt”. This term is now translated as
“state of affairs”. However, Stumpf’s states of affairs are rather close to
thoughts or propositions (see also Smith 1992, 1105). For example,
Stumpf (1907: 30) likened states of affairs to Bolzano’s sentences-in-
themselves. Sentences-in themselves are supposed to be either true or
false. This suggests that states of affairs were also conceived as truth-value
bearers by Stumpf.
According to Adolf Reinach (1911: 374, Fn.), Edmund Husserl, a student
of Brentano, was the first to clarify the significance and distinctive nature
of states of affairs. Husserl (1901: V §17, § 18) took the object and not the
content of a judgement to be a state of affairs. Every judgement has a
content, in Husserl terminology “matter” (Materie) in virtue of which it is
directed on a state of affairs, its object. Different kinds of mental act can
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be directed on the same state of affairs. For instance, when I wonder
whether Rome was built in a day and when I judge that Rome was built in
a day, I am directed on the same state of affairs, but once in the
questioning, once in the assertoric mode. Can judgements that differ in
their matter be directed on the same state of affairs? An answer to this
question would help us to fix the distinction between matter and content
for judgements. But Husserl’s answer to this question is difficult to
reconstruct. Husserl 1900 connected states of affairs further to correct
judgement, probability and the laws of logic. For instance, a judgement is
supposed to be correct if, and only if, the state of affairs it is directed on
obtains (Husserl 1900: 13).
Reinach 1911 followed Husserl: states of affairs are the “correlates” of
judgement and assertion (See Meinertsen 2020 for a comparison between
Reinach and Armstrongian states of affairs). If, for instance, a particular
rose exists, a range of states of affairs exists that depend on the rose,
whether they obtain or not (see Reinach 1911: 340). If I judge that the rose
is blue, I judge incorrectly, because the judged state of affairs exists, but
does not obtain. The property of states of affairs to obtain or fail to obtain
distinguishes them from facts. As we have seen in section 2, the “space”
of states of affairs helps Reinach to clarify the notions of modality and
probability (see Reinach 1911: 339–40). Reinach (1911: 338f) proposed,
but did not argue in detail, that states of affairs are the relata of the
ground-consequence relation. If an event a causes an event b, the state of
affairs that a occurs is the ground of the state of affairs that b occurs.
States of affairs figure prominently in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus. Potter (2011, 106) speculates about the influence of
Austrian philosophers on Wittgenstein in this respect.
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Related Entries
facts | fictionalism: modal | logical atomism: Russell’s | mereology |
possible worlds | probability, interpretations of | Russell, Bertrand |
truthmakers | Wittgenstein, Ludwig

Acknowledgments

I want to thank Arianna Betti, Will Bynoe, Chris Hughes, Fabrice Correia,
Keith Hossack, Nick Jones and Jessica Leech, Dolf Rami and four
anonymous referees for discussion and comments.

Notes to States of Affairs

1. For an outline of the “prehistory” of states of affairs in the sense
discussed here, see Smith 1989: sect. 2.

2. Forbes goes on to refine and qualify this conclusion. Sentences don’t

stand for states of affairs, but for abstract contents “abstracted” from
obtaining states of affairs, see Forbes 1989: 137ff.

54 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Summer 2021 Edition 55