1

Solutions to Atrocity: Probable Solutions to Human Rights Abuses in Venezuela

William D. Patterson

First Colonial High School

Legal Studies Academy

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Abstract

The present report seeks to summarize past examples and trends of human rights abuses and

other deleterious acts perpetrated by officials and conspirators of the Venezuelan government.

With the major strides the fact-finding mission commissioned by the United Nations Human

Rights Committee has taken in finding and documenting evidence and testimonies, further action

using the information is required. After analyzing paths to accountability for the acts,

international courts present a possible and probable solution. Given the egregiousness of the acts

committed, action is needed promptly, opening the door for more study into the effectiveness,

timeline, and best practices of solutions for accountability.

Keywords: Venezuela, Bolivarian Revolution, human rights abuses

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Solutions To Atrocity: Probable Solutions to Human Rights Abuses in Venezuela

“Whatever you believe, there is a common link between us, and it is humanity's most

fundamental agreement: Human rights. Even if you are convinced that I am a [_________], I still

have human rights” (Carvajal, 2021). These are the translated words of Hugo Carvajal,

ex-director of Venezuela’s military intelligence agency from 2004 to 2011 under revolutionary

leader and then-president Hugo Chávez (Hugo Armando, 2020). In the blank, Carvajal (2021)

said “narcoterrorist,” referring to the United States federal indictments against him and many

others on charges of drug smuggling, money laundering, arms deals, and more. However, that

same statement could be used by any of the thousands of Venezuelans killed in the extrajudicial

executions, tortured in unlawful detainments, or persecuted in the political repression by the

current regime under Nicolas Maduro. International courts such as the International Criminal

Court and the International Court of Justice present viable opportunities for the international

community to restore rule of law in Venezuela and hold individuals accountable for violations of

human rights and the corruption of governmental bodies.

History and Context

Simón Bolívar, known as El Libertador, the Liberator, for his military triumphs

liberating Venezuela and other South American countries from Spanish rule in the 1800s, is still

highly renowned and influential in Venezuelan society (Straussmann, 2021). The national

currency, the Bolívar, is named after him (Britannica, 2019). Recently, President Maduro, on the

anniversary of Bolívar’s death, tweeted, “Today Bolívar continues to ride with strength and

greatness” (Maduro, 2021). A product of enlightenment thought, Bolívar was a champion of the
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will of the people, freedom, and democracy in an educated society while heavily noting the need

for a strong executive to maintain order (Fedirka, 2016).

Through the 20th century, Venezuela’s economy became heavily dependent on oil. So

much so that when oil prices fell in the 1980s, inflation surged as the economy contracted, and

the government took on loads of debt. This combination led to unsatisfactory economic

conditions, prompting an itch for political change (Cheatham & Cara Labrador, 2021).

In the 1990s when Hugo Chávez, at the time a prominent military leader, wanted to create

a powerful, populist government, he termed it the Bolivarian Revolution because it embodied the

principles of Bolívar (Trinkunas, n.d.). Chávez promoted Bolivarianism, an egalitarian, socialist,

nationalist, anti-imperialist belief system that used the government to change society. After a

failed coup in 1992, Chávez was able to take power in 1999 as a duly elected president. That

year, with Chávez calling to eliminate corruption and use the nationalized oil revenue for social

programs, a new constitution was drafted that expanded the powers of the presidency. After his

political party in the legislature granted him the ability to enact laws by decree, he used this

power to enact elements of his version of Bolivarianism: Chavismo (Nelson, 2021).

After a widespread, months-long strike, 19,000 employees of the state-owned oil

company were fired and replaced with people more loyal to the government. This drain of

experience, along with a 2007 expropriation of select foreign-owned oil assets, is credited with

precipitating the downfall of the Venezuelan oil industry (Rapier, 2017).

When Chávez succumbed to his cancer in 2013, then-Vice President and former Foreign

Minister and National Assembly (national legislature) President, Nicolas Maduro became

president of Venezuela (Wallenfeldt, 2021).

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Factual Account

Acts against Foreign Countries

Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of

Colombia, FARC) is an organization born out of a period of intense fighting and bloodshed

between political parties in Colombia in the mid-1900s. The Colombian Communist Party

formed an irregular army, FARC, to defend itself. Over time it morphed into a large cocaine

smuggling operation backed by an irregular army. In 2016, FARC reached a peace deal with the

Colombian government after decades of attempts. Loads of weapons were destroyed and FARC

leaders gained seats in the Colombian legislature. However, leaders have since rejected the peace

deal and made their own smaller revivals of FARC (Insight Crime, 2013).

The Cartel de los Soles (Cartel of the Suns) is the Venezuelan partner of guerillas. It is

not one group with a set command structure because it describes multiple cabals of members of

the Venezuelan military. The term was first used in the 1990s before the Bolivarian Revolution

when national guard members extorted money from drug traffickers to “look the other way.”

Under the Chávez regime in the 2000s, security forces started personally handling cocaine

shipments (Insight Crime, 2021a).

In 2020, the United States Department of Justice (2020) indicted fifteen individuals,

including Nicolás Maduro. In the press statements, U.S. Attorney Geoffrey S. Berman stated,

“Today we announce criminal charges against Nicolás Maduro Moros for running, together with

his top lieutenants, a narco-terrorism partnership with the FARC for the past 20 years.” While

this is only an indictment, therefore, they are innocent until proven guilty, the DOJ alleges that

“Maduro and the other defendants expressly intended to flood the United States with cocaine in
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order to undermine the health and wellbeing of our nation. Maduro very deliberately deployed

cocaine as a weapon” (Justice Department, 2020).

The indictment itself alleges that family members of Maduro made agreements with DEA

confidential sources to send “cocaine shipments from [Maduro’s] ‘presidential hangar’ at the

Maiquetía Airport.” The relatives also explained how they were engaged in a “‘war’ with the

United States, described the Cártel de los Soles, discussed a connection to a commander for the

FARC’ … and stated that ‘what we want is for him to take control again of the … National

Assembly’” (United States of America v. Nicolás Maduro Moros, n.d.).

The indictment also alleges offenses by Diosdado Cabello Rondon, an extremely

prominent Venezuelan politician loyal to Chávez and Maduro; Hugo Carvajal Barrios, source of

the introductory quote on human rights and former Venezuelan military intelligence director; and

a former Venezuelan military general. Allegedly, the Venezuelans coordinated cocaine shipments

through Venezuela, accepted bribes from FARC members, and assisted in money laundering

operations. Chávez directed funds from the state oil company to support FARC with cash and

weapons. According to the indictment, Maduro personally met with Iván Marquez to have an

armed militia trained in exchange for weapons (United States of America v. Nicolás Maduro

Moros, n.d.).

Also listed on the indictment are Luciano Marín Arango and Seuxis Paucis Hernández

Solarte (United States of America v. Nicolás Maduro Moros, n.d.). These two are more

commonly referred to as Ivan Márquez and Jesús Santrich restively. Along with Hernán Darío

Velásquez known as El Paisa (the peasant) and Henry Castellanos Garzón known as Romaña,

these formerly strong leaders of FARC banded together in 2019 to form a FARC dissident group
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named Segunda Marquetalia (InSight Crime, 2021b). Of the four leaders, only Ivan Marquez

remains alive today. Jesús Santrich, listed on the indictment, was killed while in Venezuela when

his convoy was attacked in May 2021 (Jesús Santrich, 2021). The two not indicted were killed in

Venezuela on the same day in separate incidents in December 2021 (Diego Posada & Garcia,

2021).

It is not surprising that these leaders were in Venezuela at the time of their death because

Maduro publicly invited them. In early 2019 before the creation of Segunda Marquetalia was

announced, Maduro attended a “gathering of regional leftist politicians,” including the Cuban

president. Maduro said the two “leaders of peace,” Ivan Marquez and Santrich, “are welcome in

Venezuela” and he was “left waiting” after “[the Colombian President] announced that Ivan

Marquez and Jesus Santrich were coming” (Reuters Staff, 2019).

Acts against the Country

One way the country of Venezuela has been harmed is the corrupt, kleptocratic nature of

its government. One of the most striking cases is Alejandro Andrade. He served as Chávez’s

Minister of Finance which allowed him to arrange currency exchange operations performed on

behalf of the government. By selecting people close to him to perform the exchanges at very

favorable rates in return for bribes, he amassed over $1 billion. He has pleaded guilty to this in

US Federal District Court (Department of Justice, 2018). The currency exchange scheme allowed

certain groups to buy dollars with bolivars at the official exchange rate. Those dollars could be

sold throughout the country for the illegal market rate, much higher than the official exchange

rate. To access this preferential rate, conspirators paid Andrade (Alejandro Andrade, 2018).
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Another example is Alex Saab, a Colombian businessman and Venezuelan envoy. He is

currently due for trial in US District Court for extracting more than $350 million from

Venezuela. Part of this was for unfulfilled contracts to build houses in Venezuela as well as

participating in the preferential currency exchange scheme (Insight Crime, 2021d). When

stopping to refuel his jet in the island nation Cape Verde off of Africa, he was detained for US

extradition. At the time, he was on his way to Iran supposedly for negotiations on behalf of the

Venezuelan government. Because of this, the extradition has been very controversial. Maduro

suspended negotiations with opposition parties and revoked the house arrest status of six

American oil executives in Venezuela in response to the extradition of Saab (Armas & Buitrago,

2021). Because this situation worsened ties between the United States and Maduro regime, it also

sank any chance for efficient, bilateral change with Maduro’s party and the U.S. backed

opposition parties.

In 2016, the Venezuelan National Assembly, at the time under the control of opposition

parties, commissioned a report into corruption in PDVSA, the company that controls oil

operations within Venezuela. The commission found $11 billion missing from 11 cases of corrupt

practices between 2004-2014 with six cases pending investigation (Ulmer, 2016). The total

amount of money stolen from Venezuela has been estimated to be hundreds of billions of dollars.

Two former ministers under the Chávez regime suspect $300 billion was stolen from Venezuela

during Chavez’s rule through the preferential currency exchange (Chinea & Pons, 2016). A

policy brief from the Dialogue (2020) told that the National Assembly, in 2017, documented

proof of $87 billion “misappropriated funds.” In 2018, the leader of a legislature commission

“estimated that the cost of corruption over a 20-year span was between $350 billion and $400
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billion.” A 2016 estimate by the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project pegged the

amount stolen under the Maduro regime at $70 billion annually. Losses specifically from 2002 to

2015 were estimated to be $120 billion by the former chair of the board of Transparency

International. To put these numbers into perspective, “between 1999 to 2017, PDVSA produced

more than $1 trillion worth of oil” (Inter-American Dialogue, 2020, pp. 9-10).

In order to act as they wish, the Chavismo politicians have developed a very strong hold

on the government by taking over anything that poses a threat. First came the subjugation of the

judicial system. The US indictment against Maduro alleges that in 2005, “Chavez instructed

[Maduro], who was then a member of the Venezuelan National Assembly, and others, that

Venezuelan judges who would not protect the FARC and its activities should be removed from

their positions” (United States of America v. Nicolás Maduro Moros, n.d.). This allegation is in

line with the findings of the United Nations Human Rights Council’s Fact-Finding Missions on

Venezuela. According to the chairperson of the mission in a 2021 press release, “the Mission has

reasonable grounds to believe that instead of providing protection to victims of human rights

violations and crimes, the Venezuelan justice system has played a significant role in the State’s

repression of Governmental crimes” (United Nations, 2021). The United Nations Human Rights

Committee (2021) report details that in 2015 when the ruling party lost control of the National

Assembly, 32 justices were appointed to the Supreme Tribunal of Justice (comparable to the US

Supreme Court), 29 of which were very closely tied to the ruling party. Before the new justices

were appointed, 13 old justices resigned after being pressured by the Chief Justice, Maikel

Moreno. This is significant because the Supreme Tribunal is the heart of the judicial system. The

Supreme Tribunal appoints all lower judges. The 1999 Constitution put forth a fair “competitive
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process” to appoint judges. However, that has not happened since 2003. The Supreme Tribunal

instead appoints provisional judges that can be appointed and removed easily. Outside of the

proscribed methods for the punishment of judges, many have reported “pressure to resign” or

received “threats of dismissal.” Prosecutors are hired in the same way judges are appointed

provisionally so they can be removed and replaced. When the mission’s report was prepared,

“nearly all public prosecutors working in Venezuela … were provisional” (United Nations

Human Rights Committee, 2021).

Not only can the judicial system workers be replaced with ease to ensure a proper

workforce for the regime, but the mission also found evidence that “judicial and prosecutorial

actors at all levels … experienced or witnessed external interference and/or received instructions

about how to decide certain cases...” (United Nations Human Rights Committee, 2021, p. 4) The

instructions came from the executive branch through three avenues, direct meetings with

executive officials, notes couriered to specific justices, or public statements that were at times

summarized and delivered to justices. Judges and actors lower in the justice system food chain

received instructions from above, usually originating in the Supreme Tribunal. The influence of

the executive branch reached as far as pre-drafted decisions that justices signed without input

(United Nations Human Rights Committee, 2021). The subjugation of the judicial system has

allowed the government to operate unchecked which has led to numerous violations of human

rights (United Nations, 2021).

Acts against International Law

Another previous report from the same UNHRC Fact-Finding Mission on Venezuela

detailed the specific human rights violations that “took place amid a gradual breakdown of
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democratic institutions and the rule of law in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela since 2014”

(United Nations Human Rights Committee, 2020, p. 3). First, as a reaction to the opposition

parties winning a supermajority in the National Assembly, the Supreme Tribunal voided all laws

passed or potentially passed by the National Assembly. Then, Maduro convened the National

Constituent Assembly under the guise of revamping the Constitution, but merely “acted as a de

facto legislative branch, supplanting the functions of the National Assembly” (United Nations

Human Rights Committee, 2020, p. 3).

According to the mission, the most likely victims of human rights violations are

“government critics with high public profiles” or those who “represented a perceived threat.”

Anyone from government officials to journalists to people on the internet who brought doubt

onto the narrative of the regime was a potential target for intelligence agencies (United Nations

Human Rights Committee, 2020, p. 4).

From the cases reviewed by the mission, it found “reasonable grounds to believe”

intelligence agencies targeted people for their political acts against the regime. The Bolivarian

National Intelligence Service (SEBIN) carried out politically motivated detainment and torture.

They used the legal standard of flagrante delicto, being caught red-handed, to arrest targets

without warrants. “The mission found reasonable grounds to believe that [SEBIN] agents

tortured or subjected detainees to cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment” (United Nations

Human Rights Committee, 2020, p. 6). These acts were generally perpetrated before the arrestee

had an initial court appearance. The torture is used to obtain confessions or other information

pertinent to the investigations. Even on a deputy of the National Assembly, psychoactive drugs

were allegedly administered. The fact finding mission also found a multitude of horrid
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procedures such as: “stress positions; asphyxiation with plastic bags, chemical substances or

water; beatings; electric shocks; death threats; rape threats against either the victim and/or

relatives; psychological torture, including sensorial deprivation, constant lighting and extreme

cold; and forced nudity” (United Nations Human Rights Committee, 2020, p. 7).

Additionally, the mission reported that it found evidence to substantiate the belief that

Venezuelan security forces perpetrated arbitrary detainments and extrajudicial executions during

two large law enforcement operations. In the operations, hundreds were killed by security forces

with “resisting authority” being the most commonly used reason for the deaths. In many cases,

this explanation is contradicted by witness accounts and evidence. Even in normal security

operations separate from the two operations, the mission found enough evidence to believe that

regular security operations resulted in extrajudicial executions. (United Nations Human Rights

Committee, 2020, p. 12).

Problem and Probable Solutions

Rule of Law Crisis

A country moving from more to less democratic is called democratic backsliding. This

process has three methods of manifestation that are not mutually exclusive. Among other ways,

the first method of diminishing the liberty of the democracy can happen from unequal

applications of laws, changing the constitution in favor of the executive, circumventing the

legislature, and subjugating the judicial branch (Corrales, 2020, pp. 42-44). All of these have

happened in Venezuela, and many were observed by the UN fact finding mission. Arbitrary

detainments and torture, the National Constituent Assembly, and the general servile nature of the
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judicial branch serve as a multitude of evidence for diminishing the liberty of the once

democratic Venezuela.

The second method is harming the ability for democratic participation. Disallowing

opposition candidates from “the decision-making process” as well as clear circumvention of the

expressed will of the people demonstrate this method (Corrales, 2020, p. 44). Both can be seen

through the National Constituent Assembly. While acting as a supreme legislature to block the

opposition controlled National Assembly, the popularly elected legislature was unable to enact

the general will.

The third method pertains to the essence of a democracy. To have minimal consideration

as a democracy, a country must elect its executive and judicial branches and ensure those

elections are free and fair. Venezuela fulfills the requirement for elections, but numerous,

substantial irregularities have invalidated any claim to free and fair elections (Corrales, 2020, pp.

44, 49).

While the decline started earlier, the transformation from “a limited democracy to an

authoritarian regime” occurred under Maduro (Bull & Rosales, 2020, p. 2). The distinct lack of

the rule of law in Venezuela has interacted with two other phenomena: combating was perceived

as less of a social priority and an increased amount of militarization of security forces entrusted

with civilian protection. The open-ended mandate due to the weak social priority gave the

government the ability to target threats to the regime. This was spurred by and contributed to by

the lack of the rule of law (Galavís, 2020, pp. 67-68). By creating a cyclical and self-enforcing

system, the internal forces of Venezuela promote the continuation of the Maduro regime.
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International Court of Justice

The International Court of Justice is the United Nations body responsible for settling

disputes and resolving conflicts that arise from international treaties (The Court, n.d.). Out of all

of the possibly applicable treaties, such as the UN Convention against Corruption, International

Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, International

Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel,

Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, the last, commonly referred to as the

Convention against Torture (CAT), is of prime interest to the international community (The Core,

n.d.). The Convention against Torture and the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)

are the only two UN treaties Venezuela has ratified, are generally applicable to the rights

violations, and are subject to suits in the ICJ. With every international treaty, nations can make

reservations from certain sections that remove their participation and liability to other sections.

Venezuela has not reserved itself from the mandatory jurisdiction of the ICJ with CAT and

ICCPR (Status of Ratification, n.d.).

Between the two treaties, the Convention against Torture presents a solution to much

more grave violations of human rights and an easier path to a victorious court finding. The UN

fact-finding mission has found many detailed acts of torture that are systemic and representative

of crimes against humanity. From the UN Human Rights Committee fact-finding mission,

Venezuela has failed to prosecute for the commission of these acts and therefore could be held to

the prosecute or extradite standard handed down in Belgium v. Senegal. This is the only time the

CAT has been adjudicated in the ICJ and presents a strong precedent. Senegal was harboring the

former president of Chad who oversaw the commission of widespread crimes against humanity.
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Because he was not prosecuted, the ICJ ruled Senegal was obligated to extradite the former

president to a jurisdiction that was willing to prosecute (Questions Relating, n.d.). Since

Venezuela has not sufficiently prosecuted individuals for their suspected acts against the CAT, a

suit in the ICC is a potential route for accountability.

International Criminal Court

In November 2021, the Prosecutor for the International Criminal Court (ICC)

officially opened an investigation into human rights violations in Venezuela. This decision

follows a preliminary examination commenced in 2018. “A reasonable basis to believe” the

presence of crime against humanity was determined by the Office of the Prosecutor in 2020

(International Federation for Human Rights, 2021). As an international body, the ICC is designed

as a supplement to state justice systems, taking action when the nation does not. Under the Rome

Statute, the court covers genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and crimes of

aggression. Instead of facing charges under a treaty, individuals face charges for specific crimes.

Every individual the ICC has indicted previously has been from an African country. Seventeen

have reached the stage of detainment. Of the thirteen trials that have been completed, nine ended

in convictions (Felter, 2021).

Although the ICC has been limited to the scope of the African in the past, the present

action by the Court’s prosecutor and the wealth of evidence already available proving crimes

against humanity have been committed makes the ICC a very healthy avenue for accountability.

Because the court has secured convictions in the past and the Venezuelan case is moving along in

its progression, further action towards accountability in the ICC is not just possible but probable.
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