Journal of Personality and Social Psychology Copyright 2003 by the American Psychological Association, Inc.

2003, Vol. 85, No. 4, 723–735 0022-3514/03/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/0022-3514.85.4.723

Relationships Between Personality Structure, Structure of Word Meaning,

and Cognitive Ability: A Study of Cultural Mechanisms of Personality
Aaro Toomela
University of Tartu

Native-born Estonian men (N ⫽ 912), 17– 68 years old, participated in a study on relationships between
personality characteristics, dominant structure of word meaning (“everyday concepts” thinking or
“scientific concepts” thinking), and level of cognitive ability. Individuals who primarily used everyday
concepts thinking or who possessed relatively low levels of cognitive ability did not reveal a coherent Big
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Five personality structure, whereas individuals who primarily used scientific concepts thinking or
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possessed high levels of cognitive ability did. Thus, personality may be shaped by a cultural factor—
word meaning structure. Earlier studies, which seem to support the idea that Big Five personality
structure is a biologically determined human universal, suffer from serious sampling problems and
insufficient data analyses.

Five-factor theory postulates that five personality traits—Neu-
roticism, Extraversion, Openness, Agreeableness, and Conscien-
tiousness—are endogenous and biologically determined (McCrae
& Costa, 1996, 1999; but see Saucier & Goldberg, 1996, who, like
many others, understand five-factor models as descriptive summa-
ries rather than endogenous traits). Indeed, some have said that the
issue of the structure of personality traits has been resolved in
personality psychology. As a result, if certain samples fail to reveal
a five-factor model structure, then the premise of universality or
adequacy of the translation and administration of the personality
instrument must be questioned (McCrae, 2000).
The idea that major personality dimensions are determined by
biological factors is supported by studies of the heritability of
personality dimensions. Studies have shown that about 20%–55%
of the total variation in personality dimensions is attributable to
genetic sources (e.g., Jang, McCrae, Angleitner, Riemann, &
Livesley, 1998; Pedersen, Plomin, McClearn, & Friberg, 1988).
The same heritability studies also show that a substantial amount
of variation is due to nongenetic factors. In addition, heritability
studies probably overestimate the role of genetic factors and un-
derestimate the role of environment (e.g., Funder, 2001; Joseph,
2001). Moreover, there is much evidence that human biology is
shaped profoundly by the social world and vice versa (Cacioppo,
Berntson, & Sheridan, 2000). Finally, heritability studies try to
“explain” variation in a personality dimension statistically. There
are, however, two kinds of variation in psychological constructs.
One is variation in the presence or absence of a construct. The
other is variation in the degree of expression of the existing
dimension. Several studies have demonstrated that some persons
may not have particular traits at all (e.g., Baumeister & Tice, 1988;
This work was supported by Estonia Science Foundation Grant 5388. I
thank Jüri Allik and Aleksander Pulver for sharing their data and knowl-
edge, Lawrence T. White for advice, and Kristina Seepter and Mango Meus
for help with data collection and scoring.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Aaro
Toomela, Department of Special Education, University of Tartu, Salme 1a,
Tartu 50103, Estonia. E-mail: aaro.toomela@ut.ee
Britt, 1993). Heritability studies have not taken that possibility into
account.
Factors that contribute to the emergence of a personality dimen-
sion and to variation in a personality dimension may be both
intraindividual and environmental. Intraindividually, cognitive
processes such as thinking, memory, and perception may contrib-
ute to the structure and expression of personality dimensions.
There is clearly a need for research that examines the relationship
between personality and cognition (Endler, 2000). Several studies
have already demonstrated that personality dimensions are weakly
but significantly correlated with intelligence (e.g., Allik & Realo,
1997; Beier & Ackerman, 2001; Paunonen & Ashton, 2001). It is
noteworthy that the correlation between two personality do-
mains—Psychoticism and Neuroticism, as measured by the Ey-
senck Personality Questionnaire—may be different at different
ability levels (Austin et al., 2002). Austin et al. (2002) speculated
that personality structure might change with ability level. Orthog-
onal dimensions of Psychoticism and Neuroticism may exist
among the most able, whereas the less able are better described by
a personality structure with nonorthogonal dimensions. Thus, the
structure of personality may indeed be related to cognitive factors.
The most obvious environmental factor that may shape person-
ality is culture. Studies in more than 20 cultures with languages
from many different language families, however, seem to suggest
that the five-factor personality trait structure is a human universal.
What may vary between cultures is the mean level of a personality
trait (e.g., Costa, Terracciano, & McCrae, 2001; McCrae, 2000,
2001; McCrae & Costa, 1997). According to other authors, the
number of factors may be larger than five in some cultures, but the
content of the basic five factors remains the same (e.g., Blumberg,
2001; Cheung et al., 2001). These studies, however, are method-
ologically and conceptually flawed.
First, matched factor structures do not guarantee equivalence
across cultures because factors may differ in the proportion of
variance accounted for in different cultures, different items within
a factor may have different loadings, means and variances may
differ across cultures, factors can assume a different meaning
within the context of questions or items not included in the

723
 724 TOOMELA
analysis, and some relevant items may not be included in the factor
analysis (Marsella, Dubanoski, Hamada, & Morse, 2000).
Second, most studied samples are not representative of the
culture. Of 26 cultures studied, only two samples were approxi-
mately representative (McCrae, 2001). Most studies use very non-
representative samples of undergraduates or participants with ex-
ceptionally high levels of education, which are the most common
samples in personality research (Endler & Speer, 1998; Mallon,
Kingsley, Affleck, & Tennen, 1998). Such samples are at least
partly Westernized (Poortinga & van Hemert, 2001) so that many
college students may be culturally understood as strangers in their
own lands (Marsella et al., 2000). Thus, problems arise when one
leaps from studies of student populations in industrial countries to
claims of universality of factors and then to national comparisons
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based on mean levels of self-reported traits (Bock, 2000).
Third, replications of the five-factor structure in different cul-
tures are methodologically biased. The authors of the translations
of Estonian and Finnish versions of the NEO Personality Inventory
(NEO-PI; Costa & McCrae, 1985), for example, have explicitly
stated their goals: “the factor structure of the developed tests must
correspond as closely as possible to the original factor structure of
the NEO-PI [italics added]” (Pulver, Allik, Pulkkinen, & Hä-
mäläinen, 1995, p. 111). Similar goals seem to characterize other
translations of the Revised NEO Personality Inventory (NEO-
PI-R) as well. If the primary goal of the researchers is to replicate
the structure of the original inventory, the result cannot be taken as
reliable evidence for a “human universal.” The result may just as
easily point to a “researchers’ universal.”
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, culture in all cross-
cultural studies on the structure of personality has been understood
in a very specific way. Cultural psychology has two theoretical
wings, sociologically oriented and psychologically oriented (Toma-
sello, 1996). The sociologically oriented wing emphasizes the
distributed and collective nature of human cognition. In this ap-
proach, culture is usually defined as a political border/country,
nation, or ethnicity (cf. Toomela, in press). Nearly all cultural
studies of personality are representatives of the sociological wing.
The psychologically oriented wing emphasizes the role of the
individual; it assumes that to participate meaningfully in cultural
activities, individuals must bring to the process certain social and
cognitive skills. As personality psychology is a psychology of
individual differences, a sociological conceptualization of culture
may be inappropriate for understanding the contribution of culture
to individual personality.
Taken together, human personality is shaped by cognitive pro-
cesses as well as culture. The next question is: What specific
cultural factors shape personality in important ways? Culture,
following the cultural– historical school of psychology, is under-
stood here as “socially shared information that is coded in sym-
bols” (Toomela, 1996, p. 298). In this article it is argued that one
of the most influential factors that shapes personality is the struc-
ture of word meaning. One reason for this hypothesis is that
personality is usually studied with verbal measures— question-
naires (Endler & Speer, 1998; Mallon et al., 1998). More gener-
ally, the most influential personality accounts today rest on the
lexical hypothesis, according to which all important aspects of
human personality are coded in language (e.g., Digman, 1996;
McCrae & Costa, 1996, 1999; Saucier & Goldberg, 1996). Costa
and McCrae’s lexical approach to personality ignores the possi-
bility that there may be profound individual differences in the
structure of word meaning. Nevertheless, some researchers have
suggested that different persons may understand words describing
personality differently (e.g., Block, 1995; Johnson, 1997). Even
more, language may not only be a repository of the set of individ-
ual differences but language may also constrain descriptions and
perceptions of personality (Saucier & Goldberg, 1996).
Personality psychology on the whole seems to be unaware of the
abundant evidence that the structure of word meaning may be
systematically different in different people because of the way in
which word meanings are constructed. This dimension, first de-
scribed by Lev Vygotsky (Vygotsky, 1934/1996), can be under-
stood as a boundary to word meaning. I have called such a
boundary a topographical constraint (cf. Toomela, 2000, 2003), to
exclude certain forms of function of a system or restrict processes
to the possibilities compatible with boundaries. In human cultures
of today, the most common types of word meanings are so-called
“everyday concepts” (or “complexes”) and “scientific concepts”
(Vygotsky, 1934/1996).
Words of the everyday concept type encode information on the
basis of perceptual attributes of word referents and on the basis of
observation of events in everyday life; word meanings are tied to
immediate sensory experiences. Word meaning is, thus, con-
strained by the characteristics and contexts of external referents.
As an everyday concept, the expression “efficient person,” for
example, refers to observable external behaviors like “a person
who built a house, bought an expensive car, and runs a big
company.” Words of the scientific concept type encode informa-
tion in the language; the structure of word meaning is abstract and
hierarchical, its structure is formally logical, and it does not
depend on the immediate reflection of reality. “Efficient person” in
this case would mean, “A person acting or functioning compe-
tently, a person who causes desired effects.” A researcher who
builds a novel theory would not be “efficient” in everyday concept
boundaries because building a theory is often not reflected in
external behavior. For example, writing a book after 25 years of
observation and thinking (as Charles Darwin did) would not be
labeled “efficient” in everyday concept boundaries. The same act,
however, would refer to extreme efficiency in scientific concept
boundaries, where it is understood that an enormous amount of
information was systematized in Darwin’s The Origin of Species.
Another important idea is that everyday and scientific structures
of word meanings are hierarchically related to each other. A
scientific structure is a hierarchical system of words; the words
that form the initial, lower levels of the hierarchy refer directly to
external objects and phenomena. For example, happiness and
anger are first encoded in terms of external events and only later
change into scientific concepts through their connection with a
common denominator “emotion.”
Space limitations do not allow a thorough discussion, but it is
enough to know that these two types of word meaning structures
have been differentiated in developmental psychology (e.g., Kikas,
1998, 2003; Luria, 1979; Nelson, 2003; Toomela, 2003), in cul-
tural psychology (e.g., Luria, 1974, 1979; Toomela, 1996, in
press), and in neuropsychology (e.g., Funnell, 2001; Luria, 1973,
1979; Toomela, Tomberg, Orasson, Tikk, & Nômm, 1999).
It is important to note that the structure of word meaning is not
directly related to vocabulary; the same words can encode infor-
mation in both ways. Similarly, the particular words in a person’s
vocabulary do not tell us how the meanings of the words are
constructed. If we ask a person to rate himself or herself on the
 RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN PERSONALITY AND WORD MEANING
Likert scale of a personality inventory item (e.g., “I am efficient
and effective at my work,” from the Competence facet of the
Conscientiousness dimension in the NEO-PI-R), the answer
strongly agree may derive from very different conceptual struc-
tures and refer to very different ideas.
This study is the first direct empirical test of the hypothesis that
the dominant structure of word meaning is related to different
structures of personality. Two specific hypotheses were tested.
First, it has been demonstrated that high intellectual ability is
related to adaptive traits (Austin et al., 2002). Therefore, it was
hypothesized that persons with different types of dominant word
meaning structure will exhibit different mean levels of personality
traits. Specifically, individuals who possess a predominantly sci-
entific concept type of word meaning, who encode information
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both about external events and unobservable mechanisms and
ideas behind external events, will be less neurotic because of their
ability to predict and understand the world better.
Second, and more importantly, it was hypothesized that the
basic structure of personality itself may be different in persons
with different types of dominant word meaning structures. Such
differences may be expressed in the number of personality factors,
but not necessarily. On the one hand, persons with a predominantly
scientific word meaning structure have at their disposal mental
tools to organize their perception of their own personality into a
few general hierarchical dimensions. If that were the only impor-
tant aspect of word meaning structure, one would expect the
number of factors to be higher among persons with everyday
conceptual structures because they lack mental tools for creating
hierarchical categories of personality dimensions. On the other
hand, scientific conceptual structures are more differentiated than
everyday structures. This is because of the hierarchical relationship
between the two types of word meanings. If a whale, for example,
is encoded as a “mammal” in a scientific hierarchical structure,
one’s knowledge that whales look and behave like a fish does not
disappear. Rather, a more differentiated understanding of a whale
emerges. As a result, one might find fewer distinguishable factors
in self-report personality measures among persons with dominant
everyday conceptual structure because their descriptions of per-
sonality may be less differentiated. Thus, opposite tendencies may
lead to the same number of factors despite different dominant word
meaning structures. The content of factors, however, would be
substantially different.
What should distinguish personality structures in individuals
with different types of dominant conceptual structures is the struc-
ture itself. It was predicted that in persons with predominantly
everyday conceptual structures, the structure of personality does
not correspond to usual five-factor solutions. It was also predicted
that the five-factor structure of personality as described by Costa
and McCrae (1992) will be found only in persons with a predom-
inantly scientific structure of word meaning. The rationale for this
hypothesis comes from studies that have found that scientific word
meaning structures characterize individuals with high levels of
Westernized formal schooling (e.g., Cole, 1996; Luria, 1974). As
the NEO-PI-R findings are based primarily on highly educated
samples, it is possible that the five-factor structure is “universal”
only for that particular stratum of society.
If these hypotheses about the relationships between dominant
type of word meaning structure and personality are supported by
the data, an important question emerges. Dominant type of word
meaning structure is closely related to level of education—and
725
level of education is closely related to cognitive ability. Moreover,
word meaning structure and cognitive ability are theoretically
related constructs. Space limitations do not allow a full discussion
of this relationship (see Toomela, 2003, in press; Vygotsky, 1929/
1994, 1934/1996, for discussions). Briefly, a word meaning struc-
ture can be understood as a set of mental “tools” used for all kinds
of mental operations. Cognitive ability, in turn, can be understood
as one’s level of mastery in using those tools. More complex tools
allow more sophisticated and effective operations. But it is possi-
ble to use simple tools for complex operations. It is also possible
to use complex tools inefficiently and ineffectively. Thus, simple
tools— everyday concepts—sometimes allow complex operations
but usually are associated with relatively ineffective cognitive
performance. More complex scientific concepts, in turn, can be
used inefficiently, but normally are associated with relatively high
levels of cognitive performance. As a result, personality may also
be related to differences in cognitive ability. In this study, I
hypothesize that both word meaning structure and cognitive abil-
ity—as theoretically related, complementary facets of cognition—
are related to differences in personality dimension levels and
personality structure.
Method
Participants
A sample of physically and mentally healthy adults was constructed to
represent all educational levels. Participants were 912 male members of the
Estonian military— 407 military recruits, 204 noncommissioned officers,
and 191 officers. The data were collected in 1999 and 2000. At that time,
university students did not serve in the military before graduation (and
some did not serve at all). Therefore, an additional 62 undergraduate
students were studied. Finally, 48 participants were members of a volun-
tary paramilitary organization, the Estonian Defense League (Kaitseliit).
All participants were native Estonians, both by nationality and ethnicity,
and all test materials were administered in the Estonian language. At the
time of the study, recruits were selected for the army only on the basis of
medical examinations; no psychological tests were used.
Forty-two participants were excluded from the final sample because they
failed to complete all questionnaire items. The final sample comprised 870
participants with a mean age of 24.64 years (SD ⫽ 8.14), range 17– 68
years. Younger persons were relatively overrepresented in the sample (the
median age was 21 years). There were 255 participants with primary
education (9 years or less), 498 participants with secondary education (12
years), 62 first- or second-year university students, and 55 participants with
a university degree (Bachelor of Science or Bachelor of Arts in nearly all
cases).
Test Materials and Procedure
Personality inventory. Personality was measured with the Estonian
version of the NEO-PI-R (Costa & McCrae, 1992). The Estonian NEO-
PI-R (Kallasmaa, Allik, Realo, & McCrae, 2000) was developed on the
basis of the Estonian NEO-PI (Pulver et al., 1995). The Estonian version of
the NEO-PI-R demonstrates high levels of Cronbach alphas of both domain
and facet scales (.87–.93 and .56 –.85, respectively), and retest reliabilities
are acceptable (across a 2-year testing interval, reliabilities were .67–.86
and .48 –.81 for domain and facet scales, respectively). The Estonian
NEO-PI-R also reveals five factors as expected, and the extracted factors
show reasonable congruence with the original inventory. After Procrustes
rotation (the transformation of a factor matrix to approximate a target
 726 TOOMELA
factor matrix defined by the analyst), an excellent fit to the American target
was obtained for all five factors.1
Structure of word meaning. I constructed an original test according to
suggestions by Luria (1979) to measure dominant type of word meaning
structure. Three complementary measures of word meaning structure were
used. The first part of the test comprised definitions of eight concepts. Half
of the concepts were concrete (car, hospital), and half of the concepts were
abstract (republic, revolution). The second part comprised nine word pairs;
the participant was asked to describe the most important similarity of the
concepts. Word pairs varied in the transparency of their similarity—words
referring to items from the same category in one extreme (dog– cat) and
words referring to objects in complementary relationships in the other
extreme (head– hat). The third part comprised nine triplets of words. The
task was to indicate which two words out of three “go together,” and to
state explicitly why the chosen two words go together.
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All 26 answers were coded into two categories, everyday concepts
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(coded as 0) or scientific concepts (or “hierarchical” concepts, coded as 1).
The criteria for coding were those proposed by Luria (1979). An answer
was coded as an everyday concept when the definition, description of
similarity, or definition of commonality described (a) sensory attributes of
objects (e.g., car and bicycle go together because both have round wheels;
door and window go together because both are rectangular), (b) observa-
tions of external everyday activities (e.g., school is where children go for
learning), (c) observations of everyday situations and connections of ob-
jects in everyday situations (e.g., potato and carrot go together because
both grow in the field), (d) the function of the object was described (e.g.,
car is for driving from one place to another), (e) sharing of parts was
described (e.g., cat and dog are similar because both have sharp teeth), (f)
no answer was given. No answer was coded as an everyday concept
because some items are not answerable when one lacks scientific (hierar-
chical) word meanings. For example, the similarity of “a horse” and “a
rider” is not coded in everyday concepts, so a hierarchical response (e.g.,
“both are living beings/animals”) is required. When a person whose dom-
inant structure of word meaning is of everyday concepts is required to
answer such questions, nothing comes to mind. It should be noted that all
participants answered at least two items in each of the three parts. There-
fore, failure to respond cannot be attributed solely to a lack of motivation.
An answer was coded as a scientific (or hierarchical) concept when (a)
the relationship between words was defined hierarchically (e.g., knife and
bread are similar because they are both physical objects, drives and opens
go together because both are verbs), (b) a word was related to a hierarchi-
cally higher level concept (e.g., hospital is a medical institution, revolution
is a kind of change that is characterized by sudden reorganization of a
system).
Responses were coded by two assistants. In addition, protocols of 50
randomly selected participants were simultaneously coded by both assis-
tants. Interrater agreement was high; when adjusted for chance, Cohen’s
␬ ⫽ .91. Doubtful cases were coded after discussion between the assistants.
A participant’s dominant structure of word meaning was characterized by
the sum of all item scores (maximum 26).
Cognitive ability. Cognitive ability was measured with the Estonian
Cognitive Ability Scale (Pulver, 1999). The Cognitive Ability Scale con-
tains 36 questions designed to measure verbal, arithmetical–logical, and
spatial abilities. The sum of all correct answers on the Cognitive Ability
Scale provides a measure of the participant’s general level of cognitive
ability.
Results
Word Meaning Structure Groups
Structure of word meaning. The maximum possible range of
scores on the test is 0 –26; in the studied sample, scores between 1
and 25 were observed (M ⫽ 11.17, SD ⫽ 4.66). The distribution
of scores on the Structure of Word Meaning test was unimodal and
not statistically different from a normal distribution (Kolmogorov–
Smirnov d ⫽ .014, ns), ␹2(20, N ⫽ 870) ⫽ 23.12, p ⫽ .28. It
appears that the structure of word meaning varies across individ-
uals and the present sample is representative of the possible
variation in the population.
It was hypothesized that the structure of word meaning is related
to the level of formal education. Indeed, correlation between years
of education and the number of hierarchical answers on the Struc-
ture of Word Meaning test was highly significant (r ⫽ .46, p ⬍
.0001).
Mean levels of personality dimensions. Participants were di-
vided into five groups according to their number of hierarchical
answers on the Structure of Word Meaning test. The first group
consisted of participants who scored more than one standard
deviation below the sample mean. The second group consisted of
participants who scored more than one standard deviation above
the mean. The remaining participants (who scored between ⫹/⫺
one standard deviation) were divided into three groups of roughly
equal size. These groups are referred to as H1 (1– 6 hierarchical
answers), H2 (7–9 hierarchical answers), H3 (10 –12 hierarchical
answers), H4 (13–15 hierarchical answers), and H5 (16 –25 hier-
archical answers). H1 represents a relatively pure group with a
predominantly everyday concept type of word meaning structure,
and H5 represents a relatively pure group with a predominantly
scientific concept type of word meaning structure. The other
groups represent relatively mixed word meaning structures.
Mean levels of personality dimensions for participants in the
five word meaning structure groups are shown in Figure 1. An
analysis of variance (ANOVA) revealed significant main effects
due to group, F(4, 865) ⫽ 10.74, p ⬍ .0001, and personality
domain, F(4, 3460) ⫽ 432.51, p ⬍ .0001, as well as a significant
Group ⫻ Domain interaction, F(16, 3460) ⫽ 12.21, p ⬍ .0001.
Inspection of Figure 1 reveals that the mean differences between
word meaning structure groups follow a systematic pattern: The
higher the number of hierarchical answers, the lower the level of
Neuroticism and the higher the level of all other personality
domains. Post hoc analyses (Scheffé test) revealed that the level of
Neuroticism was significantly lower in the H5 than in the H1
group ( p ⬍ .0001); levels of Extraversion, Openness, Agreeable-
ness, and Conscientiousness were significantly higher in the H5
than in the H1 group ( p ⬍ .04 in all cases). Mean scores of
adjacent groups were not significantly different in any of the
personality dimensions. Thus, it appears that the dominant type of
word meaning structure affects mean levels of all personality
domains.
Factor structure of the NEO-PI-R. A series of factor analyses
were conducted to determine if personality structure is less coher-
ent in those participants who provided a small number of hierar-
chical responses to the Structure of Word Meaning test and more
coherent in those participants who provided a large number of
hierarchical responses.
First, the number of extracted factors was analyzed for the entire
sample and for the five word meaning structure subgroups. Two
reliable statistical methods for determining the number of factors
to retain—Horn’s parallel analysis (based on mean eigenvalues
1
NEO-PI-R data for this study, collected as part of the Estonian test
construction project, were provided by Jüri Allik, leader of the Estonian
NEO-PI-R development team.
 RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN PERSONALITY AND WORD MEANING
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Figure 1. Mean levels of personality dimensions in different word meaning structure groups. N ⫽ Neuroticism;
E ⫽ Extraversion; O ⫽ Openness to Experience; A ⫽ Agreeableness; C ⫽ Conscientiousness.
of 50 random data sets) and Cattell’s scree test (cf. Zwick &
Velicer, 1986)—were performed. For the entire sample and all
subgroups (with the exception of H1), five factors were suggested
by both the scree test and the parallel analysis. In the case of H1,
six factors should be retained by the scree test and four factors by
the parallel analysis. So, in almost all cases a five-factor solution
is the best.
The first five factors accounted for 63.4% of the variance in the
entire sample. In the subgroups, five factors accounted
for 59.3%, 63.3%, 65.4%, 64.6%, and 66.6% of the variance in H1,
H2, H3, H4, and H5, respectively. It should be noted that the
proportion of the total variance accounted for by the five factors
systematically increases with the number of hierarchical answers.
This result is in agreement with the hypothesis that an everyday
concept word meaning structure may be associated with a less
coherent personality structure.
Finally, the pattern of factor loadings was analyzed for the entire
sample and all subgroups. In Table 1, the results of a principal-
components analysis with a varimax rotation are shown for the
entire sample and for the five word meaning structure groups
separately.
In the entire sample, Factor 1 is a Neuroticism–Conscien-
tiousness factor; Factor 4 is a relatively pure Neuroticism factor
with two Openness facets loading on that factor too; Factor 2 is an
Extraversion factor; Factor 3 is an Agreeableness factor; and
Factor 5 is an Openness factor (with two facets loading on the
Neuroticism factor instead of on the Openness factor). Overall, the
results for the entire sample are not substantially different from the
original NEO-PI-R with one exception: Neuroticism is split be-
tween two factors, one that is shared with Conscientiousness and
another that is relatively pure Neuroticism. Although the original
NEO-PI produces a simple structure, it should be noted that, in the
original version, Neuroticism and Conscientiousness scales were
strongly and negatively correlated (⫺.53; Costa & McCrae, 1992,
Appendix F). At first glance, it appears that the Estonian version of
the NEO-PI-R may be flawed, but it has been demonstrated that
727
the Estonian version, created with a sample similar to that of the
original, replicates the original structure very well (Kallasmaa et
al., 2000).
In the present study, the sample was selected to represent the
entire range of differences in word meaning structure because
different subgroups may exhibit different personality structures.
The results shown in Table 1 support this hypothesis. In the least
hierarchical word meaning structure group, H1, the pattern of
factor loadings does not correspond to the usual five-factor solu-
tion, with the exception of the Neuroticism factor. In the most
hierarchical group, H5, the highest loadings of facet scales, with
only three exceptions (N5, O4, and O6), are on the “correct”
factors. N5 also loaded on the Conscientiousness factor in the
Estonian NEO-PI-R (Kallasmaa et al., 2000).
It is noteworthy that, as the number of hierarchical answers on
a word meaning structure test increases, the factor structure be-
comes closer and closer to the original structure of the NEO-PI-R.
The relatively chaotic Extraversion, Agreeableness, and Consci-
entiousness factors in H1 stabilize in H2 and remain stable in the
remaining subgroups. The least stable Openness factor becomes
relatively stable in H3 and remains stable in the remaining groups.
The pattern of loadings of Neuroticism facets changes systemati-
cally in an interesting fashion. Neuroticism is the only factor in
which all facets load on the same factor in H1. In the remaining
groups, there is always a factor on which all facets of Neuroticism
load together (with the exception of H4, in which one of six facets
does not load on the same factor). In H2, H3, and H4 Neuroticism
and Conscientiousness load on the same factor. In addition, in H3
and H4 Neuroticism facets load simultaneously on two factors, one
shared with Conscientiousness and the other being relatively pure
Neuroticism.
Cognitive Ability Groups
Cognitive ability. The maximum possible range of scores on
the Cognitive Ability Scale is 0 –36; in the studied sample, scores
 728 TOOMELA

Table 1
Factor Loadings of NEO-PI-R Scales After Varimax Rotation, for Entire Sample and for Different Word Meaning Structure Groups

Word meaning structure (H) groupb

Entire sampleb H1 H2
(N ⫽ 870) (N ⫽ 158) (N ⫽ 158)
NEO-PI-R
scalesa 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5

Neuroticism (N)

N1 ⴚ53 ⫺20 ⫺01 ⴚ64 10 ⴚ72 ⫺04 ⫺11 18 02 ⴚ78 ⫺20 ⫺01 21 18
N2 ⴚ51 ⫺17 ⫺24 ⴚ62 00 ⴚ76 ⫺17 13 ⫺17 ⫺14 ⴚ82 ⫺06 ⫺16 22 06
N3 ⴚ55 ⫺31 ⫺04 ⴚ62 06 ⴚ85 ⫺06 ⫺07 ⫺10 01 ⴚ79 ⫺25 ⫺01 25 12
N4 ⴚ51 ⫺29 04 ⴚ60 04 ⴚ79 00 ⫺10 ⫺07 09 ⴚ71 ⫺29 ⫺01 23 17
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N5 ⴚ74 13 ⫺08 ⫺26 07 ⴚ60 03 ⫺14 24 ⫺37 ⴚ80 07 ⫺03 ⫺20 ⫺05
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N6 ⴚ67 ⫺39 ⫺04 ⫺34 ⫺14 ⴚ55 ⴚ53 ⫺06 ⫺14 ⫺13 ⴚ70 ⴚ40 ⫺14 ⫺07 ⫺19

Extraversion (E)

E1 28 70 26 16 15 44 41 36 35 ⫺19 37 63 29 02 ⫺03
E2 12 72 04 29 ⫺13 48 14 36 32 ⫺32 29 59 ⫺06 ⫺14 ⫺23
E3 45 59 ⫺32 16 19 31 13 77 ⫺02 ⫺07 38 63 ⫺29 ⫺00 38
E4 43 64 ⫺11 03 13 16 39 61 20 12 38 60 ⫺03 01 24
E5 12 75 ⫺12 ⫺02 12 ⫺08 53 49 33 11 12 72 ⫺04 09 03
E6 07 72 13 34 16 37 38 19 58 ⫺32 10 72 21 ⫺28 ⫺03

Openness to Experience (O)

O1 ⴚ40 17 02 11 61 ⫺36 01 09 71 15 ⫺37 24 11 ⴚ44 32

O2 17 ⫺08 06 08 74 08 01 13 14 77 02 ⫺12 11 ⫺18 79
O3 07 33 17 01 67 08 35 09 65 26 ⫺11 37 39 ⫺17 50
O4 ⫺09 11 ⫺01 59 26 28 ⴚ51 ⫺03 41 25 ⫺01 06 01 ⴚ77 08
O5 24 07 ⫺18 20 72 10 ⫺04 62 11 52 23 03 ⫺06 ⫺00 76
O6 ⫺15 06 09 61 30 29 ⫺16 ⴚ42 47 ⫺16 03 ⫺01 ⫺04 ⴚ66 05

Agreeableness (A)

A1 22 22 55 28 13 31 47 ⫺18 ⫺05 ⫺09 37 17 39 ⫺20 18

A2 26 ⫺22 65 05 ⫺06 38 19 ⴚ43 00 02 34 ⫺29 64 ⫺06 02
A3 16 36 65 06 15 10 65 ⫺12 21 ⫺19 15 23 65 04 08
A4 11 ⫺18 63 23 ⫺15 52 09 ⫺34 05 03 29 ⫺39 51 ⫺16 ⫺09
A5 ⫺04 ⫺39 53 ⫺13 ⫺13 05 34 ⴚ61 02 ⫺13 10 ⫺30 55 ⫺11 ⫺39
A6 ⫺01 25 64 ⫺24 26 ⫺15 70 04 18 ⫺11 ⫺10 14 71 19 10

Conscientiousness (C)

C1 74 39 04 17 12 59 44 28 ⫺11 07 64 41 20 21 35
C2 75 20 10 ⫺04 09 48 40 ⫺00 26 25 68 26 20 16 29
C3 73 17 34 ⫺06 09 28 72 ⫺11 ⫺04 20 64 17 49 20 19
C4 74 37 04 ⫺17 09 28 70 33 ⫺10 14 57 31 22 37 27
C5 79 29 13 11 08 55 54 05 08 19 71 31 28 18 27
C6 78 ⫺08 16 08 ⫺02 46 39 01 ⫺35 03 76 ⫺00 10 33 18

Note. Decimal points are omitted; loadings greater than or equal to 兩0.40兩 are printed in bold. NEO-PI-R ⫽ Revised NEO Personality Inventory.
a
Facet names of personality domains: N1: anxiety; N2: angry hostility; N3: depression; N4: self-consciousness; N5: impulsiveness; N6: vulnerability; E1:
warmth; E2: gregariousness; E3: assertiveness; E4: activity; E5: excitement-seeking; E6: positive emotion; O1: fantasy; O2: aesthetics; O3: feelings; O4:
actions; O5: ideas; O6: values; A1: trust; A2: straightforwardness; A3: altruism; A4: compliance; A5: modesty; A6: tender-mindedness; C1: competence;
C2: order; C3: dutifulness; C4: achievement striving; C5: self-discipline; C6: deliberation. b Factors are reported in order of extraction.

between 1 and 35 were observed (M ⫽ 20.43, SD ⫽ 7.69). The
distribution of scores was significantly different from a normal
distribution (Kolmogorov–Smirnov d ⫽ .051, p ⬍ .05), ␹2(31,
N ⫽ 870) ⫽ 126.08, p ⬍ .0001, but the overall shape of the
distribution was roughly bell-shaped.
It was hypothesized that the structure of word meaning is related
to cognitive ability. Indeed, correlation between the result of the
Structure of Word Meaning test and the number of correct answers
on the Cognitive Ability Scale was highly significant (r ⫽ .54, p ⬍
.0001).
Mean levels of personality dimensions. Participants were di-
vided into five groups according to their number of correct an-
swers on the Cognitive Ability Scale. The first group consisted of
participants who scored more than one standard deviation below
the sample mean. The second group consisted of participants who
scored more than one standard deviation above the mean. The
 RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN PERSONALITY AND WORD MEANING 729

Word meaning structure (H) groupb

H3 H4 H5
(N ⫽ 217) (N ⫽ 185) (N ⫽ 152)

1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5

Neuroticism (N)

ⴚ79 ⫺18 ⫺02 ⫺37 02 ⫺36 ⫺21 ⫺00 ⴚ75 03 ⫺33 ⴚ77 ⫺10 02 ⫺28
ⴚ73 ⫺17 ⫺21 ⫺36 ⫺04 ⫺29 ⫺11 ⫺25 ⴚ76 ⫺09 ⫺37 ⴚ71 ⫺24 ⫺01 ⫺24
ⴚ76 ⫺26 ⫺03 ⴚ41 ⫺03 ⴚ40 ⫺36 ⫺03 ⴚ69 08 ⫺38 ⴚ62 ⫺03 03 ⴚ47
ⴚ70 ⫺19 07 ⴚ46 ⫺05 ⫺35 ⫺33 11 ⴚ71 06 ⫺30 ⴚ62 ⫺01 ⫺19 ⴚ48
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ⴚ48 20 ⫺16 ⴚ55 07 ⴚ68 21 ⫺17 ⫺37 09 ⴚ71 ⴚ42 ⫺07 06 01

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ⴚ45 ⫺31 ⫺06 ⴚ63 ⫺27 ⴚ63 ⫺37 04 ⴚ45 ⫺09 ⴚ49 ⴚ57 08 ⫺09 ⴚ49

Extraversion (E)

06 70 32 24 23 24 72 32 21 12 24 22 29 14 71
33 71 17 11 ⫺09 ⫺07 76 08 24 ⫺04 17 20 02 ⫺10 77
22 59 ⫺28 41 22 38 66 ⫺23 19 22 44 27 ⫺26 10 63
02 65 ⫺04 47 07 48 68 ⫺11 10 ⫺00 33 17 ⫺02 08 69
05 78 ⫺08 12 11 08 73 ⫺09 02 24 09 12 ⫺16 ⫺04 80
38 69 14 06 22 01 74 18 32 16 ⫺03 17 09 24 74

Openness to Experience (O)

06 23 14 ⴚ41 61 ⴚ40 12 ⫺03 ⫺29 59 ⴚ42 04 ⫺15 63 03

⫺08 ⫺04 02 20 72 26 ⫺01 16 06 71 02 05 21 78 ⫺04
⫺05 34 12 13 64 03 32 17 ⫺19 62 09 ⫺21 17 68 29
60 19 03 ⫺10 09 ⫺17 05 ⫺17 29 46 ⫺20 40 15 33 33
17 13 ⫺14 08 72 28 15 ⫺07 11 72 08 36 ⫺19 74 ⫺04
47 ⫺04 16 ⫺10 51 ⫺31 11 ⫺05 51 44 ⴚ46 49 01 20 19

Agreeableness (A)

31 12 68 19 11 05 22 56 33 07 09 18 59 18 29
04 ⫺27 63 29 ⫺10 24 ⫺25 65 02 ⫺15 15 06 68 ⫺08 ⫺30
09 33 77 10 15 09 23 70 04 06 22 23 56 19 33
36 ⫺16 64 ⫺01 ⫺09 06 ⫺30 67 ⫺00 ⫺15 03 21 69 ⫺27 ⫺13
⫺28 ⴚ44 39 ⫺02 ⫺18 03 ⴚ65 36 ⫺05 ⫺09 ⫺05 ⫺21 58 07 ⴚ42
⫺29 17 71 14 15 01 ⫺01 62 ⫺15 34 ⫺13 ⫺24 62 27 29

Conscientiousness (C)

38 35 06 69 15 72 38 07 28 06 61 37 ⫺04 07 47
10 18 16 74 01 84 13 03 ⫺03 06 84 01 ⫺05 ⫺09 17
03 13 32 77 07 72 00 22 15 ⫺01 79 03 25 03 19
⫺04 36 02 78 ⫺03 81 27 01 ⫺00 17 76 04 ⫺02 05 39
29 29 12 75 02 79 23 05 25 03 76 24 08 04 32
37 ⫺17 14 68 07 77 ⫺20 19 17 ⫺05 76 26 08 ⫺06 ⫺05

remaining participants (who scored between ⫹/⫺1 standard devi-
ation) were divided into three groups of roughly equal size. These
groups are referred to as CA1 (1–12 correct answers), CA2 (13–18
correct answers), CA3 (19 –24 correct answers), CA4 (25–28
correct answers), and CA5 (29 –35 correct answers).
Mean levels of personality dimensions for participants in the
five cognitive ability groups are shown in Figure 2. An ANOVA
revealed significant main effects due to group, F(4, 865) ⫽ 4.65,
p ⬍ .002, and personality domain, F(4, 3460) ⫽ 443.17, p ⬍
.0001, as well as a statistically significant Group ⫻ Domain
interaction, F(16, 3460) ⫽ 17.61, p ⬍ .0001.
Inspection of Figure 2 reveals that the mean differences between
cognitive ability groups follow a systematic pattern: The higher the
cognitive ability, the lower the level of Neuroticism and the higher
the level of all other personality domains with the exception of the
Agreeableness dimension. Post hoc analyses (Scheffé test) re-
vealed that the level of Neuroticism was significantly lower in the
CA5 than in the CA1 group ( p ⬍ .0001); levels of Extraversion,
 730 TOOMELA
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Figure 2. Mean levels of personality dimensions in different cognitive ability groups. N ⫽ Neuroticism; E ⫽
Extraversion; O ⫽ Openness to Experience; A ⫽ Agreeableness; C ⫽ Conscientiousness.
Openness, and Conscientiousness were significantly higher in the
CA5 than in the CA1 group ( p ⬍ .003 in all cases); there were no
differences between groups in the mean levels of Agreeableness
( p ⬎ .43 in all cases). Thus, it appears that the cognitive ability
level affects mean levels of all personality domains with the
exception of Agreeableness.
Factor structure of the NEO-PI-R. To test the possibility that
differences in personality structure may be related to cognitive
ability, a series of factor analyses were conducted on the person-
ality data. First, the number of extracted factors was analyzed for
the five cognitive ability subgroups. Horn’s parallel analysis
(based on mean eigenvalues of 50 random data sets) and Cattell’s
scree test were performed. For the CA1, CA2, and CA3, five
factors were suggested by both the scree test and the parallel
analysis. In the case of CA4, four factors should be retained by
both tests. In CA5, three factors should be retained by the scree test
and four factors by the parallel analysis. So, it appears that the
five-factor solution is the best only for participants with relatively
low or average level of cognitive ability. The first five factors
accounted for 62.0%, 62.3%, 64.2%, 67.1%, and 63.9% of the
variance in the CA1, CA2, CA3, CA4, and CA5, respectively.
Finally, the pattern of factor loadings was analyzed for all
subgroups. In Table 2, the results of a principal-components anal-
ysis with a varimax rotation are shown for the five cognitive ability
groups separately.
In the two lowest cognitive ability groups, CA1 and CA2, the
pattern of factor loadings does not correspond to the usual five-
factor solution; Neuroticism and Conscientiousness facet scales
load on the intended factor whereas different Extraversion, Open-
ness, and Agreeableness facet scales load on different factors. In
addition, in CA2 and CA3, Neuroticism and Conscientiousness
facet scales load on the same factor. In the highest levels of
cognitive ability, CA4 and CA5, the highest loadings of facet
scales, are on the “correct” factors, with six exceptions for the CA4
(N5, N6, O4, O6, and A5) and two exceptions for the CA5 (N5 and
C1).
Thus, again, there is a clear shift toward “desired” five-factor
structure with increasing level of cognitive ability. At the same
time, however, the factor solutions at different cognitive ability
levels do not replicate exactly the factor solutions in different
dominant word meaning structure groups. The most notable dif-
ferences between cognitive ability groups and word meaning struc-
ture groups are in the number of extracted factors in different
groups, in the proportion of the total variance accounted by five
factors in different groups, and in the patterns of factor loadings,
especially with the Agreeableness factor, which becomes similar to
“desired” factor structure “earlier” with word meaning structure
(H2) than in cognitive ability level (CA3).
Discussion
Relationships Between Personality and Word Meaning
Structure
As noted earlier, personality may be shaped by intraindividual
processes and by culture. Culture can be defined in many ways,
each suitable for its own purposes. In this article, I have selected
an approach to culture that allows for a direct connection between
culture and intraindividual psychological processes. Culture is
understood here as socially shared information that is coded in
symbols (Toomela, 1996). This definition, following the tradition
of the cultural– historical school of psychology (e.g., Vygotsky,
1929/1994, 1934/1996), encompasses individual and cultural as-
pects of mind in one phenomenon that simultaneously reflects both
the cultural (in the form of symbols) and the individual (in the
form of word meanings). Theoretically, words have two comple-
mentary roles. On the one hand, words are used for communica-
tion, for social interaction—that makes words cultural. On the
other hand, words can be used intraindividually as “psychological
tools,” as tools for guiding thinking, memory, perception, emotion,
attention, and perhaps also personality.
One fundamental fact about word meaning is that the structure
of word meaning—how information is coded with words— can
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Table 2
Factor Loadings of NEO-PI-R Scales After Varimax Rotation, for Different Levels of Cognitive Ability

Cognitive ability (CA) groupb

CA1 (N ⫽ 160) CA2 (N ⫽ 173) CA3 (N ⫽ 232) CA4 (N ⫽ 160) CA5 (N ⫽ 145)
NEO-PI-R
scalesa 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
Neuroticism (N)
N1 ⴚ82 04 ⫺11 09 08 ⴚ53 01 10 ⴚ62 08 ⴚ76 ⫺27 04 26 17 ⫺28 ⫺24 ⫺17 07 ⴚ79 ⫺18 ⫺16 ⫺06 ⫺00 ⴚ80
N2 ⴚ67 08 ⫺19 ⫺30 ⫺34 ⴚ55 ⫺26 ⫺11 ⴚ60 ⫺04 ⴚ73 ⫺18 ⫺22 28 19 ⫺31 ⫺12 ⫺24 01 ⴚ77 ⫺16 ⫺03 ⫺33 ⫺06 ⴚ77
N3 ⴚ80 ⫺06 ⫺17 ⫺25 ⫺09 ⴚ57 04 ⫺04 ⴚ66 08 ⴚ76 ⫺33 ⫺07 32 14 ⫺36 ⫺38 ⫺06 10 ⴚ70 ⫺30 ⫺27 ⫺08 ⫺05 ⴚ75
N4 ⴚ79 ⫺09 ⫺09 ⫺12 01 ⴚ54 09 ⫺02 ⴚ58 ⫺00 ⴚ75 ⫺30 05 31 08 ⫺28 ⫺36 01 ⫺08 ⴚ74 ⫺24 ⫺31 ⫺04 ⫺05 ⴚ71
N5 ⴚ61 ⫺09 ⫺14 24 ⫺20 ⴚ67 ⫺18 24 ⫺19 ⫺17 ⴚ83 12 ⫺11 ⫺06 08 ⴚ71 11 ⫺14 ⫺03 ⫺37 ⴚ54 19 ⫺20 13 ⴚ48
N6 ⴚ47 ⫺10 ⴚ68 ⫺16 ⫺15 ⴚ70 11 ⫺33 ⫺23 ⫺02 ⴚ74 ⴚ42 ⫺01 13 ⫺09 ⴚ57 ⫺33 05 ⫺11 ⴚ56 ⫺38 ⫺20 02 ⫺23 ⴚ75
Extraversion (E)
E1 24 19 57 43 03 47 ⫺19 60 28 ⫺03 26 67 32 ⫺01 22 22 69 37 13 26 13 71 30 14 24
E2 44 31 18 48 ⫺28 34 ⴚ17 41 41 ⫺04 19 76 13 ⫺21 ⫺08 08 69 13 ⫺18 37 04 80 05 ⫺09 08
E3 32 74 27 10 03 58 ⴚ51 36 10 07 37 66 ⫺27 08 16 41 65 ⫺21 24 30 24 48 ⫺36 19 48
E4 11 49 39 34 04 60 ⫺30 45 14 03 30 74 ⫺03 16 11 47 62 ⫺06 12 15 38 62 ⫺14 09 26
E5 ⫺02 43 53 37 ⫺24 29 ⴚ43 57 13 18 09 76 ⫺12 ⫺08 02 02 70 ⫺06 10 08 19 75 ⫺19 10 07
E6 42 16 29 60 ⫺12 20 ⫺23 67 41 ⫺20 13 74 20 ⫺22 20 ⫺06 66 18 18 41 ⫺12 74 09 15 18
Openness to Experience (O)
O1 ⫺17 19 07 71 12 ⫺38 ⫺11 50 01 23 ⴚ41 02 ⫺01 ⫺35 45 ⴚ48 16 ⫺00 64 ⫺06 ⴚ51 02 ⫺07 64 ⫺07
O2 ⫺06 27 12 13 78 09 04 05 ⫺04 81 13 06 08 ⫺02 72 09 ⫺14 07 82 11 18 01 17 77 ⫺05
O3 00 06 31 61 19 11 ⫺00 70 ⫺06 29 ⫺12 15 22 ⫺05 74 04 25 08 76 ⫺09 ⫺06 47 11 50 16
O4 42 ⫺05 ⫺38 28 33 ⫺15 ⫺02 ⫺02 51 37 03 18 01 ⴚ65 07 ⫺21 21 09 28 49 ⫺03 34 08 47 00
O5 09 67 08 07 50 17 ⫺18 13 05 80 27 17 ⫺27 ⫺20 62 07 09 ⫺01 81 14 15 ⫺05 ⫺10 74 27
O6 23 ⫺25 ⫺12 47 18 ⫺17 17 12 66 00 03 ⫺05 ⫺05 ⴚ77 14 ⴚ40 05 16 39 48 ⫺36 20 04 40 23
Agreeableness (A)
A1 18 ⫺24 45 04 45 31 23 34 31 05 34 24 56 ⫺12 09 ⫺02 10 66 12 30 10 25 66 13 19
A2 33 ⴚ69 23 ⫺11 15 21 66 03 06 01 26 ⫺29 61 18 11 24 ⫺24 68 ⫺11 ⫺07 21 ⫺03 76 ⫺03 08
A3 ⫺04 ⫺21 67 33 03 17 31 69 05 00 23 26 67 ⫺09 09 02 18 77 10 23 06 18 56 27 32
A4 27 ⫺37 02 09 54 14 77 06 21 ⫺01 24 ⫺17 63 ⫺04 ⫺16 10 ⫺26 66 ⫺21 25 ⫺17 ⫺11 71 ⫺11 18
A5 ⫺11 ⴚ67 22 02 01 ⫺09 52 ⫺05 ⫺12 ⫺38 ⫺04 ⴚ48 43 05 ⫺07 07 ⴚ57 39 ⫺03 ⫺09 06 ⴚ44 59 ⫺08 ⫺25
RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN PERSONALITY AND WORD MEANING

A6 ⫺24 ⫺12 71 14 02 24 29 58 ⫺22 ⫺04 ⫺28 11 71 13 15 ⫺01 12 68 34 ⫺14 09 11 58 41 ⫺19

Conscientiousness (C)
C1 40 23 69 09 10 82 ⫺08 28 12 06 74 41 07 06 13 64 36 ⫺04 09 37 53 22 ⫺02 10 64
C2 35 04 60 16 ⫺04 70 28 20 ⫺01 12 66 23 09 19 28 83 11 03 ⫺07 ⫺00 73 20 01 ⫺00 33
C3 18 ⫺24 80 ⫺02 04 71 30 33 ⫺07 ⫺01 65 17 30 21 21 82 ⫺02 26 01 ⫺04 60 10 23 07 44
C4 11 29 81 ⫺13 09 78 ⫺09 24 ⫺05 04 56 45 16 28 27 82 28 ⫺00 ⫺02 04 79 24 ⫺09 14 27
C5 43 ⫺02 69 10 15 80 07 25 18 04 75 33 11 09 21 83 21 01 03 14 65 22 09 02 55
C6 47 02 43 ⫺31 01 77 19 ⫺03 02 10 78 ⫺11 17 15 14 75 ⫺19 13 ⫺08 26 67 ⫺13 25 ⫺02 37

Note. Decimal points are omitted; loadings greater than or equal to 兩0.40兩 are printed in bold. NEO-PI-R ⫽ Revised NEO Personality Inventory.
a
Facet names of personality domains: N1: anxiety; N2: angry hostility; N3: depression; N4: self-consciousness; N5: impulsiveness; N6: vulnerability; E1: warmth; E2: gregariousness; E3: assertiveness;
E4: activity; E5: excitement-seeking; E6: positive emotion; O1: fantasy; O2: aesthetics; O3: feelings; O4: actions; O5: ideas; O6: values; A1: trust; A2: straightforwardness; A3: altruism; A4: compliance;
731

A5: modesty; A6: tender-mindedness; C1: competence; C2: order; C3: dutifulness; C4: achievement striving; C5: self-discipline; C6: deliberation. b Factors are reported in order of extraction.
 732 TOOMELA
vary. The two most common types of word meaning structure are
so-called everyday concepts, which organize information around
everyday activities and the immediate sensory environment, and
scientific concepts, which encode information hierarchically in the
language and is relatively distanced from an individual’s immedi-
ate environment (e.g., Nelson, 2003; Toomela, 2003; Vygotsky,
1934/1996). It was hypothesized that individual differences in
word meaning structure are related both to mean levels of person-
ality dimensions and, more importantly, to the structure of person-
ality. Findings of the study were in full agreement with the
hypotheses.
Structure of word meaning, dimension of individual differences.
The results of this study demonstrate that the structure of word
meaning is a true dimension of individual differences. A test was
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constructed to measure which type of word meaning structure,
everyday concept or scientific concept, is dominant for an indi-
vidual. In the studied sample, nearly the entire range of possible
scores was observed (possible range 0 –26, observed range 1–25).
Test scores in the studied sample were distributed normally.
The dominant type of word meaning structure was closely
related to level of education, a finding that agrees with many
cultural studies (cf. Cole, 1996; Luria, 1974; Toomela, in press).
Persons with higher levels of education are more likely to possess
the scientific concept type of word meaning structure.
Most studies in personality psychology use undergraduate stu-
dents and other highly educated samples (Endler & Speer, 1998;
Mallon et al., 1998). Our finding that the everyday concept type of
thinking is underrepresented in educated samples demonstrates
that studies must use more representative (of the entire adult
population) samples if they wish to examine a phenomenon that is
or may be related to the structure of word meaning. Our results
demonstrate that personality is one such phenomenon.
Structure of personality in individuals with different dominant
structures of word meaning. We conducted a series of factor
analyses with data from the Estonian version (Kallasmaa et al.,
2000) of the NEO-PI-R (Costa & McCrae, 1992). When the entire
sample was entered in the analysis, five factors emerged, which
closely resembled the structure of the original analysis.
A very different picture emerged when the sample was divided
into five groups according to the number of hierarchical answers
on the word meaning structure test. Theoretically, differences in
word meaning structure should produce differences in the number
of factors and/or the coherence of factors. The number of factors
may not differ between dominant word meaning structure types
because two opposite tendencies are involved. On the one hand,
scientific concepts are organized hierarchically, which should lead
to a decrease in the number of factors. On the other hand, scientific
concepts are more detailed and differentiated in content, which
should lead to an increase in the number of factors. Indeed, it was
found that in all groups, with the exception of the least hierarchical
word meaning structure group, a five-factor solution was the best.
In the least hierarchical group, four or six factors should have been
retained.
A hierarchical scientific concept type of word meaning structure
should be related to a highly coherent factor structure because such
individuals prefer to organize information into hierarchical do-
mains of knowledge. Everyday concepts are not organized hierar-
chically and, therefore, should be related to a less coherent factor
structure. This is exactly what we found. In the least hierarchical
group, only the Neuroticism factor was clearly defined; as the
number of hierarchical responses increased, the factor structure
more and more closely resembled the original factor structure of
the NEO-PI-R. In the most hierarchical group, the original struc-
ture was replicated quite well.
Several explanations are possible. First, the Estonian version of
the NEO-PI-R may not be adequately translated. This clearly is not
the case, as the Estonian adaptation replicates the structure of the
original fairly well (Kallasmaa et al., 2000). Moreover, in the
present study the original structure of the NEO-PI-R was repli-
cated in the subsample of highly educated participants. Similarly
educated samples were used to create the original and translated
versions of the NEO-PI-R.
Second, the subsamples in our study may have been too small
(between 152 and 217 participants in each subsample) to get
reliable results in the factor analysis. This explanation is unlikely,
as sample sizes above 150 and five or more variables per factor
(there were six in this study) are entirely acceptable (Guadagnoli &
Velicer, 1988; Velicer & Fava, 1998). In addition, it has been
demonstrated that, when sample sizes are small, Type I errors in
factor analysis (i.e., observed variables are incorrectly identified as
measuring a component) are extremely rare. When errors occur,
they are usually Type II errors (i.e., observed variable is incor-
rectly not identified as measuring a component; Guadagnoli &
Velicer, 1988). In the present study, in only one subsample 1 facet
in 30 did not load beyond |0.40| on some factor. That is, almost all
facet scales measured at least one component in every subsample.
In the least hierarchical subgroups, it is unlikely that the loadings
on “wrong” factors were Type I errors.
Third, the least hierarchical group may have exhibited an inco-
herent factor structure because of some unidentified problem re-
lated to the composition of that particular subsample. This was not
the case, however, because the factor structure changed very
systematically in accordance with an increase in the dominance of
scientific concept type of word meaning structure. The remaining
four groups were ordered exactly as predicted with respect to
factor structure and mean levels of personality domains.
Fourth, and most plausibly, our results differ from earlier studies
because the studied sample successfully represented the maximum
possible range of variation in word meaning structure. Indeed,
most samples used to create and replicate the Big Five structure in
different cultures/languages have not adequately represented the
population (McCrae, 2001). Even when samples were representa-
tive, they did not include sufficient variability in word meaning
structures or even its marker, level of education. The original
NEO-PI-R studies used samples that overrepresented individuals
from high socioeconomic status groups and underrepresented in-
dividuals with low levels of education (cf. Costa & McCrae, 1992,
pp. 39 – 40).
It should be noted that the sample in this study was also not
perfectly representative of the larger population. It included only
men with some connection to military or paramilitary organiza-
tions. One subsample was representative of a particular population
of men—recruits together with undergraduate students represented
the entire population of healthy 19 –21-year-old Estonian men. In
a worst-case scenario, our findings about the relationships between
word meaning structure and personality structure can only be
generalized to young, healthy Estonian men. Even in this most
restricted case, however, it should be evident that the Big Five
structure of personality is not universal to every culture and to
every healthy man.
 RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN PERSONALITY AND WORD MEANING
Mean levels of personality dimensions. In this study, differ-
ences in the mean level of major personality dimensions were
found to depend on word meaning structure. It was found that all
personality dimensions were systematically related to word mean-
ing structure: The everyday concept type of word meaning struc-
ture was related to high levels of Neuroticism and low levels of all
other personality dimensions. Results of factor analyses, however,
suggested that only the differences in Neuroticism can be mean-
ingfully interpreted. All other dimensions did not have a stable
factor structure in all subgroups.
As hypothesized, individuals with a dominant scientific concept
type of word meaning, who encode information both about exter-
nal events and unobservable mechanisms and ideas behind exter-
nal events, reported lower levels of Neuroticism. So-called “sci-
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This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
entific thinking” may enhance one’s ability to predict and
understand the world. This finding is in agreement with other
findings, which demonstrate that one’s intellectual ability is related
to adaptive traits (Austin et al., 2002).
Alternative Explanations
This study clearly demonstrates that personality structure and
mean levels of personality dimensions, as measured by the NEO-
PI-R, may be very different in different individuals from the same
sociologically defined “culture.” It may be possible, however, that
variation in personality is not related to word meaning structure
but rather to some other human characteristic. The most plausible
alternative is cognitive ability, which is tightly related to word
meaning structure.
Relationships between personality and cognitive ability. First,
the studied sample included nearly the entire range of possible
scores on the Cognitive Ability Scale (possible range 0 –36, ob-
served range 1–35). Second, dominant type of word meaning
structure was, indeed, related to level of cognitive ability. Partic-
ipants who used hierarchical thinking were more likely to demon-
strate a high level of cognitive ability.
Next, it was found that cognitive ability is related to mean levels
of personality domains. Levels of Neuroticism were negatively
correlated with cognitive ability, whereas levels of Extraversion,
Openness, and Conscientiousness were positively correlated with
cognitive ability. Agreeableness was not related to cognitive abil-
ity but was related to word meaning structure. Thus, both cognitive
ability and word meaning structure are related to mean levels of
personality dimensions, but not in exactly the same way.
The factor structure of the NEO-PI-R also changed systemati-
cally with different levels of cognitive ability. At higher levels of
cognitive ability, the factor structure corresponded more closely to
the original NEO-PI-R structure. Again, the data point to an
inescapable conclusion: The five-factor structure of Neuroticism,
Extraversion, Openness, Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness is
not a human universal. It appears that cognitive ability and word
meaning structure are differently related to personality structure as
measured by the NEO-PI-R. There were differences in the number
of factors that should be extracted (four or six in H1 and five in
H2–H5; five in CA1–CA3, but only four in CA4, and only three or
four in CA5). There were also differences in the proportion of total
variance accounted for by the five factors in different groups. In
the case of the word meaning structure groups, the variance ac-
counted for by the five factors increased systematically with an
increase in the number of hierarchical responses; in the cognitive
733
ability groups, the highest proportion of variance accounted for by
five factors was found in CA4. Finally, there were differences in
the patterns of factor loadings, especially with the Agreeableness
factor that becomes similar to the “desired” factor structure already
in H2 group of word meaning structure, but only in the CA3
cognitive ability group.
Altogether, it can be concluded that personality, as measured by
the NEO-PI-R, changes systematically with the dominant type of
word meaning structure and with level of cognitive ability. Nev-
ertheless, there are notable differences in exactly how personality
changes depending on these two cognitive factors. Theoretically,
word meaning structure describes mental “tools” and cognitive
ability can be understood as mastery of using those tools. Which
tools are available for an individual and how well a person has
acquired the skill to use those tools should both affect all aspects
of mind that are related to the tools. The results of this study are
in agreement with our theoretical model—personality is described
by using mental tools (i.e., words), and personality is different
depending on which tools are available for a person and how those
tools are used.
Some other alternatives. It is also possible that changes in
personality, as measured by the NEO-PI-R, are not directly caused
by differences in dominant type of word meaning structure or
cognitive ability. It might also be possible that people who score
“low” on the word meaning structure test or who score low on a
test of cognitive ability are careless, uncooperative, and/or insuf-
ficiently motivated to provide valid data to the researcher, com-
pared with people who score “high” on the word meaning test or
high on a test of cognitive ability. This explanation, however, does
not fully correspond to the data. Carelessness may be expressed in
the amount of variance accounted for by five factors; low levels of
cognitive ability and low levels of hierarchical thinking were,
indeed, related to smaller amounts of “explained” variance. Nev-
ertheless, the individuals in H1 and CA1 provided responses to the
NEO-PI-R that were structured. Neuroticism facets clearly loaded
on the same factor in these groups that were most different from
the supposedly universal five-factor structure of personality. If
responses had been given carelessly, there should have been no
structure for any of the personality domains. But responses were
structured in all studied groups; the structure was just different
from the “universal” structure. It is not plausible to think that
“careless” individuals responded carefully and systematically to
Neuroticism items but responded carelessly to all other items.
There are other factors that psychological researchers have
found to be related to individual psychological differences; level of
education and socioeconomic status are perhaps the best two
examples. In the case of such variables, it is important to make a
clear distinction between descriptions of where individuals have
been (or what kind of life they live) and who these individuals are.
An educational system helps individuals to develop skills and
knowledge; socioeconomic status, however, results from individ-
ual differences in skills and knowledge. In this study it was found
that educational level is related to dominant type of word meaning
structure (and also to cognitive ability). Education in this context
can be understood as a primary cultural institution that induces
development of word meaning structure and cognitive ability.
Education also causes changes in personality—not directly, but
through changes in mental tools and skills in using those tools. It
follows that, theoretically, there is a causal chain from (a) educa-
tion to (b) change in word meaning structure and cognitive effi-
 734 TOOMELA
ciency to (c) change in personality. The results of this study
strongly support such a model, although the hypothesis can only be
tested directly with a large scale longitudinal study. The causal
chain can be extended to include socioeconomic status as a product
of differences in cognitive efficiency and personality.
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Received May 31, 2002
Revision received February 24, 2003
Accepted March 7, 2003 䡲