Philosophy of Architecture

First published Wed Sep 9, 2015

This article offers an overview of issues in the philosophy of architecture. Central issues
include foundational matters regarding the nature of:

1. Architecture as an artform, design medium, or other product or practice.

2. Architectural objects—what sorts of things they are; how they differ from other
sorts of objects; and how we define the range of such objects.
3. Special architectural properties, like the standard trio of structural integrity
(firmitas), beauty, and utility—or space, light, and form; and ways they might be
special to architecture.
4. Architectural types—how to consider abstract groups of architectural objects and
their instances.
5. Meaning and other language-like phenomena in architecture and its objects.
6. Formation of and warrant for our basic grasp, and considered judgment, of
architectural objects.
7. Social and moral features of architectural objects and architectural practice.
Yet other questions engage applied philosophical concerns regarding architecture, such
as the character of architectural notation; intellectual property rights; and client-
architect obligations.
A far-reaching philosophy of architecture extends beyond even a broadly aesthetics-
based assessment, to include considerations of ethics, social and political philosophy,
and philosophical reflections on psychology and the behavioral sciences. The aesthetics
of architecture, by itself, spans traditional issues mooted in philosophy of art, as well as
aesthetics of the everyday, and environmental aesthetics. Such traditional issues include
the nature of the work; the possibility of classes, kinds, or types in the domain; the
character and roles of representation, intentionality, and expression; and the warranted
foundations for criticism. The ethics of architecture also addresses traditional issues,
including delineation of rights, responsibilities, the good, virtues, and justice in
architectural milieus. Still other aspects of philosophy of architecture concern social and
technological characteristics.

• 1. Introduction
o 1.1 Architecture as Relatively Neglected by Philosophy
o 1.2 A Word on Terminology
• 2. What is Architecture?
 o 2.1 The Sort of Enterprise Architecture Is
o 2.2 Architecture and Essential Features
o 2.3 The Kinds of Things Architecture Makes
• 3. Metaphysics
o 3.1 Ontology
o 3.2 Part-Whole Relations
o 3.3 Causality
• 4. Architectural Language and Notation
• 5. Formalism and Anti-formalism
o 5.1 Formalism
o 5.2 Anti-Formalism and Functional Beauty
• 6. Architectural Experience, Knowledge, and Appreciation
o 6.1 Experience of Architecture
o 6.2 Architectural Knowledge
o 6.3 Architectural Appreciation
• 7. Architectural Ethics
• 8. Architecture and Social and Political Philosophy
o 8.1 Socially Constitutive Features of Architecture
o 8.2 Socially Efficacious Features on, and of, Architecture
o 8.3 Architecture and the Political
• 9. Further Issues in Philosophy of Architecture
• Bibliography
• Academic Tools
• Other Internet Resources
• Related Entries

1. Introduction
1.1 Architecture as Relatively Neglected by
Philosophy
Over the course of Western philosophy, including the history of aesthetics, architecture
has largely failed to attract sustained, detailed attention—particularly as compared with
other artforms. Neither philosophical issues prompted by architecture, nor the fit of
architectural phenomena into larger philosophical debates, have captured the
philosophical imagination as have, for example, literature or painting. Some
contributions across the span of Western philosophy—including those of Wolff and
Schopenhauer—rank as historically significant; other, more recent accounts are broad-
ranging and gravid with conceptual concerns, including those of Scruton and Harries.
Further, some philosophers have even dabbled in architectural projects: Dewey
contributed to plans for the Chicago Laboratory School, Wittgenstein collaborated on
designing a house for his sister, and Bentham sketched the Panopticon design as a plan
for prison reform. Yet the overall state of philosophical reflection on architecture—even
in the present day—is less lively than like discussions focused on artforms of far more
recent origin, such as film or comics. Some philosophers working in the Continental
tradition have offered accounts of the experience of architecture or its social
ramifications; a deficiency is more marked in analytic aesthetics.
For more on the background and context of conceptual explorations of architecture, see
the supplementary documents:
Philosophy of Architecture in Historical Perspective
Philosophy and the Tradition of Architectural Theory

1.2 A Word on Terminology

This essay refers generally to the basic creative output of architects, in any
(unspecified) form, as “architectural objects”. This is in parallel with the term “art
objects” in use, across aesthetics and philosophy of art, to refer to objects created by
artists independent of the artform and without regard to ontological or other discussions
where other terms may evoke one or another particular stance. It may turn out that
“architectural object” proves value-laden. Yet this is less likely than with common
alternatives in the literature: “architectural works”, perhaps wedded to creator intent,
status as extant or integral whole, or aesthetic ranking; or “buildings”, certainly wedded
to built, hence concrete, structures. “Built structures” is used here (except in historical
reference) to refer to the generic built output resulting from architectural design, in
recognition of a domain some view as broader than buildings per se.

2. What is Architecture?
Fundamental questions about the nature of architecture motivate much of contemporary
philosophy of architecture: what sort of enterprise architecture is; whether architecture
has essential features; what kinds of things architecture makes—yielding the further
issue as to whether architecture always, only sometimes, or never is an artform; what
renders architecture distinct from other artforms (if it is one); and whether architecture
includes all built structures.

2.1 The Sort of Enterprise Architecture Is

One approach to grasping the true nature of architecture is to define it in terms of the
discipline. We may embrace the disciplinary determinism of the British architect Cedric
Price: “Architecture is what architects do”. Defining the discipline or practice of
architecture may seem a simple empirical affair. Even if we have difficulty assessing
what architectural objects or products are, we can point to thousands of architects over
several millennia around the world engaged in one or another sets of activities that
conventionally have been associated with architectural practice, and generate a long
disjunctive claim about what architects do. An empirically rooted approach has a long
history: Vitruvius devises his normative account of the virtuous architect on the basis of
his familiarity with then-contemporary practice. The same is true of other traditional
accounts of virtue in architects or builders, as in the sixth to eighth century
Indian Mānasāra (मानसार) (Acharya 1928) and eleventh century Chinese Yingzao fashi(
營造法式) (Feng 2012). In the present-day, sociology of the architectural profession
offers a detailed empirical perspective (Gutman 1988), and this can be extended to a
sociology of architectural worlds, modeled on Becker’s sociology of art worlds.
A problem arises, though, if we look to history or sociology for a unified account with
common features of an architectural discipline. While architectural practice has
remained stable in certain respects, change over its history greatly limits common
features, perhaps, to a core set of basic tools and rudimentary principles of structural
engineering. This suggests that, at root, the practice of architecture must involve
engineering or related design. But architecture can’t be reduced to a form of
engineering, if we think architectural ideals, taste, and expertise contribute something
over and above engineering facts, rules, and practical knowledge. These further
contributions suggest an art or art-like role for architectural practice. However, the
historical record is mixed on the matter of whether architects are at the same time
pursuing art (or what we now consider as art) or should be thought of as artists.
Moreover, the historical record and resulting disjunctive claim do not address cases
where even the most basic tools or structural principles are not deployed. Some such
cases of not observing basic structural principles, as fantasy architecture, may be
deemed marginal; other such cases, as landscape architecture, are not.
Another dimension of defining architecture as a practice is specifying the sorts of
structures that architects design. At a bare minimum, we can say that they feature some
connection to human use. But attempts to render this as non-trivial introduce further
puzzles (see §2.3).
2.2 Architecture and Essential Features
A contrasting definitional approach suggests that, as a matter of reasoned judgment, we
can attribute to architectural practice—or to the domain of architectural objects—core
or even essential features. A dominant reading of the Vitruvian tradition has it that
architecture embodies and is best understood through the three aspects of beauty,
structural integrity, and utility. An essentialist variant suggests that architects must
observe all three aspects or that any structure aspiring to architectural status features all
three. Other prominent views advance a single aspect, generally function or form, as
primary. Thus, functionalist architectural doctrine places function or utility at the heart
of the architectural enterprise, with other aspects of architecture subordinate thereto.
A hard-line functional essentialist holds that, if a built structure has no function, then it
is not architecture. As a modest dissent, Graham (1989) proposes that such a
structure is an architectural work—but a failure at such. One brand of more radical
rejection suggests that some architectural objects—perhaps including follies,
memorials, or monuments—need have no function at all. As a competing essentialism,
formalist architectural doctrine suggests that an object is architectural just in case it
features forms proper to the domain. A common interpretation says that forms proper to
architecture can be chosen off a stylistic menu (or combination of menus), leaving
architects great latitude while upholding the possibility of contrasting, non-architectural
forms (this is difficult to square, however, with some experimental architecture).
In weighting architecture’s aspects as essential, core, or some lesser status, a related
question is whether one or another aspect is primary or necessary to any of the others.
As Graham notes (1989), the traditional question in architectural theory of whether
form trumps or precedes function may be cast in such terms.
Against these traditional brands of essentialism, two further kinds of doubt may be cast.
First, it may be that the Vitruvian triad, or some single aspect thereof, does not
represent the right list—we should include either further aspects or different aspects
altogether. Alternatives might include dimensions such as context, relations among
architectural objects, systemic features, sustainability, and psychological or social
features. Some theorists propose other candidates as essential architectural aspects,
including space (Zevi 1978) or the organizing concept of the parti(Malo 1999).
Second, it may be that essentialism represents a false start. On one non-essentialist
view, the nature of an architectural object is as we experience it, a matter upon which
we may agree but which depends in part on subjective perception and reception of, and
interaction with, the work (Scruton 1979/2013). This leaves open the possibility that
architecture has essential aspects but we simply don’t experience them as such. A more
determined nominalist has it that diversity among architectural objects is sufficient to
quash the prospect that they share any essentialaspects.

2.3 The Kinds of Things Architecture Makes

Yet another way to pose the question of what architecture is focuses on the sorts of
things architectural objects are. In particular, and relative to architecture’s possible
status as artform, architecture as a domain may be defined variously in terms of its
objects being art objects (or not), being distinctive sorts of art objects, or belonging
exhaustively to a special class of built structures (rather than including all such
structures).
Whether architecture always, only sometimes, or never is an artform. At the
negative extreme, architecture may be viewed like any engineered artifact that only
incidentally bears aesthetic value. Any view of even slightly more positive valence
bows in the direction of intent to generate aesthetic value. The classic Vitruvian view,
for example, has it that engineered design and aesthetic design are conjoint intentional
elements of architectural objects. At the positive extreme, that is, the suggestion that
architecture is always and in all ways an art, we may lose any means of discriminating
among built structures as art or not. This is a troubling prospect to exclusivists who see
architecture as a high art only (see below).
In the negative camp, S. Davies (1994) argues that mere production of occasional
artworks does not suffice to constitute an artform—crafts being a notable example—
and the aim of architecture is frequently, or even typically, not the production of art but
useful items that do not aim at artistic value. In the positive camp, Stecker (2010)
responds that we can carve out a subclass of architectural objects that are art even if not
all are. He adds, by way of historical argument, that architecture was included among
the artforms, by early agreement among aestheticians. We might have grounds for
dismissing architecture from the canonical list if the nature of architecture has changed,
and in this vein Stecker notes a rising tide of building design that is functionally
oriented without significant aesthetic investment. A further alternative is to say that
architectural objects are all art works, or at least intended as such, within bounds. To
make sense of the term “vernacular architecture” requires that we see architectural
objects as typically art objects, while we make allowance for a broad class of
architectural objects that are low-art rather than high-art.
If the negative view is correct, then we need at least a workable set of criteria by which
to discriminate architectural objects as art. To this end, we may draw on our intuitions,
norms, or socially expressed views. Further considerations may include the pertinent
cultural tradition in which an architectural object is created, whether particular sorts of
aesthetic qualities count more towards artwork status, or whether there is instrumental
benefit in considering the object as art.
What renders architecture distinct from other artforms (if it is one). If architecture
counts among the artforms, we may think that it has distinctive features as such. For
example, Scruton (1979/2013) suggests that architecture is a non-
representational artform since it need not—and generally does not—represent any
content. Despite architecture’s non-representational status, Scruton agrees with Langer
(1953) (and anticipates Goodman (1985)) that architectural objects can express or refer;
in his view, to thoughts associated with expressed properties. Others focus on
architecture’s distinctive commitments to creator or user engagement. Winters (2011)
sees architecture as a “critical” artform, requiring the creator’s engagement in the
environment where other artforms may tolerate a creator’s detached stance. Another
distinctive mark of architecture among the artforms is its nontraditional status as a
narrative medium: the design of circulatory pathways allows architectural objects to
communicate a sequence of events through the movement of visitors or inhabitants.
Whether architecture includes all built structures. Among the issues noted here, that
of the greatest consequence is the question of what counts among architectural objects.
On an inclusivist or expansive conception, architectural objects are those designed
objects ranging over the whole of the built environment; on an exclusivist conception,
the range describes only some coherent subset of the whole of the built environment.
Examples of exclusivist subsets include (a) only built structures that people can occupy
(typically: houses, temples, office buildings, factories, etc.), or (b) only built structures
designed in primarily aesthetic (rather than purely functional) terms. An inclusivist
conception entails a vastly larger architectural domain of objects—and areas of practice
and inquiry.
Proponents of exclusivity (S. Davies 1994, Scruton 1979/2013) are eager to protect
architecture as the preserve of just those objects in the built environment with abundant,
apparent, and appreciable aesthetic qualities; clear creator’s intentions to generate art;
or the panache of high art and engagement with art historical trajectories. Stecker
(2010) offers a putative variation, allowing that as a broader creative medium
architecture has an inclusivist character—though, as an artform, architecture is
exclusivist. Scruton, for his part, identifies a specific intent to exalt: architecture as a
pursuit has lofty goals or purposes, such that architectural objects do as well. One
commonsense justification for exclusivity overlaps with an institutionalist perspective:
laymen and connoisseurs alike can differentiate between the striking work of an
architect and the humdrum, cookie-cutter building design of a draftsman.
Arguments for inclusivity include Carlson’s appeal (1999) to consider the class of
architectural objects as of a continuum with the broader class of everyday designed
objects, where everything admits of possible aesthetic appreciation.
Then, contra Stecker, we can effortlessly count all built structures as architecture,
though some such things—like garage doors or drainage ditches—will neither look like,
nor be, art. Another line of attack is to respond to exclusivists that architects simply
have intentions to create objects that are, in one aspect, art—and that they may fail as
art is beside the point. Further, it may be that recognizing intentions is irrelevant to
judging a built structure as architecture, as when we judge as architecture the vernacular
structures of foreign cultures. In response to Scruton’s exaltation criterion, the
inclusivist may note that for all artforms, there are typically innumerable objects in the
domain with no such goals—and possibly no goals at all. Finally, inclusivism has its
own commonsense justification: we standardly refer to a creator of a mundane built
structure as the architect, which seems less a linguistic shortcut than recognition of the
training and ethos attached to the creator of architectural objects.
It is not clear how to craft intermediary positions between inclusivism and exclusivism,
given that the various brands of exclusivism are not absolute and test cases are instead
subject to judgment along any number of parameters. Stecker’s exclusivism for only
architecture as art represents one such relativized stance. Inclusivism, by contrast—
along with any attached views on, for example, architectural appreciation or the nature
of aesthetic success in architecture—is an absolutist doctrine. All elements of the built
environment—and much else besides—must count as architectural objects, or else the
view fails.

3. Metaphysics
The metaphysics of architecture covers a surprising range of questions for those who
see in architecture no more than metaphysically mundane built structures or stones,
wood, metal, and concrete arranged in a pleasing fashion: the nature of architectural
objects and their properties and types, the relations of architectural parts and wholes,
and the prospect of architectural causality.

3.1 Ontology
Given the familiarity of architecture in, and as constitutive of, our physical
surroundings, it is strongly intuitive to think of architectural objects simply as buildings,
in the way we think of the objects of the sculpture artform as sculptures, or the objects
of cutlery as forks, knives, and spoons. Yet such intuitions may be misguided. For one,
though some built structures—including roadways, bazaars, and newspaper kiosks—are
not buildings per se, we may take them to have architectural properties and thereby
consider them as architectural objects. For another, the outputs of architecture are not
limited to built structures but include as well models, sketches, and plans, and this
variety prompts questions as to whether these are all reasonably considered
architectural objects and which, if any, such form of output represents a primary sort of
object in architecture. A third consideration is the focus in architecture, not solely on
whole or individual buildings, but also on parts of buildings and buildings considered in
context, among other buildings and in landscapes (downwards and upwards
compositionality or modularity). A fourth consideration is that—as with music and
photography—where multiple instantiations of a given work are possible, we may
dispute whether the work is identical to the instancing built objects or else to the
common entity (e.g., plan) on which those instances are modeled. In addition to such
challenges, the intuitive view must best alternative views.
Instantiating architectural objects. To address one sort of question about the identity
of an architectural object, we seek kind-wise criteria that establish when an object
is architectural, instead of being non-architectural altogether or only derivatively so. To
address another sort of identity question, we look for instance-wise criteria that
establish when an object is this or that singular object, or an instance of a multiple
object. Ready criteria for identifying object instances in architecture include historical,
environmental, stylistic, and formal features—all of which may be read as signaling
intentions to design particular, self-contained architectural objects. One issue, however,
is whether traditional criteria (or others as may be posed) are sufficiently specific so as
to skirt vagueness problems that all such artifacts may face (Thomasson 2005) and
provide markers of being a bona fide instance of a multiple work or a replica of all
other bona fideinstances (Goodman 1968/1976).
Architectural objects as ontologically distinctive. Yet another way to pick out
architectural objects is to set them apart from other art objects or artifacts. Assuming
there is more than one art ontology (see Livingston 2013), we might look to define a
distinctive architectural ontology by reference to specifically architectural qualities,
such as “mass” (degrees of heaviness and lightness) or directedness (in circulatory
pathways); or utility considerations, such as functional design, use, and change; or
everyday artifactual features. An inclusivist may add features special to the built
environment beyond the realm of buildings.
Kinds of architectural ontologies. Architecture’s distinctive qualities may help sort
among candidate ontologies. One option is concretism, which—in keeping with
standard causal efficacy claims and expressed intentions of architects, clients, and
users—suggests that architectural objects are either built structures or, on one variant,
otherwise physically instantiated designs for such structures (such as models).
Concretism is supported by an artifactual ontology that subsumes architectural objects
into the class of objects that are the product of intentions, designs, and choices (on the
view that all art objects are best so understood, see Dutton 1979, S. Davies 1991,
Thomasson 1999, and Levinson 2007.) One version of architectural artifactualism
identifies buildings as systems (Handler 1970). As against concretism, intentionality
may be the mark of materially constituted, designed architectural objects but that need
not commit us to their existence alone or their primacy among such objects. Moreover,
taking intentions as determinative leaves the concretist with the problem of shifting
intentions and unintended goals attached to built structures over time.
Abstractist alternatives follow a well-worn path in aesthetics (Kivy 1983; Dodd 2007;
critics include S. Davies 1991; Trivedi 2002; Kania 2008; D. Davies 2009) and
accommodate an expansive architectural domain that includes historical, fantasy, and
unbuilt works. Per classic Platonism, abstractism allows identification of an
architectural object and concrete counterparts—including multiple replicas—by
reference to a single, fixed, and unchanging background source of what real world
structures (or fantasy structures) are and should look like.
Against abstractism, some architectural objects are apparently singular because
historically and geographically contingent (Ingarden 1962); it is unclear what an
experiential account of architectural abstracta looks like; and abstracta are not created
whereas architectural objects are. De Clercq (2012) further proposes that, even if there
were abstract architectural objects, we don’t refer to them. If I refer to “10 Downing
Street”, my expression picks out the built structure, not the plan, nor any other abstract
representation or entity to which the built structure at 10 Downing Street corresponds.
However, a plausible alternate interpretation of the referent is as “the abstract object
physically instantiated by the structure I am perceiving (or have perceived)”.
As an alternative to an abstractist-concretist divide, a pluralist ontology (per Danto
1993), allows “material bases” and “aesthetic ideas” as different sorts of architectural
objects. Goodman’s account (1968/1976) lends itself to a pluralist, or at least aspectual,
reading. He suggests that, but for certain conditions unmet, an architectural object could
be identified as those structures that perfectly realize a corresponding plan or other
suitable architectural notation (see §4). On his nominalist view, the objects turn out to
be the built structures but an available realist interpretation—which may better
accommodate the multiples that are key to his story—takes the objects to be the class of
such structures.
Another alternative suggests that architecture consists in actions or performances
(per Currie 1989; D. Davies 2004), rendering derivative any concrete structures or
“traditional” abstract entities. Lopes (2007) proposes the possibility of an events or
temporal parts ontology for a kind of built structure that passes in and out of existence,
though De Clercq (2008, 2012) counters that such can be rendered in a material objects
ontology through temporal indexing. Yet other ontologies are contextual or social
constructivist, proposing that architectural objects exist, beyond their status as
structured materials, in virtue of ways our reality is framed, psychologically, socially, or
culturally (per Hartmann 1953, Margolis 1958). A shift in any such frame may bring
about shifting identity in an architectural object, in the manner of Borgesian art
indiscernibles (Danto 1964), and it may count in favor of those ontologies that
architectural indiscernibles are all around, in the form of repurposed built structures.
Picking an ontology has wide-ranging significance, relative to questions of material
constitution, composition, part-whole relations, properties, and relations in architecture,
as well as the character of architectural notation, language, cognition, or behavior; there
are also ramifications for simplicity and complexity, and the nature of ornament,
proportion, context, and style. In architectural practice, the ontology of choice also
colors perspectives on such matters as intellectual property rights, collaborative work,
and preservation of architectural structures.

3.2 Part-Whole Relations

On one customary view of architectural objects, individual built structures (or their
abstract counterparts) represent the primary unit of our aesthetic or, for that matter, any
architectural, concern; all other ways of carving up the architectural world are
derivative. Th