Philosophies of the Multiverse

The Nietzschean Religion of Leira

Title: The Nietzschean Religion of Leira
Overall Series: Philosophies of the Multiverse
Date of Release: September 30, 2021
Author: Søren Wollenberg (Twitter: @WollenbergGaard)
Artist: E. M. (Twitter: @EmnicIllustrat1 | Instagram: @Emnic_Illustrations)

On the cover: A game of Dungeons

& Dragons is underway, with Lady
Philosophy—as depicted in the writings
of Boethius—serving as Dungeon Master.
Her players Friedrich Nietzsche, playing
his Leiran Cleric character, and Georg
Hegel, playing his elf wizard and devotee
of Corellon character, discuss how to best
approach the ebb-and-flow of the game as
it has been progressing, as their characters
have found themselves flung beyond the
boundaries of the Material Plane.

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This work contains material that is copyright Wizards of the Coast and/or other authors.
Such material is used with permission under the Community Content Agreement for Dungeon Masters Guild.
All other original material in this work is published under the Community Content Agreement for Dungeon Masters Guild.
Table of Contents
❏ Introduction to Project (p.2)
❏ Approach to Sources (p.2)
❏ How Sources will be Used (p.2)
❏ How to Read this Text (p.2)
❏ On Section Labeling (p.3)
❏ Structure of Essays (p.3)
❏ Content Warning (p.3)
❏ The Nietzschean Religion of Leira (p.4)
❏ §1 - Case of the Mistshadow (p.4)
❏ §1.1 - Official Leira depictions (p.4)
❏ §1.2 - Summary of Leira and her faith (p.5)
❏ §2 - Nietzsche’s Life and Legacy (p.5)
❏ §2.1 - The “Efforts” of Elisabeth (p.7)
❏ §3 - Dionysus-Leira & Apollo-Oghma (p.8)
❏ §3.1 - Schopenhauer’s Suffering Will (p.8)
❏ §3.2 - Greek Tragedy (p.8)
❏ §3.3 - The Third God (p.9)
❏ §3.4 - Tragedy in the Realms (p.9)
❏ §4 - Truth & Truths (p.11)
❏ §4.1 - Trickery of Language (p.11)
❏ §4.2 - Perspectives on Truth (p.13)
❏ §4.3 - Serving Life (p.13)
❏ §4.4 - Oghma’s View of Truth (p.14)
❏ §4.5 - Leira’s Truths (p.15)
❏ §5 - The Crisis of Values (p.17)
❏ §5.1 - Hollow Gods (p.17)
❏ §5.2 - The Moral Revolt (p.19)
❏ §5.3 - Noble Conversion (p.21)
❏ §5.4 - Guilty Conscience (p.21)
❏ §5.5 - Unmasking Values (p.22)
❏ §6 - An Experiment of Life (p.23)
❏ §6.1 - Limitless Power (p.23)
❏ §6.2 - Affirmation Loop (p.25)
❏ §6.3 - People on Higher Ground (p.28)
❏ §6.4 - Gaiety in Science and Virtue (p.30)
❏ §6.5 - Leirans as Higher Types (p.33)
❏ §7 - No God in a Setting of Gods? (p.36)
❏ §8 - Nimbral, Samarach & Selûne (p.38)
❏ §8.1 - The Fairytales of Nimbral (p.38)
❏ §8.2 - The Snakes of Samarach (p.40)
❏ §8.3 - Fly Me to Selûne (p.41)
❏ Conclusion (p.44)
❏ Index (p.49)
❏ Freely Available Resources (p.50)
❏ Bibliography (p.53)

1
Introduction to Project
This book will perhaps only be understood by those who
have themselves already thought the thoughts which are
expressed in it—or similar thoughts [...] Its object would
be attained if it afforded pleasure to one who read it with
understanding.
- Ogden; Wittgenstein, 1999/2012, p.27
The text presented here might be somewhat different from
the texts a general reader is used to reading, and especially
different from other D&D products. This text will be one
of hopefully a series of releases, each made up of an essay
engaging with and interpreting the cultures, religions, and
values of the worlds of D&D through the lens of different
philosophical systems of thought.
Why do this? The answer to this question is that if one
engages the fictional values and views expressed by NPCs
in D&D and puts them into the context of real and more
extensive philosophical positions, it might elevate one’s
ability to roleplay a character with such views, as well as
potentially making some positions both more attractive to
roleplay, more understandable, and more coherent as a
view for a plausible individual to believe in and live by.
With this being said, whatever interpretations of D&D
views presented in the following essays are of course not
to be taken as the correct way of understanding these ideas
and concepts. There are many ways of interpreting these
sources, and many ways to prioritize the content of one
over another. These essays are simply tools for players to
use as found useful, to pick-and-choose from my insights
as is deemed helpful for enabling creativity and roleplay.
Due to this “mission statement” priority will be given,
in these essays, to philosophical positions within D&D
which might appear as unfamiliar to the average reader or
which contain aspects that might seem contradictory or
otherwise inappropriate for a given position. And which
therefore stand to gain far more use and coherence from
being interpreted and contextualized in this way, than more
familiar positions might.
Approach to Sources. As mentioned above, the different
texts will each be presented in the form of academic essays
(though their visual format will be kept in the style familiar
to readers of 5e products). As such, each essay will make
liberal use of quotes and references from both D&D books
and philosophical sources. When it comes to the different
choices of sources, I do not intend to limit myself in which
types of sources to draw from, however, when it comes to
philosophical sources, I do intend to include at least a few
sources in each essay which is freely available to readers.
By doing this, any interested reader is given an immediate
way of engaging further with the topic of an essay beyond
that which is presented therein.
How Sources will be Used. The field of philosophy is an
area flat out characterized by its lack of wide consensus on
basically any subject at all. What some philosopher
did-or-did-not mean when writing something-or-other
is something continuously debated and reevaluated within
the relevant academic circles across the world.
With this being said, when writing the text that is to
follow, it is by no means my intention to reinvent the
wheel, and I will therefore be making a point of sticking
to what little canon and consensus does exist around how
these different systems of thought are to be understood.
I choose to do this particularly due to the general goal
of this project. Since the goal is to illuminate the ideas of
D&D’s cultures, I already stand to do plenty of research
into the extent of relevant D&D sources. So I’ll leave the
general interpretations of philosophy to the experts.
Of course, in cases where varying interpretations of a
given philosophical topic are relevant, I will make a point
of including such opposing views.
How to Read this Text
Those who have read about everything are thought
also to understand everything; but it is not always so.
Reading provides the mind only with materials of
knowledge; thinking makes what we read ours.
- Bennett; Locke, 2017, p.18
Not every person is used to reading texts with an academic
format. For the benefit of such people it will be worthwhile
to dedicate a bit of space to explaining some of the details
of the format. Specifically, how references work.
The following text will be making frequent references
to other texts and similar media. These references will look
one of two ways. Longer quotes will appear as above, in
light-blue boxes with an abridged version of the reference
to the source below it. Shorter quotes will however simply
appear encased with quotation marks “ ” around them, and
followed immediately thereafter by a similarly abridged
2
reference to the source of the quote, but in this case placed
within parenthesis ( ). In instances of paraphrasing rather
than directly quoting, a reference in parenthesis will also
be used.
At the end of the document appears the “Bibliography”
section which will feature each referenced text-information
in their fully unabridged form. Each in alphabetical order
based on the involved individuals’ surnames. Specifically,
will references list their information in the following order
and visual format (though of course horizontally rather than
the vertical structure shown below):
❏ Surname,
❏ First Name
❏ (Year of publication).
❏ “Title of the Source.”
❏ Series it potentially is included in.
❏ Publisher.
❏ Location of Publisher.
In cases of more than one relevant creator, additional
names follow immediately after the first name and a
semicolon ; in alphabetical order.
In regard to the actual quotes, in cases where parts of
a quote has been altered by me, these alterations will be
placed within a set of brackets and ellipses. Like this [...]
if something has been cut, and like this [...if something...]
has been added to the quote.
On Section Labeling. Within the essays themselves,
different sections of the texts will be labeled both with
a paragraph § number as well as a name describing the
content of the section. The addition of the numbering of
the sections is for the purpose of easily allowing for the
essays to reference former and later sections within
themselves, independently of which version of the text is
being read (this also allows for easy reference from one
essay to a different essay, independently of page numbers).
Structure of Essays. This essay will open with a general
description of the nature of the topic discussed within it, as
well as outlining some of the basic information and factors
relating to both the philosophical and D&D topics.
This is followed by a closer examination of the different
sources and a presentation of the argumentation making up
the interpretation of the subject.
The essay then ends with a quick overview of the ideas
presented in the text so far, highlighting some of the most
useful points for roleplaying in a quick-for-reference bullet
point format. As well as listing any extra miscellaneous
ideas not presented within the main essay itself.
This structure should allow for readers disinterested in
anything but roleplay-suggestions to easily access these
points of interest by jumping directly to the end of the
essay.
CONTENT WARNING
A list of subjects and themes discussed within this essay,
regardless of how benign or to what degree, is presented
at the bottom of the following page; within a box labeled
“Featured Sensitive Topics.”
If any relevant subjects aren’t listed within said box,
readers are encouraged to contact me about such missing
warnings, so that these can be rectified, and I apologize
beforehand for any discomfort any such omissions might
cause for readers.
Be mindful when using any of the supplied resources
for further engagement with the topics of the essay, that
the same warning applies to these, to greater or lesser
degrees. What the essay might simply glance over, the
resources might discuss in depth.
3
The Nietzschean Religion of Leira
[...] truths are illusions about which one has forgotten
that this is what they are; metaphors which are worn out
and without sensuous power [...]
- Kaufmann; Nietzsche, 1968, p.47
§1 - Case of the Mistshadow
Her true appearance was never known, and she
was never depicted in (uncensored) religious art.
Swirling gray mists—sometimes in a vaguely
humanoid form—were always shown to represent her,
and her horned altars framed no image above them.

Back in the introduction to this overall writing-project I
made a point of emphasising the lack of consensus within
philosophy as a characteristic of the field itself. I stand by
this claim, and add that nowhere will the truth of this be
more apparent than with the thought of the philosopher I
will be covering in this essay, Friedrich Nietzsche.
To call Nietzsche a controversial thinker would not only
be appropriate, it would be an understatement. However,
it is important to acknowledge that much of the controversy
surrounding Nietzsche has more to do with how his ideas
have been both misunderstood, as well as misused, in ways
that have often had little to nothing to do with what
Nietzsche actually thought or argued for. As a result, the
list of sensitive subjects below might seem vast, but this I
will assure the reader is more often than not simply due to
me having to address different accusations often leveled at
Nietzsche, but which not only have been well documented
over the years as false, but which also often obfuscate what
Nietzsche actually did write and think. Therefore, although
I will have to bring up a few unpleasant topics within this
essay, this will largely be for the sake of denoting them as
largely irrelevant for the understanding of Nietzsche and
the ideas I’ll be discussing here. It is not my task here to
try and defend Nietzsche from slander, and these topics
will therefore simply be brought up so that I immediately
can put them aside.
- Boyd; Martin, 1996, p.93
With all of the preliminary clarifications out of the way,
let’s actually have a look at what the rest of this essay will
concern itself with, Leira the Lady of Deception.
Within the Forgotten Realms campaign setting, Leira is
a Faerûnian goddess with dominion over lies and illusions.
However, perhaps appropriately for the so-called Guardian
of Liars, the nature of Leira and the religion that surrounds
her is quite difficult to get a grasp on and severely lacking
in both clarifications and examples which would allow for
emulation and incorporation of characters—both NPCs and
Player Characters—with a Leiran worldview.
To mitigate this lack, this particular essay will seek to
explain and argue for the view that Leira’s religion can be
meaningfully compared to multiple doctrines of german
philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche, thereby allowing for the
adaptation of Nietzsche’s thought into those of Leira and
her worshipers. To this end, this essay will seek to explain
key aspects of Nietzsche’s philosophical writing on topics
such as ethics and how to live; on his metaphysics of how
he thinks the world does-and-doesn’t work; and the nature
of truth as a concept; as well as other clarifying topics.
§1.1 - Official Leira depictions. Though the reasons for
the elusive nature of Leira’s faith can be attributed partially
to the very nature of the subject-matter; a far more relevant

FEATURED SENSITIVE TOPICS

• Mentions of physical health issues.
• Discussion of suffering.
• Mentions of animal abuse.
• Discussion of nazism.
• Mentions of eugenics.
• Mentions of death.
• Mentions of mental health issues.
• Mentions of emotional abuse.
• Mentions of conflict and violence.
• Mentions of militarism.
• Discussion of superior race.
• Discussion of “slavery” in a sense.
• Mentions of delusions and illusion.
• Mentions of sex, drugs and alcohol.
• Mentions of glorifying violence.
• Discussion of antisemitism.
• Mentions of ableism.
• Discussion of Christianity.

4
reason for it is encompassed by the canonical lore which
connects to Leira, and the as a result great lack of depiction
of both her and her faithful.
The elephant-in-the-room is that the earliest and most
defining “depiction” of Leira involves the narrative of her
death at the hands of the gods Cyric and Mask within the
plot of the novel “Prince of Lies” by James Lowder.
The result of this has been that as soon as Leira became a
goddess and religion Players would wish documented, her
relevance dwindled as both she and her faith were wiped
out and subsumed by that of Cyric instead. Thus, future
D&D products with reasons to describe Leira would either
come to do so not in terms of an existing religion, but as a
faith corrupted and falling apart. Or such products would
simply use this state of affairs as an opportunity to ignore
her and her faith entirely—often granted only the status of
footnotes within the entries on Cyric or Oghma.
Our hands are thus quite tied up when it comes to official
sources from which we’d be able to pull ideas. Tied, yes,
but not to an unworkable degree that is. Some useful and
significant sources for our purposes do exist—especially
when taking a broader look at the canon of the Forgotten
Realms—and indeed, with Leira’s resurrection as a result
of the Second Sundering, the amount of sources addressing
Leira’s role in society has begun to grow steadily.
Additionally, to broaden the pool of sources to draw from
even further, this essay will also shape ideas about Leira
based on sources addressing her divine rival Oghma.
Specifically, this essay will occasionally treat the faith of
Oghma as a stand-in for groups Nietzsche criticizes—when
doing so is appropriate that is.
§1.2 - Summary of Leira and her faith. As the goddess
of liars, Leira didn’t have that many dedicated followers,
since people don’t typically value misunderstandings and
tricking others all that highly. More casual forms of Leira
worship were however quite common within the Realms,
calling on her for aid in instances of lying, or to placate her
when something important was to be decided on, and thus
needed clarity (Boyd; Martin, 1996, p.93).
Celebrations, among commoners, seeking to both honour
and placate Leira involved mingling while masquerading,
allowing for people to engage in anarchic and hedonistic
frenzies while such behaviour wouldn’t come to harm one’s
otherwise good reputation. This ritualistic accomplishment
is achieved not only through the use of masks, but also by
the making of a symbolic distinction between the “surface
lies” of the flesh, and the “inner truth” of the soul (Carter,
et al., 2018, pp.25-26).
What needs to be emphasized here, however, is that these
are the ways of celebrating for the non-initiated of Leira,
for those who, as stated, were seeking to placate her, rather
than accept her ways. These activities and symbols are thus
not necessarily—indeed, not even likely to be—accurate to
the actual views of the church of Leira.
A more “accurate” account of Leiran teachings might
instead include the view that although Leira by her very
nature could be anything, her manifestations and actions
were not without consistency. She frequently appeared to
prefer feminine forms—particularly that of an extremely
tall and thin woman with grey hair and very large eyes,
black-and-glistening like the void of the cosmos itself.
She was thought to enjoy tantalization; to seek to inspire
her followers through the appearance of surreal sights like
flying pigs and technicolour pachyderms; and thought to
be a dangerous foe to cross, though her grand, deceptive
designs largely were capricious and moody in nature, not
malicious (Boyd; Martin, 1996, pp.93-94). Indeed, Leira
wasn’t even viewed “[...] as a trickster but [...was rather...]
seen as enigmatic, quiet, and retiring.” (Crawford; Mohan;
et al., 2015, p.32).
When it comes to the clergy itself, members are taught
and encouraged to induce doubt in people wherever this
is possible so that mystery is returned to the world. Their
numbers are believed to be small, but due to how the faith
operates, it is quite difficult to truly tell. The same holds
true for their places of worship. Temples are few and far
between, often encompassing smaller structures in hidden
or secluded locations (Boyd; Martin, 1996, p.94).
Further details of the structure, rituals, and activities of
the church of Leira, as well as their views of their goddess
and their own place in the world, will be elaborated upon
as such details become relevant in the following sections.
§2 - Nietzsche’s Life and Legacy
Gradually it has become clear to me what every
great philosophy so far has been: namely, the personal
confession of its author and a kind of involuntary and
unconscious memoir [...] it is always well (and wise) to
ask: at what morality does all this (does he [...the given
historical philosopher...]) aim?
- Kaufmann; Nietzsche, 1966, §6
5
Though a biographical account of Nietzsche’s life and how
his philosophy has been understood isn’t central to the
comparison between his thought and that of the faith of
Leira, some basic insights into his history does serve well
at illuminating some of the contexts within which his ideas
are to be taken and understood.
Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche was born on October 15th
1844, in the village of Röcken, near the city of Leipzig, in
the then nation of Prussia. Friedrich’s father Karl Ludwig
worked as a Lutheran Minister within the village, or rather,
he did so until he died shortly before Friedrich turned five,
thus leaving behind “[...his wife...] Franziska, Friedrich,
a three-year old daughter, Elisabeth, and an infant son.
Friedrich’s brother died unexpectedly shortly thereafter
[...]” (Wilkerson, 05-05-2021, §1). After the loss of her
husband, Franziska relocated the family to the town of
“[...] Naumburg, where he [...Friedrich…] grew up in
a household comprising his mother, grandmother, two
aunts, and his younger sister [...]” (Anderson, 2017, §1).
Throughout his youth, Friedrich was offered an education
of great quality in theology, the humanities, and languages,
while additionally learning how to play piano and compose
music. He eventually began studying at the University of
Bonn, where he initially read theology and “[...] philology
which is a study of language with a particular view to
engaging in textual criticism [...]” (Ansell-Pearson; Bragg;
Hughes; Mulhall, 2018, timestamp.02:09-02:17), but only
a year into his studies, he abandoned theology to study
philology exclusively, even relocating along with his
professor, Friedrich Ritschl, from Bonn to the University
of Leipzig. Ritschl soon began promoting Nietzsche as
a prodigy in philology, and thereby, in 1869, managed
to secure him the “[...] position as Professor of Greek
Language and Literature at the University of Basel in
Switzerland [...]” (Wilkerson, 05-05-2021, §1), this being
in spite of the fact that Nietzsche hadn’t even begun the
work on his Ph.D yet, as well as the fact that Nietzsche
only was 24 years old at the time, making him the youngest
person ever appointed to that post at the time.
Nietzsche’s own feelings of these turns-of-events were,
however, quite mixed. His passion for philology had begun
to wane, and he had initially entertained both the thought
of changing his studies entirely to chemistry, or perhaps to
pursue a second Ph.D in philosophy along with his current
pursuit. Nietzsche, however, couldn’t bring himself to
refuse this job offer (Anderson, 2017, §1; Strathern, 1996,
timestamp.13:00-13:25; 14:30-14:52).
During his time teaching at Basel, Nietzsche developed
a close friendship with the composer Richard Wagner and
Wagner’s soon-to-be-wife Cosima. This relationship had
a profound impact on the early intellectual activities of
Nietzsche—and not just due to a shared admiration for the
writings of the philosopher Arthur Schopenhaur—but he
broke significantly with Wagner, both intellectually as well
as personally, by 1878 due to a turn to christian themes in
Wagner’s compositions and his growing associations with
anti-semites. Lastly, the final cause for Nietzsche’s turn in
thought was due to his failing health, which had always
been poor, leading him to resign from his position at Basel
to look for climates better suited to it—typically the Swiss
mountains and the Mediterranean—thus, taking up the life
of what was known as a “good European” at the time.
Specifically; “For the next decade [...the rest of his active
years...], Nietzsche was a wandering, independent writer
and philosopher, living on his disability pension.” (Hill,
2007, p.8; Anderson, 2017, §1; Higgins; Solomon, 2000,
p.35; Wilkerson, 05-05-2021, §8).
During his wandering-life, Nietzsche engaged in an
explosion of writing, publishing several books as well as
producing multiple texts in varying degrees of complete
states. His health did however not meaningfully improve,
as he continued to suffer from intense headaches, nausea,
failing eyesight, and much more—the cause of which still
is debated to this day, including possibilities like syphilis
and a brain tumor (Anderson, 2017, §1; Wicks, 1997/2017,
§1; Higgins; Solomon, 2000, pp.24-25), and in the January
of 1889 it all came to an end, for the first time:
[...] Nietzsche collapsed in the street in Turin [...while
embracing a horse—attempting to defend it from being
beaten...], and when he regained consciousness he wrote
a series of increasingly deranged letters. His close Basel
friend Franz Overbeck was gravely concerned and
travelled to Turin, where he found Nietzsche suffering
from dementia. After unsuccessful treatment in Basel
and Jena, he was released into the care of his mother,
and later his sister, eventually lapsing entirely into
silence. He lived on until 1900, when he died of a stroke
complicated by pneumonia.
- Anderson, 2017, §1
Due to his collapse, it has often been said that Nietzsche
died two deaths; one mental and one physical (Andersen;
Kristensen; Schmidt, 1985, p.180).
6
 §2.1 - The “Efforts” of Elisabeth. As stated above,
Nietzsche is a controversial thinker—and he actively
wanted this to be so; his style is bombastic, aggressive, and
deliberately provocative—however, a large and historically
persistent aspect of the controversy surrounding Nietzsche
had little to do with what he actually wrote or thought.
Earlier I claimed that Nietzsche broke up his relationship
with Wagner in part due to his anti-semitism. This might
come as a surprise to some readers, since Nietzsche often
is thought to have been not only an anti-semite himself, but
a supporting precursor to the shaping of Naziism, a thought
which many related contemporary political movements
have been known to occasionally echo.
The reality surrounding Nietzsche’s relation to the Nazis
is, however, rather that not only were “[...] some Fascists
[...at the time...] skeptical of the commensurability of
Nietzsche’s thought with their political aims.” (Wilkerson,
05-05-2021, §8), but additionally that the image of him as a
Nazi—indeed, even just him as a Nationalist—is based on
the editorial work of his younger sister Elisabeth.
After his collapse, Nietzsche’s literary legacy was left in
the hands of Elisabeth who immediately went to work on
transforming her, until then, largely unknown brother into
an icon of German culture; literally parading him about and
putting his unresponsive body on display (Roderick, 1991,
timestamp.05:35 06:09). She further began working on
having his unpublished books and notes published, but
heavily edited these without scholarly support, and added
titles to sections for the sake of making them seem
pro-Germany, pro-warfare, and pro-aryan-race-ideas.
She also, according to Steen Nepper Larsen, both rewrote
sections to create completely opposing meanings—like
changing “never” to “ever”—and fabricated letters in
Friedrich Nietzsche’s name (Larsen; Rahbek, 1995, p.330).
The obvious question a reader might have upon reading
these accusations against Elisabeth is of course, why would
she want to do any of these things? The answer to this is
that unlike her brother Friedrich, Elisabeth indeed was
an anti-semite, having married the notorious proto-nazi
Bernhard Förster with whom she’d tried-and-failed to
establish a “racially pure” colony in Paraguay—one can
hear Elisabeth personally hold a small speech about this
project within this radioshow at (Czerniawski; Steadman
2001, timestamp.07:25-08:15). Prior to his collapse,
however, Friedrich despised Förster for his views, and even
refused to attend the wedding between him and Elisabeth.
So, as stated, after Friedrich’s collapse, as well as the
death of Förster, Elisabeth returned to Germany, changed
her name to “Förster-Nietzsche” to connect the work of the
two men, and began actively influencing the reception of
her brother’s work, leading to multiple “[...] ill-informed
and haphazard interpretations [...] produced in the early
part of the twentieth century [...]” (Wilkerson, 05-05-2021,
§8), including some people who would normally know
better like Emmanuel Levinas and Bertrand Russell. But
since Elisabeth during her efforts had managed to become
a personal acquaintance of Adolph Hitler himself, it was
probably quite simple to take the propaganda at face value
at the time. The rectification of the damage done by the
work of Elisabeth, wasn’t truly beginning to take hold until
the work done by Walter Kaufmann and others in the 50s
and the 60s (Wilkerson, 05-05-2021, §8; Schacht, 2006,
timestamp.00:03:16-00:04:55).
With the “clean up” of the blemishes on Nietzsche’s
writing having been performed, the engagement with and
interpretation of his work has diversified considerably.
Before we move on to look at some of Nietzsche’s actual
ideas and compare them to the teachings of Leira, it is
however important to address one significant aspect of
his thought which impacts how he has been interpreted.
As a result of Nietzsche’s philological education, he “[...]
held that men can never get back to the “original text”;
they are confined to interpretations that reflect their biases
and preconceptions [...] he did not want to pass along
nuggets of meaning unchanged by his readers; he wanted,
rather, to induce them to be creative by finding new
meanings for themselves in his writings.” (Jones, 1976,
pp.260-261). This has made some interpreters, like Giorgio
Colli, state that one can’t present an interpretation of
Nietzsche through the use of quotations of Nietzsche’s
work without fabricating the interpretation, them claiming
that he has said everything, as well as the opposite of
everything. This view, however, other interpreters rightly
call out as absurd, Lars-Henrik Schmidt noting that a more
meaningful view is that singular quotes aren’t adequate,
but that Nietzsche rather has to be read from different types
of perspectives (Andersen; Kristensen; Schmidt, 1985,
p.24), while Steen Nepper Larsen further states that: “One
can not [...] make Nietzsche into just anything [...] the text
resists if one tries to do violence upon it or read away from
it.” (Larsen; Rahbek, 1995, p.343 [my translation]). Thus,
although as is often said, everyone has their own personal
Nietzsche, I will continue to rely on expert readings for
this essay, based on the view that some people’s Nietzsche
are more accurate and useful than others. Even if due to
“little more” than time spent on understanding his work.
7
§3 - Dionysus-Leira & Apollo-Oghma
In this completely abnormal nature, instinctive wisdom It is made up of conflicts over interests which continue
only shows itself sporadically in order to oppose eternally and are impossible to ever meaningfully satisfy
and obstruct conscious knowledge. While in all (Higgins; Solomon, 2000, p.140; Andersen; Kristensen;
productive people it is precisely instinct which is the Schmidt, 1985, p.32).
creative-affirmative force and consciousness which This thought is obviously quite distressing, and
criticizes and dissuades, in Socrates, however, instinct Schopenhauer therefore advised that the only way to
becomes the critic and consciousness the creator — a combat the suffering will is through an active effort to
true monstrosity per defectum! not want-or-will anything, to deny the “satisfaction”
of one’s desires.
- Nietzsche; Smith, 2000, p.75 Aiding in this pursuit—if the desire for not desiring can
be called a pursuit—Schopenhauer thought was possible
Nietzsche’s first book, “The Birth of Tragedy, from the through the disinterested contemplation of abstract beauty
Spirit of Music” was written while he still worked as a through art. Specifically, he thought that through this act,
philologist, and was a study in how the ancient Greeks the artist would gain insight into “[...] the ideas, which are
understood their place in the world through the melting the will’s objectifications in pure form [...] and thereby
of two aesthetic concepts. These concepts I intend to link lead to the realization that life and the world isn’t anything
directly to the gods Leira and her rival Oghma. other than manifestations of the will, Schein.” (Andersen;
§3.1 - Schopenhauer’s Suffering Will. To understand the Kristensen; Schmidt, 1985, p.32 [my translation]). In the
central concepts discussed within “The Birth of Tragedy,” opinion of Schopenhauer, music as an artform stood in a
we, however, need a momentary look at the philosophy privileged position for the purpose of enabling the insights
influencing Nietzsche’s project, as well as the problem he into the metaphysical truths of the will. His reason for this
is trying to address within the book. This is the pessimistic view was that music, to him, was capable of mediating its
philosophy of Arthur Schopenhauer, which Lars Erslev message without reference to the ideas, and that it thus was
Andersen introduces like this: capable of complete independence from the phenomenal
world—unlike artforms like painting or poetry which need
In Schopenhauer’s view, the cause of existence is the to represent aspects of the world (Andersen; Kristensen;
primordial-will. The perceptual, empirical reality, Schmidt, 1985, pp.32-33).
phenomenal world, or the skin, is the result of the Nietzsche found himself quite taken with the thoughts of
primordial-will’s drive for existence, for life. Schopenhauer, but Schopenhauer’s pessimistic conclusions
Will is will-to-life, and this drive takes form through troubled him, and he therefore—with the encouragement
objectification. of Wagner—rejected “[...] the suggestion that the only path
to ethical perfection [...by which is meant a good life...] is
- Andersen; Kristensen; Schmidt, 1985, p.32 self-denial, compassion, and self-annihilation. Following
[my translation] the clues left behind in Schopenhauer’s aesthetics, [...he...]
looks for a way to use art to make life worth living.” (Hill,
What is encompassed in this idea is that, to Schopenhauer, 2007, p.19).
all things—especially living beings—are manifestations of §3.2 - Greek Tragedy. As stated, within “The Birth of
a singular, dynamic “underlying” will. This however results Tragedy,” Nietzsche distinguishes between two concepts
in the problem that this will’s desires for life—through its of greek art, both named after gods of art, Dionysus and
manifestations—consistently aren’t compatible, and thus, Apollo.
result in conflict and suffering. “Yet this result is perverse, To Nietzsche, these two gods and the concepts which he
in that each party to a conflict of interest is, metaphysically, found associated with them “[...] weren’t just expressions
identical.” (Hill, 2007, p.18). Additionally, since the will is of artforms or significant moods within Greek culture, but
a will, even if a given desire is fulfilled, it simply moves on further expressed the dynamic forces within human life
to desire more ways of life, and therefore, more conflict. In which lead us toward creative work [...]” (Thielst, 1999,
other words, to Schopenhauer, life simply is suffering. p.24 [my translation]).

8
 [...Dionysian arts...]” (Tanner, 2000, p.13).
Apollo represented the plastic (sculptural) and the epic In other words, tragedy caused spectators to remember that
(storytelling) arts, where beauty depended on the artist’s simply to be a part of “[...] the roaring flow of life was so
skill at mastering the material, keep a calm headed view powerful and joyous that life was unquestionably worth
and refine their pieces — Dionysus represented music [...the suffering...], the price of admission.” (Higgins;
and the lyrical-dramatic arts, where beauty manifests Solomon, 2000, p.67). The Greeks thus, in Nietzsche’s
[...through feelings of being “pulled along”...] and the view, found an answer to the question of why life is worth
sensuality which then causes one to forget or transcend living, in spite of the great suffering this entails. However,
oneself. with all this having been said, Nietzsche comes to notice a
- Thielst, 1999, pp.24-25 [my translation] villain walk onto the scene and destroy this achievement of
Attic tragedy.
The opposition between the Apollonian and the Dionysian §3.3 - The Third God. As the opening quote—from “The
concepts are however not to be confused as antagonistic in Birth of Tragedy” at the start of §3—alludes to, the villain
nature, but rather should be seen as rivals, spurring each and slayer of tragedy is the philosopher Socrates. Indeed,
other on continuously to ever greater instances of creation, to Nietzsche, this would be the crime for which Socrates
eventually leading to a kind of synthesis of the concepts would deserve his hemlock, rather than his corruption of
in something greater than either could achieve individually; the youth of Athens.
Attic tragedy (Tanner, 2000, p.9). How did Socrates supposedly slay tragedy? With the
But what does tragedy, according to Nietzsche, actually power of his optimism; he overemphasized the Apollonian
meaningfully achieve? The answer lies in the expanded to the detriment of the Dionysian through his radical faith
symbolism of Apollo and Dionysus. Due to their art-based in the omnipotence of reason, that is, that all the flaws in
associations—Apollo’s art association with appearances, human experience are understandable and correctable—a
leads to his further connection to dreams and clairvoyance, deeply anti-tragic outlook (Tanner, 2000, p.15; Higgins;
where clear insights and an eye for individual details is Solomon, 2000, pp.67-68; Higgins; Solomon, 2013,
central—while Dionysus’ association with sensualness lecture.5, timestamp.02:18:58-02:19:53). However,
connects him to the notions of ecstasy and Rausch (a form Nietzsche found that behind this supposedly optimistic
of intoxication). The central point which Nietzsche draws philosophy, was an outlook of profound pessimism. This
from these aspects of the two concepts is however that: was due to Socrates’ proclamation upon his deathbed that
he owed Asclepius the god of medicine a sacrificial
[...] the Apollonian in its pure form leads to a conformity rooster, which Nietzsche understood as Socrates’ final
of rule-following and a type of barrenness which is a judgement on life; that it is an illness for which the only
threat to both art and life. The same is true of [...the cure is death. Socrates hated life. When understood in light
Rausch...] and the Dionysian if allowed to run wild of this realization, Socrates’ philosophy stands as a form of
uninhibited: the pure ecstasy becomes raw and barbaric escapism, an “optimistic” look to a different, more perfect,
which leads to an equal betrayal of art and life. world to fall in love with, so that one doesn’t have to care
about our present world. “What gives way, when we
- Thielst, 1999, p.25 [my translation] abandon the Dionysian [...] in favour of the purely
rationalistic [...] Apollonian, is that we stop thinking in
What is thus achieved in Attic tragedy is, as a result of the terms of life.” (; Higgins; Solomon, 2013, lecture.5,
synthesis of the two concepts, a way for humans to be able timestamp.02:21:21-02:21:41; 02:34:20-02:35:13; Higgins;
to occasionally get in touch with the incomprehensible and Solomon, 2000, pp.153-154). The death of tragedy thus
grotesque nature of the world. Nietzsche’s conclusion from followed when poets like Euripides began writing, not
this about the Greeks themselves was that they realized from the perspective of the gods Apollo and Dionysus,
“[...] that to confront reality instead of [...just...] loving but rather from that of the new god Socrates (Nietzsche;
beautiful appearances they must cope with the fact that life Smith, 2000, p.68).
[...in essence is...] eternally destructive of the individual, §3.4 - Tragedy in the Realms. We have now addressed
and allow themselves to abandon their separateness [...as all the central points relevant to “The Birth of Tragedy”
encouraged by the Dionysian, and...] delighting in the which are relevant to this essay’s considerations.

9
But the question, of course, remains where Leira fits into
all of this? As the title of §3 suggests, my goal is here to
argue that the divine artistic concepts of Attic tragedy can
be directly adapted to those of Leira and Oghma. However,
what might be a lot less clear upon having outlined what
the two concepts entail, is why the two pairs I intend to
argue for are Dionysus-Leira and Apollo-Oghma? After all,
one’s first instinct would presumably be that Apollo—who
represents dreams and how things appear to us—obviously
would connect to Leira far better than Dionysus—standing
for the underlying truth of reality—would. This impression
is however mistaken, and we realize this by considering
how the two principles encourage us to engage with art,
and by considering where Socrates fits into this picture.
Let’s begin by taking a look at one of the myths of the
faith of Oghma; they claim that at the beginning of time,
Oghma came upon a “[...] chaotic landscape of indistinct,
shapeless concepts yearning to be given solidity. To each
of these concepts he gave a name that would define it [...]”
(Boyd; Mona, 2002, pp.52-53). This act of giving solidity
to the indistinct should sound familiar, as this is the very
act the Apollonian encourages, the act of emphasising the
individual from among the mass. However, note that the
“material” which Oghma gives names to is an indistinct
chaos of multiplicity, which is exactly what the Dionysian
consists of, as expressed in §3.2 above. Thus, this myth of
the Oghmanyte faith is in a sense an Attic tragedy—though
only descriptively so, as it lacks music. If we acknowledge
the actions of Oghma as aligning with those of Apollo as a
principle, then we, however, still need a second god along
with whom Oghma would be able to allow mortals insight
into the “indistinct chaos” through the creation of tragedy.
Leira herself would be a prime candidate for this role, that
is, if one considers the ways in which she is worshiped, by
commoners, through anarchic and hedonistic frenzies quite
befitting of the Dionysian concept, as highlighted in §1.2.
If one takes seriously this equating of the Leiran with the
Dionysian, and the Oghmanyte with the Apollonian, then
a Player or DM might want to consider incorporating the
following Leiran myth in one’s game:
In the earliest ages, Leira and Oghma were partner deities,
and together they allowed mortals to master and cope with
the harsh nature of the newly-born world in which they had
their existence.
If this narrative is accepted to some extent, then the next
topic of note is the appearance of Socrates and his thought.
Or, it would have been, if it wasn’t for the fact that what
Socrates did was to overemphasize the Apollonian at the
detriment of the Dionysian, thus transforming the concept
of the Apollonian into that of the Socratic. If taken in the
context of the Oghmanyte and Leiran, then, this would
mean that Oghma himself eventually came to abandon his
counterpart in Leira for the sake of pursuing a “greater”
notion of knowledge and art; by changing from having the
Apollonian view, to instead come to speak for the Socratic.
Does any of the lore surrounding Oghma support such
an interpretation? If read from the angle of putting the
philosophical terminology and concepts, described within
the lore, into their proper contexts, then absolutely so.
To begin with, we have the most prominent term used
across the different sources on Oghma, a core term in his
dogma itself—ideas (Boyd; Martin, 1996, p.132; Boyd;
Mona, 2002 p.53; Crawford; Mohan; et al., 2015, p.35).
As would be expected, the uses of the term are quite loose
and muddy within the different sources on Oghma, but
within philosophy itself, idea is a term with a very specific
meaning—though, granted, it does change meaning based
on which philosopher is using it. The meaning of the term
we are interested in here is, however, of course the Socratic
meaning—though more commonly referred to as Platonic
Ideas or Forms, but they are for all practical purposes the
same. Especially in Nietzsche’s view. As stated in §3.3,
Socrates’ optimistic philosophy encompassed the thought
that reality, at its core, wasn’t incomprehensible and cruel,
but rather, that it was inherently knowable and perfect. The
reason for this thought, Socrates encapsulated in his notion
of the Ideas, by which he meant that behind our reality of
particular instances of things like rocks and trees, was a
truer reality of eternal, changeless, and abstract concepts,
the Ideas, from which the particulars in our reality drew
their traits. So to Socrates, the reason that two trees are
alike is because they both gained their “treeness” from the
Idea of the tree (Kraut, 2017, §1). If read with a favourable
eye, the final line within Oghma’s dogma lends itself to be
interpreted as this version of idea: “Before anything else
can exist, the idea must exist.” (Crawford; Mohan; et al.,
2015, p.35), this is, however, more likely to be meant in
the context of creativity, of getting an idea. More definitive
is, however, that the concept of the idea appears—though
the term itself does not—within the context of the Naming
ritual within the Oghmanyte faith. In this ritual, the priests
“[...] reveal to [...an Oghmanyte youth...] his or her “True
Name,” a secret signifier that represents that being’s true
essence.” (Boyd; Mona, 2002, p.53).
10
Though there does exist some uncertainty as to whether
Socrates-or-Plato thought individual people had individual
Ideas connected to them, the important thing is that we in
this ritual have a clear instance of Oghmanytes prioritizing
an initially hidden truth over experienced states of affairs,
which is plenty to establish a reasonable link between the
faith of Oghma and the philosophy of Socrates.
Where does this leave us? The answer to this is that Leira
in the “guise” of Nietzsche would be leveling an accusation
at Oghma. This accusation being that he, like Socrates, has
turned his back on life in hatred, to instead fall in love with
a hidden, perfect, and unchanging reality—to have fallen
out of love with the truths of reality, for the sake of falling
in love with The Truth (this will be elaborated on further
in §4 below).
Entertaining this narrative also serves to illuminate an
otherwise quite puzzling aspect of Oghma and Leira’s
shared lore; “The End of Creation.” This curse, supposedly
cast by Leira upon Faerûn, leading to a day when “[...]
nothing can be created. On that day, the artist will stare
blankly at his canvas [...]” (Boyd; Mona, 2002, p.54).
The notion of Leira having cast such a curse is, however,
absurd—not only in the Dionysian view of this essay—but
also within the context of Leira’s own faith, a faith heavily
concerned with expressions of creativity, and where Leira
specifically is known to manifest “[...] as a sign to inspire
her faithful.” (Boyd; Martin, 1996, p.94). Thus, what
would make far greater sense is that “The End of Creation”
isn’t a curse but rather a warning and prediction of
Leira’s of what will come to pass if Oghma and his faith
doesn’t remember their Apollonian roots—and with it,
their need of Leira as a counterpart—since, they otherwise
risk the stagnation of creativity—highlighted in §3.2 and
§3.3—which comes from a denial of life.
§4 - Truth & Truths
We invent the largest part of the thing experienced and
can hardly be compelled not to observe some process
with the eyes of an “inventor.” [...] We are basically and
from time immemorial accustomed to lying. Or, to say it
more virtuously and slyly, hence pleasantly: we are much
greater artists than we know.
- Cowan, M; Nietzsche, 1955, p.101
So we have established that Oghma has turned to a new
understanding of truth, a turn which is detrimental to art.
How did this turn come about? If we follow the diagnosis
of Nietzsche’s, then Oghma’s mythological “naming” act
would be quite a revealing factor.
To understand the starting-point of Nietzsche’s critique
of the Socratic understanding of truth—and by extension
Leira’s critique of Oghma—it is helpful to think back to
his expertise in classical philology. That is, when we today
read a text from ancient times, what needs to be understood
is that such a text is a reconstruction:
[...] It is the product of collating several surviving
manuscript “sources.” But these manuscripts themselves
are only versions—[...] copies of copies of copies
[...]—of the long-lost original [...however...] Beginning
with the first copy, errors and mistakes have crept in;
pages have been lost; paragraphs have been transposed.
- Jones, 1976, p.236
So whenever a copyist or translator came upon something
that didn’t make sense within their manuscripts, for one
reason or another, it would then become their task to try
and interpret what the text should say, and such accepted
interpretations would then be copied again by the copyists
taking up the task later on. In modern times, the situation
for philologists is no different, “[...] they provide us only
with more interpretations. And none of these can possibly
be “final” [...] for each reflects the “subjectivity” of the
scholar making it [...]” (Jones, 1976, p.237), including their
outlook, biases, skills, and historical knowledge—and, yes,
lack thereof.
To Nietzsche, the thought then arises that perhaps all our
knowledge is to be understood in this way. That is, that we
“[...] are active, not passively receptive. Perceiving and
thinking are acts of interpretation, in which our desires,
memories, and passions affect in greater or less degree the
outcome—the object that we perceive or think about.”
(Jones, 1976, p.237). In other words, the perceived world
to Nietzsche is a kind of “construct” of the mind, which is
a philosophical view linking back to the philosophers Kant,
Hegel, and Schopenhauer. I will however not dwell further
on these influences, on Nietzsche, here.
§4.1 - Trickery of Language. So Nietzsche has raised an
objection against the status of objectivity of our thoughts
and perceptions, as well as the possibility of trying to reach
beyond these limitations of the human mind.
11
However, he does not stop here, but continues his attack on
conventional notions of knowledge by attacking the role of
language itself in the creation of knowledge.
Think back to §3.4 when Oghma named the “shapeless
concepts yearning to be given solidity.” This, Nietzsche
would call a moment of deeply revealing honesty, since this
aspect of the myth exactly serves to undermine its Socratic
conclusions:
[...Nietzsche...] tries to show us the seductive power
of language. We get the Concept, according to him,
by making the non-identical identical, or the dissimilar
similar [...which he clarifies by noting that...] the concept
of the leaf, as a [...Socratic...] idea, is a general concept
through which we interpret the world when we see all
the individual leaves. We speak of them as though
[...the individual leaves...] had something to do with the
leaf-concept. But they don’t, it is after all us who have
constructed the general concept of the leaf [...] We ignore
that we view the world through glasses. Language is our
glasses.
- Larsen; Rahbek, 1995, pp.336-337
[my translation]
Thus, since philosophers primarily have been concerning
themselves with abstract concepts as their focus of study
throughout history, Nietzsche accuses them of handling
so-called “Conceptual Mummies,” that is, dead things with
no actual connection to the world and its particularity.
What Nietzsche essentially is trying to say here is that,
when we name something, or when we write out a theory
about some aspect of reality—as Oghma acknowledged in
his act of granting “solidity”—this act results in a form of
inertia, in a tendency to become unchanging:
This kind of inertia, Nietzsche saw, increases as soon
as the concept is formulated linguistically. To cast an
interpretation into language is to rigidify it; it then
becomes a Procrustean bed that our experience of the
world is forced to fit. According to Nietzsche, many
of the concepts that have seemed to be of fundamental
importance in philosophy are nothing but linguistic traps
of this kind [...]
- Jones, 1976, p.239
Thus, to Nietzsche, language is the medium through which
every kind of knowledge has to “flow,” and which results
in all knowledge being the product of a perspective—that
is, that there neither is, nor could there ever be, a neutral,
all-comprehending, disinterested, “God’s-Eye” view from
which the truth could be established. Indeed, not even to
God. Nietzsche’s answer to the Pre-Socratic philosopher
Parmenides’ claim that one can’t think of that which isn’t
real, is thus that the situation is exactly backwards, in that
if we can think something, then that thought is clearly a
fiction (Higgins, Solomon, 2000, p.208; Andersen;
Kristensen; Schmidt, 1985, pp.105-106).
Everything is subjective, you say: but even this is
already an interpretation. The subject isn’t something
given, but something poetized, something inserted
behind [...reality. But is...] it necessary to insert an
interpreter behind the [...interpretation? Nietzsche...]
thought that six metaphysical-deadly-sins were stuck
to language and to Western philosophy. Specifically
thinking in unity, in identity, in duration, in substance,
in causes, and in objects.
- Larsen; Rahbek, 1995, pp.338-339
[my translation]
With these thoughts, Nietzsche denies Descartes’ famous
insistence on the necessary existence of an “I,” that is, in
the existence of an individual subjective self—and from it,
an attempt at establishing such an aforementioned neutral
viewpoint. Denying this might appear to be an incredibly
unintuitive and extreme claim, but “Nietzsche’s point here
is that everything that anyone might ever say about the
self can be expressed by verbs (doing, acting, becoming);
we introduce the complexity of a subject that acts and
becomes only because it happens that a declarative
sentence takes a noun as its grammatical subject.” (Jones,
1976, p.241). But not only is this quite a dubious as well
as arbitrary justification for the self, but it is also just a
plain lie in Nietzsche’s view:
[...] a thought comes when “it” wants to and not when
“I” wish, so that it’s a falsification of the facts to say that
the subject “I” is the condition of the predicate “think.”
It thinks: but that “it” is precisely that old, celebrated
“I” is, to put it mildly, only an assumption [...and...] in
no way an “immediate certainty.”
- Johnston; Nietzsche, 2011, §17 [my italics]
12
From all of this, Nietzsche as a result concludes that “[...]
we blindly believe that we, through language, can grasp the
world and find the truth. Within this context, metaphysics
appear to basically spring forth from language itself.”
(Thielst, 1999, p.63 [my translation]). Language is thus
the great trickster of philosophy, having led philosophers
to unfounded ways of thinking for thousands of years,
and Nietzsche chooses therefore to declare that there
“[...] exists neither a perceptive, a material, nor a spiritually
given world independently. All becomes manifest by being
interpreted [...] The perspective creates the subject and the
object.” (Larsen; Rahbek, 1995, p.337 [my translation]),
and there is therefore, to Nietzsche, no such thing as a “[...]
world “in itself,” and even if there were such a world, we
would not know it or even know of it.” (Higgins, Solomon,
2000, p.208). Left is only Nietzsche’s Perspectivism.
§4.2 - Perspectives on Truth. What this perspectival
attack by Nietzsche amounts to is that The Truth—to be
understood as an alone-standing, “God’s-Eye” view, state
of affairs completely independent of any perspective—is
discarded as an absurd impossibility. With this Nietzsche
does however not mean that truth doesn’t exist. His point
is simply that truth is to be found within the many existing
perspectives. “Rather, Nietzsche urges that we cultivate
intensely interested, but very broad and diverse, relations
with the object [...of a given inquiry...]” (Hill, 2007, p.106).
In other words, since a singular and neutral access to Truth
is ridiculous, truth should rather be established through the
sum of as many perspectives as possible—by how many
different ways a given phenomenon can be experienced.
However, even if one is open to Nietzsche’s new concept
of how truth should be understood, one concern does arise;
if all there is, is perspectives which have nothing objective
to be based upon, then what metric is there to judge the
different perspectives by—since they aren’t justified by
anything, wouldn’t any perspective be as good-or-bad as
any other? Perhaps not:
[...Nietzsche...] certainly talks about there being better
arts of interpretation, so if we’re always looking at
interpretations you can still interpret badly, and I think
one of the ways you can interpret badly is with a total
lack of self-awareness or honesty [...]
- Appiah; Drochon; Mitcheson;
Mulhall; Prideaux; Sweet,
2018, timestamp.12:57-13:30
But what would this honesty consist in, if there is no state
of affairs to be honest about? One way of answering this
issue is by encouraging honesty about “[...] how your own
standpoint is shaping your view [...rather than...]; a denial
of the fact that it is an interpretation; a denial of even how
your unconscious drives may be influencing you [...]”
(Appiah; Drochon; Mitcheson; Mulhall; Prideaux; Sweet,
2018, timestamp.12:57-13:30). Another—related—option
is that, to Nietzsche, knowledge always exists in service of
life itself—which will be elaborated on in the paragraphs
below—making Nietzsche argue for a pragmatic theory of
truth (Bengt-Pedersen; Gilje; Jørgensen; Skirbekk, 1995,
pp.186-187; Wicks, 1997/2017, §2).
The existence of these options does, however, far from
shield Nietzsche’s perspectivism from objections. Indeed,
by the very nature of the position itself, Nietzsche has to
be committed to the view that perspectivism itself also isn’t
The Truth, but indeed, just an interpretation—in this case
Nietzsche’s own. He was, however, well aware of this fact
and indeed welcomed it. Why would he welcome this?
Because every new perspective “[...] precisely because it
is novel, must do battle for survival against old, entrenched
interpretations that claim to be objectively true [...and...]
even if it wins, victory is only temporary [...]” (Jones,
1976, pp.247-248). So, indeed, only through coming to
face off against objections and surviving would Nietzsche
even be inclined to accept his own perspectivism as true.
§4.3 - Serving Life. Think back to the different sections
in §3, here Nietzsche acknowledged Schopenhauer’s view
that life is suffering, but he nonetheless still thought that
a denial of life was the wrong answer. Instead, philosophy
should seek to aid us in affirming life, in embracing what
our lives actually consist in, rather than hold out hope for
“better lives”—or afterlives—elsewhere.
[...] But this supremacy of life-assertion and
self-assertion means that even truth, truth itself
must be subjugated to [...life...] If there are truths
that would damage us [...], damage our lives, then
we don’t want to know them.
- Magee; Stern, 1987, Section 3,
timestamp.00:00-00:14
This is what is encompassed by Nietzsche’s pragmatic
theory of truth, the acknowledgement that the “price paid”
for having certain types of knowledge might be too high.
13

[...] he believed that knowledge was not absolute.
That the acquisition, the pursuit of knowledge was not to
be taken absolutely. But that a given civilization had its
own particular entitlement to the kind of knowledge that
it could bear. You see, the emphasis is on, it could bear
it. He did envisage situations where knowledge would
destroy the knower.
- Magee; Stern, 1987, Section 2,
timestamp.04:10-04:40
His predictions of the existence of such knowledge have
indeed come to pass over the 100+ years since his death;
obvious examples including such instances of knowledge
as how to produce nuclear weapons. Nietzsche’s prediction to have them encourage further action (Higgins; Solomon,
was however also of a far broader nature.
Within the second entry of his “Untimely Meditations,”
he “[...] challenges the view that historical accuracy is
intrinsically good, suggesting that history is valuable only
when it assists the main project of the current age, that of
living well in the present.” (Higgins; Solomon, 2000, p.69), in §6 below, but for now, let us discuss how these insights
so in other words, like all other knowledge, history is only relate to Leira and Oghma.
valuable when in the service of life.
Nietzsche presents his critique of historicizing life,
or rather the overemphasis of this, by first distinguishing
between three types of history; Monumental, Antiquarian,
and Critical history.
Monumental history paints events or people of the past
with a greatness which in itself can impede and cause a
paralysis of action. While additionally being lifted up by
feelings of admiration so great and emphasised that the
present or future never could stand a chance. Thus, there
is a tendency to express that the [...great events...] worth following quote from Oghma’s dogma:
living for already have passed [...us by...]
- Thielst, 1999, p.41 [my translation]
An example of such thinking lies in the comparing of the
accomplishments of the present with those of the past and
only acknowledging them when they align with those of
the past. The right use of the monumental, in Nietzsche’s
view, is rather to use it for emboldening people to perform
their own great achievements.
The antiquarian primarily concerns itself with preserving
“relics” of the past. But thus results in a very narrow kind
of “tunnel-vision” which only concerns itself with the
present and future insofar as they can be “preserved” into
aspects of the past. As such, the antiquarian “mummifies”
the present before it ever truly gets to realize itself. The
final result of this is that this historical perspective “[...]
not only understands, but also lives, life backwards.”
(Thielst, 1999, p.42 [my translation & italics]). This is not
to say that the antiquarian is entirely harmful either, as it
also serves to offer people resources for their own ways of
interpreting their lives.
Finally, the critical view of history attempts to learn from
history and thereby contextualize the present. To Nietzsche
this perspective is as a result not only aggressive, but it is
also transformative. From this does however also come the
risk of either creating troubling lies or of grasping for the
wrong sources of inspiration in history, and therefore fail
2000, p.69; Thielst, 1999, p.43). So, as already expressed,
to Nietzsche, the use of history must always have as its
focus its service to life—and not simply historicizing for
its own sake.
We will further consider what Nietzsche means by “life”
§4.4 - Oghma’s View of Truth. So where do these
considerations of Nietzsche’s views on truth leave us?
The overall theme of §4 has been that Nietzsche attacks
the notion of absolute truth and knowledge, as well as the
value of such a notion.
Can an equivalent critique be leveled at Oghma? To some
extent, yes. The first question is whether Oghma’s view
of truth is that it is valuable in itself—known as intrinsic
good—or whether it is only valuable when put to proper
use—known as extrinsic good—the answer to which, in
the sources, is somewhat mixed. To see this, consider the
Knowledge, particularly the raw knowledge of ideas,
is supreme [...] Knowledge is power and must be used
with care, but hiding it away from others is never a good
thing. Stifle no new ideas, no matter how false or crazed
they seem; rather, let them be heard and considered.
- Boyd; Mona, 2002, p.53
What this quote thus is saying is that:
● Knowledge is supreme (Intrinsic)
● Knowledge must be used with care (Extrinsic)
● Knowledge should never be hidden (Intrinsic)
● All knowledge is worth considering (Intrinsic)
14
Further, “Oghma is said to decide whether a new idea
would be known to the world or confined to [...and die
with...] its originator.” (Boyd; Martin, 1996, p.131), which
again would suggest an extrinsic viewpoint—an extension
of this view is emphasised by Oghma’s worries about the
“overly innovative” attitude of his ally, Gond the Lord of
All Smiths.
Lastly, there is the proclamation that the acts of the “[...]
priests of Kelemvor [...Lord of the Dead, who...] routinely
destroy any writings about the creation of the undead that
they find—an act that offends those who value knowledge
for its own sake, such as the faithful of Oghma and Deneir”
(Crawford; Mohan; et al., 2015, p.32 [my italics]), which
obviously would speak for an intrinsic perspective, but is
technically only claimed of the faithful of Oghma, rather
than Oghma himself. This is, however, a minor distinction.
How can these conflicting attitudes be rectified?
Once again, Nietzsche has an answer for us—however,
before I can elaborate on this answer, it needs to be
clarified that, to Nietzsche, “[...] Christianity is Platonism
for `the people´ [...]“ (Johnston; Nietzsche, 2011,
Prologue). However, as mentioned in §3.4 the philosophies
of Socrates and Plato are basically the same. So whenever
Nietzsche writes of either Socrates, Plato, or Christianity,
it also is important to keep the rest in mind:
One of Christianity’s great virtues, from Nietzsche’s
point of view, is its commitment to honesty.
In this respect, Christian values made way, however
unintentionally, for the development of knowledge
[...and it thereby promoted...] an alternative, more
scientific way of seeing the world [...and further...]
led ultimately to its own demise. [...As they...] directed
their inquiry at Christianity itself, and discovered that
they could not honestly sustain their belief.
- Higgins; Solomon, 2000, p.94
Thus, as Christians had their concept of truth grow ever
more demanding, it also became ever more impossible to
maintain a belief in God. This lack of belief then results
in Nietzsche’s infamous proclamation that “God is dead.”
The point of the death of God is however not technically
meant as an atheist claim, but rather that the “[...] common
basis for collective life that was supposed to have been
immutable and invulnerable has turned out to be not only
less stable than we assumed, but incomprehensibly mortal
[...]” (Anderson, 2017, §2).
We will return to the question of what makes our “common
basis mortal” in §5 below. For the purposes of our current
discussion, however, we simply need the observation that
a dedication to honesty—and thus knowledge—for its own
sake eventually results in a situation where the pursuit of
truth begins to undermine itself. What does this mean?
That Oghma’s continuous commitment to truth has led him
to find evermore exceptions to his absolutist outlook, thus,
leaving behind only an extrinsic understanding of the value
of truth. The conclusion is then that the tension within the
dogma of Oghma’s, regarding the value of truth, is due to
Oghma’s wish to perceive The Truth as intrinsically good,
but since he is committed to honesty, he cannot deny the
counterexamples of extrinsic nature.
Oghma’s commitment to truth is thus the same as that
of Christianity, and he is therefore vulnerable to the same
critique as Christianity is—and by extension Socratism.
§4.5 - Leira’s Truths. With the general considerations we
have illuminated throughout §4, we are now ready for the
process of outlining an initial Nietzschean interpretation of
the faith of Leira.
So let’s not beat-around-the-bush, the interpretation that
has been introduced and defended throughout this essay
so far—and will continue to be throughout the rest of the
essay—is the view that the title “Lady of Deception” is not
only an oversimplification but also a misleading take on
what Leira stands for. In its stead, the view of this essay is
that Leira indeed is a deity of both knowledge and nature
in her own right.
This is obviously a strong claim to make, so how can we
justify such a view? The basis for this argument will be
largely constituted through our characterization of Oghma
so far.
Think back to this characterization—both present in §2
and §3—here, we saw that the Oghmanyte view of truth
and knowledge is significantly compatible with that of the
Socratic-Platonic Theory of Forms or Ideas. The core of
this view of truth that concerns our current argument is that
it is a monistic theory, meaning that it argues for a single
principle being adequate to explain its topic—in this case
truth. So what? One might ask, but the crucial consequence
of this for our argument here is what happens when the
status of a claim is evaluated by such monistic theories.
One of two things can occur; either the contents of the
claim can be reduced to knowledge, or it can’t. In other
words, either a claim is “objective” or it isn’t—and if it
is not, then the Socratic theory of knowledge would not
deem the claim as being knowledge, and thus, not true.
15
 The obvious question then of course becomes; if it isn’t
true, then what is it? The answer is obviously right at hand.
If the claim being judged isn’t objectively true, then it
must necessarily be not true, “subjective,” perspectival, a
fabrication—or as more commonly known a lie. Take this
simple math problem as an example—1.99 + 2—here, the
Socratic view would be that there only is one answer, 3.99
and anything but would be false. It does not matter that one
might wish to “round up” to the answer of 4—this answer
is wrong from the Socratic view.
However, as we have seen, Nietzsche would deny this
conclusion, insisting instead that all knowledge originates
from a perspective, and that there, as a result, is plenty of
practical instances where 4 is just as true as 3.99 would be.
By defining the concept of lies through this exclusionary,
monistic understanding of truth, we arrive at a far broader
and more coherent understanding of what Leira promotes;
rather than a monistic theory of truth, she would represent
a pluralistic and pragmatic theory of truth.
Accepting this broader concept of lies would additionally
serve to contextualize some otherwise perplexing aspects
of the faith of Leira. Including that they “[...] should speak
truth whenever possible only to fellow worshipers of Leira
[...and that they...] by holy writ only truth is spoken [...]”
(Boyd; Martin, 1996, pp.94-95), when occasionally the
clergy gathers. Why indeed would the faithful of Leira ever
care to speak the truth to each other if doing so wasn’t of
any value? No, far more meaningful would be that they
at such gatherings speak The Truth—Oghma’s absolutist
view of truth, that is—and that they do so simply for the
purpose of debating how to best undermine the spread and
development of this competing, life-denying view of truth,
as opposed to their own perspectival view of truth.
Further, this interpretation also shows that the tendency
among Leirans to take on frequent new personas and titles,
which often incorporate contradicting elements, isn’t done
arbitrarily. Rather, they would do this specifically for the
purpose of embodying as many perspectives as possible,
and thereby attain the Nietzschean form of “objectivity”
described in §4.2 above. This too, would be the reasoning
behind their switching of tinted masks depending on the
time of day; to reflect different perspectives on how time
is perceived, as well as how different times of day affect us
and our outlook (Boyd; Martin, 1996, pp.94-95). Indeed,
the act of embodying different identities with different, if
not outright opposing perspectives, would be an expression
of what Nietzsche valued most about science. Its focus on
experimental testing.
In this particular case, which Nietzsche encouraged, the
faithful of Leira would be testing which perspectives one
can truthfully hold and live well by—that is, without such
a perspective leading to a denial of life—this they then do
through the experiment of actually trying to live different
identities with different perspectives. This then, all for the
purpose of getting as “complete” a perspective on our own
individual lives (Anderson, 2017, §3.2.3; §3.2.5). This
conclusion, one might argue, is further supported by the
policy within the church of Leira that after they “[...] work
swindles on others, [...thereby...] enriching and entertaining
themselves [...this...] someone they rob must later be aided
by Leiran hands to make up for [...this...]” (Boyd; Martin,
1996, p.94). It is however unclear why Leirans would be
concerned with doing such, if not due to them wanting to
acknowledge the perspectives of their victims.
However, if any of this experimenting is to be possible,
then Leirans are committed to having to be truthful. This of
course doesn’t mean the Oghmanyte notion of The Truth,
but rather, that Leirans must be honest about their truth,
as in, they must be honest about the individual perspectives
they each hold, and by extension must be honest about how
things truly seem to each of them. Which, of course, from
the perspective of Oghma, means that they lie (Anderson,
2017, §3.2.3; Bonevac, 2021, timestamp.15:55-17:00).
Now, as a preliminary lead-in to the following topic, let
us end this paragraph with a short outline of some different
types of perspectives people might employ:
I hold the world but as the world, Gratiano:
A stage, where every man must play a part,
And mine a sad one.
- Shakespeare; Watts, 2000, Act I, Scene I
Nietzsche often expresses a preference for the aesthetic
perspective, though this is largely due to how frequently
it is ignored, rather than due to it being truly better than
other perspectives. He also highlights this perspective
because of how it is inclined to come into conflict with
the scientific perspective, the perspective from which the
majority of people in the modern age does perceive truth.
Further, there are the various religious as well as spiritual
perspectives of the world, along with the three historical
perspectives described in §4.3—lastly, we have the subject
of the following sections, the moral perspective, in which
Nietzsche famously excavated two—the Master and Slave
(Higgins, Solomon, 2000, pp.208-211).
16
§5 - The Crisis of Values importantly present in Nietzsche’s character, the Madman.
He, like Nietzsche himself, is presenting his findings to
The Madman [...] jumped into their midst [...] "Where is a largely atheist audience—even if Nietzsche’s audience
God gone?" he called out. "I mean to tell you! We have isn’t always aware of its own lack of real belief. The point
killed him,—you and I! We are all his murderers! But of highlighting this is that Nietzsche isn’t simply engaged
how have we done it? How were we able to drink up the in an attempt to strip himself of Christian influence; to try
sea? Who gave us the sponge to wipe away the whole and justify atheism. This is not Nietzsche’s task. But rather,
horizon? What did we do when we loosened this earth to Nietzsche, the death of God is a truly “[...] calamitous
from its sun? [...] Whither do we move? Away from cultural crisis.” (Higgins, Solomon, 2000, p.85), one that
all suns? Do we not dash on unceasingly? Backwards, is both an alarmingly obvious conclusion, while also being
sideways, forewards, in all directions? Is there still an one people have continued to ignore.
above and below? Do we not stray, as through infinite Specifically, Nietzsche’s worry was primarily twofold;
nothingness? Does not empty space breathe upon us? [...] first, that his contemporaries hadn’t truly managed to find
Do we not hear the noise of the grave-diggers who are a way to renounce their faith, but had simply continued to
burying God? Do we not smell the divine putrefaction? follow the edicts of Christianity in disguised form; second,
[...] With what water could we cleanse ourselves? [...] Nietzsche was concerned that, when God died he didn’t die
Is not the magnitude of this deed too great for us? Shall alone, but was “buried” with the aspects of life which were
we not ourselves have to become Gods, merely to seem founded upon the belief in him (Higgins, Solomon, 2000,
worthy of it? [...] pp.84-85; p.96).
- Common; Nietzsche, 2010, §125 §5.1 - Hollow Gods. To many, Nietzsche and the term
nihilism are near-synonymous. This is not unreasonable.
Aside from his proclamation that “God is dead,” Nietzsche However, the notion that Nietzsche himself was a nihilist
is probably best known for his thoroughgoing attack on the is largely misleading—unless viewed in a few technical,
different value-systems throughout Western history: philosophical contexts—Nietzsche was rather nihilism’s
diagnostician.
[...] it aims to undermine not just religious faith or At its most basic, nihilism should be understood through
philosophical moral theory, but also many central the unique nature of the human condition itself. As noted
aspects of ordinary moral consciousness, some of which all the way back in §3.1, Nietzsche does accept the view
are difficult to imagine doing without (e.g., altruistic spoken for by Schopenhauer that life is suffering based in
concern, guilt for wrongdoing, moral responsibility, the a will to life, and through this a will to more life. Suffering
value of compassion, the demand for equal consideration should here however be understood in a somewhat broader
of persons, and so on). sense, including both notions of general destruction as well
- Anderson, 2017, §2 as change. Things change, this statement is pretty much as
uncontroversial as a statement could be, but what needs
Of course, one can’t truly separate the death of God from to be realized is for change to occur something prior has
this attack on the values of society. Indeed, it is rather his to be destroyed, at least insofar as it no longer is exactly as
very reason for it in the first place. it was; R. Kevin Hill offers the example of romantic love.
Before we get too far into the topic of clarifying the The love one feels for a partner after years in a relationship
different aspects of Nietzsche’s critique of modern values, is not of the same character as that which one felt for the
it is however an important fact to remember that this attack same partner when first falling in love, it has matured and
comes from the position of an “insider of Christianity.” gone through multiple characterising experiences.
Remember Nietzsche’s early life, from §2, he was raised in However, due to this nature of change, the inevitable fate
a deeply religious household, and was indeed known as the of everything valuable to us is destruction—even if only
“little minister” to his friends and family. He also initially due to either our death, or the “heat-death of the universe.”
tried to study theology at university, so signs do point to his These are disturbing thoughts to consider, to be sure, but
criticism coming from a place of formerly, sincerely having they of course are of no relevance to most animals, what
a belief in what he now attacks. This same sincerity is also makes the human condition unique is that we are aware of

17
this troubling state of affairs. To Nietzsche, the pessimism Nietzsche identifies an answer to this in a sense of deep
of Schopenhauer—as well as the hidden pessimism of both exhaustion due to the continuous transformative process,
Socrates and Christianity—is clear evidence of this truth a feeling of not being able to continue it forever. He sees
being unbearable to know, and humans therefore need a that, due to this exhaustion, we want to engage in our work
way to restore their ignorance. The solution then, as was of creating values and what we find valuable, but then wish
seen with Socrates, is to imagine that rather than there only to preserve these so our task can be “complete” (Bukdahl;
being one “World of Becoming,” there indeed also is the Hass, 1979, p.99; Hill, 2007, pp.64-65).
second “World of Being.” This world characterised through So due to this exhaustion, humanity imagines a world of
immutability and eternity (Hill, 2007, pp.60-61): being, and then imagines all that is valuable as belonging
to that world rather than the world of becoming we actually
Clearly the mere fact, if it is a fact, that there is a world live in. But due to value-creation being a part of our nature,
of permanence, stasis and immutability will have no we still find ourselves constantly valuing the fragile things
importance if nothing that we value subsists within that of the world of becoming. This, of course, undermines the
world of being, and everything we value is still in the very point of our creation of the world of being in the first
world of becoming. But if we can also imagine that what place, and therefore, is seen as something which must be
we value subsists in the world of being, we can imagine overcome. The way this then is accomplished is by further
value preserved. Once we hit upon this solution, it will viewing the world of becoming as being not only valueless,
seem inadequate to locate only some of what we value but also unreal, an illusion behind which lies the real world
in the world of being and some in the world of becoming. of being. In other words, due to our exhaustion, we think
For whatever we leave behind is still vulnerable and our up a fictional world and call it real, while dismissing the
ontological condition is not as good as it could be. actual world as fictional (Hill, 2007, p.62).
This places pressure on the human imagination to However, as we have seen in §4.4 there is a problem with
relocate everything we value in the world of being and this—beyond its very foundation, that is—which is that we
to downgrade the world of becoming to worthlessness. due to our desire for access to the hidden world, our desire
If all things in the world of becoming are worthless, for The Truth, the will to truth as Nietzsche names it, we
their destruction is a matter of complete indifference [...] come to unmask the Two-World-Picture as the fabrication
it is. But this then leaves us left only with the worthless
- Hill, 2007, p.61 [my italics] world of becoming, meaning that nothing has meaning at
all. This is nihilism as Nietzsche understands it.
What does this mean? It means that everything we value, What can be done about the onset of nihilism? Nietzsche
everything society has guided itself by, has been based on shows that Western culture cannot simply go back to the
lies—not lies in the Leiran sense of §4.5 where they simply way things were before the unmasking of the world of
are personal perspectives—but actual lies, figments of our being; even if collective ignorance could be restored, the
imagination referring to something that isn’t there, indeed, will to truth ingrained within the value-system in question
referring to nothingness. Nietzsche’s claim is then that the would soon enough unmask it all anew. However, since the
concept of “[...] nihilism doesn’t express an opposition to drive to transform our surroundings and set values was a
European civilization, but is rather its culmination [...that part of our nature, Nietzsche thought that we simply should
is...] “culture” is truly masked nihilism [...]” (Bukdahl; accept the forces of destruction and change, and get on the
Hass, 1979, p.95 [my translation]). What the former quotes task of creating new values and things to value (Hill, 2007,
hint add regarding Nietzsche’s view of values is that—just pp.64-65). However, why would we make all new values?
as was the case with The Truth—there are no such thing as Couldn’t we still keep the values which have worked for us
“given values,” meaning that one cannot find values, no, so far and simply try and find other ways to support them?
values have to be created, set, chosen, and we humans are Nietzsche would have his doubts about such a notion, but
who are capable of such creation. This capability of ours far more important is that he also simply didn’t find such a
is however what the Two-World-Picture denies, or rather, prospect desirable. Why? Because not only were the values
what we deny through the imagining of it. But why would of Western society based on a lie, but this lie also resulted
we do this? Especially since Nietzsche identifies this need in values which he deemed sick and harmful to life. Values
for creative value-setting as a fundamental human drive? created from a basis of weakness and hate—ressentiment.

18
 §5.2 - The Moral Revolt. Since Nietzsche’s reason for
critiquing morality, at least in part, is for the sake of getting
people of the modern era to rediscover their status as the
sources of the world’s values; he channels his attack based
on a historical account of morality—that is, he attempts to
show that morality is a historically sensitive topic, and as
such, to show that what was considered moral has changed
over time.
In this light, it shouldn’t come as a surprise that when
Nietzsche attacks morality, he isn’t attacking all kinds of
morality, but rather, his attack is based on a distinction
between morality and The Morality. This way of writing
“The Morality” should at this point seem familiar to the
reader. Obviously, it is connected directly with the notion
of The Truth, and thus, is an expression of an “objective”
notion of morality; one which is universal in nature, and
therefore, applies to everyone. This notion of The Morality,
as it was also the case with The Truth, is Nietzsche’s target
of attack. The other morality, on the other hand, Nietzsche
has no problem with. Indeed, such a notion of morality,
or better yet, moralities is simply the expression of what
he noted as being a part of human nature in §5.1 above,
that is, our need to value aspects of our world, as well as
put these values into hierarchies. Thus, morality in this
sense simply expresses “how things are done” in certain
circumstances, including etiquette, prescripts, and taboos.
Such moralities can of course never be singular, since they
are entirely based on context (Higgins; Solomon, 2013,
lecture.19, timestamp.09:13:13-09:18:12).
With this being said, to return to Nietzsche’s historical
critique. “To make the case for historical change [...within
morality...], he identifies two patterns of ethical assessment,
each associated with a basic pair of evaluative terms,
a good/bad pattern and a good/evil pattern.” (Anderson,
2017, §2). Evil VS. Bad—what is the difference? Would
here be a perfectly reasonable question. The answer to this
is to be found within the context of how the two concepts
come about. But for this, we must first understand “Good.”
Within the context of the Good/Bad-dichotomy, it needs
to be understood that Nietzsche is of the view that “People
do what they are motivated to do.” (Higgins; Solomon,
2013, lecture.13, timestamp.06:19:32-06:19:40), which
indeed reflects this dichotomy. The people who lived by
this morality, understood goodness simply as entailing the
ability to get what one wants, to have the strength to leave
one’s own impact upon the world. Thus, this morality was,
according to Nietzsche, held by people of the ancient past
who were members of a privileged social class. Nietzsche
refers to these people, as well as their morality, both as the
nobility or as the masters. However, “[...] eventually the
idea of goodness was “internalized” [...transferred over to
being...] traits of character and other personal excellences
that were typically associated with the privileged [...]”
(Anderson, 2017, §2), like warriors considering the virtue
of Courage to be a good characteristic. However, within
this morality, goodness is a manifestation of exclusivity of
virtue, as in, it comes about through a contrast with those
people who aren’t like the masters, who aren’t capable of
doing what they want to do—due to a lack of strength. And
what are those people then? They are judged to be bad. As
in, “it would be bad if I was like that.” The dichotomy then
manifests from what Nietzsche calls a pathos of distance,
which is exactly this, the act of noting one’s superiority
(Anderson, 2017, §2).
The Good/Evil-dichotomy, on the other hand, is quite
different as it begins its moral evaluations, not with good,
but with its negative evaluation, evil. Specifically, this type
of morality came about as a reaction, as a “[...] slave revolt
in morality [...]” (Kaufmann; Nietzsche, 1967/2010, §10).
The exact nature of this alleged revolt is a matter of
ongoing scholarly controversy [...] but the broad outline
is clear enough. People who suffered from oppression
at the hands of the noble, excellent, (but uninhibited)
people valorized by good/bad morality—and who
were denied any effective recourse against them
by relative powerlessness—developed a persistent,
corrosive emotional pattern of resentful hatred against
their enemies, which Nietzsche calls ressentiment.
- Anderson, 2017, §2
This term, “ressentiment,” which Nietzsche takes from
French, is an expression with a broader meaning than that
of the related English word “resentment.” How so? Well,
the difference is that resentment, or just simple revenge,
describes “[...] the direct hitting back at the source of your
hurt. And as such, it would prove cathartic [...], once you
have satisfied the feeling of revenge, ideas of vengeance
would disappear from you.” (Ansell-Pearson; Bragg;
Hughes; Mulhall, 2018, timestamp.19:44-20:10). Contrast
to this is ressentiment. This feeling stems from a position
of [...] impotency, pessimism, cunning [...]” (Wilkerson,
05-05-2021, §6). Remember, the feeling manifests within
the oppressed, people who aren’t in a position to strike
back at what is causing their hurt—since this source is the
19
masters who are oppressing them through their superiority
of might alone. What is important to understand within this
context is that they “[...] weren’t really self-reflective, it
wasn’t even that [...the masters...] believed that they were
powerful. They just were powerful, they just got out and
`did it.´” (Ansell-Pearson; Bragg; Hughes; Mulhall, 2018,
timestamp.23:32-23:40), as in, their entire understanding of
good was based on the ability to get and do what you want,
so they indeed just did what they wanted whenever they
wanted it. They had no reason to ever choose otherwise.
What all of this amounts to is that the oppressed slaves,
literally are in a position of not being able to live out their
desires for vengeance. Thus, ressentiment basically refers
to a frustrated form of the feeling of resentment. This, of
course, would be an outright horrid state to be in, as well as
seemingly impossible to be rid of. Thus, the slaves needed
some kind of solution for satisfying ressentiment, since it,
when you feel it, “[...] poisons your [... psychological...]
system, and you compensate yourself with an imaginary
revenge [...This revenge, in turn, is the slave revolt which
comes about when...] ressentiment becomes creative and
gives birth to values.” (Ansell-Pearson; Bragg; Hughes;
Mulhall, 2018, timestamp.20:10-20:50 [my italics]), the
most important of these values, of course, being evil. Thus,
as stated before, in the Good/Evil-dichotomy the value of
evil is primary, derived from a characterization of what the
masters view as good, the ability to express yourself freely,
as instead being evil. In other words, for the slaves, virtue
lies not in being yourself, and being true to what you want,
“[...] but in not being the other, the master, the privileged,
the oppressor [...and thus, in...] slave morality, the simple
distinction between good and bad gets replaced by the
metaphysical distinction between good and evil.” (Higgins,
Solomon, 2000, p.111). This metaphysical proclamation of
the slaves, however, commits them to an understanding of
what good is—which insists that even if the slaves weren’t
oppressed, they still wouldn’t want to assert themselves in
the way masters do, since that is evil. As a result, they can
however judge that if asserting oneself is evil, then they
as slaves surely must be good (Higgins; Solomon, 2013,
lecture.21, timestamp.10:31:43-10:35:00). In spite of how
devious all of this might sound, Nietzsche actually doesn’t
condemn the slaves for performing the move that they did,
rather he sees it as having probably been for the best at the
time, since it would have been the only way for the slaves
to even attempt to satisfy their natural need to express
themselves—meaning, that even though the slaves think
they aren’t asserting themselves, they in fact are through
the very act of creating their new morality.
When understood as just another morality, Nietzsche
doesn’t truly have a problem with it. Where the problems
set in is when slave morality develops the pretensions that
it is The Morality, This pretension is however necessary for
slave morality to maintain since its main goal is to destroy
the noble morality of the masters, which wouldn’t have a
chance of being effective if it couldn’t assert “objectivity”
against them (Higgins, Solomon, 2000, p.111). Which in
turn, ultimately means that for “[...] Nietzsche our [...slave
morality...] amounts to a vindictive effort to poison the
happiness of the fortunate [...], instead of a high-minded,
dispassionate, and strictly rational concern for others.”
(Anderson, 2017, §2), as even secular philosophers have
otherwise maintained as the case throughout history.
It might be difficult to accept these harsh claims about
morality, however, Nietzsche isn’t making his case without
evidence—perhaps not enough to prove his claim, but they
should be enough to make a reader wonder:
[...] he points to the surprising prevalence of [...]
“brimstone, hellfire, and damnation diatribe” in
Christian letters and sermons [...] it is a troubling
puzzle what this genre of “vengeful outbursts” [...]
is even doing within (what is supposed to be) a religion
of love and forgiveness. Second, Nietzsche observes [...]
how frequently indignant moralistic condemnation itself
[...] can detach itself from any measured assessment of
the wrong and devolve into a free-floating expression
of vengeful resentment against some (real or imagined)
perpetrator. [...This is...] more in line with Nietzsche’s
diagnosis of altruism than it is with our conventional [...]
moral self-understanding.
- Anderson, 2017, §2
Indeed, Nietzsche himself became the target of such
“hellfire diatribes” after his collapse, as mentioned in §2
of this essay:
[...] Nietzsche went mad [...] much to the delight
of various [...] Christian commentators and others,
who argue that anyone who took some of the extreme
positions [...] about God [...]; the argument is that [...]
you’ll go mad or you’ll change your mind in a foxhole
or whatever. So his madness was a consolation to many
[...]
- Roderick, 1991, timestamp.04:40-05:10
20
And him being marked as “a known antichrist” within the
notes recording his burial after his death. Likely not meant
as a well-meaning “nod of acknowledgement” to his book
of the same title—even if Nietzsche likely would have been
amused by such a “knighting” of himself by the Christian
church (Botton, 2014, timestamp.21:06-21:21).
Of course, Nietzsche’s entire point is that these supposed
“outbursts” aren’t just random uncharacteristic occurrences
in slave morality, but rather a “boiling over” of consistently
hidden away feelings on the “inside.” Indeed, to Nietzsche,
with the creation of slave morality, we find the very time
when the development of the distinction between the inner
soul or mind, with that of outer bodies is made. All for the
purpose of hiding away “true” inner feelings, while at the
same time showing “false” feelings outwardly (Higgins;
Solomon, 2013, lecture.21, timestamp.10:34:33-10:35:00).
§5.3 - Noble Conversion. With Nietzsche’s narrative of
slave morality’s origins outlined, one might however feel
left with a significant question—how could slave morality
possibly have succeeded if the very premise of the masters’
noble morality is that it is dismissive and appalled by the
slaves. Why would they ever care what the slaves think?
The answer to this question is a matter of consistent
debate among scholars, and I will not be attempting to
illuminate the question much further here, as the topic is of
only minor concern to the focus of this essay. Instead, I will
simply list a few of the options in general terms. The first
option is that slave morality wasn’t named such because
it was made by them, but because it was given to them by
a group somewhat akin to them among the masters, known
as the priests, and the priests in turn recruiting the slaves
for the sake of gaining more power for themselves, through
the force of numbers alone, that is (Ansell-Pearson; Bragg;
Hughes; Mulhall, 2018, timestamp.17:30-18:33; Hill, 2007,
pp.125-128)—another option is that the creation of the God
of the slaves, along with the aforementioned promises of
hellfire, would result in a slow-but-growing worry in the
masters, and in turn, eventually leading to them adapting
so they don’t stand to face punishment (Higgins; Solomon,
2013, lecture.21, timestamp.10:39:33-10:43:10)—lastly,
there is the notion of debt, which Nietzsche claims comes
prior to morality, and how debt resembles the concepts of
guilt and blame, where the creditor has the right to claim
compensation from a debtor if they are unable to repay the
debt they owe. This in turn, leads to punishment being born
and with it, the fear of being unable to pay one’s debt. Now
Nietzsche however points out that many early religions are
based around concepts of revering “ancestor spirits” since
the current generation owes their fortunes to these. His idea
is then that these ancestor spirits, over time, are turned into
gods, and then God, as the debt to them grows ever-greater
and eventually impossible to repay (Anderson, 2017, §2;
Hill, 2007, pp.122-124).
Depending on the interpreter of Nietzsche, these different
concepts interplay in different ways, and each have varying
degrees of relevance and impact as the explanatory notion
regarding how slave morality managed to become simply
The Morality. What all of these different explanations have
in common however, and what is of concern to us here, is
what they all seek to do to the masters; they seek to create
an environment of fear wherein the masters begin to worry
and psychologically turn on themselves as individuals.
§5.4 - Guilty Conscience. The idea underneath that of
debt turning into guilt and blame is that as this process or
“transformation” occurs:
[...] an accompanying purification and internalization
of the feeling of indebtedness, which connect the
demand for compensation to a source of wrongful action
that is supposed to be entirely within the agent’s control,
and thereby attach a negative assessment to the guilty
person’s basic sense of personal worth.
- Anderson, 2017, §2
In other words, an indebted person would come to feel
like a bad person for not being able to pay their debts,
mainly due to them viewing themself becoming indebted
as a choice they themself made and had control over—the
importance of “control” here will get further weight when
we consider Nietzsche’s views on “free will” in §6 below.
Guilt becoming internalized in this way, in turn, leads to
the strange situation where an actual victim of wrongdoing
indeed isn’t even necessary for guilt to manifest. “Any
observer (whether real or ideal/imagined) of the violation
can equally be entitled to resent the guilty party [...] even
when no one was harmed [...resulting in...] free-floating
guilt [...]” (Anderson, 2017, §2). To understand this notion
better, let’s consider what should be a familiar scenario:
You approach a street-crossing, here the traffic-light shines
red signalling for you not to cross. However, you have a
clear and far view of each road in the crossing, making it
clear that no one else is in, nor near, the crossing. Thus,
you decide to make the crossing in spite of the red light.
The thought is now that if one indeed were to perform this
21
crossing, one might also feel somewhat bad about having
done so. But why? No one was hurt by this act, nor was
there even anyone present to even be endangered by the
act. The answer is that there indeed is someone who was
hurt by the act. This someone was however simply not an
actual victim, but rather an ideal victim—that is, the traffic
law. “In such cases, free-floating guilt can lose its social
and moral point and develop into [...] a pathological desire
for self-punishment.” (Anderson, 2017, §2). Thus, the mind
punishes itself with feelings of guilt simply because a rule
was violated at all, in spite of the rule serving no purpose in
the given context.
The most potent and extreme version of guilty conscience
we in turn find within asceticism. It takes the fact that “[...]
suffering is an inevitable part of the human condition, and
the ascetic strategy is to [...then...] interpret such suffering
as punishment, thereby connecting it to the notion of guilt.”
(Anderson, 2017, §2). The ascetic in turn plays on our need
for someone guilty to blame for this inevitable suffering,
our need for suffering to not be meaningless, and proclaims
that it is: “Quite so, my sheep! Someone must be to blame
for it: but you yourself are this someone, you alone are to
blame for yourself!” (Kaufmann; Nietzsche, 1967/2010,
p.128), and thus leading the individual to hate themself
whenever they inevitably fail to not experience the kinds of
suffering that are meaningless—due to completely natural
things such as hunger, lust, or anger not being met—and
seemingly leaving no other recourse than to commit oneself
to one’s “[...] own fundamental worthlessness.” (Anderson,
2017, §2), and instead condemn as evil any needs which
could ever come to be failed to be satisfied, and solely try
to diminish the feeling of such needs or desires through
self-discipline—in short, by taking up asceticism. But, “[...]
because of [...] the poisonous nature of ressentiment, the
slaves never feel as if they’ve completely won. There is
always [...] this lingering feeling that things still aren’t
working in the way they should.” (Ansell-Pearson; Bragg;
Hughes; Mulhall, 2018, timestamp.28:22-28:35), and how
indeed could it ever? What the ascetic slaves and priests
are opposing—both in the case of the masters, the personal
desires of their own, and the meaningless suffering of the
world—is the fundamental nature of reality, there is no way
to be truly rid of suffering, nor desire.
Asceticism is thus, as far as Nietzsche is concerned, an
attempt at “self-medication,” but one which is ultimately
self-defeating, as it both fails to address the suffering itself,
but instead solely offers a way of dealing with the fear of
suffering, and further simply manages to make people even
sicker due to the creation of inner, psychological conflict
(Anderson, 2017, §2; Jones, 1976, p.251; Ansell-Pearson;
Bragg; Hughes; Mulhall, 2018, timestamp.29:30-31:32).
What none of these observations of Nietzsche’s amount
to, however, is a refutation of the validity of the views of
The Morality and Asceticism. But, as noted earlier, this is
also not truly Nietzsche’s aim, he is a diagnostician of the
views. Nietzsche is seeking to show that these positions are
sick and harmful, not to disprove them (Anderson, 2017,
§2; Higgins, Solomon, 2000, p.113). Thus, in summary of
what has been discussed throughout §5 so far:
Master and slave moralities, the truths of which are
confirmed independently by feelings that power has
been increased, are expressions of the human being’s
will to power in qualitatively different states of health.
The former is a consequence of strength, cheerful
optimism and naiveté, while the latter stems from
impotency, pessimism, cunning and [...], ressentiment,
the creative reaction of a “bad conscience” coming to
form as it turns against itself in hatred.
- Wilkerson, 05-05-2021, §6
§5.5 - Unmasking Values. So what does any of this
have to do with Leira, and by extension Oghma? Directly,
the answer might be nothing much. Though, a common
characteristic of the variously Neutral-aligned deities is
that they often don’t have any canonical views on morality.
However, when considering our discussion so far, it does
not seem implausible that related descriptions would apply.
To begin with a modest claim, since the faith of Oghma
is concerned with The Truth, and includes philosophers
among its faithful, it would seem highly plausible that they
would be interested in questions of moral realism—that is,
questions of whether such a thing as moral facts exist, as
in, whether a moral stance can be “objectively” true—and
indeed, some would plausibly even claim such a position.
Further, since the faith of Oghma akin to Christianity is
committed to the will to truth, as noted in §5.1, they too
would eventually stand to unmask any such commitments
to moral realism they might have had, as false. Thus, also
leaving the faith of Oghma susceptible to nihilism.
Lastly, in spite of a lack of a well-defined ethical stance,
we might still be able to gauge some moral views of the
faith based on some of their other activities. Immediately
of note is the deities listed among Oghma’s foes, beyond
the mere gods of deception that is, which include the gods
22
Bane and Talos—the god of tyrannical oppression, and of
the natural forces of destruction, respectively—which as
readers will remember, are exactly the forces slave morality
came about to oppose (Greenwood; Stewart, 1997, p.41;
Boyd; Martin, 1996, p.131). The connections do not stop
here either, however, as Oghma’s faith also encourages
that their followers engage in acts of charity; “Teach any
folk who ask how to read and write or as much of these
crafts as time and tasks permit—and charge no fee for this
teaching.” (Boyd; Martin, 1996, p.132). Which suggests
that the faith of Oghma might endorse at least some notion
of compassion, which is another aspect of Nietzsche’s war
on Morality—the impact of this part of his critique will be
of more relevance in §6. In spite of this, it might be more
fruitful to quickly sketch out Nietzsche’s views here, as his
critique of compassion relates straight to suffering, which
we have focused on here, throughout §5—Nietzsche’s “[...]
complaints begin from the observation that a morality of
compassion centers attention on the problem of suffering,
presupposing that suffering is bad as such.” (Anderson,
2017, §2). What Nietzsche thinks regarding this is twofold;
first, that the connection of suffering with evil, and pleasure
with good, rests on circular reasoning—as in, happiness
is good because it is good to be happy—second, and more
important in Nietzsche’s view, is that the potential role of
suffering as an enhancing feature for other values in the life
of a suffering person, that is, Nietzsche argues that there is
a potential for personal growth within some instances of
suffering, which in turn would mean that an ethics based on
compassion would become “[...] presumptuous because it
concludes from the outside that a person’s suffering must
be bad, thereby flattening out “what is most personal” [...]”
(Anderson, 2017, §2), to an individual and rob us of our
chance at interpreting and choosing for ourselves the value
and meaning of our own unique sufferings (Thielst, 1999,
pp.76-77; Anderson, 2017, §2).
With this, I would thus still maintain that we should hold
onto the view that Leira is engaged in a Nietzschean form
of critique on Oghma and the developments of his religion.
Accusing him of shepherding himself and his faithful down
a road towards nihilism, while simultaneously shaping an
outlook on life which, in seeking to explain away the issues
in life, simply manages to internalize one’s frustrated needs
and thereby attacking the self, rather than truly helping it.
An alternative to the ascetic slave morality which Oghma
has “bought into” is thus severely needful. But what form
should it take? This we’ll consider within the final section
dedicated to Nietzsche’s views specifically.
§6 - An Experiment of Life
What is good?—Whatever augments the feeling
of power, the will to power, power itself, in man.
What is evil?—Whatever springs from weakness.
What is happiness?—The feeling that power
increases—that resistance is overcome.
Not contentment, but more power; not peace at
any price, but war [...]
- Nietzsche, 1918/2014, §2
In light of our considerations so far, before we can begin
elaborating on what Nietzsche finds to be valuable for the
right way of living, we must first consider what Nietzsche
exactly thinks we humans are doing when we supposedly
“give value” to aspects of our life and world. Specifically,
from what is called a meta-ethical point of view, when we
value something, what sort of status does this valuing then
enjoy? Is it independent of mind, body, and attitudes?
A reader of this essay so far will presumably be quick to
assume that the answer to this would be ‘no,’ and as far as
this essay is concerned, one would be right in thinking so.
However, some interpreters have argued for reading the
ethics of Nietzsche as normative realism, meaning that he
believed in the existence of moral facts, and therefore that
one can be either right or wrong regarding moral questions.
As just stated, this essay works with a premise that denies
such readings of Nietzsche, instead understanding him as
an anti-realist, obviously meaning that no moral facts exist
from Nietzsche’s point of view. What this means, however,
is that none of the ethical characteristics that I will be
describing throughout section 6 are to be understood as
strictly “true,” but as has been emphasized all throughout
this essay, simply expressions of how things are looking
from Nietzsche’s point of view. And thus, when Nietzsche
writes with such rhetorical force that it appears as though
he is writing of facts, what this force truly expresses is his
feelings of desperation and passion for his cause of waking
up his true audience; people who would be better served
living life in accordance with his views, and who are being
emotionally harmed by the common understanding of what
morality entails (Leiter, 2004/2020, §3; §3.2).
The normative realist interpretations of Nietzsche are,
however, still of interest to us here since they are based on
assigning special, objective status to a concept about which
we will be discussing next—the will to power.
§6.1 - Limitless Power. To get a sense of what the will to
power is, as well as how it has been known to lend itself to
23
realist readings, one need look no further than to famous
statements of Nietzsche’s like that “[...] living is simply the
will to power.” (Johnston; Nietzsche, 2011, §259), or put in
another way, “[...] the will to power, which is just the will
to live.” (Common; Nietzsche, 2010, §349). These, along
with related quotes from Nietzsche have resulted in the
thought that Nietzsche reduces all types of instincts and
motives to deep down simply being expressions of the will
to power, the need for the individual to gain more power,
and that, as a result, since literally everything we value at
all, deep down all are expressions of the will to power, it
must thus be the only thing that can truly be valued; the
only thing with value. From this conclusion, realists can
then argue that since the expansion of the will to power is
the only thing with value, that means that any morality that
fails to encourage the expansion of the will to power would
then be objectively bad; while a morality which expanded
the will to power less than another morality did, would be
objectively worse than the latter option. To put the thought
another way, “[...] creatures like us (or more broadly: all
life, or even all things period) aim at the enhancement of
their power—and then further, that this fact entails that
enhanced power is good for us (or for everything).”
(Anderson, 2017, §3.2.1).
Against this realist reading one can however note that
Nietzsche claims that the will to power can be undermined
or outright lacking, which wouldn’t be possible if literally
everything was an expression of this will. Further is the fact
that Nietzsche, at least appears to speak of both affects and
desires as other features of our reality beyond the will to
power (Leiter, 2004/2020, §3.1). Either way, regardless of
how strong a claim we are meant to be taking Nietzsche to
be in the process of making; the above theory is at least a
helpful, initial description of the will to power.
As already expressed back in §2.1, initial interpretations
of Nietzsche’s thought, and especially of the will to power,
took the form of the “[...] deeply unattractive, blunt claim
that “Might makes right”, which [...past interpreters...]
associated with disturbing social and political tendencies
salient at the era [...]” (Anderson, 2017, §3.2.1)—fascism.
Kaufmann’s efforts to recuperate Nietzsche’s thought was
mainly fulfilled through the emphasis on how much weight
Nietzsche puts on power specifically taking the form of
[...] internally directed self-control and the development
of cultural excellence, rather than mindless domination of
others.” (Anderson, 2017, §3.2.1).
Some commentators have, however, since then criticised
Kaufmann for potentially having done too thorough a job
when trying to “sanitize” Nietzsche, threatening to remove
the aspects of Nietzsche’s thought, which gave it its force
as a critique and attack on our moral intuitions. Indeed,
one might want to ask in what way Nietzsche’s emphasis
on self-control is supposed to be at all different from the
very same encouragement made by the ascetic religions
he attacks?
This, in turn, has lead to an emphasis on the concession
of Nietzsche’s “[...] distinction between tyranny (in which
a dominant drive wholly effaces what it dominates) and
mastery (in which a more dominant drive allows some
expression to the less dominant one but controls and
redirects that expression to its own larger ends) [...]”
(Anderson, 2017, §3.2.1), and how Nietzsche seemed to
endorse both of these concepts, even if he found mastery
to be of greater value than tyranny.
A significant development within interpreters’ way of
understanding the will to power has as a result of this been
that it is presented as the drive to overcome resistance.
This way of understanding will to power of course links
itself directly to Nietzsche’s positive assessment of the
notion of suffering, and it further offers a more intuitive
way of understanding how power is supposed to be good,
that is, by linking it directly to a person’s ability to impact
their environment to their own ends. Indeed, within this
way of understanding the will to power, we find a condition
for being able to act at all; as in, if one is unable to impact
one’s environment, one obviously doesn’t have any ability
to act at all. Additionally, this way of understanding will
to power also serves to present it as a clear response to the
philosophy of Schopenhauer:
[...] replacing Schopenhauer’s will to life with his
[...Nietzsche’s...] will to power (understood as a drive to
overcome resistance, which wills the world’s resistance
along with its overcoming [...]), Nietzsche can argue
that our basic condition as desiring, striving creatures
can lead to a mode of existence worthy of endorsement,
rather than to inevitable frustration (as Schopenhauer
had it) [...] The will to power thereby contributes
directly to Nietzsche’s program of combating nihilism
(in its guise as the evaluative claim that the world ought
not to exist).
- Anderson, 2017, §3.2.1; §6.1
24
Some interpreters have however challenged this version
of the will to power, noting that resistance-suffering isn’t
a logically necessary aspect of impacting an environment,
and therefore not fundamental (Hill, 2007, p.68; p.76).
However, as Leiter notes, Nietzsche is not trying to
show that resistance-suffering is intrinsically good, but
only that it is extrinsically good. Nietzsche specifically
states that “It is great pain only which is the ultimate
emancipator of the spirit [...] I doubt whether such pain
“improves” us; but I know that it [...makes us more
profound...]” (Common; Nietzsche, 2010, Preface #3).
Thus, even if the detractors of the understanding of will
to power as overcoming resistance are correct, that
resistance-suffering isn’t fundamental to the concept.
It is still the case that Nietzsche views the interplay
between the will to power and resistance-suffering as the
only thing that actually matters. One can thus understand
Nietzsche as making a kind of empirical observation and
claim; in the world as we actually experience it, will to
power is characterized by the overcoming of resistance.
Does it have to—Who cares? It is the fact that we indeed
do experience life this way that is interesting and calls for
examination (Leiter, 2004/2020, §1.3).
Further, when considering will to power as the ability to
impact one’s environment, it is important to highlight the
connection between this impacting and notion of values
which has already been discussed at length: “The will to
power is narrowly connected to the notion that »to live is
to want, to want is to pick out values.« The will to power
manifests through us, or as [...Nietzsche...] writes: »Wille
zur Macht wertet durch uns«, [...that is...] picks out values
through us.” (Larsen; Rahbek, 1995, p.340 [my translation]),
and as a result, Nietzsche’s notions of health and strength
are directly linked to will to power and “value fatigue.”
With the importance of overcoming resistance established
we can then return to the value of self-control:
Nietzsche locates the most important aspect of
“overcoming resistance” in self-mastery and
self-commanding [...] all living creatures are said
to be obeying something, while “he who cannot
obey himself will be commanded. That is the nature
of living creatures.” It is important to note the
disjunction: one may obey oneself or one may not.
Either way, one will be commanded, but the difference
is qualitative.
- Wilkerson, 05-05-2021, §6
In addition to further clarifications on self-control, this
statement, leads us to Nietzsche’s views on the question
of free will.
§6.2 - Affirmation Loop. Though Nietzsche was known
to attack many aspects of the natural sciences, at the end of
the day, he was himself committed to the view that reality
was structured based on deterministic laws, as in; when a
billiard ball rolls along a table and into another ball, it is
due to the force of the impact of the first ball that the other
ball then itself would begin to roll—cause and effect.
However, unlike many other philosophers, and most of
the world’s religions, Nietzsche accepts the implications
of this for the notion of free will—that it doesn’t exist
(Pacheco, 2021; Jensen, 09-09-2021, §4).
To Nietzsche, people have no free will, and thus, what
they do and who they are is “[...] determined from the
inside, by [...their...] heredity, upbringing, situation, and
response.” (Higgins, Solomon, 2000, p.201), over which
we obviously don’t have any individual control. This in
turn is one of Nietzsche’s reasons for his attacks on the
claims of morality, since they largely hinge on the notion
of free will being true, and that people therefore can be
blamed for what they do. Which then, from Nietzsche’s
perspective isn’t the case. Nietzsche does however not
think we should despair at this, but instead sees this as all
the more reason for us to affirm the life we are actually
living, rather than wishing for alternative “better” lives or
existences beyond this one—this view, he encapsulates in
the expression “amor fati” meaning the love of fate.
He thus wrote of wanting to be able to see what is great
and beautiful within necessity, and to not condemn when
faced with things he found troubling, for they too are also
necessary and not the result of anyone’s choices. Instead,
he would simply accept these things as something he didn’t
approve of and “look away” (Anderson, 2017, §3.2.2).
These words of Nietzsche’s might sound somewhat silly
to a reader of this essay however. Since when considering
the great zeal with which Nietzsche attacks the teachings
of Christianity and other philosophical doctrines.
But of course, it should be remembered that these attacks
are directed specifically at the aspects of these doctrines
which condemn “[...] earthly existence, demanding that we
repent of it as the price of admission to a different, superior
plane of being [...thus, they are negating...] our life, instead
of affirming it.” (Anderson, 2017, §3.2.2). And the reason
why Nietzsche attacks these positions is therefore solely
due to the fact that we couldn’t honestly affirm life while
accepting them.
25
 Affirming life in the radical way Nietzsche calls for is
however obviously difficult. Indeed, even if you were able
to affirm life in the appropriate sense, how would you then
know that you were able to do so? Nietzsche’s answer to
this lies within what he himself claims as the “discovery”
of his with the greatest importance—eternal recurrence.
The fact that Nietzsche writes of the eternal recurrence
as being of the importance that he does, “[...has however...]
not made it any easier for commentators to understand.”
(Anderson, 2017, §6.3), and indeed, it might be his most
controversial doctrine of all among experts.
A reason for this particular controversy is that Nietzsche
only presents eternal recurrence through hypotheticals;
asking his readers to imagine it; or he layers the concept
in metaphor-after-metaphor. As a result, before getting into
ways of understanding eternal recurrence and its role in
Nietzsche’s general project, it is probably for the best to
allow Nietzsche himself tell his story:
The Heaviest Burden. What if a demon crept after you
into your loneliest loneliness some day or night, and said
to you: "This life, as you live it at present, and have lived
it, you must live it once more, and also innumerable
times; and there will be nothing new in it, but every pain
and every joy and every thought and every sigh, and all
the unspeakably small and great in thy life must come to
you again, and all in the same series and sequence—and
similarly this spider and this moonlight among the trees,
and similarly this moment, and I myself. The eternal
sand-glass of existence will ever be turned once more,
and you with it, you speck of dust!"—Would you not
throw yourself down and gnash your teeth, and curse the
demon that so spoke? Or have you once experienced a
tremendous moment in which you would answer him:
"You are a God, and never did I hear anything so divine!"
- Common; Nietzsche, 2010, §341
The initial reaction to this doctrine, by interpreters, was the
thought that Nietzsche was offering a cosmological theory
about the nature of time and fate. Such a theory would then
serve as a challenge to linear ideas of time, and with them,
a challenge to the concept of social or historical progress.
As we have seen, Nietzsche did indeed oppose the idea of
progress, and it is as a result plausible that this opposition
indeed is the motive for his doctrine of eternal recurrence.
However, over the years since the initial interpretations of
Nietzsche, cosmological takes on the doctrine have largely
fallen out of favour, and is instead largely replaced with
existential, practical, ethical, and mythical interpretations
(Anderson, 2017, §6.3).
The interpretation of eternal recurrence of the most use
to us here is however that it is to be understood as a type
of thought experiment with the specific purpose of testing
whether we are capable of affirming our life, whether we
are capable of embracing amor fati.
How exactly would eternal recurrence accomplish this?
Let’s take a closer look at some attempts at explaining its
impact on ethical life—eternal recurrence will be of great
significance for this essay’s culminating thoughts on Leira
and the activities of her faithful, so it serves to try and get
a proper grasp on the ideas involved:
Three features seem especially salient: we are supposed
to imagine 1) that the past recurs, so that what happened
in the past will be re-experienced in the future; 2) that
what recurs is the same in every detail; and 3) that the
recurrence happens not just once more, or even many
times more, but eternally.
- Anderson, 2017, §6.3
Let’s consider each section individually. The significance
of [1] would plausibly lie in its ability to undermine what
is known as future-bias:
Since we cannot change the past but think of
ourselves as still able to do something about the
future, our practical attention is understandably
future directed. But if the question is about the
value of our life overall, events in the past matter
just as much as those in the future, and disregarding
them is a mistake [...]
- Anderson, 2017, §6.3
If understood in this way, then [1] blocks our ability to use
future-bias for the purpose of denying aspects of our life
we might rather forget about, as in; “Whew! At least I’ll
never have to go through that again...” (Anderson, 2017,
§6.3). A similar type of motivation lies behind aspect [2].
Since the entire point of the thought experiment is to make
one undergo self-examination, if one were to simply omit
26
aspects of one’s life, then that self-examination would not
be an honest one, and therefore wouldn’t be able to aid us
in affirming life. Finally, [3] is a little more complicated.
If one takes a cue from the earlier aphorism’s name which
feature Nietzsche’s telling of eternal recurrence, “Heaviest
Burden,” then one can understand eternity here as making
both the importance and difficulty of affirmation greater.
To highlight this with an example; “[...] one might well be
very happy to live one’s marriage again (once, or twice, or
even many times), but still prefer some variation in spousal
arrangements over the course of eternity [...]” (Anderson,
2017, §6.3), but this in turn wouldn’t then be affirming life
in the way eternal recurrence demands.
To add to the interpretation so far is the thought that it
is potentially important for Nietzsche “[...] to rule out as
insufficient a particular kind of conditional [...Christian...]
affirmation [...], which would leave in place the judgement
that earthly human life carries intrinsically negative value.”
(Anderson, 2017, §6.3); here this condition, in turn, would
be that for affirming one’s earthly life, one would be given
an eternal, heavenly reward in the afterlife. The doctrine of
eternal recurrence would however serve to block this kind
of affirmation, since it rules out any sort of afterlife—there
would be no future wherein your earthly life would be over.
Before we move on from eternal recurrence, as I have
chosen to present it in this essay, we should however take
a quick look at some further considerations, questions, and
complications which arise from this particular version.
The first question to consider regards aspect [2] above,
the extent of sameness Nietzsche is calling for. The thought
is that he is emphasising every detail, but one might note
that “[...] since eternal recurrence is a thought experiment,
its significance lies not in the details but rather in the
general outlines.” (Higgins; Solomon, 2000, p.203 [my
italics]). The point here is that, if we take the example
above of reliving one’s marriage, then when asking if it
was “[...] worth it, all things considered? A few minor
changes here or there would not affect your view. It is,
rather, the whole of the marriage [...]” (Higgins; Solomon,
2000, p.203 [my italics]) which one would have to judge.
What needs affirming within this interpretation then, is that
one decided to live a married life rather than, say, living the
life of a solitary traveller—that one isn’t lamenting failing
to live a radically different life.
Next we have a complication which must be addressed.
Since what Nietzsche calls for through eternal recurrence
is affirmation of life through eternity, we are left with the
question of whether this is supposed to be a necessary or
a sufficient condition for having lived life the right way?
The point here is that, in spite of the weight Nietzsche put
on the doctrine, eternal recurrence doesn’t seem to be only
necessary, rather than sufficient for a good life.
The reason for this is that the requirements of eternal
recurrence, as a doctrine, seem to be “[...] both too thin and
too severe as a criterion of perfection standing alone: too
thin, because anyone suitably superficial and complacent
might will [...]” (Leiter, 2004/2020, §2) eternal recurrence
perfectly happily—which obviously defeats the purpose of
the doctrine in the first place. It would, however, also seem
too demanding, since it would appear to demand of us to
affirm the eternal recurrence of the many humanitarian
atrocities which came to pass after Nietzsche’s death, that
is, during the 20th and 21st century. This might very well
still be Nietzsche’s demand, but it is unclear if this indeed
was Nietzsche’s intent to advocate for. Regardless of this,
however, Leiter’s main point is that the eternal recurrence
would seem to “merely” be a necessary condition for the
right kind of life to be attained, in Nietzsche’s view, but not
a sufficient condition. Which in turn means that something
more is needed, in his view—what this might be, we will
take a closer look at in the next section.
The final question to address is whether the idea behind
eternal recurrence is solely a matter of evaluating one’s
life, or if it also is meant as a tool for changing one’s life?
Now, it would obviously be natural for one to think so.
If I look at my life and find it impossible to affirm,
my first step would obviously be to change it... Right?
Perhaps so, but remember, Nietzsche is a kind of fatalist
or determinist, he does not believe in free will, and thus,
the notion of changing oneself and one’s life is something
Nietzsche had “[...] mixed feelings about [...however, with
this being said...] he also insisted that one becomes who
one is, which indicates change at least in the Aristotelian
sense of realizing one’s potential.” (Higgins; Solomon,
2000, p.203), so it might not be out of the question that
the self-examination of eternal recurrence could result in
some form of change in one’s life. It simply couldn’t be
a fundamental change in one’s nature, psychology, etc.
27
 With these questions all addressed, to make a concluding role in Nietzsche’s thought.” (Higgins; Solomon, 2000,
summarization of the key points: p.215), making it all the more quaint that it has become
so infamous. Indeed, as a result of how obscure the
[...] Nietzsche’s doctrine of eternal recurrence [...] concept is in Nietzsche’s thought, many interpreters are
serves to draw attention away from all worlds other uncertain if it even is supposed to hold a meaningful role
than the one in which we presently live, since eternal (Leiter, 2004/2020, §2; Wicks, 1997/2017, §4). As opposed
recurrence precludes the possibility of any final escape to the übermensch, “Nietzsche talks much more often
from the present world. The doctrine also functions as about ``higher men,´´ but often to lament the fact that
a measure for judging someone’s overall psychological even they, too, are ``human, all too human.´´” (Higgins;
strength and mental health, since Nietzsche believed Solomon, 2000, p.215). These complications don’t have
that the doctrine of eternal recurrence was the hardest to trouble us here however. The reason for this being that
world-view to affirm. regardless of whether an interpreter is characterizing the
- Wicks, 1997/2017, §3 übermensch or higher men, the characteristics emphasized
largely align—with only minor deviations—and we can
here therefore treat the two as largely equivalent. And we
Indeed, Nietzsche was well aware that not being able to will therefore, in the rest of this essay, primarily use the
affirm the eternal recurrence was only—human, all too “catch-all” term, higher type of people, or simply higher
human—and that we therefore, like it was suggested by types.
the “madman” who proclaimed the death of god, have to What is it then that characterizes this higher type?
become something greater, something higher. The immediate answer to this is that it is an “illusion”
§6.3 - People on Higher Ground. Here we are, if eternal or a kind of “ideal.” The higher type is “[...] an illusion
recurrence is the most controversial aspect of Nietzsche’s in the sense that it isn’t [...real...] yet, but it is an illusion
thought among scholars, then the following has proven to which has to step out of the realm of ideas and become
historically be the most controversial aspect among people flesh and blood between people—step into existence. An
in general—Nietzsche’s übermensch. illusion one must believe in, so one doesn’t oneself become
At this point, I would hope that Nietzsche’s position as an illusion [...]” (Thielst, 1999, p.109 [my translation]).
not being a nazi or anything associated with them, should The higher type is thus the person capable of “[...] putting
have been well established, and I will thus not waste space the human, all too human behind itself, meaning it
within this essay on debunking the thought that Nietzsche’s overcomes [...divine...] idols, biases and false values
übermensch should be equated with “[...] the proud german [...which in turn means that one further has become...]
of aryan race [...]” (Thielst, 1999, p.106 [my translation]). true to the earth, but also finally has become mature
No, all that needs to be said about the übermensch—or the enough for the earth—worthy for life itself.” (Thielst,
superman, overhuman, or superhuman—in this regard is 1999, p.108 [my translation]). The higher type is thus an
that “[...] there is nothing biological, racial, or metaphysical authentic kind of person, ready to acknowledge themself
characterising the übermensch, but instead only something as the source of values in the world—of their values.
existential [...]” (Thielst, 1999, p.108 [my translation]). What further characterizes the higher type, based on
This is not to say that Nietzsche, like everyone else at the the discussion within the former section, is its attitude
time, didn’t take eugenics seriously as a topic to be figured regarding eternal recurrence:
out and studied. The underlying point here is that even if
Nietzsche did have views on such topics, which would be
[...] the higher type embraces the doctrine of the eternal
worth condemning by a reader—which is still a topic of
recurrence and thus evinces what Nietzsche often calls
debate among scholars—then these views would still be
a “Dionysian” or “life-affirming” attitude. A person, for
of no relevance to the übermensch as a concept (Higgins;
Nietzsche, has a Dionysian attitude toward life insofar
Solomon, 2000, pp.8-9; pp.13-14).
as he affirms his life unconditionally; in particular,
With all of this out of the way, we do however now find
insofar as he affirms it including the “suffering” or other
ourselves in the strange situation where we won’t truly be
hardships it has involved.
discussing the übermensch any further. Why not? Because
- Leiter, 2004/2020, §2
the übermensch “[...] in fact plays a very small and obscure

28
To put these aspects of the higher type in context of lower
types, including the slaves from earlier sections, then what
Nietzsche highlights is that:
[...Platonism and faith…] are refuges of “slaves” who,
having become fainthearted, weary, and dizzy from
looking into the abyss, have given up the climb.
Where does the climb lead? Nowhere. There is only the
climber and his knowledge that, however far and long he
climbs, he is doomed to repeat the same ascent endlessly.
Why climb at all then? Because it is our nature to do so.
The only question is how well we climb and how we
cope with the knowledge that the climb is meaningless.
- Jones, 1976, p.258 [my italics]
“How well” here signifies with which outlook and energy
one performs the climb-that-is-life. And this, in turn, is
where the will to power enters the picture, since what “[...]
makes man human is the ability to contain and direct his
will to power.” (Jones, 1976, p.259), people, and especially
the higher types, seek to show self-control, but specifically
for the purpose of bringing style to one’s being—to one’s
climb. The way, or at least a way, this is accomplished is
through the pursuit of either a coherent or a unified life
project. (Leiter, 2004/2020, §2; Higgins; Solomon, 2000,
pp.8-9; pp.180-181; pp.196-197). What these life projects
amount to according to Nietzsche is that they allow for
secular people to rediscover the spirituality which he views
as necessary for combating nihilism. Spirituality shouldn’t
here be misunderstood as otherworldliness, but is rather an
experience of something greater than oneself, of becoming
“enlarged” by breaking down the borders between the self
and the non-self. This is something Nietzsche especially
thinks is accomplished through music, where one feels
neither selfish nor selfless (Higgins; Solomon, 2000, p.26;
pp.96-101; pp.212-213). Nietzsche also notes that in older
religions, spirit was viewed as inhabiting everything in the
world. Spirits then, would be the means by which people
would be akin to the natural world, rather than us being
different from the world due to the spirit, as Christianity
often suggests (Parkes, 2009, timestamp.15:00-16:50).
When it comes to life projects, we find ourselves in a
position where Nietzsche becomes more specific about the
sorts of people he admires—meaning the sorts of people he
primarily is trying to reach with his writings, the types of
people he finds to be in need of a new type of morality.
Some of the most noteworthy of these figures, of these
“exemplary, higher men,” include Goethe, Caesar, Wagner,
Alexander the Great, Beethoven, Napoleon, Schopenhauer,
Jesus Christ, Nietzsche himself, and, of course, Socrates
(Higgins; Solomon, 2000, pp.127-128; p.136; Jones, 1976,
p.257; Leiter, 2004/2020, §2; Magee; Stern, 1987, Section
2, timestamp.10:13-10:35).
One might initially be surprised by the inclusion of many
of these figures, and indeed, many more which would seem
equally as surprising could easily be included. The thing
that should be remembered, however, and which unifies all
of these figures as higher men was their commitment to a
coherent life project, as mentioned before. For Nietzsche,
the nature of each figure’s project was of lesser concern.
What mattered was the zeal with which each engaged with
their chosen, holistic cause and goal.
Again, which cannot be emphasised enough, is that
this life project which the higher man engages in, is a
coherent expression of the given individual’s personal
values, the values they have chosen for themself, and
therefore, as stated, a personal form of the will to power.
[...] the term »overhuman« becomes a metaphor for [...]
freedom [...in a Nietzschean sense...]. The overhuman
is the human who has the courage to say: this is how
I am, I do this, and I will continue to do such, because
these are the values I have chosen for myself [...].
The individual power to choose one’s own values
while knowing that they are individual [...to oneself...].
- Larsen; Rahbek, 1995, p.340 [my translation]
And though he did not acknowledge his values as only his
alone, Socrates is here the clearest example of a figure that
Nietzsche truly admired. Even if Nietzsche didn’t approve
of Socrates’ life project—of his values—Nietzsche still
had to respect the impact of Socrates’ efforts. Indeed, he
even mused that, if not for Socrates’ influence on human
history, then humanity might have outright gone extinct
long ago (Higgins; Solomon, 2000, p.129; Magee; Stern,
1987, Section 2, timestamp.06:30-07:25; 10:27-10:35).
Deep down then, Nietzsche truly thought that of all the
people he wrote of and critiqued, Socrates was perhaps
the one who was him the closest, and who he was most
likened to (Strauss, 1971/2014, timestamp.00:30-01:00;
Higgins; Solomon, 2000, pp.129-130).
29
 With Nietzsche’s great admiration of Socrates’ impact on
the world being stated, or more specifically of his project,
it should however be noted that the impact of the project
isn’t what makes a higher type the higher type that they are.
In other words, a higher type’s project can indeed even fail,
without this failure damaging their status as a higher type
at all, according to Nietzsche. Again, what matters is the
conviction and clarity with which the project is pursued
(Abbey; Saunders, 2010/2011, timestamp.17:00-17:50).
Before we move on to describe some further features of
what higher types might be like, it is however important to
clarify that when the quote above speaks of the übermensch
as a metaphor for freedom, this isn’t to be taken in a normal
sense of the word. Remember, Nietzsche is some type of
determinist or fatalist, and does not believe in free will. But
what is then the purpose of speaking of freedom at all, isn’t
it simply misleading then? Arguably so, but what Nietzsche
is thought to be doing here is something which needs to be
understood through the context that Nietzsche doesn’t think
that conscious thought has any causal power—also known
as epiphenomenal, and is the very thing the notion of free
will otherwise claims would be the case—and that he as a
result thereof has to appeal to something other than reason
and logical argument for the purpose of inspiring change in
his readers. What Nietzsche is doing then, is attempting to
appeal to an emotional weight already present within his
readers. That is, to appeal to the value we already feel for
the notion of freedom, for being free. In other words, he is
using the fact that people—including higher types, as they
too are influenced by their culture—already care about the
idea of freedom to make them accept the outlook he argues
for, through the act of presenting this as the true version of
freedom. It is simply a rhetorical trick used to bypass the
fact that no real alternatives exist (Leiter, 2004/2020, §1.2;
Leiter, 2009, timestamp.28:28-30:30; 44:00-44:44).
§6.4 - Gaiety in Science and Virtue. In the preceding
section we discussed what largely would be considered the
essential aspects of higher types. In this section, we’ll look
at some further characteristics which might best be thought
of as Nietzsche’s suggestions or predictions of alternative
traits and attitudes which society could come to value in
people, and thereby overcome a future nihilism. A reader
of this essay might reasonably think of this that it sounds
somewhat “floaty” or “vague.” One would be right to think
so, but the reason for these somewhat non-committal ideas
of Nietzsche’s is to be found in his advocating for what he
calls “gaya scienza,” translated as “joyous wisdom,” or as
“gay science.”
Nietzsche’s notion of gay science can meaningfully be
seen as springing from his rejection of the existence of a
singular Truth in the world—as discussed in §4—instead
insisting on the existence on many truths, the existence
of many interpretations. Rather than dismissing the
pursuit of knowledge as pointless because of this,
however, Nietzsche instead views this revelation as but
a further, joyous reason for why we indeed should make
this pursuit a way of life. After all, if there are that many
truths out there. So many interpretations in which one
could base one’s life. Then how many truths could we
take into ourselves and affirm? (Anderson, 2017, §3.2.3).
Gay science is thus a new way of thinking about, as well
as doing, intellectual work. It is a playful break away from
the traditional, academic way of dedicating oneself to the
life of learning:
In philosophy as in science, [...Nietzsche...] encourages
experimentation, flirtation now with this hypothesis,
now with that one. So, too, with moral “theories.” The
question is not so much “Are they true?” It is, rather,
“What kind of life results from them?”—and the only
way to find out is to try them. [...What...] a philosopher
does is ultimately more important than—indeed the test
of—what he says.
- Higgins; Solomon, 2000, pp.206-207 [my italics]
The main focus of gay science is then simply a repeated
question of “what if I see things from this perspective?”
Now trying the perspective of a warrior, now a pacifist,
now a thief, now a judge—all without concerning oneself
with the question whether the perspectives denied each
other. “For Nietzsche, to aim at consistency was a sign of
weakness.” (Jones, 1976, p.260), as in, weakness meaning
the feelings of exhaustion at having to make new values
over and over again, rather than cementing existing ones
as eternal and “objective”—as noted back in §5.1. What
is instead important to Nietzsche is that one approaches the
pursuit of knowledge and ways of life in a way akin to a
treasure-hunter, an adventurous seafarer, or an explorer of
unknown frontiers (Thielst, 1999, pp.86-87)—not with an
intent of greed or hoarding, that is, but with open, playful
thoughts of “what is out there?”
The different characteristics which are to follow in the
rest of this paragraph are then to be understood from this
perspective. They aren’t truly Nietzsche’s answers, but are
instead plausible hypotheses, ready for testing.
30
 The following list covers the different characteristics or of Christian culture is harming them. However, not all
“virtues” which Nietzsche advocates for the importance of. people are higher types, and thus, those who still need the
However, it is important to acknowledge that Nietzsche values of Christianity to find meaning in their lives, he is
also believed in “individual virtues,” as in, characteristics trying to protect from his own writings. Nietzsche’s goal
unique to a singular person which made them individually is to help higher types, not to harm Christians. The purpose
great. And as a result of this, thought that virtues shouldn’t of Nietzsche’s harsh tone then, is simply to try and make
be named, since this would serve to generalize them. With sure that those who wouldn’t benefit from his work would
this detail in mind, we will however still try and find some either stop reading him, or be so outraged that they might
general characteristics here. Simply noting that there is the miss the harmful things he actually had to say (Anderson,
thought that they can be made unique (Higgins; Solomon, 2017, §5).
2000, p.179). Solitude. With the above emphasis on courtesy having
been stated, it is however important to highlight that for
● Courtesy Nietzsche this virtue is contrasted and complemented by
● Solitude the virtue of solitude as the higher type, by the very nature
● Overflowing of their position, constantly finds themself in opposition
● Style with majorities everywhere. Contradicting the majority in
● Pride both word and action. The higher type then, for Nietzsche,
This list is by no means exhaustive, and it is even intended is further characterised by a “[...] penchant for solitude, an
to have multiple characteristics represented within just one absolute devotion to one’s tasks, an indifference to external
virtue. But more striking to a reader would probably be the opinion, a fundamental certainty about oneself and one’s
virtues themselves; many of them hardly seem like virtues. values (that often strikes others as hubris) [...]” (Leiter,
This fact is obviously no accident. Nietzsche was after all 2004/2020, §2), and they therefore value their solitude
on a mission to reshape what society once found valuable, so they indeed can dedicate themself to their great project.
so of course he would advocate for values which would be Indeed, from Nietzsche’s perspective, some of the higher
viewed as strange. Let’s take a closer look at these virtues. type’s virtues might only be able to truly show themselves
Courtesy. From reading the descriptions of Nietzsche when in solitude (Higgins; Solomon, 2000, pp.194-195).
throughout this essay, one might not expect him to care None of this should be misunderstood as Nietzsche not
all that much for courtesy, but the reality is quite different. valuing notions such as friendship, however, not at all. He
“Nietzsche contends that rudeness betrays a lack of style, clearly did think it was deeply valuable to have someone
a lack of self-discipline, and a poverty of perspective. By with whom to share one’s great project, one who inspires
contrast, more noble individuals are courteous, sometimes oneself, and whom oneself might inspire too. Nietzsche
even in their thoughts [...]” (Higgins; Solomon, 2000, himself wanted companions with whom he could share his
p.184), meaning that they have an eye for what is best in writings. Not parroting disciples (Ansell-Pearson; Bragg;
the people around them, as well as an open-minded view Hughes; Mulhall, 2018, timestamp.46:46-47:09; Higgins;
of other perspectives but their own. This, however, doesn’t Solomon, 2000, p.188).
come from a fear of confrontation, but rather from a lack of Overflowing. Obviously, to dedicate oneself entirely to a
desire for looking down upon or punishing others (Higgins; life project requires enormous amounts of both energy and
Solomon, 2000, pp.191-192; Magee; Stern, 1987, Section effort. Further, it might demand incredible courage as well
2, timestamp.09:12-09:46). to dedicate oneself to such, in the face of a potentially big
One might however still be left with a feeling of unease and consistent opposition from other people. This and even
at the idea of Nietzsche’s emphasis on courtesy; how does more is what overflowing stands for as a virtue.
that fit with his vicious attacks on Christianity and similar? What the word “overflowing” here seeks to capture is
A possible answer to this question is that it exactly is out of probably best explained through some examples, let’s take
courtesy. The entire point of Nietzsche’s project is to make courage first:
clear to higher types that their way of life within the values

31
 It is then for the sake of style that one must master oneself,
Courage, for Nietzsche, refers not so much to so that the “[...] moments of ugliness [...can be...] gradually
overcoming fear (the standard account) or having removed or reworked through the formation of a second
“just the right amount” of fear (Aristotle’s account), nature [...]” (Anderson, 2017, §3.2.4). Nietzsche basically
and it certainly doesn’t mean having no fear (the wants us to see our lives or character through the eyes of a
pathological conception of courage). Rather, as in gardener; taking what might initially be ugly and cultivate
so many of his conceptions of virtue, Nietzsche has in it what is beautiful. Not by adding something on top of
a model of “over-flowing”—overflowing with an the ugliness, but instead by encouraging and trying to steer
assertiveness that overwhelms fear [...] not without the growth-from-within which is already occurring. For an
fear, but overriding fear. example, one might take ugly feelings of jealousy and try
- Higgins; Solomon, 2000, p.183 to transform those feelings into a beautiful rivalry instead.
(Botton, 2014, timestamp.12:17-13:58; 15:17-16:40).
To put the point in straightforward terms, Nietzsche was
As the quote above suggests, this assertive overflowing also
of the view that “[...] beauty [...isn’t an...] accident but the
plays a central role in other virtues, such as generosity,
consequence of sustained effort [...]” (Higgins; Solomon,
which then isn’t the overcoming of miserliness and greed,
2000, p.197).
nor the simple habit of giving, but again an overflowing,
A final quick point on style before we move on to the last
a feeling of being “[...] on top of the world, unconcerned
virtue. The reason behind giving one’s life style relates to
about preserving one’s position.” (Higgins; Solomon, 2000,
Nietzsche’s view of the relationship between truth and art,
p.189), and therefore happy, even taking pleasure in the act
or illusion, as discussed throughout §3 and §4. Style within
of giving to, or helping, others. Overflowing thus stands in
this context stands on the side of art as a counterforce to
direct opposition to feelings of exhaustion or weakness.
truth and honesty, or more specifically as a good will to the
This should however not be misunderstood as necessarily
state of being deceived. The thought here is that since the
having an outgoing or otherwise energetic personality or
world and our human relationship toward it generally lends
manner (Higgins; Solomon, 2000, pp.185-186).
itself more to resulting in errors—a state of affairs which
How does the higher type maintain such overwhelming
we come to realize more and more through the discoveries
amounts of energy? Part of the answer is certainly that it
of science—if we valued nothing but truth then this state
simply is an aspect of who they are. They just are inclined
of affairs would be completely unbearable to us, and thus
towards such overabundance. However, Nietzsche does
destroy us. However, since we have chosen to value lies,
also note that the higher type knows what is best for their
the opposite of truth, within the form of art, this problem
own health. Knowing how to listen to their own needs, and
does not arise (Anderson, 2017, §3.2.4). Style as a form of
thereby not get bogged down by circumstances or views
art, in this case then, is a virtue due to it allowing us to say
which would exhaust creative energy. This being true both
both that we do and do not know ourselves. We can’t know
in the case of spiritual health, as well as with literal health
all the hidden drives that dictate our lives, but we can make
(Leiter, 2004/2020, §1.2).
a beautiful, coherent interpretation of it which we do know.
Style. Nietzsche’s notion of “giving style to one’s life”
Pride. What is perhaps more commonly known as one of
has been mentioned in passing a few times throughout this
the seven deadly sins, even the worst one of them, is from
essay already. Here, I wish to clarify the notion further, but
the perspective of Nietzsche a virtue and the ultimate cause
the reality is that Nietzsche is very vague on how style is
or motive for action. It is perhaps quite fitting that, like the
supposed to work when he describes it. Still, here are some
slaves who took what their masters thought was good and
relevant points:
instead made it evil. For his new morality, Nietzsche takes
Christianity’s ultimate evil and makes it good.
[...Style...] is not just a way of “dressing” oneself, a way Of course, pride should not be misunderstood here. What
of talking or acting, a way of “coming on.” It reflects an Nietzsche means by the term is akin to “self-respect,” or
essential “inner” drive, [...or...] instincts, which manifest even “self-reverence” in a near-religious sense. This in turn
[...] in every aspect of a person’s self-presentation. results in Nietzsche emphasising that not just anyone truly
- Higgins; Solomon, 2000, p.196 is worthy of pride. Instead, he notes that self-interest is
only worth as much as the individual who has it. Which

32
then both has the potential to be of great value, as well as toas the higher types are concerned, regardless of which one,
be outright contemptible. With this, Nietzsche is rejecting one might point to. What I mean by this is that Nietzsche
the distinction between altruism and selfishness. In the case doesn’t view the realization of the higher type as the “final
of the higher type, their “[...] self-interest is to the benefit
goal” of humanity. Even if he does speak of it as being the
of the greater good.” (Higgins; Solomon, 2000, p.185). “meaning of the earth” he simply means thereby that it is a
Additionally, Nietzsche views pride as an indication of one way of potentially overcoming nihilism. So even if we then
being both of great health—in the sense of the overflowing did overcome nihilism by bringing the higher type into
energy discussed above—as well as expressing satisfaction being, that wouldn’t suddenly mean that we now could
with earthly life—rather than needing other worlds (Leiter, stop with creating new values, that project would still go
2004/2020, §2; Higgins; Solomon, 2000, p.193). on eternally. Remember, Nietzsche does not believe in any
version of teleology—the thought that a purpose exists in
We have now discussed in some detail a few virtues, nature or even in the process of history—and the higher
as well as the central positive doctrines, which Nietzsche type can therefore not be any kind of goal for humanity.
argued for, for the sake of humanity overcoming nihilism. The higher type is thus just to be understood as Nietzsche’s
Before we move on to compare these ideas with Leira and answer to the immediate problem of the onset of nihilism.
her followers, I do however wish to take a moment to once What all of this amounts to is then, and when paired with
again emphasise some points about the nature of the ideas the playful nature of gay science, that the higher type as he
which have been described here. describes it potentially isn’t the best way of combatting the
The central point of Nietzsche’s positive moral thought is nihilism of the future, there might be completely different
that he wants to cultivate the higher type. That is the point values and virtues which Nietzsche haven’t thought of that
of all the other ideas, to find a way for higher types to be solve the problem far better. But Nietzsche obviously is
able to flourish. aware of this, and he is as a result perfectly happy to both
Now, the first point to emphasise about this is that if one advocate for the higher type, while also joyously saying
were to read Nietzsche’s ideas and then wish for oneself to that the higher type stinks (Kaufmann, 1960/2008, part 2,
become a higher type, then sadly the answer is that this is timestamp.28:42-29:10; Higgins; Solomon, 2013,
not possible. Why not? Because of Nietzsche’s denial of [lecture 8], timestamp.03:56:00-04:02:22; [lecture 17],
free will. When Nietzsche writes to higher types, he is not timestamp.08:31:25-08:32:30; [lecture 23],
writing to people with the potential for becoming higher timestamp.11:43:00-11:44:30). Nietzsche has thus left free
types, but to people who are higher types. In other words, space for future philosophers—or players of D&D—to
whether one is a higher type or lower type is not a matter come up with their own, better characteristics of the higher
of choice; one either is or isn’t one, and it cannot change. types of their respective age and society.
Indeed, this inherent inequality in nature and among people §6.5 - Leirans as Higher Types. With the positive ideas
too is an aspect of reality which Nietzsche wants the higher of Nietzsche established, let’s see how they fit with the few
type to learn to affirm. Now, with this having been said; on aspects of Leira’s faith of which we have information of.
the other hand, as stated back at the opening of §6, I am in Nietzsche’s main demand is that morality should serve
this essay considering Nietzsche as an anti-realist when it life, that it should care for and enhance the lives of higher
comes to values. Values do, however, include his notations types of people. The initial burning question then; does
of higher and lower types, which in turn would mean that Leira even care about life? About people?
even though Nietzsche doesn’t think we can change what If this question can’t be answered at least partially in the
type of person we are, he also doesn’t truly think that there affirmative, then the entire comparison wouldn’t be all that
is any actual facts about which type we are either (Leiter, appealing. However, one of the few sources which speaks
2004/2020, §3; §3.2; Leiter, 2009, timestamp.44:11-47:17) of Leira’s relationship to people expresses that “[...] it is
From the point of there being no true facts of the matter known that those few who managed to visit her realm in
when we speak of values, we can move on to the second Limbo uninvited were normally trapped or restrained
point I wish to note, the actual characteristics of the higher rather than simply being atomized, as is the practice of
types. As I stated before listing Nietzsche’s virtues above, most evil or impatient powers.” (Boyd; Martin, 1996, p.93
these virtues are simply initial ideas worth testing as far as [my italics]), which at least would suggest that Leira has
Nietzsche is concerned. The thing is, the same is true as far some concern for the lives of people, even beyond her own

33
faithful. And though this doesn’t mean much, one could
further contrast Leira’s tendencies with Oghma’s greater
readiness for lethal measures (Boyd; Martin, 1996, p.132).
Leira’s preference for non-lethal overpowering of enemies
is also reflected by her clergy, who generally favour a gas
which induces sleep when inhaled as their main weapon of
choice (Boyd; Martin, 1996, p.95).
These minor notes should be sufficient to establish some
degree of concern for mortal life. But of course, Nietzsche
didn’t simply mean the preservation of life when he spoke
of it. As we have seen, what Nietzsche truly values about
life is the self-realization of the higher types, which then,
if we take Leira’s faith to be equivalent, would mean that
Leirans presumably all would be higher types. This being
the case would give further context to the believed very
low number of actual priests, its loose structure, and the
need for several meetings between the faithful—beyond
the deceptive nature of the faith itself that is (Boyd; Martin,
1996, pp.94-95). The point here is that Nietzsche thought
higher types to be quite rare, and indeed, that even those
who did exist have been so affected by majority lower type
culture that they don’t realize their own status as higher
types, nor the value of being such.
Like Nietzsche himself through his writing, Leirans then,
would have as one of their purposes the task, not to convert
people to the church of Leira, but rather, to identify higher
types in society, unaware of themselves being such, and try
and awaken their realization of this fact to them. However,
since the values of the lower types are so heavily cemented
in the minds of the “unawakened” higher types, it is very
difficult to truly know who is a lower type, a higher type
ready-to-be-awakened, or a higher type who is not ready
yet. Nietzsche and the Leirans thus have to be very delicate
when addressing possible higher types:
It is a dilemma [...Nietzsche...] finds himself in over and
over again—should he content himself with dropping
hints, or should he say what he thinks it is necessary for
us to know in skywriting? He wants us to be the kind of
people who only need hints because we are so fine-tuned,
but he knows that we will be deaf to anything less than
apocalyptic thunder—and then accuse him of making too
much noise.
- Tanner, 2000, pp.48-49
Beyond a simple appreciation for lies as art, Leirans then,
speak in riddles for the purpose of trying to tease out new
thoughts and reactions in their listeners which might lead
them to realize their status as higher types. And if any such
reactions do not manifest, that is then all for the better, as
the person in question then likely still is in need of lower
type morality and culture.
An example of this can be seen in the game Baldur’s
Gate, within the dialogue of the Leiran called Shaella who
initially notes when engaged in conversation that the party
of Gorion’s Ward—that is, the Player Character—seems to
be “[...] strong and worthy adventurers.” (BioWare, 1998,
Shaella [NPC]). If this statement is taken in a Nietzschean
context, then what she is saying is that they appear to have
the overflowing abundance of “health” for creating their
own values and that they are ready to affirm their earthly
lives—as emphasised as a virtue to Nietzsche in §6.4. But,
if Gorion’s Ward answers this in the affirmative, claiming
that Shaella “sees clearly,” then she denies this, stating that
she only sees this “[...] dimly [...], through the mists [...]”
(BioWare, 1998, Shaella [NPC]). Why would she react this
way? Because the emphasis on clarity by Gorion’s Ward
signifies a continued attachment to the value of The Truth
in their view of the world—perhaps not surprising as they
were raised in a temple of Oghma.
Let’s look at some other Nietzschean ideas shared with
the faith of Leira. In extension to the small numbers, lack
of structure, and the need for meetings discussed before,
one might also note that Leira too values her solitude, as
Nietzsche does (see §6.4). “She was apparently content
with her small following and had no great and glorious
plans or ambitions. On a personal level, she seems to have
been a very private power, and the only passing friendship
she maintained was with Mask [...]” (Boyd; Martin, 1996,
p.93). Leira’s supposed lack of plans or ambitions does
initially seem like a contradiction to the Nietzschean call
for higher types to commit themselves to a unified project.
But one should remember that she is the goddess of this
view, meaning that she should rather be seen as inspiring
others to strive for such projects. Such an interpretation
of her is indeed also supported by sources, as it is stated
that she actively sought to aid and inspire her faithful
through the manifesting of absurd or enigmatic creatures
which “[...] were invisible to anyone but those they were
sent to help [...and...] inspire [...]” (Boyd; Martin, 1996,
p.94). Indeed, one might interpret this as Leira having
the emotional and creative well-being of her higher type
faithful as her primary priority—rather than any “personal”
divine projects of her own, like other deities often have
commitment to.
34
 Next I wish to examine the specifics of Leira’s dogma.
Do any of Nietzsche’s positive accounts serve to illuminate
some different aspects of the dogma further? Let’s look at
some of what it says:
Leirans are to give as well as take, to raise hope as well
as dashing hopes [...] Cherish and further illusions and
rumors, for distortion and legend are what make folk
happy and life alluring. Hiding a thing gives it value by
the very act of cloaking.
- Boyd; Martin, 1996, p.94
Beyond being a second case of Leira showing concern for
the well-being of people and their lives, what is being said
in this quote when read in a Nietzschean context? I would
say that it is referring to Nietzsche’s thought of the good
will to appearance and deception (see §6.4). This idea of
Leirans both “raising and dashing hopes” is presented in
the context of what is referred to as “Holy Mystery” in the
world, which is what science and philosophy seeks to rid it
of for the sake of finding The Truth—as was discussed in
§4—but remember, since no such Truth actually exist from
Nietzsche’s perspective, unmasking this “Holy Mystery”
would only serve to bring about nihilism (see §5.1). Which
itself was the reason why Leiran’s were to avoid speaking
The Truth, and as noted in §4.5 instead keep to pragmatic
truths. The Leiran edict to “cherish and further illusions”
would then be for the sake of protecting people from the
damage which occurs from the pursuit of The Truth. There
is however more to it than that. Since the dogma also calls
for “hopes to be raised,” Leiran lies and illusions can’t just
be anything. No, they must offer some kind of coherence or
meaning—to whatever topic is being “lied” about—as this
was what notions of The Truth otherwise offered. What I
mean by this is that Leiran’s can’t just pull the rug out from
under the feet of science and philosophy and call it a day.
People look to “The Truth” of science and philosophy for
ways of understanding their world, both natural and social,
and thus, if Leiran’s undermine the status of these world
views, then they need to offer an alternative way for people
to find meaning in their lives—to find “hope.“ How they
do this then, I’d say, would be through the aforementioned
pragmatic view of truth and science, and by extension, the
encouragement of engaging in gay science (see §6.4). That
is to say, by pursuing knowledge from the perspective that
“life is alluring” and that the ”cloaked” state of it is why it
is so alluring.
Leirans then, would be encouraging a person’s search for
knowledge. Not in cases where the purpose is to find The
Truth, but rather, they’d do so in cases where the goal is to
broaden one’s horizons, where one is simply trying to find
out “what else is out there?” or “what do other people think
of this?”
A further way we can look at this part of Leira’s dogma,
is as an articulation of the will to power. Specifically, to be
“[...] understood as a drive to overcome resistance, which
wills the world’s resistance along with its overcoming [...]”
(Anderson, 2017, §3.2.1). This interpretation is basically
an extension of the former one; it accepts that there is no
final goal to arrive at for neither our pursuit of knowledge,
nor for our lives. Life is a constant striving towards a goal,
after goal, after goal. And the very fact that it takes effort
to achieve one’s goals is, though not outright what makes
them meaningful, it certainly is an important, contributing
factor in it (Botton, 2014, timestamp.06:44-10:20; Leiter,
2004/2020, §1.3).
For our final comparison of Nietzsche’s positive thought
with the Leiran faith, let’s take a look at one of the most
important rituals of the religion, The Unmasking. The ritual
is described like this:
The Unmasking is performed as purification by novices
entering the priesthood, priests rising in rank, or priests
doing penance for slighting their faith (telling the truth
too often, for example). In this ritual, the bare-faced
supplicant walks down ranks of priests holding tall lit
candles between reflecting pools of water and mirrors.
- Boyd; Martin, 1996, p.95
Now, as is true for all religious rituals, some, if not all, of
the elements of the ritual are steeped in layers upon layers
of symbolism relevant to the faith. Thus, the question here
is what the ritual really is trying to accomplish through its
use of symbols?
When considering the following elements of the ritual,
I however don’t find this all that difficult to ascertain; it (1)
involves the use of reflective surfaces; (2) supplicant has to
be bare-faced; (3) the ritual is performed within the context
of personal change, that is, penance and rank-change. What
do these three elements of the ritual amount to when all put
together? Simple. They show the purpose of the ritual to be
honest self-examination. Where did self-examination come
up in the thought of Nietzsche?—in eternal recurrence.
35
 We have already covered the important features of the
idea of eternal recurrence in detail in §6.2, so let’s simply
summarize some key points and reflect on them a bit.
As just stated, self-examination is a highly plausible
theme shared between both eternal recurrence and The
Unmasking ritual. But in the case of eternal recurrence, the
self-examination isn’t an end unto itself, but rather is made
for the sake of enabling oneself in affirming life; achieving
amor fati. How would this translate to Leiran rituals then?
Presumably, during The Unmasking, a Leiran would gaze
at their own reflection and consider the contents of their
life so far, where they’re from, and where they are going.
The Leiran would reflect on the aspects of life they value,
and try to accept that these are their values, set by themself,
and don’t have any external truth. Further, the Leiran also
would seek to accept and affirm that they are constantly in
a process of change. Try to affirm not what they are. But
what they have become, what they are becoming, and that
they will continue to become forever. The ultimate question
of the ritual is then whether the Leiran has the strength or
health to continue down the Leiran path of life affirmation.
Which in turn would explain why Leiran “[...] priests doing
penance for slighting their faith (telling the truth too often,
for example),” as mentioned above, also would be expected
to undergo the ritual—because their health has come into
question. Thus, again, the point of the ritual is ultimately
to investigate whether a Leiran still has the attitude of the
higher type.
What if the Leiran finds themself unable to affirm their
life in the relevant way? Then they might be in need of new
perspectives on their lives, additional perspectives from
which to consider where one has been, how one changed in
life, and where one might be going (see §4.2). Though the
author of this essay knows of no Nietzsche commentators
who write on this question, I would say that the emphasis
of Nietzsche’s on cultivating as many perspectives as one
personally can manage and affirm to thereby arrive at as
holistic a truth as possible. Then it leaves the possibility
open where, even if an individual is unable to affirm their
life from one perspective, they might still be able to do so
from another perspective.
Here is an example to highlight my point: Imagine that
you killed a person to save the life of a friend. Now, if you
were to have the perspective of a pacifist, then one would
not expect you to be able to affirm your actions from this
perspective. However, if you also had the perspective that
it is important to protect innocent lives. Then you indeed
might be able to affirm your actions from this perspective.
Now, these two perspectives need not necessarily always
be in conflict. But even if they were to conflict, this would
not undermine the value of holding both to Nietzsche. For,
if you remember, to “[...] Nietzsche, to aim at consistency
was a sign of weakness.” (Jones, 1976, p.260), thus, to be
able to see the value of a perspective, even if it conflicts
with other valued perspectives, is a sign of inner strength.
The ultimate conclusion is then that if a Leiran cannot
affirm their life—even after having considered all their
different perspectives—their next course of action would
then be to try out new perspectives, new lives from which
the Leiran might indeed be able to affirm the aspect of their
life which they so far have been unable to (see §6.4). For
example; if one can’t affirm aspects of one’s life from the
perspective of a knight, travelling priest, or king. Perhaps
those aspects can indeed be affirmed from that of a beggar?
Thus, what might to an outsider of the Leiran faith, seem
like a Leiran “impersonating” and “infiltrating” different
circles of society, might rather be a Leiran in the process of
trying to “live life from a new perspective.”
§7 - No God in a Setting of Gods?
Leira, [...] Some say she died in the Time of Troubles,
killed by Cyric, betrayed by Mask. Some say she loved
Mask and loves him still. Some say gods can die. Some
say gods can be born. Some say gods can live. Some say
gods are an illusion we create for our own contentment.
Some say gods are an illusion we create to disguise our
fear of living, our fear of dying, our fear of being. If
gods are a disguise, if gods are an illusion, then perhaps
Leira is the only beacon of truth in our entire pantheon
of lies. But if gods are real and true and all-knowing,
then Leira cannot be a god and must be dead if indeed
she ever lived at all.
- BioWare, 1998, Shaella [NPC]
With all the major, relevant points of Nietzsche’s thought
outlined, a compelling case for its compatibility with the
faith of Leira should now have been established. However,
there are still some complications to be addressed, which
the final §7 and §8 will seek to address.
Let’s begin with the rather obvious elephant-in-the-room.
One could easily argue that all of Nietzsche’s philosophy is
focused on addressing the “death of god” and finding ways
to live without the belief in god.
36
The obvious problem is then, of course, that gods in fact do
exist and are very much still alive in the Forgotten Realms
setting, or most any other setting for that matter.
This seemingly obvious problem is deceiving however.
Remember, as discussed in §4.4, Nietzsche’s concept of the
“death of god” is not truly an atheist claim. His main point
does not hinge on the actual existence of divinity. No, what
Nietzsche argued was that collective belief in a singular,
true, and unchanging way of life had become impossible to
believe in. And indeed, this view is advocated for by the
followers of Leira as well—as expressed above: “If gods
are a disguise, if gods are an illusion, then perhaps Leira is
the only beacon of truth in our entire pantheon of lies. But
if gods are real and true and all-knowing, then Leira cannot
be a god and must be dead [...]” (BioWare, 1998, Shaella
[NPC]). What Shaella is expressing in this quote is that if
the word “god” represents immutable concepts like “evil,”
“good,” “justice,” or “being,” then Leira’s godhood does
not fall under this definition of the word “god.” However,
since she, as well as several other gods, in fact have died or
been replaced, or indeed even changed perspective on how
they best “act out their divinity,” this suggests that the gods
of D&D indeed aren’t to be understood in an immutable
sense of the word “god,” but rather as ever-changing forces
of reality. Unpredictable and earthly. Which, in turn, is why
Shaella claims that the other gods make up a “pantheon of
lies,” when they attempt to keep up the false appearance of
divine immutability.
The issue of divine existence does, however, also raise an
additional and more subtle issue for our Nietzsche-based
interpretation of Leira’s faith; the existence of the afterlife,
as well that of souls independent of bodies.
Now, to understand how these truths of D&D still allow
for the Nietzschean interpretation of Leira we will need to
think about and emphasize a few important aspects of what
it truly is Nietzsche is arguing against regarding the idea of
the afterlife. Further, this will require us leaving behind the
Forgotten Realms setting for a bit, for the sake of taking a
closer look at what these afterlives are actually like.
First, to understand what Nietzsche is trying to say, we
need to get slightly more acquainted with Immanuel Kant.
As was quickly suggested back at the start of §4, Nietzsche
does accept Kant’s transcendental idealism in some sense
or form—this is far from an uncontested claim, and even
if accepted is still far more complicated than what we can
reasonably address here. What matters for our purposes
here is simply that Nietzsche rejects the notion that people
can have knowledge of transcendental matters—even if
only in very minor aspects. What Kant means by this idea
“[...] is that human beings experience only appearances,
not things in themselves; and that space and time are only
subjective forms of human intuition that would not subsist
in themselves if one were to abstract from all subjective
conditions of human intuition.” (Rohlf, 2010/2020, §3).
Again, we do not need to understand the nuances of Kant’s
thought here, nor what Nietzsche thought of these ideas.
What matters is simply that transcendence here refers to
things as they are in themselves, in other words, what Kant
denied we had any perceptual knowledge of. In the most
extreme group of transcendent notions would be ideas like
god and the soul—things completely separate from earthly
life. Such transcendent entities are what Nietzsche denies
the existence of. But wait... Doesn’t this just bring us back
to where we started? Not quite. If what Nietzsche rejects,
when he rejects otherworldliness are transcendent entities,
entities completely beyond mortal perceptual knowledge,
is he then truly speaking of the Outer Planes as understood
in D&D? Not even slightly. The Outer Planes are realms in
their own right. Alien and strange, certainly, but people can
not only perceive their existence, but both go there and live
there. The Outer Planes, the afterlife in D&D, are indeed
not transcendental, they are unfamiliar. And of course, just
as prone to change as the D&D gods can be (Cook; Wise,
1994, [A DM Guide to the Planes], pp.1-7; pp.18-20). This
is, however, not to say that Nietzsche wouldn’t still reject
the idea of a person living their life with the eventual goal
of achieving a certain afterlife.
Speaking of people, our discussion so far only leaves the
soul as unaddressed. However, due to the fact that we now
have addressed the afterlife overall, this already negates
most of the issues with the existence of souls. What is left
is simply to have a look at what souls “do” after they have
died, or rather, whether they indeed do anything at all.
What I mean by this is that if souls were to be transcendent
in nature, then their afterlives would have to involve being
eternal and unchanging, and of course, they’d have to be
completely immaterial. This is, however, far from the case
for D&D souls—let us ignore creatures such as ghosts and
similar undead, as they are expressions of failed afterlives,
as it were. And aren’t immaterial in the relevant way—as,
when a D&D soul dies and becomes a “petitioner” in one
of the Outer Planes, they do take physical form in a kind of
sense. Further, these petitioners do this for the purpose of
being able to pursue some sort of task relevant to the plane
of their afterlife. Whatever these tasks may be, the purpose
for completing them is the same for all.
37
All petitioners working at their individual tasks are doing
so for the sake of, through these tasks, aligning themselves
to the plane of their afterlives at large, and eventually
merge with the plane (Cook; Wise, 1994, [A Player’s Guide
to the Planes], pp.9-10; p.21).
What do these characteristics of petitioners mean? In fact,
quite a few things for our purposes. The most immediately
obvious is that mortal souls neither are transcendental, nor
truly immaterial, and lastly, neither are they unchanging.
Quite the opposite, they are largely physical entities which
actively engage in tasks for the very purpose of changing,
so that they can merge with their plane. These details are
however also relevant in a far subtler way. If we consider
the D&D afterlife from a Nietzschean perspective, then it
isn’t really an afterlife at all. It is rather a further life-stage,
a quite different one granted, but overall it could be said
that the existence of a petitioner isn’t all that different from
that of a mortal person; they are both individuals, engaged
in active tasks which lead them to undergo change. They
are also both threatened by the possibility of destruction.
And eventually, both of them will come to face some kind
of destruction (Cook; Wise, 1994, [A Player’s Guide to the
Planes], p.10)—unsurprising since destruction is necessary
for change.
Where the true subtly steps in, however, is when we see
that to Nietzsche—and thus to Leira too—this idea of the
“merging with the plane” is where we find the true concept
of the afterlife in the transcendental sense. The thing is,
when petitioners supposedly “merge” in this way, they are
of the belief that they’ll lose their sense of individuality,
and that this merging will be “ultimate,” as in “final.” This
then suggests that petitioners believe that they in the loss of
their individuality become part of something greater as well
as something eternal. And lastly, a state which they have to
“transcend” to—which is the only context beyond that of
the Transcendent Order where the term is employed (Cook;
Wise, 1994, [A DM Guide to the Planes], p.62; [A Player’s
Guide to the Planes], pp.9-10; [Sigil and Beyond], p.34).
What does this mean then? Simply, that Nietzsche as well
as Leira would view this transcendental state past merging
with the plane as not being real. Or at least something that
we can’t know anything about, including whether it is real.
And it is thus not something for which one should spend
one’s life—or afterlife in this case—on preparing oneself
for. As the “merging with the plane” should be viewed in
the same way as Nietzsche views the Christian afterlife.
What this suggests then is that Leiran petitioners likely
wouldn’t be actively seeking to merge themselves with the
Plane of Limbo—where Leira’s divine realm, the “Court of
Illusion” is located—though they presumably wouldn’t be
actively seeking to avoid it either. They would instead see
their afterlives as but a new phase in their lives, and thus
they’d be free to continue their former projects. Now with
the potentially direct encouragement of Leira herself.
In conclusion, none of the inherently spiritual aspects of
the D&D multiverse stand in direct opposition to the thesis
of this essay.
§8 - Nimbral, Samarach & Selûne
Not that you lied to me, but that I no longer believe you,
has shaken me.
- Kaufmann; Nietzsche, 1966/1989, §183
The final complication of this essay to be addressed is that
so far, our Nietzschean interpretation of Leira’s faith has
been entirely based on sources seeking to describe her faith
in general terms, with a specific focus on the priesthood.
It would certainly be sufficient for the goal of this essay to
simply leave the matter with that and put the discussion to
an end here. However, a few further sources relating to the
worship of Leira do still exist, and even if their alignment
with this essay’s interpretation were to be impossible, I’d
still consider it fruitful to identify potential similarities or
divergences. The different sources in question focus on
three “known” places of Leira worship—the hidden lands
of Nimbral and Samarach, as well as the surface of Toril’s
moon, Selûne.
Before we take a closer look at these three locations it is
however important to acknowledge one thing. Since these
are all societies more-or-less defined by the influence of
Leira, it might ultimately be futile to try and find a specific
truth behind the way they live. After all, this is the very
thing Leira urges her followers to avoid. This in turn leads
to us having to concede that both in cases where activities
clearly align, as well as cases where they clearly contradict
the conclusions of this essay so far, we can’t truly know if
these observations are truly trustworthy.
§8.1 - The Fairytales of Nimbral. Located down at the
southwest of Lantan and the Chultan peninsula—a pair
of regions quite mysterious in their own right—the island
realm of Nimbral is thought by many to be little more than
myth. To the people of the Sea of Swords however, the fact
that the Nimbrese “Flying Hunt” was real became crystal
clear when they for a short time performed numerous raids
38
on ships in the larger region (Greenwood, 1995/2004, #1). faith of Leira on Nimbral, there are some reasons to view
Of course, this is not what concerns us here. Rather, what
the narrative as given with some skepticism—beyond the
we need to know is how the Nimbrese live and what their fact that we, as a minimum, are dealing with remnants of
relationship to Leira is like. the faith of Leira—and not just due to the interpretations
As suggested, the church of Leira serves as state religion
argued for in this essay, but also Leira’s faith overall.
for the isle of Nimbral. Or at least it used to, however after
The first issue is that the Nimbrese approach to law isn’t
the Time of Troubles, and with it Leira’s death, the peoplepresented as a remnant of when Leira’s faith ruled the isle,
of Nimbral supposedly sought to rid themselves of the of but rather as a “system” introduced by the wizards, called
her religion, and indeed of organized religions in general the Nimbral Lords, after they came to power. However, if
(Greenwood, 1995/2004, #5). This sudden turn supposedly the Nimbral Lords truly were to “[...] jealously guard the
occurred after the formerly subjugated wizards of Nimbral isolation of Nimbral and their personal secrecy [...for fear
overthrew the Leiran priesthood (Greenwood, 1995/2004, of...], attacks from magically powerful groups [...in case
#6). If so, then any cultural remnants of Leira as well as her
the...] knowledge of their power ever [...were to be leaked
faith—both as written as well as the Nietzschean version out...]” (Greenwood, 1995/2004, #8), which one would’ve
presented in this essay—would simply be instances of old imagined would include potential hidden survivors of the
habits difficult to discard. Leiran priesthood—a group priding themselves on their
Such Leiran habits would include the following: ability to “disappear” after all—then why would the Lords
employ such a “hands off” approach to enforcing their rule.
● The Nimbrese continued to enjoy deceptive pieces And further, why would they hole-themselves-up in the
of art and architecture. Indeed, the pegasus-riding very location where they used to be imprisoned. A location
knights of the realm all lived in their own personal which any potentially still-living enemies would know the
castles described as “fairytale-like” in construction hidden entrances and secrets of better than the Lords would
(Greenwood, 1995/2004, #3). themselves? (Greenwood, 1995/2004, #8).
● By extension of the above point, the Nimbrese liked A second puzzling fact is that the Nimbral Lords also yet
telling minor lies and were interested in the telling still favour the creation of magic items which are disguised
of stories (Greenwood, 1995/2004, #3; #5; #6). multiple times over:
● The Nimbrese valued smaller communities. Young
members often leaving the island to explore the rest They don't use the standard forms in most of them (no
of Toril but nonetheless still typically would return Nimbral Lord makes a ring of blinking when she can
to avoid the many crowds (Greenwood, 1995/2004, craft a bracer of blinking), they magically disguise them
#2; #3). as something else (that bracer resembles a bloodstained
● For a Nietzschean point, the Nimbrese were of a
bandage) [...]
fatalistic mindset, thinking that misfortune simply - Greenwood, 1995/2004, #8
is an expression of how the world is (Greenwood,
1995/2004, #4).
Why put such great effort into the continuous disguising of
● “Knights seldom compete directly with nearby
their creations if they disapprove of such methods? Sure,
neighbors in types of produce grown, but when
there is the simple matter of prudence, but prudence would
they do, rivalries can be fierce.” (Greenwood,
be acknowledged just as well through the saving of one’s
1995/2004, #3). When viewed from a Nietzschean
resources for future creations. Why would all the Nimbral
perspective, then this quote suggests that the people
Lords make a point out of doing this?
of Nimbral are inclined to pursue their projects with
A third issue is that the “[...] Lords promote the idea that
great feelings of passion.
all organized worship is founded in deceit, and is therefore
● Finally, when it comes to crimes, Nimbrese laws,
a bad and self-limiting thing.” (Greenwood, 1995/2004,
as well as enforcement of these are largely done on
#5), however, as established by this essay, the faith of
a case-by-case basis with the focus being on direct
Leira is by its very nature not organized, and even if one
retribution (Greenwood, 1995/2004, #5).
were to argue that the Nimbrian church was an exception
However, in spite of these supposed remnants of the former to this rule, I’d have to note that this would seem like a

39
highly unlikely scenario when considering how its Remember that this story was told in the wake of Leira’s
activities during its reign were described: death at the hands of Cyric. That is after all why the story
of the wizards overpowering the now-helpless cleric would
[...] always-changing games of falsehood and deception be so plausible. However, this very context also raises a far
were spun with lies, playacting, illusions, physical different scenario. As Leira died, the Nimbral priesthood
disguises, and hallucinatory drugs added to most would indeed have become helpless. But her death would
drinkables and cooked dishes. Priests took pride in being have had no impact on the powers of her illusionist wizard
the "Master Dreamweavers" of manipulation, causing worshipers. This in turn would have meant that it would be
Nimbrans to do strange things through false perceptions up to the wizards of Nimbral to lead the community, while
and beliefs. the priesthood would go into hiding. These acts, as well as
- Greenwood, 1995/2004, #6 the creation of the narrative of the wizard uprising would
then have been fabricated for the purpose of hiding the
Though this description certainly suggests a collectively now weakened state of Nimbral from potential enemies.
accepted religion, that is not the same as the religion being It was thus not false when the older sources claim that the
organized, far from it. And indeed, since it is specifically Nimbral Lords “jealously guarded their secrets,” and that
emphasized that the population of Nimbral was never all they’d do so out of fear of “magically powerful groups.”
that large, considering Leira’s church as a truly organized These claims would be reflecting the truth, but the reason
religion in this location is doubtful. for this fear would be because of Nimbral’s lack of clerics,
Lastly, the reasons for the imprisonment of the wizards nothing more.
remains unexplained. Our only piece of information is that Further, this interpretation of the available sources would
they were kept in “spell-workshops,” but nothing more is also both explain why the Nimbral Lords continued their
offered (Greenwood, 1995/2004, #6). None of this adds up, work on the creation of magic items with highly deceptive
however. Leirans seek to hide away things which already qualities, as well as why they would have remained within
are of value, or to sponsor the creation of such. It does not the very structure where they’d originally been “held.” It
seek to secretly create valuable things without anyone would be because they never ceased being Leirans, and the
knowing. Further, wizards are not considered of lesser structure likely is a temple of hers.
rank within the church, when compared to clerics (Boyd; All the reasons for accepting my recontextualized state of
Martin, 1996, p.94). affairs have so far been based on D&D sources themselves,
With all of these issues attached to the narrative of the but there is also appeal in accepting this narrative from the
Lords, I am inclined to argue that it in itself is a Leiran lie, perspective of the hypothesis of this essay. The appeal of
and that the people of Nimbral never ceased their worship this new narrative is that it allows us to discard the claims
of Leira. This view is supported not only by these many made in the quote above, seeking to characterize Nimbral
inconsistencies, but also by later-but-shorter descriptions “society” during the reign of the Leiran priesthood. Doing
of Nimbral, stating that though the island vanished during so is appealing for our Nietzschean interpretation of Leira
the Spellplague, it has reappeared since. And although it is both because the characterization contradicts Nietzsche’s
still ruled by the Nimbral Lords, it is now acknowledged opposition to artificial sources of Rausch (see §3.2)—like
that they indeed are worshipers of Leira, and that the island alcohol and drugs (Botton, 2014, timestamp.15:15-16:50).
has multiple temples dedicated to her—something the older And it further is appealing due to the fact that life within
sources mentions nothing of (Crawford; Mohan; et al., Nimbral society under the rule of the Nimbral Lords aligns
2015, p.8; p.32; p.72). itself with the characteristics Nietzsche valued to a quite
The story of wizard subjugation and eventual uprising significant extent, as noted in the list above.
would thus seem to be nothing but another lie from Leiran With all of these details having been considered, I would
wizards. But what would they have sought to conceal with not determine Nimbral as being a contradictory case for the
this massive, elaborate lie? One obvious option is that they reading of Leira’s religion argued for in this essay.
were concealing nothing in particular, simply spinning the §8.2 - The Snakes of Samarach. The case of Samarach
lie for the sake of doing so. I however think there might be is a difficult one. The nation is located along the southern
a bit more to it than that. shore of the Chultan peninsula and has direct ties to the isle
of Nimbral.

40
 The problem with determining to what degree Samarach
aligns itself with a Nietzschean interpretation of the Leiran
church is that although the influence of the faith of Leira is
obvious in the nation—the people of the nation valuing the
use of illusions deeply, and lies being the common form of
interactions—this influence is owed more to the local fear
of yuan-ti infiltrators and spies in the region, than due to
belief itself—indeed, to such a degree that other peoples
of the Chultan peninsula perceive Samarachans as outright
cowards (Boyd; Drader; Greenwood, 2004, pp.116-117;
Greenwood; Heinsoo; Reynolds; Williams, 2001, p.106).
These worries are however not just expressions of simple
paranoia, but have reasonable cause behind them, both due
to a consistent history of yuan-ti infiltrations, as well as the
contemporary, though lesser, influence of the serpent folk
(Boyd; Drader; Greenwood, 2004, p.118; p.122; Evans;
Obsidian Entertainment, 2008).
With these details having been stated, it is thus quite the
problem to identify any of the impact of Leira’s faith on the
culture and life in Samarach. Indeed, beyond the abundance
of illusions and the presence of the “Leira’s Trick” inn, the
only other noteworthy characteristic is that the wearing of
masks or veils is highly favoured among the people of the
city of Samargol (Evans; Obsidian Entertainment, 2008,
Samargol, Leira’s Trick [Area]; Boyd; Drader; Greenwood,
2004, p.117). Though this is far from apparent in the parts
of the city open to foreign merchants.
The facts would then lead to one of two options—though
they aren’t truly mutually exclusive. The first option is that
the worship of Leira is largely just a-means-to-an-end, and
indeed, maybe just a side-effect of that end. Specifically,
Leira’s role in Samarachan society would in this case be
much the same as that of Savras in the neighboring nations
Thindol and Tashalar—where the faithful simply call out to
their chosen deity for protection from yuan-ti spies (Boyd;
Drader; Greenwood, 2004, pp.126-128; p.132). As a result,
the people of Samarach would in this case not be all that
concerned with incorporating every aspect of Leira’s faith
in their lives. An alternative, second option is that since the
faith of Leira was introduced by the Nimbrese illusionists
that went on to also govern Samarach, the true followers of
the faith might truly be made up exclusively by the wizard
elites of Samargol’s inaccessible, inner city (Boyd; Drader;
Greenwood, 2004, pp.116-118).
Where do these considerations lead us? Not far. The idea
that the faithful largely are made up of a reclusive, cultural
elite would at least partially align some of Samarach with
the Nietzschean interpretations of this essay. Specifically,
it would align the Samarachan-and-Nimbrese wizards’ way
of life with Nietzsche’s emphasis on the virtue of solitude
described in §6.4 above.
Regardless of what little correlation can be squeezed out
of Samarach, it must however ultimately be concluded that
Samarachan culture and lore simply is too underdeveloped
to draw any significant conclusions from its setting. It can
neither support the Nietzschean reading conclusively, nor
can it undermine it meaningfully.
§8.3 - Fly me to Selûne. The case of Toril’s moon, called
“Selûne” after the goddess of the same name, is without a
doubt the most complicated when it comes to communities
dedicated to Leira. Indeed, it even serves to put some of
the considerations regarding Nimbral and Samarach into
question.
Though inhabited, Selûne’s “Torilian side” is masked by
an enormous illusion depicting the moon as an empty, and
desolate “moonscape.” This illusion was supposedly given
by Leira herself and cannot be dispelled by any being short
of another god more powerful than Leira herself (Henson,
1991, p.25; p.27).
Behind its mask, Selûne is a world covered in enormous
bodies of water, a few massive, volcanic mountain-ranges,
and some huge cities, all connected to one another by large
and decorative streets. Some of these cities further featured
great spelljamming docks, though exclusively on the side
of Selûne facing away from Toril (Henson, 1991, p.27).
So far, so good. But where things get complicated is with
the citizens of Selûne—or rather “Leira” as they themself
refer to the moon they inhabit—who exhibit a profound
fear of, and hostility toward, Torilians in general. This in
itself wouldn’t necessarily be problematic, but when put in
the context that the people Selûne explicitly are stated to
be hedonists completely disinterested in space-travel, then
things begin looking dire for the Nietzschean thesis of this
essay (Henson, 1991, pp.25-27). Indeed, when looking at
the details of Selûnian life, the situation appears outright
catastrophic.
Hedonism, for those unfamiliar, is a doctrine which states
that pleasure and pain are the sole factors in morality, that
is, either being the sole things which motivates us in life,
or further, the sole things with moral value at all. It is also
a traditionally underlying premise of utilitarianism. Both
of these doctrines, however, were adamantly denied by
Nietzsche. He did this for several reasons, but his central
objection was that pleasures aren’t what we strive for, but
rather are potential results of our striving (Bukdahl; Hass,
1979, pp.133-134).
41
 Remember, to Nietzsche what truly matters morally is the
expression of the will to power through self-assertion (see Their interests today do not necessarily dictate their
§6.1). This expression is what is primary. Any pleasure that interests for tomorrow. They do, however maintain a
comes from this is secondary. constant interest in music and the arts, but like children,
That Nietzsche disagrees with the views of utilitarianism the attention span they possess is so short that they are
and hedonism isn’t in itself the problem however. No, the always looking for something new and different.
reason Selûnian culture is catastrophic is due to them being
similar in outlook to what Nietzsche describes as the “Last - Henson, 1991, p.27
Men” within the book, “Thus Spoke Zarathustra.” These
are presented as a possible alternative to the higher types: So, Selûnians are indeed like this, but are the followers of
Leira truly like this too—if Selûnian activities are worthy
[...The Last Man...] is utterly unadventurous, incapable of Leira herself giving them a divine illusion, does this not
of self-criticism, wholly caught up in his own petty suggest that they truly are her most favoured and that the
pleasures, his contentment, his “happiness.” [...] When faith at large should ideally imitate them? Plausibly so, but
Zarathustra announces this vision to the people of the there are, however, some factors which put this conclusion
town [...], Nietzsche has them cheer and demand [...], into question.
that they be made Last Men now [...] The issues with Selûnian life are twofold. The first is that
if the conclusion reached in §6.5 that Leira and her faithful
- Higgins; Solomon, 2000, p.47 [my italics] value life and actively avoid using lethal measures, is true,
then this contradicts the lethal force Selûnians readily use.
The last men are thus people who are concerned only with Not just for dealing with potential “Torilian spies.” But it
their “happiness,” or basically just general comfort: “`We also highlights the absurdity of Selûnians actively leading
have invented happiness,´ say the last men, and they their hired interplanetary artist to their deaths within days,
blink.” (Kaufmann; Nietzsche, 1978, p.17 [my italics]). again and again (Henson, 1991, pp.26-28). The second and
What then makes “him” different from the higher types is obviously worse issue is that Selûnians, in spite of their
that the last man is one “[...] who “blinks” at expectations worship of Leira, appear to oppose roguish behaviour, and
for rank, self-overcoming, and striving for greatness.” value lawfulness and expressions of sincerity. And, again,
(Wilkerson, 05-05-2021, §5). if someone is suspected of ever lying about one’s roguish
Is this what Selûnians are like—the example of all things activities, then they are immediately beheaded (Henson,
wrong with modernity according to Nietzsche? Absolutely 1991, p.26; p.28).
is the alarming answer: If I am right that these are too drastic departures, not just
from the Leiran church, but also from Leira herself, then it
The people on [...Selûne...] want nothing personally to raises the question whether something has happened to the
do with spelljamming. They think it grand that cultures people of Selûne? After all, the continued existence of the
across the universe have made their world a stop in illusion masking the moon is more than evidence enough
their trading routes, but they want nothing to do with to show that the Selûnians were faithful followers of Leira,
the discomfort of the tight quarters and the hair-raising at least at some point or another. If this is so, then we need
adventure on the sail. to identify what time period our sources are seeking to
describe, and then consider whether adjacent events could
- Henson, 1991, p.27 [my italics]
have been the cause of any potential shifts in Selûnian life.
Let us then begin by identifying when the earliest point
As these quotes should have managed to highlight, it is not in history would seem to have been when Leira-worshiping
the Selûnian focus on pleasurable experiences that is the humans from Toril could have migrated to Selûne. Perhaps
problem—Nietzsche too emphasized aesthetics and the arts not surprising, wizards of ancient Netheril were indeed
deeply after all—but rather the risk-aversion. The fear of aware of spelljamming technology, so Netheril would seem
committing oneself to something greater in life. The will to be the oldest example which included humans (Butler;
to “put one’s life on the line” in a broader sense. However, Slade, 1996, p.11).
Selûnians’ cowardice too bleeds into their art experiences:

42
Next, we are led to the year 173 DR when Leira following
wizards from Halruaa—a state founded by survivors from
fallen Netheril—left the nation behind to found the island
country of Nimbral (Baker; Bonny; Stout; Williams, 2005,
p.98-99). What is significant about having Nimbral come
up again is that the Realmspace source claims that Nimbral
features a city-sized spelljamming dock called The Resort,
a claim which directly contradicts the far more detailed
sources on Nimbral. A fact which further encourages the
employing of a skeptical attitude regarding the truthfulness
of either of these sources—due to the deceptive influence
of Leira (Henson, 1991, p.23). The fact that spelljamming
docks are exceedingly rare on Toril, paired with the note
that both Nimbral and Selûne’s majority populations are,
or were, made up almost entirely of humans and high elves,
makes it hardly a stretch to claim that the Selûnians must
have initially been from the island of Nimbral.
With these factors in place, let’s identify the latest point
in time the Realmspace source can be addressing. This is
best done through references to the characters Khelben
“Blackstaff” Arunsun and An Ching Wang who both were
characters alive and active in the period around the late
1350s and the early 1370s DR (Batista; Christian; Nephew;
Pondsmith; Swan, 1988, p.35; Henson, 1991, p.24; Schend,
2006, chp.40). This particular source would thus have to
address this particular time period.
When determining the time period of the Realmspace
source based on the dates of release of these sources, it’d
further have to be based on information of the “Forgotten
Realms Adventures” book, rather than the first “Campaign
Set” as the deity Cyric is acknowledged within our source,
in spite of him not having been introduced in the original
“Campaign Set” yet (Greenwood; Grubb; Martin, 1987,
p.11; Greenwood; Grubb, 1990, p.17; p.23; Henson, 1991,
p.74).
The presence of Cyric is important for our considerations
here as it confirms that Leira, in fact, is dead in the period
addressed by the Realmspace source, in spite of it not itself
acknowledging this.
The reason this is important is that Cyric is the deity who
took over Leira’s position as the god of lies. But, right as
he did so, he pretty much immediately took up an obsessive
mission of having a holy book written, proclaiming himself
as the one and only True God, but indeed, upon his success
it instead drove Cyric outright insane, turning him into the
mad god, and taking up titles such as “The Everything,”
“The One,” “The All,” and “The Face Behind the Mask”
(Lowder, 1993/2003; Denning, 1998).
Of course, by the time of the writing of “Realmspace,”
these developments were not yet established, but as stated,
Cyric’s pursuit went into effect almost immediately after
his claiming of Leira’s portfolio. Further, even before the
writing of this source, a connection between Leiran insight
into The Truth and madness had been shown (Greenwood;
Grubb, 1990, p.23). Lastly, remember that Leira’s so-called
curse, “The End of Creation” appeared better understood
as a warning to Oghma against the folly of Absolute Truth
(see the end of §3.4).
When considering all of these details together, a picture
emerges which suggests that when Leira was slain, she put
the obsessive drive for the creation of the holy book—the
Cyrinishad—in Cyric’s mind, or even his divine essence.
Done either deliberately, or as a result of the portfolio of
lies and illusions’ nature itself. Ultimately, Cyric and his
Cyrinishad would have become the final embodiments of
Leira’s “End of Creation,” the declaration that The Truth
in an absolute sense is inherently self-destructive.
Very well. One might indeed be inclined to accept this
narrative, but what does any of this have to do with Selûne
and its people? Remember, her Realmspace worship is
both widespread as well as almost exclusive to Selûnians,
and not only were they so devout that they were gifted a
holy illusion by the goddess, but they further continued to
receive spells even after the time of her death (Henson,
1991, p.75). However, as has been confirmed by multiple
sources, this continued granting of spells was exactly done
by Cyric, a truth which Leirans seemed both to suspect, as
well as be unconcerned by (Boyd; Martin, 1996, pp.93-94;
Boyd; Drader; Greenwood, 2004, p.116). So what? Well, it
means that when Leira died, the Selûnian population would
have suddenly become dominated by the influence of the
mad god. The question is therefore whether the reason for
the violent paranoia of Selûnians, in truth, is a very recent
change, having come about due to the influence of Cyric
and his slowly developing self-delusions? Could they be
sharing their new god’s growing madness, causing them to
exhibit outright antithetical views and behaviours to those
they might have formerly lived by when Leira was alive?
It certainly could be an explanation. However, one piece
of contradictory evidence should be acknowledged. This
being that the minority population of dwarves on Selûne
have been continuously denied the privilege of burrowing
cavern-homes for themselves on Selûne, due to the secret
fact that the humans and elves already have dug massive
invasion shelters for themselves underground. The reason
this would seem contradictory is that one would imagine
43
that it would have taken quite a bit of time to dig these big Then the essay went on to outline Nietzsche’s thoughts on
shelters, and that the dwarves would have kept requesting the concept of truth and lies, and how both of these are of
the creation of underground homes continuously over the importance for human existence (see §4).
years, and they’d presumably have inhabited Selûne for a In §5 we then went over Nietzsche’s infamous critique of
while (Henson, 1991, pp.26-27). morality, and how this has led to the rise of nihilism in the
However, these facts can also undermine such objections. western societies dominated by Christianity. §6 followed
After all, if both these shelters, as well as the dwarves, had these insights of morality to present Nietzsche’s positive
indeed both been on Selûne for a very long time, then it’d values, and his views of how people should change if they
become less-and-less plausible with every passing day that wished to overcome modern nihilism.
knowledge of their existence could have been kept from the After having outlined all of Nietzsche’s relevant thought,
dwarves. Thus, it would seem that the dwarves either just I then dedicated the rest of the essay to addressing possible
migrated to Selûne—not unreasonable when considering complications and objections to the Nietzschean reading of
their supposedly small numbers—or the existence of the Leira. First, by considering the issues of divine existences
shelters would have been a new development. An obsessive in D&D (see §7), and second, by discussing to what degree
undertaking possibly having come about as a result of the the three major existing communities of Leirans could be
also obsessive nature of Cyric, which now influenced them. considered compatible with the Nietzschean interpretation.
Indeed, both could be true. And further considering possible solutions when instances
Whether one is inclined to accept either the Nietzschean of incompatibility arose (see §8).
narrative of this essay, or the narrative just described with
Cyric at its centre, the Torilian moon of Selûne remains a I would like to use the remainder of this essay for the
strange case when considering the more detailed sources on purpose of offering a few and final guidelines for how to
Leira and her worshipers. go about roleplaying a Leiran character from a Nietzschean
perspective, including some extra views of Nietzsche that
didn’t fit organically within the main-body of the text.
Let’s begin this effort by once again summarizing, but in
this case, the Nietzschean interpretations of Leira that have
come about throughout this essay. As noted back in §3.4,
Leirans believe that Leira and Oghma together allowed for
Conclusion people to gain insight into the harsh and roiling chaos of
I say unto you: one must still have chaos in oneself to reality, while still being able to live with it. Leira through
be able to give birth to a dancing star. I say unto you: the subtle access to these insights, and Oghma by offering
you still have chaos in yourselves. a simplified way of grasping and categorizing this chaos,
a way of distancing oneself from it. However, Oghma then
- Kaufmann; Nietzsche, 1968, p.129 turned his back on this relationship, instead seeking out the
hidden ideal Truth, denying the unknowable chaos, and the
We have arrived at the end. By this point, I should have world and life with it. Leira then took on the position of
hopefully formulated a convincing, as well as expansive, “goddess of lies” for the purpose of showing Oghma that
case for the view that Leira and her religion can fruitfully he, in fact, was the one living and pursuing a destructive
be interpreted and expanded upon through the lens of the and great lie. These insights we then expanded upon within
thought of philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche. §4.4 and §5.4 which outlined the dangers of Oghma’s idea
To this end, I initially offered an outline of the portrayal of Absolute Truth, against which Leira raised a pragmatic
of Leira and her faithful within the primary, official sources theory of truth which stated that truth is made up of the
of D&D (see §1). Thereafter, I gave a historical account of many different perspectives which the Leiran is capable of
the life of Nietzsche, as well as the legacy of his writings honestly affirming and living with.
(see §2). Next I presented Nietzsche’s early concepts of the In §5.5 we then went on to consider whether Oghma also
Apollonian, Dionysian, and the Socratic, and presented the believed in an absolute ascetic moral Truth, and therefore
case that these concepts lended themselves well with being susceptible to nihilism in the same way as Christianity.
actualized in the Realms by Oghma and Leira (see §3). Ultimately concluding that such a reading was reasonable,

44
and that Oghma’s values as a result were spiritually sick, as
they are in denial of life.
Finally, in §6.5 we discussed Leiran followers’ status as
Nietzschean higher types, and how, as a result, they have as
an aspect of their lives the task of trying to “awaken” the
higher types not yet aware of their status, but that they had
to do this subtly, as the values of lower types have been
misguidedly adopted by higher types through their supreme
status in culture at large. Further, we also found that Leira
encouraged her followers to live the lives of “explorers,”
trying to find new ways-of-life, new perspectives, that they
could honestly affirm and live by. Lastly, I presented the
Leiran ritual called “The Unmasking” as a kind of test of
whether a Leiran indeed is capable of affirming their life,
when engaged in honest self-examination.
Now then, what minor, additional features can be added
to these points? The probably most interesting concerns the
“types of lies” which Leirans would tell, as it were. These
being myths.
Mythic thinking, to Nietzsche, is to be understood as a
contrast to both historical thinking, as well as conceptual
thinking. How so? Let’s look at these other ways of thought
first (Geuss, 2013/2014, timestamp.26:54-32:02).
Historical thinking is simply to describe history as a
chain of events. “The battle of Waterloo happened on June
18th in 1815,” is a historical statement. The same is true of
the statement that “Napoleon died at Longwood House on
May 21st in 1821.” The thing about these statements is,
however, that there is a sense of contingency surrounding
them. That is, even though both these claims are true, we’d
think it perfectly reasonable for them to have turned out in
a different way. In this case, Napoleon could have perfectly
well died during the battle of Waterloo, rather than having
fled, and then die later.
Conceptual thinking is the act of establishing necessities
through the analysis of the meaning of abstract concepts.
Logic is thus a form of conceptual thinking. “All bachelors
are unmarried,” is as a result a conceptual statement. It is
both establishing something universal and necessary with
what it is saying, since the word “bachelor” simply means
“a man who isn’t, and never has been, married.” The first
statement can therefore be altered to show its necessary,
logical truth; “All unmarried men are unmarried.”
Mythic thinking on the other hand, seeks to stand as a
kind of middleground between these other two ways of
thinking. Attempting to “fuse” them, in a way. But unlike
conceptual thinking, it is not abstract in nature, but instead
is particular in nature; as it tells the stories of individual
people. Further, these stories are structurally held together,
not by logical implication as is the case for conceptual
thinking, but instead by notions of “appropriateness.”
However, this “appropriateness” still has some kind of
necessity to it, even if not a logical one, and the mythic
narratives are thus not the same as contingent cases of
historical happenstance. Mythic events are therefore more
necessarily tied together than historical events are. To
expand on this, as stated mythic stories, though particular
in nature, are not just particular in nature, they do have
some kind of universality to them, and that is in the idea
that mythic stories speak of what happens to certain kinds
of people, in other words, they speak of what appropriately
happens, and will continue to happen, to certain kinds of
people.
Let’s try and illustrate this with an example by Raymond
Geuss:
Suppose that someone you know is notoriously clumsy,
that they spill drinks, knock over objects, and-so-on.
Say now that the next time you meet them, they once
again spill a drink of theirs.
Now, it is not the case that one could say, about this clumsy
person, that it was a logical necessity that they would again
spill their drink in that particular moment. However, since
we are talking about your clumsy acquaintance, it also isn’t
the case that them spilling their drink is an event which is
entirely contingent in nature. It was not a coincidence. This
story therefore is neither historical nor conceptual, but is
instead mythical. The story is treating your acquaintance
as a mythical type of person; a clumsy person, and then
says that spilling one’s drink is exactly the sort of thing
that happens to clumsy people, to this mythic type (Geuss,
2013/2014, timestamp.23:40-25:00).
To get another example, this time from Nietzsche, think
back to the story of the masters and slaves in §5.2, this too
is a myth. It is a story which seeks to describe what keeps
happening, again-and-again, to people who embody these
different types. Thus, the “slave revolt” is meant as being
a recurring “event” in society (Ansell-Pearson; Bragg;
Hughes; Mulhall, 2018, timestamp.45:05-46:16; Geuss,
2013/2014, timestamp.21:36-32:02).
Ultimately then, Leirans too would be mythmakers, or
“tellers of myths,” since these stories aren’t meant to be
neither true nor false, but rather, simply are “things that
people say” and seek to offer the listener insights which
45
they otherwise wouldn’t have access to, and which they of “living dangerously” due to them “overcoming gravity.”
then can use for understanding the world through, and act This is especially true of the eagle as it represents pride,
accordingly (Geuss, 2013/2014, timestamp.16:50-19:25). and the willingness to stand alone with its pride. It is also
the “[...] solitary power of the individual to simply express
This next additional feature is a list of a few metaphors its nature [...]” (Sanders; Saunders; Schipperheyn, 2006,
which Nietzsche notably employs, as well as the nuances timestamp.10:00-10:10). And lastly, due to society having
of their meanings. If one were to play a Leiran character, traditionally discouraged feelings of pride as evil, the eagle
then one has the option of potentially employing some of now also “[...] represents the buoyant health of the person
these as expressions the Leiran character uses: whose pride has been recovered.” (Higgins, Solomon,
2000, p.231)—see §6.1 for more on strength and health,
Gravity. The force of gravity, as well as other concepts and §6.4 for more on pride.
of weight, are often used by Nietzsche when describing, Lion. The classic image of the “king of the jungle,” is so
in a negative sense, topics which he thinks bogs us down. too for Nietzsche, and thus represents the pride of a master
The most noteworthy example of which would be tradition. and someone who has mastered themself. However, more
However, Nietzsche also acknowledges that gravity, as well important is that the lion represents the second stage of the
as tradition, is what keeps us rooted to the ground and our spirit, after the camel, where the individual has learned
“universe” in place. Thus, it was scary when the death of how to say “no” to the old values of tradition through the
God caused us to be “unchained” from the sun. (Higgins, use of healthy self-assertion. The lion thus, is the one that
Solomon, 2000, p.237)—see §5 for more information on slays the dragon (Higgins, Solomon, 2000, p.231)—see
the death of God. §5.2 for more on the noble masters.
Camel. For Nietzsche, “[...] the quintessential beast of Snake. Nietzsche plays in his writings with oppositional
burden. In Zarathustra’s “Three Metamorphoses” the camel conceptions of snakes. In the Eastern world, the snake is
represents the spirit in its first stage of development, in often associated with wisdom, while in the West, it is often
which it reverently bears the burden (but also the wealth) connected to the seduction of lies—due to its role within
of the tradition.” (Higgins, Solomon, 2000, p.231), and is the biblical story of Adam and Eve. Nietzsche then takes
thus deeply affected by gravity, but also firmly rooted to these ideas and highlights how “truth” really comes from
the earth, and its place in the universe. the ability to falsify. From the ability of humans to lie to
Dragon. An obviously quite important aspect of D&D, themselves in ways that are useful for their ends (Sanders;
but to Nietzsche the dragon is “[...] cast as the guardian Saunders; Schipperheyn, 2006, timestamp.10:14-10:50).
of traditional Western values in Zarathustra’s ``Three Thus, it wasn’t original sin that came from the eating of the
Metamorphoses.´´” (Higgins, Solomon, 2000, p.236), and fruit, but indeed, genuine wisdom. And further, the snake
must thus be slain. Not just for the sake of creating new also, as “[...] one who crawls into the earth [...], represents
values, but also because the dragon’s values are harmful: earthly wisdom, as well as insight into the tragic.”
(Higgins, Solomon, 2000, p.233)—see §3 for more on
[...] the values based on “good” and “evil” are derived, tragedy and the world, and §4 for more on truth and lies.
according to the Genesis account, from Adam and Eve’s Child. The final stage of spiritual development according
eating fruit stolen from a forbidden tree. A curse goes to Nietzsche is that of the child. Children represent a kind
with the stolen values, like the curse on the stolen gold in of endless energy for experimentation with what is new. In
the Germanic myth [...of Sigurd and the dragon...], even Nietzsche’s view, children at play involve a certain kind of
if both confer power. seriousness, they should be developing in certain ways, but
- Higgins, Solomon, 2000, p.236 no single game is understood as somehow a fundamental
pursuit; children play tag, then hide-and-seek, then invent
Eagle. Nietzsche often used birds as metaphors, but the a new game, and-so-on, and-so-on. Children “regenerate”
most noteworthy of these is the eagle. Now, as a result of their activities, and with it, their energy for more (Higgins;
being a bird, the eagle represents the “[...] double-edged Solomon, 2013, lecture.8, timestamp.03:54:04-03:55:44).
nature of freedom [...as someone in flight also...] suggests This, the child can accomplish since it is “[...] unburdened
someone who can be shot on sight.” (Higgins, Solomon, by the past [...and again, because it is...] enthusiastic in
2000, p.231), and there is thus a notion attached to the bird trying new things.” (Higgins, Solomon, 2000, p.235)—see

46
§6.4 for more on creative experimentation.
The Nose. Philosophers have traditionally had a tendency
to put sight on a pedestal as the greatest of our senses. This
is done due to sight’s ability to “get beyond the body.”
To Nietzsche, this is a significant mistake and notes that
all our senses are “precision equipment” exactly because of
their ties to the body and the earth. The nose is here of note
as it especially is capable of expressing abhorrence with
one’s surroundings. When “something stinks,” things might
still “look” good on the surface, but truly be rotting beneath
this surface (Higgins, Solomon, 2000, p.239).
This list of Nietzschean metaphors is not complete by
any means, but should serve to give an idea of how he
employs them in a general sense.
With all of these different insights now in place, what sort
of people are Nietzschean Leirans then typically like? If
one were to wish to create such a character, what should
one then keep in mind about them? Here is a list of bullet
points featuring the most significant details:
● Art. Leirans have a deep appreciation for aesthetics
and the arts. Indeed, many of them are themselves
some form of artists—which in this broader context
even would include the position of philosopher (see
§3 for more).
● Suffering. To the Leiran, the notions of suffering,
death, and destruction are all simply aspects of the
natural world. They are not something which one
should explain away supernaturally or morally. But
it should instead be acknowledged and embraced as
something to be overcome, and thereby make us all
the more strong and beautiful beings (see both §3,
§5, and §6 for more on this. But especially §5).
● Honesty. Leirans do not believe in notions such as
singular, objective truth. Thus, when they can, they
avoid speaking in absolutes. Instead they believe
that truth is accomplished through the consideration
of as many varied perspectives as possible. Even of
contradictory perspectives. As a result, they think
that one only can speak of pragmatic truths. Which
means that something is true based on how useful it
is for present purposes (see §4.5 and §6.5). Thus, to
the Leiran, all generalizations are fabrications. This
does not mean they aren’t necessary and important,
but they are still false simplifications nonetheless.
● “Irrational.” Leirans do not think that reason and
argument truly have any causal impact on our
actions or decisions. So they instead try to subtly
appeal to other forces—like the emotions—which
they do think have causal power, to thereby induce
change in people (see also §6.4).
● Life Project. The Leiran is dedicated to a great,
unified life project. A project with the aim of
impacting the overall culture of the present era.
Such projects as Socrates’ interrogation of the
“unexamined life,” Wagner’s “music of the future,”
or Nietzsche’s own “revaluation of all values”
(Ambury, 26-09-2021, §2; Wagner, 1861; Kranak,
2014). The project doesn’t however necessarily
have to succeed (see also §6.3 and §6.4).
● Spiritual. The Leiran embodies a deep spiritual life,
however, this form of spirituality is entirely earthly
in nature, and focused on breaking down the border
between the self and the non-self. Feeling a part of
the world at large. An example of which being the
above-mentioned life project, as it accomplishes an
impact of the self on the rest of the world, culture,
and the future—even after their deaths (see §6.3).
● Persona. Leirans take on many “fake” identities for
the purpose of expanding their perspectives on how
one can meaningfully live one’s life (see §4.5 §6.4).
● Solitude. Leirans value solitude. Not in the sense
that they are loners who are unconcerned with other
people or unwilling to share their past, secrets, and
views. But they are simply so dedicated to their
project that they don’t have time for social relations
which fail to either further their project, or which
are with their very closest of friends. People one
truly can value and share every aspect of one’s life
with (see §6.4).
What sort of character might a player of D&D want to
create based on the different Nietzschean characteristics,
and what sort of adventures might they participate in?
Beyond the obvious clerics and illusionist wizards, I would
highlight their roguish characteristics, thus having Leirans
also fit with arcane tricksters and shadow monks. Far more
appropriate, however, I’d say are bards due to the weight
Leirans put on the arts, and especially music—and how it
has an outright spiritual quality to it, linking the self to the
rest of the world.
47
 Speaking of the spiritual connection of the Leirans to
the world, I would also suggest that Leirans might be
perfectly inclined to being druids, barbarians, and rangers,
and a DM might as a result also want to consider allowing
Leiran clerics access to the Nature-domain, for this same
reason. The connection to nature which Leirans emphasize
is however less focused on plants and animals, and instead
concerned more with the natural forces of reality—such
as gravity—as well as the natural drives which control our
lives—like hunger, the emotions, sexual urges, or pain.
The most immediate reason for why a Leiran would wish
to adventure would be for the sake of having this lifestyle
enable “gay science,” the joyous exploration of the world,
for the sake of learning “what kinds of things is out there.”
But another, though related, reason for adventuring would
be to try and discover new perspectives from which the
Leiran might be able to affirm their life—due to them not
being able to do so at the beginning of the campaign.
On the other side of the gaming-table, an interesting use
of Leiran NPCs for DMs is as surprise allies, and ways out
of TPKs.
Due to their concern with “living different perspectives,”
for the sake of judging whether these perspectives are ones
they can personally affirm, many Leirans would be inclined
to “infiltrate” villainous organizations for the purpose of
experiencing their ways-of-life and values.
Thus, if a party ever were to get stuck in a dungeon, get
captured, or all die, the DM might have a Leiran reveal
themselves to the party and aid them. Either just
momentarily—like dropping a key to a cell, or leaving the
directions for a secret door—so that they can continue their
activities in the organization; for a short period of
time—until they can escape the dungeon of the villains
safely perhaps—and then leave; or they might even support
the party continuously for a while—perhaps deciding that
the views of the villains are life-denying, and thus must be
actively opposed. All while, of course, the Leiran would be
considering whether the values of the adventurers also are
either life-affirming or life-denying.
Thus maybe helping with clearing out the dungeon, and
perhaps even aiding the party for some time afterward.
Naturally, Leirans would also serve as interesting options
for quest-givers. As they—while in disguise—would give
the party quests which would appear simple, but then turn
out to be far bigger, more complicated, and dangerous than
was suggested—like sending the party on a simple treasure
hunt, and then have them find that the quest truly involves
the unmasking of a demonic conspiracy manipulating the
region’s leadership. The Leiran having known of all of this
from the very beginning. Note, however, that the Leiran
presumably would do this specifically for the purpose of
testing whether one-or-more of the adventurers themselves
would be “unawakened” Leirans (higher types). Or for the
purpose of using the party as means to fulfilling the life
project of the Leiran further, in some way.
Here we are, we have arrived at the true ending of the
essay. To any reader who might at this point have gotten
an interest in, perhaps not only studying Nietzsche further,
but maybe even reading some of his own works, I would
like to leave you with a final piece of advice. Before you
begin reading Nietzsche’s own books, take some time to
read up on some sources which address the nuances of his
style of writing. I suggest this as I in this essay have almost
completely ignored this topic, but that is in spite of it being
an incredibly important aspect of his work, and absolutely
essential for the understanding of his philosophy in detail.
Some resources which offer such insight into Nietzsche’s
style are listed below in the “Freely Available Resources”
section.
If a reader has made it this far in my essay, I would like
to offer you a thank you, and I hope I’ve managed to make
the read enjoyable, or at least understandable.
48
Index
❏ Affirm, Affirmation — §4.3, §6.2, §6.4, §6.5,
Conclusion, p.13, p.25, p.26, p.27, p.28, p.30,
p.33, p.34, p.36, p.44, p.45
❏ Amor Fati — §6.2, §6.5, p.25, p.26, p.36
❏ Apollo, Apollonian — §3, §3.2, §3.3, §3.4, p.8, p.9,
p.10, p.11, p.44
❏ Ascetic, Asceticism — §5.4, §5.5, §6.1, Conclusion,
p.22, p.23, p.24, p.44
❏ Christianity — §2, §4.4, §5, §5.1, §5.2, §5.5, §6.2,
§6.3, §6.4, §7, Conclusion, p.6, p.15, p.17, p.18, p.20,
p.21, p.22, p.25, p.27, p.29, p.31, p.32, p.38, p.44
❏ Cyric — §1.1, §8.1, §8.3, p.5, p.40, p.43, p.44
❏ Dionysus, Dionysian — §3, §3.2, §3.3, §6.3,
Conclusion, p.8, p.9, p.10, p.11, p.28, p.44
❏ Drive — §3.1, §4.2, §5.1, §6.1, §6.4, §6.5, Conclusion,
p.8, p.13, p.18, p.24, p.32, p.35, p.48
❏ Eternal Recurrence — §6.2, §6.3, §6.5, p.26, p.27,
p.28, p.35, p.36
❏ Evil — §5.2, §5.4, §5.5, §6, §6.4, §6.5, §7, Conclusion,
p.19, p.20, p.22, p.23, p.32, p.33, p.37, p.46
❏ Free Will — §5.4, §6.1, §6.2, §6.3, §6.4, p.21, p.25,
p.27, p.29, p.30, p.33
❏ Gay Science, Gaya Scienza — §6.4, §6.5, p.30, p.33,
p.35
❏ God, Goddess — §1, §1.1, §1.2, §3, §3.2, §3.3, §3.4,
§4.1, §4.2, §4.4, §5, §5.1, §5.2, §5.3, §5.5, §6.2, §6.5,
§7, §8.3, Conclusion, p.4, p.5, p.8, p.9, p.10, p.12, p.13,
p.15, p.17, p.20, p.21, p.22, p.23, p.26, p.28, p.34, p.36,
p.37, p.41, p.43, p.44, p.46
❏ Good — §4.2, §4.3, §4.4, §5.2, §5.5, §6, §6.1, §6.4,
§6.5, §7, Conclusion, p.13, p.14, p.15, p.19, p.20, p.23,
p.24, p.25, p.32, p.35, p.37, p.46
❏ Health — §2, §6.1, §6.2, §6.4, §6.5, Conclusion, p.6,
p.25, p.28, p.32, p.33, p.34, p.36, p.46
❏ Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich — §4, p.11
❏ Higher Men — see “Higher Type”
❏ Higher Type — §6.3, §6.4, §6.5, §8.3, Conclusion, p.28,
p.29, p.30, p.31, p.32, p.33, p.34, p.36, p.42, p.45
❏ History — §4, §4.1, §4.3, §4.5, §5, §5.2, §6.2, §6.3,
§6.4, Conclusion, p.11, p.12, p.14, p.16, p.17, p.19,
p.26, p.29, p.33, p.45
❏ Kant, Immanuel — §4, §7, p.11, p.37
❏ Master, Noble — §5.2, §5.3, §5.4, §6.4, Conclusion,
p.19, p.20, p.21, p.22, p.31, p.32, p.45, p.46
❏ Morality, The — §5.2, §5.3, §5.4, p.19, p.20, p.21, p.22
❏ Myth — §3.4, §4, §4.1, §6.2, §8.1, Conclusion,
p.10, p.11, p.12, p.26, p.38, p.45, p.46
❏ Nihilism — §5.1, §5.5, §6.1, §6.3, §6.4, §6.5,
Conclusion, p.17, p.18, p.22, p.23, p.24, p.29,
p.30, p.33, p.35, p.44
❏ Objective, Objectivity — §4.1, §4.2, §4.5, §5.2, §5.5, §6,
§6.1, §6.4, Conclusion, p.11, p.13, p.15, p.16, p.19,
p.20, p.22, p.23, p.24, p.30, p.47
❏ Oghma — §1.1, §3, §3.4, §4.1, §4.4, §4.3, §4.5, §5.5,
§6.5, Conclusion, p.5, p.8, §8.3, p.10, p.11, p.12, p.14,
p.15, p.16, p.22, p.23, p.34, p.43, p.44, p.45
❏ Perspective, Perspectivism — §4.1, §4.2, §4.3, §4.4,
§4.5, §5.1, §6.4, §6.5, Conclusion, p.12, p.13, p.14,
p.15, p.16, p.18, p.30, p.31, p.35, p.36, p.44, p.45, p.47
❏ Plato — §3.4, §4.4, §4.5, §6.3, p.10, p.11, p.15, p.29,
❏ Power — §3.2, §4.4, §5.2, §5.3, §5.4, §6, §6.1, §6.3,
§8.3, Conclusion, p.9, p.14, p.20, p.21, p.22, p.23, p.24,
p.25, p.29, p.30, p.35, p.42, p.46, p.47
❏ Ressentiment — §5.1, §5.2, §5.4, p.18, p.19, p.20, p.22
❏ Schopenhauer, Arthur — §2, §3.1, §4, §4.3, §5.1, §6.1,
§6.3, p.6, p.8, p.11, p.13, p.17, p.18, p.24, p.29,
❏ Slave, Lower Type — §4.5, §5.2, §5.3, §5.4, §5.5, §6.3,
§6.4, §6.5, Conclusion, p.16, p.19, p.20, p.21, p.22,
p.23, p.29, p.32, p.33, p.34, p.45
❏ Socrates — §3, §3.3, §3.4, §4.3, §5.1, §6.3, Conclusion,
p.8, p.9, p.10, p.11, p.15, p.18, p.29, p.30, p.47
❏ Suffering — §2, §3.1, §4.1, §4.2, §4.3, §5.1, §5.4, §5.5,
§6.1, §6.3, Conclusion, p.6, p.8, p.9, p.13, p.17, p.22,
p.23, p.24, p.25, p.28, p.47
❏ Truth, The — §3.4, §4.1, §4.2, §4.4, §4.5, §5.1, §5.2,
§5.5, §6.5, §8.3, p.11, p.12, p.13, p.15, p.16, p.18, p.19,
p.22, p.34, p.35, p.43
❏ Übermensch — see “Higher Type”
❏ Value — §4.4, §4.5, §5, §5.1, §5.2, §5.5, §6, §6.1, §6.2,
§6.3, §6.4, §6.5, §8.1, §8.3, Conclusion, p.14, p.15,
p.16, p.17, p.18, p.19, p.20, p.23, p.24, p.25, p.26, p.27,
p.28, p.30, p.31, p.32, p.33, p.34, p.35, p.36, p.40, p.41,
p.42, p.44, p.45, p.46, p.47
❏ Virtue — §4.4, §5.2, §6.4, §8.2, p.15, p.19, p.20, p.30,
p.31, p.32, p.33, p.41,
❏ Wagner, Richard — §2, §2.1, §3.1, §6.3, Conclusion,
p.6, p.7, p.8, p.29, p.47
❏ Will to Power — see “Power”
❏ World of Becoming, World of Being — §5.1, p.18
49
Freely Available Resources
❏ Entry on Friedrich Nietzsche in the “Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy” which includes a
great focus on highlighting varying interpretations
of his thought.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nietzsche/
❏ Entry on Friedrich Nietzsche in the “Internet
Encyclopedia of Philosophy” which offers a more
cosmological approach to his thought. Since my
text didn’t concern itself much with this approach,
this article would be where to start if a reader found
themself interested in this alternative understanding
of Nietzsche’s philosophy.
This particular article also offers a worthwhile
look at some ways interpreters have sought to
contextualize Nietzsche’s thought, while it also
seeks to consider the merits of these approaches.
https://iep.utm.edu/nietzsch/
❏ An article on the moral and political thought
of Nietzsche within the “Stanford Encyclopedia
of Philosophy.”
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nietzsche-moral-political/
❏ A historical look at Nietzsche’s life within the
“Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.”
https://iep.utm.edu/niet-his/
❏ An overview of Nietzsche’s personal history,
as well as a description of his writing tendencies
within the “Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.”
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nietzsche-life-works/
❏ Short episode on Nietzsche in a documentary series
by Alain de Botton on how to attain happiness.
Noteworthy for showing of Nietzsche’s childhood
home and emphasizing the influence of christianity
on his life in general, as well as the importance of
struggling.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YBOWyHofpqs&ab_channel=AlaindeBotton
❏ Episode of a BBC-series which features discussions
between Bryan Magee and other philosophers, this
one with J. P. Stern on Nietzsche. The discussion
primarily seeks to illuminate the meaning behind
some of Nietzsche’s more controversial concepts.
https://cosmolearning.org/documentaries/bryan-magee-talks-to-jp-stern-about-nietzsche-872/
❏ Singular video recording of a class taught on the
history of philosophy. This entry on Nietzsche,
and taught by Arthur Holmes. Mainly noteworthy
for putting Nietzsche in the context of later thinkers
as well.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7AHGUBo7rPo&t=2224s&ab_channel=wheatoncollege
❏ Presentation on Nietzsche by Bonevac, focusing
on his “middle period” of writing, thus covering
several of the topics also addressed in this essay.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Cv9I6foOeS4&ab_channel=DanielBonevac
❏ Lone video presentation by Bernard Reginster that
seeks to explain, in greater detail than I have been
able to within this essay, how Nietzsche thinks the
notion of guilt came about from indebtedness.
http://podcasts.ox.ac.uk/genealogy-guilt
❏ Single video-lecture on Nietzsche in a largely
sociological context. Some historical mistakes
are made by Szelényi, but nothing troublesome.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ALiZkclxdko&ab_channel=YaleCourses
❏ Video presentation by David Mikics which features
a more literary interpretation of Nietzsche, and thus
especially focuses on his links to Romanticism.
Mikics especially emphasises conflicting themes in
Nietzsche’s writing, including the opposition made
between truth-seeking and artistry also highlighted
within this essay.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8wbcszqoDPs&ab_channel=YaleUniversity
❏ Singular video, serving as the introduction to a full
lecture series by Rick Roderick titled “Self Under
Siege.” During this lecture, Roderick seeks to show
the impact of Nietzsche’s critique on religion, as
well as that of other figures, on modern culture’s
perception of itself. Further, the very topic of the
series overall relates significantly to the spiritual
decline which Nietzsche predicted for humanity.
http://rickroderick.org/301-paul-ricoeur-the-masters-of-suspicion-1993/
❏ Another lone video by Rick Roderick. This one is,
not unlike the video above, focused on Nietzsche’s
genealogy of morals.
http://rickroderick.org/106-nietzsche-knowledge-and-belief-1990/
❏ Full video-series of lectures, once again by Rick
Roderick, but this one focused entirely on the ideas
of Nietzsche. Though, once again, put very much in
the context of modern life.
http://rickroderick.org/200-guide-nietzsche-and-the-postmodern-condition-1991/
❏ Multiple video presentations from a conference on
Nietzsche titled “Nietzsche on Mind and Nature.”
Due to this, the complexity of the presentations,
as well as the need for viewer-familiarity is higher
here than in other resources provided here. These
videos are of experts speaking before other experts.
http://podcasts.ox.ac.uk/series/nietzsche-mind-and-nature
50
❏ Video lecture-series by Raymond Geuss on ❏ Audio recording of a singular lecture by Walter
Nietzsche which goes into a quite nuanced and Kaufmann—the man who managed to clear out the
widespread interpretation of Nietzsche’s thought Nazi-interpretations of Nietzsche among english
within the context of his age. speakers—where he discusses the issues Nietzsche
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2fTnEB_r_6Q&ab_channel=KottiEverdene
is addressing. As a result, it takes a little while
❏ Multiple videos on vimeo by Shannon Bell where before he actually gets to Nietzsche himself, since
she on separate occasions is re-teaching a course he spends some time setting the stage. It should be
titled “Modern Political Thought.” Each of these noted that the quality of the audio is quite poor, but
videos are then different lectures on Nietzsche and due to its short length, it is still well worth listening
how his thought has been put to political use since to, as Kaufmann has truly unique insights to share
his death. The structure of Bell’s lectures is best of both his own way of reading Nietzsche, as well
described as somewhat floaty, so a reader might as comments on other then-contemporary readers.
want to familiarize themself with other sources on https://archive.org/details/NietzscheAndTheCrisisInPhilosophy
Nietzsche first, before watching her videos. ❏ For a somewhat different interpretation of the
https://vimeo.com/245078149 views of Nietzsche than what has been highlighted
https://vimeo.com/251149081
within this essay, here is an audio recording of a
https://vimeo.com/310415427
❏ Audio recordings of a full series of lectures held by talk by Allan Bloom on Nietzsche’s relatability to
Leo Strauss on Nietzsche’s book “Beyond Good students. I don’t know to what degree I’d really
and Evil.” Perhaps appropriate for its age, Strauss’ recommend this recording, however. Bloom claims
interpretations of Nietzsche would in some cases to not be well read in Nietzsche, a claim which
nowadays be considered outdated and questionable. I—without meaning to be mean-spirited or
https://leostrausscenter.uchicago.edu/nietzsche-beyond-good-and-evil-st-johns-college-1971-72/ dismissive—would have to agree with, as many of
❏ Supplement to the audio-lectures of Strauss above. his observations about Nietzsche and modern
This video is of a conference held in relation to the culture are quite anecdotal in nature. Additionally I
print publication of Strauss’ lectures on Nietzsche. would insist that many of his readings are mistaken,
The video offers multiple experts commenting on and suffering from a lack of familiarity with the
Strauss’ interpretation of Nietzsche, including both broader material. This obviously wouldn’t have to
its contents and merits. be a problem, if not for the fact that rather than
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RsfTtNx6WH8&ab_channel=TheUniversityofChicago
argue for why he reads Nietzsche as he does, he
❏ An episode of the radio program “In Our Time”
instead takes it for granted that his audience is
by the BBC. This entry on Nietzsche’s genealogy
aware of the basis for his reading—a basis which is
of morals, and offers opinions of multiple experts.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ep9dXlQs6UM&t=157s&ab_channel=BBCPodcasts indeed reasonable within the context of his talk, but
❏ A short episode of a podcast by the ABC, focused which makes it questionable to what degree this
primarily on the influence of Christianity on recording is of any use to a listener wanting to learn
Nietzsche’s project and thought, and specifically, more on the topic. Lastly, Bloom’s presentation has
how Nietzsche attempts to achieve Christianity’s a quite free-form and somewhat scatterbrained
former ability to transform the negative aspects of structure, making it occasionally difficult to follow
life into positives. how the different anecdotes about Nietzsche,
https://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/philosopherszone/nietzsche-and-transfiguration/1346755
0?fbclid=IwAR1yV3Rk-pnhvq_97yTugc6K4k3VMD55C_J4GZN5XRSVVV8BC2bg2JpqD28 nihilism, racism, and university culture are
❏ Episode of “The Philosopher’s Zone” radio show. supposed to fit together. In spite of all of this,
This one offers insight into the aphoristic form of I have still chosen to add his talk to this list of
writing, a form which Nietzsche frequently used for resources, since Bloom does have a few interesting
his work, and which contributes to his complexity. insights, and simply to make any potential reader
Thus, this recording might offer some help to the aware of the recording’s existence. And by
reader who might wish to start reading some of the extension, allowing for others to potentially get
work of Nietzsche. something useful out of Bloom’s presentation, even
https://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/philosopherszo if I personally have struggled with doing so.
ne/philosophy-in-a-nutshell-pt-1-the-aphorism/12722752 https://archive.org/details/AllanBloomNietzscheLecture

51
❏ An episode of the radio program “Free Thinking.” ❏ An episode of the radioshow “Great Lives,” here
This episode focuses on Nietzsche’s relevance for focusing on Nietzsche from a more biographical
the modern world. As a result, the tone of the show perspective.
is somewhat joking, but it does offer a quick view https://www.bbc.co.uk/sounds/play/b00763z8
at some of Nietzsche’s core ideas. ❏ An assortment of links to different sources on both
https://www.bbc.co.uk/sounds/play/m0000d8k Goethe—who is generally considered the greatest
❏ Two more episodes of “The Philosopher’s Zone.” example of a higher type to Nietzsche—as well as
Both of these addressing Nietzsche’s supposed link Socrates—whom Nietzsche considered the closest
to Naziism. The first is on Nietzsche’s connection to himself, and thus his greatest rival. Hopefully, by
with the Nazis of the second world war, while the taking these two figures and comparing them to the
second is on Nietzsche’s relationship with modern characteristics which Nietzsche outlines as great in
day alt-right movements. the higher types, as well as in Nietzsche himself, a
https://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/philosopherszone/nietzsche-an player might be able to conceptualize a concept for
d-the-nazis/3452576
https://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/philosopherszone/alt-nietzsche a new character who also is a higher type.
/10377654 https://iep.utm.edu/goethe/
❏ Though this audio-series of lecture by Kathleen https://www.encyclopedia.com/arts/culture-magazines/g
Higgins and Robert Solomon on Audible, isn’t oethe-johann-wolfgang-von-1749-1832
free, it is easily acquired, and is invaluable for https://iep.utm.edu/socrates/
understanding Nietzsche as an ethical thinker, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/socrates/
and I have as a result relied heavily on its insights https://historyofphilosophy.net/socrates-without-plato
on multiple occasions within this essay. https://historyofphilosophy.net/plato-socrates
https://www.audible.com/pd/The-Will-to-Power-The-Philosophy-of-Friedrich-Nietzsche-Audiobook/B00DJ7H7FC?ref=a_lib
rary_t_c5_libItem_&pf_rd_p=85df3330-9dc4-4a45-ae69-93cc2fc25ca4&pf_rd_r=FRD4MXTEQCE5FK4HEK39 https://historyofphilosophy.net/woolf-socrates

52
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