G.R. No.

196510, September 12, 2018

SOFIA TABUADA, NOVEE YAP, MA. LORETA NADAL, AND GLADYS
EVIDENTE, Petitioners, v. ELEANOR TABUADA, JULIETA TRABUCO, LAURETA
REDONDO, AND SPS. BERNAN CERTEZA & ELEANOR D. CERTEZA, Respondents.

the petitioners commenced Civil Case against respondents (Spouses Certeza), Eleanor
Tabuada, Julieta Trabuco and Laureta Redondo3 For failure of the respondents to file their
answers within the reglementary period.

RTC denied the Motion to Admit Answer, and declared Eleanor Tabuada, Trabuco and
Redondo in default and the Spouses Certeza in default for failure to file their answer.8

At the ex parte hearing to receive their evidence, the petitioners presented Sofia Tabuada,
who testified

 that her late husband was Simeon Tabuada, the son of Loreta Tabuada and the
brother-in law of defendant Eleanor Tabuada;
 that her co-plaintiffs were her daughters; that defendant Julieta Trabuco was the
daughter of Eleanor Tabuada while Laureta Redondo was the latter's neighbor;
 That loreta tabuada died on April 1990 while her husband had died July 1997, that at
she received the notice sent by the Spouses Certeza regarding their land, that her
husband had inherited from his mother, Loreta Tabuada, and where they were
residing, informing them that the land had been mortgaged to them (Spouses
Certeza);
 that she immediately inquired from Eleanor Tabuada and Trabuco about the
mortgage, and both admitted that they had mortgaged the property to the Spouses
Certeza;
 that she was puzzled to see the signature purportedly of Loreta Tabuada on top of
the name Loreta Tabuada printed on the Mortgage of Real Rights  and Promissory
Note  despite Loreta Tabuada having died
 that the property under mortgage was the where she and her daughters were
residing;

RTC: judgment in favor of the petitioners: plaintiffs Sofia Tabuada, Novee Yap, Ma. Loreta
Nadal, and Gladys Evidente, and against defendants Eleanor Tabuada, Julieta Trabuco,
Laureta Redondo and Spouses Bernan and Eleanor Certeza. The Mortgage of Real Rights
and the Promissory Note are hereby declared null and void.

null and void for not complying with the essential requisites of a real estate
mortgage. It opined that based on the complaint and the testimony of Sofia Tabuada
"Eleanor Tabuada, who [was] not the absolute owner without having the legal
authority to mortgage said property [had] misrepresented herself as the
deceased Loreta Tabuada and mortgaged the property without the knowledge of
plaintiffs, and benefited from said mortgage to the detriment of the rights and
interests of plaintiffs."

CA: reversing RTC Decision.

Issue: WON CA seriously err in reversing the RTC considering that there was ample
evidence competently establishing the relationship of plaintiff Sofia Tabuada to the
late Loreta Tabuada?
RULING: Yes. The legal relationship of Sofia Tabuada with deceased Loreta
Tabuada was established by preponderance of evidence

Under the Rules of Court, evidence – as the means of ascertaining in a judicial proceeding

the truth respecting a matter of fact24 – may be object,25 documentary,26 and
testimonial.27 It is required that evidence, to be admissible, must be relevant and
competent.28 But the admissibility of evidence should not be confused with its probative
value. Admissibility refers to the question of whether certain pieces of evidence are to be
considered at all, while probative value refers to the question of whether the “admitted”
evidence “proves” an issue. Thus, a particular item of evidence may be admissible, but its
evidentiary weight depends on judicial evaluation within the guidelines provided by the rules
of evidence.29

Although documentary evidence may be preferable as proof of a legal relationship, other

evidence of the relationship that are competent and relevant may not be excluded. The
preponderance of evidence, the rule that is applicable in civil cases, is also known as the
greater weight of evidence. There is a preponderance of evidence when the trier of facts is
led to find that the existence of the contested fact is more probable than its
nonexistence.30 In short, the rule requires the consideration of all the facts and
circumstances of the cases, regardless of whether they are object, documentary, or
testimonial.31

In the present case, The mere discrepancy between the name of the deceased entered in
the death certificate (Loreta Yulo Tabuada) and the name of the titleholder (Loreta H.
Tabuada) did not necessarily belie or disprove the legal relationship between Sofia Tabuada
and the late Loreta Tabuada. To establish filiation, the courts like the RTC herein should
consider and analyze not only the relevant testimonies of witnesses who are competent but
other relevant evidence as well.32 There was on record herein Sofia Tabuada's unchallenged
declaration of her being the daughter-in-law of the registered titleholder.33 Also on
record was the petitioners' being in the actual possession which they had been using as
the site for their family residence.34 Such established circumstances indicated that the
deceased Loreta Yulo Tabuada and titleholder Loreta H. Tabuada could only be one and the
same person. Moreover, even the Spouses Certeza were aware that respondents Eleanor
Tabuada and Tabuco were the relatives of Sofia Tabuada; and that the respective families of
Eleanor Tabuada, Tabuco and Sofia Tabuada actually resided on the same lot.35 Verily, the
facts and circumstances sufficiently and competently affirmed the legal relationship between
Sofia Tabuada and the late titleholder Loreta H. Tabuada.
 [ G.R. No. 205752, October 01, 2019 ]
IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF JAN AUREL MAGHANOY BULAYO WITH APPLICATION FOR
CHANGE OF NAME OF ADOPTEE FROM "JAN AUREL MAGHANOY BULAYO" TO "JAN AUREL
BULAYO KIMURA,"

Spouses Mary Jane B. Kimura, a Filipino national, and Yuichiro Kimura, a Japanese national, got
married.Prior thereto, petitioner Mary Jane gave birth to her son Jan Aurel. However, she was not married
to her son's biological father, Jun Baldoza, thus making Jan Aurel her illegitimate child. Her last
communication with the minor's father was when she was (4) months pregnant with [Jan Aurel]. From
then on, she has no knowledge of his whereabouts. petitioners filed a joint petition for adoption to have
him declared as their legitimate son, enjoying the rights and observing the duties of an adopted
child as provided by law.

During trial, petitioners presented the DSWD Minor's Case Study which recommended approval of said
petition. Likewise, petitioners presented the documents to show that they are in possession of full civil
capacity and legal rights to adopt, of good moral character, have not been convicted of any crime
involving moral turpitude, and emotionally and psychologically capable of caring for children and other
documents to support their petition for adoption.

RTC denied the petition for adoption because Yuichiro, being a Japanese citizen, did not comply with the
requirements of the law. It observed that Yuichiro was not exempt from the residency and certification
requirements of R.A. No. 8552 because Jan Aurel was the illegitimate child.

Issues: Whether or not the existence of diplomatic relations between the Philippines and Japan is within
judicial notice of the courts.

RULING: Courts may take judicial notice of the existence of diplomatic relations between the Philippines
and Japan

The petitioners assert that their petition for adoption has indicated the existence of the diplomatic relations
between Philippines and Japan, but they did not anymore prove the same during the trial because the
existence of such diplomatic relations was within the judicial notice of the courts.14

The courts of the Philippines are bound to take judicial notice of the existence of the diplomatic
relations between our country and Japan. Diplomatic relations form part of the official acts of the
Executive Department of our Government. They are also matters of public knowledge.

There is no dispute, indeed, that the Philippines and Japan have had a long history of diplomatic
relations.. Both countries were also signatories to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, an
indication that they wished to have a more prominent diplomatic presence in each other by sending of
diplomatic missions. This further shows that both countries, being signatories to the  Vienna Convention,
aimed to have the representation of the interests of the sending state and promoting friendly relations with
the receiving state.16 The countless efforts to maintain their diplomatic relations no longer required the
presentation of proof of the existence of diplomatic relations.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for review on certiorari; ; GRANTS the petition for

adoption; DECLARES that henceforth, JAN AUREL MAGHANOY BULAYO, is freed from all legal obligations of
obedience and maintenance with respect to his biological father, and shall be, to all intents and purposes, the
child of the Spouses Mary Jane B. Kimura and Yuichiro Kimura, with his surname to be changed to KIMURA.
G.R. No. 200401
METRO RAIL TRANSIT DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioner vs.
GAMMON PHILIPPINES, INC., Respondent

Gammon won the bid. Parsons issued a Letter of Award and Notice to Proceed to Gammon. (First
Letter), Gammon signed and returned the First Notice to Proceed without the contract documents.13 
(Second Letter), Gammon transmitted to Parsons a signed Letter of Comfort to guarantee its obligations
in the Project. However, MRT wrote Gammon that it would need (1) or (2) weeks before it could issue the
latter the Formal Notice to Proceed. Gammon transmitted the contract documents to Parsons. In a
facsimile transmission sent on the same day, Parsons directed Gammon "to hold any further mobilization
activities."  Gammon sent Parsons a facsimile “to confirm” if all requirements in the contract
documents were temporarily suspended pending the clarification of the scope and programming of
the Project. 21Parsons confirmed "the temporary suspension of all [the] requirements under the contract
except the re-design of the project."22

Thereafter, MRT decided to downscale the Podium's construction and to proceed with the Project's
conceptual redesign.23 Upon Parson's request order, Gammon presented to MRT the sequencing and
phasing of the work.25 MRT decided to adopt Gammon's recomendation to construct the Podium up to
Level 2 only. 26 Due to these revisions on the scope of work, MRT also decided to redesign the Level 2
slab, which it perceived would be exposed to more load stresses from prolonged exposure to elements
and the weight of heavy construction equipment. MRT asked Gammon to re-design.27

Parsons issued Gammon a (Second Notice to Proceed) for the engineering services based on the
redesigned plan. Gammon signed the Second Notice to Proceed with qualification. Gammon submitted
to Parsons a Revised Lump Sum Price Proposal for the construction of the Podium up to Level 2,
including the design of the floor slab at Level 2.32 At this time, Gammon had already started its
engineering services pursuant to the Second Notice to Proceed. Gammon sent Parsons a breakdown of
the Revised Extra Contract Expenses it allegedly incurred in connection with the works' suspension.
Gammon notified Parsons of its revised Breakdown of Lump Sum Price. MRT issued in favor of Gammon
(Third Notice to Proceed).Gammon acknowledged receipt of the Third Notice to Proceed and requested
clarification of certain items.  Parsons informed Gammon that MRT was temporarily rescinding the Third
Notice to Proceed, noting that it remained unaccepted by Gammon. 40

Gammon received from Parsons the Contract for the Construction and Development of the
Superstructure, MRT-3 North Triangle -(Fourth Notice to Proceed).41 The terms of the Fourth Notice to
Proceed were different from those of the First and the Third Notices to Proceed. Gammon
qualifiedly accepted the Fourth Notice to Proceed. MRT treated Gammon's qualified acceptance as a
new offer. MRT rejected Gammon's qualified acceptance and contract would be awarded instead to
Filsystems if Gammon would not accept the Fourth Notice to Proceed within five (5) days.44

Gammon wrote MRT, acknowledging the latter's intent to grant the Fourth Notice to Proceed to another
party despite having granted the First Notice to Proceed to Gammon. Thus, it notified MRT of its claims
for reimbursement for costs, losses, charges, damages, and expenses it had incurred due to the
rapid mobilization program in response to MRT's additional work instructions, suspension order, ongoing
discussions, and the consequences of its award to another party. 45

MRT expressed its disagreement with Gammon and its amenability to discussing claims for
reimbursement.46 MRT informed Gammon that it was willing to reimburse Gammon to about 5% of
Gammon's total claim of more or less ₱121,000,000.00. Gammon replied that MRT's offer was not
enough to cover the expenses it had incurred for the Project and that it was willing to send MRT additional
information necessary for the evaluation of its claims.49 Gammon filed a Notice of Claim before CIAC
against MRT.52

CIAC: rendered and AWARD is made on the monetary claims of Claimant. ₱58,642,969.62 - TOTAL
DUE THE CLAIMANT (including damages for breach of contract and reasonable expense)

CA: Affirmed CIAC decision.

CONTENTION

MRT It argues that Gammon was not entitled to CIAC's award considering that there is no perfected contract
between MRT and Gammon64 and that Gammon's claim for lost profits was based only on an unsubstantiated
and self-serving assertion of its employee. 65 Additionally, it contends that the claim for reimbursements was not
supported by official receipts. It also avers that it is not estopped from contradicting its alleged judicial
admission of liability for reimbursements in the amount of ₱5,493,639.27

Gammon insisting that there is a perfected contract between them. 69 It argues that this Court determined the
perfection of the contract in Gammon v. Metro Rail Transit Development Corporation, 70 and thus, the doctrine
of the law of the case applies. 71 Gammon asserts that its claim for lost profits was sufficiently
substantiated72 and that it has proven its entitlement to the reimbursements. 73 It avers that damages may be
proved not only by official receipts, but also through other documentary evidence, such as invoices and
debit notes. 74

MRT further claims that invoices and debit memos are not sufficient proof of payment to entitle Gammon to
reimbursements because an invoice is a mere detailed statement of the items and their prices and charges,
while a debit memo is only an advice to the receiver of an outstanding debt. 84

ISSUE: whether or not petitioner Metro Rail Transit Development Corporation is bound by its allegation in its
Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim that it was "willing to pay GAMMON the total amount of P5,493,639.27
representing the sum of P4,821,261.91 and P672,377.36, which comprise GAMMON's claim for cost of the
engineering and design services and site de-watering and clean-up works, respectively"

RULING: This Court rules that MRT is bound by its judicial admission. Under Rule 129, Section 4 of the
Revised Rules of Court. CIAC correctly held that MRT is bound by this admission and is estopped from
denying its representation.

Section 4. Judicial admissions. An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the
proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by
showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.

Judicial admissions may be made by a party in his or her pleadings, during the trial, through verbal or
written manifestations, or in other stages of the judicial proceeding. 186 They are binding such that no
matter how much the party rationalizes it, the party making the admission cannot contradict himself or
herself unless it is shown that the admission was made through a palpable mistake. 187

In this case, MRT alleges that it is willing to pay Gammon the total amount of ₱5,493,639.27, which
comprises the latter's claim for cost of engineering and design services, and de-watering and clean-up
works. 188 MRT's allegation was not qualified. It neither stated that Gammon must first present proof of
its claims for the cost of engineering and design services, and of de-watering and clean-up works nor
amended the Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim to either correct this allegation or to qualify that
Gammon must first present official receipts.

ISSUE: whether or not respondent Gammon Philippines, Inc. 's claims for actual damages, reimbursement of
amounts, and lost profits were sufficiently proven
RULING:

 Actual damages constitute compensation for sustained measurable losses. 189 It must be proven
"with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof or the best evidence
obtainable." 190 It is never presumed or based on personal knowledge of the court. 191

This Court, emphasized that actual damages cannot be presumed and courts, in making an award, must
point out specific facts which could afford a basis for measuring whatever compensatory or actual
damages are borne. An award of actual damages is "dependent upon competent proof of the damages
suffered and the actual amount thereof. The award must be based on the evidence presented, not on
the personal knowledge of the court; and certainly not on flimsy, remote, speculative and
unsubstantial proof."

Although official receipts are the best evidence of payment, this Court has acknowledged that actual
damages may be proved by other forms of documentary evidence, including invoices.

 As to the reimbursement award for engineering services, design work, site de-watering, and
clean-up, The Court of Appeals found that there are sufficient bases for the award of Gammon's
reimbursement claims.207 It ruled that MRT failed to prove that the evidence was insufficient and
that Gammon's computations were erroneous. 208 It found that Gammon provided the best
available documentary evidence, through invoices, debit notes, and official receipts. 209
 award of lost profits in favor of Gammon. This Court affirms the findings of CIAC and of the Court
of Appeals.

The only exceptions subject to this rule were laid out in Uniwide Sales Realty and Resources Corp. v. Titan-Ikeda
Construction and Development Corporation:230

As a rule, findings of fact of administrative agencies and quasi-judicial bodies, which have acquired expertise
because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generally accorded not only respect, but also finality,
especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals. In particular, factual findings of construction arbitrators are final
and conclusive and not reviewable by this Court on appeal. This rule, however admits of certain exceptions. In David
v. Construction Industry and Arbitration Commission, we ruled that, as exceptions, factual findings of construction
arbitrators may be reviewed by this Court when the petitioner proves affirmatively that: (1) the award was procured
by corruption, fraud or other undue means; (2) there was evident partiality or corruption of the arbitrators or
of any of them; (3) the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material
to the controversy; (4) one or more of the arbitrators were disqualified to act as such under Section nine of
Republic Act No. 876 and willfully refrained from disclosing such disqualifications or of any other misbehavior
by which the rights of any party have been materially prejudiced; or (5) the arbitrators exceeded their powers,
or so imperfectly executed them, that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted to them
was not made.

Other recognized exceptions are as follows: (1) when there is a very clear showing of grave abuse of discretion
resulting in lack or loss of jurisdiction as when a party was deprived of a fair opportunity to present its position before
the Arbitral Tribunal or when an award is obtained through fraud or the corruption of arbitrators, (2) when the findings
of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the CIAC, and (3) when a party is deprived of administrative due
process. 231 

However, petitioner failed to prove that any of these exceptions are present in the case at bar. Thus, this Court will no
longer disturb CIAC's factual findings, which were affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals October 14, 2011 Decision and January 25, 2012
Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 98569 are hereby AFFIRMED.
 G.R. No. 156284             February 6, 2007
AUGUSTO GOMEZ, as Special Administrator Intestate Estate of Consuelo omez, Petitioner, vs.
MARIA RITA GOMEZ-SAMSON, MARCIAL SAMSON, JESUS B. GOMEZ, and the REGISTER OF
DEEDS OF PASIG and MARIKINA, RIZAL, Respondents.

Petitioner Augusto Gomez instituted two civil cases: (1) Civil Case No. 36089, and (2) Civil Case No.
36090.

In Civil Case No. 36089, Augusto Gomez alleged that Consuelo Gomez was the owner of three parcels
of land covered by three TCT. He averred that after the death of Consuelo, Rita and Jesus fraudulently
prepared and/or caused to be prepared a Deed of Donation inter vivos. On such basis, Rita and
Jesus sought the cancellation of the certificates of title in the name of Consuelo and the issuance of new
ones in their names. As such, petitioner prayed that the Deed of Donation be declared false, null and
void and/or be declared nullified, and that the certificates of title should bear the name of the Intestate
Estate of Consuelo Gomez. Defendants Rita and Jesus denied the allegations in the complaint claiming
that the document is valid. Further, they declared that they have the right to use, enjoy, possess,
dispose, and own these properties.

In Civil Case No. 36090, petitioner alleged in his complaint that Consuelo was also the sole and absolute
owner of several personal properties which includes stock of VTri Realty, Inc., common shares of stock
of First Philippine Holdings Corp., jewelries and collector’s items, a 1978 Mercedes Benz, 1979
Toyota Corona, and Php 200,000 including accrued interests. that after Consuelo’s death, defendants
Ariston Sr. and Ariston Jr. fraudulently prepared and/or caused to be prepared a Deed of Donation
inter vivos. On such basis, petitioner prayed that the Deed be declared false, null and void and/or be
nullified. He prayed that the personal properties be delivered and cash be paid. He also prayed for
damages. Defendants denied the allegations claiming that the Deed is valid, As such, ownership has
passed to them. Thus, declared that they have the absolute right to use these properties.

both the trial court and the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of respondents. Ordered petitioner to pay them
solidarily and jointly for damages.

CONTENTION

Petitioner claims that, in the two Deeds of Donation he is impugning, the signatures of the donee were
jotted down before the bodies of the Deeds were typewritten. Respondents maintain that the bodies
of the Deeds were encoded first, and then, a clashing presentation of expert witnesses and
circumstantial evidence ensued. Petitioner's expert claims she is certain of the answer: the signature
came first. Respondents' expert, on the other hand, says that it is impossible to determine which came
first accurately. because there were no intersections at all. The trial court added: if there are no
intersections (between the typewritten and the handwritten words), it would be extremely difficult, if not
impossible, to determine which came first."21 The CA found nothing erroneous in these findings of the trial
court.22

The only direct evidence presented by petitioner on this matter is the testimony of Zenaida Torres,
Document Examiner of (NBI). Respondents, on the other hand, presented their own expert witness,
Francisco Cruz, Chief of Document Examination of the PC-INP Crime Laboratory. Other direct evidence
presented by respondents includes testimonies positively stating that the Deeds of Donation were
signed by Consuelo in their completed form in the presence of Notary Public Jose Sebastian. These
testimonies are that of Jose Sebastian himself, and that of several of the respondents including Ariston
Gomez, Jr. who allegedly drafted said Deeds of Donation.

Argument on unwilling or hostile witness Petitioner claims that no credence should have been given
to the testimony of the notary public, Jose Sebastian, as said Jose Sebastian is the same judge whom
this Court had dismissed from the service that the dismissal of Judge Jose casts a grave pall on his
credibility as a witness. especially given how, in the course of the administrative proceedings against
him, he had lied to mislead the investigator, as well as employed others to distort the truth. Petitioner
further claims that the reliance by the CA Certification by Jose Sebastian is misplaced, considering the
questionable circumstances surrounding such certification. Petitioner points out that the Certification was
made ‘after’ the death of Consuelo, and claims that the same appears to be a scheme by Jose
Sebastian to concoct an opportunity for him to make mention of the subject Deeds of Donation intervivos,
"despite the plain fact that the latter had utterly no relation to the matter referred to by Jose Sebastian in
the opening phrase of the letter.

ISSUE: Whether or not Jose Sebastian is allowed to testify notwithstanding his dismissal as a
judge.

RULING: YES. Sec 12 of rule 132 provides for the rule that a party may not impeach his own witness’s
credibility. Jose Sebastian was originally a witness for petitioner Augusto. As such, Rule 132 prohibits
petitioner from impeaching him. The provision states:

Except with respect to witnesses referred to in paragraphs (d) and (e) of section 10, the party producing a
witness is not allowed to impeach his credibility.

A witness may be considered as unwilling or hostile only if so declared by the court upon adequate
showing of his adverse interest, unjustified reluctance to testify, or his having misled the party into
calling him to the witness stand.

The unwilling or hostile witness so declared, or the witness who is an adverse party, may be impeached
by the party presenting him in all respects as if he had been called by the adverse party, except by
evidence of his bad character. He may also be impeached and cross-examined by the adverse party,
but such cross-examination must only be on the subject matter of his examination-in-chief.

This rule is based on the theory that a person who produces a witness vouches for him as being
worthy of credit, and that a direct attack upon the veracity of the witness "would enable the party to
destroy the witness, if he spoke against him, and to make him a good witness, if he spoke for him, with
the means in his hands of destroying his credit, if he spoke against him."

In this case, Neither had there been declaration by the court that Jose Sebastian was an unwilling or
hostile witness. Jose Sebastian is also neither an adverse party, nor an officer, director nor a managing
agent of a public or private corporation or of a partnership or association which is an adverse party. Be
that as it may, even if Jose Sebastian had been declared by the court as an unwilling or hostile witness,
the Section 12 of Rule 132, only allows the party calling the witness to impeach such witness by
contradictory evidence or by prior inconsistent statements, and never by evidence of his “bad
character”. Thus, Jose Sebastian's subsequent dismissal as a judge would not suffice to discredit him as
a witness in this case.

The fact of prior criminal conviction alone does not suffice to discredit a witness; the testimony of
such a witness must be assayed and scrutinized in exactly the same way the testimony of other
witnesses must be examined for its relevance and credibility. 

The effect of this pronouncement is even more significant in this case, as Jose Sebastian has never
been convicted of a crime before his testimony, but was instead administratively sanctioned eleven
years after such testimony. Scrutinizing the testimony of Jose Sebastian, we find, RTC and CA did, no
evidence of bias on the part of Jose Sebastian. On top of this, Jose Sebastian’s testimony is supported by
the records of the notarial registry, which shows that the documents in question were received by the
Notarial Registrar four months before the death of Consuelo.

Weight and Credibility of the Expert Witnesses

PETITIONER EXPERTS’s ZENAIDA TORRES

Zenaida Torress testimony signatures therein were indeed those of Consuelo. However, she opined that
Documents No. 401 and No. 402 were not typed or prepared in one continuous sitting because the horizontal lines
had some variances horizontally. Nevertheless, she admitted that the vertical lines did not show any variance.
Torres admitted that she had not taken any specialized studies on the matter of Questioned Documents , except on
one or two seminars on Questioned Documents. She admitted that she had not passed the Board Exams, as a
Chemist; she further admitted that she has not written any thesis or similar work on the subject matter at issue.
Regarding non-typing in one continuous sitting, she admitted that she had never seen the typewriter used to type
the Donations
401 and 402, nor even tried to get hold of it, before she made the report.

Court: In effect, insofar as the issue of typewriting in one sitting or not, is concerned, the testimony of Torres was
completely discredited
RESPONDENTS EXPERTS’s FRANCISCO CRUZ

Cruz was admitted to have inspected the type writer. As per Cruz, this is another indication that the Donations 401
and 402 were prepared in one continuous sitting, because, as per Cruz, if the typewriter is used one time and
sometime after that, the typewriter is used again, the color tone will most probably be different. By using an
instrument which is a typewriting measuring instrument produced by the Criminal Research Co., Inc. in the USA
and placing said instrument to test the vertical alignment from the top down to the bottom, there is a perfect
vertical alignment. He explained that the slight variances as to the spacing of the words there is a slight
disagreement in the spacing, but not in the alignment. He explained that the normal reason for such discrepancy in
the spacing is because the typist sometimes tries to push the variable spacer.

COURT: sided with Francisco Cruz who testified, citing authorities,19[19] that it is impossible to determine
accurately which came first, because there were no intersections at all.

ISSUE: WON TC erred in siding respondent’s witness?

RULING: this Court will undauntedly sustain the findings of the lower court.

Expert testimony no doubt constitutes evidence worthy of meriting consideration, although not
exclusive on questions of a professional character. The courts of justice, however, are not bound to
submit their findings necessarily to such testimony; they are free to weigh them, and they can give or
refuse to give them any value as proof, or they can even counterbalance such evidence with the other
elements of conviction which may have been adduced during the trial. The problem of the credibility
of the expert witness and the evaluation of his testimony is left to the discretion of the trial court whose
ruling thereupon is not reviewable in the absence of an abuse of that discretion. The trial court is
consequently given the discretion in weighing all these circumstances in its determination of the
expert witness credibility, as it is in a better position than the appellate courts to observe the demeanor
of these witnesses.

In present case, Respondents admit that the use of one sheet of paper for both Deeds of Donation was
intentional, for brevitys sake. While the ensuing litigation could now have caused regrets on the part
of Ariston, Jr. for his decision to sacrifice the margins for brevitys sake, there still appears no indication
that he did so maliciously. Time and again, this Court has ruled that the findings of the trial court
respecting the credibility of witnesses are accorded great weight and respect since it had the
opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses as they testified before the court. Unless
substantial facts and circumstances have been overlooked or misunderstood by the latter which, if
considered, would materially affect the result of the case, this Court will undauntedly sustain the
findings of the lower court.

ISSUE: WON PETITIONER ABLE TO PROVE his FACTUM PROBANS of alleged intercalation of the
deeds of donation on blank pieces of paper containing the signature of consuelo?

RULING: NO. The factum probans68 this time around is the alleged payment of the Donor’s Tax after the
death of Consuelo.

Firstly, there is a failure of the factum probans, even if successfully proven, to prove in turn the factum
probandum. As intimated by respondents, payment of the Donors Tax after the death of Consuelo does
not necessarily prove the alleged intercalation of the Deeds of Donation on blank pieces of paper
containing the signatures of Consuelo.

Secondly, Petitioner failed to prove this factum probandum.

Ariston, Jr. never testified that Consuelo herself physically and personally “delivered” PCIB Check No.
A144-73211 to the BIR. He instead testified that the check was “prepared and issued” by Consuelo
during her lifetime, but that he, Ariston, Jr., physically and personally “delivered” the same to the
BIR.69 Petitioner, however, merely formulated conjectures based on the evidence he presented, and did
not bother to present Nestor Espenilla to explain the consecutive numbers of the RTRs or what he meant
with the words on even date in his certification/ Neither did petitioner present any evidence that the
records of the BIR Commissioner were falsified or antedated, thus, letting the presumption that a public
official had regularly performed his duties stand. This is in “contrast” to respondents’ direct evidence
attesting to the payment of said tax during the lifetime of Consuelo. With respect to respondents’
evidence, all that petitioner could offer in rebuttal is another speculation totally unsupported by evidence:
the alleged fabrication thereof.

This Court does not find anything suspicious in a person wanting to transfer her properties by donation to
her loved ones before leaving for abroad via an airplane. As held by the Court of Appeals, petitioner did
not present any proof that it had been impossible to perform those alleged acts within three hours. 91[91]
As argued by respondents, the one-paged documents can be read aloud without difficulty within five to
ten minutes each. We can also take judicial notice of the fact that traffic is usually very minimal on
Saturday mornings, and was much less of a problem in 1979.

Circumstance that aforesaid properties were actually transferred in the names of the donees only after
the death of the donor, although the deeds of donation were dated April 21, 1979, does not by itself
indicate that the said documents were antedated. In sum, all these circumstantial evidence presented by
petitioner had failed to comply with the strict requirements in using circumstantial evidence, for which
Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: (a)
There is more than one circumstance; (b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; and (c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt.

When the scales shall stand upon an equipoise and there is nothing in the evidence which shall incline it
to one side or the other, the court will find for the defendant. Under this principle, the plaintiff must rely on
the strength of his evidence and not on the weaknesses of the defendants claim. Even if the evidence of
the plaintiff may be stronger than that of the defendant, there is no preponderance of evidence on his side
if such evidence is insufficient in itself to establish his cause of action. DENIED

G.R. No. 117487 December 12, 1995

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
ARNEL ALICANDO y BRIONES, accused-appellant.

Romeo Penecilla, father of the four year old victim Khazie Mae, was drinking liquor in his house.
Appellant joined them but every now and then would take leave and return. Luisa Rebada also lives in
neighborhood, saw the victim at the window of appellant's house. She offered to buy her "yemas" but
appellant closed the window. Soon she heard the victim crying. She approached appellant's house and
peeped through an opening between its floor and door. The sight shocked her appellant was naked, on
top of the victim, his left hand choking her neck. She retreated to her house in fright. Romeo Penecilla
returned to his house. He did not find Khazie Mae. Rebada was aware that the Penecillas were looking
for their daughter but did not tell them what she knew. Instead, Relada called out appellant from her
window and asked him the time Khazie Mae left his house. Appellant replied he was drunk and did not
know.

Leopoldo Santiago went down from his house to answer the call of nature. He discovered the lifeless
body of Khazie Mae under his house. Rebada suffered a change of heart. She informed Penecillas that
appellant committed the crime. Forthwith, appellant He verbally confessed his guilt without the
assistance of counsel. On the basis of his uncounselled verbal confession and follow up interrogations,
the police came to know and recovered from appellant's house, Khazie Mae's green slippers, a pair of
gold earrings, a buri mat, a stained pillow and a stained T-shirt all of which were presented as
evidence for the prosecution.

Appellant adopted the autopsy report of Dr. Doromal as his documentary evidence to prove that the
proximate cause of Khazie Mae's death was asphyxia by strangulation.

RTC: ccused, Arnel Alicando, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for (sic) the Crime of Rape with
Homicide. The death sentence shall be executed by putting the person under sentence to death by
electrocution (electric chair).

The case is before us on automatic review considering the death penalty imposed by the trial
court. A new counsel, Atty. Joel Tiongco, took the cudgel for appellant. assails the decision of the TC.

trial court sentencing the appellant to death is shot full of errors, both substantive and procedural.
The conviction is on an amalgam of inadmissible and incredible evidence and supported by
scoliotic logic.

ISSUE: Whether or not the evidence obtained through appelants uncounseled verbal confession
may be admitted in evidence

RULING: No. Some prosecution evidence, offered independently of the plea of guilt of the appellant,
were inadmissible, yet, were considered by the trial court in convicting the appellant.
 These are inadmissible evidence for they were gathered by PO3 Danilo Tan of the Iloilo City PNP
as a result of custodial interrogation where appellant verbally confessed to the crime
without the benefit of counsel.

In the case at bar, PO3 Tan did not even have the simple sense to reduce the all important confession
of the appellant in writing. Neither did he present any writing showing that appellant “waived” his
right to silence and to have competent and independent counsel despite the blatant violation of
appellant's constitutional right, the trial court allowed his uncounselled confession to flow into the records
and illicitly used it in sentencing him to death.

It is not only the uncounselled confession that is condemned as inadmissible, but also evidence derived

therefrom. The pillow and the T-shirt with the alleged bloodstains were evidence derived from the
uncounselled confession illegally extracted by the police from the appellant.

We have not only constitutionalized the Miranda warnings in our jurisdiction. We have also
adopted the libertarian exclusionary rule known as the "fruit of the poisonous tree," a phrase
minted by Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter in the celebrated case of Nardone v. United
States. 18 According to this rule, once the primary source (the "tree") is shown to have been
unlawfully obtained, any secondary or derivative evidence (the " fruit " ) derived from it is also
inadmissible. 19 Stated otherwise, illegally seized evidence is obtained as a direct result of the
illegal act, whereas the "fruit of the poisonous tree" is the indirect result of the same illegal act.
The "fruit of the poisonous tree"  is at least once removed from the illegally seized evidence, but it
is equally inadmissible. The rule is based on the principle that evidence illegally obtained by the
State should not be used to gain other evidence because the originally illegally obtained
evidence taints all evidence subsequently obtained. 

But even assuming arguendo that the pillow and the t-shirt were admissible evidence, still, the trial court
erred in holding that they "strongly corroborated the testimony of Luisa Rebada that the victim was
raped." For one, there was no basis for the trial court to conclude that the stains on the pillow and t-shirt
were human bloodstains. The pillow and the t-shirt were not examined by any expert. To hold that they
were human bloodstains is guesswork. For another, there was no testimony that the stains were caused
by either the blood of the appellant or the victim. In addition, there was no testimony that the t-shirt was
the one worn by the appellant when he allegedly committed the crime. It must also be noted that it is not
unnatural for appellant to have bloodstains on his shirt. He is a butcher by occupation.

The burden to prove that an accused waived his right to remain silent and the right to counsel before
making a confession under custodial interrogation rests with the prosecution. It is also the burden of
the prosecution to show that the evidence derived from confession is not tainted as "fruit of the
poisonous tree." The burden has to be discharged by clear and convincing evidence. the waiver must be
in writing and in the presence of counsel. In the case at bar, the records show that the prosecution utterly
failed to discharge this burden. It matters not that in the course of the hearing, the appellant failed to
make a timely objection to the introduction of these constitutionally proscribed evidence. The lack of
objection did not satisfy the heavy burden of proof that rested on the prosecution.

our commitment to the criminal justice system is not only to convict and punish violators of our laws. We
are equally committed to the ideal that the process of detection, apprehension, conviction and
incarceration of criminals should be accomplished with fairness, and without impinging on the dignity of
the individual. In a death penalty case, the Court cannot rush to judgment even when a lowlife is involved
for an erroneous conviction will leave a lasting stain in our escutcheon of justice.

In sum, the Court cannot send the appellant to die in the electric chair on the basis of the procedural
irregularities committed by, and the inadmissible evidence considered by the trial court.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision in Criminal Case No. 43663, convicting accused Arnel Alicando of the
crime of Rape with Homicide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death is annulled and set aside
and the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. No costs.

G.R. No. 227038

JEFFREY MIGUEL y REMEGIO, Petitioner vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent

a Bantay Bayan operative of Barangay San Antonio Village named Reynaldo Bahoyo (BB Bahoyo) was
doing his rounds when he purportedly received a report of a man showing off his private parts . BB
Bahoyo and fellow  BB Velasquez then went to the said street and saw a visibly intoxicated person, which
they later identified as herein petitioner, urinating and displaying his private parts while standing in front of
a gate enclosing an empty lot. BB Bahoyo and BB Velasquez approached petitioner and asked him where
he lived, and the latter answered Kaong Street. BB Bahoyo then said that he also lived in the same street
but petitioner looked unfamiliar to him, so he asked for an identification card, but petitioner failed to
produce one. BB Velasquez then repeated the request for an identification card, but instead, petitioner
emptied his pockets, revealing a pack of cigarettes containing (2) pieces of rolled paper containing dried
marijuana leaves. This prompted BB Bahoyo and BB Velasquez to seize the foregoing items, take
petitioner to the police station, and turn him, as well as the seized items, over to SP03 Rafael Castillo.
SP03 Castillo then inventoried, marked, and photographed the seized items, all in the presence of BB
Bahoyo and BB Velasquez. After examination, it was confirmed that rolled paper contained marijuana and
that petitioner was positive for the presence of methamphetamine but negative for THC-metabolites, both
dangerous drugs.8

Petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge, and thereafter, presented a different version of the facts.
According to him, he was just urinating in front of his workplace when (2) Bantay Bayan  operatives
then frisked him, took away his belongings, and thereafter, handcuffed and brought him to the
barangay hall. He was then detained for about an hour before being taken to the Ospital ng Makati
and to another office where a bald police officer questioned him. Thereafter, he was taken back to
the barangay hall where they showed him (2) sticks of marijuana joints allegedly recovered from
him.

RTC: petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged

found that BB Bahoyo and BB Velasquez conducted a valid warrantless arrest, as petitioner was
scandalously showing his private parts at the time of his arrest. Therefore, the resultant
search incidental to such arrest which yielded the seized marijuana in petitioner's possession
was also lawful.

CA: affirmed petitioner's conviction.15 It held that the search made was done incidental to his arrest for
exhibiting his private parts on public. As such, the said seized marijuana is admissible in evidence
and, thus, sufficient to convict him for the crime charged.16 The CA likewise held that the rule on
chain of custody was duly complied with and, thus, the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
drugs were not compromise d.17
 ISSUE: whether or not the CA correctly upheld petitioner's conviction for illegal possession of
dangerous drugs.

Ruling: No.

the Court is convinced that the acts of the Bantay Bayan - or any barangay-based or other volunteer
organizations in the nature of watch groups - relating to the preservation of peace and order in their
respective areas have the color of a state-related function. As such, they should be deemed as law
enforcement authorities for the purpose of applying the Bill of Rights. the Court shall now determine
whether such arrest and search were validly made.

"Section 2,27 Article III of the 1987 Constitution mandates that a search and seizure must be carried out
through or on the strength of a judicial warrant predicated upon the existence of probable cause,
absent which, such search and seizure becomes "unreasonable". To protect the people from
unreasonable searches and seizures, Constitution provides that evidence obtained from unreasonable
searches and seizures shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. In
other words, evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such unreasonable searches and
seizures are deemed tainted and should be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous
tree.29

One of the recognized exceptions to the need [of] a warrant before a search may be [e]ffected is a search
incidental to a lawful arrest. In this instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before
a search can be made- the process cannot be reversed. 30

Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another.

In warrantless arrests made pursuant to Section 5 (a), Rule 113, two (2) elements must concur,
namely: (a) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (b) such overt act is done in the presence or
within the view of the arresting officer. On the other hand, Section 5 (b), Rule 113 requires for its
application that at the time of the arrest, an offense had in fact just been committed and the arresting
officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the accused had committed it. 32 In both instances,
the officer's personal knowledge of the fact of the commission of an offense is essential. Under Section 5
(a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the officer himself witnesses the crime;
while in Section 5 (b) of the same, he knows for a fact that a crime has just been committed."33

In this case, Clearly, circumstances do not justify the conduct of an in jlagrante delicto  arrest, considering
that there was no overt act constituting a crime committed by petitioner in the presence or within the view
of the arresting officer. Neither do these circumstances necessitate a "hot pursuit"  warrantless arrest as
the arresting Bantay Bayan  operatives do not have any personal knowledge of facts that petitioner
had just committed an offense.
More importantly, the Court simply finds highly implausible the prosecution's claim that a valid
warrantless arrest was made on petitioner on account of the alleged public display of his private parts
because if it was indeed the case, then the proper charge should have been filed against him. However,
records are bereft of any showing that such charge was filed aside from the instant criminal charge for
illegal possession of dangerous drugs - thereby strengthening the view that no prior arrest was made on
petitioner which led to a search incidental thereto. As stressed earlier, there must first be a lawful arrest
before a search can be made and that such process cannot be reversed.

All told, the Bantay Bayan  operatives conducted an illegal search on the person of petitioner.
Consequently, the marijuana purportedly seized from him on account of such search is rendered
inadmissible in evidence. Since the confiscated marijuana is the very corpus delicti of the crime charged,
petitioner must necessarily be acquitted and exonerated from criminal liability. 38

G.R. No. 189206               June 8, 2011

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, Petitioner, vs.
THE HONORABLE 15th DIVISION OF TH E COURT OF APPEALS and INDUSTRIAL BANK OF
KOREA, TONG YANG MERCHANT BANK, HANAREUM BANKING CORP., LAND BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES, WESTMONT BANK and DOMSAT HOLDINGS, INC., Respondents.

The controversy originated from a surety agreement by which Domsat obtained a surety bond from
GSIS to secure the payment of the loan from the Banks. When Domsat failed to pay the loan, GSIS
refused to comply with its obligation reasoning that Domsat did not use the loan proceeds for the payment
of rental for the satellite. GSIS alleged that Domsat, with Westmont Bank as the conduit, transferred the
U.S. $11 Million loan proceeds from the Industrial Bank of Korea to Citibank New York account of
Westmont Bank and from there to the Binondo Branch of Westmont Bank.5 The Banks filed a
complaint.

In the course of the hearing, GSIS requested for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum to the
custodian of records of Westmont Bank.

RTC issued a subpoena decus tecum.7 A motion to quash was filed by the banks on three grounds: 1) the
subpoena is unreasonable, oppressive and does not establish the relevance of the documents sought; 2)
request for the documents will violate the Law on Secrecy of Bank Deposits; and 3) GSIS failed to
advance the reasonable cost of production of the documents. 8  the RTC Order denying the motion to
quash for lack of merit.

The law declares bank deposits to be "absolutely confidential" except (6) In cases where the
money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation.

The case at bench is for the collection of a sum of money from defendants that obtained a
loan from the plaintiff. The loan was secured by defendant GSIS which was the surety. It is
the contention of defendant GSIS that the proceeds of the loan was deviated to purposes other
than to what the loan was extended. The quashal of the subpoena would deny defendant GSIS
its right to prove its defenses.

the trial court granted the second motion for reconsideration filed by the banks. The previous subpoenas
issued were consequently quashed.12 The trial court invoked the ruling in Intengan v. Court of
Appeals,13 where it was ruled that foreign currency deposits are absolutely confidential and may be
examined only when there is a written permission from the depositor.
Respondent judge capriciously and arbitrarily ignored Section 2 of the Foreign Currency Deposit Act (RA 6426) in ruling in his
Orders dated September 1 and December 30, 2003 that the US$11,000,000.00 deposit in the account of respondent Domsat in
Westmont Bank is covered by the secrecy of bank deposit.

CA: respondent court is hereby ordered to issue subpoena duces tecum ad testificandum directing
the records custodian of Westmont Bank specific docs (Applications for cashier check, bank transfer and
copy of agreement)

 declared that Domsat’s deposit in Westmont Bank is covered by Republic Act No. 6426 or the
Bank Secrecy Law as such it cannot be examined, inquired or looked into without the written
consent of its owner. Petitioner, therefore, had inappropriately invoked the provisions of Central
Bank (CB) Circular Nos. 343 which has already been superseded by more recently issued CB
Circulars. CB Circular 343 requires the surrender to the banking system of foreign exchange,
including proceeds of foreign borrowings. This requirement, however, can no longer be found in
later circulars. Even under CB 1389, proceeds of foreign borrowings are no longer required to be
surrendered to the banking system.

Undaunted, petitioner (GSIS) now argues that CB Circular 1389 is applicable because Domsat’s
$11,000,000.00 loan from respondent banks was intended to be paid to a foreign supplier Intersputnik
and, therefore, should have been paid directly to Intersputnik and not deposited into Westmont Bank. The
fact that it was deposited to the local bank Westmont Bank, petitioner claims violates the circular and
makes the deposit lose its confidentiality status under R.A. 6426. However, a reading of the entire CB
Circular 1389 reveals that the portion quoted by the petitioner refers only to the procedure/conditions of
drawdown for service of debts using foreign exchange. The provision relied upon by the petitioner
does not in any manner prescribe the conditions before any foreign currency deposit can be entitled to the
confidentiality provisions of R.A. 6426.15

 Anent the third issue, the CA ruled that the testimony of the incumbent president of Westmont
Bank is not the written consent contemplated by Republic Act No. 6426.
 The CA however upheld the issuance of subpoena. The appellate court believed that the
production of these documents does not involve the examination of Domsat’s account since it will
never be known how much money was deposited into it or withdrawn therefrom and how much
remains therein.

ISSUE: which of the two laws should apply in the instant case.

RULING: since subject matter of subpoena is foreign currency such as US Dollar deposits. then RA 6426
is applicable. Hence, GSIS may not inspect such accounts unless depositor would give its consent.

ection 8 of Republic Act No. 6426 provides; Secrecy of Foreign Currency Deposits. – All foreign currency
deposits authorized are hereby declared as and considered of an absolutely confidential nature and,
except upon the written permission of the depositor, in no instance shall foreign currency deposits
be examined, inquired or looked into by any person, government official, bureau or office whether judicial
or administrative or legislative or any other entity whether public or private; Provided, however, That said
foreign currency deposits shall be exempt from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process
of any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever.

On the one hand, Republic Act No. 1405 provides for four (4) exceptions when records of deposits may
be disclosed. These are under any of the following instances: a) upon written permission of the depositor,
(b) in cases of impeachment, (c) upon order of a competent court in the case of bribery or dereliction of
duty of public officials or, (d) when the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation,
and e) in cases of violation of the Anti-Money Laundering Act (AMLA), the Anti-Money Laundering Council
(AMLC) may inquire into a bank account upon order of any competent court. 22 On the other hand, the lone
exception to the non-disclosure of foreign currency deposits, under Republic Act No. 6426, is disclosure
upon the written permission of the depositor.
These two laws both support the confidentiality of bank deposits. There is no conflict between them.
Republic Act No. 1405 was enacted for the purpose of giving encouragement to the people to deposit
their money in banking institutions and to discourage private hoarding so that the same may be
properly utilized by banks in authorized loans to assist in the economic development of the
country.23 It covers all bank deposits in the Philippines and no distinction was made between domestic
and foreign deposits. Thus, Republic Act No. 1405 is considered a law of general application. On the
other hand, Republic Act No. 6426 was intended to encourage deposits from foreign lenders and
investors.24 It is a special law designed especially for foreign currency deposits in the Philippines. A
general law does not nullify a specific or special law. Therefore, it is beyond cavil that Republic Act No.
6426 applies in this case.

.Applying Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6426, absent the written permission from Domsat, Westmont
Bank cannot be legally compelled to disclose the bank deposits of Domsat, otherwise, it might expose
itself to criminal liability under the same act.27

The basis for the application of subpoena is to prove that the loan intended for Domsat by the Banks and
guaranteed by GSIS, was diverted to a purpose other than that stated in the surety bond. The Banks,
however, argue that GSIS is in fact liable to them for the proper applications of the loan proceeds and not
vice-versa. We are however not prepared to rule on the merits of this case lest we pre-empt the findings
of the lower courts on the matter.

The third issue raised by GSIS was properly addressed by the appellate court. The appellate court
maintained that the judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, grant the second motion for
reconsideration despite its being pro forma. The appellate court correctly relied on precedents where
this Court set aside technicality in favor of substantive justice. Furthermore, the appellate court
accurately pointed out that petitioner did not assail the defect of lack of notice in its opposition to the
second motion of reconsideration, thus it can be considered a waiver of the defect.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. The Decision dated 29 February 2008 and 19
June 2009 Resolution of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 190846
TOMAS P. TAN, JR., Petitioner, vs.
JOSE G. HOSANA, Respondent.

The respondent (Jose) married (Milagros)  During their marriage, Jose and Milagros bought a house

and lot, Milagros sold to the petitioner (Tomas) the subject property, as evidenced by a deed of sale
executed by Milagros herself and as attorney-in-fact of Jose, by virtue of a (SPA) executed by Jose in her
favor. After the sale, TCT was cancelled and New TCT was issued in the name of Tomas. Jose filed
a Complaint for Annulment of Sale/Cancellation of Title/Reconveyance and Damages. In the
complaint, Jose averred that while he was working in Japan, Milagros, without his consent and
knowledge, conspired with Tomas to execute the SPA by forging Jose's signature making it appear that
Jose had authorized Milagros to sell the subject property to Tomas. In his Answer, Tomas maintained that
he was a buyer in good faith and for value. 

Jose presented his brother, (Bonifacio), as sole witness. Bonifacio further testified that Jose's signature in
the SPA was forged. Bonifacio presented documents containing the signature of Jose for comparison.On
the other hand, Tomas submitted his own account of events as corroborated by (Rosana), his
goddaughter. Tomas directed Rosana to go to the house of Milagros to confirm if Jose knew about the
sale transaction. Through a phone call by Milagros to Jose, Rosana was able to talk to Jose who
confirmed that he was aware of the sale and had given his wife authority to proceed with the sale. Rosana
informed Tomas of Jose’s confirmation.23

RTC in favor of Jose and nullified the sale of the subject property to Tomas. held that the SPA wherein
Jose supposedly appointed Milagros as his attorney-in-fact, was actually null and void.

CA: affirmed the RTC ruling that the deed of sale and the SPA were void. However, the CA modified the
judgment of the RTC. Despite Tomas’ allegation that he paid P700,000.00 for the subject lot, the CA
found that there was no convincing evidence that established this claim. 28

CONTENTION

Tomas that the amount of P200,000.00 as reimbursement for the purchase price of the house and lot was
insufficient and not supported by the evidence formally offered before and admitted by the RTC . Tomas
contended that the actual amount he paid as consideration for the sale was P700,000.00, as
supported by his testimony before the RTC.29

ISSUE: whether the testimony of Tomas is sufficient to establish the actual purchase price of the
sale.
RULING: No. The CA found Tomas’ claim of paying P700,000.00 for the subject property to be
unsubstantiated as he failed to tender any convincing evidence to establish his claim. in civil cases, the
basic rule is that the party making allegations has the burden of proving them by a preponderance of
evidence.40 Moreover, the parties must rely on the strength of their own evidence, not upon the weakness
of the defense offered by their opponent.41

Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side
and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term "greater weight of the evidence" or "greater
weight of the credible evidence."42 Preponderance of evidence is a means probability of the truth. It is
evidence that is more convincing to the court as it is worthier of belief than that which is offered in
opposition thereto.43

Therefore, Tomas’ bare allegation that he paid Milagros the sum of P700,000.00 cannot be considered as
proof of payment, without any other convincing evidence to establish this claim. Tomas’ bare allegation,
while uncontroverted, does not automatically entitle it to be given weight and credence.

It is settled in jurisprudence that one who pleads payment has the burden of proving it; 44 the burden rests
on the defendant to prove payment, rather than on the plaintiff to prove non-payment. 45 A mere allegation
is not evidence,46 and the person who alleges has the burden of proving his or her allegation with the
requisite quantum of evidence, which in civil cases is preponderance of evidence.

ISSUE: WoN a void document may be admissible as evidence?

RULING: Yes. The force and effect of a void contract is distinguished from its admissibility as
evidence.

Evidence is the means  of ascertaining in a judicial proceeding the truth respecting a matter of fact,

sanctioned by the Rules of Court. 53 The purpose of introducing documentary evidence is to ascertain the
truthfulness of a matter at issue, which can be the entire content or a specific provision/term in the
document.

The deed of sale as documentary evidence may be used as a means to ascertain the truthfulness of the
consideration stated and its actual payment. The purpose of introducing the deed of sale as evidence is
not to enforce the terms written in the contract, which is an obligatory force and effect of a valid contract.
The deed of sale, rather, is used as a means to determine matters that occurred in the execution of
such contract, i.e., the determination of what each party has given under the void contract to allow
restitution and prevent unjust enrichment.

Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law of these
rules.54 There is no provision in the Rules of Evidence which excludes the admissibility of a void
document. The Rules only require that the evidence is relevant and not excluded by the Rules for its
admissibility.55

Hence, a void document is admissible as evidence because the purpose of introducing it as evidence is to
ascertain the truth respecting a matter of fact, not to enforce the terms of the document itself.

It is also settled in jurisprudence that with respect to evidence which appears to be

of doubtful  relevancy, incompetency, or admissibility, the safer policy is to be liberal and not reject
them on doubtful or technical grounds, but admit them unless plainly irrelevant, immaterial, or
incompetent; for the reason that their rejection places them beyond the consideration of the court, if
they are thereafter found relevant or competent. On the other hand, their admission, if they turn out
later to be irrelevant or incompetent, can easily be remedied by completely discarding them or ignoring
them.56
In the present case, the deed of sale was declared null and void by positive provision of the law
prohibiting the sale of conjugal property without the spouse’s consent. It does not, however, preclude the
possibility that Tomas paid the consideration stated therein. The admission of the deed of sale as
evidence is consistent with the liberal policy of the court to admit the evidence which appears to be
relevant in resolving an issue before the courts.

An offer to prove the regular execution of the deed of sale is basis for the court to determine the
presence of the essential elements of the sale, including the consideration paid.

The deed of sale in the present case was formally offered by both parties as evidence.57 Tomas, in
fact, formally offered it for the purpose of proving its execution and the regularity of the sale.58

The offer of the deed of sale to prove its regularity necessarily allowed the lower courts to consider the
terms written therein to determine whether all the essential elements 59 for a valid contract of sale are
present, including the consideration of the sale. The fact that the sale was declared null and void does not
prevent the court from relying on consideration stated in the deed of sale to determine the actual amount
paid by the petitioner for the purpose of preventing unjust enrichment.

Hence, the specific offer of the Deed of Sale to prove the actual consideration of the sale is not necessary
since it is necessarily included in determining the regular execution of the sale.

The consideration stated in the notarized Deed of Sale is  prima facie evidence of the amount paid
by the petitioner.

The notarized deed of sale is a public document and is prima facie evidence of the truth of the facts
stated therein.60

Prima facie  evidence is defined as evidence good and sufficient on its face. Such evidence as, in the
judgment of the law, is sufficient to establish a given fact, or the group or chain of facts constituting the
party’s claim or defense and which if not rebutted or contradicted, will remain sufficient.61

In the present case, the consideration stated in the deed of sale constitutes prima facie  evidence of
the amount paid by Tomas for the transfer of the property to his name. Tomas failed to adduce
satisfactory evidence to rebut or contradict the consideration stated as the actual consideration and
amount paid to Milagros and Jose.

The deed of sale was declared null and void by a positive provision of law requiring the consent of
both spouses for the sale of conjugal property. There is, however, no question on the presence of the
consideration of the sale, except with respect to the actual amount paid. While the deed of sale has no
force and effect as a contract, it remains prima facie  evidence of the actual consideration paid.

As earlier discussed, Tomas failed to substantiate his claim that he paid to Milagros the amount of
P700,000.00, instead of the amount of P200,000.00 stated in the deed of sale. No documentary or
testimonial evidence to prove payment of the higher amount was presented, apart from Tomas’ sole
testimony. Tomas’ sole testimony of payment is self-serving and insufficient to unequivocally prove
that Milagros received P700,000.00 for the subject property. Hence, the consideration stated in the
deed of sale remains sufficient evidence of the actual amount the petitioner paid and the same amount
which should be returned under the principle of unjust enrichment.

WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the petition for review on certiorari. The decision dated August 28, 2009
and the resolution dated November 17, 2009, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 88645
is AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 187850, August 17, 2016

ANITA U. LORENZANA, Petitioner, v. RODOLFO LELINA, Respondent.

(Ambrosia), married to (Aquilino), executed a Deed of Absolute Sale6  in favor of her son, the respondent.
Immediately after the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale, respondent took possession of the
property. Since then, the tenants of the property, continued to deliver his share of the produce of the
property as well as produce of the remaining half of the land.  respondent and his three tenants were
invited at the Municipal Agrarian Office for a conference where they were informed that the property is
already owned by petitioner by virtue of a Deed of Final Conveyance and TD No. 11-21367-A both in the
name of petitioner.11 Alerted by the turn of events, respondent filed a complaint for quieting of title and
cancellation of documents. petitioner alleged that she acquired a land through a foreclosure sale.
Petitioner claims that she became the judgment creditor in a case for collection of sum of money 1.
she filed against Aquilino, and the decision in her favor became final. An auction sale was conducted and
a Certificate of Sale was issued in favor of petitioner. The same Certificate of Sale was registered with
the Register of Deeds. No redemption having been made despite the lapse of the one year period for
redemption, a Deed of Final Conveyance18 was issued in her favor The same was registered with the
Register of Deeds.

RTC: upheld respondent's ownership over the half of the levied property.27  It  ruled that the  levied
property  is  exclusively  owned  by Ambrosia, and could not be held to answer for the obligations of her
husband in the collection case. As a result, it declared the Deed of Final Conveyance invalid and without
force and effect on Ambrosia's paraphernal property.29 

CA: affirmed the findings of the RTC. It ruled that the power of the court in the execution of its judgment
extends only to properties unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor. Since Ambrosia
exclusively owned the levied property, the sheriff in the collection case, acted beyond its power and
authority when it levied on the property. Consequently, petitioner cannot rely on the execution sale in
proving that she has better right over the property because such execution sale is void.33 

Arguments

Petitioner argues that respondent's sole basis for his claim of ownership over the property is the Deed of
Absolute Sale, the original of which was not presented in court. Since only the photocopy of the Deed
of  Absolute Sale was presented, its contents are inadmissible for violating the best evidence rule.

Issue: WON PHOTOCOPY DOCUMENT INADMISSIBLE?

Ruling; No. The best evidence rule requires that when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a
document, no evidence is admissible other than the original document itself except in the instances
mentioned in Section 3, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court. As such, mere photocopies of
documents are inadmissible pursuant to the best evidence rule.42 Nevertheless, evidence not objected to
is deemed admitted and may be validly considered by the court in arriving at its judgment.43 Courts are
not precluded to accept in evidence a mere photocopy of a document when no objection was raised
when it was formally offered.

In order to exclude  evidence,  the  objection to  admissibility  of evidence must be made at the proper
time, and the grounds specified.45 Objection to evidence must be made at the time it is formally
offered.46 In case of documentary evidence, offer is made after all the witnesses of the party making the
offer have testified, specifying the purpose for which the evidence is being offered.47 It is only at this time,
and not at any other, that objection to the documentary evidence may be made. And when a party failed
to interpose a timely objection to evidence at the time they were offered in evidence, such objection shall
be considered as waived.48 This is true even if by its nature the evidence is inadmissible and would
have surely been rejected if it had been challenged at the proper time.49 Moreover, grounds for
objection must be specified in any case.50 Grounds for objections not raised at the proper time shall be
considered waived, even if the evidence was objected to on some other ground.51 Thus, even on
appeal, the appellate court may not consider any other ground of objection, except those that were
raised at the proper time.52chanrobleslaw

In this case, the objection to the Deed of Absolute Sale was belatedly raised. Respondent submitted his
Formal Offer of Evidence53 on February 12, 2003 which included the Deed of Absolute Sale as Exhibit A.
While petitioner filed a Comment and Objection54 on February 21, 2003, she only objected to the Deed
of Absolute Sale for being self-serving. In the Order55 dated February 27, 2003, the RTC admitted the
Deed of Absolute Sale, rejecting the objection of petitioner. Having failed to object on the ground of
inadmissibility under the best evidence rule, petitioner is now deemed to have waived her objection on
this ground and cannot raise it for the first time on appeal.

From the foregoing, we uphold respondent's ownership over the subject property, as well as the
cancellation of Deed of Final Conveyance and TD No. 11-21367-A under the name of petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are
hereby AFFIRMED.
 G.R. No. 174673
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs.
FE ROA GIMENEZ AND IGNACIO B. GIMENEZ, Respondents.

The Republic, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), instituted a Complaint
for Reconveyance, Reversion, Accounting, Restitution and Damages against the Gimenez Spouses
before the Sandiganbayan. “The Complaint seeks to recover ill-gotten wealth acquired by [the Gimenez
Spouses] as dummies, agents[,] or nominees of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda
Marcos[.]” During trial, the Republic presented documentary evidence attesting to the positions held,
business interests, income, and pertinent transactions of the Gimenez Spouses. The Republic presented
the testimonies of Atty. Tereso Javier, Head of the Sequestered Assets Department of PCGG, and of
Danilo R.V. Daniel, Director of the Research and Development Department of PCGG. Witnesses
testified on the bank accounts and businesses owned or controlled by the Gimenez Spouses.

The Republic eventually manifested that it was “no longer presenting further evidence.” Accordingly, the
Sandiganbayan gave the Republic 30 days “to file its formal offer of evidence.” Republic moved “for an
extension of thirty (30) days, within which to file [its] formal offer of evidence.” This Motion was granted
by the Sandiganbayan. On April 27, 2006, the Republic moved for an additional 15 days which likewise
granted by the Sandiganbayan. Following this, no additional Motion for extension was filed by the
Republic.

SANDIGAN (1st Resolution): noted that the Republic failed to file its Formal Offer of Evidence
notwithstanding repeated extensions. Thus, it declared that the Republic waived the filing of its Formal
Offer of Evidence.

Ignacio Gimenez filed a Motion to Dismiss on Demurrer to Evidence. He argued that the
Republic showed no right to relief as there was no evidence to support its cause of action

Republic filed a MR [of the first assailed Resolution] and to Admit Attached Formal Offer of
Evidence.

SANDIGAN (2nd Resolution): denied the Republic’s MR and granted the Gimenez Spouses’ Motion to
Dismiss. While it is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities and that the higher ends of
substantial justice militate against dismissal of cases purely on technical grounds, the circumstances of
this case show that the ends of justice will not be served if this Court allows the wanton disregard of
the Rules of Court and of the Court’s orders. Rules of procedure are designed for the proper and
prompt disposition of cases.
 that the documentary evidence presented by the Republic consisted mostly of certified true
copies. However, the persons who certified the documents as copies of the original were not
presented. Hence, the evidence lacked probative value.

CONTENTION

Petitioner claims that the following exhibits were acquired in relation to the PCGG’s functions prescribed
under Executive Order No. 1, Section 3(b), and form part of the official records of the PCGG:
“Certifications as to the various positions held in Government by Fe Roa-Gimenez, her salaries and
compensation during her stint as a public officer, the BIR Income Tax Returns and Statement of Assets
and Liabilities showing the declared income of spouses Gimenezes; the Articles of Incorporation of
various corporations showing spouses Gimenezes’ interests on various corporations; and several
transactions involving huge amounts of money which prove that they acted as conduit in the
disbursement of government funds.“

respondent Ignacio Gimenez argues that petitioner’s documents are not “official issuances of the
Philippine government.”They are mostly notarized private documents. Petitioner’s evidence has no
probative value; hence, a dismissal on demurrer to evidence is only proper.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan erred in holding that petitioner Republic of the
Philippinesvwaived the filing of its Formal Offer of Evidence

RULING: YES. This court is of the belief that the Rules be relaxed and petitioner be allowed to submit its
written Formal Offer of Evidence. This court has adopted a liberal approach regarding technical rules of
procedure in cases involving recovery of ill-gotten wealth in case of doubt, courts should proceed with
caution in granting a motion to dismiss based on demurrer to evidence

Our Rules of Court lays down the procedure for the formal offer of evidence. Testimonial evidence is
offered "at the time [a] witness is called to testify.” Documentary and object evidence, on the other hand,
are offered "after the presentation of a party’s testimonial evidence." Offer of documentary or object
evidence is generally done orally unless permission is given by the trial court for a written offer of
evidence. More importantly, the Rules specifically provides that evidence must be formally offered to be
considered by the court. Evidence not offered is excluded in the determination of the case. "Failure to
make a formal offer within a considerable period of time shall be deemed a waiver to submit it."

The rule on formal offer of evidence is intertwined with the constitutional guarantee of due process.
Parties must be given the opportunity to review the evidence submitted against them and take the
necessary actions to secure their case. Hence, any document or object that was marked for
identification is not evidence unless it was "formally offered and the opposing counsel [was] given an
opportunity to object to it or cross-examine the witness called upon to prove or identify it.”

In present case, petitioner was able to file its Formal Offer of Evidence, albeit, belatedly. Even assuming
that no documentary evidence was properly offered, Petitioner presented other evidence during the 19
years of trial. The Sandiganbayan erred in ignoring petitioner’s testimonial evidence without any basis or
justification. Numerous exhibits were offered as part of the testimonies of petitioner’s witnesses. Petitioner
presented both testimonial and documentary evidence that tended to establish a presumption that
respondents acquired ill-gotten wealth during respondent Fe Roa Gimenez’s incumbency as public officer
and which total amount or value was manifestly out of proportion to her and her husband’s salaries and to
their other lawful income or properties which must be reconveyed to the Republic for being acquired in
blatant violation of the Constitution and the Anti-Graft statutes.

This court is not unmindful of the difficulty in gathering voluminous documentary ev idence in cases of
forfeiture of ill-gotten wealth acquired throughout the years. It is never easy to prosecute corruption and
take back what rightfully belongs to the government and the people of the Republic.

This is not the first time that this court relaxed the rule on formal offer of evidence.
 [G.R. No. 7969. October 5, 1912. ]
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHUA MO, Defendant-Appellant.

complaint charged that the defendant did "in the city of Manila, Philippine Islands, voluntarily, illegally, and
criminally have in his possession and under his control a certain quantity of opium." The lower court found
that the crime had been committed "at No. 717 Calle Sacristia in the city of Manila ." An examination of the
evidence shows that the crime was committed "at No. 717 Calle Sacristia." None of the witnesses stated
where or in what city No. 717 Calle Sacristia was located. The judge of the lower court evidently took
judicial notice of the fact that Calle Sacristia was one of the public streets of the city of Manila.

ISSUE: whether or not a trial judge can take judicial notice of the fact that a certain public street is
located in a certain city or political division of the Philippine Islands.

RULING: Yes, Courts of justice are bound to take judicial notice of the territorial extent of
their jurisdiction. Courts may take judicial notice that a certain city has been surveyed into
lots, blocks and streets and judicial notice may be taken of such divisions.

Under Section 275 of the Code of Procedure in Civil Actions (Act No. 190) provides:

"Matters judicially recognized. — The existence and territorial extent of states, and of the several islands
forming the Philippine Archipelago, their forms of government, and symbols of nationality, the laws of
nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political constitutions and
history of the United States and of the Philippine Islands, the seals of the several departments of the
Government of the United States, and of the States of the Union, and of the Philippine Islands, public and
private, and official acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of the United States and of
the Philippine Islands, the laws of nature, and the measure of time, the geographical divisions and
political history of the world, and all similar matters of public knowledge shall be judicially recognized by
the court without the introduction of proof; but the court may receive evidence upon any of the subjects in
this section stated, when it shall find it necessary for its own information, and may resort for its aid to
appropriate books, documents, or evidence."cralaw virtua1aw library
In the case of Marzon v. Udtujan, this court held, under the provisions of section 275 above quoted, that
the trial court had a right to take judicial notice of the fact that a certain municipality or barrio was within its
jurisdiction.

In the present case the question presented is whether or not the trial court had a right to take judicial
notice of the fact that a certain house, upon a certain street, was within a city in its jurisdiction. Said
section 275 provides that trial courts may take judicial notice, among other things, of the geographical
division of the state. Cities and municipalities are created by public law. Their limits are also prescribed by
public law. The streets are laid out, surveyed and established by virtue of public authority. In the present
case the complaint alleged that the crime was committed in the city of Manila. The court, in his
findings of fact "from the evidence, found that the crime was committed in the city of Manila." We are of
the opinion and so hold that the lower court was authorized, under the provisions of section 275, to take
judicial notice of the fact that the house located at No. 717 Calle Sacristia, was located within the city of
Manila.

We believe, considering the ample provisions of said section 275 and the jurisprudence already
established by reputable courts, that we have authority for holding that the lower court committed no error
in taking judicial notice of the fact that the place where the crime was committed was within its jurisdiction .
Therefore the sentence of the lower court is hereby affirmed, with costs. So ordered.

G.R. Nos. 173148               April 6, 2015

ELSA DEGAYO, Petitioner, vs.
CECILIA MAGBANUA-DINGLASAN, JOHNNY DINGLASAN, ASUNCION MAGBANUA-PORRAS,
MARIANO P ASCUALITO and AMADO JR., all surnamed MAGBANUA, Respondents.

Records show that Lot in the Cadastral Survey of Dingle, Iloilo registered in the name of Degayo’s
deceased parents, spouses Marcelo Olmo and Rosalia Labana. Lot used to be bounded on the southwest
by the Jalaud River that serves to separate Dingle from Pototan Iloilo.On the other side of Jalaud
River, opposite Lot collectively owned by the respondent. Sometime in the 1970’s the Jalauad River
steadily changed its course leaving its old riverbed dry. Eventually, the course of the Jalaud River
encroached on Lot No. 7328. As a result, Lot No. 7328 progressively decreased in size while the banks
adjacent to Lot No. 861 gradually increased in land area. Degayo and the tenants believed that the area
was an accretion to Lot No. 861. As a result, her tenants, commenced cultivating and tilling that disputed
area with corn and tobacco. The respondents, on the other hand, argued that the disputed property was
an abandoned riverbed, which should rightfully belong to them to compensate for the erstwhile portion
of Lot No. 7328, over which the Jalaud River presently runs.

the respondents filed a complaint for ownership and damages against the tenants, as Civil Case No.
16047. Degayo initiated the present suit against the respondents for declaration of ownership with
damages as Civil Case No. 18328, involving the disputed parcel of land.

In her complaint, Degayo alleged to have acquired Lot No. 861 by inheritance by virtue of a Quitclaim
Deed and that she had been in possession of that land since 1954. She likewise stressed that the area in
dispute was an accretion to Lot No. 861. Meanwhile, notwithstanding the previous denial of her motion to
intervene in Civil Case No. 16047, Degayo was able to participate in the proceedings therein as a witness
for the defense.

RTC: rendered its decision in Civil Case No. 16047, in favor of the respondents. Meanwhile, in Civil Case
No. 18328, the court, a quo, found in favor of Degayo and declared the property in question as an
accretion to Lot No. 861.
CA: granted the respondents’ appeal and reversed and set aside the decision in Civil Case No. 18328.
noted that the disputed properties are abandoned riverbeds. Being abandoned riverbeds, the property
in question rightfully belongs to the respondents as the owners of the land now occupied by the Jalaud
River.5 The CA likewise noted that the previous RTC decision in Civil Case No. 16047 is conclusive to
the title of the thing, being an aspect of the rule on conclusiveness of judgment.6

ISSUE: . The CA erred in taking judicial notice of the RTC decision in Civil Case No. 16047, which
was not even presented during the hearing of the present case;

RULING: No. SC agree with the uniform view of the CA – on the application of conclusiveness of
judgment to the present case. The CA may take judicial notice of Civil Case No. 16047.

The taking of judicial notice is a matter of expediency and convenience for it fulfills the purpose that the
evidence is intended to achieve, and in this sense, it is equivalent to proof.36 Generally, courts are not
authorized to "take judicial notice of the contents of the records of “other cases” even when said
cases have been tried or are pending in the same court or before the same judge.37 " However, this
rule is not absolute. There are exceptions to this rule. In the case of Tiburcio v PHHC,38 this Court, citing
Justice Moran, stated:

"In some instance, courts have taken judicial notice of proceedings in other causes, because of their
close connection with the matter in the controversy.Courts have also taken judicial notice of previous
cases to determine whether or not the case pending is a moot one or whether or not a previous ruling is
applicable in the case under consideration."

In present case, Degayo’s objection to the action of CA on this matter is merely technical because
Degayo herself repeatedly referred to the Civil Case No. 16047 in her pleadings in Civil Case No.
18328and even in her appellee’s brief before the CA and her petition for review before this Court . In
particular, in her complaint, she stated that her motion to intervene in Civil Case No. 16047, which was
denied by the Court.39 The existence of that case was likewise jointly stipulated by that parties in Civil
Case No. 1832840 and mentioned by the court a quoin its decision.41 In her appellee’s brief as well,
Degayo expressly referred to Civil Case No. 16047. In particular, she stated:

 "The said Civil Case No. 16047 was for recovery of ownership and possession with damages
over the property subject of the instant case filed by the herein defendants-appellants against [the
tenants]"

 She also referred to the decision in Civil Case No. 16047 in her appellee’s brief. She mentioned:
"In Civil Case No. 16047, the Court had ordered the deposit of 50% of the net produce of the
disputed portion that pertains to the owner, thus depriving the plaintiff of her share of not less
than Php 4,000.00 a year starting 1986, to the damage of plaintiff."

There was thus no denial of the existence and the decision in Civil Case No. 16047.1âwphi1 In fact,
Degayo stated on record her full knowledge of Civil Case No. 16047 and clearly and frequently referred to
it in her pleadings, and sufficiently designated it by name, parties, cause of action and docket number
from the court a quo, to the CA and even before this Court. Under the circumstances, the CA could
certainly take judicial notice of the finality of a judgment in Civil Case No. 16047. There was no sense in
relitigating issues that have already been passed upon in a previous civil case . That was all that
was done by the CA in decreeing the dismissal. Certainly such an order is not contrary to law. As we aptly
stated in Republic v. CA,42 citing Justice Edgardo L. Paras:

"A court will take judicial notice of its own acts and records in the same case, of facts established in
prior proceedings in the same case, of the authenticity of its own records of another case between the
same parties, of the files of related cases in the same court, and of public records on file in the same
court. In addition judicial notice will be taken of the record, pleadings or judgment of a case in another
court between the same parties or involving one of the same parties, as well as of the record of
another case between different parties in the same court. "

Lastly, there is another equally compelling consideration. Degayo undoubtedly had recourse to a remedy
which under the law then in force could be availed of, which is to file a petition for certiorari with the
CA. It would have served the cause of justice better, not to mention the avoidance of needless expense
on her part and the vexation to which the respondents were subjected if she did reflect a little more on the
matter.

With the conclusion that Civil Case No. 16047 constitutes resjudicata on the present case, we see no
reason to engage in a discussion on the factual issues raised by the petitioner for they have been passed
upon and considered in Civil Case No. 16047.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition for lack of merit. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 221029

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner vs
MARELYN TANEDO MANALO, Respondent

That petitioner is previously married in the Philippines to a Japanese national named YOSHINO MINORO
That recently, a case for divorce was filed by herein [petitioner] in Japan and a divorce decree was
rendered by the Japanese Court. That at present, by virtue of the said divorce decree, petitioner and her
divorce Japanese husband are no longer living together. That there is an imperative need to have the
entry of marriage in Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila cancelled, in order that it would not appear
anymore that petitioner is still married to the said Japanese national. That this petition is filed principally
for the purpose of causing the cancellation of entry of the marriage between the petitioner and the said
Japanese national, which marriage was already dissolved by virtue of the divorce decree; [and]

During the initial hearing, counsel for Manalo marked the documentary evidence (consisting of the trial
courts Order, affidavit of publication, and issues of the Northern Journal) for purposes of compliance with
the jurisdictional requirements. The OSG did not present any controverting evidence to rebut the
allegations of Manalo.

(RTC), however, denied the petition for lack of merit. It opined that, based on Article 15 of the New Civil
Code, the Philippine law “does not afford Filipinos the right to file for a divorce, whether they are in the
country or living abroad, if they are married to Filipinos or to foreigners, or if they celebrated their
marriage in the Philippines or in another country”.

(CA) overturned the RTC decision. It held that Article 26 of the Family Code is applicable even if it was
Manalo who filed for divorce against her Japanese husband because the decree they obtained makes
the latter no longer married to the former, capacitating him to remarry.
ISSUE: Whether or not the divorce decree abroad obtained by the Filipino spouse be recognized and
enforced in the Philippines?

RULING: Yes a Filipino may initiate divorce against a foreign spouse, There is no real and substantial
difference between a Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceedings and a Filipino who obtained a
divorce decree upon the instance of his or her alien spouse. In the eyes of the Philippine and foreign
laws, both are considered as Filipinos who have the same rights and obligations in a alien land. However
in this case, Marelyn's case was still remanded to the RTC to allow Marelyn to present evidence as proof
of the relevant Japanese law on divorce.

Jurisprudence has set guidelines before the Philippine courts recognize a foreign judgment relating to the
status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of foreign country. Presentation solely of the
divorce decree will not suffice.89 The fact of divorce must still first be proven.90 Before a a foreign divorce
decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.91

Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the document must first be presented
and admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. The decree
purports to be written act or record of an act of an official body or tribunal of foreign country.

Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven as a
public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof
attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the
Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or
consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the
record is kept and (b)authenticated by the seal of his office.92

In granting Manalo's petition, the CA noted:

In this case, Petitioner was able to submit before the court a quo the 1) Decision of the Japanese Court
allowing the divorce; 2) the Authentication/Certificate issued by the Philippines Consulate General in
Osaka, Japan of the Decree of Divorce; and 3) Acceptance of Certificate of Divorce byu the Petitioner and
the Japanese national. Under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48 (b) of the
Rules of Court, these documents sufficiently prove the subject Divorce Decree as a fact. Thus, We are
constrained to recognize the Japanese Court's judgment decreeing the divorce.93

If the opposing party fails to properly object, as in this case, the divorce decree is rendered admissible a a
written act of the foreign court.94 As it appears, the existence of the divorce decree was not denied by
the OSG; neither was the jurisdiction of the divorce court impeached nor the validity of its proceedings
challenged on the ground of collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of fact or law, albeit an opportunity to do
so.95

Nonetheless, the Japanese law on divorce must still be proved. x x x The burden of proof lies with the
"party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action

It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other
facts, they must alleged and proved. x x x The power of judicial notice must be exercise d with caution,
and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the negative.96

Since the divorce was raised by Manalo, the burden of proving the pertinent Japanese law validating it, as
well as her former husband's capacity to remarry, fall squarely upon her. Japanese laws on persons and
family relations are not among those matters that Filipino judges are supposed to know by reason of their
judicial function.

If We disallow a Filipino citizen who initiated and obtained a foreign divorce from the coverage of
Paragraph 2 Article 26 and still require him or her to first avail of the existing "mechanisms" under the
Family Code, any subsequent relationship that he or she would enter in the meantime shall be
considered as illicit in the eyes of the Philippine law.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The September 18, 2014 Decision and
October 12, 2015 Resolution if the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV. No. 100076, are AFFIRMED IN
PART. The case is REMANDED to the court of origin for further proceedings and reception of evidence
as to the relevant Japanese law on divorce.

SO ORDERED

G.R. No. 152392             May 26, 2005

EXPERTRAVEL & TOURS, INC., petitioner, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and KOREAN AIRLINES, respondent.

Korean Airlines (KAL) through Atty. Aguinaldo, filed a Complaint2 against ETI with the (RTC), for the
collection of the money. The verification and certification against forum shopping was signed by Atty.
Aguinaldo, who indicated therein that he was the resident agent and legal counsel of KAL and had
caused the preparation of the complaint.

ETI filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that Atty. Aguinaldo was not authorized to execute the
verification and certificate of non-forum shopping . KAL opposed the motion, contending that Atty.
Aguinaldo was its resident agent and was registered as such with the (SEC) as required by the
Corporation Code of the Philippines. It was further alleged that Atty. Aguinaldo was also the corporate
secretary of KAL. Appended to the said opposition was the identification card of Atty. Aguinaldo, showing
that he was the lawyer of KAL.

During the hearing, Atty. Aguinaldo claimed that he had been authorized to file the complaint through a
resolution Upon his motion, KAL was given a period of 10 days within which to submit a copy of the said
resolution. The trial court granted the motion. Atty. Aguinaldo subsequently filed other similar motions,
which the trial court granted.

Finally, KAL submitted an Affidavit, it was averred that in that same teleconference, the board of directors
approved a resolution authorizing Atty. Aguinaldo to execute the certificate of non-forum shopping
and to file the complaint. Suk Kyoo Kim also alleged, however, that the corporation had no written copy
of the aforesaid resolution.
RTC: denying the motion to dismiss, giving credence to the claims of Atty. Aguinaldo and Suk Kyoo Kim
that the KAL Board of Directors indeed conducted a teleconference during which it approved a resolution

ETI filed a MR of the Order, contending that it was inappropriate for the court to take judicial notice of the
said teleconference without any prior hearing.

CA: dismissing the petition, ruling that the verification and certificate of non-forum shopping executed by
Atty. Aguinaldo was sufficient compliance with the Rules of Court. Atty. Aguinaldo had been duly
authorized by the board resolution and was the resident agent of KAL. As such, the RTC could not be
faulted for taking judicial notice of the said teleconference of the KAL Board of Directors.

ISSUE: DID CA DEPART FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL
PROCEEDINGS WHEN IT RENDERED ITS QUESTIONED DECISION AND WHEN IT ISSUED ITS
QUESTIONED RESOLUTION, ANNEXES A AND B OF THE INSTANT PETITION?7

RULING: Yes,

Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the matter must be one of
common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or
uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The principal
guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can
be said that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records and facts of general notoriety.
[15] Moreover, a judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to a reasonable dispute in that it is either:
(1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court; or (2) capable of accurate and ready
determination by resorting to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questionable.16

Things of "common knowledge," of which courts take judicial matters coming to the knowledge of men
generally in the course of the ordinary experiences of life, or they may be matters which are generally
accepted by mankind as true and are capable of ready and unquestioned demonstration. Thus, facts
which are universally known, and which may be found in encyclopedias, dictionaries or other publications,
are judicially noticed, provided, they are of such universal notoriety and so generally understood that they
may be regarded as forming part of the common knowledge of every person. As the common knowledge
of man ranges far and wide, a wide variety of particular facts have been judicially noticed as being
matters of common knowledge. But a court cannot take judicial notice of any fact which, in part, is
dependent on the existence or non-existence of a fact of which the court has no constructive
knowledge.17

In this age of modern technology, the courts may take judicial notice that business transactions may be
made by individuals through teleconferencing. Teleconferencing is interactive group communication
(three or more people in two or more locations) through an electronic medium. In general terms,
teleconferencing can bring people together under one roof even though they are separated by hundreds
of miles.18 This type of group communication may be used in a number of ways, and have three basic
types: (1) video conferencing - television-like communication augmented with sound; (2) computer
conferencing - printed communication through keyboard terminals, and (3) audio-conferencing-verbal
communication via the telephone with optional capacity for telewriting or telecopying.19

Indeed, teleconferencing can only facilitate the linking of people; it does not alter the complexity of group
communication. Although it may be easier to communicate via teleconferencing, it may also be easier to
miscommunicate. Teleconferencing cannot satisfy the individual needs of every type of meeting.23

In the Philippines, the Court agrees with the RTC that persons in the Philippines may have a
teleconference with a group of persons in South Korea relating to business transactions or corporate
governance.
Even given the possibility that Atty. Aguinaldo and Suk Kyoo Kim participated in a teleconference along
with the respondent’s Board of Directors, the Court is not convinced that one was conducted; even if there
had been one, the Court is not inclined to believe that a board resolution was duly passed specifically
authorizing Atty. Aguinaldo to file the complaint and execute the required certification against forum
shopping.

In this case, Suk Kyoo Kim declared that the respondent "do[es] not keep a written copy of the aforesaid
Resolution" because no records of board resolutions approved during teleconferences were kept.
This belied the respondent’s earlier allegation in its February 10, 2000 motion for extension of time to
submit the questioned resolution that it was in the custody of its main office in Korea. The respondent
gave the trial court the impression that it needed time to secure a copy of the resolution kept in Korea,
only to allege later (via the affidavit of Suk Kyoo Kim) that it had no such written copy. Moreover, Suk
Kyoo Kim stated in his affidavit that the resolution was embodied in the Secretary’s/Resident Agent’s
Certificate signed by Atty. Aguinaldo. However, no such resolution was appended to the said certificate.

The respondent’s allegation that its board of directors conducted a teleconference on June 25, 1999 and
approved the said resolution (with Atty. Aguinaldo in attendance) is incredible, given the additional fact
that no such allegation was made in the complaint. If the resolution had indeed been approved on June
25, 1999, long before the complaint was filed, the respondent should have incorporated it in its complaint,
or at least appended a copy thereof. The respondent failed to do so. It was only on January 28, 2000 that
the respondent claimed, for the first time, that there was such a meeting of the Board of Directors held on
June 25, 1999; it even represented to the Court that a copy of its resolution was with its main office in
Korea, only to allege later that no written copy existed. It was only on March 6, 2000 that the respondent
alleged, for the first time, that the meeting of the Board of Directors where the resolution was approved
was held via teleconference.

Worse still, it appears that as early as January 10, 1999, Atty. Aguinaldo had signed a
Secretary’s/Resident Agent’s Certificate alleging that the board of directors held a teleconference on
June 25, 1999. No such certificate was appended to the complaint, which was filed on September 6,
1999. More importantly, the respondent did not explain why the said certificate was signed by Atty.
Aguinaldo as early as January 9, 1999, and yet was notarized one year later (on January 10, 2000); it
also did not explain its failure to append the said certificate to the complaint, as well as to its Compliance
dated March 6, 2000. It was only on January 26, 2001 when the respondent filed its comment in the CA
that it submitted the Secretary’s/Resident Agent’s Certificate30 dated January 10, 2000.

The Court is, thus, more inclined to believe that the alleged teleconference on June 25, 1999 never took
place, and that the resolution allegedly approved by the respondent’s Board of Directors during the said
teleconference was a mere concoction purposefully foisted on the RTC, the CA and this Court, to avert
the dismissal of its complaint against the petitioner.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 61000 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of Manila is hereby
ORDERED to dismiss, without prejudice, the complaint of the respondent.

SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 148786 December 16, 2004
ROGER MANZANO, petitioner, vs.
LUZ DESPABILADERAS, respondent.

respondent Luz Despabiladeras obtained on credit from petitioner Roger Manzano various construction
materials which she used in her construction project at the Camarines Sur Polytechnic Colleges (CSPC).
By petitioner’s claim, he delivered to respondent a total of P307,140.50 worth of construction materials
payable upon respondent’s initial collection from CSPC Respondent having paid the amount of only
P130,000.00 exclusive of interest, despite receipt of payments from CSPC, petitioner filed a complaint
against her for sum of money with damages.

TC:Considering that the defendant, up to this time ha[s] not answered under oath the request for
admission, as prayed for by the counsel for the plaintiff, the facts requested to be admitted are hereby
confirmed.

The plaintiff then presented the last witness, Ederlinda K. Manzano, whose direct testimony was
completed. x x x After the testimony of the witness, the counsel for the plaintiff formally offered Exhibits A
to E and submarkings which were all admitted.

At the reception of evidence for the defense, respondent offered documentary evidence including two
cleared checks payable to petitioner, , the receipt of the checks was admitted but it was claimed that they
represented payment for previous accounts, not for respondent’s account subject of the present case.

TC: In favor of petitioner

  Despite receipt of said request for admission, defendant did not answer the same, under
oath, consequently, defendant is deemed to have admitted that plaintiff delivered to her
and she received the goods delivered with the total value of P314,610.50 and that of the
said total amount, she has paid only P130,000.00.

 There is no more need for the Court to examine and discuss the evidence submitted by
the plaintiff to prove the account of defendant because what has been admitted need not
be proved. On the other hand, the evidence submitted by defendant which are intended
to impress upon the Court that aside from P130,000.00, she paid on September 20,
1989, she made other payments, and that her total unpaid balance is not the amount
being demanded by plaintiff, have to be ignored by the court, without even ruling on their
credibility, because of her aforesaid admission that her total account is P314,610.50 and
out of which, she has paid only P130,000.00. Admission made by the parties in the
pleadings, or in the course of the trial or other proceedings do not require proof and
cannot be contradicted unless previously shown to have been made through palpable
mistake (Yu v. Magpayo, 44 SCRA 163). There is no showing in this case of such fact.

CA: set aside that of the trial court and dismissed petitioner’s complaint.

 If at all there was failure by the appellant to file a sworn statement denying the request for
admission, it was precisely because of the agreement by the parties during the pre-trial period
that the appellant would only file a comment, which she did by submitting a list of items, either
admitting receipt of construction materials or denying receipt thereof. Necessarily, the appellant
could not have impliedly admitted the facts mentioned in the request for admission. The Court
even required the appellee to present evidence on the "matters" mentioned in the request for
admission, or on the issue concerning payment and the balance of the indebtedness. Aside from
that, the appellee was even allowed to present evidence on rebuttal. This is not to mention the
fact that documents showing payments, other than the P130,000.00, were admitted by the Court.
If indeed the unpaid balance was admitted, supposedly because of denial of the request for
admission, then, necessarily the appellant should have been prevented by the Court from
presenting evidence contradicting such admissions.

ISSUE: What is the legal consequence when a request for admission of material and relevant
facts pursuant to Rule 26 is not answered under oath within the period stated in the Rules by a
party litigant served therefore?

RULING:

Rule 26 of the Rules of Court provides that at any time after issues have been joined, a party may serve
upon any other party a written request for the admission by the latter of the genuineness of relevant
documents described in and exhibited with the request or of the truth of any material and relevant matters
of fact set forth in the request.

The agreement of the parties during the pre-trial conference as reflected in the pre-trial order of even
date, was that "the [petitioner] shall submit an offer to stipulate showing an itemized list of
construction materials delivered to the [respondent] together with the cost claimed by the
[petitioner] within fifteen (15) days[,] furnishing copy thereof to the [respondent] who will state her
objections if any, or comment there[o]n within the same period of time." In substantial compliance
with said agreement, petitioner chose to instead file a request for admission, a remedy afforded by a party
under Rule 26.

The above-quoted Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 26 should not be disregarded, as in fact the trial court did not,
when it ordered respondent to file comment thereon, just because the parties mutually agreed that
petitioner submit "an offer to stipulate."
For, as stated earlier, the request for admission is a remedy afforded any party after the issues had been
joined.

In present case, Respondent having failed to discharge what is incumbent upon her under Rule 26, that
is, to deny under oath the facts bearing on the main issue contained in the "Request for Admission," she
was deemed to have admitted that she received the construction materials, the cost of which was
indicated in the request and was indebted to petitioner in the amount of P184,610.50 (P314,610.50 less
the partial payment of P130,000.00). During the trial, however, petitioner admitted that aside from the
P130,000.00 partial payment, he had received a total of P122,000.00 (P97,000.00 plus P25,000.00).
Respondent thus had a remaining balance of P62,610.50.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. RTC is hereby REINSTATED with the MODIFICATION
that respondent Luz Despabiladeras is hereby ordered to pay petitioner Roger Manzano the amount of
P62,610.50 plus interest at the legal rate (12% per annum) from the filing of the complaint up to the time
of actual payment, and that the award of attorney’s fees is deleted