Territorial Use Rights in Fisheries (TURFs)
A Doerr, S Cardenas, S Jardine, H Yoon, and S Bucaram, University of California, Davis, CA, USA
JN Sanchirico, University of California, Davis, CA, USA; Resources for the Future, Washington, DC, USA
ã 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Glossary
Economic rent Most simply, economic rent is analogous
to net profits. It is payment, for either goods or services,
greater than the resource owner’s opportunity and
production costs.
Equilibrium A population is in equilbrium when the
number of births is equal to the number of deaths, resulting
in a constant population. With fisheries, the equilibrium
necessarily includes off-take in addition to natural mortality,
so that the number of births is equal to the number of losses.
Externalities Externalities are costs or benefits that accrue to
parties outside the original transaction. Externalities by
definition result in a social loss or gain. Pollution is often
cited as an example of a negative externality. Free,
unplanned pollination services in a neighboring orchard,
provided by the bees in a honey seller’s beehives, would be
an example of a positive externality.
Ex-vessel markets Refer to purchases and sales of the
commercial harvest. Involve markets where the sellers
(fishermen) make the goods available at their premises and
the buyers are responsible for all charges.
Ex-vessel price Price received at the dock by fishermen for
finfish, shellfish, and other marine plants and animals
landed.
Introduction
In an open-access fishery, individual users do not have any rights
to the resource until it is onboard their vessels. Without resource
rights, there is no reward for the individual resource users who
consider how their actions diminish the value of the resource for
others. They are unable to capture the benefits provided by a
reduction in their harvest, and thus, they have no incentives to
do so. Because of the external nature of costs and benefits
associated with fisheries resource use, the open-access equilib-
rium will be inefficient; the resource will be overused and profits
to the resource users will be dissipated. An efficient equilibrium
is defined here as one in which the net benefits to society,
coming from use of the resource, are maximized. Even when
entry to a fishery is regulated, it is nearly impossible to control
all the ways in which resource users can increase the effort they
apply to the fishery, and the outcome will seldom be efficient.
Therefore, a variety of management regimes have been devised
in an attempt to address problems that come from a lack of
resource rights. One of these management regimes is called
territorial use rights in fisheries (TURFs). This essay defines
TURF, discusses the various types of TURFs, explores the poten-
tial efficiency and distributional outcomes from implementa-
tion of territorial use rights (TURs), and presents case studies on
TURFs in Japan and Chile.
232 Encyclopedia of Energy, Natural Resource and Environmental Economics
Profit pooling The collecting and combining of all proceeds
from a group’s efforts prior to redistribution. Group costs,
such as licensing or management fees, may be taken from
the combined proceeds, and the remainder is redistributed
to members. Redistribution may be equal or may occur
according to a predetermined distribution scheme.
Total allowable catch (TAC) A catch limit set for a particular
stock of fish or type of fish, in a given area, for a given time
period. TAC limits may take the form of tons of live-weight
caught, or total number of fish. TAC limits may be modified
annually or as needed and may be raised or lowered
depending on the heath and perceived population of the
relevant stock. TAC limits are designed to prevent overfishing.
Tragedy of the commons (TOC) This term comes
from Garrett Hardin’s 1968 paper of the same name.
In a TOC scenario, each individual is motivated to act in
such a manner that a shared resource is depleted. This is
because the benefits gained from exploiting the resource
are individual, and the costs are shared among all users.
With a TOC, individual actors may know that
conserving the resource is in their own long-term best
interest, but they continue to deplete the resource
because any part they conserve will be used or consumed
by another user.
Definition and Characteristics
Definition
Definition of TURFs
Panayotou defined TURFs as community held rights of use and
exclusion over the fishery resources within a specific area and
a specific period of time accompanied by responsibilities for
maintenance and proper management of the resource base as
well as restrictions on the exercise of the rights of use and
exclusion.
Effective TURFs typically comprise a relatively small and
clearly distinguishable territory, provide rights of exclusion
and determination of the kind and amount of use, allow for
the right to extract benefits, and are specific in ownership.
Conditions affecting the creation and maintenance of
effective TURFs
The conditions that are important in creating and maintaining
TURFs are related to the attributes of natural resources, the
definition of boundaries, fishing technology, cultural attitudes,
wealth distribution effects, and governmental authority and
legal institutions (Table 1). TURFs can be more easily assigned
and enforced for sedentary species than for highly migratory
species. Furthermore, it is easier to monitor the use of a terri-
tory and to implement TURFs in locations with a readily
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-375067-9.00047-4
 Policy Tools | Territorial Use Rights in Fisheries (TURFs)
Table 1 Conditions for effective TURFs
Conditions Comments and examples
Natural resource attributes Sedentary species versus migratory
species
Boundary Clearly defined region or boundary
Fishing technology Stationary gear versus mobile gear
Cultural factors Resistance to assigned user rights and
exclusions versus history of commonly
managed fisheries
Governmental authority Government-mandated requirements,
and legal institutions such as baseline studies
defined boundary. Across the different types of fishing tech-
nologies (e.g., stationary and mobile), stationary gear that is
placed in well-defined sites is more likely to be subject to TURs
on a permanent or seasonal basis because of the easier ability
to monitor actions. Another factor that influences the creation
and maintenance of TURFs is historical and cultural tradition.
For example, North America has historically supported an in-
dividuals’ right to fish, often with few restrictions on location
or species type. This tradition makes it potentially more diffi-
cult to impose exclusive rights, which are provided to certain
individuals or communities and not to others.
Potential Benefits
TURFs are a potential management tool to overcome the prob-
lems of open access, such as overfishing, crowding, excessive
effort, and high monitoring and enforcement costs. They may
play a role as a management tool to increase fishery net bene-
fits, enhance the distribution of benefits, and improve benefits
to society, resulting in improvements to both efficiency and
equity.
TURFs may enhance efficiency by increasing fishery net
benefits through several processes. The blanket exclusion of
outsiders from a territory may reduce management, monitor-
ing, and enforcement costs by letting government focus on the
resolution of intercommunity conflicts rather than monitoring
the intrusion of outsiders. In addition, the control of labor and
capital within a TURF, through either incentives or penalties,
may reduce the need for increased investment in these re-
sources, increasing profits. TURFs motivate members to take
into account externalities – the effects of their catch and returns
on others – by combining members into one management unit
and through coordination with adjacent TURFs over shared
stocks. TURFs provide control over a resource, thus allowing
both an opportunity to manage resources within the territory
and the motivation to do so. They may facilitate investment for
future returns by restricting fishing in certain areas and seasons
and promoting community investments in fishing facilities.
Unlike many other management tools, TURFs may be more
sustainable because of their flexibility; the TURF can be modi-
fied by members or regulators to reflect the bio-socioeconomic
environment. TURFs are localized and flexible enough to adjust
to changes in local communities, markets, fishing technology,
and resource characteristics.
TURFs may also contribute to an improvement in the dis-
tribution of benefits among the members. The local
233
employment opportunities within a territory may improve as
employment opportunities shift from outsiders to insiders,
as generated rents are used to increase employment, and as
secondary jobs are created in local processing and marketing.
Wealth redistribution, the generation of rents, and facilitation
of more integrated development may also increase local in-
come and resources. This local income could lead to greater
local consumption and better nutrition. By creating common
interests and promoting cooperating and sharing, a TURF may
encourage more social organization and reduce intracommu-
nity conflicts. It may also enhance social mobility among the
members. For example, low-income members such as crew-
men and landless laborers might be able to obtain shares in
the TURFs to get income from property beyond their labor
income.
Learning by doing may be promoted through TURFs with
strong community networks. Community-based control over
resources may encourage a sense of community responsibility
and enhance existing social organizations, or lead to the devel-
opment of a new social organization. Development and use of
new technologies may be facilitated through TURFs, because
they secure tenure and collective control. In addition, fisher-
men in TURFs may gain access to a broader capital market
through better status of their returns.
In addition to the benefits to members, TURFs may be
beneficial to wider society. TURF members have increased
incentives to conserve marine resources as the state of the re-
source and their income are highly correlated. Members may be
motivated to protect the environment to sustain their liveli-
hoods. This environmental protection agenda can contribute
to better management of both fishery and nonfishery uses
within the region and enhance general ecological health. TURF
members may identify more strongly with the territory and the
surrounding environment, and social ties may become stronger.
TURFs may also improve government finances by saving man-
agement and enforcement costs, reducing costly assistance to
poor fishing communities, and generating more resource rents.
Types
TURFs may be characterized by their scale, the type of owner-
ship, and the rights assigned. Although the areas defined
by TURFs are generally small, the term has been used to iden-
tify areas as large as countries’ exclusive economic zones. For
the purposes of this article, the focus will remain on local
TURFs, although the size of these can vary significantly as
well. For monitoring and management to be effective, these
areas should have well-defined boundaries and clear owner-
ship or membership rights. A TURF’s ‘boundaries’ may include
the entire water column in a given area or just part of
it (Figure 1). Additionally, within a given area, the use rights
may be specific to a certain species or assigned for all species
(SURF is the abbreviation for a TURF that focuses on a
single species). Regardless of how rights are assigned or the
size of the allocated area, a TURF that is large enough such
that resource use outside the area does not compromise the
value of resources used or captured inside is more likely to
internalize the externalities. In situations where this is not
the case, there success will depend on the possibility of
234 Policy Tools | Territorial Use Rights in Fisheries (TURFs)
Benthic species
Migratory species
Figure 1 TURFs may be defined by species, location, or portion of
water column.
coordination with the users and managers of the areas outside
the TURF.
Ownership
Single individual or corporation
TURs may be assigned to a single user or corporation or be
managed at a community level. There are numerous examples
of both in the literature, and the nature of the use rights often
reflects the history of the fishery or characteristics of the species
being caught. An interesting example of a long-standing
individual-level TURF is described by Brownstein and Trem-
blay. A community in Nova Scotia, Canada, had a lobster
poaching problem in the late 1800s. A local minister resolved
the issue by using existing property lines; individual property
lines were extended out to sea, thus defining the TUR. In any
given year, if a particular owner was not able to harvest a
reasonable amount from his assigned fishing area, he was
given temporary access to a reserve ‘commons’. This manage-
ment system is still in use today.
At a corporate level, the scallop fishery in Nemuro Bay,
Hokkaido prefecture, Japan, provides an illustrative example
of the evolution of a TURF (Figure 3). Historically, scallops in
Nemuro Bay were overfished, at least in part because of the
high number of individual fishing vessels, and return per fish-
ing effort was unsustainable. Given the steadily decreasing
level of the scallop population, a total ban was placed on
scallop fishing in Nemuro Bay in 1974. The five cooperatives
that had previously been fishing the area created a joint com-
mittee and collectively decided to plant additional scallops and
allow for recovery of the population. After recovery, the co-
operatives jointly hired a small number of boats to harvest
scallops, and profits were divided among members of the co-
operatives. Previously, annual catch had been approximately
2000 tons; following recovery, annual catch exceeded 6000
tons, with a significantly reduced level of effort. Today, scallop
fisheries in the Hokkaido prefecture account for the greatest
percentage of Japanese scallop catch and are being considered
for inclusion in the Marine Stewardship Council’s certified
sustainable seafood program.
Community
More expansive TURFs are often cooperative in nature and
collectively managed by a large number of members. There
are several well-known examples of these, including Chilean
W management and exploitation areas for benthic resources
a (MEABRs) and Japanese fishery management organizations
t
(FMOs). MEABRs, at the national level, average 62 members,
e
r although this value ranges extensively. Within the most inten-
sively managed fourth and fifth Chilean administrative regions,
MEABRs average 80 members. The average membership size of
C FMOs is 53, although about a fifth of FMOs have more than 100
o
l members. Although there is no technical limit on the size of a
u community-managed TURF, smaller memberships may enjoy
m easier coordination, while larger numbers may result in more
n
efficient monitoring of the region. For these reasons, a moder-
ate number may be most effective, as long as the membership
level does not grow beyond a sustainable level in regard to
fishing effort and marine resources.
Not all community-managed TURFs are nationally or even
regionally mandated or controlled. A well-known example of
self-created TURFs is that of the lobster fishery of Maine. The
southern Maine lobster fishery evolved over time into a system
that appears to be both socially and environmentally stable.
Each community within this fishery has a very well-defined
fishing territory. When lobster traps belonging to someone
outside the user community are found within a given territory,
users with trapping rights identify the outsider’s traps; this
involves an obvious signal, such as tying a bow onto the line
by the buoy. If the same individual’s traps are found on sub-
sequent fishing trips, the lines to the trap may be cut. Social
ostracism, in addition to potential destruction of the gear,
is used to discourage fishing outside a community’s assigned
fishing area. Fishing communities also create barriers to entry
into the fishery and have set catch limits, gear restrictions, and
temporal restrictions. The result is a seemingly stable fishery
with a very well documented history of TURs.
Species
TURFs may have restrictions on the types of marine resources
that can be harvested from a given area, but this is not a
necessary management component. In Japanese FMOs, use
rights are typically assigned for a single species, but the larger
fishery cooperative associations (FCAs) govern multiple spe-
cies. A typical FCA, a management unit comprising several
FMOs, may include sedentary species, such as clams and aba-
lone, and mobile species, ranging from shrimp to herring.
Likewise, Chilean MEABRs are not actually ‘single’-species
TURFs, but 85–90% target loco, a commercially important
benthic sea snail also known as Chilean abalone, as their
primary harvest species.
Generally speaking, less mobile species are far easier to
manage, and these are often the focus of TURFs. Many success-
ful TURFs focus on benthic species, such as abalone and mus-
sels, or migratory species that can be easily caught in stationary
traps, such as lobster. However, a TURF may still be used for
highly mobile or migratory species (Table 2). In such cases, the
TURF may provide for sole access to a stationary fishing device
used to capture a migratory fish stock. The user(s) may have
 Policy Tools | Territorial Use Rights in Fisheries (TURFs) 235

Table 2 Examples of species harvested in TURFs

Species Image Mobility Fishing methods Examples of countries

with TURFs

Walleye pollock Highly mobile, Primarily longline Japan

(Theragra migratory
chalcogramma)

Sakuraebi (Sergia Limited spatial mobility Paired-boat dragnet Japan

lucens) (found only within
Suruga Bay in Japan)

Pacific sandeel Mobile species, limited Paired-trawling Japan

(Ammodytes range
personatus)

Loco (Concholepas Low Manual collection; Chile

concholepas) skin diving;
compressed air
(hooka) diving

Tuna (Thunnus spp.) Highly mobile, Handlines, fishing Philippines

migratory aggregation devices

American lobster Mobile Traps United States, Canada

(Homarus
americanus)

territorial rights to a given region where traps, nets, or fish Efficiency

aggregation devices have been deployed. In the Philippines,
TURFs have been used for tuna, a highly migratory species.
Different fishing companies have sole access to areas surround-
ing a stationary fish aggregation device (usually a large concrete
block with buoys or floats attached). The fish aggregate in very
large schools around these devices and can then be harvested
by TURF members.
Criteria for Effectiveness
Two criteria can be used to judge the success of a particular
TURF: an efficiency criterion, or the gains in economic rents,
and a distribution criterion, or how the economic rents are
shared. Understanding the potential for efficiency gains as well
as different potential distributional outcomes is important for
defining the goals when a TURF is established.
There are three potential sources of efficiency gains. First, the-
ory predicts that a resource characterized by open access will be
overused, but if a sole owner manages the resource, that owner
would have the incentive to maximize net benefits from the
resource. Although typically the rights to a TURF are not allo-
cated to a single individual, the idea behind the TURF system is
to move to the sole-owner equilibrium point of maximum
economic yield (Figure 2). In order to realize these efficiency
gains, however, economies of scale must be considered. For
example, if multiple TURFs are all small, the gains could be
small due to a mismatch of scales.
Second, if TURF holders believe they will be able to capture
returns from their investments, they have the incentive to
invest in the fishery whenever the expected net benefits are
positive. Efficiency gains of this sort, however, require that
the users reasonably expect the TURF to be maintained and
enforced over time.
236 Policy Tools | Territorial Use Rights in Fisheries (TURFs)
Yield
Maximum Open access
economic yield equilibrium
E1 E2 Effort
Figure 2 Sole-owner versus open-access equilibria.
Finally, implementation of a multispecies TURF, in which
rights holders benefit from more than one interdependent
species within a territory, should provide users with incentives
to consider cross-species externalities. For example, in the case
of a predator and prey species, the TURF might be expected to
reduce the catch of the prey as a means of increasing the growth
of the predator when the benefits in terms of increased catch of
the predator outweigh the opportunity costs of forgone catch
of the prey.
It should be stated, however, that granting TURs to a com-
munity does not guarantee that economic rents will be main-
tained. As in regulated open-access or limited open-access
fisheries, incentives for the ‘race to fish’ are still present in a
TURF: individual fishermen compete among themselves to
harvest valuable fish stocks, but in doing so, they invest heavily
in production inputs (e.g., large vessels, powerful motors, and
additional gear) that economic profits are driven to zero. This
problem is commonly referred to as an overcapitalized fishery.
Although the race to fish has typically been described in an
open-access or limited open-access setting, the same incentives
driving the race to fish may be present in a TURF. Therefore,
without additional management structure in place, economic
rents in a TURF could become dissipated if fishermen overcap-
italize to compete.
Distributional Outcomes
TURFs have the potential to increase the economic rents to a
fishery. It is also important to consider how these economic
rents will be distributed. Critical to the distribution of eco-
nomic rents is the initial allocation of the property rights.
As mentioned, TURs holders can range from a single indi-
vidual to an entire community. Thus, there is a wide range of
potential rent distributions among holders of the rights. When
rights are granted to a single individual or a small group of
individuals, it is expected that they will essentially become
monopolists of these rights or the sole seller of access rights
to the fishery. Therefore, the economic rents that the TURF
creates will be extracted and concentrated. This should happen
if the holders of the use rights are too few in number to harvest
the optimal amount of the resource on their own and choose
to sell the right of access to fishermen in the community. It may
also happen if the use rights are granted to an individual or a
group of individuals who were not former users of the resource
and do not desire to harvest the resource on their own. It is
theoretically possible for the government to extract the surplus
through a tax on the rights holder(s) and then redistribute this
wealth.
On the other hand, the rights can be granted to the entire
community of resource users, who will be able to collectively
manage the resource. This type of community-managed TURF
is common, seen in both Chile and Japan, and can lead to
a more equitable distribution of fishery rents. However, even
if community-owned TURFs avoid rent dissipation, rents
may be unequally shared. Both Chilean and Japanese TURFs
have designed policies to address both preservation and equi-
table distribution of fishery rents. Two main mechanisms have
emerged in these fisheries. The first is allocation of quotas
among individuals in a TURF. The simplest allocation scheme,
adopted by some Chilean TURFS, involves evenly distributing
the chosen total harvest among the TURF members.
Some TURFs go beyond simply allocating harvest among
members and manage effort over space and time. For example,
the Japanese walleye pollock TURFs have adopted a schedule
for each fishing ground within the TURF. Members are rotated
over the fishing grounds throughout the season. This system
eliminates the incentives for overcapitalization: when mem-
bers are rotated over all the fishing grounds (both good and
bad fishing areas within the TURF), they no longer have to
compete to be the first to arrive at the fishing ‘hot spots.’
However, the schedules in these fisheries often do not take
weather conditions and shifting hot spots into consideration.
Therefore, issues of fairness may still remain with this distri-
bution scheme.
Another option to address rent dissipation and equity is-
sues is profit pooling. Although the term ‘profit pooling’ is
frequently used to describe revenue pooling, there are TURFs
in both Chile and Japan that have adopted profit pooling
in the strict sense: both costs and revenues are shared.
Profit pooling can eliminate race-to-fish incentives, because
individual fishermen will not see the full returns to their indi-
vidual capital investments. However, with profit pooling, in-
dividuals do not realize the full returns to their effort. As a
result, fisherfolk with higher-than-average skills may choose to
leave the group. In addition, regardless of skill level, an indi-
vidual who does not realize the full returns to their effort has
an incentive to reduce effort. The stability of the profit-pooling
system is compromised when higher skilled members leave the
group and when TURF members reduce their fishing effort.
Gaspart and Seki look at how social status, defined by an
individual’s relative productivity, affects the outcome of profit-
pooling systems. They suggest that profit pooling has two-
sided incentive effects: fishermen with higher-than-average
landings face incentives to decrease effort when their profits
are pooled, and fishermen with lower-than-average landings
are motivated to increase their landings for social status con-
siderations. As a result of the two-sided incentive effects, land-
ings become more homogeneous when profits are pooled, and
the profit-pooling system is strengthened.
These authors conducted a case study in a Japanese glass
shrimp fishery with three fishing groups that had been engaged
in varying degrees of profit pooling since the 1960s. One group
practiced full profit pooling, another practiced partial profit
pooling, and the third abandoned profit pooling after 1 year.
The two groups with profit pooling showed greater
 Policy Tools | Territorial Use Rights in Fisheries (TURFs)
homogeneity in landings than the group that abandoned it
(although the authors were unable to establish a causal rela-
tionship and note that more homogeneous individuals may be
more inclined to adopt profit-pooling arrangements). That
social status is important to TURF members is an artifact of
culture and is consistent with the idea that cultural factors can
determine the likelihood that a community-managed TURF
will succeed.
The sakuraebi fishery in Suruga Bay, Japan, provides an
interesting explanation of why pooling with equal distribution
may be successful despite the potential disadvantages to highly
skilled fishermen. In this fishery, it was the highly competitive
fishermen who proposed instituting a pooling arrangement.
These fishermen were not only more concerned about the
fishery but also more experienced and emotionally attached
to it. Hence, social attitudes could influence the long-term
application and success of strategies implemented in TURFs.
This section examined several management strategies that
have emerged to address the preservation and distribution of
economic rents in TURFs. The additional management neces-
sary to meet the efficiency and equity goals in these fisheries
comes at a cost if enforcement of allocations requires monitor-
ing of TURF members. Although monitoring of a TURF typically
involves excluding nonmembers from the fishery, the added
costs of monitoring members provide further motivation for
designing TURFs that can easily be surveyed. The following
section elaborates on successful TURFs in Japan and Chile.
Case Studies
The idea of exclusive fishing zones had its inspiration in reef
and lagoon tenure of fishing rights in the South Pacific. There
has also been a long history of TURs as community manage-
ment tools in Japan and India. More recent examples involve
the sea urchin dive fisheries in Canada and Latin America.
To illustrate the processes of creation and development of
TURFs, this section focuses on cases in Japan and Chile,
where TURFs have been widely implemented, and reviews the
different historical and management perspectives.
Japan
In Japan, fishing cooperatives with spatial property rights have
their origin in the feudal period, dating back to the sixteenth
century. Coastal villages that did not have enough arable land
to grow rice were allowed to fish. These communities were
given specified areas along the near-shore coast for their exclu-
sive use. Fishermen then formed harvester guilds to protect
these areas against poaching. A sense of territorial rights over
the coastal waters emerged among the villagers, and those
rights were eventually recognized by the samurai lords. These
spatial user rights were given formal legal status in 1901 with
the enactment of the Fishery Law. In 1948, the fishers’ guilds
were transformed into FCAs, and they gained the status to
represent user groups.
Local fishery cooperative associations
Japanese coastal fisheries are governed by fishery cooperative
associations. The jurisdictional boundaries of these
237
associations are defined geopolitically. FCAs play a unique
role in that they manage collective fishing rights, often in the
form of TURs. These rights are granted by the government at
the province level (called prefectures) and protected by law
(Figure 3). TURFs are nominally granted for 10-year terms
with possible renewal. Fishermen in Japan have a substantial
voice in the process of granting rights, because prefectures are
required to consult fisheries regulation committees. These two
institutions, FCAs and TURFs, form the basis of Japanese fish-
ery management. As of February 2010, there were 1873 FCAs in
Japan: 1057 along Japanese coastal waters, 696 located in
inland waters, and 120 gear-specific FCAs.
FCAs are usually associated with specific coastal communi-
ties so that each FCA typically encompasses all the different
fisheries within that community or communities. Members of
these FCAs are mostly fishing households and small compa-
nies (defined by the number of employees and gross tonnage
of the vessels owned). The target species of FCAs include sed-
entary shellfish resources, such as clams, mussels, sea urchins,
abalone, and shrimp. They also involve moderately mobile
groundfish, including various flat fish and rockfish, and more
mobile fish, such as mackerel, herring, and pollock. FCA mem-
bers may employ a wide range of gear, which can include
dredges, gill nets, seines, set nets, and small trawls, as well as
diving.
FCAs are responsible for joint purchases of inputs, admin-
istration of ex-vessel markets, and provision of insurance and
credit to members. FCAs also keep catch records, which are
used to provide official statistics.
Management of fisheries
Management within each jurisdictional TURF is implemented
by fisheries management organizations (FMOs), most of
which are affiliated with their parent FCAs. An FMO is an
autonomous group of fishermen who share the same fishing
ground and/or operate in the same fishery and are collectively
engaged in resource and/or harvest management according to
mutually agreed upon rules. These management regimes were
implemented as a national fishery policy in the early 1980s.
The primary factors leading to the creation of FMOs included
declining fish stocks and excessive competition within certain
TURFs. FMOs inherited the benefits of established and well-
defined TURFs and limited entry of new members. The
Japanese central government has recognized FMOs as an effec-
tive tool for fisheries management, and as of November 2003,
1608 FMOs were operating in Japan.
FMO boundaries are typically seaward extensions of mu-
nicipal boundaries on land. Some extend 1 km or less; others
extend more than 5 km. The distance is a function of the target
species, the type of gear used, and the topography of the ocean
floor. The membership size of FMOs varies, although the trend
is toward small sizes. In 1998, 47.3% of FMOs had 30 mem-
bers or fewer, and only 17.2% of FMOs had 100 members
or more. Although smaller groups are believed to be more
successful in fishery collective management, this correlation
is still unclear because of the interaction of diverse internal
factors (e.g., fishermen cohesiveness) and external conditions
(e.g., market forces). FMOs manage a variety of target species.
A 2006 survey, focused on 116 FMOs, showed that 66% tar-
geted sedentary species; 16%, spiny lobster; 12%, moderately
238 Policy Tools | Territorial Use Rights in Fisheries (TURFs)
Prefectures
(provinces)
Tokyo
Shizuoka prefecture
Ohigawamachi FCA
Figure 3 Jurisdictional boundaries of provinces (prefectures) in Japan and boundaries for two FCAs within Shizuoka prefecture. Adapted from
Uchida H and Baba O (2008) Fishery management and the pooling arrangement in the Sakuraebi fishery in Japan. In Townsend R, Shotton R, and
Uchida H (eds) Case Studies in Fisheries Self-Governance. Rome: FAO. FAO Fisheries Technical Paper 504.
mobile groundfish; and 5%, migratory species. Japanese TURFs
are limited to common fishing rights for coastal fisheries.
FMOs manage TURFs, but there are also separate FMOs that
manage aquaculture and offshore licenses.
FMOs and FCAs are interrelated in several ways. Operating
bodies for FMOs may be FCAs (if the local FCA is small in
number of fisheries and target species), subgroups within FCAs
(if the FCA is large and encompasses multiple fisheries), alli-
ances of FCAs (if two or more FCAs jointly manage a fishery,
especially for migratory species), and other forms (transregio-
nal fishers’ organizations, such as the Prefectural Federation of
Bottom Trawl Fishery). Nearly 95% of Japanese FMOs are
operated by an FCA or by an affiliate organization.
Regulatory strategies
Most Japanese fisheries are based on a comanagement system
that consists of government regulation and self-regulation.
National and prefectural governments usually regulate and
set the federal total allowable catch (TAC) and the guidelines
for seasonal length, size limits, and gear restrictions. A mosaic
of self-regulation measures, applied in a decentralized way, has
been adopted by individual FMOs. The Japanese fishery census
categorizes these measures as resource management (e.g., stock
assessment and hatchery development), fishing ground man-
agement (e.g., protection, monitoring, and usage rules), and
fishing effort control (e.g., fishing season, number of vessels,
and specific fishing gear). Most FMOs have adopted combina-
tions of various measures from each of the three categories.
An analysis of the most popular measures imposed indi-
cated that congestion on fishing grounds is a priority issue.
FMOs have adopted rules from simple rotation systems to
Hokkaido
Two FCAs managed the
sakuraebi fishery in the
Shizouka prefecture
Yui Harbor FCA
Fishing
grounds
sophisticated fishing effort coordination measures. For exam-
ple, the sakuraebi fishery (pink or cherry blossom shrimp) in
Shizuoka prefecture established a committee that makes de-
cisions on fishing operations and fishing coordination in a
centralized manner. Sakuraebi has a patchy distribution, and
hot spots are small and few. All fishing units (vessels) conduct a
coordinated initial search to locate the hot spots for the season.
The committee then allocates the hot spots to fishing units and
decides how much to fish per fishing day. All fishing operations
are synchronized through constant communication. Similarly,
although the walleye pollock fishery in Hokkaido prefecture
does not have a centralized committee, it has developed a
complex fishing ground rotation scheme for spatial and tem-
poral coordination of fishing effort. There are three layers of
rotation: groups (base towns), teams, and individuals. The FCA
section is divided in three segments of coastline, from north to
south. Each group rotates through the segments on successive
days. Within this big rotation, teams rotate within their group
and individual vessels rotate within their teams.
Spatial and temporal fishing coordination based on rigid
assignment of fishing locations may be made unstable by
variable quantities of harvest, depending on exogenous factors
not considered in the coordination scheme. Also, the long
distances that some vessels have to travel to reach their
assigned areas can compromise economic efficiency. To over-
come these issues, some FMOs have adopted pooling arrange-
ments as part of effort coordination. Under an income-pooling
strategy, a team of fishermen harvest fish simultaneously under
collaborative arrangements, sell the catch cooperatively, and
divide the income on the basis of a specific set of rules. Income
distribution rules vary among fisheries. For instance, in the
 Policy Tools | Territorial Use Rights in Fisheries (TURFs) 239

sakuraebi fishery, the revenue side for the period is pooled but
not the costs, given the distinct administrative costs among the
operating FCAs. In the case of the walleye pollock fishery, the
distribution of revenues is calculated daily and is based on the
number of baskets of longline per fishing boat.
Season closures and marine protected areas, used by
fisheries managers to protect spawners and/or juveniles, can
complement TURs. The sandeel fisheries in Ise Bay illustrate
how the establishment of temporary no-fishing zones has
protected estivating sandeels and increased landings. The loca-
tion and size of no-fishing zones vary annually depending on
ecological information about juvenile distribution and migra-
tion patterns. Since the measure was implemented, total har-
vest in two FCAs increased from 515 tons in 1982 to 19 073
tons in 2006.
Positive effects and challenges
Effort coordination measures and rotation schemes, together
with income-pooling strategies, have equalized fishing oppor-
tunities, increased fairness in income distribution, and helped
eliminate the incentives for race to fish and thus certain sources
of social conflict. In several cases, effort coordination measures
make the whole fishery behave as if it was operated by a sole
owner, where revenues are maximized as fishermen try to
reduce costs significantly. Under this scenario, not only has
equal opportunity been realized, but efficiency may also be
enhanced through measures such as cooperative agreements
encouraging vessels to fish at the nearest fishing grounds.
In addition, pooling arrangements often have a free-riding
problem, in that they may encourage members to shirk and
take advantage of others.
In a large-scale setting, some Japanese fisheries have coor-
dinated efforts among neighboring FMOs, which has increased
the joint benefits and improved the management of the fish-
eries. The case of the walleye pollock fisheries, discussed above,
is one example. These FMOs have formed the Hiyama Walleye
Pollock Long Line Association. This association manages the
migratory fish by joining together three suborganizations
(or subregion-specific associations), each of which brings to-
gether groups that correspond to townships where they are
located. Overall, these town groups are organized in four
FCAs with their corresponding FMOs (Figure 4). During a
fishing season, association members (leaders of each town
group) meet regularly to make adjustments to regional opera-
tions and rules. Besides these regional rules, each section
applies specific measures.
Self-governance and self-monitoring are important aspects
of FMOs and are achieved largely through peer pressure or
through decisions made by committees of member represen-
tatives. Explicit sanction procedures, such as confiscation of
harvest or reduction of distribution shares, are imposed by
some FMOs. Market coordination activities have also had
other positive effects on Japan’s TURFs. This is clearly seen in
the sakuraebi and walleye pollock fisheries. Specific activities
include controlling the landing volume in accordance with
market indicators, developing and advertising private brands,
and general quality control. FMOs that are actively engaged in
marketing activities tend to earn higher revenue per member.
The social advantages of having fishermen managing their
own resource and its territory include the value of their exten-
sive experience with the resource and region, an increased
sense of cooperative spirit and fairness, and improved commu-
nication between stakeholders. The relationships between reg-
ulators and fishermen are fairly close in Japan. One of the
functions of FCAs is to inform their members of new and
changing national fisheries policies.
There are three main challenges within the current Japanese
FCA–TURF system. First, discrepancies may exist between the
area where a fish species reproduces and migrates and the
jurisdictional boundaries assigned to managing FCAs and
FMOs. Although Japan has established institutions for multi-
jurisdiction management, they are rarely used because of the

Distribution of
walleye pollock
Hiyama region
Spawning ground

Transport of eggs
larvae Musashi bank
Nursery
Spawning migration ground
Hokkaido

Kumaishi FCA

Toyohama Hiyama Walleye

FCA Pollack Longline
Shakotan Pen.
Otobe
Nishi section Association
Hokkaido
Esashi-Kaminokuni
section Esashi FCA
Kaminokuni

Hiyama
FCA

0 10 20 km

(a) (b)

Figure 4 (a) Regional migration pattern of walleye pollock along west coast of Hokkaido prefecture. (b) Organizational structure of Hiyama’s regional
fishery and extent of Hiyama Walleye Pollock Longline Association. Adapted from Uchida H and Baba O (2008) Fishery management and the
pooling arrangement in the Sakuraebi fishery in Japan. In Townsend R, Shotton R, and Uchida H (eds) Case Studies in Fisheries Self-Governance.
Rome: FAO. FAO Fisheries Technical Paper 504.
240 Policy Tools | Territorial Use Rights in Fisheries (TURFs)
lack of supporting scientific information. Second, ecosystem-
based management, through multispecies management (non-
target species and prey interactions) and habitat enhancement,
has not been widely implemented in Japan, since most FMOs
are formed around single species. Few cases, mainly related to
aquaculture activities, do incorporate habitat management.
Third, scientific information to support comanagement is
underutilized. Collaboration among scientists, fishermen,
and government needs to be enhanced, so that scientific infor-
mation can be integrated into TURF management and com-
municated to TURF members.
Despite the room for improvement in the Japanese fishery
system, it is credited with the recovery of several fisheries that
had collapsed because of race-to-fish situations under open-
access regimes. It provides a whole history of experiences and
lessons learned from diverse fisheries management strategies
and from the transition toward right-based and collective man-
agement regimes.
Chile
In the mid-1970s and -1980s, an increase in both foreign
demand and price of the gastropod Concholepas concholepas
(‘el loco’) occurred. This, coupled with the implementation
of an aggressive exchange rate policy (due to the adoption of
a neoliberal policy framework by the Chilean dictatorial gov-
ernment of that time), substantially improved the export earn-
ings of this species. The combination of these factors led to the
formation of a social phenomenon in the fishery sector of
Chile known as loco fever, which generated the mobilization
of thousands of divers around Chile, engendering social con-
flicts as well as the imminent overexploitation of loco. Land-
ings declined precipitously between 1980 and 1988, with loco
fever leading to a ‘tragedy of the commons’ situation and a
collapse of the loco fishery. The collapse forced both the clos-
ing of the loco fishery from 1989 to 1992 and a reassessment of
the government regulations related to the management of
coastal marine resources.
The major result of this reassessment was a new legislation
and institutional framework that generated a series of rules
controlling access to benthic and pelagic coastal resources
by the artisanal fishery sector. This legislation was fundamen-
tally represented by the 1991 Fishery and Aquaculture Law No.
18–892 (FAL), which drastically reformed the right to fish
within and between the industrial and artisanal fishing sectors.
The FAL regulated mobility of the fleets through zoning, intro-
ducing a differential transferable quota, and creating a system
of TURFs in Chile with three characteristics:
• User rights for artisanal fishermen: Exclusive fishery access
rights are assigned to artisanal fishermen in a zone that
extends to five nautical miles from the shoreline along
2500 km of coast (from 18
360 S, 70
300 W to 41
270 S,
74
100 W).
• Regionalization: Artisanal fishermen are restricted to work
within the coastal region adjacent to their area of residence.
• Creation of ‘MEABRs’: Harvesting rights for benthic re-
sources are allocated to legally registered artisanal small-
scale fishing associations.
Management and exploitation areas for benthic
resources
The most important consequence of the FAL was the creation
of MEABRs. These areas are assigned to a fishing associa-
tion after the association presents a management and ex-
ploitation project related to one or more benthic species.
Participation in a MEABR is not compulsory for any fishing
organizations; however, MBEARs do provide use rights for
those that choose to participate. MEABR regulations require
the payment of rent for the exclusive use of benthic resources
and require the provision of an initial baseline study and a
management and exploitation plan (MEP) for the benthic
species that the association is targeting. The baseline studies
include a description of the benthic community in the region; a
direct quantification of the main species in the MEABR; and an
identification, characterization, and distribution of substrata
and their depths. The MEP must include a statement of objec-
tives; provide a description and justification of actions directed
for the support of targeted species; list studies that should be
conducted to maintain the biological health of the area; pro-
vide a yearly proposal that includes harvesting periods, allow-
able fishing techniques, and quantity to be harvested; and lay
out a detailed program with a full description of activities and a
timetable. In addition, annual monitoring must be performed
by universities or registered consultants for each harvested area.
Since 1997, more than 700 MBEARs have been assigned
to fishermen organizations. These account for more than
1100 km2 of the near-shore of Chile, with a distance between
them being 4–10 km, thus generating important connectivity
among MEABRs. Even though loco, keyhole limpets, and sea
urchins are the most important species targeted by the fishing
associations (and were the main motivations for the creation
of MEABRs), more than 50 species are now covered by various
MEABR plans in Chile. The size of the individual MEABRs
also varies extensively, with management units ranging from
25 to 900 members. The members of these associations are
responsible for deciding how to manage their TURFs as well as
how to allocate their effort, although they are also regulated by
the federal government. To ensure compliance with manage-
ment plans, federal authorities require MBEARs to pay external
consultants to undertake follow-up assessments of stocks in
the management area.
Positive effects and challenges
This system has produced many important benefits, the great-
est being a recovery of the abundance and individual size of
targeted resources within MEABR areas, such as gastropods like
el loco that were previously on the fringe of collapse. This is
especially true in comparison with open-access sites that con-
tinue to be heavily harvested by fishermen. In fact, current
landings of loco have increased fivefold from levels prior to
government suspension of the fishery. Other positive effects of
the MEABR system include (1) greater efficiency in the
accumulation of knowledge about the response of the stocks
to harvest; (2) improvement in marketing practices; (3) en-
hancement of the quality of the product; (4) increased appre-
ciation of the resource by MEABR members, who have
essentially become environmental stewards as well as fisher-
men; (5) enrichment of the social capital of the members of
 Policy Tools | Territorial Use Rights in Fisheries (TURFs) 241

fishing associations, due to the establishment of shared re-
sponsibilities as well as the development of appropriate in-
centives; and (6) ability for fishing associations to establish
their own institution, supporting or even replacing the role of
an external authority.
Despite the success of this system, there are problems that
remain and will likely require attention in coming years.
MBEARs will need to (1) effectively handle the inherent het-
erogeneity of fishing association members, who often have
different understandings of the problems they face; (2) in-
crease support from the National Fisheries Service to oversee
execution of MEABRs; (3) enforce stronger sanctions on fish-
ermen caught stealing from MEABRs, a common problem in
regions where TURFs and open-access areas coexist; (4) in-
crease financial support for monitoring and control of areas;
(5) address problems of scarcity and overexploitation in open-
access diving grounds; and (6) improve knowledge about the
effect of fishing activity on the species not targeted by the users.
Chilean fishery governance reforms and innovative man-
agement tools seem to have counteracted many of the prob-
lems that are characteristic of common pool resources in
open-access systems. In particular, the implementation of the
MBEAR system is considered the main factor in the prevention
of overfishing of benthic shellfish resources in the Chilean
coast. However, new challenges require a new dialog between
fishermen, government, and scientists in order to make pro-
gress toward the governance and institutions required to
address these issues and maintain the system in its path of
sustainability (Figure 5).
Conclusion
We have discussed the primary components of an effective
TURF system, as well as highlighted potential benefits of
implementing TURFs. There is no universal solution to the
problem of open-access fisheries or overfishing in open or
closed systems, but TURFs have successfully addressed some
of these issues. In particular, TURFs can encourage users to
consider both environmental and social aspects of a fishery
and to work with other TURF members to regulate the take and
maintain the health of the resource. However, there is still
extensive need for research into TURFs, particularly in coun-
tries other than Chile and Japan. Few case studies exist that
examine TURFs in the United States, Canada, Europe, or
Australia, all of which have globally significant fishing indus-
tries. TURFs are also more commonly applied to fisheries that
focus on species with little or limited mobility. Case studies of
TURFs implemented for highly mobile species, such as tuna or
herring, could be very informative. Although interest in TURFs
is growing, existing systems, such as coastal communal tenure
systems with a long history of traditional management, may be
in danger of disappearing due to the modernization of fisheries
and the pressure of global markets.

Canada Japan
USA * Nova Scotia * Various fisheries
* Maine lobster fishery * Green sea urchin dive * Spatial user rights emerged in
* Defined fishing fishery the 16th century and were
territories were self- * Restricted fishing zones legally transformed in Fishing
created approved in 1995 Cooperative Association in
1948.

Mexico Philippines
* Campeche region * Various fisheries
* Lobster fishery including highly mobile
* Defined fishery units tuna schools
called ‘casitas’ created
in 1960s
Nigeria Srilanka
* Restricted * Various fisheries
access fishing * Property rights that
grounds in small restrict access to
rivers and lakes lagoons, estuaries, and
* Traditional tenure beaches in place for
Chile inherited within
- Mainly shellfish ‘loco’ centuries
the kin group
fisheries
- Management and
exploitation areas
created in 1991

Brazil Pacific Islands

* Only in state of Bahia * Various small-scale
* Coastal fisheries fisheries
* Informal tenure system that * Reef and lagoon communal
has existed for a century tenure systems established
before European colonization

Figure 5 TURF systems worldwide.

242 Policy Tools | Territorial Use Rights in Fisheries (TURFs)
TURFs are often not adequate management tools on their
own. Additional management techniques are almost univer-
sally necessary to eliminate the incentives to race to fish, to
monitor fishing techniques and exclude nonmembers, and to
ensure equitable distribution of costs and profits. However,
TURFs can be very effective for the successful and sustainable
management of fisheries, particularly when their strengths and
potential weaknesses are acknowledged and addressed during
their implementation.
Further Reading
Acheson JM (1975) The lobster fiefs: Economic and ecological effects of territoriality in
the Maine lobster fishery. Human Ecology 3: 183–207.
Brownstein J and Tremblay J (1994) Traditional property rights and cooperative
management in the Canadian lobster fishery. The Lobster Newsletter 7: 5.
Cancino JP, Uchida H, and Wilen JE (2007) TURFs and ITQs: Collective vs. individual
decision making. Marine Resource Economics 22: 391–406.
Castilla JC and Gelcich S (2008) Management of the loco (Concholepas concholepas)
as a driver for self-governance of smallscale benthic fisheries in Chile.
In: Townsend R, Shotton R, and Uchida H (eds.) Case Studies in Fisheries
Self-Governance. Rome: FAO. FAO Fisheries Technical Paper 504.
Christy FT Jr. (1983) Territorial use rights in marine 1982 fisheries: Definitions and
conditions. Rome: FAO. FAO Fisheries Technical Paper 227.
Christy FT (1996) The death rattle of open access and the advent of property rights
regimes in fisheries. Marine Resource Economics 11: 287–304.
Costello C, Lynham J, Lester SE, and Gaines SD (2010) Economic incentives and
global fisheries sustainability. Annual Review of Resource Economics
2: 299–318.
Gaspart F and Seki E (2003) Cooperation, status seeking and competitive
behaviour: Theory and evidence. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
51: 51–77.
Gelcich S, Edwards-Jones G, and Kaiser MJ (2007) Heterogeneity in fishers’ harvesting
decisions under a marine territorial user rights policy. Ecological Economics
61: 246–254.
González E (1996) Territorial use rights in Chilean fisheries. Marine Resource
Economics 11: 211–218.
Johannes RE (1978) Reef and lagoon tenure systems in the Pacific islands. South
Pacific Bulletin 31–34. 4th quarter.
Kaffine DT and Costello C (2011) Unitization of spatially connected renewable
resources. The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy 11(1). Article 15.
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (2001) The 10th Fishery Census of Japan
1998. Tokyo: Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries.
Panayotou J (1984) Territorial use rights in fisheries. Paper presented at the Expert
Consultation on the Regulation of Fishing Effort (Fishing Mortality). Rome: FAO.
FAO Fisheries Report 289.
Tomiyama M, Komatsu T, and Makino M (2008) Sandeel fisheries governance in
Ise Bay, Japan. In: Townsend R, Shotton R, and Uchida H (eds.) Case Studies in
Fisheries Self-Governance. Rome: FAO. FAO Fisheries Technical Paper 504.
Townsend R, Shotton R, and Uchida H (eds.) (2008) Case Studies in Fisheries
Self-Governance. Rome: FAO.
Uchida H (2009) Fishing effort coordination and revenue pooling arrangement in fishery
comanagement: Evidence from Japan. KMI International Journal of Maritime
Affairs and Fisheries 1: 1–26.
Uchida H and Baba O (2008) Fishery management and the pooling arrangement in the
Sakuraebi fishery in Japan. In: Townsend R, Shotton R, and Uchida H (eds.)
Case Studies in Fisheries Self-Governance. Rome: FAO. FAO Fisheries Technical
Paper 504.
Uchida H and Makino M (2008) Japanese coastal fishery co-management: An overview.
In: Townsend R, Shotton R, and Uchida H (eds.) Case Studies in Fisheries
Self-Governance. Rome: FAO. FAO Fisheries Technical Paper 504.
Uchida H and Watanobe M (2008) Walleye pollock (Suketoudara) fishery management
in the Hiyama region of Hokkaido, Japan. In: Townsend R, Shotton R, and Uchida H
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