1 Working for Peace: the

Functional Approach,
Functionalism and
Beyond
David Long and
Lucian M. Ashworth

Functionalism has been a feature of international relations theory for

over fifty years. In that time, it has been modified, augmented, supple-
mented, critiqued and ignored. The approach has inspired both sharp
criticism and emulation. In its initial form it was primarily concerned
with the creation of a more peaceful and stable world order. It has
come over time to be identified with the establishment and study of
international organizations such as the European Union and the
Specialized Agencies of the United Nations. Since the Second World
War, functionalists and neofunctionalists have emphasized the role of
technical and intergovernmental organizations in the creation of a
cooperative international polity. Yet this focus does not exhaust the
scope of issues that can be comprehended by the functional approach.
The work of David Mitrany, commonly cited as the originator of the
functional approach, spans the causes of war, the anatomy of national-
ism and the distinction between peasant and industrial economies.
Similarly, the functional approach to international relations spans
conflict analysis and resolution, world order studies, and liberal and
social democratic approaches to the global political economy.
When trying to understand the functional approach and its
significance in international theory, we must not lose sight of the his-
torical conjuncture that marked its emergence and development. The
functional approach emerged from the writings of a number of
liberals, socialists and other radicals on international affairs. Its
origins cannot be disentangled from the interwar debates on the effect-
iveness of the League of Nations and the role of capitalism in war.
Writers such as David Mitrany, Harold Laski and H. N. Brailsford had

1
2 David Long and Lucian M. Ashworth
criticized the League of Nations for failing to address the cultural and
economic causes of conflict, especially the minorities issue and the
maldistribution of wealth. The latter issue was blamed on the failure
of both capitalism and the market to properly provide for the vast
majority of the world's population. The functional approach emerged
as a possible solution to both of these problems. A function-specific
approach was meant to provide better services in an increasingly
globalized economy, while taking many policy decisions away from
institutions that were controlled by national interests.
Although most often associated with David Mitrany, the functional
approach was influenced by other writers in the turbulent two decades
between the wars. It was the form given it by Mitrany, however, that
provided the base and direction for the future functionalist paradigm
in the discipline of international relations. In this chapter we examine
the development of the functional approach by David Mitrany and
consider the changes wrought in this approach in the construction of
functionalism and neofunctional integration theory in international
relations. We then consider and try to set to rest an important critique
of the functional approach advanced by Inis Claude. We conclude
with a few remarks on the utility of reconstructing the functional
approach once again.
Functionalism and neofunctionalism are said to share a number of
characteristics as theories of integration but also to differ on such
issues as the end state of integration and the process of learning by
which integration is achieved. 1 The common view of Mitrany as
primarily an integration and international organization theorist
stems from a shift in the emphasis of the functional approach after
1945. Mitrany's perspective and what became functionalism was con-
ditioned by the academic context of debates he was engaged in pri-
marily after the Second World War. The search for, and explanation
of, 'really existing' functional organizations became a more important
goal than the articulation of the functional approach's normative base,
namely preventing war and reconciling democracy with planning.
Functionalism was widely touted as one of the few coherent (non-
communist) alternatives to the supremacy of realism in international
relations. As a result, it was adopted and adapted by a (predominantly
American) segment of the academic international relations com-
munity. In this form it was used to explain the emergence of the
European Economic Community, and functionalism came to be asso-
ciated with the study of European integration. The advent of behav-
iouralism in international relations brought a new wave of scholars
 Working for Peace 3
seeking to refine old tenets into scientific theory and test them against
or othetwise apply them to empirical evidence. In the case of func-
tionalism, the 'theory' was applied to attempt to explain or account
for the rapidly growing number and size of international organiz-
ations. In the context of European integration it became the theoret-
ical alternative to the older tradition of federalism.
However, there is another, relatively neglected yet as important,
distinction: between the functional approach created by Mitrany and
the later portrayals of functionalism that were attributed to Mitrany.
Mitrany himself never used the term functionalism to describe his own
ideas. This fact is not without significance. One of the few times that
he referred to functionalism was in response to Ernst Haas. Haas's
version of functionalism, Mitrany argued, was significantly different in
its intent and context from his own work. 2 To a great extent, in fact, it
was Haas rather than Mitrany who defined what is now often referred
to as functionalism. Haas's intent was to present a critique of what he
regarded as Mitrany's 'functionalism', and to follow this up with his
own 'neofunctionalist' alternative. Yet, in trying to sum up Mitrany's
thought as part of his formulation of neofunctionalism, Haas created a
systematized form of functionalism that was distinct from Mitrany's
own functional approach. 3

MITRANY'S FUNCfiONAL APPROACH

In any event, the social scientific concern with explaining the develop-
ment of international integration was not where the functional
approach began, nor where Mitrany himself felt its key insights lay. In
its original formulations in the 1930s and 1940s, Mitrany's idea of the
functional approach was considerably broader than this, encompass-
ing an understanding of world politics and international organizations
as a manifestation of a broader trend towards organization and co-
operation in world politics. Much of the early work that built towards
the functional approach was set in the context of a debate on the
collective security system of the League of Nations. Mitrany then
deployed it, most famously, as an approach to post-Second World
War reconstruction.
InA Working Peace System, Mitrany argued that reconstruction was
the most important task facing international politics after the Second
World War. Reconstruction was necessary to maintain peace, and
subsequently to build prosperity. He dismissed suggestions that a
4 David Long and Lucian M. Ashworth
revived League of Nations would be an adequate response to the
requirements of postwar reconstruction and systematically criticized
suggestions of international federations based on common liberal
democratic ideology or regional contiguity as bases for the postwar
world order. Mitrany proposed instead what he described as 'The
Functional Alternative'. He based his argument for this alternative on
a brief consideration of what he called 'The Trend of Our Time', by
which he meant the transformation of the role of government from
the protector of a constitution that guaranteed individual rights to a
facilitator, organizer and provider of social services. Mitrany accepted
the common social liberal wisdom of his era that the classical form of
state that provided no more than formal means for the guaranteeing
of what today are called negative rights was obsolete. This old form of
state was being superseded by a welfare state where negative rights
were both guaranteed and complemented by the provision of welfare
services to meet needs (or positive rights). He argued that
Society is everywhere in travail because it is everywhere in transi-
tion. Its problem after a century of laissez faire philosophy is to re-
sift in the light of new economic possibilities and of new social
aspirations what is private from what has to be public, and in the
latter sphere what is local and national from what is wider. 4
According to Mitrany the corollary of the transformation of the
nature of governance was the collapse of the distinction between
international and domestic government that went with the constitu-
tional understanding of the role of the state. The transition from
rights to services for Mitrany also entailed the shift 'from power poli-
tics to a functional order'. 5 This is because the division between
domestic and international realms made some sense in a world of
states that were either autocratic and took their citizens' rights for
granted or liberal and protected individual rights and liberties. With
the emergence of the welfare orientation of states towards citizens'
individual and collective needs, the international/domestic distinction
made less sense - what mattered was not the protection of rights
within the framework of a liberal state but the most efficient, effective
and equitable provision of needs.
Mitrany applied these insights to certain problems in international
relations such as the thorny issue of peaceful change and the equality
of states in international relations. He then suggested that 'The Broad
Lines of Functional Organization' - that is, the future shape of co-
operation and organization in international relations - should and in
 Working for Peace 5
fact will follow a variant of the Comtean principle: 'Activities would
be selected specifically and organized separately, each according to its
nature, to the conditions under which it has to operate, and to the
needs of the moment.' 6 This suggested to him that, for instance,
railway systems should be organized continentally, shipping interna-
tionally (meaning involving those states who are interested in ship-
ping) and broadcasting what he calls 'universally'. The key or 'cardinal
virtue of the functional method' was 'technical self-determination'; as
Mitrany argued, 'The function, one might say, determines the execu-
tive instrument suitable for its proper activity, and by the same process
provides a need for the reform of that instrument at every stage.' 7
Thus the geographic reach and the organizational structure, nature
and power derived simply from the issue under consideration, accord-
ing to Mitrany. While there were issues of coordination within and
between separate functions as well as the question of system-level
planning or guidance, Mitrany did not expect these to be insurmount-
able. They were, he thought, themselves technical questions.
Mitrany conceived of military security as a negative 'law and order'
function, and thus as one among many functions. This conceptualiz-
ation was intended to reduce the superordinate status of security in
international relations ordained for it by realism, in which all issues
are ranked and ordered according to their salience for national mili-
tary security. Security as defence was likely to be most effectively
organized regionally, according to Mitrany. But this was only one
aspect of security. In a passage that anticipates a lot of the more
recent discussion of a wider notion of security, Mitrany suggested that
social security, such as health issues and the drug and white slave
traffic, was of rising importance and involves, for example, police
cooperation rather than military competition. 8
Mitrany hoped that overlapping separate functional organizations
would 'combine as well as may be international organization with
national freedom,' in a way that paralleled the preservation of individ-
ual free choice in the face of national planning for the common good
in the domestic context. 9 He suggested that separate functional orga-
nizations would create devolved structures in the face of the centraliz-
ing tendencies of the welfare service provision of modem government.
InA Working Peace System, reconciling democracy with planning was a
central and crucial concern. Mitrany did not believe that traditional
democratic methods would work in the face of 'The Trend of Our
Time'. According to Mitrany, state equality in representation in inter-
national organizations was a by-product of the doctrine of national
6 David Long and Lucian M. Ashworth
sovereignty further exacerbated by the prerequisites of national plan-
ning. Mitrany argued for 'equality in non-representation', because
arguments for formal equality of all states led to either 'equality
without government, or government without equality.' Instead, repre-
sentation should be limited to those who had a specific interest in an
issue. 10
Extrapolating from the examples of nineteenth-century interna-
tional organization for communications and transport as well as from
Depression and Second World War era instances of functional organ-
ization within and between states (especially the United States),
Mitrany suggests reconstruction after the War should be organized
functionally in order to create not 'a protected peace but ... a working
peace', 11 concentrating on fulfilling needs as efficiently and effectively
as possible. National agencies would not wither away, he claimed, but
would expand with functional cooperation, while 'action through func-
tional agencies would minimize the intrusion of power politics in the
guise of foreign help, or the wasteful use of international help by
national agencies.m The narrow concern with postwar reconstruction
gives way at the end of A Working Peace System to a consideration of
'the real tasks of our common society - the conquest of poverty and of
disease and of ignorance.' 13 Given the all-pervasiveness of social inter-
dependence, the functional approach, Mitrany argued, offered the
best prospect for peace and for prosperity in the modern era.
In sum, the functional approach emphasized that cooperation
across national boundaries occurred because the maximization of
social welfare, though a goal of states, was not attainable within the
boundaries of each national state separately. In Mitrany's interna-
tional theory, in sharp distinction to realist interpretations, the foreign
behaviour of states in the era of the welfare state is influenced by the
same broad goals of social welfare that determine domestic politics.
While realist authors stress the fundamental differences between
foreign and domestic policy, Mitrany suggested that the development
of the welfare state, while making international cooperation neces-
sary, also helped to collapse the distinction between internal and
international state behaviour. 14
Mitrany believed that it was on specific technical issues that cooper-
ation would advance first and fastest. Cooperation would be embodied
and facilitated through international organizations concerning them-
selves with the specific function that was within their mandate.
Mitrany pointed out that modern government gave a strong indication
of the direction of functional development of government towards
 Working for Peace 7
specialized technical agencies, the Tennessee Valley Authority being a
clear example of this. In the international realm, Mitrany initially
cited the development of international organization in the nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries, highlighting the importance of such
functionally oriented bodies as the Universal Postal Union, the
International Telegraphic Union and the International Maritime
Organization, as well as the creation and operation of the
International Labour Organization. He claimed that the trend of
international relations was toward greater international organization
along these lines. While there might be arguments about Mitrany's
explanation of the 'trend of the times' in politics and international
relations, the identification of the proliferation of international
organizations and their increasingly technical and specialist character
has certainly proven true. Nevertheless, Mitrany might be dis-
appointed at the extent to which international organizations are still
dominated by states in terms of their representation and the concerns
they address.

FROM THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH TO FUNCfiONAUSM

While he developed his ideas after the publication of A Working

Peace System, the theoretical structure and assumptions stayed very
much the same in later work. Similarly, Mitrany maintained the termi-
nology 'functional approach' or 'functional theory' to describe his
approach. The term functionalism that is so prevalent today was
apparently introduced in a systematic way by Ernst Haas. Mitrany's
desire to avoid functionalism is largely related to his dislike of
inflexible thinking and especially his feeling that 'isms' implied ideo-
logical dogma. It is implicit throughout Mitrany's work that when a
set of ideas form an 'ism', or dogma, they lose the ability to change.
Intellectual flexibility was important to Mitrany, and consequently his
views on international relations constituted an 'approach' or 'tempera-
ment' (as described by Inis Claude), and were subsequently upgraded
by Mitrany to a theory in The Functional Theory of Politics, but were
never an 'ism'. Haas's project was quite different, that is, to derive a
systematic theory of international integration and to modify the func-
tional approach to this end. Yet the systematic approach created by
Haas differs fundamentally from the original formulation of the func-
tional approach. Indeed, in a private response to Haas, Mitrany
denied that Haas's conceptions of his work were correct. 15
8 David Long and Lucian M. Ashworth
There are more differences between Mitrany's functional approach
and Haas's functionalism than simply terminology. The fundamental
differences include their approach to the notion of function, to func-
tional theory and to theory in the social sciences. However, a number
of differences in emphasis between Haas and Mitrany on what has
since become functionalism also stand out and serve to highlight the
distinction between the different approaches. According to Haas, in
functionalism, the technical is divided from the political; there are
technical issues and matters of politics, and these can be readily distin-
guished. Haas then goes on to criticize this view as unrealistic. While
Mitrany does distinguish between technical and political problems,
there is no indication that this distinction is either basic to the
functional approach or true in all cases.
Mitrany's distinction is not between the technical and the political,
but rather between federal-style government structures that involve
political bargaining between geographically specific units and those
that do not. 16 In this context, it is not so much the case that Mitrany
wishes to remove the political from the technical, but rather that he is
hunting for a way, as he stated in 1933, of removing cultural concerns
from political allegiance. 17 In other words, Mitrany is seeking to mini-
mize the role of culture, especially nationalism, in political decision-
making, and to raise the profile of technical concerns within the
process of government. It is probably truer to say that Mitrany was
attempting to fuse rather than split the political and the technical. If
this led to situations in which the technical was sometimes over-
stressed in this new relationship this does not necessarily mean that
Mitrany, in all cases, was putting technical considerations ahead of the
political process. Indeed, he was quick to criticize certain technical
concerns, such as efficiency, if he felt that they interfered with the
political goal of the satisfaction of human needs. 18
Haas understands functional organizations as basically 'voluntary'
bodies akin to interest groups and, once again, he goes on to criticize
this tendency and make a claim to a more comprehensive approach
for his neofunctionalism. Yet, the functional approach does not
suppose any particular type of organization, and most of Mitrany's
examples of really existing functionalism involved non-voluntary state
or quasi-state organizations, that is what was subsequently described
by Keohane and Nye as transgovernmental relations. 19
For Haas, the dynamics of functionalism resemble a free market of
competing interest groups projected onto the international stage. 20
Such an interpretation makes functionalism the international political
 Working for Peace 9
analogue of laissez faire liberalism. This flies in the face of Mitrany's
own position as a liberal critic of the failures of free market liberalism.
The functional organization of the world was, in Mitrany's view, to be
a vehicle for international planning, albeit planning in function-
specific organizations. Yet, neither was the common good envisaged
by Mitrany the generalized abstract altruism portrayed by Haas.
Rather, according to his syndicalist-informed argument, functional
associations pursue their collective good as represented in that associ-
ation. While society-wide common good is integral to the functional
approach, it is reached through the organization of associations to
attain narrower collective goods, that is, the performance of functions
and the service provision of individual and collective welfare.
Haas suggests that functionalism ultimately leads to the state being
superseded by regional and global international organization. But
Mitrany's functional vision does not entail the replacement of the
state by any general-purpose regional or global international organiz-
ation. Indeed, for Mitrany, technical cooperation through functional
international agencies would precisely avoid the need to create
formal, constitutionally based political organs at the international
levet2 1 Rather, Mitrany's vision of a functionally organized world was
one with many overlapping, non-congruent international functional
organizations, including for some purposes territorial states. 22
Finally, Haas regards functionalism as advocating government by
experts. 23 Certainly, Mitrany oftentimes gave the same impression,
particularly in his later writings when he praised international func-
tional organizations, such as UN agencies, that were technocratic
rather than democratic. Yet, Mitrany retained a deep concern for rep-
resentation and democracy. Experts do not appear in A Working
Peace System, though the idea of effective management as opposed to
formal democratic notions of equal representation does. In fact, the
two goals of functional organization for Mitrany were rescuing
democratic government and facilitating international cooperation. 24 By
contrast, Haas appears to believe that there are only two ways of under-
standing the functionalist view of interest representation; it is either
mechanical or utopian, that is to say, it is either simply directly dele-
gated by the narrow collective interests of the members or it is the deci-
sion of a select group of experts who somehow represent the interests
of the greater whole. 25 This is an exceedingly cynical reading of the
possibilities of associations and one certainly not shared by Mitrany.
Several broader theoretical implications follow from the differ-
ences between Mitrany and Haas on the functional approach and
10 David Long and Lucian M. Ashworth
functionalism. First, the functional approach is a response, in
Mitrany's view, to a shift from a largely constitutional and laissez faire
system of government and economic relations to the planned welfare
state. Second, it is a means by which the 'inevitability' of the growth of
needs-aware public authorities can be reconciled with democratic
government and international cooperation. This is crucial, according
to Mitrany, if we are to prevent war between states or tyranny within
them. As political and economic organization grows in scale and as
the prospective battle over scarce natural resources attendant on that
growth increases, there is a parallel need for organized cooperation to
avoid potential conflicts. And third, the functional approach is a way
of looking at the world in general, but was never meant to be a blue-
print for an international order. Indeed, for Mitrany, the scientific
approach was concerned with constant change, and therefore rigid
formulas based on supposed eternal laws were, at best, pre-scientific.26
The functional approach eschews blueprints and worldviews in favour
of a view of science as concerned with change. It envisages coopera-
tion in order to forward the common good, not in an abstract, general
sense but in particular, concrete instances. For this reason, there is no
need, as there is in Haas's neofunctionalism, for a concept of spillover
from one realm to another; the functional approach expects coopera-
tion to emerge naturally in functionally specific issue areas. 27
Making the distinction between the functional approach and
functionalism is not to argue that functionalism and neofunctionalism
do not themselves represent legitimate bodies of knowledge, nor to
deny that Mitrany's work was an important influence on these bodies
of knowledge. Nevertheless, that Mitrany may not, in the strict
definition of the term, be a functionalist is significant. It is clear, for
instance, that Mitrany's concerns lie elsewhere than in positive
theoretical explanation and prediction of regional integration. The
functional approach, as the sum of Mitrany's philosophy of global gov-
ernance, can be distinguished from its functionalist offspring in its
concern with the process of international organization (rather than
the activities or growth of international organizations), in its more
general approach to tendencies in international relations and in its
normative and interpretive emphasis.
The functional approach is a broader theoretical orientation
towards modem global politics. As such the literature on international
organization and integration represents a part, but only a part, of its
theoretical agenda. Other parts of the agenda include the introduc-
tion of non-traditional issues into international politics. This is now,
 Working for Peace 11
perhaps, old hat, but functionalism was an approach that considered
the importance of issue areas often considered either marginal or
domestic or both, such as scientific and technical standards, coopera-
tion over navigation in international waters and airspace, and so on.
Just as important, the functional approach does not simply focus on
states but considers what are now called non-governmental organ-
izations, social movements and other components of a nascent
global civil society. The functional approach began as an innovative
approach to peace, yet the potential contribution to the subsequent
literature on conflict resolution has been limited by the narrowly econ-
omistic and instrumental reading of functionalism in the international
relations literature. We consider some of the issues in the functional
approach to conflict resolution below. In combination with the orien-
tation towards organization and integration, the functional approach
propounded by Mitrany thus constitutes an agenda for a peaceful,
prosperous and just world order.

CRITICISMS

Having said that, an analysis of the functional approach cannot ignore

its serious lacunae and deficiencies. A number of problems and limita-
tions with the functional approach have been identified in the interna-
tional relations literature. The most important and comprehensive
critique of the functional approach was also one of the earliest. Inis
Claude's chapter in Swords into Ploughshares on 'The Functional
Approach to Peace' contains many of the arguments subsequently
used against functionalism. 28 After a careful discussion of the nature
and merits of functional theory and practice, he concludes that, 'the
accumulated evidence tends to discredit, rather than to confirm, the
basic proposition that preliminary concentration on international
cooperation in the areas designated by functionalism promises to
heal the political cleavages that plague the international system.'29
However, Claude's assessment and that of many subsequent critics of
functionalism is a result of having set up a 'straw man'. Claude, like
Haas, misconstrues Mitrany and then criticizes the misconstruction.
The functional approach, Claude correctly suggests, is 'not so much
a theory as a temperament, a kind of mentality, a style of approach to
international affairs.' Claude notes that in general the functional
approach has a negative attitude to the state, nationalism, power and
politics, but he focuses his critique on what he calls the logical steps of
12 David Long and Lucian M. Ashworth
the functional approach, namely the 'separability-priority thesis' and
the 'doctrine of transferability'. 30 We will deal with these as three
propositions:
1. social, economic and political life can be compartmentalized -
that is, issues are separable;
2. economic need takes priority over political or social or other
concerns; and
3. cooperation on economic issues can be transferred into politics
and society more generally.

Separability

According to Claude, the functional approach suggests that technical,

political, economic issues and so on can be separated from one
another and dealt with more practically and effectively when sep-
arated. Separating out different aspects of a problem is an important
part of the scientific method, of course. However, Claude argues that
the separability hypothesis at the heart of functionalism is wrong.
Rather, he suggests, we need to understand the interconnection and
relatedness of the various aspects of real world issues. In addressing
Claude's argument, we will address two things. First, does the func-
tional approach rest on a separability assumption? Second, are real
world issues separable into component parts?
Claude advances the critique of separability because he mis-
construes the functional approach to politics and the reintegration of
politics and economics that is part of that approach. Like most of
Mitrany's critics, Claude adopts a traditional power-political definition
of politics at variance with Mitrany's service-oriented view. He has,
that is, ignored the evolutionary tone of the functional approach with
regard to the changing nature of politics and governance more gener-
ally. With his service/needs-based understanding of the function of
political institutions, Mitrany could argue that the separation of
political and technical was absurd and that this was never part of his
approach. The emphasis on the technical was, for Mitrany, a new and
rational form and way of conducting politics that is his recognition
that politics would increasingly be, like other social institutions,
ordered by bureaucratic, administrative rules of public service. Of
course, this view can appropriately be accused of being more than a
little naive about the vagaries of power. However, it is arguable
whether this naive view is any more wrong than the narrow traditional
 Working for Peace 13
power-political vie~ that rests on the importance of observable coer-
cion or coercive capacity as the basis of political influence and the
ultima ratio of political life.
In his critique Oaude has inverted but accepts the classical liberal
discourse on the separability of politics and economics that Mitrany
rejected. Mitrany was drawing from a critique within liberalism
regarding the division of civil and political rights from social and
economic needs. The division of politics from economics/society/tech-
nology is made by classical liberals in their formulations of civil and
political rights. Claude accepts this division in what amounts to his
own version of the separability thesis: that is, that a particular version
of politics, so-called high politics associated with diplomacy and strat-
egy, is the paradigm of politics and is separable and distinct from
other realms of social life. This is a staple of realist scholarship; an
exemplar of the ostensible autonomy of politics in realism is Hans
Morgenthau's Politics Among Nations. 31 Thus, it is not the functional
approach that creates the separation of political and technical, but
Claude and other realists' understanding of the political and the tech-
nical, where the liberal idea has been inverted rather than refuted.
One might add, as a footnote to this, that Mitrany's functional
approach is a forerunner of political economy in international rela-
tions in its attempt to reintegrate politics and economics in interna-
tional relations and also to reconsider the strict division of domestic
and international arenas. The functional approach considers econ-
omic aspects of international politics and, rather more obliquely
perhaps, the international political (or at least institutional) aspects
of economic change.
As to the plausibility of the separability in real world issues, the
second of our questions above, Claude is quite correct that people's
lives are not separable into component parts. But separability applies
to issues and issue areas, not people or social life as a whole. Indeed,
the contrary argument that everything is connected (to everything
else) is not at all obvious either. Nor is it clear that political and econ-
omic issues must always be connected in some consistent fashion. The
more important point, however, is that the analytical distinction
between politics, economics and so on is possible. Indeed it is made all
the time and is the basis of different epistemologies in the respective
academic disciplines. Claude's point is that, in practice, the issues
cannot be separated. Yet, the functional approach does not suggest
such separability, but rather an integration of the political and the
technical.
14 David Long and Lucian M. Ashworth
Priority

Claude's critique of the priority assumption is that the functional

approach suggests that economic issues have priority over political
ones. He suggests in reply not only that technical and economic
matters cannot be separated from political and strategic concerns but
also that military-strategic concerns have priority over technical issues.
As with the separability proposition, this is an inversion of the priority
argument that is part of liberalism (and is assumed to be part of
functionalism, therefore) rather than a denial of it. Claude is suggest-
ing that a different set of issues have priority rather than rejecting the
idea of a hierarchy of issues altogether. More specifically, Claude's
position is a variant of a common realist argument that power politics
is the only or at least the primary constraint and guide for state policy.
A good example of this in more recent international relations is
Robert Gilpin's reply to the critical commentary by Richard Ashley,
where Gilpin reasserts the apparently timeless verities of realist inter-
national theory. 32 Yet, liberal critiques from the 1970s, for instance by
Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, contain criticisms of realism and
especially the central guiding notion of the national interest that are
directly applicable to Claude's realist assertion of priority of interna-
tional politics (security) over economics. Claude's critique assumes
that all issues will be dealt with and decided according to the requi-
sites and capabilities of coercive power. Patterns of international
cooperation and discord will, according to this argument, reflect the
patterns of military power and alliance. Keohane and Nye suggest that
the priority of military over other issues, the centrality of the use or
threat of military force in determining international outcomes, the
primacy of traditional diplomatic and foreign policy channels, all
decline in an international system marked by complex interdepend-
ence. Arguing in a period of detente between the superpowers,
Keohane and Nye's criticism of realism is applicable to Claude's
essentially Cold War vision. 33 Indeed, Claude's critique is arguably of
limited use outside the narrow confines of its Cold War context,
although it could also be argued that highly politicized disputes or
areas of conflict (such as the Middle East, for example) maintain the
priority and predominance of security or high politics.
In any event, Claude's assertion of the priority of power politics says
nothing of whether the functional approach asserts the priority of
economics over security and political issues. Certainly, Mitrany
advanced the primacy of human welfare needs, but the point was not
 Working for Peace 15
to identify particular areas of social life or issues which held primacy
but to hold this as an overriding concern in all issues. Drawing on
early twentieth-century pluralist theories of the state, Mitrany envis-
ages society as a range of activities (or functions) pursued by a variety
of associations. In this plurality of activity and organization, there is
no intrinsic priority of one activity over another in so far as each and
all increase or contribute to human good/welfare. Mitrany's contribu-
tion was to apply the pluralistic approach to government and the state
beyond the bounds of the state to international relations. Mitrany
believed that the functional approach entailed cooperation within
each functional area. There is no prioritization of economics here
except in so far as it is related to need-fulfilment. An accusation of
economic determination in the functional approach thus reduces to
the assertion that the fulfilment of human needs is wholly an econ-
omic issue. Mitrany did not believe this.
In the final analysis, the difference between the functional approach
and Claude's critique on this issue is an empirical question rather than
a theoretical one, if one accepts the notion of separability. In principle
the differences can be decided by empirical testing to ascertain to
what extent military-strategic-political issues have priority over techni-
cal issues or vice versa. Claude and many others have attempted to
show that this is the normal run of international politics. He suggests,
for instance, that '[t]he ideal of developing joint Arab-Israeli exploita-
tion of the economic potential of the Jordan River as a step toward
resolving the endemic political conflicts of the Middle East seems to
reverse the realistic possibilities; political settlement in that region
appears to be a prerequisite for, not a probable consequence of, econ-
omic cooperation.'34 One might argue that the Middle East is hardly
the norm for international relationships. Even here, while the nub of
negotiations goes on bilaterally between the parties with the assistance
of the United States in some instances, there are multilateral negotia-
tions and these are organized functionally: water, refugees and so
on.35
aaude's insights regarding the importance of power politics receive
more support in instances of politicization of what are on the face of it
well-established peaceful relations. In the recent fisheries dispute
between Canada and the EU, political conflict in what has tradition-
ally been a friendly relationship tended to undo technical cooperation
rather rapidly, rather than being prevented by it. Indeed, {the denial
of) technical and cultural cooperation became weapons in the fight.
Similarly, the so-called salmon war between Canada and the US on
16 David Long and Lucian M. Ashworth
the Pacific coast has threatened, through the use of occasionally fiery
rhetoric, to escalate beyond the technical issue of a salmon treaty in
order to preserve stocks and the respective fishing industries in each
country.
Yet, more generally within the developed world, as we see in the
more recent work conducted by Keohane and his colleagues as well as
in a number of contributions to this volume, issue-specific coopera-
tion is prevalent. This contrasts markedly with the vision of interna-
tional cooperation being determined by one overriding issue relating
to national security. Indeed, in general terms, it might be argued that
this issue specific cooperation has rather more relevance now than it
once did. Issue segmentation has simultaneously followed and pro-
voked the proliferation of NGOs and social movements as well as the
IGOs, global conferences and summitry, and the increasing transgov-
ernmental contacts between previously domestically oriented depart-
ments such as agriculture that set out to control and manage complex
international issues. There is thus an increased tendency for state-to-
state relationships to be segmented by issue area. These issue areas
are more often than not what Mitrany and the functionalists would
have described as a function or functional area. Furthermore, what-
ever the tensions between the US and Canada, or between West
European countries, for instance, and there are many, the overall rela-
tionship remains amicable and there is no interest in upsetting that
relationship for the sake of one narrow issue area.

Transferability

This brings us to Claude's third charge regarding the transferability of

lessons from one functional area to another, particularly from tech-
nical issues to political ones. Once again this criticism results from a
misunderstanding of the functional approach. Transferability is a
problem in neofunctionalism where the development of integration
and cooperation rests on the concept of 'spill-over' from one issue
area to another. By contrast, there is simply no problem of transfer-
ability in Mitrany's functional approach because each function was
expected to develop its own organization at the level and to the extent
that the service of need required. The problem of transferability arises
in the context of a view of issues as hierarchically organized or other-
wise intrinsically linked. Mitrany made no assumptions about the links
between issues and indeed he suggested that we should expect to see
the relationship between social issues constantly shift because change
 Working for Peace 17
is in the nature of social life. The general orientation of the functional
approach is, of course, towards learning how to best fulfil welfare
needs rather than focusing on a specific type of issue and divining the
way in which the lessons from this issue could be transferred to other
arenas of social existence.
The problem for the functional approach is not transferability but
coordination - as Claude noted in his criticisms of functionalist prac-
tice later in Swords Into Ploughshares. 36 With the variety and number
of different functional organizations, both nationally and internation-
ally, the difficulty that Mitrany foresaw and Claude identified was that
it would be difficult to devise overall global (or even national) strategy
on any issue area. This is a significant problem but it is one that comes
almost by definition with the functional approach since inherent in it
is a distaste for central and particularly global level planning.

ASSESSMENT

A good deal of Inis Claude's critique of the functional approach fails

because it misapprehends the latter's purport and focus. Thus the
critique of the functional approach is only partly successful. However,
another large part of the plausibility of the critique rests on an asser-
tion that the conditions for the success of the functional approach do
not exist. Claude suggests that the international politics of conflict and
power dominates any cooperation on economic or technical matters.
As a generalization regarding the international system as a whole, this
must be considered a Cold War artefact. The critique of functionalism
suggests ideologically inspired or overlaid conflicts of the Cold War
were less susceptible to functional conflict management techniques.
We have suggested contra Claude that the functional approach need
not be stymied by ideologically inspired power politics because
Claude's critique is based on a number of misreadings of Mitrany and
also because of the decreased salience of narrowly ideological factors
in international politics after the Cold War.
As we see in the chapters by Sewell and by Murphy, the functional
approach can be a useful way of understanding and dealing with
certain types of conflicts. We can see also such an argument advanced
in theoretical terms by Cooper and by Ashworth, and in more specific,
practical terms by Long and by Wolfe. Issues can be separated from
one another and dealing with the need to cooperate on some matters
of shared concern can be a basis for building more broadly based and
18 David Long and Lucian M. Ashworth
secure cooperative relationships. Disputes are neither wholly shaped
by the dictates of realpolitik nor resolved simply according to the cal-
culus of power politics. After the Cold War, it might be suggested that
the ideological division that coloured so much international conflict is
no longer an obstruction to functional cooperation.
If the ideological divisions of the Cold War are perhaps of less
salience, there are other serious challenges for the functional
approach in the apparent rise in ethnically based intra-state conflict
and in the rapid and accelerating changes in the global economy. It
might be argued that ethnic and other identity-based conflicts create
even more of a problem for the functional approach than did the con-
straints of the Cold War. After all, as Ashworth points out, national-
ism is dealt with rather condescendingly as an atavism and obstacle to
rational development. Furthermore, the functional approach appears
to concentrate on the rational aspects of conflict settlement, as in, for
instance, the focus on providing for the material needs of the belliger-
ents. It also seems to be an approach that emphasizes the inter-
national and global elements of modernity. By contrast, ethnic and
religiously based conflict is often portrayed as local (if not parochial)
and tradition-based. In addition, the intensity and intimacy of violence
instigated by irregular forces in much of ethnic conflict (in contrast to
the putatively rational calculations of national armed forces!) seems to
mitigate against rationalist solutions as provided by the functional
approach's emphasis on building on what the opponents share in
common.
As Craig Murphy suggests in his chapter, however, the idea that the
functional approach lacks relevance for ethnic conflict is a superficial
argument. Indeed, conflict resolution addressing identity conflicts
appears to fit neatly with the functional approach, because it concen-
trates on the many sided nature of identity in its model for building
national and international cooperation. Murphy suggests that conflict
resolution workshops follow logically from the organizational theory
from which Mitrany drew some of his inspiration. Nevertheless,
Murphy's reasons for optimism about the functional approach must
be tempered, first of all of course, by the limits in practicability of both
functionalism and conflict resolution workshops. In addition, it might
be argued that the functional approach is fundamentally ambiguous
on conflict resolution. The functional approach to conflict resolution
separates various issues into their respective areas and works on co-
operation in those various areas. It deliberately does not specifically
concentrate on the issues that have caused the conflict. Instead it
 Working for Peace 19
focuses on issues of cooperation and technical areas rather than
embarking on attempts to bring opposing sides together by discussing
the matters on which they differ. By contrast, the human needs
approach propounded by, among others, John Burton, stresses the
recognition of the needs of security and identity by all parties to the
conflict and thus directly addresses issues in conflict.37
The contribution of the functional approach to international rela-
tions is not limited to conflict and security studies, however. As we
hinted above, the functional approach can be read as an early liberal
attempt at political economy of international relations. More gener-
ally, the functional approach was one of the earliest of the modern
theories of international relations to devote extensive attention to
factors that were not simply high politics. By extending the notion of
politics beyond the diplomatic and other official relations of states,
the functional approach was an opening to political economy in inter-
national relations. In this context, the functional approach directs our
attention to the non-state actors that are important in the global polit-
ical economy: the intergovernmental organizations and arrangements,
the international tribunals and regimes, and particularly the multi-
national corporations.
Mitrany's long association with Unilever was not simply oppor-
tunism on his part but reflected a deep and consistent intellectual
concern with the development of private as well as public aspects of
international organization.38 As with conflict and security, the func-
tional approach to the role and importance of multinational enter-
prises in the new global economy is a critical one. An application of
the functional approach must assess the overall impact of the various
MNEs on the global economy in terms of the touchstone, service for
human welfare needs. Furthermore, the functional approach would
pay attention to the structure of accountability and organization in the
corporations. The origins of the functional approach suggest that it
would be an avenue to understanding the potential for democratiz-
ation of multinational corporations and the global impact of MNE
activities in human welfare terms.
We have argued that, while the functional approach has its roots in
the debates of the interwar period, this does not mean that it should
be treated as merely a historical curio. While understanding the intel-
lectual background to a set of ideas helps us understand its form, this
does not mean that its form is invalidated just because it is historically
grounded. Recent trends in IR theory, and across a number of para-
digms, have stressed the importance of change in understanding the
20 David Long and Lucian M. Ashworth
current state of the global political economy. Articles on the processes
of globalization, micro-nationalism, the end of history or the coming
anarchy have all stressed movement - even if that movement is not
necessarily progress. The functional approach, if it is anything, is a
theory of managing change, especially managing the agents of instabil-
ity that are the collateral by-products of change. The value of the
functional approach today is that it assumed the process of globaliz-
ation, it hoped to deal with new nationalisms, it pre-empted the end of
history debate ofthe early 1990s (as John Eastby shows) and it feared
a coming anarchy. These familiar themes demonstrate that we have
yet to escape the global problems that the functional approach was
established to cope with.
Yet, the lacunae and deficiencies of the functional approach must
not be forgotten. It is, after all, a liberal approach, with all the glaring
errors that are common to liberalism. The functional approach is still
tied to a utilitarian conception of rationality that assumes that cultural
norms are a mere superstructure to a common rational thinking, as is
argued in the chapters by Cooper, Eastby, Ashworth and Murphy. It
also assumes history is progressive, and that all peoples should follow
the same rational path of progress. While this is central to the form of
the functional approach found in the works of Mitrany, it does not
follow that a naive rationalism invalidates the rest of the approach,
nor does it mean that the goals of the functional approach are neces-
sarily invalidated. To a certain extent the rationalism implicit in the
functional approach represents an attempt to make the logic of the
approach a causal and scientific one.
The goals of the functional approach, especially the issues of peace-
ful coexistence, the fulfilment of need and the restructuring of global
governance, do not become any less valid because the rationalist argu-
ments that support them are out of vogue, however. These goals have
a normative value for late twentieth-century humanity, and thus we
do not need to make a rational causal argument to support them. A
functional approach that values need fulfilment, peaceful coexistence
and the substantial reordering of the state need not be incompatible
with recent radical versions of IR that are looking to new social move-
ments and a less state-centred approach to global politics.
The problems for a reconstruction of the functional approach,
beyond the particular theoretical limitation mentioned above, are at
least twofold beyond the particular theoretical limitation mentioned
above. First, in so far as functionalism has influenced the practice of
international relations or in other ways anticipated trends in interna-
 Working for Peace 21
tiona! relations, it seems outdated because what it predicted forty or
fifty years ago has since come to pass. It is, in short, old news. As
Claude points out, the functional approach was at least implicitly
influential in understanding the development and growth in number
and influence of the technical agencies of the United Nations and
other functional arrangements.
However, there are problems beyond the simple one of becoming
outdated because its central thesis about the development of func-
tional organizations has been addressed. First of all, there was of
course the reaction to the apparent growth in functional agencies, of
which Claude's and Haas's work are among the most famous. In
addition, however, there have been developments in the institutions
and even more so in the ideas and ideologies of the world political
economy that run counter to functionalism. This means that the trend
of Mitrany's time may not be the trend of our time. Instead of the
growth of international institutions along the lines of the Specialized
Agencies and so on, we are now seeing significant retrenchment of
these organizations and critiques of the operations of intergovern-
mental organizations and especially the UN. Instead we see the prolif-
eration of global and regional arrangements that are not manifested in
organizational form but are institutionalized in different ways as, for
instance, in the case of the North American Free Trade Agreement.
Furthermore, the trend of government in the Western world is not
what it was in Mitrany's time. In reaction to the perceived overgrowth
of the welfare state there has been some rollback of government
activities. There has in fact been much more rollback in the perceived
(or desired) role of government than in actuality. Indeed, neoliberal
ideology has been in reaction and direct contradiction to the activist
welfarism that underpins the functional approach. For all of these
reasons, the reaction to the functional approach might be 'that was
then, this is now'.
Finally, there have been many changes in international politics and
the global economy that simply do not feature nor were anticipated in
any way by the functional approach. While technological change is a
motif, its manifestations and the changes wrought in terms of global-
ized production and telecommunications, among many other things,
find no place in Mitrany's formulation. Environmentalism has gone
far beyond the resource focus that it is given in any approach asso-
ciated with functionalism, as Robert Boardman points out. And, as
Craig Murphy astutely observes, women's place is left untouched by
the functional approach, though there are troubling indications that
22 David Long and Lucian M. Ashworth
the public realm of functional associations was primarily a world of
men.
These critical observations are not so much devastating reasons for
abandoning the functional approach altogether as they are a recogni-
tion that theoretical and practical work waits to be done. Some of this
work is conducted in subsequent chapters. But here we would like to
briefly touch on some of the possibilities for theoretical development
of the functional approach that would make it a contemporary
approach to global governance. The lacunae and limitations of func-
tionalism as it has come to be understood in international relations
and even the functional approach as we have presented it here mean
that its contribution will remain limited. How can the functional
approach be reconstructed? It is sensible to begin, we believe, with
the reconstruction by Ernst Haas. We criticized Haas earlier for his
misreading of Mitrany. Nevertheless, he was fundamentally correct in
his identification of problem areas in Mitrany's functional approach.
Where we part company with Haas is over his suggested remedies.
Haas suggests that the functionalist theory of interest needs to be
revised and he introduces a theory of competing interests that is
familiar to those in American political science. Haas is right that
Mitrany is overly optimistic as to the way in which functional groups
are created and the way they operate. However, the interest group
politics that he introduces has its own limitations. More recent devel-
opments in international relations theory and in policy analysis
suggest a different remedy for Mitrany's utopian and/or deterministic
concept of technological self-determination. What needs to be done is
to find alternative ways of conceptualizing 'function', in terms of the
collective identification of needs, and also a new way of understanding
the development of functional organizations. Constructivist theory in
international relations suggests that collectivities are generated from
mutual understandings and shared norms. 39 This opens the way not
only for a different answer to how functional organizations are consti-
tuted but also indicates that a variety of different groups and associa-
tions in civil society can be considered functional organizations. 40
Feminist and other critical theories help us to understand the various
types of groups that may form and to appreciate that the original
focus on a narrow concept of public organization needs to be
jettisoned in order to reformulate the functional approach. 41
Contemporary policy analysis on the other hand indicates that par-
ticular groups are more effective at aggregating group interests and
moving them forward.
 Working for Peace 23
Haas also suggests that the utopian aspect of functionalism, where
experts unproblematically understand and represent the common
goals of the group, should be removed and replaced with a concept of
bureaucratic or technocratic leadership. This is an important insight
but has its own limitations, among which are the opposition of this
type of leadership to political leadership and an emphasis on co-
optation and logrolling. An alternative to the positivist agenda sug-
gested by Haas is to look at theories of democracy as a way of
rereading the problem of representation in functional organization
and also as a way of understanding the functional approach as a poss-
ible democratic answer to contemporary global political and economic
developments. Combining the functional form of organizations with
theories of participatory and deliberative democracy points to an
interesting avenue for research. This would be a complement, and
possibly an alternative, to cosmopolitan democracy, the approach
taken by David Held and his followers. Once again, feminist and other
critical theories will be useful in comprehending the alternative
approaches to democracy that will be the basis of legitimacy in
functional associations. 42
Finally, Haas suggests that the functional approach lacks a way of
formalizing the rules of a functionally organized world and that there-
fore there is a need for a functional theory of law. This is once again
an intriguing and important contribution, and Haas is certainly correct
that international law has changed with the emergence of so many
international functional organizations. However, Haas's answer to this
lacuna in the functional approach is itself too restrictive. What is
missing from the functional approach, surely, is some explicit discus-
sion of the normative basis of global governance in an emergent func-
tionally organized world. Mitrany tended to collapse together his
analysis of and his prescription for functional organizations. This is
problematic enough for rigorous analysis, but it also means that
Mitrany's examination of the norms emerging with functional organ-
izations was little more developed than the suggestion that there is
immanent cooperation within and between organizations.

CONCLUSION

It is an irony that though Mitrany was essentially interested in ways of

preventing war and reconstructing international politics through
organization that the functional approach he developed has received
24 David Long and Lucian M. Ashworth
precious little attention from students of international conflict or of
global governance. Functionalism has become associated with the
explanation and justification of an elite-led process of international
integration between states that have already established peaceful rela-
tions, and particularly European economic integration. 43 Furthermore,
the concern of the functional approach with the reconciliation of
technological change with political authority, and specifically of
democracy and planning, has entirely disappeared in analyses of func-
tionalism and neofunctionalism, to be replaced by accusations of
economic reductionism.
In this chapter we have tried to distinguish some of the important
features of the functional approach that have been underplayed in
subsequent iterations of the approach as 'functionalism'. The more
general orientation towards a form of global governance doubtless will
leave some readers cold. Where is the explanatory theory, they may
well ask. Part of our task here has been to show that this is not the sort
of theorizing that Mitrany was interested in or thought to be useful.
His own ideas are critically flawed in a number of respects, although
previous critics have brought to bear as many of their own prejudices
as they have demolished or exposed Mitrany's. We have suggested
that there are interesting avenues to be pursued in the combination of
the functional approach with more recent constructivist, feminist and
other critical theory. This will radically alter the focus of the
functional approach, for sure. But as an early critical approach to
international relations, the functional approach suitably revised could
be a promising theoretical starting point for a new critical approach to
global governance.

Notes

1. See Ernst Haas, Beyond the Nation-State: Functionalism and

International Organization (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press,
1964), pp. 12-13, 47-8; and Charles Pentland, 'Functionalism and
Theories of International Political Integration', in A. J. R. Groom and
Paul Taylor (eds), Functionalism: Theory and Practice in International
Relations (London: University of London Press, 1975), p. 21.
2. David Mitrany, 'Note for Ernst Haas', unpublished paper from the
Mitrany Collection at the London School of Economics (hereafter
referred to as the Mitrany papers), 14 February 1963.
 Working for Peace 25
3. For Haas's view of functionalism see 'Functionalism and the Theory of
Integration', Part I of his Beyond the Nation-State.
4. David Mitrany,A Working Peace System: An Argument for the Functional
Development of International Organization (London: Royal Institute of
International Affairs, 1943), p. 56.
5. Ibid., p. 39.
6. Ibid., p. 33.
7. Ibid., p. 35.
8. Jessica Tuchman Mathews, 'Redefining Security', Foreign Affairs, 68, 2
(Spring 1989).
9. A Working Peace System, p. 32.
10. Ibid., pp. 41-2.
11. Ibid., p. 51.
12. Ibid., p. 53.
13. Ibid., p. 54.
14. A. Moravcsik, Liberalism and International Relations Theory, Working
Paper No. 92-61, Center for International Relations, Harvard
University {1992), has identified the social utility determination of state
behaviour as one important aspect of the liberal approach to inter-
national relations.
15. David Mitrany, 'Note for Ernst Haas', 14 February 1963, from the
Mitrany papers.
16. David Mitrany, 'The Functional Approach to World Organization',
International Affairs, 24,3 (July 1948), p. 358.
17. David Mitrany, Progress of International Government (New Haven, CN:
Yale University Press, 1933), p. 134.
18. David Mitrany, 'International Consequences of National Planning',
Yale Review, XXXVII (1) (September 1947), p. 26.
19. Robert 0. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, 'Introduction', in Robert
0. Keohane and JosephS. Nye (eds), Transnational Relations and World
Politics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972), identify
transgovernmental relations as relations between government depart-
ments that are responsible for what is usually considered domestic
policy issues, such as agriculture or justice. For a revival of this view, see
Anne-Marie Burley Slaughter, 'The Real New World Order', Foreign
Affairs, 76, 5 (September-October 1997), pp. 183-97.
20. Haas, Beyond the Nation-State, pp. 30-3.
21. A Working Peace System, p. 55; David Mitrany, A Working Peace System
(Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1966), pp. 211-12.
22. Cf. Charles Pentland, International Theory and European Integration
(London: Faber & Faber, 1973), p. 64.
23. Haas, Beyond the Nation-State, p. 21.
24. Mitrany, 'Note for Ernst Haas'.
25. Haas, Beyond the Nation-State, p. 30.
26. For Mitrany's view of 'scientific' and 'pre-scientific' see his 'Research in
International Relations', in the Mitrany Papers, p. 3.
27. On neofunctionalist spillover, see Jeppe Tranholm-Mikkelsen, 'Neo-
functionalism: Obstinate or Obsolete? A Reappraisal in Light of the
New Dynamism of the EC', Millennium, 20, 1 (Spring 1991).
26 David Long and Lucian M. Ashworth
28. For example, Charles Pentland, International Theory and European
Integration, Chapter 3; James Patrick Sewell, Functionalism and World
Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1966), Part 1;
R. J. Vincent, 'The Functions of Functionalism in International
Relations', Yearbook of World Affairs (1973} London Institute of
World Mfairs; and Roger Tooze, 'The Progress of International
Functionalism', British Journal of International Studies, 3, (July 1977).
29. Inis L. Claude, Swords into Plowshares (New York: Random House,
1971}, pp. 403-4.
30. Claude, Swords into Plowshares, p. 384.
31. Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 3rd edn (New York: Alfred
A. Knopf, 1965}, p. 11.
32. Robert Gilpin, 'The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism', in
Robert 0. Keohane (ed.) Neorealism and its Critics (New York,
Columbia University Press, 1986).
33. Robert 0. Keohane and JosephS. Nye, Power and Interdependence,
2nd edn (Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman, 1989}, Chapter 2.
34. Claude, Swords into Ploughshares, p. 404.
35. For a discussion of issues at stake in the Middle East conflict, see Alwyn
R. Rouyer, 'The Water Issue in the Palestinian-Israeli Peace Process',
Survival, 39, 2 (Summer 1997).
36. Claude, Swords into Ploughshares, pp. 396-7.
37. John W. Burton, Conflict: Resolution and Provention (New York:
St. Martin's Press, 1990), Chapter. 14.
38. See Mitrany's 'Memoir' for a discussion of his involvement in Unilever
in The Functional Theory of Politics (London: Martin Robertson, 1975).
39. Alexander Wendt, 'Collective Identity Formation', American Political
Science Review, 88,2 (July 1994).
40. Ronnie Lipschutz, 'Reconstructing World Politics: the Emergence of
Global Civil Society', Millennium, 21, 3 (Winter 1992).
41. See J. Ann Tickner, Gender in International Relations (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1992); and A Claire Cutler, 'Artifice,
Ideology and Paradox: the Public Private Distinction in International
Law', Review of International Political Economy, 4, 2 (Summer 1997).
42. David Held, Democracy and the Global Order (Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press, 1995).
43. Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams (eds}, Critical Security Studies
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997) and Craig Murphy,
International Organization and Industrial Change (Cambridge: Polity
Press, 1994).