Case histories of incidents in heated

bitumen storage tanks

F. M. Davie, P. F. Nolan and T. W. S. Hoban*

Department of Chemical Engineering, South Bank University, London, UK
*Shell Bitumen UK, Riversdell House, Guildford Street, Chertsey, Surrey, UK

A study has been made of 73 case histories of incidents involving heated bitumen storage
tanks. The majority of incidents were found to be due to operations such as charging and
discharging of tanks, including overfilling which can lead to lagging fires and exposure of
heater tubes. A number of incidents were the result of spontaneous ignition or unknown
causes: it is proposed that regular cleaning of tanks would reduce the number of these
incidents.

Keywords: case histories; bitumen storage

A number of fires and explosions occur in heated
bitumen storage tanks each year, the majority of which
can be easily explained. These include incidents due
to maintenance work being carried out on tanks, such
as welding in tanks in which the atmosphere has not
been tested or in which bitumen has not been removed
from the immediate area. This can lead to ignition of
flammable vapour or of spilt bitumen. Operations such
as charging or discharging of tanks can lead to
overfilling or exposure of heater tubes if levels are
not properly monitored. The subsequent contamination
of insulation by bitumen can lead to fires in the tank
lagging, while exposure of heater tubes can lead to
ignition of flammable vapours present within the tank.
Although in most cases a feasible explanation for the
incidents can be found, in some cases the cause of the
fire or explosion is unknown. In 1980, Dimpfl’ made
a study of such incidents and proposed that:
Light hydrocarbons can often be present at concen-
trations above the lower flammable limit (%LFL).
These may be undetected in conventional, standard
flashpoint testing procedures2.
Deposits on the underside of tank roofs can auto-
ignite at around 463 K or at lower temperatures if
pyrophoric iron sulfide is present.
The tanks are often deficient in oxygen due to the
smouldering of deposits, and this, coupled with the
current practice of having only one vent, ensures
that the oxygen content is below the minimum
oxygen concentration required for explosion.
Swindells ef aL3 investigated the proposals set out
by Dimpfl and found that flammable atmospheres
could exist within the vapour space of storage
tanks containing oxidized grades of bitumen at the
recommended maximum storage temperatures4.
095G4230194/030217-05
0 1994 Butterworth-Heinemann Ltd
Deposits on the underside of the tank roofs are
formed by condensation of the hot vapours evolved
from the bitumen surface. Davie et a1.5 found that the
deposits undergo a smouldering reaction dependent
on oxygen availability, which, if sustained over a
period of time, could lead to a depletion in the oxygen
concentration of the storage tank and so contribute to
conditions suitable for the formation of pyrophoric
material. This smouldering does occur at temperatures
found at the underside of the roof of storage tanks;
the onset temperature for exothermic behaviour ranges
from 337 to 406 K. Evidence was found to support
the presence of pyrophoric material in some samples
of deposit taken from refinery tank&‘.
Nature of bitumen
Bitumens are viscous liquids or solids consisting
essentially of hydrocarbons and their derivatives. They
are obtained by refinery processes from petroleum
and are also found as a natural deposit or as a
component of naturally-occurring asphalt. Bitumens
are characterized by their softening point and pen-
etration and are divided into a number of specific
types such as penetration and oxidized grades, cutbacks
and emulsions.
Types of bitumen and bitumen derivatives
Penetration grades. These are usually produced from
the distillation residue of petroleum crude oil by further
distillation, partial oxidation, solvent precipitation or
a combination of these processes. Penetration grades
are classified by their penetration value’.
Oxidised grades. These are produced by passing air
through hot, soft bitumen under controlled temperature

J. Loss Prev. Process Ind., 1994, Vol 7, No 3 217

Case histories of incidents in heated bitumen storage
conditions to give a rather rubbery bitumen with
greater resistance to imposed stresses. They are
classified by a combination of softening points and
penetration value. A grade such as 105/35 has a
softening point of 105 and a penetration value of 35.
Cutback bitumens. These are produced by mixing
penetration grade or oxidized grade bitumens with
petroleum distillates such as white spirit, kerosene or
gas oil. When the distillates evaporate, the properties
of the bitumen initially used are recovered.
Bitumen emulsions. These are fine dispersions of
bitumen in water, the bitumen content varying from
30 to 70%.
Due to their high viscosity at ambient temperatures,
bitumens need to be stored at elevated temperatures,
typically between 453 and 503 K, to ensure ease of
pumping and transportation.
Bitumen storage conditions
Two types of heated bitumen storage tanks are readily
distinguished in the UK:
l refinery tanks
l tanks at the premises of bitumen users such as
quarries and roofing felt manufacturers.
Bitumen storage tanks at refineries tend to consist
of a vertical cylindrical shell with a domed roof, fitted
with a vent, and a small gauge hatch and a larger
manhole both of which have covers. They are equipped
with steam heating coils, hot oil coils or gas- or oil-
fired or electrical heaters located near the base of the
tank to improve heating and circulation in the bottom
layers of the bitumen. All exterior tank surfaces
are insulated with glass fibre blocks covered with
aluminium sheeting to conserve heat and prevent
contact with tank walls. An outlet pipe is located at
the base of the tank to allow discharging. Storage
tanks found at the premises of users tend to be either
vertical or horizontal and can be either cylindrical or
rectangular in shape with a smaller capacity than the
refinery tanks. These are also fitted with a vent, a
gauge hatch and a manhole.
Operations
Discharging of a bitumen tank is normally effected by
gravity via an outlet pipe at the base of the tank,
while charging is effected by pressure or pumping.
The vent pipe allows a flow of air into the tank to
compensate for pressure changes during filling and
discharge.
Inerting of bitumen tanks
Inert gases are sometimes used to reduce the oxygen
concentration within storage tanks and therefore
remove one side of the fire triangle, reducing the risk
of an explosion or fire. The gases include nitrogen,
218 J. Loss Prev. Process Ind., 1994, Vol 7, No 3
tanks: F. M. Davie et al.
combustion gases and low-pressure steam. Hydro-
carbon compounds cannot bum in less than 10.5%
oxygen and so inert gases are used to displace the air
within the storage tank until the oxygen concentration
is below this level. However, if the oxygen level in
the vapour space is below 3%, the conditions are such
that pyrophoric material may form. Therefore, to
prevent this, the inert gases have an oxygen concen-
tration of about 5% and displace the air within the
vapour space until the oxygen level in the tank does
not exceed 8%.
Tank maintenance
Tanks that have contained bitumen may still contain
flammable atmospheres, hydrogen sulfide or be
deficient in oxygen even after cooling. The Institute
of Petroleum code4 states that it is important to
monitor the atmosphere within a tank during hot work,
as explosimeter readings at ambient temperatures do
not give a true representation of the dangers present
if heat is applied to a surface which has not been
adequately cleaned. Bitumen and bitumen deposits
need to be removed from the vicinity of hot work to
avoid the production of vapours and the ignition of
bitumen. Deposits building up around the heating
coils, walls and roof of the tanks need to be removed
so as not to interefere with the running of the tank.
To remove these deposits, the tank is emptied and
allowed to cool to ambient temperature, and then the
deposits are chipped out using mechanical cutting tools
or high-pressure water jets.
Analysis of incidents
Following a comprehensive literature search and an
examination of incident reports supplied by both the
UK Health and Safety Executive and companies, the
causes of 73 incidents involving bitumen storage have
been analysed, as summarized in Table 1. While the
numbers of such incidents have no absolute numerical
meaning, they can be indicative of the type of incidents
which occur during storage. Some of the incidents
relate to the inherent nature of bitumen while other
incidents are independent of the stored medium.
Table 2 provides a breakdown of incidents in the
UK reported to the Health and Safety Executive over
the period 1971-1992. The increase in numbers of
reported incidents in the later years is mainly due to
Table 1 Breakdown of the causes of incidents
Incident Number of incidents %
Maintenance 9 12.3
Operations 28 38.4
Equipment failure 5 6.9
General 12 16.4
Spontaneous ignition 12 16.4
Unknown origin 7 9.6
 Case histories of incidents in heated bitumen storage tanks: F. M. Davie et al.

Table 2 Annual number of incidents involving bitumen storage Table 3 Breakdown of incidents due to operations
in the UK
Incidents due to operations Number of incidents
Year Number of incidents Year Number of incidents
Charging/discharging 19
1971 7 1982 No data available Exposure of thermostat 3
1972 1 1983 No data available Exposure of heating tubes 4
1973 1 1984 No data available Introduction of water-based materials 2
1974 2 1985 1
1975 No data available 1986 2
1976 5 1987 No data available
1977 2 1988 3
1978 2 1989 8 tanks (Table 3). Overfilling can subsequently lead to
1979 2 1990 12
1980 6 1991 7 saturation of insulation with bitumen resulting in fires
1981 3 1992 9 in the tank lagging. Accurate level monitors need to
be installed to prevent such incidents occurring, and
such monitors are currently being developedg. Coke
deposits floating in the bitumen can give incorrect dip
new reporting requirements (under the UK RIDDOR
readings, resulting in exposure of heating tubes during
regulations).
emptying; deposits should be regularly removed to
prevent this from happening.
Incidents due to maintenance
All the incidents due to maintenance appear to be
Case history 3. Vapour became ignited when the
due to hot work such as welding on a storage tank
bitumen level was being lowered in a tank. The
whilst full of bitumen and unblocking a pipeline using
electrically-operated pump was in operation when the
a blow torch. Nine such incidents occurred in the
ignition occurred. It was claimed that electrical power
period 1971-1992. Tanks that have contained bitumen
had been cut from the heating elements about 15 min
may still contain flammable atmospheres, even after
before the fire was observed. Evidence suggested that
cooling. The Institute of Petroleum code4 states the
the level of bitumen may have been allowed to drop
importance of monitoring the atmosphere within the
below the top surface of the heating tubes during the
tank during hot work, especially in the vicinity of
pumping operation. It is possible that the temperature
deposits. Bitumen deposits can contain large amounts
of the external surfaces of the heating tubes exceeded
of condensed light oils which can be given off during
the minimum spontaneous ignition temperature for
heating and result in flammable atmospheres in areas
the bitumen vapour.
where hot work is taking place. Bitumen and bitumen
deposits should therefore be removed from the vicinity
Case history 4. A 45 m3 fabricated tank containing
of hot work to avoid the production of flammable
30 m3 of bitumen at 433 K ruptured and sprayed hot
atmospheres and the ignition of bitumen.
bitumen over a distance of 20 m. The bitumen tank
was ruptured by an internal pressure rise after a water-
Case history 1. An explosion occurred in a 45 m3
based emulsion had been drawn into the tank when
bitumen storage tank whilst electric welding was being
interchangeable delivery and return lines for the
undertaken on fixtures on the outside of the tank.
emulsion and bitumen to the mixing chamber of a
The investigation indicated that the welding current,
coating plant were used. The water in the emulsion
instead of travelling directly via the earthing cable as
flashed off.
was intended, found a path along the flexible steel
cord connecting the slide to a float resting on the
Incidents due to equipment malfunction
bitumen surface inside the tank. The cord may have
A small number of incidents occur due to thermostat
detonated the vapour in the tank. The explosion was
and/or level-measuring device failure and to defective
confined to one tank and was caused due to a poor
pumps (Table 4). Reliable temperature control needs
earth on the welding machine.
to be stressed to reduce the incidence of overheating
of bulk bitumen leading to an increase in the flammable
Case history 2. A fire in a bitumen tank containing
cutback bitumen (penetration grade 200) occurred
when sparks from welding operations ignited vapour
in a new 36 m3 electrically-heated storage tank. The Table 4 Breakdown of incidents due to equipment malfunction
tank was being used before the completion of install-
ation. incidents due to equipment Number of incidents
malfunction

incidents due to operations

Defective pump 1
A number of incidents occur during emptying and Flame tubes fracture 1
filling of tanks due to exposure of heating tubes, Thermostat failure 3
exposure of the thermostat and overfilling of the

J. Loss Prev. Process Ind., 1994, Vol 7, No 3 219

Case histories of incidents in heated bitumen
Table 5 Breakdown of general incidents
General incidents Number
Ignition by hot surfaces
Fires in the tank lagging
Smoking
Friction
nature of the vapour space and the rate of formation
of deposits.
Case history 5. Fumes from cutback bitumen became
ignited when the level of contents was low in an
electrically-heated bitumen tank. Flames spread
through a return pipe and ignited the contents of a
second tank. Defects in the level-indicating device and
thermal cut-out contributed to the fire.
General incidents
Of the general incidents occurring in heated bitumen
storage tanks, the largest number occur due to ignition
of Aammable vapours by hot surfaces (Table 5). A
number of incidents are also due to fires in the tank
lagging which are caused by contamination of insulation
by bitumen and bitumen vapours.
Case history 6. A fire occurred during the manual
charging of the header tank forming part of the heating
oil circuit. Flammable vapours escaping through the
filling tube of the header tank became ignited by hot
gases passing out of the chimney fitted to the oil-fired
furnace which formed an integral part of the asphalt
plant. The fire was due to the ignition of flammable
vapours forced out of the header tank by cold oil and
to the hot gases escaping from the low chimney fitted
to the furnace.
Case history 7. An extensive fire occurred at a storage
facility consisting of four 18 m3 tanks and containing
bitumen (penetration grade 200) at 412 IL The fire is
believed to have been caused by spontaneous combus-
tion within the tank-insulating material due to pollution
by bitumen spillage and water seepage. The insulation
had been water-drenched in a previous fire and
contained bitumen from overspill during filling oper-
ations.
Incidents due to spontaneous combustion and
unknown origin
It has been found that bitumen deposits can undergo
a smouldering reaction dependent on the availability
of oxygen. This smouldering, sustained over a period
of time, could lead to a depletion in the oxygen
concentration of the storage tank and so contribute to
conditions suitable for the formation of pyrophoric
material. Twelve such incidents occurred in the period
1971-1992. Incidents of unknown origin have occurred
during emptying of tanks, when manhole covers have
220 J. Loss Prev. Process Ind., 1994, Vol 7, No 3
storage tanks: F. M. Davie et al.
been left open or raised by strong winds. Seven such
incidents occurred in the period 1971-1992. These
situations lead to an increase in the oxygen concen-
of incidents
tration around the deposit and may be due to an
6 increase in the reaction rate of the smouldering deposit
3 or the presence of pyrophoric material. Deposits left
1 to accumulate can smoulder, and, in situations where
2
cross-ventilation occurs, such as a manhole cover being
left open, can reach high temperatures increasing the
risk of fire.
Case history 8. A fire occurred within a storage tank
when the oxygen concentration within the vapour
space was increased. This was the result of a strong
wind raising the gauge hatch cover sufficiently to admit
air into the vent. The air then escaped via the gauge
hatch, from which sparks and flames were observed
to be escaping. These deposits were found to be high
in pyrophoric iron sulfide.
It has also been found that deposits reach a critical
thickness above which the deposits become susceptible
to self-heating’“. It left to accumulate, the deposits
can reach their critical thickness and so become active.
This may be the case in the following case history
where a previously safe deposit reached a critical
thickness and so became thermally active.
Case history 9. A 190 X lo3 kg capacity storage tank
containing 105135 oxidized grade bitumen exploded
after withdrawal of some of the product. The coils
were covered and there was no evidence of electrical
malfunction.
In the case of inerted tanks, the condition may be
exaggerated by the fact that none of the deposit will
have reacted due to the low oxygen concentration.
When the tanks are subsequently taken off-line for
cleaning, all the deposit formed will be unreacted and
will undergo an oxidation reaction on introduction of
air. Instead of a smouldering reaction taking place
over a period of time as the deposit forms, all the
deposit reacts simultaneously. There is also the risk
of pyrophoric material forming in inerted tanks which,
on introduction of air, can react violently leading to
fire and explosion as illustrated in the following case
history.
Case history 10. An incident occurred in a tank
containing 190 x lo3 kg of lOY35 oxidized bitumen.
A small purge of steam was applied to the vapour
space. The tank was held at approximately 513 K for
seven days. The contents were then gradually unloaded
until 115 x 10” kg remained. In the next 24 hours,
86 x 103 kg were withdrawn; ten hours later there
was an explosion inside the tank. The coke deposits
on the roof were extensive as the tank had not been
cleaned for three years.
The vast majority of cases of spontaneous combustion
and fires and explosions due to unknown origin can
 Case histories of incidents
be prevented by regular cleaning of the tanks. Strict
control is needed of the amount of bitumen deposit
that is allowed to build up on the underside of the
tank roof and the conditions that are allowed to prevail
within the vapour space. Deposits left to accumulate
can smoulder, and, in situations where cross-ventilation
occurs, such as a manhole cover being open, can reach
high temperatures increasing the risk of fire. Large
amounts of deposit can also lead to the vapour space
becoming deficient due to smouldering and so increase
the risk of pyrophoric material forming.
Conclusions
The majority of incidents in heated bitumen storage
tanks are due to operations such as charging and
discharging of tanks. Overfilling of tanks occurs most
often, resulting in contamination of insulation and
possible injury due to hot bitumen spillage. Exposure
of heater tubes also occurs when discharging is taking
place, resulting in possible ignition of flammable
vapours in the tank. Accurate level control is needed
to prevent such incidents occurring. Incidents can also
occur during charging due to operations using blow
torches to unblock pipes and igniting spilt bitumen.
A reduction in the number of incidents involving
overfilling of tanks should result in fewer cases of fires
in the tank lagging due to contamination of insulation
by bitumen and ignition of spilt bitumen.
A number of incidents occur during maintenance
involving hot work; this may be due to ignition of
flammable vapours or spilt bitumen in the area.
Bitumen and bitumen deposits should therefore be
removed from the vicinity of hot work to avoid the
production of flammable atmospheres due to light oils
contained within the deposits or the ignition of
bitumen. Explosimeter readings (%LFL) should be
taken after removal of deposits and during hot work,
if possible.
A number of incidents are the result of spon-
taneous ignition or unknown causes. It is known that
deposits on the underside of the roof of heated bitumen
storage tanks can smoulder, and, if sufficient oxygen
is present, can reach high enough temperatures to act
as an ignition source to flammable vapours. These
deposits should not be allowed to build up as they
have been found to reach a critical thickness above
in heated bitumen storage tanks: F. M. Davie et al.
which they can become thermally active. Regular
cleaning would reduce the number of incidents involv-
ing self-heating of deposits.
It has also been shown that pyrophoric material
may form within bitumen storage tanks if the tank is
inerted or deposits are allowed to build up to such a
level that the oxygen concentration becomes depleted.
If an inerted tank is then taken off-line for cleaning,
the pyrophoric material will undergo self-heating on
introduction of oxygen and result in a fire or explosion.
This may also be the case for deposits within inerted
tanks, as, although under normal conditions the deposit
is continuously reacting with available oxygen, this is
not possible in an inerted tank. When oxygen is
introduced into the tank before cleaning, all the
deposit will become thermally active simultaneously,
resulting in higher temperatures than normally experi-
enced and possible fire or explosion. Regular cleaning
of tanks is therefore a better alternative to inerting if
reduction in the numbers of this type of incident is to
be achieved.
Acknowledgements
The authors are grateful to the Health and Safety
Executive for supplying statistical data on incidents
involving bitumen and its derivatives.
References
Dimpfl, L. H. Oil Gas J. 1980, 29, lSC-185
BS 2839. British Standard Method for Determination of the
Pensky-Marten’s Closed Cup Flash Point of Flammable Liquids,
1979
Swindells, I., Nolan, P. F. and Pratt, D. B. ‘Safety Aspects in
the Storage of Bitumen, Hazards IX’, IChemE Symposium
Series No 97, IChemE, Manchester, 1986
Institute of Petroleum, Bitumen Safety Code, Part I1 of the IP
Model Code of Safe Practice in the Petroleum Industry, 2nd
edn, 1979
Davie, F. M., Mores, S., Nolan, P. F. and Hoban, T. W. S.
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Davie, F. M., Nolan, P. F. and Hoban, T. W. S. J. Loss Prev.
Process Ind. 1993, 6, 139-143
BS 4961. British Standard Method for Determination of the
Penetration of Bitumen, 1971
8 BS 4692. British Standard Method for Determination of the
Softening Point of Bitumen (Ring and Ball), 1971
9 MacSwan, A. ‘Level Measurement in Heated Bitumen Storage
Tanks’. PhD Thesis, South Bank University, in preparation.
10 Davie, F. M., Nolan, P. F. and Tucker, R. 1. Loss Prev. Process
Ind. 1993, 6, 203-208
J. Loss Prev. Process Ind., 1994, Vol 7, No 3 221