ART XII SEC 1: CANCELLATION OF PROPERTY the petitioner’s posture, in cancelling the export CLASS was given 10 days
CLASS was given 10 days to submit its exhibits, and
RIGHTS/PRIVILEGES
201. American Inter-Fashion vs. OP
Private Respondent Glorious Sun Fashion
was found guilty by Garments and Textile Export
Board (GTEB) of dollar salting and mis-declaration of
importations. As a result, its export quotas were
cancelled. After GTEB rendered its decision, Glorious
filed with the Court a petition for certiorari and
prohibition contending that its right to due process
of law was violated and that GTEB decision was not
supported by substantial evidence. However, in
1984, Glorious filed a manifestation of its intention
to withdraw such petition, to which the Court
granted. After 2 years, Glorious filed with GTEB a
petition for restitution of its export quota allocation
and requested for a reconsideration of the GTEB
decision, alleging that the cancelling of its export
quota was rendered as a result of duress and undue
influence exercised by former Minister Roberto V.
Ongpin in order to transfer Glorious export quotas to
“Marcos crony-owned” corporations. Glorious
further alleged that it was coerced by Mr. Roberto
Ongpin to withdraw its petition and to enter into
joint venture agreements paving the way for the
creation of De Soleil Apparel and American Inter-
Fashion Corporation (AIFC). GTEB denied the petition
of Glorious. An appeal was then taken to the Office
of the President. AIFC, herein petitioner, filed its
opposition to Glorious’ appeal claiming that the
GTEB decision has long been final. The Office of the
President ruled in favor of Glorious and remanded
the case to GTEB for further proceedings. Hence, this
petition.
WON Glorious Sun Fashion was accorded
due process in relation to the 1984 GTEB decision.
No. Glorious was denied due process when
GTEB failed to disclose evidence used by it in
rendering a resolution against Glorious. Contrary to
quotas of the private respondent GTEB violated the
private respondent’s constitutional right to due
process. Before the cancellation, Glorious had been
enjoying export quotas granted to it since 1977. In
effect the private respondent’s export quota
allocation which initially was a privilege evolved into
some form of property right which should not be
removed from it arbitrarily and without due process
only to hurriedly confer it on another. In the case
of Mabuhay Textile Mills Corporation v. Ongpin, the
petitioner was never given the chance to present its
side before its export quota allocations were
revoked and its officers suspended. While it is true
that such allocations as alleged by the Board are
mere privileges which it can revoke and cancel as it
may deem fit, these privileges have been accorded
to petitioner for so long that they have become
impressed with property rights especially since not
only do these privileges determine the continued
existence of the petitioner but also the livelihood of
some 700 workers and their families.
ART XII SEC 1: CANCELLATION OF PROPERTY
RIGHTS/PRIVILEGES
202. Alliance of DFLO v. Laguesma
The Alliance of Democratic Free Labor
Organization (ADFLO) filed an application for
registration as a national federation alleging among
others that it has 12 affiliates. After evaluation and
compliance of requirements, the Bureau of Labor
Relations (BLR) issued the Certificate of Registration.
The Confederation of Labor and Allied Social Services
(CLASS) filed a petition for the cancellation of the
Registration Certificate issued to ADFLO on the
ground that the documents submitted by ADFLO
were simulated. The BLR, through Director Pura,
cancelled the registration of ADFLO. ADFLO appealed
to Secretary of labor Torres which was granted, and
the case was remanded to the BLR. On the first
hearing, CLASS was not yet ready with its evidence.
ADFLO to comment thereon. CLASS files its Formal
Offer of Evidence. ADFLO filed an Objection to
Admission of Exhibits on the ground that they were
not marked nor identified by any witness during the
hearing of the case. BLR Director Pura, without first
ruling on the admissibility of the exhibits of CLASS
and without any further hearing, rendered an order
affirming its previous decision. ADFLO moved to
reconsider such decision on the ground that it was
denied the right to a hearing. Undersecretary
Laguesma issued an Order denying ADFLO's Motion
for Reconsideration. ADFLO appealed to the
Secretary of Labor but failed to act on its appeal.
Hence, this petition.
WON the decision of cancelling the
registration of petitioner is a violation of the due
process clause.
Yes. While, in general, administrative
agencies exercising quasi-judicial powers, like the
DOLE, are free from the rigidity of certain procedural
requirements, they are nonetheless bound by law
and practice to observe the fundamental and
essential requirements of due process in justiciable
cases presented before them. The most basic tenet
of due process is the right to be heard, and as
applied in administrative proceedings,
an opportunity to explain one's side. Such
opportunity was denied petitioner in this case. The
cancellation of a certificate of registration is the
equivalent of snuffing out the life of a labor
organization. For without such registration, it loses
its rights under the Labor Code. Under the
circumstances, petitioner was indisputably entitled
to be heard before a judgment could be rendered
cancelling its certificate of registration.
ART XII SEC 1: CANCELLATION OF PROPERTY
RIGHTS/PRIVILEGES
203. ABAKADA vs. Ermita

This is a consolidated case. Petitioners
ABAKADA GURO Party List challenged the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 9337 for authorizing the
President to raise the VAT to 12% after meeting
certain conditions. The Association of Pilipinas Shell
Dealers, Inc. also assail R.A. No. 9337 for requiring
that the input tax on depreciable goods be
amortized over a 60-month period, and for imposing
a 70% limit on the amount of input tax to be credited
against the output tax. Petitioners argue that the law
is unconstitutional, as it constitutes abandonment by
Congress of its exclusive authority to fix the rate of
taxes. Also, they contend that these provisions are
unconstitutional for being arbitrary and oppressive
for imposing limitations on the amount of input tax
that may be claimed. Input tax partakes the nature
of a property that may not be confiscated,
appropriated, or limited without due process of law.
Like any other property or property right, the input
tax credit may be transferred or disposed of, and
that by limiting the same, the government gets to tax
a profit or value-added even if there is no profit or
value-added. Petitioners also believe that these
provisions violate the constitutional guarantee of
equal protection of the law as the limitation on the
creditable input tax is not based on real and
substantial differences to meet a valid classification.
WON there was a violation of the due
process and equal protection under Article III Section
1 of the 1987 Constitution.
No. The doctrine is that where the due
process and equal protection clauses are invoked,
considering that they are not fixed rules but rather
broad standards, there is a need for proof of such
persuasive character as would lead to such a
conclusion. Absent such a showing, the
presumption of validity must prevail. Petitioners
claim that the limitations on the amount of input tax
that may be claimed would result to a portion of the
input tax which cannot now be credited against the
output tax. Petitioners argument assumes that the
input tax exceeds 70% of the output tax, and
therefore, the input tax in excess of 70% remains
uncredited. Their analysis of the effect of the 70%
limitation is incomplete. It ends at the net effect that
there will be unapplied/unutilized inputs VAT for a
given quarter. It does not proceed further to the fact
that such unapplied/unutilized input tax may be
credited in the subsequent periods as allowed by the
carry-over provision. The input tax is not a property
or a property right within the constitutional purview
of the due process clause. A VAT-registered persons
entitlement to the creditable input tax is a mere
statutory privilege. The state may change or take
away rights, which were created by the law of the
state, although it may not take away property, which
was vested by virtue of such rights.
ART XII SEC 1: CANCELLATION OF PROPERTY
RIGHTS/PRIVILEGES
204. British American Tobacco vs. Camacho
Petitioner British American Tobacco
introduced and sold 3 kinds Lucky Strike cigarettes
w/ SRP P9.90/pack. They were initially assessed with
excise tax of 8.96php. RMO 6-2003 provides for the
guidelines and procedures in establishing current net
retail prices of new brands of cigarettes and alcohol
products. RR 22-2003 was issued to implement the
revised tax classification of certain new brands
introduced in the market after January 1, 1997 based
on the survey of their current net retail prices.  This
increased the excise tax to P13.44. This cause
petitioner to file before the RTC of Makati a petition
for injunction with prayer for issuance of a TRO
and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction sought to
enjoin the implementation on the ground that they
discriminate against new brands of cigarettes in
violation of the equal protection and uniformity
provisions of the Constitution. RTC dismissed the
petition. While petitioner's appeal was pending, RA
9334 took effect which increased petitioners excise
tax to P25/pack. Petitioner prayed for a downward
classification of Lucky Strike products at the bracket
taxable at P 8.96/pack.
WON RA 9334 of the classification freeze
provision is unconstitutional for violating the  equal
protection and uniformity provisions  of the
Constitution.
No. It suffices that the laws operate equally
and uniformly on all persons under similar
circumstances, the conditions not being
different. Thus, classification if rational in character
is allowable. SC previously held: "Equality and
uniformity in taxation means that all taxable articles
or kinds of property of the same class shall be taxed
at the same rate. The taxing power has the authority
to make reasonable and natural classifications for
purposes of taxation.” Under the rational basis test,
a legislative classification, to survive an equal
protection challenge, must be shown to rationally
further a legitimate state interest. Since every law
has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality,
the burden of proof is on the one attacking the
constitutionality of the law to prove beyond
reasonable doubt that the legislative classification is
without rational basis. The presumption of
constitutionality can only be overcome if
classification is a hostile and oppressive
discrimination against particular classes, and that
there is no conceivable basis which might support it.
The classification is considered valid and reasonable
if:
(1) it rests on substantial distinctions;
(2) it is germane to the purpose of the law;
(3) it applies, all things being equal, to both
present and future conditions; and
(4) it applies equally to all those belonging to
the same class. 
ARTICLE III, SEC 1:
P. Administrative and Preliminary Investigation-
Ombudsman
205. Roxas vs. Vasquez
Peti ti oner Roxas was the Chairman,
while Nacpil was a Member, of the Bids
and Awards Committee of the Philippine
Constabulary-Integrated National Police (PC-
INP). The PC-INP invited bids for the supply of sixty-
five units of fire trucks. The Bids and Awards
Committee voted to award the contract to the Tahei
Co., Ltd., manufacturer of Nikko-Hino. Accordingly,
the contract was executed between PC-INP and
Tahei Co. The COA later discovered that there was a
discrepancy in the amounts indicated on the
disbursement voucher and the purchase
order. Thus, the DILG Secretary fi led a
complaint with the Ombudsman against
offi cers of PC-INP and the peti ti oners.
                After prelim investigation, the deputy omb
for the militaryrecommended the indictment of all
respondents except Ramirez. On review the office of
the special prosecutor recommended the dismissal
of complaints against roxas nacpil and other. Formal
charges were filed with the SB against Nazareno,
Flores, Tanchanco, Custodio, Osia, Espeña and
Santos. Flores and Tanchanco moved for a
reinvestigation, which was granted. Thereafter, the
Office of the Special Prosecutor recommended the
dismissal of the charges against Flores and
Tanchanco. In the same resolution, however, the
Special Prosecutor made a sudden turn about as
regards Roxas, Nacpil and Kairan, and ordered their
inclusion as accused.
Whether or not the inclusion of the
petitioners as accused impaired their constitutional
rights and as such SC may interfere?
Yes. Ordinarily, SC will not interfere with
the discretion of the Ombudsman to determine
whether there exists reasonable ground to believe
that a crime has been committed and that the
accused is probable guilty thereof and, thereafter, to
file the corresponding information with the
appropriate courts. However, SC find that the case at
bar falls under one of the recognized exceptions to
this rule, more specifically, the constitutional rights
of the accused are impaired and the charges are
manifestly false. In cases where the Ombudsman and
the Special Prosecutor were unable to agree on
whether or not probable cause exists, the Supreme
Court may interfere with the findings and
conclusions.
ARTICLE III, SEC 1:
P. Administrative and Preliminary Investigation-
Ombudsman
206. Ocampo v Omb
Facts: Petitioner is the Training Coordinator of.
NIACONSULT, INC., a subsidiary of the National
Irrigation Administration. NIACONSULT conducted
the training program for six Nepalese Junior
Engineers from February 6 to March , 1989.ADBN,
thru its representative, Gmbh Technical Cooperation
of the Federal Republic of Germany paid to the
petitioner the agreed training fee in two installments
of P61,488.00 and P143,472.00. NIACONSULT
demand the total training fee paid by ADBN which
petitioner personally received.Petitioner failed to
remit such thus, NIACONSULT filed an admin case
before respondent for serious misconduct before the
Omb
Omb issued an order requiring petitioner to
file a counter-affidavit within 10 days from receipt
with a caveat that failure to file the same would be
deemed a waiver of his right to present evidence.
Petitioner failed to comply with the said order. Omb
again issued same order a year later. Likewise
petitioner did not respond. Later Omb issued the
assailed Resolution, dismissing petitioner from the
service, with forfeiture of benefits and special
perpetual disqualification to hold office in the
government or any goccs. Petitioner filed his MR
raising the denial of his due process but was denied.
Hence, the petition.
Issue: W/N the petitioner was deprived of due
process in the case at bar?
Held: No. The essence of due process is an
opportunity to be heard. One may be heard, not
solely by verbal presentation but also, and perhaps
even many times more creditably and practicable
than oral argument, through pleadings. In
administrative proceedings, moreover, technical
rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly
applied; administrative due process cannot be fully
equated to due process in its strict judicial sense.A
party who chooses not to avail of the opportunity to
answer the charges cannot complain of a denial of
due process.—Petitioner’s failure to present
evidence is solely of his own making and cannot
escape his own remissness by passing the blame on
the graft investigator.
ARTICLE III, SEC 1:
P. Administrative and Preliminary Investigation-
Ombudsman
207. Serapio vs SB
Facts: Petitioner was a member of the Board of
Trustees and the Legal Counsel of the Erap Muslim
Youth Foundation, a non-stock, non-profit
foundation providing educational opportunities. In
2000 Petittioner, received a donation of (P200
Million) from Ilocos Sur Governor Singson. Later
Gov. Singson publicly accused President Estrada and
his cohorts of anomalies and filed with the Omb
several criminal charges against Joseph Estrada,
Jinggoy Estrada and petitioner, together with other
persons.
Subsequently, petitioner filed his Counter-
Affidavit.  The Office of the Ombudsman conducted a
preliminary investigation of the complaints and later
issued a joint resolution recommending, inter alia,
that Joseph Estrada, petitioner and several others be
charged with the criminal offense of plunder.
 Later Omb filed an amended Information with
SB charging Estrada and several co-accused,
including petitioner, with plunder. Petitioner filed
MR before SB to Direct the Ombudsman to Conduct
a Reinvestigation of the Charges against him. Later
the SB finding probable cause in the case issued
warrant of arrest to which the petitioner voluntarily
surrendered. Petitioner later filed motion to quash
upon cancellation of the bail which they sought
earlier which was denied. Hence the petition for
review where the petitioner raised an argument that
SB committed GAD in denying his earlier MR to
direct the Ombudsman to conduct a reinvestigation
of the charges him thus, prejudicial to his rights and
interest.
Issue: WON SB committed GAD amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in denying petitioner’s
MR, notwithstanding that the ombudsman had
totally disregarded exculpatory evidence and
committed grave and manifest errors of law
seriously prejudicial to his rights and interests?
Held: No. the right to a preliminary investigation is
not a constitutional right, but is merely a right
conferred by statute. The absence of a preliminary
investigation does not impair the validity of the
Information or otherwise render the same defective
and neither does it affect the jurisdiction of the court
over the case or constitute a ground for quashing the
Information.  If the lack of a preliminary investigation
does not render the Information invalid nor affect
the jurisdiction of the court over the case, with more
reason can it be said that the denial of a motion for
reinvestigation cannot invalidate the Information or
oust the court of its jurisdiction over the
case. Neither can it be said that petitioner had been
deprived of due process. He was afforded the
opportunity to refute the charges against him during
the preliminary investigation.
ARTICLE III, SEC 1:
P. Administrative and Preliminary Investigation-
Ombudsman
208. US v Toribio
Facts: Sometime in the 1900s, Toribio applied for a
license to have his carabao be slaughtered. His
request was denied because his carabao is found not
to be unfit for work. He nevertheless slaughtered his
carabao without the necessary license. He was
eventually sued and was sentenced by the trial
court. His counsel in one way or the other argued
that the law mandating that one should acquire a
permit to slaughter his carabao is not a valid exercise
of police power.
Issue: Whether or not the contention of Toribio’s
counsel that “said law mandating one to acquire a
permit to slaughter his carabao is invalid exercise of
police power” is proper?
Held: No. the law in question "is not a taking of the
property for public use, within the meaning of the
constitution, but is a just and legitimate exercise of
the power of the legislature to regulate and restrain
such particular use of the property as would be
inconsistent with or injurious to the rights of the
public. All property is acquired and held under the
tacit condition that it shall not be so used as to
injure the equal rights of others or greatly impair
the public rights and interest of the community.
MP: The State may interfere wherever the public
interests demand it, and in this particular a large
discretion is necessarily vested in the legislature to
determine, not only what the interests of the public
require, but what measures are necessary for the
protection of such interests.
ARTICLE III, SEC 1:
P. Administrative and Preliminary Investigation-
Ombudsman
209. Churchill v. Raferty
Facts: Appellees, Francis A. Churchill and Stewart
Tait are involved in the advertising business,
particularly in billboard advertising. Their billboards
located upon private lands in the Province of Rizal
were removed upon complaints and by the orders of
the defendant Collector of Internal Revenue by
virtue of the provisions of subsection (b) of section
100 of Act No. 2339.  
Appellees, in their supplementary complaint
challenge the power of the of the Collector of
Internal Revenue to remove any sign, signboard, or
billboard upon the ground that the same is offensive
to the sight or is otherwise a nuisance and maintain
that the billboards in question “in no sense constitute
a nuisance and are not deleterious to the health,
morals, or general welfare of the community, or of
any persons.” Defendant Collector of Internal
Revenue avers that after due investigation made
upon the complaints of the British and German
Consuls, the defendant “decided that the billboard
complained of was and still offensive to the sight and
is otherwise a nuisance.” 
Issue: Was the enactment assailed by the plaintiffs
was a legitimate exercise of the police power of the
Government?
Held: Yes. From whatever direction the social,
economic, or general welfare of the people is
menaced, there is legal justification for the exercise
of the police power; and the use of private property
may be regulated or restricted to whatever extent
may be necessary to preserve inviolate these
declared essentials to the well being of the public.
ARTICLE III, SEC. 1: Substantive Due Process
210. People v. Fajardo, et al.
FACTS: Due to a typhoon, respondents’ residential
house got destroyed. As they were only leasing a
residential house due to the aforementioned fact,
they sought permit from the incumbent mayor of
Baao, CamSur to construct a building adjacent to
their gasoline station on a parcel of land registered
in Fajardo's name, located along the national
highway and separated from the public plaza by a
creek. The request was nonetheless denied for the
reason that the proposed building would destroy the
view or beauty of the public plaza. The basis of the
denial was the ordinance, now in question, passed
by Fajardo himself when he was then mayor of the
mentioned municipality. The said ordinance states,
“Any person or persons who will construct or repair
a building should, before constructing or repairing,
obtain a written permit from the Municipal Mayor.”
Even in the absence of the permit, herein
respondents proceeded with the construction of the
building hence a complaint was filed against them.
Both the justice of the peace court and Court of First
Instance ruled (convicted, ordered to pay and
demolish the constructed building) in favor of the
municipality while the CA forwarded the case to the
SC because of the attack on the constitutionality of
the said ordinance. Hence this instant petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinance may stand to
restrict respondents’ lawful use of their property.
RULING: No. The ordinance is unreasonable and
oppressive, in that it operates to permanently
deprive appellants of the right to use their own
property; hence, it oversteps the bounds of police
power, and amounts to a taking of appellants
property without just compensation. To legally
achieve the preservation of the aesthetic appearance
of the community by prohibiting structures offensive
to the sight, the municipality must give appellants
just compensation and an opportunity to be heard.
MAIN POINT: Aesthetics may be used as reason for
“taking,” but then there must be due process and
just compensation. (Bernas Commentary)
ARTICLE III, SEC. 1: Substantive Due Process
211. Ermita-Malate Hotel & Operator v. City of
Manila
FACTS: The petitioners filed a petition for prohibition
against Ordinance No. 4760 (approved by Astorga,
then acting mayor) for being violative of the due
process clause, contending that said ordinance is not
only arbitrary, unreasonable or oppressive but also
vague, indefinite and uncertain, and likewise allege
the invasion of the right to privacy and the guaranty
against self-incrimination.
Ordinance No. 4760 has the following provisions:
1. Refraining from entertaining or accepting any
guest or customer unless it fills out a prescribed form
in the lobby in open view;
2. prohibiting admission o less than 18 years old;
3. usurious increase of license fee to P4,500 and
6,000 o 150% and 200% respectively (tax issue also);
4. making unlawful lease or rent more than twice
every 24 hours; and
5. cancellation of license for subsequent violation.
The lower court ruled in favor of the petitioners.
Hence, the appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinance is violative of
the due process clause.
RULING/MAIN POINT: No. The due process
contention is untenable. There is no controlling and
precise definition of due process. There is no
controlling and precise definition of due process. It
furnishes though a standard to which governmental
action should conform in order that deprivation of
life, liberty or property, in each appropriate case,
be valid. The standard of due process which must
exist both as a procedural and as substantive
requisite to free the challenged ordinance, or any
governmental action for that matter, from
imputation of legal infirmity, is responsiveness to the
supremacy of reason. obedience to the dictates of
justice. It would be an affront to reason to
stigmatize an ordinance enacted precisely to meet
what a municipal lawmaking body considers an evil
of rather serious pro portions as an arbitrary and
capricious exercise of authority. What should be
deemed unreasonable and what would amount to an
abdication of the power to govern is inaction in the
face of an admitted deterioration of the state of
public morals.
ARTICLE III, SEC. 1: Substantive Due Process
212. Ynot v. Intermediate Court of Appeals (IAC)
FACTS: EO No. 626-A was enacted prohibiting the
inter-provincial movement of carabaos. Herein
petitioner, however, had transported six carabaos in
a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo and for this
reason, the carabaos were outrightly confiscated by
the police for the violation of the above measure.
Hence, the petitioner sued for recovery (carabaos
were returned), but when the RTC sustained the
confiscation of the carabaos, the bond was ordered
confiscated upon failure to return the carabaos.
When the petitioner appealed the decision to the
IAC, the latter upheld the trial court’s decision. Thus,
the petitioner now challenges the constitutionality of
the EO as it authorizes outright confiscation of the
carabao being transported across provincial
boundaries.
ISSUE: Whether or not Executive Order No. 626-A
unconstitutional because it violates the due process
of law.
RULING/ MAIN POINT: Yes.Due process, generally
speaking, may not be dispensed with because they
are intended as a safeguard against official
arbitrariness. To justify the State’s exercise of police
power, it must appear, first, that the interests of the
public generally require such interference; and
second, that the means are reasonably necessary for
the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals. In this case, while
conceding that the amendatory measure has the
same lawful subject as the original executive order
(for the benefit of the small farmers who rely on
carabaos for energy needs), it cannot be said with
equal certainty that it complies with the second
requirement (lawful method). The questioned order
imposes an absolute ban not on the slaughter of the
carabaos but on their movement thus there is no
reasonable connection between the means
employed and the purpose sought to be achieved.
Hence, The SC ruled that the challenged measure is
an invalid exercise of the police power because the
method employed to conserve the carabaos is not
reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and,
worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated
because the owner of the property confiscated is
denied the right to be heard in his defense and is
immediately condemned and punished.
ARTICLE III, SEC. 1: Substantive Due Process
213. Agustin v. Edu (Land Transportation
Commissioner)
FACTS: Former President Marcos issued a letter of
instruction (LOI), effective immediately and to be
implemented immediately, directing all owners,
users or drivers of motor vehicles shall have at all
times in their motor vehicles at least one (1) pair of
early warning device. The issuance of the LOI was by
virtue of the exercise of the State’s police power in
order to prevent fatal or serious accidents in land
transportation for the interest of safety on all streets
and highways. Now, herein petitioner, an owner of a
Volkswagen Beetle car assails the constitutionality of
the LOI for it being an oppressive, unreasonable
exercise of police power because it violates the
guarantee of due process.
ISSUE: Whether or not the letter of instruction
providing for an early seaming device for motor
vehicles is violative of the constitutional guarantee
of due process.
RULING: No. The Letter of Instruction is a valid police
power measure. Police power has a broad and
expansive scope to meet the exigencies of the times.
Hence, the exercise of such great power of the state
is given the presumption of validity. It was thus a
heavy burden to be shouldered by petitioner,
compounded by the fact that the particular police
power measure challenged was clearly intended to
promote public safety. The issuance of such Letter of
Instruction is encased in the armor of prior, careful
study by the Executive Department. To set it aside
for alleged repugnancy to the due process clause is
to give sanction to conjectural claims that exceeded
even the broadest permissible limits of a pleader's
well known penchant for exaggeration.
MAIN POINT: The exercise of police power, such as
the regulation requiring cars to be equipped with
“early warning devises” (EWD), does not require
notice and hearing in the promulgation of general
regulations for the benefit of general welfare.
(Bernas Commentary)
ARTICLE III, SEC. 1: Substantive Due Process
214. Balacuit v. CFI
FACTS: The Municipal Board of the City of Butuan
passed an ordinance penalizing the selling of
admission tickets to any movie or other public
performances that require children between seven
(7) and twelve (12) years of age to pay full payment
for tickets intended for adults but should charge only
one-half of the said ticket. Herein petitioners are all
managers of theaters and they filed a complaint
before the Court of First Instance praying that the
said ordinance be declared unconstitutional on the
ground that it is an invalid exercise of police power
and violates the due process clause of the
Constitution for being oppressive, unfair, unjust,
confiscatory, and an undue restraint of trade.
Respondent court ruled in favor of respondent city
whose contention is that the questioned ordinance is
for the welfare of the public.
ISSUE: Whether or not the questioned ordinance
violates the due process clause of the Constitution.
RULING: Yes.It is already settled that the operation
of theaters, cinematographs and other places of
public exhibition are subject to regulation by the
municipal council in the exercise of delegated police
power by the local government. However, to invoke
the exercise of police power, not only must it appear
that the interest of the public generally requires an
interference with private rights , but the means
adopted must be reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals. In this case, the
ordinance is not justified by any necessity for the
public interest. The ordinance is clearly
unreasonable if not unduly oppressive upon the
business of petitioners. Moreover, there is no
discernible relation between the ordinance and the
promotion of public health, safety, morals and the
general welfare.
MAIN POINT: There can be no valid exercise of
police power if there is no discernible relation
between the ordinance (or law) and the promotion
of public health, safety, morals, and the general
welfare. (Bernas reviewer)
Art III Section 1. Substantive Due Process
215. National Development Co. (NDC) & New Agrix
v. Phil Veterans Bank (PVB)
AGRIX had executed in favor of private
respondent Philippine Veterans Bank a real estate
mortgage over 3 parcels of land in Los Baños,
Laguna. During the existence of the mortgage, AGRIX
went bankrupt. It was for the expressed purpose of
salvaging this and the other Agrix companies that the
PD 1717 was issued, which ordered the rehabilitation
of the Agrix Group of Companies to be administered
mainly by the NDC. The law outlined the procedure
for filling claims against the Agrix Companies and
created a Claims Committee to process these claims.
Private respondent PVBfiled a claim with the AGRIX
Claims Committee for the payment of its loan credit
pursuant to PD 1717.
Petitioner NDC invoking Sec. 4 (1) of the decree, filed
a petition with the RTC, for the cancellation of the
mortgage lien against it. Respondent took steps to
extrajudicially foreclose the mortgage, prompting the
petitioner to file a second case with the same court
to stop the foreclosure. Respondents argue that
property rights, like all rights, are subject to
regulation under the police power for the promotion
of the common welfare.
RTC to held in favor of the respondent on
the ground of unconstitutionality of the decree for
violating the equal protection clause. Hence, this
petition.
W/N PD 1717 is an invalid exercise of the
police power thus entitling Philippine Veterans Bank
as creditor of Agrix for payment.
Yes. PD 1717 is an invalid exercise of the
police power, the extinction of the mortgage and
other liens and of the interest and other charges
pertaining to the legitimate creditors of Agrix
constitutes taking without due process of law, and
this is compounded by the reduction of the secured
creditors to the category of unsecured creditors in
violation of the equal protection clause.
A mortgage lien is a property right derived from
contract and so comes under the protection of Bill of
rights so do interests on loans, as well as penalties
and charges, which are also vested rights once they
accrue. Private property cannot simply be taken by
law from one person and given to another without
just compensation and any known public purpose.
Main point in bold.
Art III Section 1. Substantive Due Process
216. Maranaw Hotel v. NLRC
Facts:
Eddie Damalerio, a room attendant for Maranaw
Hotel, was seen by hotel guest Jamie Glaser with left
hand inside the latter's suitcase.
Glaser lodged a written complaint before shift-in-
charge of security of the hotel which was brought to
the chief. Damalerio was given a Disciplinary Action
Notice. An administrative hearing was conducted on
the matter. Taking the witness stand on his own
behalf, Damalerio denied the accusation against him,
Damalerio received a memorandum issued stating
that he was found to have committed qualified theft
in violation of House Rule No. 1, Section 3 of Hotel
Rules and Regulations. The same memorandum
served as a notice of termination of his employment.
Damalerio filed with the Labor Arbiter a Complaint
for illegal dismissal against the petitioner. After the
parties had sent in their position papers, Labor
Arbiter Diosana decided the case in favor of the
respondent.
Issue:
W/N not respondent NLRC committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in holding
that petitioner failed to adduce conclusive evidence
in support of its version of the incident, considering
the fact that the evidence on record ineluctably
shows that private respondent was caught in
flagrante delicto; and
Ruling:
NO. Records disclose petitioner's failure to
substantiate such imputation against him. During the
investigation presided over by the Labor Arbiter,
unsubstantiated suspicions and baseless
conclusions by employers are not legal justification
for dismissing employees. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the employee, in keeping with
the principle of social justice enshrined in the
Constitution.
Damalerio was illegally dismissed thus he is entitled
to be paid full back wages and be reinstated.
Main point in bold.
Art III Section 1. Substantive Due Process
217. Magtajas v. Pryce Properties
Facts:
PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan
de Oro City. It leased a portion of a building
belonging to Pryce Properties Corporations, Inc.,
renovated & equipped the same, and prepared to
inaugurate its casino during the Christmas season.
Petitioners opposed the casino’s opening as violative
of Ordinance No. 3353, prohibiting the issuance of
business permit and canceling existing business
permit to the establishment for the operation of the
casino, and Ordinance No. 3375-93, prohibiting the
operation of the casino and providing a penalty for
its violation.
Respondents assailed the validity of the ordinances
on the ground that they both violated PD 1869 which
created PAGCOR to help centralize and regulate
games of chance.
Petitioners contend that, pursuant to the LGC, they
have the police power authority to prohibit the
operation of casino for the general welfare.
CA ruled in favor of respondents. Hence, the petition
for review.
Issue:
W/N the ordinances are valid.
Ruling:
NO. CDO City, like other local political subdivisions, is
empowered to enact ordinances for the purposes
indicated in the LGC. It is expressly vested with the
police power under what is known as the General
Welfare Clause.
However, an ordinance must conform to the
following substantive requirements:
1) It must not contravene the constitution or any
statute.
2) It must not be unfair or oppressive.
3) It must not be partial or discriminatory.
4) It must not prohibit but may regulate trade.
5) It must be general and consistent with public
policy.
6) It must not be unreasonable.
Ordinances should not contravene a statute. Casino
gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. This decree has
the status of a statute that cannot be amended or
nullified by a mere ordinance. Local councils
exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred
on them by Congress as the national lawmaking
body. The delegate cannot be superior to the
principal or exercise powers higher than those of
the latter.
Main point in bold.
Art III Section 1. Substantive Due Process
218. Bennis v. Michigan
Facts:
Bennis's husband was convicted of gross indecency
following his sexual activity with a prostitute in the
couple's jointly-owned car. The local county
prosecutor filed a complaint alleging the car was a
public nuisance subject to abatement (i.e., to
eliminate or confiscate the car). The Circuit Court
entered the abatement order, but the Appeals Court
reversed. After granting leave to appeal, the
Supreme Court of Michigan reversed the appellate
court's decision and re-entered the abatement
order. Bennis appealed to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
W/N the abatement order entered against Bennis's
car constitute a taking of private property for public
use.
Ruling:
NO. The abatement order against Bennis's car did
not violate the takings clause. Her innocence and
lack of knowledge concerning her husband's illegal
and indecent activity, in the couple's jointly owned
car, could not serve as a defense against her
vehicle's forfeiture. Furthermore, under the present
circumstances, the vehicle's forfeiture did not
violate Bennis's property rights without due
process. Michigan's abatement policy, aimed at
deterring criminal uses of property, lawfully
transferred her vehicle to the state. As such,
Michigan is not required to compensate Bennis for
the vehicle's forfeiture.
Main point in bold.
Art III Section 1. Substantive Due Process
219. Cruzan v. Dir. Missouri
Facts:
Nancy Beth Cruzan was involved in an automobile
accident which left her in a "persistent vegetative
state." She was sustained for several weeks by
artificial feedings through an implanted gastronomy
tube. Cruzan's parents attempted to terminate the
life-support system. State hospital officials refused to
do so without court approval. Missouri Supreme
Court ruled in favor of the state's policy over
Cruzan's right to refuse treatment.
Issue:
W/N the Due Process Clause permits Cruzan's
parents to refuse life-sustaining treatment on their
daughter's behalf.
Ruling:
YES. While individuals enjoyed the right to refuse
medical treatment under the Due Process Clause,
incompetent persons were not able to exercise such
rights. Absent "clear and convincing" evidence that
Cruzan desired treatment to be withdrawn, the
Court found the State of Missouri's actions designed
to preserve human life to be constitutional. Because
there was no guarantee family members would
always act in the best interests of incompetent
patients, and because erroneous decisions to
withdraw treatment were irreversible, the Court
upheld the state's heightened evidentiary
requirements.
Main point in bold.
Section1, Article III
Administrative; Quasi-Judicial Proceedings;
Arbitration
9. Substantive Due Process
220. JMM Promotion and Management Inc. v. CA
Facts: Following the death of Maricris Sioson,
President Cory Aquino ordered a total ban against
deployment of performing artist abroad, However
after some protest the ban was removed provided
that the performing artist shall have an artist record
book (ARB) before the processing of their papers.
Now promoters are now questioning the validity of
the ARB requirement contending that it is
discriminatory, illegal and unconstitutional since it
violates various rights.
Issue: W/N requiring ARB deprived individual artists
of their licenses without due process of law
Ruling: No. Locally, the Professional Regulation
Commission has begun to require previously licensed
doctors and other professionals to furnish
documentary proof that they had either re-trained
or had undertaken continuing education courses as a
requirement for renewal of their licenses. It is not
claimed that these requirements pose an
unwarranted deprivation of a property right under
the due process clause. So long as professionals and
other workers meet reasonable regulatory
standards no such deprivation exists.
Main Point: IN BOLD
Section1, Article III
Administrative; Quasi-Judicial Proceedings;
Arbitration
9. Substantive Due Process
221. Corona v. United Harbor
Facts: PPA issued an administrative order PPA-AO
No. 04-92 limiting the term of appointment of
harbor pilots to one year subject to yearly renewal or
cancellation. Respondents now contend that they
are deprived due process since there was no hearing
or consultation done before the passing of the
administrative order. Especially since there is no
doubt that pilotage is a property right.
Issue: W/N the yearly “renewal “apparent that PPA-
AO No. 04-92 constitutes to deprivation of property
without due process of law
Ruling: Yes. It is readily apparent that PPA-AO No.
04-92 unduly restricts the right of harbor pilots to
enjoy their profession before their compulsory
retirement. In the past, they enjoyed a measure of
security knowing that after passing five examinations
and undergoing years of on-the-job training, they
would have a license which they could use until their
retirement, unless sooner revoked by the PPA for
mental or physical unfitness….Renewal of their
license is now dependent on a “rigid evaluation of
performance” which is conducted only after the
license has already been cancelled. Hence, the use of
the term “renewal.” It is this pre-evaluation
cancellation which primarily makes PPA-AO No. 04-
92 unreasonable and constitutionally infirm. In a real
sense, it is a deprivation of property without due
process of law.
Main Point: An administrative order that provides
for pre-evaluation cancellation of a license is
unreasonable and constitutionally infirm—in a real
sense, it is a deprivation of property without due
process of law.
Section1, Article III
Administrative; Quasi-Judicial Proceedings;
Arbitration
9. Substantive Due Process
222. Kelly v. Johnson
OG DIGESTER SAYS: (guys sorry tlg if ung mainpoint
is like that wala kasi full txt na free pero legit
naganito ang case)
Facts: Johnson (plaintiff), the president of the Suffolk
County Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association, sued to
challenge regulations established by Kelley
(defendant), the former commissioner of the Suffolk
County Police Department, The regulations dictated
the style and length of hair worn by male members
of the police force. Johnson argued that the
regulations violated his liberty interest that was
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. The
district court dismissed the case. The court of
appeals reversed. Kelley appealed.
Issue: W/N petitioner’s determination that such
regulations should be enacted is so irrational that it
may be branded ‘arbitrary,’ and therefore a
deprivation of respondent’s ‘liberty’ interest in
freedom to choose his own hairstyle.”
Ruling: No.  State and federal employers could
impose considerable restrictions on their employees
that could not be imposed on citizens outside that
employment context. The Court concluded that the
respondent failed to show the regulation was so
irrational that it was arbitrary and unconstitutional.
Main Point: A county regulation limiting the length
of county policemen's hair held not to violate any
right guaranteed  224. Cruz v. Flavier
Section1, Article III
Administrative; Quasi-Judicial Proceedings;
Arbitration
9. Substantive Due Process
223. Chavez v. Romulo
Facts: President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo delivered a
speech before the members of the PNP stressing the
need for a nationwide gun ban in all public places to
avert the rising crime incidents. She directed the
then PNP Chief, respondent Ebdane, to suspend the
issuance of Permits to Carry Firearms Outside of
Residence (PTCFOR). Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, a
licensed gun owner to whom a PTCFOR has been
issued, requested the Department of Interior and
Local Government (DILG) to reconsider the
implementation of the assailed Guidelines. However,
his request was denied.
Issue: W/N revocation of PTCFOR is a violation of
right to property hence denial of substantive due
process
Ruling: No. All property in the state is held subject
to its general regulations, necessary to the common
good and general welfare. In a number of cases, we
laid down the test to determine the validity of a
police measure, 1) The interests of the public
generally, as distinguished from those of a particular
class, require the exercise of the police power; and
(2) The means employed are reasonably necessary
for the accomplishment of the purpose and not
unduly oppressive upon individuals. Deeper
reflection will reveal that the test merely reiterates
the essence of the constitutional guarantees of
substantive due process, equal protection, and non-
impairment of property rights.
Main Point: IN BOLD
Section1, Article III
Administrative; Quasi-Judicial Proceedings;
Arbitration
9. Substantive Due Process
Facts:Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed
a suit for prohibition and mandamus, assailing the
constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act
No. 8371, otherwiseknown as the Indigenous
People’s Rights Act of 1997(IPRA) and its
implementing rules and regulations (IRR). The
petitioners assail certain provisions of the IPRA and
its IRR on the ground that these amount to an
unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over
lands of the public domain as well as minerals and
other natural resources In addition, petitioners
question the provisions of the IPRA defining the
powers and jurisdiction of the NCIP and making
customary law applicable to the settlement of
disputes involving ancestral domains and ancestral
lands on the ground that these provisions violate the
due process clause of the Constitution
Issue: W/N the IPRA violate the due process clause
of the Constitution since it only includes the
indigenous people
Ruling: No. The fact that the NCIP is composed of
members of the indigenous peoples does not mean
that it (the NCIP) is incapable, or will appear to be
so incapable, of delivering justice to the non-
indigenous peoples. A person’s possession of the
trait of impartiality desirable of a judge has nothing
to do with his or her ethnic roots. In this wise, the
indigenous peoples are as capable of rendering
justice as the non-indigenous peoples for, certainly,
the latter have no monopoly of the concept of
justice.
Main Point: IN BOLD
ART 3 SEC1: SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
225. Smith Kline v. CA
FACTS: Petitioner herein was granted a patent for
the manufacture, use, and sell of Cimetidine, which
is useful as an antihistamine and in the treatment of
ulcers, by the Bureau of Patents, Trademark and
Technology Transfer (BPTTT). Years after the grant of
such patent, private respondents applied for
compulsory patent for the use and manufacture of
medicines using Cimetidine. That under Sec 43 (1) (e)
of RA 165 or the Patent Law, that application for
compulsory patent may be issued upon the lapse of
2 year from the date of grant of such patent,
provided that its use and manufacture is necessary
for public health or public safety. Petitioner oppose
the issuance of this compulsory patent to private
respondent. However, BPTTT still issued the patent
with the payment to the former by the latter of 2.5%
of net sales from the sale of such as royalties. Still in
dismay, Petitioner went to appeal to the CA,
however the appellate court only concurred
ISSUE: Whether or not the grant of a compulsory
license to private respondent results in the
deprivation of petitioner’s property without just
compensation.
RULING:No. It must be pointed out that as owner of
Letters Patent No. 12207, petitioner had already
enjoyed exclusive rights to manufacture, use and
sell Cimetidine for at least two years from its grant,
Even if other entities like private respondent are
subsequently allowed to manufacture, use and sell
the patented invention by virtue of a compulsory
license, petitioner as owner of the patent would still
receive remuneration for the use of such product in
the form of royalties.
ART 3 SEC1: SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
226. Pareno v. COA
FACTS: After retiring from the AFP and receiving
pension benefits, herein petitioner, Salvador Pareno,
migrated to Hawaii and became a naturalized
American Citizen. The AFP, invoking Section 27 of PD
1638 (which provides the guidelines for AFP’s
retirement and separation benefits), stopped
releasing petitioner’s monthly pension. In the said
PD, those retirees who losses their Filipino
citizenship will have their benefits terminated. The
petitioner wanting to reinstate his monthly pension
payment, went to COA and filed a claim for the
continuance of his monthly pension. However, COA
dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Whether or not PD 1638 deprives or impairs
petitioners right to property (receiving monthly
pension) and due process as provided in the
constitution.
RULING: No. PD 1638, as amended, does not impair
any vested right or interest of petitioner. There was
no denial of due process in this case. When
petitioner lost his Filipino citizenship, the AFP had no
choice but to stop his monthly pension in accordance
with Section 27 of PD 1638, as amended.
MAIN POINT: Since petitioner abandoned his Filipino
citizenship, it is unequivocal that such vested right to
receive monthly pension has been terminated. Thus,
due process guarantee may not be invoked when no
vested right is present.
ART 3 SEC1: SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
227. Esponcilla v. Bagong Tanyag
FACTS: Upon failure of the petitioners, who has been
occupying in the disputed lots since 1978, to comply
with the requirements of the Community Mortgage
Program (CMP) of the National Home Mortgage
Finance Corporation (NHMFC) for the grant of loan
to be paid out the land owners of the land where
they have been occupying. The Bagong Tanyag
Homeowners’ Association Inc. (BATAHAI), herein
respondents and the organization in charge for the
distribution of such land to the occupants, delisted
said petitioners and reassigned the lots to others.
Contending that they have been deprived of due
process, petitioners brought the case before the
Home Insurance and Guaranty Corporation (HIGC),
which sustained the action of BATAHAI to delist
them. The CA also sustained the ruling of HIGC. Thus,
this petition for review on certiorari to reverse the
decision of the CA.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondents subdivided the
lots which they(petitioner) have been occupying
since 1978 without their knowledge and consent,
reassigned the lots without observing due process of
law.
RULING: No. The petitioners have been given
sufficient information of the action that may result if
they failed to comply with the requirement of
obtaining the loan and the period during which
petitioners occupied the lots, no matter how long,
did not vest them with any right to claim ownership
since it is a fundamental principle of law that acts of
possessory character executed by virtue of license or
tolerance of the owner, no matter how long, do not
start the running of the period of acquisitive
prescription.
MAIN POINT:The due process guarantee cannot be
invoked when no vested right has been acquired.
ART 3 SEC1: SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
228. BF Homeowners’ Association v. The City
Mayor, Paranaque

FACTS: Municipal Ordinance No. 97-08 was passed
converting El Grande and Aguirre Avenue inside of
BF Homes Paranaque to commercial zones. The
petitioners, United BF Homeowners’ Association Inc,
(UBFHAI), questioned the said ordinance before the
Court of Appeals. That such ordinance would
amount to impairment of contract between the lot
buyers and the developer which states that such lot
are residential lots and will tantamount to invalid
exercise of police power. Public Respondents
contends that the issuance of such ordinance is a
valid exercise of their police power. The CA ruled in
favor of the respondents citing the general welfare
clause of RA 7160 (Local Government Code). Still not
contented with the decision of the appellate court, a
petition for review of the CA decision was submitted
before the SC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the issuance of Municipal
Ordinance No. 97-08 is a valid exercise of police
power by the respondents.
RULING: Yes.Under Section 447 of RA 7160, the
Sangguniang Bayan or the Municipal Council, as the
legislative body of the municipality, has the power to
enact ordinances for the general welfare of the
municipality and its inhabitants.
MAIN POINT:That while non-impairment of
contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, the rule is
not absolute, the exercise of police power may be
judicially inquired into and corrected only if it is
capricious, whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, there
having been a denial of due process or a violation of
any other applicable constitutional guarantee.
ART 3 SEC1: SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
229. St. Luke’s v. NLRC
FACTS: Before the passage of RA 7431 or also known
as Radiologic Technology Act of 1992, which requires
Radio Technicians to acquire certification before
they could practice, Private petitioner, Maribel
Santos, was hired at St. Lukes in the Radiology
department. After the passage or RA 7431, the HR
department of St. Lukes notified Santos to comply
with the requirement of the said RA. Failure to
comply of Santos, led to her dismissal from the said
hospital. Before the NLRC, a decision was ruled in
favor of Santos subjecting the hospital to pay her
separation pay. The same ruling was given by the CA
upon appeal by herein petitioner. Petitioner
thereafter filed a petition for certiorari with the CA
which, as previously mentioned, affirmed the
decision of the NLRC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner by dismissing
private petitioner, Maribel Santos, amounts to the
deprivation of due process as required by law.
RULING: No. It is undeniable that her continued
employment without the required Board
certification exposed the hospital to possible
sanctions and even to a revocation of its license to
operate. Certainly, private respondent could not be
expected to retain petitioner Santos despite the
inimical threat posed by the latter to its business.
MAIN POINT: No malice or ill-will can be imputed
upon an employer where the separation of an
employee is undertaken by it conformably to an
existing statute. Justice, fairness and due process
demand that an employer should not be penalized
for situations where it had no participation or
control.
ART. III, SEC. 1, SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
230. Carlos Superdrug Corp. v. DSWD
FACTS: This case questions the constitutionality of
Sec. 4(a) of the Expanded Senior Citizens Act of 2003
(R.A. No. 9257) on the ground that it violates Art. III,
Sec. 1 of the Constitution. Said section provided the
grant of twenty percent (20%) discount in the
purchase of unbranded generic medicines from all
establishments dispensing medicines for the
exclusive use of the senior citizens. Petitioner
contends that said law is unconstitutional because it
constitutes deprivation of private property, alleging
that the law failed to provide a scheme whereby
drugstores will be justly compensated for the
discount.
ISSUE: Whether or not the assailed section is
unconstitutional on the ground that it violated the
due process clause for undue taking of property.
RULING: No. R.A. No. 9257 is a legitimate exercise of
police power which, similar to the power of eminent
domain, has general welfare for its object; when the
conditions so demand as determined by the
legislature, property rights must bow to the primacy
of police power because property rights, though
sheltered by due process, must yield to general
welfare
MAIN POINT: Subject to the determination of the
courts as to what is a proper exercise of police
power using the due process clause and the equal
protection clause as yardsticks, the State may
interfere wherever the public interests demand it,
and in this particular a large discretion is necessarily
vested in the legislature to determine, not only what
interests of the public require, but what measures
are necessary for the protection of such interests.
ART. III, SEC. 1, SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
231. Perez v. LPG Refillers Association of the
Philippines
FACTS: BP Blg. 33 was enacted to penalize illegal
trading, hoarding, overpricing, adulteration,
underdelivery, and underfilling of petroleum
products, as well as possession for trade of
adulterated petroleum products and of underfilled
liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) cylinders which sets
P20,000 and P50,000 as the minimum and maximum
penalties, respectively. The Department of Energy
issued a circular to implement the law. Respondent
filed a petition to nullify the circular on the ground
that it introduced offenses not included in the law
and by providing penalties on a per cylinder basis for
each violation which might exceed the maximum
penalty under the law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the amount of imposable fine
prescribed under the assailed Circular is excessive to
the extent of being confiscatory and thus offends the
Bill of Rights of the 1987 Constitution.
RULING: No. The Circular is not confiscatory in
providing penalties on a per cylinder basis. Those
penalties do not exceed the ceiling prescribed in
Section 4 of B.P. Blg. 33, as amended, which
penalizes “any person who commits any act [t]herein
prohibited.” Thus, violation on a per cylinder basis
falls within the phrase “any act” as mandated in
Section 4. To provide the same penalty for one who
violates a prohibited act in B.P. Blg. 33, as amended,
regardless of the number of cylinders involved would
result in an indiscriminate, oppressive and
impractical operation of B.P. Blg. 33, as amended.
The equal protection clause demands that “all
persons subject to such legislation shall be treated
alike, under like circumstances and conditions, both
in the privileges conferred and in the liabilities
imposed.”
MAIN POINT IN BOLD
OG DIGESTER SAYS: **Note for Case 242: Dyan lang
talaga may connect sa Art. III
ART. III, SEC. 1, SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
232. MMDA v. Viron
FACTS: To solve the worsening
traffic congestions problem in Metro Manila, the
President issued Executive Order (E.O.)
179―Providing for the Establishment of Greater
Manila Mass Transportation System. To decongest
traffic, petitioner Metropolitan Manila Development
Authority (MMDA) came up with a recommendation,
proposing the elimination of bus terminals located
along major Metro Manila thoroughfares, and the
construction of mass transport terminal facilities to
provide a more convenient access to the commuting
public. MMDA was designated as the implementing
agency. The respondents, which are engaged in the
business of public transportation with a provincial
bus operation assailed the constitutionality of said
E.O. They alleged that the E.O., insofar as it
permitted the closure of existing bus terminal,
constituted a deprivation of property without due
process because provincial bus operators would be
deprived of their real properties without due process
of law should they be required to use the common
bus terminals.
ISSUE: Whether or not the said EO is
unconstitutional on the ground that it constituted
deprivation of property without due process.
RULING: No. As to the alleged confiscatory character
of the E.O., it need only to be stated that
respondents’ certificates of public convenience
confer no property right, and are mere licenses or
privileges. As such, these must yield to legislation
safeguarding the interest of the people. Even then,
for reasons which bear reiteration, the MMDA
cannot order the closure of respondents’ terminals
not only because no authority to implement the
Project has been granted nor legislative or police
power been delegated to it, but also because the
elimination of the terminals does not satisfy the
standards of a valid police power measure.
MAIN POINT: A bus company’s certificate of public
convenience confers no property right, and are mere
licenses or privileges which must yield to legislation
safeguarding the interests of the people.
OG DIGESTER SAYS: **Note on Case No. 243: As to
deprivation of property, undue siya. However, the
same EO was still declared unconstitutional because
the it should have been the DOTC who should
implement the law. MMDA has no police power.
ART. III, SEC. 1, SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
233. Sec. of DND v. Manalo
FACTS: The brothers Raymond and Reynaldo
Manalo, farmers from Bulacan who were suspected
of being members of the New People’s Army, were
forcibly taken from their home, detained in various
locations, and tortured by CAFGU and military units.
After several days in captivity, respondents
recognized their abductors as members of the armed
forces led by General Jovito Palparan. They also
learned that they were being held in place for their
brother, Bestre, a suspected leader of the
communist insurgents. After eighteen months of
restrained liberty, torture and other dehumanizing
acts, the brothers were able to escape and file a
petition for the writ of amparo.
ISSUE: Whether or not the right to freedom from
fear is or can be protected by existing laws.
RULING: Yes. “The life to which each person has a
right is not a life lived in fear that his person and
property may be unreasonably violated by a
powerful ruler. Rather, it is a life lived with the
assurance that the government he established and
consented to, will protect the security of his person
and property. The ideal of security in life and
property pervades the whole history of man. It
touches every aspect of man’s existence.”
MAIN POINT: While the right to life under Article III,
Section 1 of the Constitution guarantees essentially
the right to be alive, the right to security of person is
a guarantee of the secure quality of this life; In a
broad sense, the right to security of person
“emanates in a person’s legal and uninterrupted
enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his health,
and his reputation, including the right to exist, and
the right to enjoyment of life while existing, and it is
invaded not only by a deprivation of life but also of
those things which are necessary to the enjoyment
of life according to the nature, temperament, and
lawful desires of the individual.”
OG DIGESTER SAYS: **Note on Case No. 244: This is
the first Amparo case. You might want to read
further about this just in case. :)
ART. III, SEC. 1, SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
234. Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs
Board
FACTS: R.A. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002 was implemented. Section 36
thereof requires mandatory drug testing of
candidates for public office, students of secondary
and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public
and private offices, and persons charged before the
prosecutor’s office with certain offenses. In its
Petition for Prohibition under Rule 65, petitioner, a
registered political party, seeks to prohibit DDB and
PDEA from enforcing paragraphs (c), (d), (f) and (g)
of Sec. 36 of RA 9165 on the ground that they are
constitutionally infirm on the ground that the
provisions trench in the equal protection clause
inasmuch as they can be used to harass people.
ISSUE: Whether or not the assailed sections of R.A.
9165 should be struck down as unconstitutional for
violating the due process clause.
RULING: No as to paragraphs (c) and (d) covering
students of secondary and tertiary schools and
those covering officers and employees of public and
private offices. The Court deduced that schools and
their administrators stand in loco parentis with
respect to their students and that they have the right
to impose conditions on applicants for admission
that are fair, just, and non-discriminatory. As to
employees and officers, the reduced expectation of
privacy on the part of the employees, the compelling
state concern likely to be met by the search, and the
well-defined limits set forth in the law to properly
guide authorities in the conduct of the random
testing, we hold that the challenged drug test
requirement is, under the limited context of the
case, reasonable and, ergo, constitutional. Yes as to
paragraphs (f) and (g) covering persons charged
before the prosecutor’s office with certain offenses
and candidates for election.  In the case of persons
charged with a crime before the prosecutor's office,
a mandatory drug testing can never be random or
suspicionless. To impose mandatory drug testing on
the accused is a blatant attempt to harness a medical
test as a tool for criminal prosecution. Drug testing in
this case would violate a person’s right to privacy. As
applied to electoral candidates, the requirement is
unconstitutional because it adds to the exclusive
qualifications for such offices as prescribed by the
Constitution.
MAIN POINT: In the case of persons charged with a
crime before the prosecutor’s office, a mandatory
drug testing can never be random or suspicionless;
To impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is
a blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a tool
for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated
objectives of RA 9165.
Art III Sec 1. Substantive Due Process
235. Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Atienza
FACTS: The SJS sought to compel respondent former
Manila City Mayor Atienza to enforce Ordinance No.
8027 which reclassified the area described therein
from industrial to commercial, and directed the
owners and operators of businesses disallowed
under the reclassification to cease and desist from
operating their businesses, which included the
Pandacan Terminals of the oil
companies, Chevron, Shell, Petron. The oil
companies sought for the nullification of the
ordinance, contending that it is unfair and
oppressive because they have invested billions of
pesos in the depot; it has discriminated against and
singled out the Pandacan Terminals; and that it
contravenes RA 7638 (Department of Energy Act of
1992) and RA 8479 (Downstream Oil Industry
Deregulation Law of 1998) which vests upon the
Department of Energy the jurisdiction over the
administration of the oil companies.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Ordinance No. 8027 is
constitutional.
RULING: YES. For an ordinance to be valid, it must
not only comply with the procedural requirements
of law but also with the ff. substantive
requirements: it (1) must not contravene the
Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair
or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or
discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may
regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent
with public policy and (6) must not be
unreasonable. Such are satisfied in the case at bar.
Ordinance No. 8027 was passed by the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Manila in the exercise of its police
power. It is not unfair nor oppressive as the
properties of the oil companies remain theirs and
only their use is restricted although they can be
applied to other profitable uses permitted in the
commercial zone. It was not partial nor
discriminatory as there was reasonable classification
because unlike the depot, the surrounding
community is not a high-value terrorist target. Any
damage caused by fire or explosion occurring in
those areas would be nothing compared to the
damage in the depot itself. Further, the ordinance
does not violate RA 7638 and RA 8749 as nothing in
these statutes prohibits the City of Manila from
enacting ordinances in the exercise of its police
power.
Art III Sec 1. Substantive Due Process
236. SEC v. Interport
FACTS: The SEC received reports that Interport
Resources Corporation (IRC) failed to make timely
public disclosures of its negotiations with
Ganda Holdings Berhad (GHB). SEC later issued an
Omnibus Order where it created a special
investigating panel to hear and decide the case in
accordance with the Prosecution and Enforcement
Department (PED) Rues of Practice and Procedure.
Upon appeal, the CA ruled that the PED Rules of
Practice and Procedure did not comply with the
statutory requirements contained in the
Administrative Code of 1997, as it affords a party the
right to be present but without the right to cross-
examine witnesses presented against him, in
violation of Section 12(3), Chapter 3, Book VII of the
Administrative Code
ISSUE: Whether or not the PED Rules of Practice and
Procedure was invalid since Section 8, Rule V thereof
failed to provide for the parties’ right to cross-
examination.
RULING: NO. Firstly, Section 4, Rule I of the PED
Rules of Practice and Procedure provides that
subject to the requirements of due process,
proceedings before the PED of the SEC shall be
summary in nature not necessarily adhering to or
following the technical rules of evidence obtaining in
the courts of law. Further, PED exercises powers
which are investigative in nature and Section 12,
Chapter 3, Rule VII of the Administrative Code affects
only the adjudicatory functions of administrative
bodies. In proceedings before administrative or
quasi-judicial bodies created under laws which
authorize summary proceedings, decisions may be
reached on the basis of position papers or other
documentary evidence only. They are not bound by
technical rules of procedure and evidence.  Thus, it
is not necessary for the rules to require affiants to
appear and testify and to be cross-examined by the
counsel of the adverse party.  In order to comply
with the requirements of due process, what is
required, among other things, is that every litigant
be given reasonable opportunity to appear and
defend his right and to introduce relevant evidence
in his favor.
Art III Sec 1. Substantive Due Process
237. People v. Siton
FACTS: Respondents Evangeline Siton and Krystel
Kate Sagarano, charged with vagrancy pursuant to
Article 202 (2) of the RPC, question the
constitutionality of the said provision, claiming that
the definition of the crime of vagrancy under Article
202 (2), apart from being vague, results in an
arbitrary identification of violators, since the
definition of the crime includes in its coverage
persons who are otherwise performing ordinary
peaceful acts, thereby violating their
constitutionally-guaranteed right to due process .The
lower court declared Art 202 (2) as unconstitutional.
Hence, the petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC committed a
reversible error in declaring unconstitutional Article
202 (2) of the RPC.
RULING & MAIN POINT: YES. In exercising its power
to declare what acts constitute a crime, the
legislature must inform the citizen with reasonable
precision what acts it intends to prohibit so that he
may have a certain understandable rule of conduct
and know what acts it is his duty to avoid. This
requirement has come to be known as the void-for-
vagueness doctrine which states that a statute
which either forbids or requires the doing of an act
in terms so vague that men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as
to its application, violates the first essential
requisite of due process of law.The said underlying
principle that Article 202 (2) fails to give fair notice
of what constitutes forbidden conduct, finds no
application here because under our legal system,
ignorance of the law excuses no one from
compliance therewith. This principle is of Spanish
origin, and we adopted it to govern and limit legal
conduct in this jurisdiction.  public interest or public welfare.
Art III Sec 1. Substantive Due Process
238. White Light Corporation v. City of Manila
FACTS: City Mayor Alfredo Lim signed into law City
Ordinance No. 7774 prohibiting short time admission
in hotels, motels, lodging houses, pension houses
and similar establishments in the City of Manila.
Petitioners argue that the ordinance directly affects
their business interests as operators of drive-in-
hotels and motels in Manila. They contend that it is
unconstitutional and void since it violates the right to
privacy and the freedom of movement, is an invalid
exercise of police power, and it is an unreasonable
and oppressive interference in their business. RTC
declared it unconstitutional but upon appeal to the
CA, the ruling was reversed. Hence, the petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the City Ordinance No. 7774
is constitutional.
RULING & MAIN POINT: NO. The primary
constitutional question in the instant case is one of
due process, as guaranteed under Section 1, Article
III of the Constitution. The purpose of the guaranty
is to prevent arbitrary governmental encroachment
against the life, liberty and property of individuals.
Specifically, substantive due process inquires
whether the government has sufficient justification
for depriving a person of life, liberty, or property.
There are very legitimate uses for a wash rate or
renting the room out more than twice a day. A
person in need of comfortable private spaces for a
span of a few hours with purposes other than having
sex or using illegal drugs can legitimately look to
staying in a motel or hotel as a convenient
alternative. The Ordinance needlessly restrains the
operation of the businesses of the petitioners as
well as restricting the rights of their patrons
without sufficient justification. Individual rights
may be adversely affected only to the extent that
may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of
Art III Sec 1. Substantive Due Process
239. Chamber of Real Estate and Builders
Associations (CREBA) v. Romulo
FACTS: Petitioner questions the constitutionality of
Section 27 (E) of RA 8424 which imposes minimum
corporate income tax (MCIT) on corporations and
creditable withholding tax (CWT) on sales of real
properties classified as ordinary assets. Petitioner
claims that the MCIT violates the due process clause
because it levies income tax even if there is no
realized gain, because said provision is pegging the
tax base of the MCIT to a corporation’s gross income,
which is tantamount to a confiscation of capital
because gross income, unlike net income, is not
realized gain. Petitioner also avers that the
imposition of CWT on real estates deprives its
members of their property without due process of
law because, in their line of business, gain is never
assured by mere receipt of the selling price. As a
result, the government is collecting tax from net
income not yet gained or earned.
ISSUES:(1) Whether or not the imposition of the
MCIT on domestic corporations is unconstitutional
and; (2) whether or not the imposition of CWT on
income from sales of real properties classified as
ordinary assets is unconstitutional.
RULING & MAIN POINT:
(1) NO. The due process clause may properly be
invoked to invalidate, in appropriate cases, a
revenue measure when it amounts to a
confiscation of property. Certainly, an income
tax is arbitrary and confiscatory if it taxes capital
because capital is not income.  However, the
MCIT is not a tax on capital but is imposed on
gross income which is arrived at by deducting the
capital spent by a corporation in the sale of its
goods, i.e., the cost of goods and other direct
expenses from gross sales. Clearly, the capital is
not being taxed.
(2) NO. The CWT is creditable against the tax due
from the seller of the property at the end of the
taxable year. The seller will be able to claim a tax
refund if its net income is less than the taxes
withheld. Nothing is taken that is not due so
there is no confiscation of property repugnant
to the constitutional guarantee of due
process. More importantly, the due process
requirement applies to the power to tax. The
CWT does not impose new taxes nor does it
increase taxes. It relates entirely to the method
and time of payment.
 
ART III SEC 1: Substantive Due Process
240. Southern Hemisphere v. ATC
FACTS: The case consists of 6 petitions challenging
the constitutionality of RA 9372 (Human Security Act
of 2007). Petitioners assailed the said law for being
intrinsically vague and impermissibly broad the
definition of the crime of terrorism under the said
law in that terms like "widespread and extraordinary
fear and panic among the populace" and "coerce the
government to give in to an unlawful demand" are
nebulous, leaving law enforcement agencies with no
standard to measure the prohibited acts.
Respondents, through the OSG, countered that the
doctrine vagueness find no application in the present
case.
ISSUE: Whether or not a penal statue may be
assailed for being vague.
RULING: YES, but only in an as-applied challenge. A
statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness
when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ as to its application. It is
repugnant to the Constitution because it violates due
process for failure to accord persons, especially the
parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to
avoid.
In this jurisdiction, penal statutes found vague as a
matter of due process typically are invalidated only
“as applied” to a defendant. This means that in
determining the constitutionality of a statute, its
provisions which are alleged to have been violated
in a case must be examined in the light of the
conduct with which the defendant is charged.
Absent of an actual or imminent charge against the
petitioner, a limited vagueness analysis of the
assailed statute is legally impermissible. Therefore,
in this case, since the petitioners have not been
charged with violation of the assailed law, the
vagueness doctrine is not applicable.
ART III SEC 1: Substantive Due Process
241. Roxas v. Macapagal Arroyo
FACTS: Melissa Roxas is enrolled in an exposure
program to the Philippines.After doing survey work
in Tarlac, Roxas and her companions rested. While
they were resting, 15 heavily armed men in civilian
clothes forcibly entered the house and dragged them
inside a van. When they alighted from the van, she
was informed that she is being detained for being a
member of Communist Party of the Philippines-New
People’s Army.She was interrogated and tortured for
5 straight days to convince her to abandon her
communist beliefs. Eventually, Roxas was released.
After her release, Roxas filed a petition for the
issuance of Writs of Amparo and Habeas Databefore
the Supreme Court, impleading the high-ranking
officials of military and Philippine National Police
(PNP), on the belief that it was the government
agents who were behind her abduction and torture.
ISSUE: Whether or not the doctrine of command
responsibility is applicable in a Writ of Amparo
petition.
RULING: NO. The doctrine is used to pinpoint
liability. It must be stated at the outset that the use
by the petitioner of the doctrine of command
responsibility as the justification in impleading the
public respondents in her amparo petition, is legally
inaccurate. The doctrine of command responsibility
is a rule of substantive law that establishes liability
and, by this account, cannot be a proper legal basis
to implead a party-respondent in an amparo
petition.
It must be clarified, however, that the inapplicability
of the doctrine of command responsibility in an
amparo proceeding does not, by any measure,
preclude impleading military or police commanders
on the ground that the complained acts in the
petition were committed with their direct or
indirect agreement. In which case, commanders
may be impleaded—not actually on the basis of
command responsibility—but rather on the ground
of their responsibility, or at least accountability.
ART III SEC 1: Substantive Due Process
242. Meralco v. Lim
FACTS: A letter was sent to the Meralco admin
department in Bulacan denouncing Lim, an
administrative clerk. She was ordered to be
transferred to Alabang due to concerns over her
safety. She complained under the premise that the
transfer was a denial of her due process. She asked
for deferment thereafter. Since the company didn’t
respond, she filed for a writ of habeas data in the
Bulacan RTC due to Meralco’s omission of providing
her with details about the report of the letter. To
her, this constituted a violation of her liberty and
security. She asked for disclosure of the data and
measures for keeping the confidentiality of the data.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a violation of Lim’s
right to privacy.
RULING: NO. There was no violation of respondent’s
right to privacy. Respondent said that the letters
were mere jokes and even conceded the fact that
the issue was labor related due to references to real
intent of management.Respondent’s plea that she
be spared from complying with MERALCO’s
Memorandum directing her reassignment to the
Alabang Sector, under the guise of a quest for
information or data allegedly in possession of
petitioners, does not fall within the province of a
writ of habeas data. Habeas data will not issue to
protect purely property or commercial concerns nor
when the grounds invoked in support of the
petitions therefor are vague or doubtful.
Employment is a property right in the due process
clause. Respondent was concerned with her
employment, one that can be solved in the NLRC.
ART III SEC 1: Substantive Due Process
243. Pollo v. Karina Constantino
FACTS: CSC Chairperson Karina Constantino-David
received a document from an anonymous source,
making her aware that there is a corrupt official in
the Commission. She then formed personnel and
directed them to back up all the files of the
computers found therein. Respondent found, in
Bricio Pollo, petitioner, legal pleading or documents
that are related to administrative cases and were for
on the behalf of parties who were facing charges. He
asserted that the CSC conducted a fishing expedition
and his right to privacy was violated and that the
source of the complaint was anonymous. The CSC
charged Pollo in violation of RA 6713 (Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials).
ISSUE: Whether or not the search conducted on
petitioner’s office computer and the copying of his
personal files without his knowledge and consent
constituted a violation of his constitutional right to
privacy.
RULING: NO. The constitutional guarantee is not a
prohibition of all searches and seizures but only of
"unreasonable" searches and seizures. The SC found
that he had no actual expectation of privacy on his
work computer. He did not have a separate office
space, nor did he use a password for his computer.
The CSC also implemented a policy that its
employees on notice that they have no expectation
of privacy in anything on their office computers,
and that the CSC may monitor their use. The validity
of the seizure of the files should be limited to the
need for determining whether or not the petitioner
unjustly utilized official resources of the Commission
for personal purposes and should not extend to the
reading of the files’ contents, which would be
violative of his right to privacy.
ART III SEC 1: Substantive Due Process
244. Sto. Tomas v. Paneda
FACTS: These consolidated cases pertain to the
constitutionality of certain provisions of RA 8042
otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and
Overseas Filipino Act of 1995. RA 8042’s purpose,
among others, is to set government’s policies on
overseas employment. It also establishes a higher
standard of protection and promotion of the welfare
of migrant workers, their families, and overseas
Filipinos in distress.
Assailed provisions: Sections 29 and 30 of the
Actcommanded the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) to begin deregulating within
one year of its passage the business of handling the
recruitment and migration of overseas Filipino
workers and phase out within five years the
regulatory functions of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA).
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 8042 is constitutional.
RULING: YES. R.A. 8042 is a police power measure
intended to regulate the recruitment and
deployment of OFWs. It aims to curb, if not
eliminate, the injustices and abuses suffered by
numerous OFWs seeking to work abroad. The rule is
settled that every statute has in its favor the
presumption of constitutionality. The Court cannot
inquire into the wisdom or expediency of the laws
enacted by the Legislative Department. Hence, in the
absence of a clear and unmistakable case that the
statute is unconstitutional, the Court must uphold its
validity.
ART. III SEC 1: EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW
245. People v Cayat
FACTS: Accused Cayat, a native of Baguio, Benguet,
Mountain Province, and a member of the non-
Christian tribes, was found guilty of violating Act No.
1639 which prohibits any native of the Philippines
who is a member of a non-Christian tribe within the
meaning of Act 1397 to buy, receive, have in his
possession, or drink any ardent spirits, ale, beer,
wine or intoxicating liquors of any kind, other than
the so-called native wines and liquors which the
members of such tribes have been accustomed to
prior to the passage of the law.
Cayat challenges the constitutionality of Act 1639 on
the grounds that it is discriminatory and denies the
equal protection of the laws, violates due process
clause, and is an improper exercise of police power.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is a violation of the
constitutional right to the equal protection of the
law in specifically classifying non-Christian tribes in
the prohibition provided for under the said law.
RULING & MP: No. It is an established principle of
constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal
protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation
based on reasonable classification. And the
classification, to be reasonable, (1) must rest on
substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to the
purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited to
existing conditions only; and (4) must apply equally
to all members of the same class.
This distinction is unquestionably reasonable, for the
Act was intended to meet the peculiar conditions
existing and designed to insure peace and order in
and among the non-Christian tribes.
ART. III SEC 1: EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW
246. Ichong v Hernandez
FACTS: Petitioner and in behalf of other alien
residents, corporations and partnerships adversely
affected assails the constitutionality of the RA 1180
or An Act to Regulate the Retail Business contending
among others that contending that it denies to alien
residents the equal protection of the laws and
deprives of their liberty and property without due
process of law for prohibiting non-filipino citizens to
engage directly or indirectly in retail trade.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is a violation of the
right of the petitioner to equal protection of the law.
RULING: No. The disputed law was enacted to
remedy a real actual threat and danger to national
economy posed by alien dominance and control of
the retail business and free citizens and country from
dominance and control. The law does not violate the
equal protection clause of the Constitution because
sufficient grounds exist for the distinction between
alien and citizen in the exercise of the occupation
regulated, nor the due process of law clause,
because the law is prospective in operation and
recognizes the privilege of aliens already engaged in
the occupation and reasonably protects their
privilege.
MP: The equal protection clause is not infringed by
legislation which applies only to those persons falling
within a specified class, if it applies alike to all
persons within such class, and reasonable grounds
exists for making a distinction between those who
fall within such class and those who do not.
ART. III SEC 1: EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW
247. Villegas v Hui Chiong Tsai Pao Ho
FACTS: Respondent herein assailed the
constitutionality of Ordinance No. 6537 which
prohibits aliens from being employed or to engage or
participate in any position or occupation or business
enumerated therein, whether permanent,
temporary or casual, without first securing an
employment permit from the Mayor of Manila and
paying the permit fee of P50.00 on the ground
among others that t is arbitrary, oppressive and
unreasonable, being applied only to aliens who are
thus, deprived of their rights to life, liberty and
property and therefore, violates the due process and
equal protection clauses of the Constitution which
had been ruled in favor of the former by the trial
court. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance No. 6537 is
unconstitutional.
RULING: Yes. The ordinance in question violates the
due process of law and equal protection rule of the
Constitution. Requiring a person before he can be
employed to get a permit from the City Mayor of
Manila who may withhold or refuse it at will is
tantamount to denying him the basic right of the
people in the Philippines to engage in a means of
livelihood. While it is true that the Philippines as a
State is not obliged to admit aliens within its
territory, once an alien is admitted, he cannot be
deprived of life without due process of law. This
guarantee includes the means of livelihood.
MP: The guarantee of equal protection of laws
includes the means of livelihood. The shelter of
protection under the due process and equal
protection clause is given to all persons, both aliens
and citizens.
ART. III SEC 1: EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW
248. Dumlao v COMELEC
FACTS: Petitioner Dumlao questions the
constitutionality of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg.
52 as discriminatory and contrary to the equal
protection and due process guarantees of the
Constitution by prohibiting any retired elective
provincial city or municipal official who has received
payment of the retirement benefits to which he is
entitled under the law, and who shall have been 65
years of age at the commencement of the term of
office to which he seeks to be elected shall not be
qualified to run for the same elective local office
from which he has retired
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 4 of BP 52 is
unconstitutional for violating equal protection of
laws.
RULING: No. The purpose of the law is to allow the
emergence of younger blood in local governments.
The classification in question being pursuant to that
purpose, it cannot be considered invalid "even if at
times, it may be susceptible to the objection that it is
marred by theoretical inconsistencies"
MP: In fine, it bears reiteration that the equal
protection clause does not forbid all legal
classification. What is proscribed is a classification
which is arbitrary and unreasonable. That
constitutional guarantee is not violated by a
reasonable classification based upon substantial
distinctions, where the classification is germane to
the purpose of the law and applies to all Chose
belonging to the same class.
ART. III SEC 1: EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW
249. Goesart v Cleary
FACTS: Valentine Goesaert owned a bar inside the
city of Michigan which had a law prohibiting females
unless she be "the wife or daughter of the male
owner" of a licensed liquor establishment from
getting a bartender's license. Goesaert challenged
the law, and the case made its way to the U.S.
Supreme Court. She argued that the law violated her
14th Amendment rights under the equal protection
clause, which required that the state government
treat everyone equal under the law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the subject law violated the
equal protection of the law clause.
RULING: No. The Court concluded that the
Constitution "does not preclude the States from
drawing a sharp line between the sexes" or "to
reflect sociological insight, or shifting social
standards, any more than it requires them to keep
abreast of the latest scientific standards."
MP: Since there may be a reasonable and valid
desire in the legislature to protect female
bartenders, the court cannot second-guess the
legislature and decide that the real purpose here
was for male bartenders to monopolize the Company, Inc. Was the only sugar central in the City
industry. of Ormoc. Still, the classification, to be reasonable,
should be in terms applicable to future conditions as
ART III, SEC 1: REQUISITES OF VALID well. The taxing ordinance should not be singular
CLASSIFICATION; Standards of Judicial Review and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently
established sugar central for the coverage of the tax.
250. ORMOC SUGAR CENTRAL VS ORMOC CITY As it is now, even if later a similar company is set up,
FACTS: The Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed it cannot be subject to a tax because the ordinance
an ordinance imposing “on any and all productions expressly points only to Ormoc City Sugar Company,
of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Inc. As the entity to be levied upon.
Company, Inc., in Ormoc City a municipal tax
MAIN POINT: Equal protection clause applies only to
equivalent to one per centum (1%) per export sale to
persons or things identically situated and does not
USA and other foreign countries.” Payments for said
bar a reasonable classification of the subject of
tax were made, under protest, by Ormoc Sugar
legislation, and a classification is reasonable where
Company, Inc.. Said company filed before the Court
1) it is based upon substantial distinctions; 2) these
of First Instance of Leyte a complaint against the City
are germane to the purpose of the law; 3) the
of Ormoc as well as its Treasurer, Municipal Board
classification applies not only to present conditions,
and Mayor alleging that the ordinance is
but also to future conditions substantially identical
unconstitutional for being violative of the equal
to those present; and 4) the classification applies
protection clause and the rule of uniformity of
only to those who belong to the same class.
taxation. The court rendered a decision that upheld
the constitutionality of the ordinance. Hence, this
appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not constitutional limits on the
power of taxation, specifically the equal protection
clause and rule of uniformity of taxation, were
infringed
RULING: YES. Equal protection clause applies only
to persons or things identically situated and does not
bar a reasonable classification of the subject of
legislation, and a classification is reasonable where
1) it is based upon substantial distinctions; 2) these
are germane to the purpose of the law; 3) the
classification applies not only to present conditions,
but also to future conditions substantially identical
to those present; and 4) the classification applies
only to those who belong to the same class. A
perusal of the requisites shows that the questioned
ordinance does not meet them, for it taxes only
centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the
Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. and none other. At the
time the ordinance was enacted, Ormoc Sugar