ECON 9030: Microeconomic Analysis II

Spring 2015

Dr.Vjollca Sadiraj
Email: vsadiraj@gsu.edu
Office: AYSPS 453
Phone: (404) 413 0193

It should be noted that this course syllabus provides a general plan for the course and
deviations may be necessary.

Locations: Langdale Hall 315

Time and Date: 3:00pm-4:15pm, Mondays and Wednesdays
Office Hours: Wednesdays, 4:30pm-6:00pm; Other days: walk in

Course Objectives: This is a continuation of Microeconomic Analysis I. The following topics will
be covered in Spring 2013: general equilibrium, social choice and welfare, game theory and
information economics.

Prerequisite: Econ 8030 and Econ 9010

Attendance Policy: Attendance is mandatory. If you must miss a class, please let the instructor
know ahead of time. University policy states that all instructors must, on a date after the mid-
point of the course, give a WF to all those students who are on their rolls, but no longer taking
the class; and report the last day the student attended or turned in an assignment.

Grading Policy: Grades will be based on two in-class exams (30% each), one final exam
(40%). If you miss an exam for a reason approved by the dean, the weight of the exam will be
transferred to the final. There will be ungraded HW assignments on a weakly basis. You can
work on HW assignments in groups of up to four people. HW assignments are due within one
week after they are assigned. Letter Grades: A+ (98-100), A (94-97), A- (90-93), B+ (87-89), B
(83-86), B- (80-82), C+ (77-79), C- (70-72), D (60-69), F (0-60).

General Policies

o Academic Honesty: Students are expected to be familiar with Georgia State University’s
Policy on Academic Honesty (Section 409). Here is a link to Section 409:
http://www2.gsu.edu/~wwwfhb/sec409.html.
Excerpt: "As members of the academic community, students are expected to recognize
and uphold standards of intellectual and academic integrity. The University assumes as a
basic and minimum standard of conduct in academic matters that students be honest and
that they submit for credit only products of their own efforts. The student is responsible for
understanding the legitimate use of resources; the appropriate ways of acknowledging
academic, scholarly, or creative indebtedness; and the consequences of violating this
responsibility"
o Disability Services: Students who wish to request accommodation for a disability may do
so by registering with the Office of Disability Services. Students may only be accommodated
upon issuance by the Office of Disability Services of a signed Accommodation Plan and are
responsible for providing a copy of that plan to instructors of all classes in which an
accommodation is sought.
o Online course evaluation: Your constructive assessment of this course plays an
indispensable role in shaping education at Georgia State. Upon completing the course,
please take time to fill out the online course evaluation.
o Online course website: The Course website (on Desire2Learn) is an integral part of the
class; please check it on a regular basis.
o Tardiness: If you're going to be late to class, don't interrupt the lecture; wait until the first
break (at 3:20) to come in.

Student Learning Outcomes:

• Students should understand the relationship between a market’s competitive structure
and economic efficiency.
• Students should understand how behaviors of economic agents are modelled and how
economic activities are organized in a competitive market system.
 • Students should be able to derive excess demands and know how to work out Walrasian
equilibrium.
• Students should know and be able to analyze the relationship between Walrasian
equilibrium allocations and core allocations arising from non-market mechanisms.
• Students should understand welfare properties of Walrasian equilibrium.
• Students should have a good grasp of issues relating to normative policy analysis, and
be familiar with and be able to use various social welfare functions for such analysis.
• Students should have a basic understanding of game theory and be able to apply the
tools developed in game theory to various settings.
• Students should have a basic understanding of asymmetric information and its impact on
economic efficiency.

Textbook: There are several excellent textbooks that are available:

[required] Geoffrey A. Jehle and Philip J. Reny, Advanced Microeconomic Theory, 3d
ed., New York: Addison Wesley, 2011
[optional] A. Mas-Colell, M. Whinston and J. Green, Microeconomic Theory, Oxford
University Press, 2000.
[optional] H. Varian, Microeconomic Analysis, Third Edition, Norton, 1992.

Topics and Reading Assignments:

1. General Equilibrium: chapter 5
2. Social Choice and Welfare: chapter 6
3. Game Theory: chapters 7 & 9
4. Information Economics: chapter 8

Important Dates: February 18 (Exam 1), March 23 (Exam 2), May 4 (1:30 – 4:00, Final Exam)

Some further reading materials

1. General Equilibrium:
(a) Arrow, K. and F. Hahn (1971), General Competitive Analysis, San Francisco: Holden-
Day.
 (b) Debreu, D. (1950), Theory of Value, New York: Wiley.
(c) Hildenbrand, W. and A. Kirman (1988), Equilibrium Analysis, New York: North-Holland.
(d) Koopmans, T. (1957), Three Essays on the State of Economic Science, New York:
McGraw-Hill.
(e) Mas-Colell, A. (1985), The Theory of General Equilibrium: A Differentiable Approach,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
(f) A. Mas-Colell, M. Whinston and J. Green (2000), Microeconomic Theory, Oxford
University Press.
(g) Samuelson, P. (1947), Foundations of Economic Analysis, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard
University Press.
(h) Danthine, J-P. and J. B. Donalson (2002), Intermediate Financial Theory, Upper Saddle
River, NJ: Prentice Hall.
(i) Silberberg, E. and W. Suen (2000), The Structure of Economics, New York: Irwin
McGraw-Hill.
(j) Stolper, W. and P. Samuelson (1941), Protection and real wages, Review of Economic
Studies, 9, 58-73.

2. Welfare Economics and Social Choice:

(a) Arrow, K. (1951), Social Choice and Individual Values, 2nd ed., 1963, New York: Wiley.
(b) Sen, A. (1970), Collective Choice and Social Welfare, San Francisco: Holden Day.
(c) Graaff, J. (1975), Theoretical Welfare Economics, London: CUP.
(d) Little, I. (1950), A Critique of Welfare Economics, London: OUP.
(e) A. Mas-Colell, M. Whinston and J. Green, Microeconomic Theory (2000), Oxford
University Press.
(f) Suzumura, K. (1983), Rational Choice, Collective Decisions and Social Welfare, New
York:CUP.
(g) Mueller, D. (1989), Public Choice II, Cambridge: CUP.
(h) Ng, Yew-Kwang (1983), Welfare Economics, London: MacMillan.
(i) Lipsey, R. and K. Lancaster (1956), The general theory of second best, Review of
Economic Studies.
(j) Samuelson, P. (1954), The pure theory of public expenditure, Review of Economics and
Statistics.
 (k) Samuelson, P. (1954), Diagrammatic exposition of a theory of public expenditure,
Review of Economics and Statistics.
(l) Suzumura, K. (2002), “Introduction”, in Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edited
by K. Arrow, A.K. Sen and K. Suzumura, North-Holland.

3. Incentives, and Information and Implementation:

(a) Green, J. R. and J. -J Laffont (1979), Incentives in Public Decision Making, Amsterdam:
North-Holland.
(b) Hurwicz, L. (1972), On Informationally Decentralized Systems, in Decision and
Organization, eds. by C. B. McGuire and R. Radner, Amsterdam: North-Holland.
(c) J. -J Laffont (1989), The economics of uncertainty and information, Cambridge, Ma.: MIT
Press.
(d) A. Mas-Colell, M. Whinston and J. Green, Microeconomic Theory (2000), Oxford
University Press.
(e) T. R. Palfrey and S. Srivastava (1993), Bayesian Implementation, Harwood Academic
Publishers.
(f) Laffont, J.-J and D Martimort (2002), The Theory of Incentives, Princeton University
Press.
(g) Gibbons, R. (1992), Game Theory for Applied Economists, Princeton University Press.
(h) Maskin, E. and T. Sjostrom (2001), Implementation Theory, in Handbook of Social
Choice and Welfare, edited by K. Arrow, A.K. Sen and K. Suzumura, North-Holland.