BEFORE THE STATE REVENUE COMMISSIONER

STATE OF GEORGIA
IN RE: OASIS GOODTIME EMPORIUM I, INC.,
PRELIMINARY DENIAL OF APPLICATION
FOR STATE ALCOHOL LICENSE,
LETTER ID # L0697384496

TO: OASIS GOODTIME EMPORIUM I, INC.,

d/b/a OASIS GOODTIME EMPORIUM
6363 PEACHTREE INDUSTRIAL BLVD
DORAVILLE, GA 30360-2543

AND

GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE,

ALCOHOL AND TOBACCO DIVISION

ORDER ON MOTION TO INTERVENE

The City of Doraville has moved to intervene in this matter concerning the Department of

Revenue’s (“Department”) preliminary denial of Oasis Goodtime Emporium I, Inc.’s (“Oasis”)

application for a state alcohol license. The Department denied Oasis’s application because Oasis,

which has its place of business within Doraville’s city limits, did not possess a valid local alcohol

license. Oasis opposes Doraville’s motion. 1 Having considered Doraville’s motion and Oasis’s

response, the motion is due to be denied.

I.

In its motion, the City of Doraville relies upon the intervention provisions of the Georgia

Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), O.C.G.A. § 50-13-14(1) and (2). First, Doraville argues

that it has the right to intervene under subsection (1) because its interest in preventing Oasis’s

unlawful alcohol sales within its jurisdiction is inadequately represented. It alleges that Oasis has

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Doraville asserts that the Department has no objection to its motion, and the record
reflects that the Department has not filed any such objection.
sold alcohol without a local license for nine years and has been held in contempt by a Dekalb

County Superior Court for violating interlocutory and permanent injunctions prohibiting it from

selling alcohol without a local license. It further alleges that the Department has unlawfully issued

Oasis state licenses for the years in which it lacked a local license. Doraville contends that granting

Oasis relief would amount to an approval of its contempt of court and would reward Oasis for

deliberately flouting the law. Doraville also contends that it has a familiarity with Oasis’s prior

alcohol license litigation that the Department lacks.

Second, Doraville argues that it may intervene under subsection (2) because its claims

share a common question of law or fact with the present proceedings. It contends that, by

intervening, it could explain how Oasis’s claims have been rejected by prior tribunals and provide

a proper interpretation of the Doraville municipal code. It asserts that intervention would not

unduly delay the proceedings or prejudice the parties because Oasis has the opportunity to respond,

the dispositive issue turns on whether Oasis possesses a local license, and Oasis’s arguments

primarily concern the municipal code. It also attaches a number of exhibits to its motion.

Oasis responds that Doraville does not have the right to intervene under § 50-13-14(1)

because this tribunal is not responsible for enforcing the Superior Court’s injunction nor does it

have the jurisdiction to do so. It further contends that Doraville’s interests would not be harmed

if it is not permitted to intervene, and the results of prior proceedings show that Doraville’s

interests are adequately represented. Oasis also argues that Doraville should not be permitted to

intervene under subsection (2). It asserts that there are no common questions of fact or law because

it has changed the nature of its business, the present proceedings do not implicate the merits of its

local license application, and the present proceedings do not affect the enforcement of the Superior

Court injunction. Moreover, Oasis contends that Doraville’s intervention would unduly delay the

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proceedings because it would expand the issue beyond the basis for the Department’s preliminary

denial, i.e., the absence of a local license, to matters involving prior litigation between itself and

Doraville. In addition, Oasis moves to strike Doraville’s proffered exhibits, contending that the

APA does not afford intervenors the right to present evidence.

II.

Under the Georgia Alcoholic Beverage Code, any retail dealer of alcoholic beverages who

operates within an incorporated municipality must possess a license issued by that municipality’s

governing authority. O.C.G.A. §§ 3-3-2(a), -4-110, -5-40(a), -6-40(a). It is unlawful to sell,

possess for sale, or otherwise deal in alcoholic beverages without possessing all applicable licenses

required by the Code. Id. § 3-3-3(a); Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. 560-2-2-.02(1).

The State Revenue Commissioner may deny, suspend, or cancel an alcohol license where

(1) a license applicant or licensee willfully fails to comply with the relevant laws and regulations;

or (2) a licensee is no longer engaged in the sale of alcoholic beverages or no longer qualifies as a

licensee. O.C.G.A. § 3-2-3(1)(B)-(C). An applicant for a state alcohol license is entitled to an

opportunity for a hearing prior to the denial of his or her application. Id. § 3-2-3(1). Such hearings

are held in accordance with Rules 560-2-16-.01 to -.08 of the Department’s regulations. Ga. Comp.

R. & Regs. 560-2-2-.02(11)(b), 560-2-16-.01 to -.08.

Hearing officers presiding over administrative hearings held by the Department involving

alcoholic beverages are empowered to exercise the same degree of authority and perform the same

actions as hearing officers under O.C.G.A. § 50-13-13. Id. 560-2-16-.01(3)(b). Under § 50-13-13,

hearing officers may, among other things, regulate the course of hearings, rule on motions to

dismiss, and rule on motions to amend or intervene. O.C.G.A. § 50-13-13(a)(6).

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 The APA allows for both mandatory and permissive intervention in “contested cases.” Id.

§ 50-13-14. First, § 50-13-14(1) provides that “any person shall be permitted to intervene when a

statute confers an unconditional right to intervene or when the representation of an applicant’s

interest is or may be inadequate.” Id. § 50-13-14(1). Second, § 50-13-14(2) provides that “any

person may be permitted to intervene when a statute confers a conditional right to intervene or

when the applicant’s claim or defense and the main action have a question of law or fact in

common.” Id. § 50-13-14(2). In deciding whether a party may be permitted to intervene under

subsection (2), the tribunal must consider whether intervention would unduly delay the

proceedings or prejudice the existing parties. Id.

Under the APA, a “party” is defined as “each person or agency named or admitted as a

party or properly seeking and entitled as of right to be admitted as a party.” Id. § 50-13-2(4). A

person who successfully intervenes pursuant to § 50-13-14 does not automatically become a party

to the proceedings. See id. § 50-13-14(1)-(2); Ga. Power Co. v. Campaign for Prosperous Ga.,

336 S.E.2d 790, 792-93 (Ga. 1985) (contrasting § 50-13-14 with § 46-2-59, which automatically

elevates intervenors in proceedings before Georgia’s Public Service Commission to the status of

parties). In addition, in contested cases, “all parties” have the right “to respond and present

evidence on all issues involved.” O.C.G.A. § 50-13-13(a)(3). Thus, the rights of intervenors under

the APA do not include the right to present evidence. See Ga. Power Co., 336 S.E.2d at 793

(characterizing the right of participation of intervenors under the APA as “extremely limited” in

that intervenors are “not entitled to present evidence, cross-examine witnesses, or otherwise be

fully heard on the issues involved.”).

The APA’s definition of “agency” specifically exempts the Department when it is

“conducting hearings relating to alcoholic beverages . . . or any violations relating thereto.”

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O.C.G.A. § 50-13-2(1); see also Blackmon v. Alexander, 213 S.E.2d 842, 844-45 (Ga. 1975)

(noting, under the language of the APA’s definitions section, that the APA was not applicable to

the Department’s regulation of alcohol in connection with a liquor license applicant).

III.

The City of Doraville seeks to intervene in these proceedings based on the APA’s

intervention provisions, O.C.G.A. § 50-13-14(1) and (2). Doraville’s reliance on these provisions

is misplaced, however, because the APA’s intervention provisions do not apply to the

Department’s alcohol license denial proceedings. Thus, because Doraville does not identify any

other sources of authority that would permit it to intervene, its motion is denied. Moreover, even

if the APA’s intervention provisions did apply, intervention would not be warranted.

The APA’s definition of “agency” specifically exempts the Department when it conducts

hearings related to alcoholic beverages. O.C.G.A. § 50-13-2(1). Hearings concerning the denial

of a state alcohol license fall within the ambit of this exemption. See id. §§ 3-2-3(1), 3-3-2(a).

This, by itself, indicates that the APA does not apply to these proceedings. See id. § 50-13-2(1);

Blackmon, 213 S.E.2d at 844-45. Moreover, in light of this specific definitional exemption, it is

notable that § 50-13-14 applies by its own terms to “contested cases,” which the APA defines as

matters that must be “determined by an agency after an opportunity for hearing.” O.C.G.A.

§§ 50-13-2(2) (emphasis added), 50-13-14. Accordingly, the APA does not apply to these

proceedings and § 50-13-14 does not provide a mechanism for Doraville to intervene.

Doraville does not offer any alternative bases for intervention and the Department’s

regulations that control these proceedings do not provide any. Although Rule 560-2-16-.01, by

reference to § 50-13-13, does indicate that hearing officers possess the authority to rule on motions

to intervene, neither the regulations nor the statute that they implement provide a mechanism for

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intervention or a standard by which a motion to intervene may be measured. See Ga. Comp. R.

& Regs. 560-2-16-.01(3)(b), 560-2-16-.01 to -.08. In the absence of any authority permitting

motions to intervene in an alcohol license denial proceeding, or a standard to measure such motions

against, the City of Doraville’s motion must be denied.

Alternatively, even if O.C.G.A. § 50-13-14(1) and (2) applied to these proceedings,

Doraville’s motion would be due to be denied. First, Doraville does not fall under the mandatory

intervention provision of subsection (1) because its interests are adequately represented by the

Department. See O.C.G.A. § 50-13-14(1). Notwithstanding the Department’s issuance of state

licenses to Oasis in the past, it has denied Oasis’s most recent application for a state license and is

now actively defending that denial in these proceedings. Further, the Department has an interest

in properly administering the alcohol laws of this state, which prohibit the sale of alcohol without

a local license. See, e.g., id. § 3-3-2(a).

Second, although there is overlap between the present case and Oasis’s prior litigation with

Doraville to the extent that a local license is a prerequisite for a state license, there are not common

questions of fact and/or law such that permissive intervention would be appropriate. See id.

§ 50-13-14(2). The fundamental question here is whether Oasis is entitled to a state license. This

question must be answered by looking to the Georgia Alcoholic Beverage Code, the Department’s

regulations, and relevant caselaw. By contrast, Doraville’s dispute with Oasis over its application

for a local license and the associated litigation involves matters that are outside the scope of these

proceedings, such as the merits of Oasis’s local application, the proper interpretation of Doraville’s

municipal code, and Superior Court cases that are unrelated to Oasis’s application for a 2022 state

license. In addition to being distinct both factually and legally, these matters would unduly expand

and delay the present proceedings. See id. § 50-13-14(2).

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 Based upon the above, the City of Doraville’s motion to intervene is DENIED. To the

extent that Oasis’s motion to strike Doraville’s exhibits is not moot, the motion is GRANTED.

See id. § 50-13-13(a)(3); Ga. Power Co., 336 S.E.2d at 792-93.

SO ORDERED, this 3rd day of March, 2022.

FOR THE COMMISSIONER:

NICO KAIRIES
ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING OFFICER

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 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I do hereby certify that I have served the parties named below with a true and correct copy
of the attached ORDER ON MOTION TO INTERVENE by the methods indicated below:

VIA ELECTRONIC MAIL

Alan I. Begner, Attorney

Email: abegner@begnerlaw.com

Eric A. Coffelt, Attorney

Email: ecoffelt@begnerlaw.com

Mitchell Watkins, Assistant Attorney General

Email: mwatkins@law.ga.gov

Scott D. Bergthold, Attorney

Email: sbergthold@sdblawfirm.com

Bryan A. Dykes, Attorney

Email: bdykes@sdblawfirm.com

James Beveridge, Director, Alcohol and Tobacco Division

Email: james.beveridge@dor.ga.gov

Christopher Luncheon, Deputy Director, Alcohol and Tobacco Division

Email: christopher.luncheon@dor.ga.gov

VIA REGULAR MAIL

Oasis Goodtime Emporium

6363 Peachtree Industrial Blvd.
Doraville, GA 30360-2543

This 3rd day of March, 2022.

Nico Kairies, Administrative Hearing Officer