CHAPTER TWENTY-SIX

intelligence and Personality

MOSHE ZEIDNER AND GERALD MATTHEWS

OVERVIEW We begin by comparing two approaches to under-

For more than half a century now psychologists
have been exploring the avenues linking human in-
telligence to a wide array of personality traits in
the hope of unravelling the mutual impact of in-
telligence and personality in the course of devel-
opment and day-to-day behavior. Although these
constructs are frequently kept apart, the artificial-
ity of the distinction has been recognized by many
of the key figures of differential psychology, in-
cluding Binet, Terman, Thorndike, and Thurstone.
Most notably, David Wechsler (1950) viewed intel-
ligence as a manifestation of personality as a whole
and argued that certain affective and motivational
factors (interest, volition, etc.) are integral compo-
nents of the construct of intelligence. According
to Wechsler, because conative and affective factors
function in concert with intelligence in determin-
ing intellectual performance, what is needed are
not tests from which personality factors have been
eliminated but tests in which these nonintellective
factors are clearly present and objectively apprais-
able. Today, it is commonly agreed that some of the
most interesting work in individual differences is be-
ing done at the interface of personality and intel-
ligence (Snow, 1995). Because intelligence is often
construed as the cognitive part of the construct of
personality, the two constructs are in effect mutu-
ally intertwined (Brody, 1972).
This chapter sets out to survey some of the past
and present attempts at shedding light on the nexus
of relationships between intelligence and person-
ality, two grand constructs of modern psychology.
standing the personality-intelligence interface. The
first is the traditional psychometric approach based
on intercorrelating dimensions of individual differ-
ences as identified largely by factor analysis. We
then survey empirical research on the direction
and magnitude of the relationship between intel-
ligence and personality constructs. The second ap-
proach is the cognitive science one that emphasizes
process rather than structure. We review the bio-
logical, cognitive, and adaptive processes that may
contribute to both personality and intelligence. We
conclude by pointing out some potential directions
for future research on the intelligence-personality
interface.
The material included in this chapter is, perforce,
exemplary rather than exhaustive; a full coverage of
all relevant topics and studies would have required a
chapter of monograph length. For further informa-
tion, the reader is referred to two recently published
edited books examining the interface between the
constructs of personality and intelligence: Personal-
ity and intelligence (Sternberg & Ruzgis, 1994) and the
International Handbook of Personality and Intelligence
(Saklofske & Zeidner, 1995).
APPROACHES TO INTEGRATING PERSONALITY
AND INTELLIGENCE
Following Eysenck (1994), we need to distin-
guish between psychometric and experimental ap-
proaches in examining the personality-intelligence
interface. The psychometric approach is concerned

581
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 582 MOSHE ZEIDNER AND GERALD MATTHEWS
with the alignments of ability and personality
dimensions within a common measurement frame-
work. For example, Cattell (1971) described the re-
lationships between various cognitive (ability) and
noncognitive (personality and motivation) dimen-
sions. Cattell's model of individual differences ac-
commodates the conjoint effects of intelligence,
personality, and motivation on behavior. For exam-
ple, test situations may evoke arousal and negative
emotions that impact on test performance, affect-
ing the inferences that may be drawn about intel-
ligent behavior (Zeidner, 1998). Cattell (1971) also
described developmental relationships between dif-
ferent constructs: there may be causal and recip-
rocal relationships between personality and intelli-
gence. Hence, the main tasks for research are the
operationalization and assessment of constructs and
the modeling of correlational relationships between
constructs, including longitudinal data to test causal
models.
Experimental approaches require a theoretical
framework. In recent years, the psychobiological
theories promoted by Eysenck (1994) have been
challenged by cognitive psychological analyses of
intelligence (e.g., Sternberg, 1977). Analyses of cog-
nitive processes may reveal interrelationships of
intelligence and personality overlooked by purely
psychometric analyses; for example, working mem-
ory is associated with both types of construct
(Matthews & Dorn, 1995). However, cognition can-
not be understand solely through development
of the information-processing models now com-
monly used in individual differences research. Ac-
cording to the "classical theory" of cognitive science
(Pylyshyn, 1984), three complementary levels of
explanation are required. The first level is the
biological or "hardware" level, which describes
the behavioral consequences of neural functions.
This approach is familiar in differential psychology
through psychophysiological analyses, and, indi-
rectly, through behavior genetics also (e.g., Eysenck
& Eysenck, 1985). Secondly, cognitive phenomena
may be described in terms of the formal proper-
ties of the cognitive architecture or "software" com-
prising (1) the rules governing the computational
operations performed on symbols (algorithms) and
(2) the processing structures supporting computa-
tion in real time, such as memory stores. Accounts
of intelligence in terms of individual differences in
processing limitations (e.g., Anderson, 1992) are ex-
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pressed at this level. Thirdly, explanations in terms
of the person's goals, intentions, and efforts at adap-
tation to the external environment are required
(the semantic or knowledge level). Much traditional
personality theory, such as psychoanalysis, is ex-
pressed at this level, but its neglect of other levels
of explanation, especially the cognitive architecture,
makes it difficult or impossible to test such theo-
ries empirically. Adaptive facets of intelligence have
been explored through work on ability and mo-
tivation (Kanfer & Ackerman, 1989), and through
Sternberg's (1985) concept of practical intelligence,
the application of intelligence to real-life adaptive
challenges.
Matthews (1997a) discusses how Pylyshyn;s
(1984) levels of explanations apply to differential
psychology (see Figure 26.1). The three-rung ladder
of explanation is reconceptualized as a loop to
accommodate the partially genetic basis for ability
and personality traits. Natural selection hard-wires
successful adaptive choices into the brain, and thus
knowledge and biological levels are linked as shown.
Psychologists are perhaps more concerned with the
other two bridging of levels. Studies of strategy use
bridge the knowledge and architecture levels by
specifying how the person's goals are translated into
sequences of computation. Also, connectionism is a
first attempt to represent computation in terms of
biologically plausible models. Individual difference
factors may require understanding at all three
levels. For example, depending on the research
context, it may be useful to conceptualize anxiety
in terms of brain systems for handling punishment
FIGURE 26.1. Levels of explanation for the cognitive science
of individual differences (Matthews, 1997a).
Adaptation
(environmental fitness)
Strategies
(performance Knowledge
and learning)
Information Natural
Architecture
processing selection
Connectionism Biology
Neuroscience
 INTELLIGENCE AND PERSONALITY 583

and fear cues (Gray, 1982) of flow diagrams for quently, the examinee is expected to give as truthful
information processing (Williams et al., 1988), or a response as possible. The differentiation is not en-
in terms of the anxious individual's self-knowledge tirely straightforward: some researchers (Ackerman
and motivations (Matthews & Wells, in press). & Heggestad, 1997; Hofstee, 1997) have reflected on
whether it may sometimes make sense to talk about
THE PSYCHOMETRIC FRAMEWORK personality as maximal performance (e.g., under in-
tense stress) or 'TQ typicality" (e.g., typical intellec-
Operationalization and Assessment tual engagement).
Factor analytic research shows that when per-
sonality and intelligence measures are analyzed to- MOTIVATION AND CONTROL IN MODIFYING
gether the two constructs can generally be differen- BEHAVIOR. The individual has some degree of vol-
tiated (McCrae, 1987). The question arises: On the untary control in expressing personality. For exam-
basis of which criteria can we differentiate the two ple, the test-anxious person can cope with his or her
concepts? Table 26.1 provides a structure for this anxiety through stress management techniques. By
differentiation. contrast, intelligence is under less personal control
and is less amenable to instructions to change or
NATURE OF THE TRAIT. Intelligence is typically modify behavior.
considered to be unidirectional, whereas personal-
ity can be considered bidirectional. Accordingly, in- INSTRUCTIONS UNDER ASSESSMENT CONDI-
telligence is typically thought of as extending in TIONS. Intelligence is generally assessed using test
a single direction, from "little of" to "much of" conditions involving a set of standard tasks that ex-
(Thorndike, 1982), and it is clear how to set optimal aminees respond to at a designated time and place
parameters for intelligent behavior. By
contrast, personality is conceived of as
being bipolar. A personality trait need TABLE 26.1. Some Relationships Differentiating Personality
not take on an extreme value for it and intelligence
to be set optimally, and midpoint val-
ues are often considered as optimal. Dimension intelligence Personality
Hence, a veridical criterion is generally Trait Unidirectional Bidirectional
employed in evaluating a response in ("little of" to (polar extremes)
the intelligence domain (cf. Nunnally, "much of")
Goals and optimal Test situation Real-life situation
1978), but behaviors falling under the
assessment requiring
domain of personality often have no situation maximal
veridical criteria for judging responses. performance
Motivation in High motivation Tends to vary
taking the
GOALS AND OPTIMAL ASSESS-
instrument
MENT SITUATION. An intelligence Instructions To do one's best To provide a
test aims at eliciting maximal perfor- candid response
mance from examinees, and they are Criteria for evaluating Veridical criterion Direction and intensity
expected to give their best shot in responses (no correct response)
Stability of the Relatively stable Tends to fluctuate
solving the problem or engaging the
instrument
task at hand. Consequently, intelli- Reliability of the Generally high Varies from high
gence is generally measured in eval- instrument to low
uative and maximal performance test Interpreting Relatively More open and
conditions. By contrast, a personality results straightforward controversial
Practical utility Moderate Low to moderate
measure is designed to gauge a person's
typical performance in a real-life situ- 1 & M. Zeidner, 1995. Constructing
Source: Adapted from B.Vfost
ation (Ackerman & Heggestad, 1997) personality and intelligence test instruments: Methods and issues. In
D. Saklofske & M. Zeidner (Eds.). International handbook of personality and
to provide the best estimate of what intelligence (pp. 475-503). New York: Plenum.
a person is most likely to do. Conse-

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 584 MOSHE ZEIDNER AND GERALD MATTHEWS
(cf. Zeidner & Most, 1992). Intelligence has not
been profitably assessed by observer ratings or self-
reports. By contrast, personality researchers have
worked most frequently with subjective media (e.g.,
projective devices), behavioral ratings, and self-
inquiry modes of gathering evidence (e.g., inven-
tories). In fact, most measures of personality rely
on someone's impression, be it the individual's per-
sonal impressions or those of someone observing
the individual.
STABILITY. Whereas theorists generally accept
the fact that cognitive traits display considerable
stability across situation and over time (Willerman,
1979), the cross-situational consistency of person-
ality traits has been more controversial (Mischel,
1968). Some recent studies of personality (cf. Costa
& McCrae, 1986) show promising findings of sta-
bility during the adulthood years, at least for basic
traits (see Maciel, Heckhausen, & Baltes, 1994, for a
recent review of the literature).
RELIABILITY OF THE INSTRUMENT. It follows
from the modifiability of personality expression
that the units of observation in personality as-
sessment (moods, dispositions, emotional states)
are quite troublesome for measurement purposes
because they are "probabilistic" rather than "all
or none" phenomena. Personality measures are
also generally more susceptible to a wide variety
of sources of measurement error (faking, response
sets, social desirability). A considerable body of
research attests to the lower reliability and validity
of personality compared with intelligence measures
(cf. Anastasi, 1986).
INTERPRETING RESULTS. Subjects' interpreta-
tions of personality tests may vary considerably
from subject to subject, causing considerable am-
biguity and further increasing measurement error.
Furthermore, in contrast to ability measures, we may
not get a typical response on personality measures
because the subject chooses not to give it or because
the subject does not have enough self-insight to
give it (Thorndike, 1982). Interpretation of ability
test scores is more straightforward, though it may be
difficult to assess the roles of affective and conative
factors.
PRACTICAL UTILITY. Both personality and intel-
ligence measures have been used for practical de-
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cision-making purposes in a wide array of sectors
and settings. Among the various practical uses of per-
sonality and intelligence measures are clinical diag-
nosis, vocational guidance and counseling, school
prediction and placement college selection, and per-
sonnel selection and placement. The main differ-
ence between the two are that intelligence tests
appear more valid and have been more widely used
in school prediction and college placement and
selection, whereas personality measures have been
more used in clinical diagnosis and counseling
(Jensen, 1980).
Despite the distinctions among the two con-
structs, it is commonly agreed that intelligence and
motivational-personality processes are never uti-
lized in isolation from each other; once activated
there is basically no way to separate the processes
or isolate the relative contribution of one from the
other. Thus, in attempting to adapt to any practical
situation, an individual needs to apply both men-
tal and motivational-affective processes which, re-
spectively, draw upon factual knowledge and knowl-
edge related to values, beliefs, and standards. In
most practical contexts, intelligence and person-
ality contexts are bound to form a coalition of
synergistic forces (Maciel, Heckhausen, & Baltes,
1994).
Empirical Links between Psychometric
Measures of intelligence and Personality
In the sections that follow we survey the re-
sults of empirical research exploring the links be-
tween personality and psychometric measure of in-
telligence. There now seems to be a more solid
and coherent theoretical basis for examining the
personality-intelligence interface than ever before.
Although there are several competing theories of
intellect, most theories converge on a hierarchical
model of intelligence, specifying both general and
group factor(s) (e.g., Cattell, 1971; Gustafsson, 1997;
Snow, Kyllonen, & Marshalek, 1984). Although
there is considerably less consensus about structure
of individual differences in personality than intel-
ligence, theoretical and empirical research over the
past 30 years prompted several investigators to con-
verge on a set of five factors (the Big Five: Costa &
McCrae, 1992) that appear across numerous per-
sonality inventories (Extraversion, Agreeableness,
Conscientousness, Neuroticism, Intellect).

Methodological Considerations
First, it may be useful to make a number of distinc-
tions and methodological comments that may help
the reader appraise the evidence relating intelligence
to personality. To begin with, one should keep in
mind the distinction between personality traits and
states. Traits are broad determining tendencies or
propensities to behave, whereas states are tempo-
rary states of mind and mood determined by the in-
teraction between a person's trait and present state
or situation (Spielberger, Gonzales, Taylor, Algaze, &
Anton, 1978). States and traits are typically corre-
lated because a trait is actually defined as a dispo-
sition that behavior is likely to be manifested in
particular situations. For example, "trait anxiety''
refers to an individual's disposition to respond with
worry, tension, and physiological arousal across a
variety of conditions (physical danger, evaluative
situations, social encounters, sports events), whereas
"state anxiety''refers to a specific level of anxiety ex-
perienced in a particular situation, such as an impor-
tant athletic competition. Two people may have the
same level of trait anxiety but differ in their anxiety
elevations in a particular situation or "state."
Zeidner (1995) delineated several different mod-
els employed in studying the direction of the causal
relationship between intelligence and personality.
In Model A intelligence is depicted as the indepen-
dent variable and personality as the dependent vari-
able. In Model B the causal direction is reversed,
and intelligence now serves as the dependent vari-
able and personality as the independent variable. In
Model C there is a bidirectional relationship and re-
ciprocal determinism between the two constructs. In
Model D the relationship is artifactual with a third
extraneous variable responsible for the relationship.
In Model E, personality is conceived as an interven-
ing or "nuisance" variable intervening between the
intelligence construct (as input) and manifest level
of intelligence (as output, evidenced in intelligence
test scores). Each of these models has been espoused
as a possible model for the intelligence-personality
relationship, although it is often difficult to discrim-
inate among them.
Meta-Analytic Results for the
Personality-intelligence interface
A recent meta-analysis (Ackerman & Heggestad,
1997), based on 135 separate studies, helps shed
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INTELLIGENCE AND PERSONALITY 585
light on the magnitude and pattern of relationships
between ability and the "Big Five" factors of per-
sonality. The largest effect observed in this analy-
sis is the meaningful positive correlation between
intelligence (g) and the Openness-Intellect factor
(r = 33) - a factor associated with a broad class of
intellectually oriented traits. In addition, a small
but significant positive correlation was reported be-
tween g and Extraversion (r = .08), and a small but
significant negative correlation with ability was re-
ported for Neuroticism (r = -.15). Correlations be-
tween g and both Conscientiousness (r = .02) and
Agreeableness (r = .01) were negligible. The authors
suggest that the personality tests that have ubiq-
uitous positive correlations with ability fall under
the broad category of Positive Affect, whereas neg-
ative correlations with ability tend to be from broad
categories of Negative Affect, such as Neuroticism
(stress reaction) and Psychoticism. Kyllonen (1997)
recently reported correlations between the Big Five
factors and measures of General, Verbal, and Quan-
titative Ability in a U.S. sample of Air Force recruits.
Just as in the reported meta-analysis, Openness and
Neuroticism were the factors most strongly related
to ability measures. Thus, Openness was meaning-
fully correlated with both g (r = .45), Verbal ability
(r = .58), and Quantitative ability (r = .29), whereas
Neuroticism was reported to be inversely correlated
with both g(r = -.23) and Verbal ability (r = -.20).
The correlations between Conscientiousness, Agree-
ableness, and Extraversion were very low, ranging
from —.11 to .11. It is interesting to note, in pass-
ing, that only cognitive factors (working memory,
knowledge, etc.), but not personality factors pre-
dicted short-term performance on learning tasks
(e.g., computer programming, flight engineering,
economics) and psychomotor performance (e.g., fly-
ing, control). However, personality did account for
larger, long-term performance (e.g., productivity on
the job).
The inference to be drawn from these data is that
at the level of latent constructs, IQ and personality
are orthogonal constructs (see Eysenck's, 1994, re-
cent review). Furthermore, neither subtest patterns
nor profiles of IQ have been systematically found to
be related to personality variables (Eysenck, 1994).
Although actual performance on IQ tests may be in-
fluenced by an array of noncognitive states (fatigue,
anxiety, arousal), personality and intelligence are es-
sentially unrelated. However, such conclusions may
 586 MOSHE ZEIDNER AND GERALD MATTHEWS
understate the personality-intelligence associations
to be found through more fine-grained examina-
tion of the evidence. Three especially productive ar-
eas of research have focused on negative affectivity,
extraversion-introversion, and openness. Another
approach is to assess the IQs of people showing var-
ious abnormalities of behavior: the mentally ill, the
deviant, and children with unusually high or low
IQs.
intelligence and Negative Affectivity
We now examine the relationship between intelli-
gence and various personality traits subsumed under
the higher order category of negative affectivity, in-
cluding neuroticism, anxiety, depression and anger.
Most studies have addressed negative affect through
anxiety, which, as a state, is characterized by appre-
hension, worry, and emotional and somatic tension.
Anxiety has received particular attention because
it may impair intellectual functioning and perfor-
mance in variety of contexts, ranging from intelli-
gence test scores and school achievement (Sarason,
1980) to dating (Hope & Heimberg, 1990). In fact,
the literature suggests that the relationship between
trait anxiety and psychometric tests of intelligence
is negligible (Matarazzo, 1972). Thus, neither pat-
tern nor scatter-analysis approaches to the Wechsler
scales have shown any relation to a trait measure of
anxiety. However, studies utilizing situationally in-
duced anxiety (i.e., state anxiety) do reveal decre-
ments in performance on the same measures of in-
tellectual functioning. Only when we separate the
currently anxious (state anxious) from the chroni-
cally anxious (trait anxious) can we show a decre-
ment in intellectual performance due to anxiety
(Siegman, 1956). Discriminating different compo-
nents of anxiety shows that worry, but not emo-
tionality, is related to impaired intelligence test
performance under time pressure (Matthews, 1986;
Morris & Liebert, 1969).
Both test and trait anxiety may interact with
situational variables (e.g., task complexity, test at-
mosphere, etc.) and personal variables (e.g., opti-
mism, personal resources, social support) in impact-
ing upon cognitive test performance (see Zeidner,
1998, for a review). For example, there is consider-
able evidence that the performance of highly test
anxious individuals on complex tasks is detrimen-
tally affected by evaluational stressors: the less com-
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plex the task, the weaker the effect. Sarason (1975)
reported that the differences between anxious and
nonanxious students in performance are realized
mainly in the competitive atmosphere; under neu-
tral conditions the differences between anxious and
nonanxious students are minimal.
Anxiety may have somewhat more general effects
on intellectual performance in real-world contexts.
It has been estimated that there is a correlation
of about - . 2 between anxiety and both measures
of performance and achievement at school and
college (Hembree, 1988; Siepp, 1991) and sports
performance (Zeidner, 1997). The relationship be-
tween neurotic personality and occupational per-
formance has also been estimated at about —.2
in studies in which there was an a priori ratio-
nale for performance being sensitive to neuroticism
(Tett, Rothstein, & Jackson, 1991). Metanalytic data
(Ackerman & Heggestad, 1997) show a mean correla-
tion of -.33 between g and self-reports of test anx-
iety. Test anxiety measures may be a stronger pre-
dictor of situational anxiety than general anxiety in
such contexts. However, meta-analysis also shows
that there is little difference between state and trait
anxiety measures as predictors of educational perfor-
mance criteria. Hence, detrimental effects of anxiety
in the real world may represent more than just dis-
traction from performance by the person's immedi-
ate worries about the test situation, which relates to
state rather than to trait anxiety.
Depression is characterized by strong negative
emotions, impairment of everyday social function-
ing, and negative beliefs such as hopelessness and
lack of self-worth. There is little evidence to suggest
that subclinical levels of depression reliably relate to
impaired intelligence test performance in laboratory
settings (e.g., Matthews, 1986). Deficits are found
in clinical populations, however, especially on the
performance subtests of the Wechsler Adult Intelli-
gence Scale (Endler & Summerfeldt, 1995). Impair-
ment of performance appears to generalize across a
variety of high-level cognitive tasks such as prob-
lem solving and reading comprehension (Hartlage,
Alloy, Vazquez, & Dykman, 1993). The effects of
depression on intellectual functioning in the real
world are presently unclear. There has been little
work on the manic symptoms central to some mood
disorders, although low levels of symptoms (hypo-
mania) may be associated with enhanced creativity

(Endler & Summerfeldt, 1995). Anger is another
potentially important influence on intelligence
test performance that remains to be investigated
(cf. Zeidner, 1995).
The causal status of anxiety and other negative af-
fects is somewhat controversial. It is often supposed
that the worry component of state anxiety uses up
working memory or attentional resources, and thus
performance is impaired if the task is sufficiently
demanding (e.g., Eysenck, 1992; Sarason, 1975).
Subjects low in intelligence, for whom the task is
objectively more difficult, may thus be especially
vulnerable to more general anxiety-related impair-
ments - an hypothesis confirmed by meta-analysis
(Hembree, 1988). We will return to cognitive mech-
anisms for anxiety impairment in a later section.
Causal effects of clinical depression on cognitive
performance are generally accepted, especially for
tasks requiring concentration or memory (Endler
& Summerfeldt, 1995). However, there are alterna-
tive explanations for negative correlations between
anxiety and intelligence. First, anxiety in the cog-
nitive test situation may be generated by more or
less veridical appraisals that failure is likely owing
to low ability or lack of preparation and study. In
other words, anxiety may be a marker for poor in-
tellectual skills rather than a factor that directly af-
fects performance (Mueller, 1992). Second, to the
extent that anxiety leads to beliefs of lack of self-
efficacy in achievement-oriented situations, individ-
uals high in anxiety may avoid activities that en-
hance intellectual growth, and thus apprehension
about academic contexts and lack of intellectual
skills become mutually reinforcing (Cattell, 1971).
Third, the observed relationship of anxiety to in-
telligence may be due to the artifactual influences
of extraneous variables (e.g., social class, childrear-
ing patterns, test situation) affecting both variables
(Weiner, 1973). Similar explanations are possible for
depression findings. It is conceivable that depres-
sion will result if low intelligence leads to a succes-
sion of performance failures, for example.
Extraversion-lntroversion
Extraversion-introversion (E) is a basic dimension
of individual differences in human behavior and is
often construed as a source trait with a strong bio-
logical basis (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1985). Extraverts
tend to be outgoing, sociable, and impulsive,
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INTELLIGENCE AND PERSONALITY 587
whereas introverts are socially reserved and cau-
tious. Extraversion-lntroversion relates to a variety
of aspects of human performance (Matthews, 1992).
However, as we have seen, it shows only small pos-
itive associations with intelligence in meta-analytic
data (Ackerman & Heggestad, 1997). As in the case of
anxiety, though, there may be some more subtle re-
lationships. Relationships between extraversion and
intelligence may be moderated by the nature of
the test. Robinson (1985) claimed that E is inti-
mately associated with different intellectual styles
and intelligence profiles but not to absolute levels of
performance on intelligence tests. Accordingly, in-
troverts and extraverts were found not to differ in
overall IQ, only on profile: introverts were found to
do relatively better on verbal tests and extraverts on
performance tests. However, these effects may not
be replicable (Saklofske & Kostura, 1990). Matthews
(1992) observed that introverts tend to do better
on problem-solving tasks requiring insight and re-
flection. Conversely, extraverts may benefit from
speeded tasks (Rawlings & Carnie, 1989). Eysenck
(1994) reviewed studies showing that E is related to
speed of working and that extraverted subjects
spend lower total time doing the test. Thus, Jensen
(1966) found that E correlated .44 with speed of so-
lution of Raven's matrices, although extraverts made
significantly more errors. Eysenck (1994) surveyed
evidence suggesting that extraverts tend to give up
towards the end of tests and take longer to obtain
correct solutions towards the end of the test, a pro-
cess he attributes to greater reactive inhibition or
lower cortical arousal.
Extraversion effects are often moderated by fac-
tors related to stress, arousal, and emotion. Some
of this work shows interactions between extraver-
sion and arousal (e.g., Revelle et al., 1980) and
has been inspired by the arousal theory hypothe-
sis that the tonic or resting level of arousal for in-
troverts is higher than that of extraverts (Eysenck &
Eysenck, 1985). This hypothesis is further discussed
in the section on neural processes. Extraversion has
also been linked to positive emotionality (Watson
& Clark, 1992), but associations between E and
positive affect in performance contexts are small
in magnitude (Matthews, 1997b). However, if ex-
traverts are more energetic and lively in some real-
world contexts, these positive moods may feed
into superior intellectual performance. Studies of
 588 MOSHE ZEIDNER AND GERALD MATTHEWS
patients with chronic fatigue syndrome show wide-
ranging deficits, including considerable impairment
of full-scale IQ (Daugherty et al., 1991). Less dra-
matic but reliable attentional deficits are found in
individuals whose mood is characterized by low
energy, although there is no straightforward rela-
tionship between subjective tiredness and intelli-
gence test performance (Matthews, 1992).
Finally, there may be a developmental or matu-
rational link between intelligence and personality
(Eysenck & Cookson, 1969). These authors suggest
that around the ages of 13 or 14, there is a tendency
for the correlation between extraversion and IQ to
change from positive to negative. There seems to
be some uncertainty over the age of the crossover
point. For example, Crookes, Pearson, Francis, and
Carter (1981) found a positive correlation between
extraversion and IQ in 15-16 year old boys and
girls. If the effect is genuine, there are various ex-
planations. According to Eysenck (1994) it may re-
late to the change from the free and easy atmosphere
at primary school, which accords well with the ex-
traverted temperament, and the more formal atmo-
sphere at secondary school, which agrees better with
the introverted temperament. A second possible ex-
planation is that more able children become intro-
verted, whereas the less able become extraverted
(Anthony, 1983). A further possible explanation is
that because introverts mature more slowly, intro-
version in primary school age children is not advan-
tageous to mental achievement, but by secondary
school it becomes an assistance (Anthony, 1983).
Eysenck (1994) suggested that the correlation be-
tween introversion and increasing relative success
in academic exams is plausible because such success
is presumably facilitated by private study, an intro-
verted type of behavior.
Openness: Intellect and Authoritarianism
Openness is characterized by vivid fantasy, artis-
tic sensitivity, depth of feeling, behavioral flexibility,
intellectual curiosity, and unconventional attitudes.
McCrae (1994) has argued that there is substantial
overlap between Openness to experience and In-
tellectual Ability. Ackerman and Heggestad's (1997)
meta-analysis established that this factor correlates
more strongly with general intelligence than any of
the other Big Five factors, although it related more
strongly to crystallized than to fluid intelligence.
However, interpretation of the data is complicated
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by uncertainty over the nature of Openness, which
has been much debated in the personality literature
(e.g., McCrae, 1996). Trapnell (1994), for example,
picks out intellectual competency and liberalism as
two distinct aspects of Openness, although he pre-
fers to relate them to Conscientiousness (see Saucier,
1994, for a rebuttal of this view). Intellectual com-
petency may mediate associations between Open-
ness and intelligence test performance. Goff and
Ackerman (1992) showed that three constructs were
mutually intercorrelated: openness, crystallized in-
telligence, and a measure of 'Typical Intellectual
Engagement" (TIE), which assesses intellectual mo-
tives and interests. In a further study, Rolfhus and
Ackerman (1996) showed that Openness correlated
at .67 with TIE and that both measures related to
knowledge of the arts and humanities, although the
TIE scale was more broadly related to self-report
knowledge. Plausibly, more Open individuals show
greater crystallized intelligence because they are
more motivated to engage in intellectual activities,
especially those of a verbal and cultural nature.
In addition, the relationship between Openness
and intelligence may also relate to its "liberal" el-
ement, that is, willingness to examine social, po-
litical and religious values and rejection of tradi-
tional conservative views. This link is shown most
clearly by research on authoritarianism, an atti-
tudinal system consisting of a set of interrelated
antidemocratic sentiments, including ethnic preju-
dice, political conservatism, and moralistic rejection
of the unconventional (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswick,
Levinson, & Sanford, 1950). Trapnell (1994) re-
ported a correlation of -.57 between a right-wing
authoritarianism scale and openness. The studies of
Adorno et al., and those of other researchers show
that Authoritarianism scores are negatively associ-
ated with intelligence and have correlations ranging
between -.20 and -.50.
One possibility is that only individuals of rela-
tively low intelligence are able to accept the kind
of ideology represented by an extreme fascist orien-
tation (Thompson & Michel, 1972). Another line of
reasoning points out that both intelligence and au-
thoritarianism are confounded by social class. Also,
it may be chiefly education or cultural sophistica-
tion rather than intelligence per se that reduces au-
thoritarianism. Cristie (1954) estimated that with
education partialled out the correlation between au-
thoritarianism and intelligence drops considerably.

Thus, those in society who are low in personal and
social resources (e.g., social status, intelligence, ed-
ucation), feel threatened and frustrated and turn to
authoritarian beliefs as a solution to problems.
Other evidence also points to the importance of
socially shaped belief systems. A survey (Argyle,
1961) of American studies of children and students
found negative correlations between intelligence
and religious beliefs, attitudes, and experiences. The
correlations are generally higher for religious con-
servatism (-.15 to -.55) than for attitudes and ex-
periences (-.19 to -.27). Similarly, several studies
showed that beliefs in the paranormal predicted low
intelligence (see Zeidner, 1995, for a review), per-
haps because higher intelligence may render an indi-
vidual less vulnerable to the circular and ephemeral
arguments put forth in defense of paranormal ideas
(Zusne & Jones, 1982). Intriguingly, though, recent
studies suggest that due to the antirationalism typ-
ical of many intellectually superior students during
the 1960s and the 1970s, the historical relationship
may have changed, and beliefs in the paranormal are
now associated with higher rather than lower intel-
ligence (cf. Jones, Russel, & Nickel, 1977).
Abnormality and Deviance
Work on abnormality of personality and intel-
ligence has tended to use clinical typologies, al-
though dimensional models based on normal per-
sonality structure are becoming more widely used in
other contexts (Matthews, Saklofske et al., in press).
Eysenck (1994) believed that research exploring sta-
tistical relations between measures of IQ and psy-
chopathology is doomed to failure in view of the
following three factors: the mindless ''blunderbuss''
approach adapted by many researchers in correlat-
ing measures of personality and intelligence; the
notorious unreliability of the criterion, that is, di-
agnosed psychopathology; and problems in statis-
tical analysis of difference scores. The role of in-
telligence in some aspects of abnormality has been
neglected, notably in the case of personality disor-
ders. Endler and Summerfeldt's (1995) review of the
literature concluded that characteristic ways of orga-
nizing and processing information and experience
appear to play major roles in the genesis and perpet-
uation of personality disorders. The cognitive char-
acteristics of these disorders are important, but there
is little systematic evidence on the role of intelli-
gence from studies using psychometric tests.
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INTELLIGENCE AND PERSONALITY 589
Delinquency
On average, delinquents score eight IQ points
lower than nondelinquents on standard intelligent
tests (Lynam, Moffitt, & Stouthamer-Loeber, 1993).
This relation holds up regardless of social class or
ethnic background. Crime and even aggression may
act over a long period of time to depress intellectual
functioning (Huesmann, Eron, & Yarmel, 1987). Fur-
thermore, recent meta-analytic research (Ackerman
& Heggestad, 1997) reports a modest inverse correla-
tion between aggression and g (r = — .19). Wechsler
(1958) pointed out that the most outstanding sin-
gle feature of the sociopath's test profile is his sys-
tematic high score on the Performance as compared
with the Verbal part of the scale. Matarrazo (1972)
listed about 30 studies that generally support this
view, although he urges caution in individual diag-
noses.
Researchers have argued over the meaning and in-
terpretation of this negative relationship (Lynam,
Moffitt, & Stouthamer-Loeber, 1993). For one, a
delinquent life style may result in lower intellectual
functioning. This lowering may be the result of one
of a variety of factors, including poor school moti-
vation, negative attitudes towards IQ testing, head
injuries incurred in numerous street or gang fights,
or the deleterious effects of drug abuse on the central
nervous system. According to Block (1995), high im-
pulsivity accounts for the lower Verbal IQ frequently
characterizing serious delinquents. Because effective
test performance requires constrained, slowed, and
reflective behavior, impulsive and uncontrolled in-
dividuals are less able to modulate their actions and
reactions, resulting in depressed test performance.
Moreover, during their education, impulsive and
undercontrolled children may cumulatively register
less of the information, reasoning, and logic upon
which verbal tests depend, and their IQ suffers be-
cause they are unprepared. It is the unresilient, un-
dercontrolled child who will be disposed to conduct
disorder, will more frequently miss days in school,
and who will lose the opportunity to develop cog-
nitive processes that underpin performance on in-
telligence tests. These behavioral deficits may be
linked to deficiencies in self-regulation, including
lack of self-control, preferences for coping through
aggression, and distorted appraisals of others' atti-
tudes towards oneself (Schwean & Saklofske, 1995;
Matthews, Schwean et al., in press). Second, a
low IQ may lead to delinquency as mediated by
 590 MOSHE ZEIDNER AND GERALD MATTHEWS
low scholastic performance and eventual school
dropout. A third explanation is that the observed
relationship is spurious, and a third variable (e.g.,
social class, race, etc.) may cause both low IQ and
delinquency.
Schizophrenia
Schizophrenic thought and judgment is seriously
impaired as mental health deteriorates with a grow-
ing tendency to confuse wish and reality (Coleman,
Butcher, & Carson, 1984). The schizophrenic mind,
although unselectively registering everything in its
field of vision, is unable to distinguish between
relevant and irrelevant cues (Williams & Beech,
1997). Decrements in intelligence test performance
are common but may in part be attributed to the
subject's low motivation to perform, minimal coop-
eration, and impaired contact with the examiner,
leading to fluctuation of test scores across occasions.
It is somewhat unclear whether impairment of
the intellect is a vulnerability factor for schizophre-
nia or whether it represents a consequence of psy-
chosis: the direct empirical evidence is conflict-
ing and often confusing. Although the intelligence
of severely schizophrenic individuals may be be-
low average, one is struck by the preservation of
average or even remarkable intellectual superiority
in many schizophrenics, especially those diagnosed
as paranoid. Some studies report (Watson, Herder,
Kucala, & Hoodecheck-Schow, 1987) substantial de-
cline between premorbid assessment and hospital-
ization, whereas other studies show that intellectual
decline among schizophrenics may be attributable
to preexisting conditions and is not an inherent fac-
tor associated with the onset of schizophrenia. In
one recent study, no significant decay in intelligence
scores was observed for schizophrenics whose initial
aptitude test scores were above average, and the ob-
served decline in test scores was largely attributable
to a drop in a specific skill - arithmetic performance
(Watson et al., 1987). Because deterioration is lim-
ited to certain skills, it is best interpreted as a loss
in particular intellectual functions rather than as a
more generalized intellectual decay.
Some research shows that intelligence deterio-
rates under schizophrenic attack, but, under remis-
sion, performance on intelligence tests improves
(Scheartzman & Douglas, 1962). Chronic schizo-
phrenic inpatients with long histories of hospital-
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ization manifest greater intellectual deficit than do
patients with recent onset or brief hospitalization.
However, this may be due to changes in the compo-
sition of hospitalized cohorts over time rather than
to the effects of hospitalization or processes intrin-
sic to psychosis. Longitudinal studies of hospital-
ized patients fail to find progressive decline (Hamlin,
1963). That is, chronics may be less bright than
acutes because of an association between IQ and re-
tention in hospitals and readmission to hospitals.
There is some research to suggest that brighter pa-
tients are less often rehospitalized several years af-
ter discharge than patients of lower IQ (Heffner,
Strauss, & Grisell, 1975). Thus, there appears to be
a prognostic significance for IQ that contributes to
the differences in intelligence between acute and
chronic schizophrenics.
The effects of psychosis on intellectual function-
ing for children may be more pernicious than for
adults and children suffering from certain personal-
ity dysfunctions and disturbances, who have been
reported to suffer from a severe deterioration of
abilities (Sattler, 1988). Children with disintegra-
tive psychosis usually have a period of normal
development for the first 3-4 years, after which
profound regression and behavioral disintegration
occur, intelligence declines, speech and language
abilities deteriorate, and social skills diminish. In ad-
dition, children become restive, irritable, anxious,
and overactive. Overall, the prognosis is poor, al-
though more intelligent children may have better
prospects.
Personality Characteristics of the Gifted
and intellectually Challenged
The previous section considered the intellectual
capabilities of individuals with abnormal person-
alities. We may also look at the personalities of
people with abnormal intellect. By virtue of their
exceptionally high and low intellectual talents, both
gifted and intellectually challenged individuals are
often viewed as suffering from special adjustment
problems, especially during childhood (cf., Anastasi,
1958).
intellectually Gifted Children
Paradoxically, it is often supposed that highly
intelligent children have special problems in ad-
justment. The famous Stanford Gifted Child Study,

initiated by L. Terman in 1921, systematically
investigated the physical, mental, and personal-
ity traits of 1,528 gifted children from California
(Mean IQ=151), following them into late adult-
hood (Terman, 1935; Terman & Oden, 1947; Terman
& Oden, 1959). Not only were these children above
norms in height and overall health, but they were
also rated by their teachers as considerably more
"self confident/' "optimistic/' and "emotionally
stable" compared with controls. In adulthood the
gifted sample proved to be equal or superior to
controls on marital adjustment and showed nor-
mal or below normal incidence of serious person-
ality maladjustment. Data on the personality and
social characteristics of these 70+ year-old subjects
are still being gathered and disseminated. Inter-
estingly, two of Terman's subjects, Lee Cronbach
and Robert Sears, grew up to become famous psy-
chologists in their own right and assumed profes-
sorships in psychology at the very university that
sponsored the study! Comparable findings can be
gleaned from the John Hopkins study of mathemat-
ically gifted youth (Stanley, Keating, & Fox, 1974).
The personality profiles of these mathematically
gifted students suggest social maturity and psycho-
logical health and are a far cry from maladjusted
by any standards. A study (Mayer, Caruso, Zigler,
& Dreyden, 1989) of 46 gifted adolescent students
attending the Duke University Talent Identification
Program has also suggested that gifted children are
characterized by optimal levels on several intellect-
related personality traits such as high intellectual ab-
sorption, the tendency to experience pleasure when
working on problems, and low degrees of apathy
or boredom in doing intellectual work. Overall, re-
search provides a highly positive personality pro-
file of the gifted, which is in sharp contrast to the
common stereotype of the highly intelligent child
as shy, unhealthy, weak, and generally socially mal-
adjusted.
intellectually Challenged Children
There is often a tendency to view mentally chal-
lenged children as a homogeneous group with spe-
cific personality deficits and problems. For exam-
ple, some research suggests that these children are
sometimes characterized by more rigid patterns of
behavior than are those who are at the same men-
tal age but who are chronologically younger. It has
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INTELLIGENCE AND PERSONALITY 591
also been suggested that personality may develop
at a slower rate in these than in normal children.
Thus, whereas the mentally challenged and nor-
mal children of the same mental age are similar in
personality characteristics, the mentally challenged
and regular children of the same chronological age
may differ in personality (Nevo, 1998). In fact, aside
from those children with clear physiological deficits,
there is much evidence against the existence of
unique personality characteristics intrinsically asso-
ciated with mental retardation (Nevo, 1998). It is
plausible, however, that poor cognitive performance
and repeated failure in school and social settings
may indirectly lead to problems of social adjustment
and rejection. This, in turn, may influence both the
development and expression of certain personality
traits.
The Psychometric Approach: Conclusions
Correlations between personality and ability con-
structs are often small, although there are substan-
tial associations between Openness and crystallized
intelligence measures. However, closer empirical
links are found in some contexts. Anxiety measures
related to specific contexts, such as test anxiety, are
moderately predictive of impaired test performance.
Both anxiety and extraversion may be shown to pre-
dict test performance when situational factors such
as level of time pressure, stress, or arousal are ma-
nipulated. Subject groups whose personality is ab-
normal, such as psychotic patients and delinquents,
may also show impairment of intellectual function.
However, groups of abnormal IQ (high and low)
show relatively little sign of dysfunctional person-
ality, and high IQ appears to be beneficial. It is of-
ten difficult to discriminate the causal hypotheses
proposed for these various relationships. On one
hand, personality may impair or facilitate the in-
tellectual competence associated with IQ, as mani-
fested in actual test performance illustrated by some
of the detrimental effects of anxiety, depression,
schizophrenia, and delinquency. On the other hand,
IQ may influence the person's adjustment to real-
world demands, and consequently, personality. For
example, the educational difficulties of low-IQ chil-
dren may variously lead to anxiety and conduct
problems. In addition, personality-IQ relationships
may be confounded by third variables, such as social
class.
 592 MOSHE ZEIDNER AND GERALD MATTHEWS

THE COGNITIVE SCIENCE PERSPECTIVE
Cognitive science emphasizes processes rather than
structural factors, whether these processes are neu-
ral, computational, or adaptive. From this perspec-
tive, individual differences dimensions refer to sta-
ble parameters governing the behavior of dynamic
systems. The first question to be addressed is
whether ability and personality are associated with
common parameters. For example, is it possible
that intelligence and personality factors relate to
a "clock-speed" parameter influencing rate of in-
formation processing? In general, the psychomet-
ric distinctiveness of the two kinds of dimension
suggests that such overlaps are limited. The sec-
ond, more subtle question is whether intelligence
and personality influence common intelligent be-
haviors via different parameters. For example, both
intelligence and some personality traits may influ-
ence response speed on some performance task, but
the effect may be mediated by different processes,
say, basic processing speed and strategy choice. This
form of overlap may be quite prevalent. Initially, we
will briefly review the evidence for process-oriented
relationships between personality and intelligence
at the three levels of explanation previously de-
scribed: the biological, the cognitive-architectural,
and the adaptive-knowledge levels. We will then
outline an integrated cognitive-adaptive framework
for interrelating personality and intelligence. It
should be recognized from the outset that it is dif-
ficult to describe the static constructs of differen-
tial psychology in process-oriented terms. An em-
pirical association between, say, intelligence and
information-processing speed, does not necessarily
imply either that intelligence is a direct expression
of processing speed or that there is some unitary
cognitive entity called intelligence that controls pro-
cessing speed (Matthews & Dorn, 1995).
Neural Processes
The treatment here of the biological level will be
brief. There is much work on the biological bases
of both intelligence and personality constructs.
Both appear to be partially inherited (Bouchard,
1995; Loehlin, 1992), and both have extensive psy-
chophysiological correlates (Deary & Stough, 1996;
Matthews & Gilliland, in press), implying that their
behavioral expressions are influenced by neural pro-
cesses. However, there is little work that attempts
to determine whether the two construct types re-
late to common neural bases. On the whole, in-
telligence and personality seem to relate to rather
different psychophysiological indices, as shown by
evoked potential studies, for example (Stelmack &
Houlihan, 1995). It is also unclear whether behav-
ior reflects interactions between distinct sets of neu-
ral processes associated with the two constructs. For
example, is it possible that the cortical circuits con-
trolling performance on an intelligence test are in-
fluenced by subcortical circuits linked to personal-
ity? A crude example might be disruption of cortical
processing caused by fear circuits centered on the
amygdala (LeDoux, 1995), if we may assume that
chronically fearful individuals show abnormality of
function in these circuits.
One strategy for integrating the two constructs
has been through arousal theory. The electroen-
cephalogram (EEG) and other psychophysiological
measures may provide an index of the functional
status of the organism, which integrates outputs
from a variety of distinct neural systems (e.g.,
Mesulam, 1985). There have been occasional at-
tempts to link intelligence to arousal (e.g., Necka,
1997), but individual differences in arousal are
more usually seen as the basis for the personality
traits of extraversion-introversion and neuroticism
(Eysenck & Eysenck, 1985). Eysenck and Eysenck
(1985) suppose that (1) extraverts tend to be less
aroused than introverts and (2) arousal is linked
to performance by an inverted-U function (the so-
called Yerkes-Dodson law).
It follows that personality and arousing agents
should have interactive effects on performance of
various tasks, including intelligence tests. Consis-
tent with prediction, arousal induced by caffeine
and time pressure tends to enhance the test per-
formance of extraverts but impairs introverts' per-
formance (Revelle, Amaral, & Turiff, 1976). How-
ever, other work presents a more complex picture.
Work by Revelle, Humphreys, Simon, & Gilliland
(1980) demonstrated that when subjects are tested
in the evening, caffeine benefits introverts, not ex-
traverts, implying that the relationship between
extraversion and arousal varies with time of day.
Revelle et al. also showed that impassivity was
more predictive than sociability of test performance.
Matthews (1985) obtained results similar to those of

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Revelle et al. using a self-report measure of arousal.
However, these data showed that arousal moder-
ated rather than mediated the effect of extraversion:
the arousal-performance relationship appeared to
be qualitatively different in extraverts and intro-
verts. Similarly, Matthews & Amelang (1993) found
that associations between EEG alpha and verbal in-
telligence test performance varied with extraversion.
Matthews (1992, 1997b) attributed such effects to
arousal having qualitatively differing effects on at-
tentional efficiency in extroverted and introverted
subjects.
Studies of this kind implicate neural arousal pro-
cesses in both extraversion-introversion and in test
performance, but their exact theoretical implica-
tions are unclear. The neural processes concerned
are not specified precisely, and so there is no basis
for modeling their interaction. Part of the problem
is that extraversion is most likely associated with a
variety of neurologically distinct functions. For ex-
ample, studies of brainstem-evoked potentials per-
mit extraversion to be linked to some specific brain
structures, such as the inferior colliculus (Bullock
and Gilliland, 1993). It is unlikely, however, that
these structures directly influence intelligent be-
havior. Matthews & Harley (1993) have proposed
a speculative connectionist model that attributes
extraversion x arousal interaction effects on cog-
nitive performance to variation in levels of ran-
dom noise within a neural net. But, such attempts
are in their infancy. Although arousal theory may
serve as a useful*heuristic for linking personality
and intelligence, its well-known shortcomings (e.g.,
Matthews & Amelang, 1993) may limit its utility in
developing neurally based theories.
Cognitive Processes
We can be fairly confident that intelligence is as-
sociated with individual differences in the cognitive
architecture (strictly, the functional architecture, in
Pylyshyn's, 1984, terms). It is clear that high IQis as-
sociated with greater processing efficiency on some
tasks, whether this advantage is attributed to work-
ing memory, attentional resources, rate of compu-
tation, or some other processing qualities. Reduced
constraints on processing imposed by architectural
features may also translate in superior acquired cog-
nitive skills (Anderson, 1992). Like intelligence, per-
sonality traits also correlate with performance on
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INTELLIGENCE AND PERSONALITY 593
information-processing tasks, but it is less clear that
such correlations reflect individual differences in ar-
chitecture, as opposed to voluntary strategy. For ex-
ample, anxious individuals often behave as though
they have a functional deficit in attentional capac-
ity. However, this deficit may reflect diversion of
capacity onto internal worries rather than a funda-
mental lack of resources (Matthews & Wells, in press;
Sarason, 1975). Conversely, subjective arousal does
seem to correlate with total availability of resources,
a parameter of the architecture (Matthews & Davies,
in press).
INTELLIGENCE. The pioneering studies of Hunt
(1978) and Sternberg (1977) provided a major impe-
tus to studies of intelligence and information pro-
cessing. It has been claimed that special importance
attaches to diverse processing constructs, includ-
ing elementary processing speed (Neubauer, 1997),
working memory (Kyllonen & Chrystal, 1990), and
strategy use (Ferrara, Brown, & Campione, 1986).
None of these constructs, however, seem likely to
replace g on psychometric grounds alone (Carroll,
1993). Instead, as Sternberg (1977) claimed, intelli-
gence may be associated with a multiplicity of lower
level components and higher level "metacompo-
nents" or control processes, and thus there is no
single critical process for intelligence. Intelligence
is distributed across a variety of independent pro-
cessing components at different levels of the archi-
tecture. The observed correlations between intelli-
gence and a specific task depend on the g loadings
of the components controlling individual differ-
ences in performance (Sternberg, 1977). We can
then ask questions about the role of personality sim-
ilar to those posed at the biological level of expla-
nation. Are there components associated with both
intelligence and personality factors? To what extent
is intelligent behavior controlled by cognitive pro-
cesses sensitive to personality as well by ^-loaded
processes?
EXTRAVERSION. In previous reviews (Matthews,
1992, 1997b; Matthews & Dorn, 1995), one of us
has concluded that, as with intelligence, personal-
ity traits are associated with a diversity of cogni-
tive correlates or cognitive patterning. However, in
contrast to intelligence, traits tend to be associated
with performance deficits as well as enhancements,
 594 MOSHE ZEIDNER AND GERALD MATTHEWS
TABLE 26.2. Cognitive Patterning of
Extraversion-lntroversion: Performance
Characteristics of the Extravert Compared
with the Introvert
Characteristics of Extraversion
Superiority in... Divided attention
Resistance to distraction
Retrieval from memory
Short-term memory
Inferiority in... Vigilance
Reflective problem solving
Long-term memory
Lower response criterion
Little systematic Attentional selectivity
effect on... Reaction-time tasks
General intelligence
which may account for the small magnitude of
personality-intelligence correlations previously dis-
cussed. Table 26.2 summarizes the cognitive cor-
relates of extraversion-introversion. At least some
of these effects, especially the associations with
attentional and memory functions, appear suffi-
ciently robust to represent individual differences
in architecture, although there is little direct
evidence. Superficially, at least, there appears to
be overlap between some of these cognitive corre-
lates and correlates of intelligence. For example, in-
troverts appear more intelligent in their superior
reflective problem solving, whereas extraverts re-
semble intelligent individuals in their superior dual-
task performance (e.g., Stankov, 1989). At the least,
then, individual differences in some aspects of per-
formance may be sensitive to both personality and
intelligence. However, more fine-grained analyses
tend to suggest that the specific processes sensi-
tive to extraversion and intelligence are often dif-
ferent from one another. For example, extraverts'
dual-task superiority may reflect greater availabil-
ity of resources (Eysenck, 1981), especially for ver-
bal tasks. For intelligence, though, the crucial pro-
cesses appear to be the control processes handling
the additional complexity associated with dual-task
performance (Spilsbury, Stankov, & Roberts, 1990).
The cognitive correlates of extraversion are highly
sensitive to contextual factors such as level of stim-
ulation (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1985) and motiva-
tional signals (Derryberry & Reed, 1994). As previ-
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ously discussed, one interpretation of these interac-
tional effects rests on analyses of neural processes
such as arousal theory. Such explanations are, at
the least, incomplete because extraversion x arousal
interactions vary with the information-processing
demands of the task. Matthews and Harley (1993)
suggested that the typical interaction effect oper-
ates on lower-level spreading activation processes.
They speculated that the effects of extraversion
and arousal factors on intelligence test performance
found by Revelle et al. (1980) may be mediated by
"automatic" verbal processes. In other words, prop-
erties of the architecture may vary to some degree
across both individuals and contexts. Overall, the
impression is that intelligence and extraversion are
associated with distinctive sets of parameter settings
for the cognitive architecture, although there may
be some overlap with regard to specific parameters.
ANXIETY. Like extraversion, anxiety effects may
be characterized in terms of a cognitive patterning
(for reviews see Eysenck, 1992; Wells & Matthews,
1994; Zeidner, 1998). In theory, anxiety may affect
cognitive performance at each of the stages involved
in processing information (i.e., encoding of new in-
formation, short- and long-term storage, elaboration
and processing of encoded material, retrieval of con-
tent from long-term memory, and problem solving).
Thus, anxiety may produce a narrowing of atten-
tion and increased distractibility, affecting encod-
ing of intelligence test information and tasks partic-
ularly sensitive to distractibility (e.g., digit-symbol
coding). Anxiety may impair the efficiency of short-
term storage and tasks such as digit span. The short-
term memory tasks most sensitive to anxiety tend
to be those that also require active processing of
information (working-memory tasks) and may re-
quire attentional resources as well as short-term re-
tention. Intelligence tests vary in their demands
on attentional resources and working memory, and
thus impairment in these information-processing
functions does not necessarily result in impairment
on any given intelligence test (Matthews & Dorn,
1995). We would expect emotional disturbance to be
most detrimental to tests making high demands on
controlled processing, attention, or working mem-
ory, such as complex arithmetic calculations per-
formed without paper and pencil. Anxiety may also
affect students' long term memory, such that highly

anxious subjects would show a greater retention loss
over time (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1985).
Anxiety effects are not limited to deficits. Anxi-
ety is also associated with negative biases in judg-
ment and with selective attention to threat (Wells &
Matthews, 1994; Zeidner, 1998). It may facilitate
performance of easy tasks (Zeidner, 1998). Again,
there is some uncertainty over whether anxiety
effects should be linked to the cognitive architec-
ture (Matthews & Wells, in press). The cognitive in-
terference hypothesis for anxiety effects (Zeidner,
1998) implies that anxious individuals are not gen-
erally lacking in attentional resources or working-
memory capacity; they simply allocate it to off-task
processing. On the other hand, there may be more
fundamental differences in some specific attentional
functions such as attentional focusing and disen-
gagement (Derryberry & Reed, 1997). Similarly, the
nature of attentional bias in anxiety is controversial.
According to Williams et al. (1988), anxiety is associ-
ated with individual differences in preattentive pro-
cesses controlling threat evaluation, which are ap-
parently a property of the architecture. Matthews
and Wells (in press) point to numerous demonstra-
tions that attentional bias effects are sensitive to
contextual and strategic factors. They argue that bias
reflects a coping strategy of monitoring for threat.
LIMITATIONS OF INFORMATION-PROCESSING
MODELS. There is little dispute that intelligence
and personality traits may conjointly influence
many aspects of performance. Even intelligence test
performance is sensitive to personality when con-
textual factors such as level of stimulation and
time pressure are taken into account (e.g., Revelle
et al., 1980). Cognitive psychological studies have
been invaluable in generating detailed information-
processing models of these findings. However, such
models are often rather superficial in their explana-
tions (Matthews, 1997a). The simplest explanation
is that individual difference factors influence multi-
ple parameters of the cognitive architecture in such
a way that intelligence and personality factors re-
late to differing cognitive patterning. Such expla-
nations may be adequate for explaining the perfor-
mance data, although, in the larger picture, they
may require supplementation with neural explana-
tions. Humphreys and Revelle (1984) and Necka
(in press) have discussed how individual differences
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INTELLIGENCE AND PERSONALITY 595
in resource availability (an architectural construct)
may be influenced by arousal (a neural construct),
for example.
In some respects, though, architectural explana-
tions may not be just limited but wrong because
they neglect volitional strategy choice. Individual
differences in strategy may reflect either the ar-
chitectural components supporting strategy imple-
mentation or the person's choices for dealing with
task demands. In the latter case, we must invoke
the knowledge-level explanations discussed in the
next section. It is often difficult to ascertain which
type of explanation is appropriate. Extraverts' de-
ficiencies in certain kinds of problem solving may
be attributed to use of "impulsive exit" strategies
(Weinman, 1987). One explanation is that the com-
putations used in deciding whether a valid solu-
tion has obtained are deficient in extraverts (archi-
tectural explanation). Alternatively, extraverts value
speed relative to accuracy and so are at risk for mak-
ing errors on the tasks concerned (knowledge ex-
planation). In the next section, we explore the role
of strategy as a construct bridging architectural and
adaptive levels of explanation.
Adaptive Processes
At Pylyshyn's (1984) knowledge level, we are con-
cerned with the processes of intentional adapta-
tion to the demands of the external environment
(cf. Lazarus, 1991). "Adaptation" here refers to the
person's volitional management of real-world op-
portunities and threats and should be distinguished
from adaptation in the evolutionary sense. Do per-
sonality and intelligence relate to common adap-
tive goals or to common adaptive outcomes? The
motivational aspect of personality is commonplace:
Consider the social motivations of extraverts or the
concerns with self-protection of the anxious indi-
vidual, for example. Motivational components of
intelligence are less obvious. Motivation involves in-
vestment of time and energy in the pursuit of per-
sonal goals. In general, intelligence consists of abili-
ties or aptitudes that help people achieve their basic
long- and short-term goals or reach certain perfor-
mance standards. Hence, intelligence is drawn into
the domain of goal satisfaction and thus becomes
more linked with general motivational dispositions.
For example, the studies of openness previously de-
scribed show that intelligent individuals are more
 596 MOSHE ZEIDNER AND GERALD MATTHEWS
likely to have intellectual interests. In this section,
we review the evidence relating to motivational pro-
cesses, their control by larger self-regulative systems,
and the implementation of control through strategy
selection.
MOTIVATION AND ENVIRONMENTAL CON-
TROL. A fundamental requirement for adaptation
is a degree of control over the external environ-
ment. To achieve environmental control, individu-
als spend considerable time and effort assessing en-
vironmental contingencies and contextual changes
as well as analyzing their own powers to cope and
excel in relevant contexts (cf. Zeidner & Endler,
1996). Attribution theory (Weiner, 1973) posits that
an essential motivation is to gain a measure of pre-
dictability and control over events with emphasis
on gaining an accurate appraisal of one's personal
characteristics. Locus of causality is an attributional
dimension. Individuals with an internal locus of
causality assume that their own behaviors and ac-
tions are responsible for the consequences that hap-
pen to them. Externally controlled people, by con-
trast, believe that the locus of causality is out of
their hands and subject to the whims of fate. Inter-
nal locus of causality, especially for positive events,
has commonly been associated with positive mental
health and more adaptive functioning. Conversely,
those who feel at the mercy of their environment
and have little control over what happens to them
may have low adaptive capacity.
Intelligence may affect the process of appraising
personal control by allowing more complex reason-
ing and consideration of alternatives and choice
among options, thus affording greater control dur-
ing both primary and secondary appraisal (Zeidner,
1995). Furthermore, people who believe they can
control their own lives will put forth the effort
to gain competencies and skills, thus enhancing
their acquired or crystallized intelligence and abil-
ities. Consistent with these hypotheses, intelligence
has been reported to be moderately and inversely
correlated with external locus of causality in ju-
nior and high school students (Samuel, 1980). Also,
some studies (Seligman, 1975) have specifically re-
lated deficits in mean IQ shown by Black examinees
to the phenomena of low controllability (learned
helplessness). Their motivation to cope with envi-
ronmental contingencies is drastically diminished
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by preliminary exposure to uncontrollable aver-
sive stimuli. Thus, people who have been success-
ful at using their abilities come to believe in their
abilities to control their destiny, and thus the lo-
cus of causality may shape the development of
intelligence. However, we do not really know for
sure what the causal direction is. Do attributions
affect cognitive test performance, or do less intelli-
gent people tend to rely more on luck and accidental
or external factors than their own abilities?
Achievement motivation designates a general
striving to perform one's best when the following
two conditions hold: (a) the quality of one's per-
formance is judged in terms of success or failure,
(b) a relevant standard of excellence applies (Weiner,
1973). It may relate to people's need to seek a sense
of control over their environment, which is often
referred to as a motivation for "effectance." Accord-
ing to achievement motivation theory (Atkinson,
1964), all individuals have a basic motive to ap-
proach an achievement-related goal and an an-
tagonistic motive to avoid failure. The strengths
of these motives vary from person to person and
situation to situation. Atkinson (1964) described
in detail how motives and expectancies influence
approach-avoidance conflict between the two op-
posing tendencies, the stronger of the two tenden-
cies being expressed in action.
Achievement strivings are a defining character-
istic of the Conscientiousness (C) trait of the
Five-Factor Model (Costa & McCrae, 1992). Some
authors have found it useful to distinguish achieve-
ment striving from the orderliness component of
C (Hough, 1992). Achievement motivation may in-
fluence intellectual development and performance
in one of several ways. First, achievement motiva-
tion may determine the level of interest, striving,
and effort that persons invest in the development
of their intellectual skills throughout all their life
experiences prior to the test. Second, achievement
motivation may help shape the level of attention,
effort, concentration, and persistence applied in the
evaluative or test situations. Recent research, in fact,
suggests that a student's motivation, as expressed by
basic interest in different school subjects, is signifi-
cantly related to cognitive abilities and achievement
(Snow, 1989). Third, intelligence may shape the per-
son's motives. Thus, a person high in quantitative
ability is likely to develop a motive to achieve in

math. Furthermore, highly intelligent students de-
velop a strong motivation to acquire or develop var-
ious intellectual skills tapped by IQ tests and to per-
form well in a testing situation.
In fact, some reviews have reported modest pos-
itive relations between need for achievement and
intelligence, but others conclude the correlation
is not statistically reliable (see Zeidner, 1995 for
review). Achievement motivation research may un-
derestimate the context dependence of motivation.
Successful entrepreneurs who left school with few
qualifications may be highly motivated to suc-
ceed - but not at schoolwork. Achievement striv-
ing predicts a variety of indices of occupational per-
formance, as does the C trait (Barrick & Mount,
1991; Matthews, 1997c). The possibility of nonlin-
ear relationships has also been rather neglected.
Basic motivation theory predicts that need for
achievement will show a linear relation to perfor-
mance outcomes when measured as cumulative aca-
demic performance but a curvilinear relationship
when immediate learning performance is measured
(Snow, 1989). Thus, the optimum immediate learn-
ing should come from those students with mid-
dle positions on need for achievement. Motivation
theory further predicts that only persons of aver-
age intelligence should be strongly motivated to
achieve or avoid failure, depending on the relative
strengths of their motivations for success or moti-
vation to avoid failure (Weiner, 1972). Hence, per-
formance differences as a function of motivation
may tend to be confined to groups intermediate in
ability (Atkinson, 1974). Contrary to this hypothe-
sis, Heckhausen (1967) found that motivation was
predictive of IQ only in high-ability groups. Kanfer
(1990) suggested that the critical moderating factor
is self-perceived ability. Motivation is beneficial only
when ability is high, focusing attention on attain-
ing performance goals. Low-perceived ability tends
to lead to goal abandonment and performance im-
pairment.
SELF-REGULATION. A more process-oriented
analysis of individual differences in motivation and
adaptation is provided by work on self-regulation.
Self-regulation refers to people's management of
their transactions with the environment under the
guidance of cybernetic control loops that seek to
align actual and ideal self-states (Carver & Scheier,
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INTELLIGENCE AND PERSONALITY 597
1991). Loosely, we can distinguish two aspects of
self-regulation. Its more passive, state-oriented
aspect refers to the person's self-representations and
subsumes both self-appraisals and the goals of self-
regulation. Its more action-oriented aspect (self-
agency) refers to beliefs about the coping strategies
used to meet those goals. Both aspects have been
linked to intelligence.
SELF-REPRESENTATIONS: SELF-CONCEPT AND
SELF-ESTEEM. A need for a positive self-concept or
self-regard develops universally. People's self-image
(how people come to see themselves) and their self-
esteem (to what degree they feel positive about
themselves) are crucial in determining their per-
sonal goals, perceptions, and behaviors. The earliest
and most general aspects of the self concept develop
in the interaction between the child and parent fig-
ures. Continuing changes in the self-concept should
take place as a consequence of later interactions as
well. Both theory and past research support the view
that a positive self-concept and high self-esteem are
related to higher academic ability and attainment.
Negative beliefs about the self are associated with
lower ability, scholastic underachievement, and fail-
ure (Purkey, 1970). Children who think of them-
selves poorly are likely to underestimate their abil-
ity, anticipate failure, and may well stop trying when
difficulties arise.
The causal dynamics in the assumed relation-
ship between intelligence and self-concept are am-
biguous. One commonly held view is that the
causality flows from intelligence to self-esteem.
Accordingly, positive self-concept and adjustment
only reflect past achievement and a person's subjec-
tive appraisals of his or her own social or educational
standing and scholastic aptitudes. In fact, a causal
modeling study by Maroyama, Rubin, and Kings-
bury, (1981) suggested that self-esteem at age 12
is significantly predicted by ability at age 7. This
suggests that the causal direction flows from abil-
ity to self-esteem. If correct, then efforts to improve
adjustment would have little effect on ability and
achievement.
SELF-AGENCY. According to current social-cog-
nitive theory, human action is governed not so
much by the objective properties of the environ-
ment but by the perceived level of personal efficacy
 598 MOSHE ZEIDNER AND GERALD MATTHEWS
to effect changes by productive use of capabilities
and enlistment of sustained effort (Bandura, 1977).
The term self-efficacy is used to refer to the belief
of being able to master challenging demands by
means of adaptive action. Self-efficacy can be con-
ceptualized as a "can-do" cognition that mirrors a
sense of control over the environment or as an op-
timistic view of one's capability to deal with stress
and anxiety. Recent research from a social-cognitive
perspective points to a meaningful relationship be-
tween self-efficacy and academic ability and attain-
ment (Bandura, 1986). Students who view ability as
reflecting an acquirable skill foster a resilient sense
of self-efficacy. Thus, students who regard intellec-
tual ability as a skill that can be acquired by gaining
knowledge and competencies tend to adopt func-
tional learning goals. These students seek challenges
that provide opportunities to expand their knowl-
edge and competencies. They regard errors as a nat-
ural part of the acquisition process rather than a
source of distress. Self-efficacy varies dynamically
with the person's experience of performing the task,
depending on the goals the person sets and their per-
ceived success in attaining them (Kanfer, 1990).
Ego resiliency is a somewhat similar construct: the
capacity of the individual to modulate and moni-
tor an ever-changing complex of desires and real-
ity constraints effectively (Block & Kremen, 1996).
A basic premise undergirding this conceptualization
is that the human goal is to be as undercontrolled
as possible and as overcontrolled as necessary. Thus,
ego resiliency refers to the dynamic capacity of an
individual to modify a characteristic level of ego
control in either direction (i.e., overcontrol or un-
dercontrol). This dynamic capacity is viewed as a
function of the demand characteristics of the en-
vironmental context so as to preserve or enhance
system equilibration (Block & Kremen, 1996). The
ego-resilient person is adaptively attuned to the sur-
rounding psychosocial environment, and thus he or
she experiences feelings of zest for life, self-esteem,
and harmony with others. Ego resiliency has ele-
ments of self-efficacy but places less emphasis on di-
rect environmental control as the route to success-
ful adaptation. Ego resiliency, as an index of human
adaptability, might be expected to relate to cognitive
function. Indeed, Block and Kremen (1996) found a
significant relationship between IQ and a measure
of ego resiliency among male students.
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Unking Adaptation to the Architecture:
The Role of Strategies
The research reviewed so far makes some broad
predictions about how motivational and self-
regulative aspects of personality may influence in-
telligence test performance. However, predicting
effects on specific intelligent behaviors requires in-
tegration of the adaptive and cognitive architectural
levels of explanation via the concept of strategy.
First, we may seek to link the executive functions
used in controlling intelligent behavior to self-
regulation. Perhaps the more intelligent person is
better able to attain personal goals in consequence.
Second, we may investigate how personality factors
influence strategy choice and the consequences of
these choices for intellectual functioning. This ap-
proach provides a fresh perspective on effects of anx-
iety and depression on performance.
EXECUTIVE FUNCTIONS IN SELF-REGULATION
AND INTELLIGENCE. One aspect of intelligence
relates to cognitive self-regulatory processes ("meta-
cognitive" or "executive functions'') that control a
person's cognitive functioning. A wide range of ac-
tivities are included under the rubric of cognitive
self-regulation. These include reflecting on the na-
ture of the problem at hand, planning activities,
predicting consequences of one's actions, monitor-
ing ongoing activities, checking results of one's ac-
tions, testing for plausibility, and reflecting on one'
actions (Flavell, 1985). Self-regulatory strategies and
"metacognitive knowledge" are believed to be pur-
posely constructed from the knowledge and expe-
rience one has acquired with respect to one's own
problem-solving behavior (Flavell, 1985).
Increased intelligence is often believed to be
associated with benefits in strategy regulation
(Borkowski & Peck, 1986). The working methods of
highly intelligent subjects are often claimed to be
dominated by well-developed metacognitive strate-
gies that are highly integrated into their rich cog-
nitive repertoires. The three metacognitive skills
perhaps most closely aligned with intelligence are
(a) formation of a clear mental representation of
learning-performance goals, (b) the capacity to de-
vise and revise a plan of action, and (c) the abil-
ity to monitor one's behavior to detect mismatches
between goals and standards and present behaviors
(Boekaerts, in press). Other theoretical accounts of

the link between metacognitive strategies and intel-
ligence have been provided by Sternberg (1985) and
Snow and Lohman (1984).
The person's use of metacognitive strategies
should contribute to his or her adaptation to
real-world environments through self-regulation of
the attainment of personally salient goals (Kanfer,
1989). Self-regulation efficiency, that is, the ability
to pursue one's goals despite alternative action ten-
dencies, has been hypothesized to be an important
variable subsumed under g (Kuhl & Kraska, 1989).
Thus, whereas more intelligent students are hy-
pothesized to use self-regulatory skills (actively set-
ting goals, planning, monitoring their performance
during problem solving, etc.), less intelligent stu-
dents rely more on the task and environmental cues
than self-regulatory cues to provide them with these
structures. These hypotheses have been supported,
in part, by recent research evidencing that external
regulation may enhance the learning and perfor-
mance of low-ability students. By contrast, self-
regulation may interfere with the self-regulatory ac-
tivities of high-ability students (Veenman & Elshout,
1995). Unfortunately, researchers have experienced
considerable difficulties distinguishing the con-
structs used in conceptualizing self-regulation (or
self-regulated learning) from those employed in
more traditional theories of intelligence (Zeidner,
Boekaerts, & Pintrich, in preparation). Researchers
are still unclear whether these constructs should be
conceptualized as independent constructs, overlap-
ping constructs, or hierarchically related constructs
(with self-regulation subsumed under the ability do-
main). Second, a review of the empirical literature
suggests that the actual role of intelligence (with
populations in the normal to gifted range) in strat-
egy regulation is either weak or inconsistent and
is still a matter of debate (Alexander & Schwanen-
flugel, 1994).
STRESS, MOTIVATION, AND STRATEGY USE.
Current transactional perspectives on emotion
(Lazarus, 1991) see stress as maladaptation to the
perceived demands of the environment. Stress arises
when the perceived demands of the environment
tax or exceed the individual's perceived capacity
to cope with these demands (Lazarus & Folkman,
1984). Stress may also be seen as a consequence of
ineffective or misguided self-regulation (Matthews,
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INTELLIGENCE AND PERSONALITY 599
Schwean et al., in press). Emotional expressions
of stress are closely linked to appraisals and cop-
ing tendencies. There has been much speculation
but rather little evidence on the relationship be-
tween intelligence and stress reactions. Intelligence
may be seen as a resource that facilitates personal
growth and adjustment and possibly buffers the
effects of environmental stress on stress reactions
(Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). Possibly, intelligence
leads to more positive appraisals through more ac-
curate and flexible assessments of demanding situ-
ations. Furthermore, more intelligent persons may
have better problem-solving skills used in deciding
how to change themselves or their environment
(cf. Payne, 1991). Haan (1977) found that changes
in intelligence from early adolescence to middle
adulthood correlate positively with increased us-
age of coping mechanisms but correlate negatively
with defense mechanisms. However, intelligence is
not necessarily beneficial in stressful situations: The
more intelligent person may be able to work out
negative consequences of a difficult situation that
would not occur to a less intelligent person. Cogni-
tive resource theory (Fiedler & Garcia, 1987) has set
forth several interesting hypotheses relating leader-
ship behavior under stress to individual differences
in leader intelligence. Accordingly, stress is assumed
to have a distracting effect on performance and lim-
its the leader's ability to make use of his or her cog-
nitive resources. A major hypothesis of this theory
states that when a leader is under stress, his or her in-
tellectual abilities will be diverted from the task. As a
result, measures of leader intelligence will not corre-
late (or even correlate inversely!) with group perfor-
mance under stressful conditions. Intelligent lead-
ers may be better able than less intelligent leaders
to foresee the consequences of failure, which makes
them less able to function (Fiedler & Garcia, 1987).
Studies of personality factors related to stress vul-
nerability, such as anxiety, demonstrate the strat-
egy choices that may influence intelligent behav-
ior under stress (Matthews & Wells, 1996). Wells &
Matthews' (1994) model of attention and emo-
tion, the Self-Regulative Executive Function (S-REF)
model, describes how choice of coping strategy is
influenced by self-knowledge in states of distress.
Matthews and Wells (in press) discuss how the
model interrelates knowledge level and architectural
concerns. At the knowledge level, the S-REF model
 600 MOSHE ZEIDNER AND GERALD MATTHEWS
states that coping is influenced by self-regulatory
goals, such as self-protection from threats (gen-
eralized anxiety), reevaluation of personal failure
(depression), maintenance of mental or physical
health (panic disorder), and avoidance of con-
tamination (obsessive-compulsive disorder). As the
transactional theory of stress specifies (Lazarus &
Folkman, 1984), coping also derives from individ-
ual evaluations of the demands of the situation and
of personal ability to implement accessible coping
strategies. The model also describes the cognitive ar-
chitecture that supports self-regulation and coping:
An executive system integrates intrusions from "au-
tomatic' ' processing with plans for coping retrieved
from a stable store of self-knowledge.
In states of distress, the coping strategy selected
is often "emotion-focused": The person may choose
to replace task-focused goals by self-regulatory goals
that generate worry and self-scrutiny (Matthews,
Schwean et al., in press). In other words, cognitive
interference reflects maladaptive self-regulation. In
the case of depression, there is considerable evidence
that lack of task motivation contributes to perfor-
mance deficit (Johnson & Magaro, 1987). The in-
tellectual performance of depressives is impaired by
self-focus of attention (Strack, Blaney, Ganellen, &
Coyne, 1985) and improved by a distracting sec-
ondary task. Foulds (1952) showed that depressives'
deficit on the Porteus Maze intelligence test was
eliminated when they also had to repeat digits back
to the experimenter. This result is inconsistent with
a simple resource-deficit explanation, which would
suppose that the extra task would increase the re-
quirement for resources and disadvantage the de-
pressives further. Similarly, studies of driver stress
have shown that negative emotions are most dam-
aging to single-task driving; stress-vulnerable drivers
appear to be able to mobilize sufficient effort to
deal with dual-task situations (Matthews, Sparkes, &
Bygrave, 1996).
The role of coping in anxiety is more controversial
because there is no clear overall motivational deficit.
Indeed, Eysenck & Calvo (1992) argued that anxious
individuals may be motivated to compensate for
their perceived deficit in performance through in-
creased compensatory effort. Anxious subjects may
counter cognitive interference resulting from emo-
tion focus with increased task focus. Hence, anxiety
may relate more strongly to processing efficiency
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than to observed performance effectiveness. The
anxious individual may be compared with a car hav-
ing a trailer hooked up to it. Additional acceleration
is needed to reach a given level of speed compared
with a car without a trailer. However, deficits in
active strategy use have been observed in trait-
anxious subjects and neurotic subjects (Mueller,
1992), implying that anxious individuals may some-
times have difficulty applying compensatory effort
adaptively. In addition, the task-focused coping of
anxious individuals may be applied to the "wrong"
task. Selective attention to threat in anxiety may
be a consequence of using the task-focused coping
strategy of monitoring for threat (see Matthews
& Harley, 1996, for a computational model). This
"hypervigilance" for threat (Eysenck, 1992) may
distract from the overt task at hand.
STRATEGIES AND ADAPTATION. In summary,
the knowledge or adaptive level brings together
several interrelated constructs: motivation, self-
regulation, and stress processes such as appraisal
and coping. Intelligence and personality may over-
lap in terms of adaptive goals and outcomes. Adap-
tive goals are perhaps primarily an attribute of per-
sonality, but achievement-related goals appear to
relate to intelligence also. Personality and intelli-
gence may interact also as influences on adaptive
success. Both may be linked to constructs such as
self-esteem, self-efficacy, and coping, though there
is a shortage of evidence. Understanding the adap-
tive processes involved requires an understanding of
how self-regulation is implemented by the cognitive
architecture through selecting and executing strate-
gies. Research should aim to specify the executive
and coping routines involved in both adaptive and
information-processing terms. Such research is in its
initial stages, but some progress has been made in re-
lating the performance consequences of anxiety and
depression to choice and implementation of coping
strategies.
The Longer View: A Cognitive-Adaptive
Framework
The previous section showed how explaining the
effects of anxiety on intellectual function within ex-
perimental settings requires analysis of both the in-
formation-processing routines involved and their
adaptive significance. Matthews (1997d, in press)
 INTELLIGENCE AND PERSONALITY 601

has developed a more general cognitive-adap-

/•"" Adaptation/Trait
tive framework that integrates the different lev-
Arousal
els of explanation over longer time periods. In it functions^. "Knowledge"
part, individual differences reflect the relatively Genes - • Neural / 1 Skills
- Motivations
- Efficacy beliefs
stable influences of genes and early learning,
feeding forward into neural systems controlling
nonspecific arousal (biological level of expla- '
r \
\ Information/^
v•
• Emotions

Early ' processing

nation) and into information-processing func-
learning
tions (cognitive architecture level). This tool kit Real-world
of elementary functions provides the basis for adaptive
behaviors
subsequent skill acquisition: real-world adap-
tation depends on somewhat context-bound skills FIGURE 26.2. A cognitive-adaptive framework for personality

(remembering conversations) rather than on basic and ability (Matthews, in press).

functions (short-term memory).
The right-hand side of Figure 26.2 illustrates the are supported both by acquired skills built on the
dynamic interplay at the adaptive level of explana- platform provided by the cognitive architecture and
tion. "Knowledge" refers to the package of psycho- by knowledge. For example, extraverts' processing
logical functions involved in self-regulation, which functions equip them to learn how to converse ef-
are, of course, discriminated in more fine-grained fectively, to deal with challenging social encounters,
models (e.g., Wells & Matthews, 1994). On the one and to act rapidly. At the knowledge level, extraverts
hand, successful adaptation reflects the application have confidence in their own abilities, which feeds
of the skills the individual is predisposed to acquire. into more effective coping in demanding environ-
Ensuing real-world success then feeds into congru- ments (Matthews, 1997b, in press). Conversely, in-
ent self-knowledge - motivation and confidence in troverts are adapted to environments characterized
application of skill - which in turn is likely to en- by infrequent stimuli, such as working as a writer
hance actual skill. On the other hand, adaptation or artist, within which they may capitalize on skills
is partially driven by knowledge itself, given that for sustained attention, reflective problem solving,
people may have unrealistic beliefs about the per- and tolerance of monotony. Intelligence is perhaps
sonal competencies. Self-beliefs and motivations in- more strongly influenced by feed-forward from
fluence the environments to which people choose basic neural and cognitive processing functions
to expose themselves, and, hence, the skills they than is personality and could be identified with the
have the opportunity to learn. Normally, there will acquired reasoning skills used for solving intelli-
be some positive feedback between the triangle of gence test problems, influenced by processing-level
components to the extent that people gravitate to- constructs such as speed of information processing.
wards environmental niches that suit their skills and The cognitive-adaptive approach provides a fresh
interests. perspective on relationships between personality
Table 26.3 shows how the three individual dif- and intelligence. The two kinds of individual differ-
ference constructs, g, E, and N, may relate to the ence factors are most sharply discriminated at the
cognitive-adaptive framework. Ability and per- adaptive level, at which each dimension represents
sonality traits are conceptualized as bundles of cognitive fitness for a different type of environment.
computationally independent processing functions However, the skills supporting different adaptations
that jointly support adaptation of the individual use some common processing building blocks. For
to specific informational environments. Intelligent example, a good short-term memory may be used to
individuals are adapted to novelty and complexity cultivate skills in fluent but nonintellectual conver-
(cf. Sternberg, 1985), extraverts to social and informa- sation, an extraverted skill, or for more intellectual
tionally demanding environments, and more neu- problem-solving skills related to g. In addition,
rotic individuals to environments in which threats specific real-world environments may sometimes
are subtle or disguised, and thus hypervigilance for relate to multiple adaptations. For example, training
threat (Eysenck, 1992) is required. These adaptations environments tend to possess both novelty and

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 602 MOSHE ZEIDNER AND GERALD MATTHEWS

TABLE 26.3. Relationship between Three individual Difference Factors and Components of the
Cognitive-Adaptive Framework

Anxiety/
intelligence Extraversion Neuroticism
Arousal ? Cortico—recticular Autonomic arousal ? (1)
functions arousability
Sensitivity to reward Sensitivity to
signals? punishment signals?
Information Processing speed (+) Dual task (+) Working memory (-)
processing Working memory (+) Short-term memory (+) Attentional
Executive functions (+) Response criterion (—) resources (—)
Vigilance (+) Judgment (negative bias)
Problem solving (-) Selective attention
Arousal-dependent effects (negative bias)
Skills Intellectual skills Conversation Awareness of danger
- handling complexity Rapidity of action Safety behaviors
— handling novelty Social encounters More "substantive"
- transfer across decision making (1)
context
Knowledge Achievement Social motivation Self-protective
motivation Self-efficacy motivations
Positive affect
Self-efficacy? Task-focused coping Low Self-efficacy
Intellectual interest Negative affect
Emotion-focused
coping
Domain-specific
knowledge (2)
Real-world Academic and High-pressure Covert threats (4)
adaptation educational occupations (3)
environments Dating and mating
1. Relates to state anxiety only.
2. Knowledge referring to specific sources of threat: e.g., social or physical threat.
3. Introverts adapted to activities offering little external stimulation: e.g., literary and scientific work.
4. Emotionally stable individuals adapted to overtly threatening environments.

cognitive complexity (congruent with g) and po-
tential information overload (congruent with E).
Hence, job performance during training relates not
just to g but also to E, although E does not relate
to job performance in general (Barrick & Mount,
1991). In other words, personality may sometimes
relate to the context-bound skills or practical intelli-
gence (Sternberg, 1985) required for specific environ-
ments. Extraverts function more intelligently than
introverts in the environments congruent with the
trait. However, the underlying cognitive basis for
this practical intelligence is not reasoning ability
but the acquired information-management skills re-
quired for handling overload and social encounters.
It is readily apparent that an individual who is
high in both intelligence and some personality fac-
tor such as Neuroticism or Extraversion will think,
feel, and act differently from another person who
has high intelligence but is very low in N or E,
respectively. The different information processing
characteristics of extraverts and introverts may not
only underlie behavioral differences but also suggest
the kinds of environments (e.g., vocational, social,
interpersonal) they are most likely to seek out and
function best in. More traditional views of intelli-
gence may be somewhat limited in describing the in-
terface between personality and intelligence and in
describing how these two broad domains contribute

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to a description of human behavior and individual
differences.
DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
The integration of research and assessment in
the ability, personality, and motivational domains
would appear to be an important goal for individual
differences research in the 21st century. To achieve
this goal, we conclude this chapter by high-
lighting several potentially useful directions for
future research on the personality-intelligence in-
terface recently suggested by Zeidner (1997).
More Refined Conceptualization
and Taxonomies of Constructs
More thought needs to be given to the conceptu-
alization of the personality-intelligence constructs
and domains of discourse. Even quite loose provi-
sional classification structures may help guide ex-
ploration and provide a useful framework to which
to pin individual data as they accumulate. The grow-
ing consensus about the multidimensional nature
of the ability domain (Carroll, 1993), together with
more recent advances in the taxonomy of personal-
ity (McCrae & Costa, 1997) and conative aptitudes
(cf. Corno, 1997), provides some solid ground for es-
tablishing personality-intelligence relations.
To that end, it may be useful to employ a
facet-analytic approach to the investigation of the
personality-intelligence interface by constructing a
matrix with ability constructs (/') represented by
rows and personality constructs (k) represented by
columns and the entire two-dimensional matrix
(/' x k), or Cartesian space, representing the do-
main of discourse for any future integrative attempt.
A third facet, area of application (school, occupa-
tion, military) may be added to form a three-faceted
cubic model. Furthermore, we need more theory-
driven research to allow us to make focused pre-
dictions of the relationship between intelligence
and personality. Thus, the optimal approach is to
look at well-established theories concerning perfor-
mance data and articulate focused hypotheses to
test, arrange experimental conditions to test deduc-
tions from these theories, use appropriate measures
to test hypotheses, and interpret results cautiously
in the light of the theories in question (Eysenck,
1994).
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INTELLIGENCE AND PERSONALITY 603
improving Research Design, Measurement,
and Analysis
Further work is needed on the interrelations be-
tween different individual difference constructs and
the underlying processes to which they relate (Snow,
1995). Various advances in design and analysis are
ripe for application to the personality-intelligence
interface such as modern confirmatory factor anal-
ysis, structural equation modeling, and multilevel
modeling techniques (Boyle et al., 1995). Research
would also benefit from using modern scaling tech-
niques such as univariate or multivariate Item Re-
sponse Theory (IRT) models in constructing affec-
tive assessment instruments. IRT technology has
been available for some time now, but few individ-
ual difference researchers have taken advantage of
modern test theory in constructing unidimensional
scales (Most & Zeidner, 1995).
Within the psychometric approach, there is scope
for testing for nonlinear relations as well as for mul-
tiplicative functions introducing both linear and
quadratic functions of intelligence and motivational
predictors of performance.
Clearer Specification of the Meaning and
Nature of the interaction between
intelligence and Personality
Much work needs to be done on modeling the
complexity of personality-ability interactions while
maintaining clarity and testability of hypotheses
(Snow, 1995). Personality-intelligence interactions
may take many forms and may reflect different hy-
potheses about particular causal mechanisms and
types of interactive effects and mechanisms pre-
sumed to be operative. We need more longitudi-
nal research modeling the dynamic transactions be-
tween personality and intellectual variables over
time via such procedures as structural equation
modeling.
Identifying Key Bridging Concepts
The psychometric approach tends to provide
personality traits that are sharply discriminated
from intelligence. Perhaps a more productive search
would be to examine a gray area between intelli-
gence and general personality, the domain of "cog-
nitive" or "intellectual" styles (Messick, 1996). A va-
riety of stylistic concepts may provide a useful bridge
between affect and cognition and a means by which
 604 MOSHE ZEIDNER AND GERALD MATTHEWS
to conceptualize the intersection and crossroads be-
tween personality, conation, and intelligence do-
mains. One of the difficulties in past research has
been the application of inappropriate measurement
models. Most measures of style have inappropri-
ately followed the ability factor model and have
yielded scores that are unipolar and value-directed
rather than bipolar and value-differentiated. In fact,
styles should be concerned with not "how much,"
but "how/' One of the important contributions
psychometricians can make to our field is through
improved measurement of stylistic variables as a
potential bridge between personality and intelli-
gence variables. Recent research suggests that in-
telligence would be most closely and organically
related to personality variables that reflect typical
ways of dealing with information, and it might be
useful to have another careful and methodologi-
cally sounder look at both old and new stylistic
variables. Several stylistic variables, such as "mental
self-government" (Sternberg & Grigorenko, 1995),
"prudence" (Haslam & Baron, 1994), "wisdom"
(Maciel, Heckhausen, & Baltes, 1994), "mindful-
ness" (Brown & Langer, 1990), and "intellectual ab-
sorption" (Mayer, Caruso, Agiler, & Dreyden, 1989)
provide contemporary and dynamic examples of
bridging concepts linking personality and intelli-
gence.
ln-Depth Research in Practical
and Clinical Settings
Personality and intelligence variables are often
used jointly for decision-making purposes in var-
ious practical domains. By necessity, the greatest
amount of integration of cognitive and personality
variables takes place in professional and applied set-
tings. Research models such as Cronbach and Snow's
(1977) Aptitude x Treatment Interaction attempted
to demonstrate empirically how characteristics of
the individual such as intelligence and personal-
ity (e.g., extraversion, anxiety) interacted with dif-
ferent possible treatments (e.g., therapies, instruc-
tional strategies, teacher characteristics) to produce
particular outcomes. The clinical, vocational, coun-
seling and school psychologist performs formal and
informal ATIs each time a client is seen for assess-
ment and diagnosis. However, we know very little
about how practitioners and clinicians conduct the
integration between personality, conative, and in-
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telligence variables in the process of psychodiagno-
sis and decision making. More research is needed
on the considerations practitioners bring to bear in
making decisions based on the integration between
affective and ability constructs.
As previously discussed, intelligence may relate to
one's current level of organization and integrative
functioning. Hence, intelligence may play an impor-
tant role in the prognosis of maladjusted individ-
uals. In fact, there is some research to support the
claim that intelligence is a significant predictor of
success in psychological treatment and therapy, al-
though not all studies substantiate the link (Zeidner,
Matthews, & Saklofske, 1998).
CONCLUSIONS
This review suggests a rather complex recipro-
cal relationship between intelligence and a vari-
ety of personality factors in which cognitive and
affective-motivational variables dynamically im-
pact upon each other in the course of development
and day-to-day behavior. On one hand, personal-
ity dispositions and motivational factors may in-
fluence intellectual functioning. It is important to
distinguish the effects personality may have on per-
formance, in the short term, from effects on com-
petence in the longer term. There is solid empirical
evidence for various negative emotional and moti-
vational states tending to impair intellectual perfor-
mance to a moderate degree, especially when the
task demands attention or working memory. It is
likely that both loss of functional resources and mo-
tivational processes contribute to intellectual im-
pairment in both emotional disorders and in sub-
clinical stress states. Conversely, strategies driven by
motivational factors such as self-efficacy and need
to achieve may serve to maintain or enhance per-
formance. Some of these effects may be context-
dependent in that they are contingent upon stress
or arousal. It is less clear whether personality factors
affect basic competence in addition to the person's
performance on specific occasions. Certain person-
ality traits, such as poor self-concept and aggres-
sion, may act over extended periods of time to de-
press intellectual functioning by reducing a person's
motivation to acquire and develop specific intellec-
tual skills. Psychotic conditions and personality dis-
orders too may affect both temporary performance

and underlying competence. We have used a cog-
nitive science framework to suggest that cognitive,
adaptive, and (possibly) neural explanations may all
be necessary in understanding the processes control-
ling these effects.
On the other hand, intelligence may impact upon
personality and affective states through encouraging
more positive cognitions of personal competence.
Thus, individuals high in intellectual functioning
are frequently shown to be better adjusted, both
socially and emotionally, than their less intelligent
counterparts. High intelligence can aid a student in
learning the realities of general and school culture
and the physical world as part of an integrated learn-
ing process and help the person acquire more so-
cially desirable traits. Overall, intelligence may serve
as a personal resource that can facilitate personal
growth and adjustment and also serve as a buffer
against the crippling effects of psychological stress
and disease (cf. Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; Lazarus,
1991). Conversely, more or less veridical appraisals
of negative outcomes on intellectual tasks may con-
tribute to the development of negative affectivity.
From a practical point of view, personality vari-
ables seldom bear such a sizable impact on intel-
lectual performance as to invalidate intelligence as-
sessments or test scores as a whole. The impact of
various personality and conative factors affecting
performance (e.g., anxiety, motivation) may in fact
be viewed as key aspects of the individual's global
intellectual capacity (Matarazzo, 1972; Wechsler,
1944). Arguably, individuals who do poorly on in-
telligence tests because of the debilitating effects
of certain personality factors (e.g., high test anx-
iety, low motivation) may also do poorly on the
criterion measure of performance - and for much
the same reasons. The cognitive-adaptive frame-
work presented in this chapter emphasizes both in-
formation processing and the expression of individ-
ual differences in real-world skills. It leaves open
causal questions concerning the origin of individ-
ual differences in feed-forward from genes and feed-
back from person-situation interactions. Plausibly,
it may be the dynamic interplay between biologi-
cally based predispositions and the varying opportu-
nities provided by the environment that determine
personality and intelligence and relationships be-
tween them. Specifically, personality may relate to
context-bound practical intelligence supported by
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INTELLIGENCE AND PERSONALITY 605
the skills acquired to handle the context concerned.
Personality assessment tells us something about the
situations in which the individual will behave more
or less "intelligently".
Current trends in individual differences research
allow for the hope of an integrated understanding
of the ways that "each person is like all other
people, some other people, and no other people"
(Revelle, 1995). A truly integrative science of per-
sonality would help clear from our path some of the
debris of disciplinary provincialism. However, there
is a difference between simple eclecticism and an
integrated model that forms the basis for a unified
approach to, and rapprochement with, the domains
of conation intelligence. Such an approach would
not simply look at a person from intellectual and
motivational or affective perspectives but instead
integrate data from these perspectives. A true inte-
gration would certainly move us a step forward in
understanding both normal as well as pathological
states, and this appears to be a major challenge for
individual differences research in the 21st century.
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