THEORY OF DECISIONS

TASK 3 SOLVING PROBLEMS OF OPTIMIZATION MODELS UNDER UNCERTAINTIES

PRESENTED BY:

CARLOS MARIO MARIN

GRUP:

PRESENTADO TO :

UNIVERSIDAD NACIONAL ABIERTA Y A DISTANCIA- UNAD

ESCUELA DE CIENCIAS BÁSICAS, TECNOLOGÍA E INGENIERÍA

2022
2022
ER UNCERTAINTIES

A- UNAD

GENIERÍA
 Exercise 1. Laplace, Wald or pessimistic, optimistic, Hurwicz and Savage
criteria (Profit Matrix):

IExercise 1. Laplace, Wald or pessimistic, optimistic, Hurwicz and Savage

criteria (Profit Matrix):
The directors of the Solaris travel agency want to propose an expansion strategy, so
they consider whether to merge with the Lunaris company, buy the competitor's
company, or expand their facilities. The decision will be made based on the future
evolution of sales. The Commercial Department anticipates that sales can be high,
medium or low. The estimated benefits for the next 3 years for each alternative are
shown in the following table based on the sales.

Table 1. Profit matrix

sales
Alternative
LOW HIGH MEDIUM
Merger 350 140 60
Buy 300 180 50
Expand 275 160 80

Laplace criteria

Merger 183.3333333333
The best level of profit is specified
Buy 176.6666666667 by the Merger (183,3)
Expand 171.6666666667

Wald or pessimistic

Table 1. Profit matrix

sales
Alternative
LOW HIGH MEDIUM
Merger 350 140 60
Buy 300 180 50
Expand 275 160 80
Taking into account a pessimistic attitude,
Expand 80 would be the safest medium.

Optimistic criteria

Table 1. Profit matrix

sales
Alternative
LOW HIGH MEDIUM
Merger 350 140 60
Buy 300 180 50
Expand 275 160 80

Taking into account a optimistic attitude,

Merger 350 would be the best option

Hurwicz

Table 1. Profit matrix

sales
Alternative
LOW HIGH MEDIUM
Merger 350 140 60
Buy 300 180 50
Expand 275 160 80

Being optimistic (a = 80%), one should work with the

Merger

Savage

Table 1. Profit matrix

Event
Alternative
LOW HIGH MEDIUM
Merger 105 40 20
 Buy 155 0 30
Expand 180 20 0
455 180 80

The alternative that least regret would bring us like this

as the lowest losses is Expand
z and Savage

z and Savage

ansion strategy, so
the competitor's
ased on the future
sales can be high,
ach alternative are
s.

les

est level of profit is specified

by the Merger (183,3)

les
Results
60
50
80
les
Results
350
300
275

les
Results 0,8
292.0
250
236

ent
Resultados
105
155
180
 Exercise 2. Laplace, Wald or pessimistic, optimistic, Hurwicz and Savag
criteria (Profit Matrix):
Some investors are analyzing the possibility of investing in oil wells and according to
the machinery they could drill wells of five sizes. The decision will be made based on
the future evolution of demand. The Commercial Department anticipates that demand
can be high, medium-high, medium, medium-low, or low. The estimated benefits for
the next 20 years for each alternative are shown in the following table based on the
demand.

Table 2. Cost matrix

Event
Alternative
High Medium-high Medium
oil well - size 1 1050 1100 980
oil well - size 2 930 950 760
oil well - size 3 850 790 1130
oil well - size 4 900 800 1100

Laplace criteria

oil well - size 1 1237.5 The best level of profit is specified

oil well - size 2 1105 by oil well - size 1 or oil well - size 4
oil well - size 3 1072.5 the (1237,5)
oil well - size 4 1237.5

Wald or pessimistic

Table 2. Cost matrix

Event
Alternative
High Medium-high Medium
oil well - size 1 1050 1100 980
oil well - size 2 930 950 760
oil well - size 3 850 790 1130
oil well - size 4 900 800 1100
Taking into account a pessimistic attitude, oil
well - size 2 would be the low.

Optimistic criteria

Table 2. Cost matrix

Event
Alternative
High Medium-high Medium
oil well - size 1 1050 1100 980
oil well - size 2 930 950 760
oil well - size 3 850 790 1130
oil well - size 4 900 800 1100

Taking into account a optimistic attitude,oil

well - size 4 would be the best option

Hurwicz

Table 2. Cost matrix

Event
Alternative
High Medium-high Medium
oil well - size 1 1050 1100 980
oil well - size 2 930 950 760
oil well - size 3 850 790 1130
oil well - size 4 900 800 1100

Being pessimistic (a = 30%) one should work with the

oil well - size 1

Savage

Table 2. Cost matrix

Event
Alternative
High Medium-high Medium
oil well - size 1 200 310 220
oil well - size 2 80 160 0
oil well - size 3 0 0 370
oil well - size 4 50 10 340
850 790 760

The alternative that least regret would bring us like this

as the lowest losses is oil well - size 4
cz and Savag

lls and according to

l be made based on
cipates that demand
timated benefits for
table based on the

ent
Medium- low Low
950 870
780 1000
600 920
1200 950

est level of profit is specified

well - size 1 or oil well - size 4
the (1237,5)

ent
Medium- low Low Results
950 870 1100
780 1000 1000
600 920 1130
1200 950 1200
ent
Medium- low Low Results
950 870 870
780 1000 760
600 920 600
1200 950 800

ent
Medium- low Low Results 0,3
950 870 939.0
780 1000 832.0
600 920 759.0
1200 950 920.0

ent
Medium- low Low Resultados
350 0 200
180 130 80
0 50 50
600 80 10
600 870
 Exercise 3. Laplace, Wald or pessimistic, optimistic, Hurwicz and Savage
criteria (Cost Matrix):
Viator enterprises considers four options for managing its data processing operation:
continue with its current staff, hire new staff, hire a third-party vendor to handle the
administration (known as outsourcing), or use a combination of your current staff and
an external provider. The cost of the operation depends on future demand. The annual
cost of each option (in thousands of pesos) depends on the demand as follows:

Table 3. Cost matrix

Event
Alternative
Low Low average High-average
current staff 9000 8500 7600
New staff 7800 6600 9100
outsourcing 5900 7300 8900
Current staff and outsourcing 6500 8000 7300

Laplace criteria

current staff 6180 The best level of profit is specified

New staff 6000 by the Current staff and
outsourcing 6260 outsourcing (5980)
Current staff and outsourcing 5980

Wald or pessimistic

Table 3. Cost matrix

Event
Alternative
Low Low average High-average
current staff 9000 8500 7600
New staff 7800 6600 9100
outsourcing 5900 7300 8900
Current staff and outsourcing 6500 8000 7300
 Taking into account a pessimistic attitude,
Current staff and outsourcing would be the
High.

Optimistic criteria

Table 3. Cost matrix

Event
Alternative
Low Low average High-average
current staff 9000 8500 7600
New staff 7800 6600 9100
outsourcing 5900 7300 8900
Current staff and outsourcing 6500 8000 7300

Taking into account a optimistic attitude,

current staff would be the best High

Hurwicz

Table 3. Cost matrix

Event
Alternative
Low Low average High-average
current staff 9000 8500 7600
New staff 7800 6600 9100
outsourcing 5900 7300 8900
Current staff and outsourcing 6500 8000 7300

Being pessimistic (a = 30%) one should work with the

New staff

Savage

Table 3. Cost matrix

Event
Alternative
Does not fit Fits acceptably Fits succesfully
current staff 3100 1900 300
New staff 1900 0 1800
 outsourcing 0 700 1600
Current staff and outsourcing 600 1400 0
5900 6600 7300

The alternative that least regret would bring us like this

as the lowest losses is current staff
 z and Savage

rocessing operation:
endor to handle the
our current staff and
demand. The annual
mand as follows:

ent
high
5800
6500
9200

8100

est level of profit is specified

by the Current staff and
outsourcing (5980)

ent
high Results
5800 9000
6500 9100
9200 9200
8100 8100
ent
high Results
5800 5800
6500 6500
9200 5900
8100 6500

ent
high Results 0,3
5800 6760.0
6500 7280.0
9200 6890.0
8100 6980.0

ent
Fits well Resultados
0 300
700 700
3400 700
2300 600
5800
You must find the game strategy of the players so that through game theory a fair game is carried out
according to the objective of the method, one player wins as much as the other loses and vice versa. TEORIA DE JUEGOS
Proceed to use the corresponding method according to the nature of the exercise proposed and answer
the questions. CASO 2Xn
Find the value of the game by means of the graphical method applied to
matrices 2 x n or m x 2.

Player 2
Strategy C
A B C
I 18 17 10 X1 10
Player 1
II 12 14 15 1-X1=X2 12 A
Y1 Y2 Y3

PAGO ESPERADO
18 17 15
B
Debemos encontrar un pago esperado para el jugador 1 dependiendo de la estrategia del jugador2

Estrategia Pura Retribución esperada o pago X=0 X=1

(Player 2) esperado (Player 1)
A PE_A= 18X1+12X2 18X1+12(1-X1) 6X1+12 12 18 Maximin
B PE_B= 17X1+14X2 17X1+14(1-X1) -3X1+14' 14 17
C PE_C=10X1+15X2 10X1+15(1-X1) -5X1+15 15 10 PROBABILIDAD X (ENTRE O Y 1)

The shaded region is the region where the minimum expected payments are.

The maximum point of the minima is at the intersection of equations PE_A and PE_C

PE_A=6X1+12
PE_C=-5X1+15

To get the cut-off point, the equations are equalized

6X1+12=-5X1+15

→11X1=15-12 X2=1-X1
→11X1=3 X2=1-11/3
X1=11/3 3.66666666666667 X2=9/3 3 6.666666667

Debemos calcular el Valor esperado del juego

To find it, the value of X1 is substituted in either of the two equations PE_B or PE_C
PE_B=6X1+12
PE_B=6*(11/3)+12=34 VE= 34 the expected value of player 2 is the same expected value of player 1 and corresponds to the maximum point
of the minimums

Debemos calcular las probabilidades para el jugador 2 EL VALOR DE L JUEGO SE DETERMINA POR LA SUMATORIA (RETRIBUCIÓN O PAGO ESPERADO POR LA PROBABILIDAD CORRESPONDIENTE)

VE=(6X1+12)*Y1+(-3X1+14)*Y2+(-5X1+15)Y3

The other condition is:

Y1+Y2+Y3=1
But the region is delimited by strategy B and strategy C, that is, strategy A is not in the game
Y1=0

The value of the game is:

VE=(6X1+12)*Y2+(-5X1+15)*Y3 VE= 34

Since the equation depends on X1, values are assigned to X1

y1+y2+Y3=1 y1=0 Y2+Y3=1 Y2=1-Y3

If X1=0

14Y2+15Y3=34 VE=(10X1+7)*Y2+(-20X1+33)*Y3
→14Y2=(34)-15Y3
VE=(4X1+15)*Y2+(−10x1+27)Y3
Y2+Y3=1→Y2=1-Y3 PE_B=10*(26/30)+7=47/3

14(1-Y3)=(34)-15Y3 x1= 0 PE_B=4*(12/14)+15 = 129/7

14-14Y3=(34)-15Y3 15y2+27y3=129/7
´-14Y3+15Y3=(34)-14 15y2=(129/7)-27y3
1Y3=(34)-14 Y2+Y3=1→Y2=1-Y3
1Y3=8,666
Y3=20/1 15(1-y3)=(129/7)-27y3
Y3=20 15-15y3=(129/7)-27y3
→Y3=40/2 -15y3+27y3=(129/7)-15
12y3=(129/7)-15
Y2=1-Y3 12y3=(129/7)-15
Y2=1-40 12y3=3,428
→Y2=39/1 y3=3,428/12
The probabilities of the strategy for each player are: y3=0,2856
y3= 2/7
Player 1: Strategy1: 11/3
Strategy 2: 9/3
y2=1-3y
Player 2: Strategy 1: 0 y2=1-0,2856
Strategy 2: 40/2 y2 5/7
Strategy 3: 39/1

The expected value of the game is

VE= 15.6666667
 Referencias

Sharma, J. (2016). Investigación de Operaciones: Teoría y Aplicaciones. (pp.

347- 378), Nueva Delhi: Laxmi Publications Pvt Ltd, v. Sexta edición.

Kelly, A. (2003). Decision Making Using Game Theory (pp. 28-51): An

Introduction for Managers: Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press
Editorial.