8o Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences

York 1920); Fayol, Henri, Administration, industrielle ever, Manchuria had already become a pawn in
et general? (Paris 1917), tr. byA. Couhrou^h (Lon-
politics. Russia had long before started
J. world
don 1930); Billard, J., Organisation et direction dans
its glacial movement eastward and had advanced
les affaires prirees et le service public (Paris 1024); Lee,
An Introduction to Industrial Administration so far into Asia as to necessitate a delimitation
John,
(London 1925); W., The Principles of
Taylor, F. of frontiers. The Treaty of Nerchinsk in 1689
Scientific Management (New York 1911); Taylor So- had fixed the Amur River watershed as the line;
ciety, New York, Scientific Alanagement in American
and by negotiations in 1858 and 1860 Russia
Industry, ed. by H. S. Person (New York 1929);
obtained from China, which had already been
Mooney, James D., and Reeley, Alan C., Onward In-
dustry. The Principles of Organization, and Their Sig- humbled in two wars with western powers, the
nificance to Modern Industry (New York 1931); rest of what is now Siberia.
Church, A. Hamilton, The Science and Practice of In 1894 the Sino-Japanese War broke out,
Management (New York 1914); Robinson, Webster,
Fundamentals of Business Organization (New York signalizing Japan's advent into world affairs.
1925); Robb, Russell, Lectures on Organization Japan won and in the Treaty of Shimonoseki
(Boston? c. 1910); Lansburgh, R. H., Industrial ]\ Ian- in 1895 forced China to cede the Liaotung Pen-
agement (New York 1923); Le Coutre, Walter, Kurz- insula, the southeastern tip of Manchuria. Rus-
gefasster lAtcratur- und Quellennachiveis zur Betriebs-
sia, supported by Germany and France, then
wirtschaftslehre, vols. i-iii (Berlin 1928-31); Isaac,
Die Entwicklung der iviswnschaft lichen Be- intervened and compelled Japan to relinquish
Alfred,
triebsicirtschaftsleJire in Dcut \~chland seit i8yS Be- y
the peninsula. As reward for this assistance Rus-
triebs- und finan/wirtschaftliche Forschun^on, 2nd sia in the following year exacted from China the
vol. viii (Berlin Rudolf, Uber
right to build a railway from Chita across Man-
ser., 1923); Seijffert,
Begriff und Aufgahen der Betriebsicirtschaftdehre
churia to Vladivostok with a view to shortening
(Stuttgart 1925); Sieber, Eugcn H., Objckt und Be-
trachtungsweise der Betricbswirtschaftslchre, Betrieb the trans-Siberian route. The agreement also

und Unternehmung, vol. xii (Leipsic 1931); Nicklisch, gave Russia the right to acquire lands on both
Heinrich, Die Betriebsuirtschaft, vols. i-ii (Stuttgart sides of the line for access to necessary construc-
1929-30); Veblen, Thorstein, The Engineers and t/ie tion materials as well as the right to administer
Price System (New York 1921), and Absentee Oivner-
these lands, which was subsequently unilaterally
ship and Business Enterprise in Recent Times (New
construed by Russia as the right to station mili-
York 1923); Brookings, R. S., Industrial Ownership,
Its Economic and Social Significance (New York 1925); tary police. China was empowered by the agree-
Berle, A. A., Jr., and Means, Gardiner C., The Afod- ment to own shares in the railroad company
ern Corporation and Private Property (Chicago 1932). and to participate in its management, but this

power became nominal only. In 1898 the battle

MANCIIURIAN PROBLEM. The problem of of the concessions began, with each great state
Manchuria centers around the conflict between pressing for its share of China. To Russia fell
the expansive West on the one side and the a leasehold on the Liaotung Peninsula and the
newly self-assertive East on the other. In so far right to construct a branch of the Chinese East-
'as it involves China, Japan and Russia, the three ern Railway as the line built in pursuance of
states bordering on Manchuria, it is only a the 1896 agreement is known -from Harbin

regional problem; but by reason of its implica- south to Daircn on the Liaotung coast. Russia
tions, though less direct, for the United States had succeeded in closing a grip around Man-
and in a different sense for the major European churia, but the Russo-Japanese War was fore-

powers it becomes a world wide problem of war doomed.

and peace. The stake for which rival powers The war came in 1904 and was closed in 1905
contend is the profit of Manchuria's economic by the Treaty of Portsmouth, whereby the Rus-
exploitation. sian leasehold on the Liaotung Peninsula was
Until the closing years of the nineteenth cen- ceded to Japan together with the part of the Chi-
tury Manchuria was virtuallyunknown and un- nese Eastern Railway running between Chang-
populated and wholly undeveloped. Juridically chun and Daircn, now known as the South
it was
part of China, as the Manchu dynasty Manchuria Railway, and all Russian rights con-
which had ruled China since the seventeenth nected therewith. It was further provided that
,
century emanated from Manchuria. After the both countries were to maintain a limited rail-
overthrow of the Manchu dynasty in 1912 the way guard along their respective portions of the
Three Eastern Provinces, as the, Chinese called line.In December, 1905, China and Japan
Manchuria Fengtien, Kirin and Hcilungkiang signed an agreement confirming the transfer and
occupied a status between full incorporation in a supplementary agreement Japan bound
into China and dependency. In actuality, how- itself to withdraw its railway guard if and when
 Management Manchurian Problem
Russia didV>. Russia did withdraw its troops
on China's demand after the Bolshevik revolu-
tion but Japan has not done so to date. It is
contended by Japan that China in a secret agree-
ment concluded at the same time engaged not
to construct any railways parallel to the South
Manchuria Railway, but China denies the ex-
istence of such an agreement. China has subse-
quently constructed such lines, while Japan has
protested against them; and this is the basis for
some of the sharpest controversies between the
two countries.
The original concession of the Liaotung Pen-
insula leasehold was for twenty-five years, ex-
piring in 1923; the Chinese Eastern Railway was
ceded for eighty years from date of completion,
or until 1983, with a provision that China might
recover the road by purchase in 1939. In 1915,
however, Japan presented an ultimatum to
China, forcing the latter to sign a treaty based
on the so-called Twenty-one Demands, whereby
the leasehold on the Liaotung Peninsula was
extended to 1997 and the concession for the
South Manchuria Railway to 2002. The right
of repurchase in 1939 was revoked. China has
since contended that this treaty, being extorted
by force majeure and without quid pro quo, is
invalid and that Japan's continued presence in
Dairen, Port Arthur and environs is an act of
trespass. It is a contention that Japan of course
has not even recognized. This is the fundamen-
tal issue between the two countries and it is an
irreconcilable difference. All other disputes in
Manchuria as to the status of Japanese citizens,
the right to purchase land and similar questions
arc corollary thereto.
Manchuria might have remained deadlocked
by conflicting juridical claims had there not
supervened the force which has changed all far
eastern relations. This was Chinese nationalism.
China set out to recover its alienated territory
and sovereign rights. In south Manchuria it
entered upon a railway building program with
the object of laying down a system which would
drain off Manchurian products via Chinese rail-
ways to Chinese ports instead of via the South
Manchurian system to Dairen, the Japanese
port. Simultaneously sought by establishing
it
banks, factories, mills and trading concerns to
break Japan's economic monopoly. In north
Manchuria it encroached steadily if indirectly
on Russia's position. China had been on bad
terms with Soviet Russia since the repudiation
of the informal alliance in 1927 and the sever-
ance of diplomatic relations between the two
81
countries.There were numerous incidents and
in 1929 China resorted to direct action. It seized
the Chinese Eastern Railway, arrested a number
of Russian employees of the line and deported
several higher officials, including the general
manager. Russia dispatched a military expedi-
tion into Manchuria and after inflicting a sharp
defeat on Chinese troops compelled China to
restore the status
quo ante.
Between China and Japan ill feeling is of
longer standing and incidents have been even
more numerous. China steadily became more
exigent and the military party in Japan more
outspoken in demanding a "strong policy/' by
which meant military punitive measures. A
it
succession of minor clashes in 1931 precipitated
the crisis. On September
18 the Japanese occu-
pied Mukden, disarmed the Chinese police and
took over the civil administrative machinery.
One center after another was similarly occupied
and before the end of the year practically all of
Manchuria was under Japanese domination, in-
cluding parts of what had been the Russian
sphere. After an interval in which local govern-
ments were set up under the aegis of Japan, on
February 18, 1932, the independence of Man-
churia and Inner Mongolia was proclaimed and
a new up under the name of, at first,
state set
Ankuo, Manchukuo, with subsequent de
later,
jure recognition by Japan. On March 9 Pu Yi,
who had been deposed as emperor of China in
infancy, was brought by the Japanese to Chang-
chun and installed as dictator. At the same time
all important branches of the new government
were prt under the supervision of Japanese offi-
cials. In short, Manchuria had become a Japa-
nese possession but not without challenge. First,
Chinese military units have continued a guerrilla
campaign. Second, Soviet Russia frightened by
Japanese encroachments brought up reenforce-
ments and strongly fortified its borders. Third,
the Occident intervened through the League of
Nations and the United States.
Fundamentally there are two conflicts in
Manchuria. One is between China and all other
powers. China holds Manchuria to be its terri-
tory in law and wishes to make it so in fact. The
issue then is between Chinese nationalism and
the expansionist ambitions of other powers. The
other conflict is
amongthe great powers for the
right to exclusive domination over Manchuria.
By reason of propinquity, momentum and the
urgency of necessity Japan is the most vigorous
claimant. The
necessity is, first, that of self-
defense. Manchuria in the hands of some other
 82 Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences
great power, as was threatened in the time of the
imperialistic raids on China, would constitute a
menace to Japan's continued existence as an
independent nation. Early in the twentieth cen-
tury the aggressive ambition of czarist Russia
was the source of fear. Now Soviet Russia with
the propulsive force of a revolutionary mission
isagain the source. Second, there is economic
need. Japan is
notoriously wanting in raw mate-
rials, especially those necessary to rapid indus-
trialization. Manchuria is rich in raw materials,
especially coal, and lias considerable deposits of
iron and minerals. It has vast uncut timberlands
and in potentiality of agricultural
development
is
comparable with the American northwest.
Furthermore it is the world's principal source
of the soya bean, of which over 200,000,000
bushels are now produced annually. Japan, be-
ing overpopulated, deficient in raw materials
and food supply and committed to industrialism,
must have access raw materials, a market for
to
its and an outlet for the invest-
finished products
ment of surplus capital. All of these Manchuria
offers. Its foreign trade ^1929 amounted to
more than $500,000,000, of which Japan had
more than two fifths. Japan's investments there
are estimated at more than Si, 000,000 ,000. The
country is sparsely populated, with some
still
30,000,000 inhabiting an estimated area of 450,-
ooo square miles, including Jehol. But the pres-
sure of population in China has been pushing
between half a million and a million emigrants
over the northern borders into Manchuria every
year, and with peace in Manchuria this move-
ment would advance rather than recede. The
'prospect is that in a measurable period Man-
churia will bemore heavily populated.
To Japan then Manchuria represents a huge
vested interest and an economic outlet. Ab-
stractly there isno reason why all Japan's needs
from Manchuria could not be fulfilled without
actual control. It could buy raw materials from
Manchuria and sell its finished products there
in the open market, having the advantage of
propinquity over other foreign competitors. In
actuality there are two reasons why Japan will
not rely on the working of natural law. The first
is precedent. Since Japan emerged into the
modern world it has been the law of power
politics that strong nations desiring access to
the advantages of a rich, weak and undeveloped
land will seize they can in order to enjoy
it if
a monopoly; therefore access to the benefits of
such a land can be assured only by exclusive
possession. This law has been in full operation
in the Far East and Japan refused to believe
that it has been abrogated; the evidence of a
new spirit in international relations since the
World War is not conclusive. Japan assumes
instead that since China
is rtot strong enough to
hold Manchuria, some other power will take it
unless Japan does.
The second reason rests on conditions in
China. The first of these conditions Chinese
is
nationalism, which is economic no less than
political. China aspires to the profits from Man-
churian development for itself. China's railway
program in Manchuria is evidence; even before
hostilities broke out in Mukden in 1931 there
had been a sharp diplomatic struggle over rail-
ways, and in large part the hostilities were pre-
cipitated by this struggle. While the rush of
Chinese immigration into Manchuria offers
promise as a market it tends also to fix a new
economic polarization and to draw Manchuria
into China's economic orbit. The population of
Manchuria by Chinese would work to Japan's
advantage if the Chinese remained passive and
in a state of willing tutelage. But they will not
so remain in either China proper or Manchuria;
they are competing similarly in the foreign trad-
ing centers on the Chinese coast, in Shanghai,
Hankow and Tientsin, and there too to the
foreigner's disadvantage. The second Chinese
condition affecting Japan's attitude is the break-
down of the traditional processes of government
in China, as reflected in civil wars, banditry,
maladministration and corruption, which al-
though they may be inescapable in a period of
societal transformation obstruct the channels of
trade. To permit Manchuria to become an inte-
gral part of China would subject it to the same
condition, whereas even under indirect Japanese
hegemony it has been exempt.
The Manchurian problem is not only regional
in scope. Soviet Russia is involved because it
abuts on Manchuria and because of its interest
in the Chinese Eastern Railway and the north
Manchurian cities which the railway serves eco-
nomically. After the Russo-Japanese War the
two countries came to an understanding based
on non-interference in each other's spheres.
Until 1931 this was adhered to except in the
abnormal years of the World War, and relations
between them were undisturbed. Russia's mobi-
lization on the Siberian border in 1932 was
notification that non-interference remains a con-
dition of peaceful relations. The interest of the
western powers, notably the United States, has
been to keep Manchuria a free field for economic
 Manchurian Problem
competition. To this end the United States has
actively opposed every effort to detach Man-
churia from China and has never conceded that
Manchuria was exempted from the open door
doctrine, the principle of equality of oppor-
tunity for all trading nations, laid down for
China by John Hay. In 1915 after the Twenty-
one Demands the United States sent identical
notes to China and Japan aSsSerting that it would
recognize no treaty impairing the rights of the
United States in China, the political or terri-
torial integrity of China or the open door policy.
The Nine-Power Treaty concluded in Washing-
ton in 1922 again bound the signatories, the
nations having interests in the Far East, to re-
spect the sovereignty and integrity of China and
"
to confer whenever a situation arises which in
the opinion of any one of them involves the
application of the stipulations of the present
treaty.'* The issue could be evaded until 1932,
because no occasion arose to test the question
whether Manchuria was a part of China. In 1932
the issue could no longer be evaded. Interven-
tion by the League of Nations and protest by
the United States having proved unavailing to
arrest Japan's advance throughout Manchuria,
the United States on January 7, 1932, sent a
note to China and Japan to the same effect as
the one of 1915 but adding "that it does not
intend to recognize any situation, treaty or
agreement which may be brought about by
means contrary to the covenants or obligations
"
of the Pact of Paris of August 27, 1928. The
Assembly of the League of Nations in resolu-
tions passed March n, 1932, took a similar
stand, although less unequivocally. On this issue
there can be no technical evasions. The western
powers refuse to recognize the legality of Japan's
authority outside the Liaotung Peninsula and
the South Manchuria Railway zone or the ex-
istence of the so-called Manchukuo. Japan
steadfastly refuses, as it always has refused since
1905, to recognize the right of any third power
to interfere on the question of Manchuria. While
conceding Chinese sovereignty, at least until the
setting up of Manchukuo, it holds Manchuria
to occupy a separate status by virtue of the
treaties of 1905 and 1915.
In December, 1931, the League of Nations
decided to appoint an international commission
to conduct a first hand investigation in Manchu-
ria. The commission, headed by Lord Lytton,
published its findings in October, 1932. It de-
cided against restoration of the status quo ante
September, 1931, and against the maintenance
and recognition of Manchukuo; it recommended
the autonomy of the Manchurian provinces
under Chinese sovereignty, but with regard to
Japan's peculiar interests, and the institution
for this purpose of a special administrative
regime for the provinces. It therefore advised
the Council of the League to invite the Chinese
and Japanese governments to convoke a joint
advisory conference to draft treaties embodying
the principles and methods of operation of the
new regime.
Certain terms of reference were laid down for
the guidance of this conference: internal order
was to be maintained by a special gendarmery
organized and maintained with the aid of foreign
advisers; all other troops were to be withdrawn;
Japan was to be given the right of free partici-
pation in but not control of the economic devel-
opment of Manchuria; the right of foreigners to
settle and lease land was to be extended through-
out Manchuria but with modifications of the
right of exterritoriality; a new agreement was to
be drawn up for the operation of the railways
in Manchuria, preferably on a basis of amalga-
mation of Chinese and Japanese lines, otherwise
on a basis of joint operation under a Sino-
Japanese commission with the assistance of a
foreign adviser. To these proposals, however,
Japan refused to give consideration and reiter-
ated its determination to stand by its recognition
of Manchukuo as an independent state.
NATHANIEL PEFFER
See: FAR EASTERN PROBLEM; CHINESE PROBLEM; IN-
TERVENTION; IMPERIALISM; EUROPEAN IZATION.
Consult: For bibliographies, "Manchuria," compiled
by W. A. Slade, American Academy of Political and*
Social Science, Annals, vol. clii (1930) 393, and
"Manchuria a Bibliography,** compiled by Pearl
Snodgrass in Bulletin of Bibliography, vol. xiv (1932)
170-71. T/ie Manchuria Yearbook, 1931 (Tokyo 1931);
Clyde, P. H., International Rivalries in Manchuria,
1680-1922 (and ed. Columbus, Ohio 1928); Young,
C. W., The International Relations of Manchuria (Chi-
cago 1929), and Japan's Jurisdiction and International
Legal Position in Manchuria, 3 vols. (Baltimore 1931);
Parlett, II. G., A Brief Account of Diplomatic Events
in Manchuria (Ivondon 1929); Lattimore, Owen,
Manchuria, Cradle of Conflict (New York 1932);
Morse, H. B., and MacNair, H. F., Far Eastern Inter-
national Relations (2nd ed. Boston 1931); Blakeslee,
G. II., The Pacific Area, an International Survey,
World Peace Foundation Pamphlets, vol. xii, no. 3
(Boston 1929) ch. Yakhontoff, V. A., Russia and
iii;
the Soviet Union Far East (New York T937JT
in the
Allen, G. C., Modern Japan and Its Problems (London
1928); Matsuoka, Yosuke, Economic Co-operation of
Japan and China in Manchuria and Mongolia (Dairen
1929); Orchard, J. E. and D. J., Japan's Economic
Position (New York 1930), especially ch. xxii; Crocker,
 Encyclopaedia of the Sockl Sciences
W. R., The Japanese Population Problem (London
1931); Peffer, Nathaniel, China: the Collapse of a
Civilization (New York 1930); Clark, Grover, Eco-
nomic Rivalries in China, Carnegie Endowment
International Peace, World Economic Problems (New
Haven 1932); Sokolsky, George E., The Tinder Box
of Asia (New York 1932); Radek, Karl, "The War
in the Far East: a Soviet View" in Foreign Affairs
vol. x (1931-32) 541-57; Ware, E. E., Business and
Politics in the Far East, Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, World Economic Problems (New
Haven 1932); League of Nations, Political Section,
Appeal by the Chinese Government: Report of the
Commission of Enquiry, 1932. vn. 12 (Geneva 1932).
MANCINI, PASQUALE STANISLAO (1817-
88), Italian jurist and statesman. Mancini was
born in Campania and studied law at the Uni-
versity of Naples. He soon acquired a great
reputation as a jurist and professor of law. In
the famous letters which he exchanged in 1841
with Mamiani he discussed the foundations of
jurisprudence and especially penal jurispru-
dence, maintaining that moral justice must be
combined with social utility and that the pur-
pose of punishment is not only expiation but
also prevention of crime. As deputy to the Nea-
politan parliament Mancini composed on May
15, 1848, the solemn protest of the chamber
dissolution by the Bourbon monarch
against its
and was forced to flee to Turin, where he soon
became the most famous of the southern exiles,
an outstanding lawyer and a professor of inter-
national law in the University of Turin, occupy-
ing a chair created especially for him. In his
inaugural lecture on January 22, 1851, Delia
nazionalita come fondamento del diritto delle
^enti, he sought the vital principle of nationhood
not in historical and natural factors, such as
"
language, race and territory, but in the con-
sciousness of nationality/' In advocating respect
for every other nationality Mancini aimed to
distinguish his theory of nationalities from impe-
rialistic nationalism. The Italian school founded
by Mancini applied the principle of nationality
even to private international law, and its (dews
were adopted in juridical form by the Italian
Civil Code (1866), which regulates personal
matters, family relations and the inheritance of
aliens by the principle of national law rather
than by that of domicile.
With Bluntschli and others Mancini was one
t>t trifc founders of the Institute of International
Law (1872) and became its president in 1873.
In his political career Mancini was general sec-
retary for justice at Naples in 1861, in 1862
minister of public instruction of the new King-
dom of Italy, from 1876 to 1878 minister of
and from 1881 to 1885 minister of foreign
justice
for
affairs. He displayed great political and particu-
combating capital pun-
larly legislative activity,
ishment and the Jesuits, championing the aboli-
tion of imprisonment for debt and taking a great
,
share in drawing up the new code of commercial
law. As foreign minister he signed (May 20,
1882) the treaty of the Triple Alliance, which
remained in force until the World War. Al-
though he defended this treaty for political
reasons he refused to join Austria and Germany
in their demand for an internal reactionary pol-
icy, and he declared that Italy could never have
considered the Triple Alliance as directed
against England.
ALESSANDRO LEVI
Works'. Diritto internazionale ; prclesioni (Naples 1873).
Consult: Fusinato, Guido, // principio della scuola
italiana nel diritto pubblico internazionale (Macerata
1884), and // principio della scuola italiana nel diritto
privato internazionale (Bologna 1885); Carle, Giu-
seppe, "Pasquale Stanislao Mancini e la teoria psico-
logica del sentimento nazionalc" in R. Accademia
Nazionale dei Lincei, Rome, Classe di Scienze Morali,
Storiche e Filolojjiche, Metnorie, 4th ser., vol. vi
(1889) 548-67; Ruflmi, Francesco, "Nel centenario
della nascita di Pasquale Stanislao Mancini" in Nuova
antologia 6th ser., vol. clxxxviii (1017) Supplement
t
4t
to issue for March 16, and ll principio di nazio-
nalita in Giuseppe Mazzini e in Pasquale Stanislao
Mancini" in his L'insegnamento di Mazzini (Milan
1917) P- 17-58.
MANDAMUS is one of the "extraordinary"
common law remedies, also designated preroga-
tive writs, by which public administration is sub-
jected to judicial control. As the name implies, it
is a command,
issuing from the sovereign to a
subordinate jurisdiction, requiring the perform-
ance of a legal duty. Mandamus is defined by
Blackstone as acommand issuing in the king's
name from the court of King's Bench and di-
rected to any person, corporation or inferior
court of judicature in the king's dominions, re-
quiring the performance of some particular thing
which appertains to an office and duty (Commen-
taries, in, no). Mandamus was formerly used in
the main to determine controversies regarding
corporate acts or corporate or ecclesiastical of-
fice, while at the present time its principal use is
in connection with acts or omissions of public
Originally, after the petition for the
officials.
writ had been granted, the matter lay between
the sovereign (acting in England through the
court of King's Bench) and the subordinate,
whose return to the writ, showing either com-