G.R. No. 93436 March 24, 1995 retreat.
retreat. The rule does not apply, however, where the attack was not
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
MELCHOR REAL y BARTOLAY, accused-appellant.
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 44,
Masbate, Masbate, in Criminal Case No. 1606 finding appellant guilty of murder.
We affirm with modification, the appealed decision.
I - The information against appellant reads as follows:
That on or about March 11, 1978, in the morning thereof, at the Poblacion of the
Municipality of Aroroy, Province of Masbate, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of
this Court, the said accused with intent to kill, evident premeditation and
treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and criminally
attack, assault and hack with a sharp bolo one Edgardo Corpus y Rapsing,
hitting the latter on the nape, causing an injury which caused the death of the
said Edgardo Corpus y Rapsing several days thereafter.
That the accused is a recidivist having been convicted by the Municipal Court of
Aroroy, in the following cases:
Crime Date of Conviction
1. Ill treatment by Deed — July 6, 1965
2. Grave Threats — November 25, 1968
(Rollo, p. 14).
Upon being arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty.
After trial, the court convicted appellant and sentenced him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the victim the sum of P30,000.00
and costs.
Hence, this appeal.
II - At about 9:00 A.M. on March 17, 1978, in the public market of Aroroy,
Masbate, appellant and Edgardo Corpus, both vendors, engaged in a heated
argument over the right to use the market table to display their fish.
Moreno de la Rosa, the Municipal Mayor, who happened to be at the public
market, tried to pacify them, saying that they were arguing over trivial matters.
The two protagonists momentarily kept their peace but after awhile Corpus
raised his voice again and said something to appellant. The latter, in a soft voice,
uttered "SOBRA NA INA NA IMO PAGDAOGDAOG" (You are being too
oppressive).
When Corpus kept on walking to and fro near the disputed fish table, appellant
started to sharpen his bolo while murmuring to himself. Once Corpus turned
around with his back towards appellant, the latter hacked him on the nape. The
blow caused Corpus to collapse. He was rushed to a medical clinic. When asked
by his wife as to who hacked him, he answered "Melchor Real."
A police investigator went to the clinic to take the dying declaration of Corpus,
who said that it was appellant who stabbed him. Corpus died two days later.
Appellant admitted hacking Corpus but claimed that he did so out of humiliation
and anger when the victim threw his fish in the presence of so many people.
He testified as follows:
Q. When Edgardo Corpus was lambasting you in the presence of the public,
what did you do, how did you feel?
A. I got angry.
Q. And what did you do?
A. So I hacked him.
Q. Was he hit?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. In what part of his body was he hit?
A. At the right neck.
Q. Did you admit to the authorities that it was you who hacked Edgardo Corpus?
A. Yes, sir.
On cross-examination, he again admitted his guilt.
Q. And when this Edgardo Corpus turn (sic) his back, you immediately hacked
him on his neck?
A. Yes, sir ( TSN, July 9, 1986, pp. 6-8; Emphasis supplied).
III - Before us, appellant argues that the crime committed was only homicide and
not murder and that he is entitled to two mitigating circumstances: namely,
passion and obfuscation and vindication of a grave offense.
We agree with appellant that the offense committed was homicide. He is entitled 22211 entitled "People of the Philippines v. Edwin Razon y Lucea" and the CA
to the benefit of the doubt as to whether he acted with alevosia when he attacked Resolution dated April 14, 2003  which denied petitioner's motion for
the victim. As a rule, a sudden attack by the assailant, whether frontally or from reconsideration.
behind, is treachery if such mode of attack was cooly and deliberately adopted
by him with the purpose of depriving the victim of a chance to either fight or
preconceived and deliberately adopted but was just triggered by the sudden
infuriation on the part of the accused because of the provocative act of the victim
(People v. Aguiluz, 207 SCRA 187 [1992]). This is more so, where the assault
upon the victim was preceded by a heated exchange of words between him and
the accused (People v. Rillorta, 180 SCRA 102 [1989]). In the case at bench, the
assault came in the course of an altercation and after appellant had sharpened
his bolo in full view of the victim. Appellant's act of sharpening his bolo can be
interpreted as an attempt to frighten the victim so the latter would leave him
alone. It was simply foolhardy for the victim to continue walking to and fro near
appellant in a taunting manner while the latter was sharpening his bolo.
The suddenness of the attack does not, by itself, suffice to support a finding
of alevosia where the decision to attack was made peremptorily and the victim's
helpless position was accidental (People v. Ardisa, 55 SCRA 245 [1974]).
Appellant also claims that he is entitled to two mitigating circumstances: namely,
vindication of a grave offense and passion and obfuscation. The peculiarity of
these two mitigating circumstances is that they cannot be applied at the same
time if they arise from the same facts or motive.
If appellant attacked his victim in the proximate vindication of a grave offense, he
cannot successfully claim in the same breath that he was also blinded by
passion and obfuscation. At most, only one of two circumstances could be
considered in favor of appellant (People v. Yaon, Court of Appeals, 43 O.G. 4142
cited in I Reyes, Revised Penal Code [1981]).
The act of the victim in berating and humiliating appellant was enough to
produce passion and obfuscation, considering that the incident happened in a
market place within full view and within hearing distance of many people.
The trial court held, and the Solicitor General agreed, that the attendant
aggravating circumstance was reiteracion and not reincidencia as alleged in the
information. The trial court and the Solicitor General are in error.
According to the information charging appellant of murder and the evidence, the
accused was previously convicted of ill-treatment by deed on July 6, 1965 and
grave threats on November 25, 1968.
In recidivism or reincidencia, the offender shall have been previously convicted
by final judgment of another crime embraced in the same title of the Revised
Penal Code (Revised Penal Code, Art. 14[g]). In reiteracion, the offender
shall have been punished previously for an offense to which the law attaches an
equal or greater penalty or for two or more crimes to which it attaches a lighter
penalty (Revised Penal Code, Art. 14[10]). Unlike in reincidencia, the offender
in reiteracion commits a crime different in kind from that for which he was
previously tried and convicted (Guevarra, Penal Sciences and Philippine
Criminal Law 129 [1974]).
Appellant was previously convicted of ill-treatment by deed (Revised Penal
Code, Art. 266, Title Eight) and grave threats (Revised Penal Code, Art. 282,
Title Nine). He was convicted of homicide in the instant criminal case (Revised
Penal Code, Art. 249, Title Eight). Inasmuch as homicide and ill-treatment by
deed fall under Title Eight, the aggravating circumstance to be appreciated
against him is recidivism under Article 14[g] rather than reiteracion under Article
14(10) of the Revised Penal Code.
There is no reiteracion because that circumstance requires that the previous
offenses should not be embraced in the same title of the Code. While grave
threats fall in title (Title Nine) different from homicide (Title Eight),
still reiteracion cannot be appreciated because such aggravating circumstance
requires that if there is only one prior offense, that offense must be punishable by
an equal or greater penalty than the one for which the accused has been
convicted. Likewise, the prosecution has to prove that the offender has been
punished for the previous offense. There is no evidence presented by the
prosecution to that effect.
Appellant is convicted of homicide, appreciating in his favor the mitigating
circumstance of passion and obfuscation, which is offset by the aggravating
circumstance of recidivism.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that appellant is convicted of the crime of homicide and
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of TEN (10) YEARS of prision mayor as
minimum to SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS and FOUR (4) MONTHS of reclusion
temporal as maximum. The indemnity to be paid to the heirs of the victim is
increased to P50,000.00. SO ORDERED.
G.R. NO. 158053              June 21, 2007
EDWIN RAZON y LUCEA, Petitioner,vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking the reversal of the
Court of Appeals' (CA) Resolution dated January 31, 2001 1 in CA-G.R. CR No.
2
The facts as found by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) are summarized as follows:
PO1 Francisco Chopchopen (Chopchopen) was walking towards Upper Pinget
Baguio City, at around midnight of August 1, 1993, when a taxicab driven by
Edwin Razon y Lucea (Razon) stopped beside him. Razon told Chopchopen that
he was held up by three men at Dreamland Subdivision. Chopchopen then
asked Razon to go with him to the place of the incident to check if the persons
who held him up were still there. Razon was hesitant at first but eventually went
with Chopchopen to said area about 100 meters up the road. While walking
about eight meters off the road, Chopchopen noticed a person lying on the
ground and partially hidden by a big stone. Upon closer look, Chopchopen saw
that the person's shirt was soaked in blood and that he was hardly breathing.
Lying beside the man was a wooden cane. Chopchopen asked Razon to help
him bring the person to the hospital. On the way, Chopchopen asked Razon if he
was the one who stabbed the victim. Razon answered no. Soon they met a
police mobile patrol driven by SPO2 Samuel Bumangil (Bumangil) who followed
them to Baguio General Hospital. The victim, who was later identified as
Benedict Kent Gonzalo (Gonzalo), was pronounced dead on arrival.3 He was 23
years old and a polio victim.4
Upon questioning, Razon told Bumangil that he was held up by three men, which
included Gonzalo whom he stabbed in self-defense. Razon brought out a fan
knife and told Bumangil that it was the knife he used to stab Gonzalo. A later
search of the cab however yielded another weapon, a colonial knife with
bloodstains which was found under a newspaper near the steering wheel. At the
police station, Razon admitted having stabbed Gonzalo but insisted that he did
so in self-defense.5
An autopsy conducted on the body of the victim showed that he sustained three
stab wounds, to wit: a stab wound measuring 2.5 cms. found
in the front and lower quadrant of the abdomen, directed inward towards the mid- appearance even without his (Razon's) knowledge and conformity.
directing Razon to manifest the authenticity of his signature appearing on the
February 1, 1999 motion to withdraw as counsel filed by Atty. Gallardo. The CA
also required Razon to cause the entry of appearance of a new counsel within 5
days from notice.15
On August 27, 1999, the CA granted Atty. Gallardo's motion to withdraw as
counsel and directed Razon anew to cause the entry of appearance of his new
counsel or manifest whether he wanted the CA to appoint a counsel de oficio to
defend him, within five days from notice with warning that failure to comply with
said Resolution shall cause the dismissal of his appeal. 16
On February 22, 2000, the CA again issued a Resolution which noted the
Judicial Records Division (JRD) report that no compliance had been filed by
Razon with the resolution dated August 27, 1999; considered the right of the
accused to be represented by counsel as waived; and directed the JRD, in the
interest of justice, to resend the notice to file brief to Razon.17 On February 28,
2000, the CA issued another notice to file brief, this time addressed to and
received by Razon himself.18 On July 12, 2000, the CA issued a Resolution
requiring Razon to show cause why his appeal should not be dismissed for
failure to file the required brief despite notice thereof. 19
With the failure of Razon to comply with the said directives, the CA on January
31, 2001, issued the herein assailed Resolution dismissing his appeal as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is deemed ABANDONED and DISMISSED on
authority of Section 8, Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. 20
On July 25, 2001, the CA received a Motion for Reconsideration filed by Razon
stating that he could not read and understand English and that Atty. Gallardo
was negligent of his duties to him, as said lawyer filed his withdrawal of
21

line and slightly upward entering the abdominal wall and perforating the small The CA denied Razon's motion for reconsideration through its Resolution dated
intestines, pancreas and the abdominal aorta, having an approximate depth of April 14, 2003, thus:22
12 cm.; a stab wound on the left arm measuring 5 cm. with one end blunt and the
other end sharp having an approximate depth of about 1 cm.; and a stab wound 1. Indeed the instant motion for reconsideration was filed out of time in violation
on the right buttock 1.3 cm. long with a depth of about 4 cm. The stab wound on of Section 16, Rule 124 of the same Rules – for the appellant admitted that on
the abdomen killed Gonzalo, as it penetrated the small intestines, pancreas and March 6, 2001 he received this Court's Resolution dated January 31, 2001
the abdominal aorta, causing massive hemorrhage and loss of blood. Abrasions dismissing his appeal but the record shows that he filed the subject motion four
and contusions were also found on the body of Gonzalo, located on the left ear months later or only on July 19, 2001 to be exact.
lobe, on the chest, on the left anterolateral side, on the mid-posterior aspect and 2. Our dismissal is warranted by Section 8 of Rule 124 and circumstances
on the lumbar region of the back.6 showing that it was not only his previous counsel that was lax and negligent but
Razon for his part asserted that he acted in self-defense. He claimed that around the appellant as well...
11:30 p.m. on August 1, 1993, three men boarded his cab from the Philippine xxx
Rabbit bus station along Magsaysay Avenue in Baguio who asked to be brought
to Dreamland Subdivision in Pinget for the total sum of ₱90.00. Upon reaching 3. The appellant had ignored Our directives and the option given him to have the
their destination and while Razon was turning the cab around, Gonzalo, who was services of a counsel de oficio.
23

seated behind the driver's seat, declared a hold-up and poked a Batangas knife Petitioner now comes before this Court claiming that the CA erred in declaring
(veinte nueve) at the right side of the base of Razon's neck. The two other his appeal as abandoned and dismissed.24 He claims that he is not bound by the
passengers were shocked but Gonzalo told them to get their knives, stab Razon actions of Atty. Gallardo who was negligent of his duties to him; Atty. Gallardo
and grab his right hand. Razon however was able to grab the knife and release failed to file the required appeal brief before the CA despite the many extensions
his right hand from Gonzalo's two companions. Gonzalo's companions then went given him; worse, Atty. Gallardo filed a motion to withdraw his appearance as
out of the cab and picked up stones. Gonzalo followed and Razon ran after petitioner's counsel without petitioner's knowledge; it was only when he received
them. Gonzalo was swinging his cane and it hit Razon on his right leg. Razon the CA Resolution dated January 31, 2001 that he learned of the withdrawal of
then thought of his knife inside the cab and he went to get it and confronted the Atty. Gallardo as his counsel, and it was only then that Atty. Gallardo advised
three by swinging his knife from left to right. Gonzalo's companions ran away him to get another lawyer; petitioner received the records of the case from Atty.
and Razon went back to his cab and left.7 Gallardo, only on March 9, 2001; petitioner failed to comply with the CA
resolutions because he could not understand the same due to his educational
Not finding credence in Razon's claim of self-defense, RTC Branch 60 of Baguio deficiency; and given the chance to ventilate his appeal, petitioner would be
City convicted him of homicide as follows: absolved of the charge against him as he truly acted in self defense.25
WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused, Edwin Razon y Lucea, GUILTY For the State, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contended that petitioner
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of HOMICIDE. There being no mitigating himself is guilty of negligence; the CA gave him ample opportunity to secure the
or aggravating circumstance, he is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty services of counsel or manifest his desire to have a counsel de oficio appointed
of 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor as minimum, to 14 years 8 months and 1 by the court, but petitioner ignored said directives; petitioner's motion for
day of reclusion temporal as maximum. reconsideration of the CA's Resolution dated January 31, 2001 was also filed out
He is further ordered to pay the heirs of Benedict Kent Gonzalo, Jr. the amount of time; and Sec. 8, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court provides that the appellate
of ₱12,770.00 by way of actual damages; ₱50,000.00 by way of moral damages; court may dismiss an appeal26if the appellant fails to file his brief within the time
and ₱10,000.00 by way of attorney's fees. SO ORDERED.8 prescribed by the said Rule.
Razon filed a notice of appeal, 9 and the CA required him, through his counsel Petitioner filed a Reply and both parties filed their memoranda reiterating their
Atty. Rigoberto D. Gallardo (Atty. Gallardo) to file an appellant's brief. 10 Two respective arguments.27
motions for extension of time were filed by Atty. Gallardo. 11 Instead of filing the Sifting the arguments raised, it is clear that only two questions need to be
brief, however, Atty. Gallardo filed a Motion to Withdraw as Counsel for the answered: (1) whether the CA erred in dismissing petitioner's appeal for failure to
Accused-Appellant on January 7, 1999, claiming that Razon had consistently file appellant's brief; and (2) whether petitioner acted in self-defense in killing
shown his disinterest in the case by not attending much needed Gonzalo.
conferences.12 The CA ordered Atty. Gallardo to file another motion to withdraw
with Razon's conformity; thus Atty. Gallardo filed a motion dated February 1, The Court answers both questions in the negative.
1999, with a signature, purportedly that of Razon's. 13 Later, the CA received a The first issue. Whether the CA erred in dismissing petitioner's appeal for failure
Manifestation dated February 17, 1999, stating that Atty. Gallardo's firm could to file appellant's brief.
not secure Razon's signature to signify his conformity to Atty. Gallardo's
While appeal is an essential part of our judicial system, a party must strictly
withdrawal as his counsel, Atty. Gallardo thus requested that he be relieved of
comply with the requisites laid down by the Rules of Court on appeals, mindful of
his responsibilities as counsel
the fact that an appeal is purely a statutory right. Procedural rules are designed
even without Razon's conformity.14 to facilitate the adjudication of cases. Both courts and litigants are therefore
Due to the inconsistency of the manifestations of Atty. Gallardo in his motions enjoined to abide strictly by the rules. While there are instances when the Court
dated February 1, 1999 and February 17, 1999, the CA issued a Resolution allows a relaxation in the application of the rules, such liberality is not intended to
forge a bastion for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity. Liberality in
the interpretation and application of the rules applies only in proper cases and
under justifiable causes and circumstances.28
Indeed, the CA may dismiss an appeal for failure to file appellant's brief on time.
It is given the discretion which must be exercised in accordance with the tenets
of justice and fair play, having in mind the circumstances obtaining in each
case.29
In this case, the CA gave petitioner sufficient opportunity to file his appellant's
brief. Instead of complying, however, petitioner chose to ignore the many
directives of the CA and now puts the blame on his former counsel Atty.
Gallardo, who was allegedly guilty of gross negligence.
Even if the Court were to admit that Atty. Gallardo was negligent, the rule is that
negligence of counsel binds the client. The only exception is when the
negligence of said counsel is so gross, reckless and inexcusable that the client is
deprived of his day in court.30 No such excepting circumstance can be said to be
present in this case because as properly observed by the appellate court,
petitioner himself was guilty of negligence.31
As borne by the records, the CA issued a Resolution on April 15, 1999 requiring
petitioner to manifest within five days from receipt thereof the authenticity of his
signature appearing in the motion to withdraw as counsel filed by Atty. Gallardo
dated February 1, 1999, and to inform the CA of his new counsel.32 On August
27, 1999, the CA granted Atty. Gallardo's motion to withdraw as counsel and
required petitioner anew to cause the entry of appearance of his new counsel or
manifest whether he desires the CA to appoint a counsel de oficio to defend him,
with a warning that failure to comply with the said resolution shall cause the
dismissal of his appeal. On February 28, 2000, the CA issued another notice to
file brief, this time addressed to Razon himself.33 In a Resolution dated July 12,
2000, the CA required Razon to show cause why his appeal should not be
dismissed for failure to file the required brief.34 On January 31, 2001, or almost
three years after the notice of appeal was filed, the CA finally issued a resolution
dismissing petitioner's appeal.35
Despite the many notices given him, Razon still failed to comply with the CA's
directives. He also took a long time to file his motion for reconsideration of the
CA's January 31, 2001 Resolution because while he admittedly received a copy
of the said resolution on March 6, 2001, he only filed his motion for
reconsideration on July 19, 2001 or more than four months later.
It is thus clear that petitioner was guilty of neglect. He was aware of his
conviction and of the requirement of filing an appellant's brief.36 Yet he had no
urgency in filing the same, even with the CA's explicit orders. His excuse that his
educational deficiency prevented him from complying with the CA's resolutions
deserves scant consideration. He was able to secure the services of counsel to
file for him a petition before this Court. Had he exerted earlier the kind of effort
he put in getting a new counsel, or had he simply notified the court of his desire
to have a counsel de oficio assigned to him, then he would not have to contend
with the predicament he is presently in. For the resolution of the CA dismissing
his appeal on the ground of abandonment, petitioner has no one else to blame
but himself.
The second issue. Whether petitioner acted in self-defense.
While the CA did not rule on the merits of the case, it is best not to remand the
case to the CA. All the records and evidence necessary for the determination of
the innocence or guilt of the petitioner are before this Court. Thus, for a complete
and full disposition of the case and to avert further delay in the disposition of the
same, the Court shall hereby resolve the case on the merits.37
It is settled that when an accused admits killing the victim but invokes self-
defense to escape criminal liability, the accused assumes the burden to establish
his plea by credible, clear and convincing evidence; otherwise, conviction would
follow from his admission that he killed the victim.38 Self-defense cannot be
justifiably appreciated when uncorroborated by independent and competent
evidence or when it is extremely doubtful by itself.39 Indeed, in invoking self-
defense, the burden of evidence is shifted and the accused claiming self-defense
must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the
prosecution.40
Here, petitioner admitted having inflicted the wound which killed Gonzalo. 41 The
burden is therefore on him to show that he did so in self-defense. As correctly
found by the RTC, however, petitioner failed to prove the elements of self-
defense.
To escape liability, the person claiming self-defense must show by sufficient,
satisfactory and convincing evidence that: (1) the victim committed unlawful
aggression amounting to actual or imminent threat to the life and limb of the
person claiming self-defense; (2) there was reasonable necessity in the means
employed to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression; and (3) there was lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the person claiming self-defense or at least
any provocation executed by the person claiming self-defense was not the
proximate and immediate cause of the victim's aggression. 42
The condition sine qua non for the justifying circumstance of self-defense is the
element of unlawful aggression. 43 There can be no self-defense unless the victim
committed unlawful aggression against the person who resorted to self-
defense.44 Unlawful aggression presupposes an actual, sudden and unexpected
attack or imminent danger thereof and not just a threatening or intimidating
attitude.45 In case of threat, it must be offensive, strong and positively showing
the wrongful intent to cause injury.46 For a person to be considered the unlawful
aggressor, he must be shown to have exhibited external acts clearly showing his
intent to cause and commit harm to the other. 47
Petitioner claims that Gonzalo, who was seated behind him in the taxicab,
declared a hold-up and poked a knife at the base of his neck. Granting that this
is true, what transpired next, changed the nature of the roles played by petitioner
and Gonzalo.
As correctly found by the trial court:
Without scrutinizing Razon's assertion that he was held up, and assuming the
same to be true, there was, indeed unlawful aggression when Gonzalo poked a
knife on Razon's neck. But, when Razon, in a Herculean feat, was able to grab
the knife from Gonzalo and freed his right hand from the hold of Gonzalo's two
companions, the aggression no longer existed. In fact, Gonzalo's two
companions, went out of the taxicab and Gonzalo himself went out also towards
the canal of the road. At this point, Razon could have started his taxicab and left
the place because he was left alone in the taxicab. But he did not. He went after
Gonzalo and his two companions and started swinging the knife he grabbed from
Gonzalo. He even had time to go back to the taxicab and get his own knife and
then went back to the three men. He then was holding two knives. There was no
proof that Gonzalo's companions were able to throw stones at him or the taxicab
to indicate perhaps, that his three passengers who intended to hold him up
continued their unlawful aggression...
When Gonzalo and his two companions went out of the taxicab, and Razon
followed them outside, Razon became the aggressor. The wounds sustained by
Gonzalo would clearly show that he was attacked by Razon. 48
Such findings are well supported by the records. During his direct testimony,
Razon admitted that he followed the three men, including Gonzalo, after they got
out of the cab. Then he went back to his cab to get his knife.49 On cross-
examination, Razon admitted the same thing, and added the following:
Q. And you said that you swung the knife from left to right, is that correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And you were able to hit Benedict Kent Gonzalo, Jr.?
A. Yes, sir.
xxx
Q. So you admitted that the injuries sustained by Benedict Kent Gonzalo in
front of his abdomen was due to your act of swinging the knife from left to
right in front of him?
A. Yes, sir.
xxx
Q. And tell the Court if this is the one that you used, this colonial knife, previously
marked as Exh. "A."
A. This is the one, sir.
Q. Yes, you testified the last time that you have to go back to your taxi cab and
get this knife marked as Exh. "A"?
A. Yes, sir.50 (Emphasis supplied)
On re-cross, Razon further admitted that:
Q. And you went near the canal where Benedict Kent Gonzalo, Jr. was?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And the two others were already running away?
A. They were still there at that time.
Q. Do you know that Benedict Kent Gonzalo, Jr. was a victim of polio?
A. No, sir.
Q. But he did not run unlike the other two?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. He was in the canal which is lower than the road, is that correct?
A. Yes, sir.
ATTY. GALLARDO:
Witness is demonstrating the height of the canal about one foot, Your Honor.
ATTY. MOLINTAS:
You have to go near him and go down the canal also, is that correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. That's where you swung your knife left and right towards Benedict Kent
Gonzalo, Jr.?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And Benedict Kent Gonzalo, Jr. did not try to run away from you?
A. When I went up to get my taxi, that was the time he run away, sir.51 (Emphasis
supplied)
Petitioner unequivocally admitted that after the three men went out of his taxicab,
he ran after them and later went back to his cab to get his colonial knife; then he injury.
went down the canal to swing his knife at the victim, wounding and killing him in
the process. Such can no longer be deemed as self-defense.
It is settled that the moment the first aggressor runs away, unlawful aggression
on the part of the first aggressor ceases to exist; and when unlawful aggression
ceases, the defender no longer has any right to kill or wound the former
aggressor; otherwise, retaliation and not self-defense is committed.52 Retaliation hired the services of a private lawyer to prosecute the case.
is not the same as self-defense. In retaliation, the aggression that was begun by
the injured party already ceased when the accused attacked him, while in self-
defense the aggression was still existing when the aggressor was injured by the
accused.53
Even assuming that some danger did in fact exist, the imminence of that danger
had already ceased the moment petitioner was able to disarm the victim by
wresting the knife from the latter. After the former had successfully seized the
weapon, and he as well as his companions went out of the cab, there was no
longer any unlawful aggression to speak of that would have necessitated the
need to kill the victim.54
The defense employed by petitioner also cannot be said to be reasonable. The
means employed by a person claiming self-defense must be commensurate to
the nature and the extent of the attack sought to be averted, and must be
rationally necessary to prevent or repel an unlawful aggression.55 The nature or
quality of the weapon; the physical condition, the character, the size and other
circumstances of the aggressor as well as those of the person who invokes self-
defense; and the place and the occasion of the assault also define the
reasonableness of the means used in self-defense. 56
In this case, the deceased was a polio victim, which explains the presence of the
wooden cane at the scene of the crime.57 Petitioner also admitted that when he
went after Gonzalo, he had in his possession two knives, the Batangas knife he
wrested from the hold-uppers and the colonial knife which he took from his cab. 58
Other circumstances also render petitioner's claim of self-defense as dubious
and unworthy of belief. The nature and location of the victim's wounds manifest
petitioner's resolve to end the life of the victim.59 Here, the wound that killed
Gonzalo was 12 cm. deep which was directed inward and
slightly upward, entering the abdominal cavity, perforating the small intestines
and penetrating the pancreas and the abdominal aorta. 60 Petitioner also did not
inform the authorities at the earliest opportunity that he wounded Gonzalo in self-
defense;61 neither did he surrender right away the colonial knife which he used in
stabbing the victim. He only invoked self-defense when he could no longer
conceal his deed. As testified to by Chopchopen, Razon was hesitant at first to
go to the place where he was allegedly held up.62 Then when Chopchopen
discovered the body of Gonzalo and while they were bringing him to the hospital,
he asked Razon if he was the one who stabbed Gonzalo, to which Razon
answered in the negative.63 He only admitted to having stabbed the victim at the
police station after he was investigated by police officers.64
Petitioner's claim that he also suffered injuries brought by the attack on him by
the victim is belied by the testimonies of police officers Chopchopen and
Bumangil who said that they did not see any injury on Razon on the night in
question.65
With petitioner's failure to prove self-defense, the inescapable conclusion is that
he is guilty of homicide as correctly found by the RTC.
As to the damages awarded by the RTC, however, the Court finds that certain
modifications need to be made. While not assigned as errors, it is the duty of the
Court to correct such errors as may be found in the judgment appealed from,
since an appeal in a criminal case throws the whole case wide open for review.66
The Court notes that the RTC failed to award the heirs of Gonzalo, ₱50,000.00
as civil indemnity for his death. 67 Civil indemnity is automatically imposed upon
the accused without need of proof other than the fact of commission of murder or
homicide.68
Anent actual damages, the Court resolves to delete the same and in lieu thereof
imposes temperate damages in the amount of ₱25,000.00. This is consistent
with the ruling of the Court in People v. Werba,69 citing People v.
Villanueva70 which held that in instances where actual expenses amounting to
less than ₱25,000.00 are proved during the trial, the award of temperate
damages of ₱25,000.00 is justified in lieu of the actual damages of a lesser
amount.71 In this case, Gonzalo's heirs were only able to present receipts
amounting to ₱4,925.00.72
As to moral damages, the RTC correctly awarded the amount of ₱50,000.00, as
the prosecution was able to show that the father of the victim, Benedicto
Gonzalo, Sr., suffered mental and emotional anguish due to the untimely death
of his son. Gonzalo Sr., who was 74 years old at the time of his testimony, said
that he had special affection for his son, not only because he was the youngest
among all his children, but also because he was a polio victim. He said that he
could not eat and sleep thinking that his son could not have put up a fight due to
his physical disability.73 Indeed, moral damages may be awarded in favor of the
heirs of a victim upon sufficient proof of mental anguish, serious anxiety,
wounded feelings and similar
74
The RTC also did not err in awarding ₱10,000.00 as attorney's fees to the heirs
of the victim. As provided for in Art. 2208 (11)75 of the Civil Code, attorney's fees
may be awarded where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney's fees
and expenses of litigation should be recovered. In this case the award of
attorney's fees is proper as it is borne by the records that the family of the victim
76
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 60, Baguio City,
in Criminal Case No. 12245-R, entitled "People of the Philippines v. Edwin
Razon y Lucea" is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION to the effect that petitioner
is ordered to pay the heirs of Benedict Kent Gonzalo, Jr. the amount of
₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity and ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages in addition
to ₱50,000.00 as moral damages and ₱10,000.00 as attorney's fees.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 195021
NICOLAS VELASQUEZ and VICTOR VELASQUEZ, Petitioners
vs
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
An accused who pleads a justifying circumstance under Article 11 of the Revised
Penal Code1 admits to the commission of acts, which would otherwise engender
criminal liability. However, he asserts that he is justified in committing the acts. In
the process of proving a justifying circumstance, the accused risks admitting the
imputed acts, which may justify the existence of an offense were it not for the
exculpating facts. Conviction follows if the evidence for the accused fails to prove
the existence of justifying circumstances.
Through this Petition for Review on Certiorari2 under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, the accused petitioners pray that the assailed March 17, 2010
Decision3 and December 10, 2010 Resolution4 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR. No. 31333 be reversed and set aside, and that they be absolved of any
criminal liability.
The Court of Appeals' assailed rulings sustained the July 25, 2007 Decision5 of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, Dagupan City, which found petitioners guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of attempted murder.
In an Information, petitioners Nicolas Velasquez (Nicolas) and Victor Velasquez
(Victor), along with four (4) others -Felix Caballeda (Felix), Jojo Del Mundo
(Jojo), Sonny Boy Velasquez (Sonny), and Ampong Ocumen (Ampong) - were
charged with attempted murder under Article 248,6 in relation to Article 6,7 of the
Revised Penal Code, as follows:
That on May 24, 2003 in the evening at Brgy. Palua, Mangaldan, Pangasinan
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused
while armed with stones and wooden poles, conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping one another, with intent to kill, with treachery and abuse of
superior strength, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
maul and hit JESUS DEL MUNDO inflicting upon him injuries in the vital parts of
his body, the said accused having thus commenced a felony directly by overt
acts, but did not perform all the acts of execution which could have produced the
crime of Murder but nevertheless did not produce it by reason of some causes or
accident other than their own spontaneous desistance to his damage and
prejudice.
Contrary to Article 248 in relation to Article 6 and 50 of the Revised Penal Code. 8
All accused, except Ampong, who remained at large, pleaded not guilty upon
arraignment.9 Trial then ensued.10
According to the prosecution, on May 24, 2003, at about 10:00 p.m., the spouses
Jesus and Ana Del Mundo (Del Mundo Spouses) left their home to sleep in their
nipa hut, which was about 100 meters away.11 Arriving at the nipa hut, the Del
Mundo Spouses saw Ampong and Nora Castillo (Nora) in the midst of having
sex.12 Aghast at what he perceived to be a defilement of his property, Jesus Del
Mundo (Jesus) shouted invectives at Ampong and Nora, who both scampered
away.13 Jesus decided to pursue Ampong and Nora, while Ana Del Mundo (Ana)
left to fetch their son, who was then elsewhere. 14 Jesus went to the house of
Ampong's aunt, but neither Ampong nor Nora was there.15 He began making his
way back home when he was blocked by Ampong and his fellow accused. 16
Without provocation, petitioner Nicolas hit the left side of Jesus' forehead with a
stone. Petitioner Victor also hit Jesus' left eyebrow with a stone. 17 Accused Felix
did the same, hitting Jesus above his left ear.18 Accused Sonny struck Jesus with
a bamboo, hitting him at the back, below his right shoulder.19 Ampong punched
Jesus on his left cheek. The accused then left Jesus on the ground, bloodied.
Jesus crawled and hid behind blades of grass, fearing that the accused might
return. He then got up and staggered his way back to their house.20
Jesus testified on his own ordeal. In support of his version of the events, the
prosecution also presented the testimony of Maria Teresita Viado (Maria
Teresita). Maria Teresita was initially approached by Jesus' wife, Ana, when
Jesus failed to immediately return home. 21 She and Ana embarked on a search
for Jesus but were separated.22 At the sound of a man being beaten, she hid
behind some bamboos.23 From that vantage point, she saw the accused mauling
Jesus.24 The prosecution noted that about four (4) or five (5) meters away was a
lamp post, which illuminated the scene.25
At the Del Mundo Spouses' residence, Maria Teresita recounted to them what
she had witnessed (Jesus had managed to return home by then).26 Ana and
Maria Teresita then brought Jesus to Barangay Captain Pili ta Villanueva, who
assisted them in bringing Jesus to the hospital.27
After undergoing an x-ray examination, Jesus was found to have sustained a
crack in his skull.28 Dr. Jose D. De Guzman (Dr. De Guzman) issued a medico-
legal certificate indicating the following findings:
x.x. Positive Alcoholic Breath
3 ems lacerated wound fronto-parietal area left
1 cm lacerated wound frontal area left
Abrasion back left multi linear approximately 20 cm
Abrasion shoulder left, confluent 4x10 cm
Depressed skull fracture parietal area left.
x.x.29
Dr. De Guzman noted that Jesus' injuries required medical attention for four (4)
to six (6) weeks.30 Jesus was also advised to undergo surgery. 31 He was,
however, unable to avail of the required medical procedure due to shortage of
funds.32
The defense offered a different version of events.
According to the accused, in the evening of May 24, 2003, petitioner Nicolas was
roused in his sleep by his wife, Mercedes Velasquez (Mercedes), as the nearby
house of petitioner Victor was being stoned. 33
Nicolas made his way to Victor's place, where he saw Jesus hacking Victor's
door. Several neighbors - the other accused - allegedly tried to pacify
Jesus.34 Jesus, who was supposedly inebriated, vented his ire upon Nicolas and
the other accused, as well as on Mercedes.35 The accused thus responded and
countered Jesus' attacks, leading to his injuries.36
In its July 25, 2007 Decision,37 the Regional Tnal Court, Branch 41, Dagupan
City found petitioners and Felix Caballeda guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
attempted murder.38 The court also found Sonny Boy Velasquez guilty beyond
reasorable doubt of less serious physical injuries.39 He was found to have hit
Jesus on the back with a bamboo rod. Jojo Del Mundo was acquitted.40 The case
was archived with respect to Ampong, as he remained at large.41
The dispositive portion of its Decision read:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding
accused NICOLAS VELASQUEZ, VICTOR VELASQUEZ and FELIX
CABALLEDA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Attempted Murder
defined and penalized under Article 248 in relation to Art.ides 6, paragraph 3 and
51 of the Revised Penal Code, and pursuant to the law, sentences each of them
to suffer on (sic) indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and one (1) day of
Arrested (sic) Mayor in its maximum period as minimum to eight (8) years of
Prison (sic) Correctional (sic) in its maximum period to Prison (sic) Mayor in its
medium period as maximum and to pay proportionately to private complainant
Jesus del Mundo the amount of Php55,000.00 as exemplary damages, and to
pay the cost of suit.
The Court likewise finds the accused SONNY BOY VELASQUEZ [guilty] beyond
reasonable doubt of the [crime] of Less Serious Physical Injuries defined and
penalized under Article 265 of the Revised Penal Code and pursuant thereto, he
is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Arresto Mayor on one (1) month and
one (1) day to six (6) months.
Accused JOJO DEL MUNDO is hereby acquitted on the ground of absence of
evidence.
With respect to accused AMPONG OCUMEN, the case against him is archived
without prejudice to its revival as soon as he is arrested and brought to the
jurisdiction of this Court.42
Petitioners and Felix Caballeda filed a motion for reconsideration, which the
Regional Trial Court denied.43
On petitioners' and Caballeda's appeal, the Court of Appeals found that
petitioners and Caballeda were only liable for serious physical injuries because
"first, intent to kill was not attendant inasmuch as the accused-appellants,
despite their superiority in numbers and strength, left the victim alive and,
second, none of [the] injuries or wounds inflicted upon the victim was fatal."44 The
Court of Appeals thus modified the sentence imposed on petitioners and
Caballeda.
The dispositive portion of its assailed March 1 7, 2010 Decision45 read:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the July 25, 2007 Decision of Branch 41,
Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City is hereby MODIFIED. Instead, accused-
appellants are found guilty of Serious Physical Injuries and each of them is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of six (6) months of arresto
mayor as minimum to four (4) years and two (2) months of prisi6n
correccional as maximum.SO ORDERED.46 (Emphasis in the original)
Following the denial of their Motion for Reconsideration, petitioners filed the
present Petition.47 They insist on their version of events, particularly on how they
and their co-accused allegedly merely acted in response to Jesus Del Mundo's
aggressive behavior.
For resolution is the issue of whether petitioners may be held criminally liable for
the physical harm inflicted on Jesus Del Mundo. More specifically, this Court is
asked to determine whether there was sufficient evidence: first, to prove that
justifying circumstances existed, and second, to convict the petitioners.
I
Petitioners' defense centers on their claim that they acted in defense of
themselves, and also in defense of Mercedes, Nicolas' wife and Victor's mother.
Thus, they invoke the first and second justifying circumstances under Article 11
of the Revised Penal Code:
ARTICLE 11. Justifying Circumstances. - The following do not incur any criminal
liability:
1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following
circumstances concur:
First. Unlawful aggression;
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or
repel it;
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself.
2. Anyone who acts in defense of the person or rights of his spouse, ascendants,
descendants, or legitimate, natural or adopted brothers or sisters, or of his
relatives by affinity in the same degrees, and those by consanguinity within the
fourth civil degree, provided that the first and second requisites prescribed in the
next preceding circumstance are present, and the further requisite, in case the
provocation was given by the person attacked, that the one making defense had
no part therein.
A person invoking self-defense (or defense of a relative) admits to having
inflicted harm upon another person - a potential criminal act under Title Eight
(Crimes Against Persons) of the Revised Penal Code. However, he or she
makes the additional, defensive contention that even as he or she may have
inflicted harm, he or she nevertheless incurred no criminal liability as the looming
danger upon his or her own person (or that of his or her relative) justified the
infliction of protective harm to an erstwhile aggressor.
The accused's admission enables the prosecution to dispense with discharging
its burden of proving that the accused performed acts, which would otherwise be
the basis of criminal liability. All that remains to be established is whether the
accused were justified in acting as he or she did. To this end, the accused's case
must rise on its own merits:
It is settled that when an accused admits [harming] the victim but invokes self-
defense to escape criminal liability, the accused assumes the burden to establish
his plea by credible, clear and convincing evidence; otherwise, conviction would
follow from his admission that he [harmed] the victim. Self-defense cannot be
justifiably appreciated when uncorroborated by independent and competent
evidence or when it is extremely doubtful by itself. Indeed, in invoking self-
defense, the burden of evidence is shifted and the accused claiming self-defense
must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the
prosecution.48
To successfully invoke self-defense, an accused must establish: "(1) unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person resorting to self-defense." 49 Defense of a
relative under Article 11 (2) of the Revised Penal Code requires the same first
two (2) requisites as self-defense and, in lieu of the third "in case the provocation
was given by the person attacked, that the one making the defense had no part
therein."50
The first requisite - unlawful aggression - is the condition sine qua non of self-
defense and defense of a relative:
At the heart of the claim of self-defense is the presence of an unlawful
aggression committed against appellant. Without unlawful aggression, self-
defense will not have a leg to stand on and this justifying circumstance cannot
and will not be appreciated, even if the other elements are present. Unlawful
aggression refers to an attack amounting to actual or imminent threat to the life
and limb of the person claiming self-defense.51
The second requisite - reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent
or repel the aggression - requires a reasonable proportionality between the
unlawful aggression and the defensive response: "[t]he means employed by the
person invoking self-defense contemplates a rational equivalence between the
means of attack and the defense."52 This is a matter that depends on the
circumstances:
Reasonable necessity of the means employed does not imply material
commensurability between the means of attack and defense. What the law
requires is rational equivalence, in the consideration of which will enter as
principal factors the emergency, the imminent danger to which the person
attacked is exposed, and the instinct, more than the reason, that moves or
impels the defense, and the proportionateness thereof does not depend upon the
harm done, but rests upon the imminent danger of such injury ... As WE stated in
the case of People vs. Lara, in emergencies of this kind, human nature does not
act upon processes of formal reason but in obedience to the instinct of self-
preservation; and when it is apparent that a person has reasonably acted upon
this instinct, it is the duty of the courts to sanction the act and hold the act
irresponsible in law for the consequences.53 (Citations omitted)
The third requisite - lack of sufficient provocation - requires the person mounting
a defense to be reasonably blameless. He or she must not have antagonized or
incited the attacker into launching an assault. This also requires a consideration
of proportionality. As explained in People v. Boholst-Caballero,54 "[p]rovocation is
sufficient when it is proportionate to the aggression, that is, adequate enough to
impel one to attack the person claiming self-defense."55
II
We find petitioners' claims of self-defense and defense of their relative,
Mercedes, to be sorely wanting.
Petitioners' entire defense rests on proof that it was Jesus who initiated an
assault by barging into the premises of petitioners' residences, hacking Victor's
door, and threatening physical harm upon petitioners and their companions. That
is, that unlawful aggression originated from Jesus.
Contrary to what a successful averment of self-defense or defense of a relative
requires, petitioners offered nothing more than a self-serving, uncorroborated
claim that Jesus appeared out of nowhere to go berserk in the vicinity of their
homes. They failed to present independent and credible proof to back up their
assertions. The Regional Trial Court noted that it was highly dubious that Jesus
would go all the way to petitioners' residences to initiate an attack for no
apparent reason.56
The remainder of petitioners' recollection of events strains credulity. They claim
that Jesus launched an assault despite the presence of at least seven (7)
antagonists: petitioners, Mercedes, and the four (4) other accused. They further
assert that Jesus persisted on his assault despite being outnumbered, and also
despite their and their co-accused's bodily efforts to restrain Jesus. His
persistence was supposedly so likely to harm them that, to neutralize him, they
had no other recourse but to hit him on the head with stones for at least three (3)
times, and to hit him on the back with a bamboo rod, aside from dealing him with
less severe blows.57
As the Regional Trial Court noted, however:
The Court takes judicial notice of (the) big difference in the physical built of the
private complainant and accused Victor Velasquez, Sonny Boy Velasquez, Felix
Caballeda and Jojo del Mundo, private complainant is shorter in height and of
smaller built than all the accused.
The said accused could have had easily held the private complainant, who was
heavily drunk as they claim, and disarmed him without the need of hitting him.58
The injuries which Jesus were reported to have sustained speak volumes:
3 ems lacerated wound fronto-parietal area left
1 cm lacerated wound frontal area left
Abrasion back left multi linear approximately 20 cm
Abrasion shoulder left, confluent 4x 10 cm
Depressed skull fracture parietal area left.59
Even if it were to be granted that Jesus was the initial aggressor, the beating
dealt to him by petitioners and their co-accused was still glaringly in excess of
what would have sufficed to neutralize him. It was far from a reasonably
necessary means to repel his supposed aggression. Petitioners thereby fail in
satisfying the second requisite of self-defense and of defense of a relative.
III
In addition to their tale of self-defense, petitioners insist that the testimony of
Maria Teresita is not worthy of trust because she parted ways with Ana while
searching for Jesus.60 They characterize Maria Teresita as the prosecution's
"lone eyewitness."61 They make it appear that its entire case hinges on her.
Thus, they theorize that with the shattering of her credibility comes the complete
and utter ruin of the prosecution's case.62 Petitioners claim that Maria Teresita is
the prosecution's lone eyewitness at the same time that they acknowledge
Jesus' testimony, which they dismissed as laden with inconsistencies. 63
These contentions no longer merit consideration.
Petitioners' averment of justifying circumstances was dispensed with the need
for even passing upon their assertions against Maria Teresita's and Jesus'
testimonies.1âwphi1 Upon their mere invocation of self-defense and defense of a
relative, they relieved the prosecution of its burden of proving the acts
constitutive of the offense. They took upon themselves the burden of establishing
their innocence, and cast their lot on their capacity to prove their own affirmative
allegations.1âwphi1 Unfortunately for them, they failed.
Even if we were to extend them a measure of consideration, their contentions fail
to impress.
Petitioners' primordial characterization of Maria Teresita as the "lone
eyewitness," upon whose testimony the prosecution's case was to rise or fall, is
plainly erroneous. Apart from her, Jesus testified about his own experience of
being mauled by petitioners and their co-accused. Maria Teresita's testimony
was only in support of what Jesus recounted.
Moreover, we fail to see how the mere fact of Maria Teresita's having parted
ways with Ana while searching for Jesus diminishes her credibility. No
extraordinary explanation is necessary for this. Their having proceeded
separately may be accounted for simply by the wisdom of how independent
searches enabled them to cover more ground in less time.
Regarding Jesus' recollection of events, petitioners' contention centers on Jesus'
supposedly flawed recollection of who among the six (6) accused dealt him,
which specific blow, and using which specific weapon. 64 These contentions are
too trivial to even warrant an independent, point by point audit by this Court.
Jurisprudence is replete with clarifications that a witness' recollection of crime
need not be foolproof: "Witnesses cannot be expected to recollect with
exactitude every minute detail of an event. This is especially true when the
witnesses testify as to facts which transpired in rapid succession, attended by
flurry and excitement."65 This is especially true of a victim's recollection of his or
her own harrowing ordeal. One who has undergone a horrifying and traumatic
experience "cannot be expected to mechanically keep and then give an accurate
account"66 of every minutiae.
Certainly, Jesus' supposed inconsistencies on the intricacies of who struck him
which specific blow can be forgiven. The merit of Jesus' testimony does not
depend on whether he has an extraordinary memory despite being hit on the
head multiple times. Rather, it is in his credible narration of his entire ordeal, and
how petitioners and their co-accused were its authors. On this, his testimony was
unequivocal.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR. No. 31333 is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 205298, September 10, 2014
LEOPOLDO QUINTOS Y DEL AMOR, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, ACTING C.J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the Decision2 dated 31 July
2012 and Resolution3 dated 11 January 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR No. 33776, affirming the Joint Decision4 dated 20 October 2010 of the
Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan (trial court) in Criminal Case Nos.
L-8340, L-8341 and L-8342.
The Facts
Petitioner Leopoldo Quintos y Del Amor (petitioner) was charged, in conspiracy
with his brothers Pedro, Rolly and Lando, all surnamed Quintos, and Narciso
Buni for frustrated homicide and homicide.
The Information5 in Criminal Case No. L-8341 reads, in part:
That on or about January 15, 2008 in the afternoon at Brgy. Laois, Labrador,
Pangasinan and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused in conspiracy with each other, with intent to kill, did then and there,
wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously accost, maul and hack with bolo and samurai
Robert M. dela Cruz who suffered hacking wounds, several lacerations and
contusions on the different parts of his body, thus, the accused performed all the
acts of execution which would produce homicide as a consequence but which,
nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of the timely medical intervention
applied on him that prevented his death, to the prejudice and damage of the said
Robert dela Cruz.
CONTRARY to Article 249 in relation to Art. 6 of the Revised Penal Code.
The Information6 in Criminal Case No. L-8342 reads, in part:
That on or about January 15, 2008 in the afternoon at Brgy. Laois, Labrador,
Pangasinan and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused in conspiracy with each other, with intent to kill, did then and there,
wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously accost, maul and hack with bolo and samurai
Felomina dela Cruz who suffered hacking wounds and several lacerations on the
different parts of her body, thus, the accused performed all the acts of execution
which would produce homicide as a consequence but which, nevertheless, did
not produce it by reason of the timely medical intervention applied on him that
prevented his (sic) death, to the prejudice and damage of the said Felomina dela
Cruz.
CONTRARY to Article 249 in relation to Art. 6 of the Revised Penal Code.
In Criminal Case No. L-8340, an Amended Information 7 was filed when the victim
Freddie dela Cruz died:
That on or about January 15, 2008 in the afternoon at Brgy. Laois, Labrador,
Pangasinan and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused in conspiracy with each other, with intent to kill, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously accost, maul and hack with bolo and samurai
Freddie dela Cruz who suffered hacking wounds on the different parts of his
body, which caused his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of
Freddie dela Cruz.
CONTRARY to Article 249 in relation to Art. 6 of the Revised Penal Code.
Of the five accused, Pedro Quintos, Narciso Buni and petitioner were arrested.
Rolly and Lando evaded arrest and remain at large. Petitioner, Pedro and
Narciso all pled not guilty to the charges brought against them.
The prosecution presented five witnesses, namely: Eduardo Oyando, Felomina
dela Cruz, Robert dela Cruz, Police Officer Bernardo Cerezo, and Dr. Saniata V.
Fernandez.
The defense presented two witnesses, namely, petitioner and Pedro Quintos.  Prision Mayor in its full extent, the range of which is from six (6) years and one
Narciso Buni jumped bail before he could testify. Petitioner’s sister was also
scheduled to testify, but since her testimony would only be corroborative, the
prosecution admitted her testimony. 8cralawred
Version of the Prosecution
The prosecution established that at about 3:30 p.m. of 15 January 2008, Freddie
dela Cruz, Robert dela Cruz, Felomina dela Cruz, and Eduardo Oyando were
walking along the barangay road of Laois, Labrador, Pangasinan. They were on
their way to the town proper when they were accosted by Pedro Quintos, Rolly
Quintos, Lando Quintos, Narciso Buni and petitioner. Pedro was wielding a
samurai, Lando, Narciso and petitioner were carrying bolos, and Rolly was
holding a big stone. Robert, Freddie, Felomina, all surnamed dela Cruz, and
Eduardo Oyando ran back towards their house, but the five attackers caught up
with them.
Pedro struck Robert dela Cruz with the samurai, but the latter parried the attack
with his left hand. Robert dela Cruz attempted to gain control of the samurai, but
Rolly hit him in the face, near the jaw, with the stone Rolly was carrying. Robert
dela Cruz lost his hold of the samurai and fell to the ground.
Lando struck Freddie dela Cruz at the back of his head, which caused the latter
to fall face up. Petitioner joined Lando in hacking Freddie dela Cruz, who, while
defending himself with his hands, sustained injuries on his right hand and lost a
few fingers on his left. Rolly then crushed Freddie dela Cruz’s chest with the
same stone he used to hit Robert dela Cruz in the face. Accused PEDRO QUINTOS, POLDO QUINTOS and NARCISO BUNI GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of ATTEMPTED HOMICIDE and are
Pedro advanced towards Felomina dela Cruz as the latter moved towards Robert meted with an indeterminate sentence of Two (2) months and One (1) day
dela Cruz. Pedro pulled Felomina dela Cruz’s hair, slashed her nape with the or arresto mayor as minimum to Two (2) years, Four (4) months and One (1) day
samurai, and then kicked her to the ground. of prision correccional as maximum.
Eduardo Oyando was forced to stand aside and was prevented from helping the
dela Cruzes because Narciso Buni was aiming a bolo at him. The attackers left
when they were done, and only then was Eduardo Oyando able to approach the
victims and call for help.
Robert, Freddie and Felomina, all surnamed dela Cruz, were brought to the
hospital. They were treated for the injuries sustained from the attack. After a few
days, Freddie dela Cruz died from his injuries. Before he died, Freddie dela Cruz
identified Pedro and Lando Quintos as his attackers.
Version of the Defense
The defense presented a different version of the events. In the afternoon of 15
January 2008, Robert, Freddie, Felomina, all surnamed dela Cruz, and Eduardo
Oyando came to the Quintos’ house looking for trouble. Pedro, who was in the
front portion of the house, went out to try and pacify them. Robert dela Cruz
punched Pedro first, hitting him in the face. Robert dela Cruz then went to
Felomina dela Cruz and took a bolo wrapped in a towel that the latter was
holding. Pedro and Robert dela Cruz grappled for the bolo. Felomina dela Cruz
approached the two and tried to help Robert dela Cruz, and in the process got
slashed with the bolo. The scuffle resulted in Robert dela Cruz falling to the
ground and Pedro gaining control of the bolo.
Pedro then noticed that Freddie dela Cruz, who was holding a bolo, was fighting
with Lando. Pedro hurried over and hacked Freddie dela Cruz to defend his
brother Lando. According to Pedro, his senses dimmed and he did not remember
how many times he hacked Freddie dela Cruz. His brothers pacified him, and
Pedro went with them back to the house; while Robert, Freddie and Felomina, all
surnamed dela Cruz, were brought to the hospital.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court gave full faith and credit to the version of the prosecution.
Petitioner was found guilty for the crime of homicide for the death of Freddie dela
Cruz. However, the trial court held that the uncertainty on the nature of the
wounds of Robert dela Cruz and Felomina dela Cruz warrants the appreciation
of a lesser gravity of the crime from frustrated homicide to attempted
homicide.9cralawred
The dispositive portion of the Joint Decision dated 20 October 2010 reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of all the foregoing, the Court finds:
IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. L-8340
Accused PEDRO QUINTOS, POLDO QUINTOS and NARCISO BUNI GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of HOMICIDE as defined in Article 249 of
the Revised Penal Code. The prescribed penalty for Homicide is reclusion
temporal which is from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty years.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum penalty should be taken
from the penalty one (1) degree lower than the imposable penalty which is
(1) day to twelve (12) years. Appreciating no mitigating circumstances in favor of
the accused, the accused is accordingly sentenced from EIGHT (8) YEARS and
ONE (1) DAY of PRISION MAYOR, as minimum, to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS,
EIGHT (8) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of RECLUSION TEMPORAL, as
maximum.
Accused are further ORDERED to pay the heirs of Freddie Dela Cruz, the
amounts of (a) Php 75,000.00 as civil indemnity; (b) Php 75,000.00 as moral
damages; (c) Php 57,286.00 as actual damages;    (d) and Php 15,000.00 as
attorney’s fees.
IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. L-8341
Accused PEDRO QUINTOS, POLDO QUINTOS and NARCISO BUNI GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of ATTEMPTED HOMICIDE and are
meted with an indeterminate sentence of Two (2) months and One (1) day
of arresto mayor as minimum to Two (2) years, Four (4) months and One (1) day
of prision correccional as maximum.
Accused are furthered (sic) ordered to pay Robert dela Cruz actual damages in
the amount of Php 1,650.00 and moral damages in the amount of Php
15,000.00.
IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. L-8342
Accused are furthered (sic) ordered to pay Felomina dela Cruz actual damages
in the amount of Php 3,750.00 and moral damages in the amount of Php
15,000.00.
In all cases, considering that Pedro Quintos and Poldo Quintos have undergone
preventive imprisonment, they shall be credited in the service of their sentences
with the time they have undergone preventive imprisonment subject to the
conditions provided for in Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code. SO
ORDERED.10cralawred
Petitioner and Pedro Quintos appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals,
alleging that the trial court gravely erred in convicting them despite the
prosecution’s failure to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals found the appeal bereft of merit, thus:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED and the assailed Joint Decision
dated October 20, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan,
Branch 39, in Criminal Case Nos. L-8340, L-8341 and L-8342 is AFFIRMED IN
TOTO.
SO ORDERED.11cralawred
Hence, this petition.
The Issues
Petitioner faults the Court of Appeals for: (1) affirming the conviction, despite the
prosecution’s failure to prove petitioner’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt; and (2)
finding that conspiracy exists, in particular, that a finding of conspiracy should not
be left to conjecture, in light of the alleged failure of the prosecution to present
evidence that petitioner took part in inflicting injuries on the victims in furtherance
of a common design to kill.12cralawred
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is unmeritorious.
Review of Questions of Fact Improper
The review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is limited to
questions of law. This Court does not weigh all over again the evidence already
considered in the proceedings below.13 The narrow ambit of review prescribed
under this rule allows us to swiftly dispose of such appeals. This rule, of course,
admits of exceptions applicable to those rare petitions whose peculiar factual
milieu justifies relaxation of the Rules such as based on speculation or
conjectures, or overlooked undisputed facts which, if duly considered, lead to a
different conclusion.14cralawred
In the present case, petitioner finds fault in the decisions of the trial and appellate
courts, alleging that had the said courts given weight to the defense evidence,
conviction would not have been justified. This is clearly an invitation for the Court
to review the probative value of the evidence presented in the proceedings
below.
A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain
state of facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the
truth or falsity of the alleged facts.15 For a question to be one of law, the same
must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence
presented by the litigants.16 Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the
evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact. 17cralawred
Petitioner attempts to justify the review of facts by alleging that the courts a quo
indulged in conjectures and surmises. However, a careful reading of the
decisions of the trial and appellate courts shows that such is not the case here.
The discussion of the trial court deals extensively with evidence from both sides,
weighing each accordingly. Similarly, the appellate court evaluated the evidence
of the prosecution and the defense alike.
Uniform findings of fact of the trial and appellate courts deserve grave respect,
and in the absence of any compelling reason to deviate therefrom, are final and
conclusive upon this Court. We thus proceed with our review without disturbing
the factual findings of the Court of Appeals.
Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence
Petitioner avers that his conviction was not supported by proof of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. His argument revolves mainly on self-defense, defense of
relatives and absence of conspiracy.
We are not persuaded. The records of this case show that the prosecution
witnesses Eduardo Oyando, Robert dela Cruz and Felomina dela Cruz positively
and consistently identified the accused and relayed the sequence of events.
Their testimonies are corroborated by the evidence presented by the doctors
who attended the hacking victims, as well as by the police officer who took the
statement of Freddie dela Cruz before the latter died.
We must emphasize that the trial court found the prosecution witnesses credible.
The assessment of the trial court on this point is generally binding on this Court,
and none of the exceptions to this rule are obtaining here. Further, the trial court
found that the prosecution witnesses did not have any motive to testify falsely
against the accused.
Pedro Quintos admitted to hacking Robert dela Cruz and Freddie dela Cruz, and
hitting Felomina dela Cruz, invoking self-defense. Because of Pedro’s
admissions, he and his co-conspirators assumed the burden to establish such
defense by credible, clear and convincing evidence; otherwise, the same
admissions would lead to their conviction.18cralawred
We held in People v. Nugas:
x x x Self-defense cannot be justifiably appreciated when it is uncorroborated by
independent and competent evidence or when it is extremely doubtful by itself.
Indeed, the accused must discharge the burden of proof by relying on the
strength of his own evidence, not on the weakness of the State’s evidence,
because the existence of self-defense is a separate issue from the existence of
the crime, and establishing self-defense does not require or involve the negation
of any of the elements of the offense itself.
To escape liability, the accused must show by sufficient, satisfactory and
convincing evidence that: (a) the victim committed unlawful aggression
amounting to an actual or imminent threat to the life and limb of the accused
claiming self-defense; (b) there was reasonable necessity in the means
employed to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression; and (c) there was lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the accused claiming self-defense or at least
any provocation executed by the accused claiming self-defense was not the
proximate and immediate cause of the victim’s aggression.19
Both petitioner and Pedro also testified that Pedro hacked Freddie in defense of
their brother Lando.20 The defense of relatives argument likewise fails in light of
the lack of unlawful aggression on the part of the victims. For the accused to be
entitled to exoneration based on defense of relatives, complete or incomplete, it
is essential that there be unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, for if there
is no unlawful aggression, there would be nothing to prevent or repel.21cralawred
The discussion of the Court of Appeals on this point is well-taken:
We are hardly persuaded by accused-appellants’ allegations that they were
acting in self-defense because the victims were committing unlawful aggression.
We found the following loopholes:
First, as Pedro claims in his testimony, the dela Cruzes were shouting for the
brothers of Pedro to come out of the house. No actual sudden or imminent
attack, however, was performed. It has been ruled that mere intimidating or
threatening words, even if said aloud, do not constitute unlawful aggression.
Thus, in People vs. Cajurao, the Supreme Court held that:
There can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete unless there is clear and
convincing proof of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. The unlawful
aggression, a constitutive element of self-defense, must be real or at least
imminent and not merely imaginary. A belief that a person is about to be
attacked is not sufficient. Even an intimidating or threatening attitude is by no
means enough. Unlawful aggression presupposes an actual or imminent danger
on the life or limb of a person. Mere shouting, an[d] intimidating or threatening
attitude of the victim does not constitute unlawful aggression. Unlawful
aggression refers to an attack that has actually broken out or materialized or at
the very least is clearly imminent; it cannot consist in oral threats or merely a
threatening stance or posture.
Furthermore, as Pedro testified, the dela Cruzes were shouting for his brothers
to go out, but then, Pedro was the one who went out. If, indeed, the dela Cruzes
had some anger or aggression at that time, it was definitely not directed at
Pedro.
Then, as Pedro went down to pacify the dela Cruzes, Pedro and Robert dela
Cruz engaged in a fist fight. Robert turned and ran towards his mother, Felomina
to allegedly get a bolo which was in Felomina’s possession and concealed under
a towel. If this is true, Robert had already retreated and was trying to arm himself
to level the supposed fight with Pedro. Thus, from Pedro’s narration, it cannot be
definitely said that the dela Cruzes went to the house of the accused-appellants
with the determined intention to inflict serious harm on Pedro.
Second, Pedro claims that he was trying to defend his brother Lando Quintos
who was lying on the ground and being attacked by the deceased Freddie dela
Cruz. According to him, he hacked Freddie before the latter could stab Lando.
Pedro would like to impress upon the court that Lando was also involved in the
fight against the dela Cruzes. However, in the same testimony, Pedro said that it
was he alone who was fighting Robert, Freddie and Felomina, and that his
brothers, including Lando, were “just there, sir, pacifying.”
Third, despite the alleged savagery that transpired, surprisingly, accused-
appellants did not report the incident to the police. During cross-examination,
Pedro admitted that:
Q: After you were threatened and you did not report of the alleged incident
that happened on January 15 as what you are telling now?
A: No sir.
Q: In fact even after you were allegedly brought to the hospital and you
were treated you did not even rel[a]y to the police or even to your
barangay the alleged incident which you are now narrating, am I correct?
A: I was not able to report anymore because after I was treated to the

hospital I was brought directly to the jail, sir.
It is doctrinal that, for evidence to be believed, it must not only proceed from the
mouth of a credible witness, but it must be credible in itself such as the common
experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the
circumstances. We find it difficult to believe that accused-appellants, who
vehemently claim to be the aggrieved parties, did not report the incident to the
police. Pedro’s alleged treatment or confinement in the hospital did not prevent
them from doing so. Pedro had at least three brothers: Poldo, Rolly and Lando;
not to mention his mother and sister, who could have easily gone to the police to
report the alleged attack upon them by the dela Cruzes. This omission, therefore,
casts doubt on the veracity of the account of the accused-appellants.
Lastly, the nature of the wounds inflicted on the deceased and the other victims
negate[s] the accused-appellants’ claim of self-defense. According to the medical
certificate of Freddie dela Cruz, he suffered cardio-respiratory arrest, septicemia
and multiple hacking wounds. Then, in the death certificate, it was further stated
that Freddie dela Cruz suffered “amputation of left and right hand.” Meanwhile,
with respect to Robert dela Cruz, the attending physician, Dr. Saniata V.
Fernandez, testified that the victim suffered lacerated wounds on the forehead,
lower lip and left hand. As for Felomina dela Cruz, she also suffered almost
similar lacerated wounds.
It has been ruled that the presence of a large number of wounds on the part of
the victim, their nature and location disprove self-defense and instead indicate a
determined effort to kill the victim[s]. In the case at bar, as already explained, the
wounds on Freddie, Robert and Felomina, all surnamed dela Cruz, negate
accused-appellant’s claim of self-defense.
We have contrasted the claim of self-defense to the evidence presented by the
prosecution and this Court believes that the version of the latter is more credible
and consistent with the truth. As a matter of fact, by simply admitting that they
attacked Freddie dela Cruz and the two other victims, the case against the
accused-appellants had become irrefutable.    x x x.22
Existence of Conspiracy
Petitioner alleges that the prosecution did not present evidence of his
participation in the attacks on Robert dela Cruz and Felomina dela Cruz. He also
argues that his mere presence during the said attacks does not by itself show
concurrence of wills and unity of purpose.
Petitioner’s presence during the commission of the crime was well-established
as he himself testified to that fact. Assuming that he was merely present during
the attack, inaction does not exculpate him. To exempt himself from criminal
liability, a conspirator must have performed an overt act to dissociate or detach
himself from the conspiracy to commit the felony and prevent the commission
thereof.23cralawred
Indeed, mere presence does not signify conspiracy. However, neither does it
indicate the lack thereof. Conspiracy can be inferred from and established by the
acts of the accused themselves when said acts point to a joint purpose and
design, concerted action and community of interest.24 In fact, the prosecution
established that petitioner was actively involved in the attack on Freddie dela
Cruz.
In People v. De Leon,25 we held:
x x x To be a conspirator, one need not participate in every detail of the
execution; he need not even take part in every act or need not even know the
exact part to be performed by the others in the execution of the conspiracy. Each
conspirator may be assigned separate and different tasks which may appear
unrelated to one another but, in fact, constitute a whole collective effort to
achieve their common criminal objective. Once conspiracy is shown, the act of
one is the act of all the conspirators. The precise extent or mo[r]ality of
participation of each of them becomes secondary, since all the conspirators are
principals.
The acts of petitioner before, during and after the attacks on Robert dela Cruz
and Felomina dela Cruz disclose his agreement with the joint purpose and
design in the commission of the felony. The facts, found by the trial and appellate
courts, establish that petitioner, together with his brothers and Narciso Buni, all
of them armed, accosted the dela Cruzes, and gave chase even as the latter
were retreating towards their house. During the attacks, each conspirator had a
different task. After the attacks, all the accused left the felled dela Cruzes for
dead, clearly showing their united purpose in the felonies committed. The act of
one is the act of all. With the conspiracy proved, the conviction of petitioner was
in order.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition, and AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated 31 July 2012 and the Resolution dated 11 January 2013 in CA-
G.R. CR No. 33776.
SO ORDERED.cralawlaw library
G.R. No. 148431 July 28, 2005
SPO2 RUPERTO CABANLIG, Petitioners,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL
PROSECUTOR, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This petition for review1 seeks to reverse the Decision2 of the Fifth Division of the
Sandiganbayan dated 11 May 1999 and Resolution 3 dated 2 May 2001 affirming
the conviction of SPO2 Ruperto Cabanlig ("Cabanlig") in Criminal Case No.
19436 for homicide. The Sandiganbayan sentenced Cabanlig to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of four months of arresto mayor as minimum to two years
and four months of prision correctional as maximum and to pay ₱50,000 to the
heirs of Jimmy Valino ("Valino"). Cabanlig shot Valino after Valino grabbed the
M16 Armalite of another policeman and tried to escape from the custody of the
police. The Sandiganbayan acquitted Cabanlig’s co-accused, SPO1 Carlos
Padilla ("Padilla"), PO2 Meinhart Abesamis ("Abesamis"), SPO2 Lucio Mercado
("Mercado") and SPO1 Rady Esteban ("Esteban").
The Charge
Cabanlig, Padilla, Abesamis, Mercado and Esteban were charged with
murder in an amended information that reads as follows:
That on or about September 28, 1992, in the Municipality of Penaranda,
Province of Nueva Ecija, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, SPO[2] Ruperto C. Cabanlig, SPO1 Carlos E.
Padilla, PO2 Meinhart C. Abesamis, SPO2 Lucio L. Mercado and SPO1 Rady S.
Esteban, all public officers being members of the Philippine National Police,
conspiring and confederating and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill,
with treachery and evident premeditation, taking advantage of nighttime and
uninhabited place to facilitate the execution of the crime, with use of firearms and
without justifiable cause, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and shoot one Jimmy Valino, hitting him several times at the vital
parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon the latter, serious and mortal wounds
which were the direct and immediate cause of his death, which crime was
committed by the accused in relation to their office as members of the Philippine
National Police of Penaranda, Nueva Ecija, the deceased, who was then
detained for robbery and under the custody of the accused, having been killed
while being taken to the place where he allegedly concealed the effects of the
crime, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said victim, in such amount as
may be awarded under the provisions of the New Civil Code.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
Arraignment and Plea
On 15 December 1993, the accused police officers Cabanlig, Padilla, Abesamis,
Mercado and Esteban pleaded not guilty.
Version of the Prosecution
On 24 September 1992 a robbery occurred in the Municipality of Penaranda,
Nueva Ecija. Four days later or on 28 September 1992, the investigating
authorities apprehended three suspects: Jordan Magat ("Magat"), Randy Reyes
("Reyes") and Valino. The police recovered most of the stolen items. However, a
flower vase and a small radio were still missing. Cabanlig asked the three
suspects where these two items were. Reyes replied that the items were at his
house.
Cabanlig asked his colleagues, Padilla, Mercado, Abesamis and Esteban, to
accompany him in retrieving the flower vase and radio. Cabanlig then brought
out Reyes and Magat from their cell, intending to bring the two during the
retrieval operation. It was at this point that Valino informed Cabanlig that he had
moved the vase and radio to another location without the knowledge of his two
cohorts. Cabanlig decided instead to bring along Valino, leaving behind Magat
and Reyes.
Around 6:30 p.m., five fully armed policemen in uniform – Cabanlig, Padilla,
Mercado, Abesamis and Esteban – escorted Valino to Barangay Sinasahan,
Nueva Ecija to recover the missing flower vase and radio. The policemen and
Valino were aboard a police vehicle, an Isuzu pick-up jeep. The jeep was built
like an ordinary jeepney. The rear end of the jeep had no enclosure. A metal
covering separated the driver’s compartment and main body of the jeep. There
was no opening or door between the two compartments of the jeep. Inside the
main body of the jeep, were two long benches, each of which was located at the
left and right side of the jeep.
Cabanlig, Mercado and Esteban were seated with Valino inside the main body of
the jeep. Esteban was right behind Abesamis at the left bench. Valino, who was
not handcuffed, was between Cabanlig and Mercado at the right bench. Valino
was seated at Cabanlig’s left and at Mercado’s right. Mercado was seated
nearest to the opening of the rear of the jeep.
Just after the jeep had crossed the Philippine National Railway bridge and while
the jeep was slowly negotiating a bumpy and potholed road, Valino suddenly
grabbed Mercado’s M16 Armalite and jumped out of the jeep. Valino was able to
grab Mercado’s M16 Armalite when Mercado scratched his head and tried to
reach his back because some flying insects were pestering Mercado. Mercado
shouted "hoy!" when Valino suddenly took the M16 Armalite. Cabanlig, who was
then facing the rear of the vehicle, saw Valino’s act of taking away the M16
Armalite. Cabanlig acted immediately. Without issuing any warning of any sort,
and with still one foot on the running board, Cabanlig fired one shot at Valino,
and after two to three seconds, Cabanlig fired four more successive shots.
Valino did not fire any shot.
The shooting happened around 7:00 p.m., at dusk or "nag-aagaw ang dilim at
liwanag." Cabanlig approached Valino’s body to check its pulse. Finding none,
Cabanlig declared Valino dead. Valino sustained three mortal wounds – one at
the back of the head, one at the left side of the chest, and one at the left lower
back. Padilla and Esteban remained with the body. The other three policemen,
including Cabanlig, went to a funeral parlor.
The following morning, 29 September 1992, a certain SPO4 Segismundo
Lacanilao ("Lacanilao") of the Cabanatuan Police went to Barangay Sinasahan,
Nueva Ecija to investigate a case. Lacanilao met Mercado who gave him
instructions on how to settle the case that he was handling. During their
conversation, Mercado related that he and his fellow policemen "salvaged"
(summarily executed) a person the night before. Lacanilao asked who was
"salvaged." Mercado answered that it was "Jimmy Valino." Mercado then asked
Lacanilao why he was interested in the identity of the person who was
"salvaged." Lacanilao then answered that "Jimmy Valino" was his cousin.
Mercado immediately turned around and left.
Version of the Defense
Cabanlig admitted shooting Valino. However, Cabanlig justified the shooting as
an act of self-defense and performance of duty. Mercado denied that he told
Lacanilao that he and his co-accused "salvaged" Valino. Cabanlig, Mercado,
Abesamis, Padilla, and Esteban denied that they conspired to kill Valino.
The Sandiganbayan’s Ruling
The Sandiganbayan acquitted Padilla, Abesamis, Mercado and Esteban as the
court found no evidence that the policemen conspired to kill or summarily
execute Valino. Since Cabanlig admitted shooting Valino, the burden is on
Cabanlig to establish the presence of any circumstance that would relieve him of
responsibility or mitigate the offense committed.
The Sandiganbayan held that Cabanlig could not invoke self-defense or defense policeman may therefore differ from that which ordinarily may be offered in self-
of a stranger. The only defense that Cabanlig could properly invoke in this case
is fulfillment of duty. Cabanlig, however, failed to show that the shooting of Valino in treating the offender with wanton violence, or in resorting to dangerous means
was the necessary consequence of the due performance of duty. The
Sandiganbayan pointed out that while it was the duty of the policemen to stop
the escaping detainee, Cabanlig exceeded the proper bounds of performing this
duty when he shot Valino without warning.
The Sandiganbayan found no circumstance that would qualify the crime to
murder. Thus, the Sandiganbayan convicted Cabanlig only of homicide. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused CARLOS ESTOQUE PADILLA,
MEINHART CRUZ ABESAMIS, LUCIO LADIGNON MERCADO and RADY
SALAZAR ESTEBAN are hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged. Accused
RUPERTO CONCEPCION CABANLIG is found GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Homicide and is hereby sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate sentence of FOUR (4) MONTHS of arresto mayor, as minimum, to
TWO (2) YEARS and FOUR (4) MONTHS of prision correccional, as maximum.
He is further ordered to pay the heirs of Jimmy Valino the amount of FIFTY
THOUSAND (₱50,000.00) PESOS, and the costs.
SO ORDERED.5
On motion for reconsideration, Associate Justice Anacleto D. Badoy Jr.
("Associate Justice Badoy") dissented from the decision. Associate Justice
Badoy pointed out that there was imminent danger on the lives of the policemen
when Valino grabbed the "infallible Armalite"6 from Mercado and jumped out from
the rear of the jeep. At a distance of only three feet from Cabanlig, Valino could
have sprayed the policemen with bullets. The firing of a warning shot from
Cabanlig was no longer necessary. Associate Justice Badoy thus argued for
Cabanlig’s acquittal.
In a vote of four to one, the Sandiganbayan affirmed the decision.7 The
dispositive portion of the Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the motion for reconsideration is hereby
DENIED.8
The Issues
Cabanlig raises the following issues in his Memorandum:
WHETHER THE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN RULING THAT THE DEFENSE
OF FULFILLMENT OF DUTY PUT UP BY CABANLIG WAS INCOMPLETE
WHETHER THE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN RULING THAT CABANLIG
COULD NOT INVOKE SELF-DEFENSE/DEFENSE OF STRANGER TO
JUSTIFY HIS ACTIONS
WHETHER THE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN SENTENCING CABANLIG TO
SUFFER IMPRISONMENT AND IN ORDERING HIM TO PAY THE AMOUNT
OF ₱ 50,000 TO THE HEIRS OF VALINO9
The Court’s Ruling
The petition has merit. We rule for Cabanlig’s acquittal.
Applicable Defense is Fulfillment of Duty
We first pass upon the issue of whether Cabanlig can invoke two or more
justifying circumstances. While there is nothing in the law that prevents an
accused from invoking the justifying circumstances or defenses in his favor, it is
still up to the court to determine which justifying circumstance is applicable to the
circumstances of a particular case.
Self-defense and fulfillment of duty operate on different principles. 10 Self-defense
is based on the principle of self-preservation from mortal harm, while fulfillment
of duty is premised on the due performance of duty. The difference between the
two justifying circumstances is clear, as the requisites of self-defense and
fulfillment of duty are different.
The elements of self-defense are as follows:
a) Unlawful Aggression;
b) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;
c) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.11
On the other hand, the requisites of fulfillment of duty are:
1. The accused acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a
right or office;
2. The injury caused or the offense committed be the necessary consequence of
the due performance of duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office.12
A policeman in the performance of duty is justified in using such force as is
reasonably necessary to secure and detain the offender, overcome his
resistance, prevent his escape, recapture him if he escapes, and protect himself
from bodily harm.13 In case injury or death results from the policeman’s exercise
of such force, the policeman could be justified in inflicting the injury or causing
the death of the offender if the policeman had used necessary force. Since a
policeman’s duty requires him to overcome the offender, the force exerted by the
defense.14 However, a policeman is never justified in using unnecessary force or
when the arrest could be affected otherwise. 15
Unlike in self-defense where unlawful aggression is an element, in performance
of duty, unlawful aggression from the victim is not a requisite. In People v.
Delima,16 a policeman was looking for a fugitive who had several days earlier
escaped from prison. When the policeman found the fugitive, the fugitive was
armed with a pointed piece of bamboo in the shape of a lance. The policeman
demanded the surrender of the fugitive. The fugitive lunged at the policeman with
his bamboo lance. The policeman dodged the lance and fired his revolver at the
fugitive. The policeman missed. The fugitive ran away still holding the bamboo
lance. The policeman pursued the fugitive and again fired his revolver, hitting
and killing the fugitive. The Court acquitted the policeman on the ground that the
killing was done in the fulfillment of duty.
The fugitive’s unlawful aggression in People v. Delima had already ceased
when the policeman killed him. The fugitive was running away from the
policeman when he was shot. If the policeman were a private person, not in the
performance of duty, there would be no self-defense because there would be no
unlawful aggression on the part of the deceased.17 It may even appear that the
public officer acting in the fulfillment of duty is the aggressor, but his aggression
is not unlawful, it being necessary to fulfill his duty.18
While self-defense and performance of duty are two distinct justifying
circumstances, self-defense or defense of a stranger may still be relevant even if
the proper justifying circumstance in a given case is fulfillment of duty. For
example, a policeman’s use of what appears to be excessive force could be
justified if there was imminent danger to the policeman’s life or to that of a
stranger. If the policeman used force to protect his life or that of a stranger, then
the defense of fulfillment of duty would be complete, the second requisite being
present.
In People v. Lagata,19 a jail guard shot to death a prisoner whom he thought
was attempting to escape. The Court convicted the jail guard of homicide
because the facts showed that the prisoner was not at all trying to escape. The
Court declared that the jail guard could only fire at the prisoner in self-
defense or if absolutely necessary to avoid the prisoner’s escape.
In this case, Cabanlig, Padilla, Abesamis, Mercado and Esteban were in the
performance of duty as policemen when they escorted Valino, an arrested
robber, to retrieve some stolen items. We uphold the finding of the
Sandiganbayan that there is no evidence that the policemen conspired to kill or
summarily execute Valino. In fact, it was not Valino who was supposed to go with
the policemen in the retrieval operations but his two other cohorts, Magat and
Reyes. Had the policemen staged the escape to justify the killing of Valino, the
M16 Armalite taken by Valino would not have been loaded with
bullets.20 Moreover, the alleged summary execution of Valino must be based on
evidence and not on hearsay.
Undoubtedly, the policemen were in the legitimate performance of their duty
when Cabanlig shot Valino. Thus, fulfillment of duty is the justifying circumstance
that is applicable to this case. To determine if this defense is complete, we have
to examine if Cabanlig used necessary force to prevent Valino from escaping
and in protecting himself and his co-accused policemen from imminent danger.
Fulfillment of Duty was Complete, Killing was Justified
The Sandiganbayan convicted Cabanlig because his defense of fulfillment of
duty was found to be incomplete. The Sandiganbayan believed that Cabanlig
"exceeded the fulfillment of his duty when he immediately shot Valino without
issuing a warning so that the latter would stop."21
We disagree with the Sandiganbayan.
Certainly, an M16 Armalite is a far more powerful and deadly weapon than the
bamboo lance that the fugitive had run away with in People v. Delima. The
policeman in People v. Delima was held to have been justified in shooting to
death the escaping fugitive because the policeman was merely performing his
duty.
In this case, Valino was committing an offense in the presence of the policemen
when Valino grabbed the M16 Armalite from Mercado and jumped from the jeep
to escape. The policemen would have been justified in shooting Valino if the use
of force was absolutely necessary to prevent his escape.22 But Valino was not
only an escaping detainee. Valino had also stolen the M16 Armalite of a
policeman. The policemen had the duty not only to recapture Valino but also to
recover the loose firearm. By grabbing Mercado’s M16 Armalite, which is a
formidable firearm, Valino had placed the lives of the policemen in grave danger.
Had Cabanlig failed to shoot Valino immediately, the policemen would have been the custody of policemen. Valino was also very well aware that even the mere
sitting ducks. All of the policemen were still inside the jeep when Valino suddenly act of escaping could injure or kill him. The policemen were fully armed and they
grabbed the M16 Armalite. Cabanlig, Mercado and Esteban were hemmed in
inside the main body of the jeep, in the direct line of fire had Valino used the M16 escort, Valino assumed the consequences of his brazen and determined act.
Armalite. There would have been no way for Cabanlig, Mercado and Esteban to
secure their safety, as there were no doors on the sides of the jeep. The only
way out of the jeep was from its rear from which Valino had jumped. Abesamis
and Padilla who were in the driver’s compartment were not aware that Valino
had grabbed Mercado’s M16 Armalite. Abesamis and Padilla would have been
unprepared for Valino’s attack.
By suddenly grabbing the M16 Armalite from his unsuspecting police guard,
Valino certainly did not intend merely to escape and run away as far and fast as
possible from the policemen. Valino did not have to grab the M16 Armalite if his
sole intention was only to flee from the policemen. If he had no intention to
engage the policemen in a firefight, Valino could simply have jumped from the
jeep without grabbing the M16 Armalite. Valino’s chances of escaping unhurt
would have been far better had he not grabbed the M16 Armalite which only
provoked the policemen to recapture him and recover the M16 Armalite with
greater vigor. Valino’s act of grabbing the M16 Armalite clearly showed a hostile
intention and even constituted unlawful aggression.
Facing imminent danger, the policemen had to act swiftly. Time was of the
essence. It would have been foolhardy for the policemen to assume that Valino
grabbed the M16 Armalite merely as a souvenir of a successful escape. As we
have pointed out in Pomoy v. People23:
Again, it was in the lawful performance of his duty as a law enforcer that
petitioner tried to defend his possession of the weapon when the victim suddenly
tried to remove it from his holster. As an enforcer of the law, petitioner was duty-
bound to prevent the snatching of his service weapon by anyone, especially by a
detained person in his custody. Such weapon was likely to be used to facilitate
escape and to kill or maim persons in the vicinity, including petitioner himself.
The Sandiganbayan, however, ruled that despite Valino’s possession of a deadly
firearm, Cabanlig had no right to shoot Valino without giving Valino the
opportunity to surrender. The Sandiganbayan pointed out that under the General
Rules of Engagement, the use of force should be applied only as a last resort
when all other peaceful and non-violent means have been exhausted. The
Sandiganbayan held that only such necessary and reasonable force should be
applied as would be sufficient to conduct self-defense of a stranger, to subdue
the clear and imminent danger posed, or to overcome resistance put up by an
offender.
The Sandiganbayan had very good reasons in steadfastly adhering to the policy
that a law enforcer must first issue a warning before he could use force against
an offender. A law enforcer’s overzealous performance of his duty could violate
the rights of a citizen and worse cost the citizen’s life. We have always
maintained that the judgment and discretion of public officers, in the performance
of their duties, must be exercised neither capriciously nor oppressively, but within
the limits of the law.24 The issuance of a warning before a law enforcer could use
force would prevent unnecessary bloodshed. Thus, whenever possible, a law
enforcer should employ force only as a last resort and only after issuing a
warning.
However, the duty to issue a warning is not absolutely mandated at all times and
at all cost, to the detriment of the life of law enforcers. The directive to issue a
warning contemplates a situation where several options are still available to the
law enforcers. In exceptional circumstances such as this case, where the threat
to the life of a law enforcer is already imminent, and there is no other option but
to use force to subdue the offender, the law enforcer’s failure to issue a warning
is excusable.
In this case, the embattled policemen did not have the luxury of time. Neither did
they have much choice. Cabanlig’s shooting of Valino was an immediate and
spontaneous reaction to imminent danger. The weapon grabbed by Valino was
not just any firearm. It was an M16 Armalite.
The M16 Armalite is an assault rifle adopted by the United Sates ("US") Army as
a standard weapon in 1967 during the Vietnam War.25 The M16 Armalite is still a
general-issue rifle with the US Armed Forces and US law enforcement
agencies.26 The M16 Armalite has both semiautomatic and automatic
capabilities.27 It is 39 inches long, has a 30-round magazine and fires high-
velocity .223-inch (5.56-mm) bullets. 28 The M16 Armalite is most effective at a
range of 200 meters29 but its maximum effective range could extend as far as
400 meters.30 As a high velocity firearm, the M16 Armalite could be fired at close
range rapidly or with much volume of fire.31 These features make the M16
Armalite and its variants well suited for urban and jungle warfare. 32
The M16 Armalite whether on automatic or semiautomatic setting is a lethal
weapon. This high-powered firearm was in the hands of an escaping detainee,
who had sprung a surprise on his police escorts bottled inside the jeep. A
warning from the policemen would have been pointless and would have cost
them their lives.
For what is the purpose of a warning? A warning is issued when policemen have
to identify themselves as such and to give opportunity to an offender to
surrender. A warning in this case was dispensable. Valino knew that he was in
could use force to recapture him. By grabbing the M16 Armalite of his police
Surrendering was clearly far from Valino’s mind.
At any rate, Valino was amply warned. Mercado shouted "hoy" when Valino
grabbed the M16 Armalite. Although Cabanlig admitted that he did not hear
Mercado shout "hoy", Mercado’s shout should have served as a warning to
Valino. The verbal warning need not come from Cabanlig himself.
The records also show that Cabanlig first fired one shot. After a few seconds,
Cabanlig fired four more shots. Cabanlig had to shoot Valino because Valino at
one point was facing the police officers. The exigency of the situation warranted
a quick response from the policemen.
According to the Sandiganbayan, Valino was not turning around to shoot
because two of the three gunshot wounds were on Valino’s back. Indeed, two of
the three gunshot wounds were on Valino’s back: one at the back of the head
and the other at the left lower back. The Sandiganbayan, however, overlooked
the location of the third gunshot wound. It was three inches below the left clavicle
or on the left top most part of the chest area based on the Medico Legal Sketch
showing the entrances and exits of the three gunshot wounds. 33
The Autopsy Report34 confirms the location of the gunshot wounds, as follows:
GUNSHOT WOUNDS – modified by embalming.
1. ENTRANCE – ovaloid, 1.6 x 1.5 cms; with area of tattooing around the
entrance, 4.0 x 3.0 cms.; located at the right postauricular region, 5.5 cms.
behind and 1.5 cms. above the right external auditory meatus, directed forward
downward fracturing the occipital bone, lacerating the right occipital portion of the
brain and fracturing the right cheek bone and making an EXIT wound, 1.5 x 2.0
cms. located on right cheek, 4.0 cms. below and 3.0 cms.. in front of right
external auditory meatus.
2. ENTRANCE – ovaloid, 0.7 x 0.5 cms., located at the left chest; 6.5 cms.
from the anterior median line, 136.5 cms. from the left heel directed backward,
downward and to the right, involving soft tissues, fracturing the 3rd rib, left,
lacerating the left upper lobe and the right lower lobe and finally making an EXIT
wound at the back, right side, 1.4 x 0.8 cms., 19.0 cms. from the posterior
median line and 132.0 cms. from the right heel and grazing the medial aspect of
the right arm.
3. ENTRANCE – ovaloid, 0.6 x 0.5 located at the back, left side, 9.0 cms. from
the posterior median line; 119.5 cms. from the left heel; directed forward,
downward involving the soft tissues, lacerating the liver; and bullet was
recovered on the right anterior chest wall, 9.0 cms. form the anterior median line,
112.0 cms. from the right heel.
The Necropsy Report35 also reveals the following:
1. Gunshot Wound, entrance, 0.5 cm X 1.5 cms in size, located at the left side of
the back of the head. The left parietal bone is fractured. The left temporal bone is
also fractured. A wound of exit measuring 2 cms X 3 cms in size is located at the
left temporal aspect of the head.
2. Gunshot [W]ound, entrance, 0.5 cm in diameter, located at the left side of
the chest about three inches below the left clavicle. The wound is directed
medially and made an exit wound at the right axilla measuring 2 X 2 cms in size.
3. Gunshot Wound, entrance, 0.5 cm in diameter located at the left lower back
above the left lumbar. The left lung is collapsed and the liver is lacerated.
Particles of lead [were] recovered in the liver tissues. No wound of exit.
Cause of Death:
Cerebral Hemorrhage Secondary To Gunshot Wound In The Head
The doctors who testified on the Autopsy 36 and Necropsy37 Reports admitted that
they could not determine which of the three gunshot wounds was first inflicted.
However, we cannot disregard the significance of the gunshot wound on Valino’s
chest. Valino could not have been hit on the chest if he were not at one point
facing the policemen.
If the first shot were on the back of Valino’s head, Valino would have immediately
fallen to the ground as the bullet from Cabanlig’s M16 Armalite almost shattered
Valino’s skull. It would have been impossible for Valino to still turn and face the
policemen in such a way that Cabanlig could still shoot Valino on the chest if the
first shot was on the back of Valino’s head.
The most probable and logical scenario: Valino was somewhat facing the
policemen when he was shot, hence, the entry wound on Valino’s chest. On
being hit, Valino could have turned to his left almost falling, when two more
bullets felled Valino. The two bullets then hit Valino on his lower left back and on
the left side of the back of his head, in what sequence, we could not speculate
on. At the very least, the gunshot wound on Valino’s chest should have raised
doubt in Cabanlig’s favor.
Cabanlig is thus not guilty of homicide. At most, Cabanlig, Padilla, Abesamis,
Mercado and Esteban are guilty only of gross negligence. The policemen
transported Valino, an arrested robber, to a retrieval operation without
handcuffing Valino. That no handcuffs were available in the police precinct is a
very flimsy excuse. The policemen should have tightly bound Valino’s hands with
rope or some other sturdy material. Valino’s cooperative demeanor should not
have lulled the policemen to complacency. As it turned out, Valino was merely
keeping up the appearance of good behavior as a prelude to a planned escape.
We therefore recommend the filing of an administrative case against Cabanlig,
Padilla, Abesamis, Mercado and Esteban for gross negligence.
WHEREFORE, we REVERSE the decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal
Case No. 19436 convicting accused RUPERTO CONCEPCION CABANLIG of
the crime of homicide. We ACQUIT RUPERTO CONCEPCION CABANLIG of
the crime of homicide and ORDER his immediate release from prison, unless
there are other lawful grounds to hold him. We DIRECT the Director of Prisons to
report to this Court compliance within five (5) days from receipt of this Decision.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.