Fire and Explosion Risks and Consequences in Electrical Substations-A Transformer Case Study

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Fire and Explosion Risks and Consequences in Electrical Substations—A

Transformer Case Study
Article · April 2022

DOI: 10.1115/1.4054143
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Fire and Explosion Risks and tank is completely filled with oil, while it does not matter how
much the mineral oil level is in the conservator tank; the important
Consequences in Electrical Substations— thing is that the tank should not be empty. The transformer tank
usually has a cubical shape, whereas the conservator tank usually
A Transformer Case Study has a cylindrical shape. Power transformers failures can occur due
to various reasons [4–7]. However, the most common cause of
Mohanad El-Harbawi transformer fires and explosions is due to the bushing failures [7,8].
Mineral oil can leak from transformers in several ways: it can
Department of Chemical Engineering, result from the degradation of cork gaskets or the development of
King Saud University, holes or cracks in the radiator or oil tank; oil can also leak
Riyadh 11421, Saudi Arabia through flanges, circuit breakers, valves, fastener assemblies, and
e-mail: melharbawi@ksu.edu.sa so on [9,10]. Such leakage can cause a fire and/or an explosion
due to direct contact with high-voltage elements [11]. Furthermore,
these leaks are often slow drips, and with time, however, hundreds
This study aims to find how fires and explosions can occur in of liters of oil can spill out and spread onto the floor, forming a pool
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enclosed spaces where electrical transformers are installed and close to the transformers. This is highly dangerous because the oil
to investigate the consequences of the damages to the surrounding can easily ignite in the presence of an ignition source such as
areas caused by these accidents. This study began with the collec- flames or sparks, possibly leading to a pool fire event. In addition,
tion of a mineral oil waste sample from an indoor substation trans- the oil leakage will reduce the oil level in the tank, causing the trans-
former in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. This sample was analyzed to former windings to overheat. This will damage the insulation in the
determine its composition. Results revealed that 30 components windings and allow moisture to enter through the leak and degrade
ranging from C6 to C30 were detected in the sample. The mixture the transformer oil, causing the transformer to overheat. If the trans-
flammability limits, calculated using Le Chatelier rules and found former overheats, the temperature of the mineral oil will increase,
to be 0.97 and 6.56, indicated that the vapor mixture for the leading to the oil vaporizing and forming a flammable mixture. If
waste oil sample was not flammable at 25 °C and 1 atm. Conse- this mixture is then released into the atmosphere, it can be ignited
quence analysis was used to predict the outcome of fire and explo- by any spark or nearby fire. It is also possible that the tank can
sion events based on a transformer with a capacity of 1100 liters. rupture because of the heating of the transformer, and this will
The peak overpressure generated by an explosion was estimated result in causing vapor cloud explosion (VCE) or boiling liquid
to be 80.97 kPa. Moreover, the thermal radiation produced by expanding vapor explosion (BLEVE). It has been found that if
various types of fires was estimated as a function of the distance mineral oils are heated to approximately 500 °C, methane, ethane,
from the accident center. The thermal flux from a boiling liquid and ethylene will be liberated [12]. Furthermore, if the oil is
expanding vapor explosion (BLEVE) was 99.8 kW/m2, which is heated to an extreme temperature (higher than 500 °C), hydrogen
greater than that from jet and pool fires. The probability of an indi- and acetylene will be liberated in addition to the above gases
vidual suffering injury or dying as a result of exposure to fire and/or [12,13]. The sudden release of these gases into the atmosphere
an explosion was estimated using dose-response models. The may lead to unexpected fires or explosions.
results showed that the peak overpressure produced by an explo- People have become more and more aware of fire and explosion
sion can cause severe damage within 20 m of the explosion accidents involving transformers located in power substations
center. However, the results also showed that there is a 100% prob- [14]. Although the probability of fire and explosion in electrical
ability of the thermal radiation from a BLEVE causing fatalities up transformers is relatively low, the risk due to fire and explosion in
to a distance of 140 m. The risk due to the fragmentation of the transformer installations cannot be neglected. Transformer fires
transformer tanks was also assessed, and a majority of fragments are often divided into two types: pool fires and jet (spray) fires. If
would land within a range of 111.2 m. [DOI: 10.1115/1.4054143] the mineral oil inside a transformer tank is heated due to dielectric
breakdown or due to an external fire engulfing the oil tank, the tem-
Keywords: electrical substations, transformers, risk, fire, perature of the transformer tank will increase, and this will eventu-
explosion ally produce vapor that may form a flammable mixture with air. If
the flammable mixture suddenly escapes under pressure to the atmo-
sphere from an opening in the tank, a jet fire may occur. Explosions
1 Introduction of oil-filled transformers, known as mixed mode explosions, can be
happened due to electric sparks, arcs, or hot surfaces [15]. Sudden
The global consumption and demand for electrical energy have
transformer failure can lead to an overcharge, which could generate
increased rapidly over the last few decades. Most countries
enough heat and sparks causing high overpressure. This massive
produce electricity using fossil fuel-fired thermal plants [1], and
overpressure can cause the transformer to rupture and flashing the
fossil fuels (oil, gas, and coal) continue to play a major role in
stored oil and possibly generate fireball. Vaporization of the
energy systems worldwide. The electricity needed for human activ-
mineral oil generates gas mixture, and this creates huge amount of
ities is delivered through power lines or transformers. Dielectric
overpressure inside the transformer tank, finally causing the tank
fluids or insulating oils are key elements of electrical transformers,
to rupture, resulting in the release of significant amount of energy
and these are mainly used to absorb the heat that is generated. For
and high thermal radiation. This may cause scattered fragments,
more than 130 years (since 1887), petroleum-based fluids have been
scattering burning oil, gases decomposition products, solid insula-
used as coolants and insulating fluids in transformers. Although
tion materials, and molten winding conductors into the vicinity
mineral oils have many advantages, including their low cost,
area [16].
wide availability, and good cooling performance [2], they are
When a transformer tank explodes and oil is splashes, this does
toxic and not easily biodegradable, and they also have low fire
not necessarily result in a fire. The likelihood of a fire depends on
points [3].
the successful operation of the protection system and how quickly
Power transformers consists several parts and components as
it responds [17]. Although when a transformer tank explodes
illustrated in Fig. 22 (Appendix A). The mineral oil is stored in
without causing a fire, there can be significant environmental pollu-
the transformer in two parts: the main one is the transformer tank
tion due to oil leakage to the site.
and the second one is the conservator tank. The main transformer
Transformer fire accidents are being reported every day;
however, perhaps the worst accidents in history is the that occurred
Manuscript received October 9, 2021; final manuscript received March 9, 2022; in a coal mine in western Turkey in 2014, which happened due to an
published online April 19, 2022. Assoc. Editor: R. M. Chandima Ratnayake. electrical failure that resulted in an explosion and fire in the
ASME Open Journal of Engineering 2022, Vol. 1 / 014501-1

Copyright © 2022 by ASME
transformer. This accident left more than 200 people dead and year while the transformer was in operation before being replaced
80 injured [18]. It can be concluded from this accident and from with new oil because of the loss of its operational properties. The
other accidents that when a transformer fails, the results often oil sample was kept in a well-sealed bottle and then stored in the
lead to significant property damage and major financial losses. laboratory cabinet under normal conditions. The oil sample was
Typical power substations comprise several transformer tanks, analyzed by GC–MS according to the method presented in our pre-
and each of these tanks contains a large quantity of mineral oil. vious work [9] to identify its compositions. The mass and mole frac-
The ignition of this oil can generate heat and pressure for the trans- tions in the liquid and vapor phases can be found according to the
former tank, which can lead to rupture, allowing the burning oil to methods presented in the work of El-Harbawi and Al-Mubaddel
spill and spread around the tanker. [9] and El-Harbawi et al. [19].
In electrical substations, mineral oil can be leaked from many parts
of the transformers due to many reasons as stated earlier and espe- 2.2 On-Site Gas Detection. The detection of flammable gases
cially if these transformers did not have good maintenance. Over in an area suspected of being contaminated with flammable materi-
the time, the discharged oil will be accumulated on the transformer als is very important because vapors emanating from materials such
parts and/or on the ground surrounded by the transformer. Further- as mineral oil may exceed the allowed limits imposed by safety laws
more, during the process of replacing the old oil with a new one, if

and regulations. In electrical substations, a vapor mixture can form
the maintenance personnel do not follow the necessary instructions, for various reasons, including the spillage of mineral oil onto the
this will lead to spills of oil on the places surrounding the device. floor during the replacement of used oil. Vapor mixtures can also
Consequently, this study is aimed to investigate how could the fire be produced if bad transformer maintenance leads to the leakage
and explosion events to initiate in a close place where transformer of oil from any part of the transformer. A multigas detector (Multi-
begins installed. Furthermore, results from the consequences model- RAE Lite PGM-6208 RAE Systems) manufactured by Honeywell,
ing will be used with the probit analysis method to predict the degree USA, was employed to measure the concentration of vapor in the
of damage (probability) caused by accidents. confined space where a transformer was installed. This device can
This study included the following experimental and theoretical be used for measuring the concentration of combustible, flammable,
assessments. or toxic gases in confined areas and in the atmosphere.
• The experimental work consisted of two stages. In the first
stage, a sample of waste mineral oil was collected from an 2.3 Accident Scenarios Development and Consequence
electrical substation in Riyadh, Saud Arabia. The composition Analysis. The causes of accidents and associated scenarios were
of the sample was then determined using gas chromatography– investigated, and consequence modeling was then employed to
mass spectrometry (GC–MS). In the second stage, on-site study the impact of accidents based on various scenarios. Figure 1
measurements were conducted using a portable gas detector. illustrates an event tree for the outcomes that follow the release of
• The theoretical part of the study consisted of using the results combustible or flammable gas and/or liquid from a tank or vessel
of the experimental work to draw flammability diagrams and to into the atmosphere [20–23]. If the release of a combustible or flam-
predict the likelihood of fire and explosion hazards due to the mable material occurs without the material igniting, the liquid will
vaporization of mineral oil in electrical substations. In addi- rain out onto the ground and cause the formation of a pool that
tion, consequence modeling was employed to estimate the will evaporate into the atmosphere. If, however, the material
potential impact of different accident scenarios (pool fire, jet ignites immediately, then a fire may start. Different types of fire
fire, VCE, etc.) on people and the surrounding area. are possible: these include jet fire (spray), flash fire, pool fire, fireball,
and internal fire. A jet fire can occur because of the release of gas or
high-pressure liquid from a pressurized unit such as a storage tank or
2 Materials and Methods vessel, followed by immediate ignition. A flash fire can occur if the
2.1 Sample Collection and Composition Identification. A material stored inside a container is heated to form a flammable
sample of waste oil was obtained from a warehouse in Riyadh vapor that is suddenly released into the open air. A pool fire can
where used and waste oils are stored. Waste oil can be defined as occur when combustible or flammable chemicals leak from a
oil that was used to fill a transformer tank and then used for 1 vessel or pipe and accumulate on the ground and then ignite
Fig. 1 An event tree showing the outcome from the releases of combustible/flammable material from vessel into the atmo-
sphere [20–23]
014501-2 / Vol. 1, 2022 Transactions of the ASME

[24,25]. If the material is a liquid and is stored at a temperature below The results show that the waste oil sample contains several hydro-
its boiling point, the liquid will form a pool on the ground, and if the carbon components (CH–) varying from C6 to C30. More than 41%
liquid is stored under pressure and at a temperature above its normal of these components belong to alkane groups.
boiling point temperature, then a portion of the liquid will flash into a The mass and mole fractions of the components in the liquid and
vapor. The remaining unflashed liquid will form a pool in the area vapor phases were predicted using the same method adopted in our
surrounding the release [26]. A BLEVE (fireball) occurs because previous works [9,19]. The vapor mixture mole fraction was calcu-
of the rupture of a vessel containing a liquid at a temperature lated to be 0.37 vol%. Thus, the air content in the mixture was
above its atmospheric boiling point. After the flammable material 99.63 vol%, and the percentages of N2 and O2 were 78.71 and
is released into the atmosphere, it immediately ignites, forming a 20.92 vol%, respectively. Tables 2 to 19 (Appendix A) presents
fireball. A BLEVE will also occurs if following the spill of a flam- the details of the calculations used to find the lower flammability
mable liquid, the liquid ignites and the tank is completely engulfed limit (LFL), upper flammability limit (UFL), and LOC of the indi-
by fire, resulting in the tank rupturing [27]. The absence of an imme- vidual components of the waste oil sample and of the mixture that
diate ignition source may lead to the formation of a large flammable constituted the sample.
cloud, whereas delayed ignition may cause a flash fire or VCE. The
calculations performed in this work are based on models and data

published by the Centre for Chemical Process Safety [26] and the 3.2 Calculation of the Lower Flammability Limit, Upper
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Fire Protection Inspection Flammability Limit, and Limiting Oxygen Concentration.
Program [28]. The flammability limits for the different components present in
the sample were acquired from different sources [29,30]. Equations
2.4 Case Study. Several types of transformers with different (A1) and (A2) were used to calculate the missing flammability
capacities are used by Saudi Electricity Company. One of the limits. The values of LFLmix and UFLmix were predicted using
most popular types has an oil tank capacity of 1000 L and a conser- the Le Chatelier equations Eqs. (A5) and (A6) and were found to
vator tank capacity of 100 L. This type of transformer is frequently be 0.97 and 6.56, respectively. The LOCs for the individual compo-
used in electrical substations located in cities and villages. Thus, nents and for the mixture were estimated using Eqs. (A7) and (A8),
this study was concerned with this type of indoor transformer respectively. The value of LOCmix was found to be 11.19 vol%. The
only. Figure 23 (Appendix A) shows a sketch of the dimensions details of the calculations and the results for LFL, UFL, LFLmix,
of the conservator tank and the main tank of the transformer used UFLmix, LOC, and LOCmix are presented in Table 19 (Appendix B).
in this study. To determine whether the vapor mixture was flammable, a flam-
mability diagram was constructed. For a detailed description of how
to plot a flammability diagram, see the study by El-Harbawi et al.
[19] and Ali and El-Harbawi [31]. Figure 3 shows the flammability
3 Results and Discussion diagrams for the waste oil vapor mixture. It can be seen that the
3.1 Sample Analysis and Identification of Components. The vapor mixture composition, ymix, N2, and O2 is slightly outside
identification of the components of the waste oil sample was per- the flammable zone, and thus, the vapor mixture can be considered
formed using the same method described in our previous work not flammable at 25 °C and 1 atm.
[9]. Figure 2 illustrates the results of the GC–MS analysis. The low probability of a transformer catching fire may be due to
Table 18 (Appendix B) lists the details of the components found the lack of oxygen inside the transformer. It is therefore usually dif-
in the waste oil and summarizes the results for the flammability ficult to form a flammable mixture inside a transformer. However, at
limits and limiting oxygen concentration (LOC) of the mixture. a temperature equal to or higher than the flash point (i.e., ≥145 °C),
Fig. 2 GC-MS analysis for the waste oil sample

Fig. 3 Flammability diagram of the waste oil–vapor mixture
mineral oil tends to vaporize and form a vapor mixture inside the 3.3.2 Flashing and Evaporation
transformer container. This mixture can ignite if it escapes into 3.3.2.1 Flashing. Flashing phenomena will not occur if
the atmosphere in the presence of an ignition source. Interestingly, mineral oil is stored inside a transformer tank under normal condi-
the results obtained using the multigas detector indicated that there tions (T = 45 °C and P = 1.73 bar abs). However, if the temperature
was a flammable mixture in the compartment where the transformer
was located. The LFL level was measured to be 99 vol%, which is
considerably higher than the allowable limit. This result indicates Table 1 Input data and calculated results for the vapor and
that flammable mixtures may exist in enclosed spaces perhaps as liquid discharges
a result of poor ventilation systems or the accumulation of a large
pool of spilled oil. Input data
Heat capacity ratio 1.009

3.3 Consequence Analysis Hole size, mm 25
Temperature, K 343
3.3.1 Material Outflow Gas molecular weight 490
3.3.1.1 Vapor discharge. The primary input to any discharge Downstream pressure, bar abs 1.01
calculation is the size of the hole through which the discharge Upstream pressure, bar abs 1.73
Tank pressure above liquid, barg 0.7168
occurs. There is currently no general consensus as to what hole
Pressure outside hole, barg 0
size should be used, but values of 10 and 25 mm can be found in Liquid density, kg/m3 880
the literature [26,32]. In this study, we selected a hole diameter of Liquid level above hole, m 0.4
25 mm because the larger the hole is, the worse will be the scenario
Calculated results (vapor discharge)
that develops. The temperature of the oil inside the transformer tank
Hole area, m2 4.91 × 10−4
was assumed to be 70 °C [33]. Consequently, using the methodol- Upstream gas density, kg/ m3 29.73
ogy presented in Appendix A, Gas/Vapor Outflow section, together Expansion factor 0.614
with the input data presented in Table 1, vapor would be released Vapor discharge rate, kg/s 0.56
through the assumed hole at a rate of 0.56 kg/s (Table 1).
Calculated results (liquid discharge)
Velocity coefficient 1.25
3.3.1.2 Liquid discharge. A hole size of 25 mm was also used Exit velocity, m/s 8.3
to calculate the rate of liquid discharge. Using the methodology pre- Fuel spill volume, Lit 251
sented in the Appendix A, Liquid Outflow section, together with the Dike area, m2 12.57
input requirements presented in Table 1, liquid would be released Liquid discharge rate, kg/s 3.57
through the hole at a rate of 3.57 kg/s (Table 1).

of the oil rises to above its boiling point and oil is then released, then height, burning duration, heat release rate, emissivity, shape
it will flash. To be able to use Eq. (A13) to determine the liquid frac- factor, atmospheric transmissivity, and received thermal flux are
tion that flashes from a release of superheated liquid, the liquid heat described in Pool Fire section. Using a liquid release rate of
capacity averaged over the initial temperature of the liquid and the 3.57 kg/s (0.0041 m3/s) (as predicted by Eq. A12) and other input
atmospheric boiling point of the liquid, together with the latent heat data from Table 4 presents the results for pool fire effects
of vaporization of the liquid at the boiling point, are required. The (Table 4). The pool fire diameter, flame height, area of the pool,
reported boiling points of most mineral oils are in the range 310 °C– and burning duration were estimated to be 4 m, 6.78 m, 12.57 m2,
374 °C (average = 342 °C). Thus, the heat capacity at the average and 398.51 s, respectively.
temperature, 183.5 °C [(25 °C + 342 °C)/2], is about 5.5 J/g°C. Fires spread faster at the corners of rooms than at room centers.
Most conventional mineral oils have a latent heat of vaporization This was demonstrated using Eq. (A47), which gave a flame height
of between 220 and 245 kJ/kg at the boiling point. Thus, according of 29.55 m for the corner of the room. However, theoretically, the
to Eq. (A13), mineral oil will start to flash when its temperature is flames will not extend beyond the ceiling of a room unless the
above 342 °C. fire breaks through the ceiling or spreads from the windows and/
or doors. Moreover, if the wall linings are made of combustible
3.3.2.2 Evaporation or Boiling. Mineral oils usually have high materials, they will more quickly contribute to the release of heat.

boiling points, and their evaporation rates at room temperature are The rate of heat release for the aforementioned example of a pool
usually negligible. However, the vapor pressure plays an important fire was calculated to be 21.18 MW. The heat flux received by a
role in the evaporation process and increases as the temperature target at a distance of 50 m from the center of the fire was calculated
increases. Therefore, when assessing the hazards resulting from using two different models: the point source (Eq. (A22)) and solid
the release of flammable or combustible liquids, evaporation phe- flame (Eq. (A29)) models. These two models require information
nomena should not be neglected. For liquids with temperatures regarding the type of flammable liquid, the total amount of released
far from their boiling points, heating will lead to an increase in material in the pool, and the fire radius. The results indicated that a
the evaporation rate. For liquids with boiling points close to or receiver located 50 m away from the center of this pool fire would
above ambient temperature and in cases where the area of pooled receive a heat flux of 0.16 kW/m2 based on the point source model
liquid is large, the vaporization rate can be determined using Eq. and 0.18 kW/m2 based on the solid flame model. The results of the
(A14) [34]. Assuming the liquid is contained within a diked area, calculations for this pool fire are summarized in Table 4. It can
the area of the pool can be assumed to be the area of dike. The appli- clearly be concluded from these results that the characteristics of
cation of Eq. (A14) requires the saturation vapor pressure at 25 °C a pool fire depend mainly on the rate at which a material is released
to be known. Saturation vapor pressure data at standard conditions and on the pool diameter. Noting that different fuels burn at differ-
for the 33 components found in the waste oil sample were extracted ent speeds, faster burning fuels are likely to burn more rapidly and
from the free database on the ChemSpider website (www.chemspi- more likely to burn back to the source. Figure 5 presents the amount
der.com), and these data are listed in Table 19. By applying the data of radiation incident on a receiver as a function of distance from the
given in Table 2, using Eq. (A14), the evaporation rate for the waste pool fire.
oil sample was found to be 0.00134 kg/s.
3.3.3.3 BLEVEs/fireballs. In this study, it was assumed that the
3.3.3 Fire Types. The different types of fires include flash fires, mineral oil-filled transformer vessel was heated because of any of
jet fires, pool fires, and fireballs. Because flash fires have a short the reasons described previously and that, as the gas phase
duration, the amount of heat radiation from flash fires is usually
not significant, and thus, it is usually assumed that no deaths will
result from this [35]. Hence, the impact of thermal radiation from Table 3 Input data and calculated results for the jet fire accident
flash fires was not considered in this study. scenario
3.3.3.1 Jet fires. To estimate the consequences of a jet fire, the Input data
dimensions, geometry, and orientation of the fire, along with the
amount of thermal radiation emitted, are required. Using the math- Distance from flame, m 50
Hole diameter, mm 25
ematical models for calculating the effects of jet fires that were pre-
Discharge coefficient for hole 1
sented in Jet Fires section and the input data presented in Table 3, Leak height above ground, m 2
the flame length was estimated to be 1.55 m, and the amount of radi- Gas molecular weight 490
ation at a receiver (assumed to be located 50 m away from the Molecular weight of air 29
flame) was determined to be 0.25 kW/m2 (Table 3). Figure 4 Ambient pressure, Pa 101,325
shows how the amount of radiation generated by this jet fire Ambient temperature, K 298
varies as a function of distance. It is important to note that the Gas pressure, barg 1.73
exit velocity of the jet is low (speed = 1.68 m/s), and therefore, Relative humidity, % 30
the flame most likely will not blow out [26]. Heat of combustion for gas, kJ/kg 46,000
Heat capacity ratio for gas 1.009
Flame temperature, K 2300
3.3.3.2 Pool fires. Accidental spills of liquid materials that are
Moles of reactant per mole of product 1
stored at temperatures lower than their boiling points will lead to the Fuel mole fraction at stoichiometric 0.09
formation of circular or nearly circular pools. In the case of a trans- Fraction of total energy converted 0.4
former, mineral oil can spill and spread over the concrete floor of
Calculated results
the transformer compartment. If an ignition source is present, a
Area of hole, m2 4.91 × 10−4
pool fire may then develop. A series of simplified relationships Gas discharge rate, kg/s 0.56
giving the diameter and area of a pool fire as well as the flame Exit velocity of the jet, m/s 1.68
L/De ratio for flame 62.1
Flame height, m 1.55
Table 2 Input data used in the pool evaporation calculation Location of flame center above ground 2.78
Radiation path length, m 50.08
Area of pool, m2 12.57 Point source view factor, m2 3.17 × 10−5
Ambient temperature, K 298 Water vapor partial pressure, Pa 948
Molecular weight of liquid 490 Atmospheric transmissivity 0.766
Saturation vapor pressure, mmHg 1.46 Flux at receptor location, kW/m2 0.25

Fig. 4 The radiation at the receiver from the jet fire as a function of the distance
volume expanded and the pressure inside the vessel increased, the mathematical models used to calculate the effects of a BLEVE
oil compartment might rupture. The thermal radiation produced are described in Appendix A, BLEVE/Fireball Section.
by a fireball constitutes the main risk from a BLEVE. To
compute the amount of thermal radiation released by a fireball, Diameter, Duration, and Height of a BLEVE Fireball
the dimensions of the fireball and its dynamics need to be deter- Empirical equations that can be used to calculate the diameter,
mined first. The maximum size of the fireball depends mainly on duration, and height of a BLEVE fireball are given in Fireball Dia-
the mass of the fuel that is released and then vaporizes. A meter, Duration, and Fireball Height section (Eqs. (A40)–(A43)). A
BLEVE can cause vessels containing boiling materials to rupture fireball usually has a spherical shape, and initially, its diameter is
and produce fragments that can fly several meters—sometimes up level with the ground. The first step in determining the geometry
to a few kilometers—from the center of the explosion. The of a BLEVE is to find the amount of stored material. For a trans-
former tank containing 1100 L (1.1 m3) of mineral oil that has a
Table 4 Input data and calculated results for the pool fire
density of 880 kg/m3, the mass of stored oil will be 968 kg. Assum-
accident scenario ing that all of the stored mineral oil contributes to the fireball and
using the input data from Table 5, the geometry of the BLEVE/fire-
Input data ball was calculated, and the results are summarized in Table 5. The
fireball diameter, duration, and height were found to be 57.4 m,
Hole diameter, mm 25 1.4 s, and 43 m, respectively.
Liquid leakage rate, kg/s 3.88
Boiling point of liquid, K 370 Thermal Radiation
Heat of vaporization of liquid, kJ/kg 210 The damage caused by a fireball will be obvious within the radius
Heat of combustion of liquid, kJ/kg 46,000 of the fireball. Outside this range, the main risk is to people who
Empirical constant, m−1 0.7 might be affected by radiation. As a general rule, the radius of a fire-
Ambient temperature, K 298 ball is defined as the radius within which total destruction would
Relative humidity, % 30
Liquid density, kg/m3 880
Constant heat capacity of liquid, kJ/kg K 1.67
Dike diameter, m 4 Table 5 Input data and calculated results for the BLEVE/fireball
Mass burning rate of fuel per unit surface area, kg/m2 s 0.039 accident scenario
Receptor distance from pool, m 50
Radiation efficiency for point source model 0.35 Input data
Calculated results
Maximum pool diameter, m 5.50 Volume of the tank, m3 1.1
Pool fire diameter, m 4.001 The horizontal distance from fireball, m 50
Pool area, m2 12.57 Heat of combustion of liquid, kJ/kg 46,000
Flame height, m 6.78 Water partial pressure in air, Pa 2810
Flame H/D 1.70 Radiation fraction 0.4
Corner fire flame height, m 29.55 Calculated results
Water vapour pressure of, Pa 947.97 Initial flammable mass, kg 968
Point source height, m 3.39 Maximum fireball diameter, m 57.4
Regression rate (burning rate), m/s 4.4 × 10−5 Fireball combustion duration, s 1.4
Burning duration, s 398.51 Centre height of fireball, m 43
Pool fire heat release rate, MW 21.180 Initial ground level hemisphere diameter, m 74.6
View factor, m2 2.72 × Surface emitted flux, kW/m2 1217.5
10−5 Path length, m 37.3
Transmissivity 0.76 Transmissivity 0.714
Thermal flux at receptor, kW/m2 (based on point source 0.16 Horizontal view factor 0.12
model) Horizontal received flux, kW/m2 107.2
Thermal flux at receptor, kW/m2 (based on solid flame model) 0.18 Vertical received flux, kW/m2 124.6

Table 6 Input data and calculated results for the temperature of Consider a fire that starts inside a room where a transformer is
a hot gas layer in a room with a closed door installed and the door is closed. If the fire releases energy at a
rate of 21.18 MW (as calculated in Sec. 3.3.3.2), using the
Input data methods presented in Fires section, the temperature of the hot gas
layer inside the room will be 3126 °C. Table 6 summarizes the
Compartment length, m 6
Compartment height, m 6
results of the calculations for the temperature of a hot gas layer pro-
Compartment Width, m 5 duced by a fire in an enclosed space.
Interior lining thickness, cm 30
Ambient air density, kg/m3 1.18 3.3.5 Pressure Rise Due to Fire Growth in an Enclosed
Ambient air temperature, °C 25 Space. In a closed or semienclosed space, the heat released by
Density of the interior lining, (kg/m3) 2400 the combustion process can lead to an increase in pressure due to
Thermal conductivity of the interior lining, kW/m K 0.0016 the expansion of gases. Using Eq. (A51) and the input data provided
Specific heat of air at constant pressure, kJ/kg K 1 in Table 7, the pressure rise would be 18,962 kPa, which is very
Thermal capacity of the interior lining, kJ/kg K 0.75
large. It should be noted that in the event of a fire in a building,
Calculated results the rate at which the pressure rise is often small and the resulting

Compartment volume, m3 180 pressure is often low because of gas leakage through walls, ventila-
Mass of the gas in the compartment, kg 213.22 tion openings, and openings around windows and doors. Most
Fire heat release rate, kW 21,180
Time after ignition, s 398.51
buildings have leaks of some kind, and thus, the pressure will not
Total area of the compartment enclosing surface boundaries, m2 192 rise to very high values.
Compartment hot gas layer temperature, °C 3126 The calculated pressure rise described early indicates a very high
value. However, most transformers are installed inside buildings
equipped with wall or ceiling fans and windows for ventilation.
In such cases, there will be definitely enough leaks to prevent
occur and no one would likely survive. The radiation received by an extreme pressure rises.
object located at a given distance from a fireball can be calculated
using the method described in Appendix A. For the example 3.3.6 Explosion Modeling
described earlier, the thermal flux generated by a fireball was 3.3.6.1 Estimating the pressure increase and energy release
found to be 107.2 kW/m2 at a distance of 50 m from the tank for associated with explosions. The combustion process raises the tem-
a vertical viewing factor and 124.6 kW/m2 for a horizontal perature of gases, and as a result, the system pressure will increase
viewing factor (Table 5). Figure 6 shows how the radiation incident because of the expansion of these gases. The rapid release of high-
on a receiver varies as a function of distance. pressure gases can lead to an explosion. One of the main effects of
an explosion is a fast-moving shock or pressure wave [37]. This
shock wave produces overpressures that can cause injuries or fatal-
3.3.4 Hot Gas Layer Temperature. Fires in enclosed spaces ities and building damage. Equations (A52) and (A53) can be used
release energy and combustion products. These hot products will to calculate the pressure increase due to the expansion of gases and
form a plume that will rise toward the ceiling because of buoyancy. the blast-wave energy produced by a confined explosion, respec-
When the plume reaches the ceiling, the hot gas layer will begin to tively. The input data and the results are summarized in Table 8.
spread horizontally along the ceiling [15,36]. To determine the tem- The peak overpressure and the positive phase duration are the
peratures generated by the fire in a room where the door is closed, main parameters of the blast wave from an explosion. Typical
the type of material lining inside the room and its thermal properties values of these parameters were calculated using the TNO multi-
need to be known. The material used to line the interior of electrical energy model, which is described in detail in Sec. TNO Multi-
substations is usually concrete. Table 6 lists the thermal properties Energy Method section. By applying the inputs given in Table 9
of interior lining material and summarizes the other input data to the TNO multi-energy model, from the curves labeled “7” (for
required for calculating the temperature of the hot gas layer. a typical blast) in Fig. 24, the peak side-on overpressure at a
Fig. 5 The radiation at the receiver from pool fire as a function of the distance

Fig. 6 Thermal radiation emitted from the BLEVE as a function of the distance
Table 7 Input data and calculated results for the pressure rise Table 9 Input data and calculated results for overpressure
due to the growth of a fire in an enclosed space using the TNO multi-energy model
Compartment height, m 6 Input data

Compartment length, m 6
Compartment width, m 5 The total combustion of a stoichiometric hydrocarbon/air 3.5
Ambient air temperature, °C 25 mixture, MJ/m3
Initial atmospheric pressure, kPa 101.35 Standoff distance, m 50
Time after ignition, sec 398.51 Ambient pressure, Pa 101,325
Ambient air density, kg/m3 1.18 Explosion energy, MJ 40,480
Fire heat release rate, kW 21,180 Speed of sound at ambient, m/s 5
Specific heat for air in a constant volume, kJ/kg K 0.71 Calculated results
Cloud volume, m3 11,566
Scaled distance 0.68
Scaled overpressure 0.80
distance of 50 m from the explosion was found to be 80.97 kPa. The Peak overpressure, kPa 80.97
positive phase duration was estimated using Eq. (A57) and found to Scaled duration 0.264
be 56.44 ms. The details of these results are presented in Table 9. Duration, ms 56.44
Figure 7 shows the peak overpressure calculated using TNO multi-
energy model as a function of distance.
with an object or other targets on the ground [38]. Assuming a
3.3.6.2 Vessel fragments. Much of the damage and many of rupture pressure of 1.3 MPa for the transformer vessel [39] and
the deaths that result from explosions are attributable to fragments. using the input data in Table 10, the velocity and distance of
Therefore, predictions of the impact of fragments should not be dis- travel of fragments were calculated to be 117.73 m/s and
regarded. This problem can be considered in terms of the initial 843.18 m, respectively (Table 10).
velocity, energy, velocity, range, and number of fragments (Blast
Wave Energy in a Confined Explosion section). When fragments
are projected into the air, they fly at a high speed and may collide 3.4 Impact of Fires and Explosions on Humans and
Structures. Probit analysis was used to relate the magnitude of
accidents involving fires and explosions to the degree of damage
Table 8 Input data and calculated results for the pressure they cause (probability of damage). There are several simplified
increase and energy release associated with explosions probit models that can be used to predict the consequences of
fires and explosions. These are described in Vulnerability section.
Input data
3.4.1 Impact of Fires. When a human being is exposed to a
Heat of combustion, kJ/kg 46,000 large amount of thermal radiation, the consequences of this expo-
Yield, % 100
Ambient air temperature, K 298
sure can range from debilitating physiological effects that gradually
Adiabatic flame temperature of burned gas, K 2300 increase over the course of several minutes or more to those where
Initial ambient atmospheric pressure prior to ignition, kPa 101.35 serious pathological damage may occur quite suddenly. It has been
Mass of flammable vapor release, kg 880 found that the type of fire, distance from the fire, and exposure time
Calculated results
are the main factors that need to be considered in assessing the mor-
Maximum pressure at end of combustion, kPa 875 tality and damage due to fires [40]. A detailed analysis of fatal inju-
Blast wave energy, MJ 4.05 × 104 ries from burns, including the application of several probit
TNT mass equivalent, kg 8996 equations, can be found in Vulnerability section. As indicated
earlier, the mortality rate due to flash fires is often considered

Fig. 7 The peak overpressure at the receiver from the VCE as a function of distance
using TNO multi-energy model
Table 10 Input data and calculated results for velocity and travel respectively. This means that the danger area, the area in which
distance of fragments third-degree burns (which have a 50% mortality rate) may occur,
extends to a distance of 8.83 m from the center. (A 50% mortality
Input data rate means that 50% of hospitalized patients died because of their
injuries.) Table 11 summarizes the thermal radiation dose from a
Total volume of vessel, m3 1.11 jet fire that has a 50% probability of causing first-, second-, and
Total mass of vessel, kg 124.8
Mass of material contained in the vessel, kg, 968
third-degree burns at different distances.
Assumed number of fragments 2 Experimental data show that exposure to a 37.5 kW/m2 dose of
Mass fraction of total for fragment 0.25 thermal radiation for 60 s is sufficient to have a 100% probability
Burst pressure of the vessel, MPa 1.3 of causing death [43,44]. In other studies, it was assumed that expo-
Ambient pressure, MPa 0.101 sure to a 35 kW/m2 dose of thermal radiation will cause death
Temperature of gas within vessel, K 300 within a very short space of time [45]. Skin that is unprotected by
Heat capacity ratio of gas within vessel 1.009 clothes can be expected to suffer from second-degree burns if
Molecular weight of gas within vessel 490 exposed to a thermal intensity of 5.0 kW/m2 for 30 s [46]. For
Calculated results doses between 37.5 and 5.0 kW/m2, people indoors will be pro-
Speed of sound of gas within vessel, m/s 72 tected by the structure, but those who are outdoors and cannot
Actual number of fragments 3 reach shelter quickly may suffer from fatal burns.
Dimensionless velocity 33.77 It can also be observed from Fig. 8 that at a distance of 15 m, the
Actual velocity of fragment, m/s 117.73 probability of death resulting from exposure to thermal radiation
Travel range, m 843.18
will fall to approximately 0%. The probability of first-, second-,
and third-degree burns will be zero at distances of 25, 16, and
15 m, respectively.
zero because of the small amount of thermal radiation emitted by It should be noted that if the probit function is not directly used in
flash fires as well as the short duration time [35]. Moreover, a assessing the impact of a fire, then the use of Table 17 is recom-
flash fire is often referred to as a deflagration explosion with negli- mended for obtaining the severity of the effects of thermal radiation
gible overpressure [27,41]. However, it is usually assumed that on structures and people. The effects of thermal radiation on a struc-
people caught inside a flash fire will not survive, whereas those ture depend mainly on whether it is made of combustible materials
outside will not suffer much harm [42]. For jet fires, pool fires, as well as on the length of exposure [95]. Wooden materials
and fireballs, the impact of thermal radiation on human beings undergo thermal degradation due to combustion, whereas steel
can be more serious than that from flash fires. will fail because of the reduction in yield strength, stiffness, and
modulus of elasticity. Thus, wooden structures may ignite if the
3.4.1.1 Impact of jet fires. The main parameters affecting the intensity of radiant heat exceeds the wood ignition threshold [47].
thermal radiation emitted by a jet fire are the duration time and It can be concluded from Fig. 8 and Table 17 that the major
the mass release rate. Close to a jet fire, the risk due to heat radiation impacts on structures occur within 5 m of the center of a jet fire.
varies with the distance from the fire. For a given exposure time, the Thermal radiation can cause indirect effects that do not directly
death/injury rate due to the thermal radiation produced by a jet affect the exposed skin. These include ignition of clothing,
fire can be estimated using probit equations (Eqs. (A68)–(A70)). heating of corridors and stairways, and smoke inhalation [42].
These equations require the thermal flux (in W/m2) and the expo-
sure time (in s) as inputs. Assuming an exposure time of 60 s, the 3.4.1.2 Impact of pool fires. The thermal radiation dose gener-
probabilities of a fatality and first- and second-degree burns occur- ated by a typical pool fire was calculated based on the methods
ring were calculated as a function of distance: the results of these introduced in Appendix A. The thermal dose was converted to
calculations are presented in Fig. 8. the probability of injury or fatality by means of probit-type relation-
It can be observed from Fig. 8 and Table 17 that a person located ships. The degree of injury was found to depend on the thermal
at distances of 14.6, 9.64, and 8.83 m from the fire center has a 50% dose, the exposure time, and the distance from the fire center
probability of suffering from first-, second-, and third-degree burns, [48]: a heat flux of 10 kW/m2 was found to be capable of causing

Fig. 8 Probability of injuries due to thermal radiation resulted from jet fire versus distance
second-degree burns after an exposure time of 10 s, whereas 10 s heat flux and effects may be minimal, but physiological and patho-
exposure to a flux of 5 kW/m2 will result in onset pain. It was logical effects may still occur as the exposure time increases [50].
also found that a flux of 5 kW/m2 will cause pain in around 15‒ Figure 10 shows the probabilities of fatality and injury for an
20 s and injury (at least second-degree burns) after 30 s of exposure exposure time equal to the pool fire duration (398.51 s). The dis-
[49]. In this study, two exposure times were selected for investiga- tances at which there is a 50% probability of first-, second-, and
tion: a time of 60 s and a time taken to be equal to the burning dura- third-degree burns occurring after this time are summarized in
tion predicted using Eq. (A38), which was 398.51 s. Table 13. It can be seen from this figure and table that as the
Figure 9 shows the probability of first- and second-degree burns length of exposure to heat radiation from a pool increases, the prob-
occurring due to 60 s exposure to thermal radiation from a pool fire ability of fatalities or injuries also increases.
against distance. It can be concluded from this figure that the prob-
ability of first-, second-, and third-degree burns occurring is 50% at 3.4.1.3 Impact of BLEVEs. If the temperature of the mineral oil
distances of 12.22, 6.93, and 6.09 m, respectively. These results are in a transformer tank reaches a temperature above its boiling point,
also summarized in Table 12. then a BLEVE can occur because of the rapid pressure increase. The
The effect of thermal radiation generated by a pool fire on struc- large thermal flux and blast wave produced by a BLEVE can result
tures is evident over short distances (≤5 m). It can be concluded in serious damage to structures and severe harm to humans in the
from Fig. 5 and Table 12 that thermal radiation can cause consider- vicinity of the accident. This damage will be particularly severe
able damage to buildings and other structures within a radius of within the radius of the fireball. Outside this area, the risk is
approximately 5 m. At greater distances, the continuous, low-level mainly to people who may be affected by the thermal radiation
Fig. 9 Probability of fatalities/injuries due to exposing 60 s to thermal resulted from pool

fire versus distance

Table 11 The thermal radiation dose from a jet fire that has a Table 12 The thermal radiation dose from a pool fire that has a
50% probability of causing first-, second-, and third-degree 50% probability of causing burns of different degrees of severity
burns at different distances for an exposure time of 60 s
Thermal radiation, Thermal radiation,

Impact Q (kW/m2) Distance (m) Impact Q (kW/m2) Distance (m)
First degree burns 3.17 14.6 First-degree burns 3.17 12.22

Second degree burns 7.22 9.64 Second-degree burns 7.22 6.93
Third degree burns (fatality) 8.54 8.83 Third-degree burns (fatality) 8.54 6.09

Fig. 10 Probability of fatalities/injuries due to exposing to 398.51 s to thermal radiation
resulted from pool fire versus distance
Table 13 Thermal radiation dose from pool fire that has a 50% For a BLEVE/fireball occurring in a 1.1 m3 mineral oil tank,
probability of causing burns of different degrees of severity for exposure to thermal radiation with an intensity of 37.5 kW/m2
an exposure time equal to pool fire duration would occur at a distance of about 82 m from the center of the fire-
ball. According to Table 17, this is sufficient to demolish buildings,
Thermal radiation, structures, and equipment. Tsao and Perry [52] suggested that expo-
Impact Q (kW/m2) Distance (m) sure to a radiation intensity of 30 kW/m2 for 60 s has a 100% fatal-
ity rate. This study indicated that 60 s exposure to radiation from a
First-degree burns 0.68 28.00
Second-degree burns 1.75 17.20
BLEVE/fireball that has an intensity of 30 kW/m2 will have a 100%
Third-degree burns (fatality) 2.07 15.71 fatality rate and that this intensity will be experienced at a distance
of 90 m from the center of the accident (Fig. 12). This clearly shows
that even short exposure to high heat flux levels can be fatal. Hse
and Osd [50] suggested that exposure to an intensity of
35 kW/m2 would lead to immediate fatalities in the vicinity of a
[51]. Therefore, the radius of the fireball is considered the radius at fire. Cox [53] also indicated that people caught inside a flammable
which no one will survive and complete destruction will occur. Fire- cloud at the moment of ignition would not survive, whereas those
balls usually have shorter duration times than pool fires and jet fires. outside the flammable zone would. This means that everyone
In this study, the fireball duration time was estimated to be 1.4 s, within a fireball diameter of 55.6 m will not survive. It has been
and the predicted impacts were based on this time. Using the documented that events such as BLEVEs and large jet fires that gen-
probit analysis described by Eqs. (A69)–(A71), the probabilities erate large heat fluxes usually result in severe skin burns or fatali-
of first-, second-, and third-degree burns occurring due to a ties. The long duration time of such incidents can increase the
BLEVE were estimated as a function of distance. Figure 6 shows effects even at large distances [50,54].
the amount of thermal radiation at different distances from the
BLEVE/fireball. The probability of various types of burns caused 3.4.2 Impact of Explosions. The peak overpressure resulting
by a BLEVE occurring in 1.1 m3 mineral oil tanks versus distance from an explosion was calculated using the TNO multi-energy
is illustrated in Fig. 11. It can be seen from this figure that there is a model described in Appendix A, TNO Multi-Energy Method
100% probability of first-, second-, and third-degree burns occur- section, and the results are presented in Appendix A. These
ring at distances of 0, 100, and 140 m, respectively. Table 14 sum- results were used in probit equations Eqs. (A71)–(A74) to calculate
marizes the distances at which there is a 50% probability of a person the impact of an explosion on people and structures. The primary
suffering from first-, second-, and third-degree burns. effects of overpressure are lung hemorrhage, eardrum rupture, inju-
It is apparent from Fig. 11 and Table 14 that in the case of a ries due to shattered windows, and structural damage. Figure 13
BLEVE/fireball, the danger area extends to a distance of 42 m, demonstrates the probability of these effects occurring as a function
which causes third-degree burns (50% fatal). of distance from the center of an explosion. As shown in this figure,

Fig. 11 Probability of fatalities/injuries due to exposing 1.4 s to thermal resulted from BLEVE
versus distance
Table 14 The thermal radiation doses from a BLEVE/fireball that ruptured eardrum up to several kilometers away depending on the
have a 50% probability of causing first-, second-, and overpressure generated by the explosion. Lung hemorrhages can
third-degree burns also result from direct exposure to excessive overpressure from
an explosion. The probability of a fatality occurring as a result of
Impact Thermal radiation, Q (kW/m2) Distance (m) a lung hemorrhage can be calculated using Eq. (A72). However,
it should be noted that for an explosion in a tank with a capacity
First-degree burns 2.84 206.6 of 1.1 m3, there is almost no chance of a fatal lung hemorrhage
Second-degree burns 7.22 150.2
occurring even close to the center of the explosion: as shown in
Third-degree of burns 143.2 42
Fig. 13, the maximum probability at the center of the explosion is
around 1%. Karlos and Solomos [41] and Baker et al. [55] sug-
gested that 99% of people can survive a lung hemorrhage due to
there is an approximately 95% probability of eardrum rupture for shock pressures of about 2 barg. Equation (A73) is the probit equa-
someone at the center of the explosion, whereas there is an approx- tion that can be used to calculate the probability of glass shattering
imately 50% probability of someone at a distance of 46.37 m suffer- due to the peak overpressure. The probability of glass breaking as a
ing from an eardrum rupture. Karlos and Solomos [41] indicated function of distance is illustrated in Fig. 13. It can be concluded that
that there is a 10% chance of an eardrum rupture occurring as a there is a 100% probability of glass damage occurring at a distance
result of exposure to a pressure of about 0.25 bar. This indicates of 80 m from the center of the explosion, and at 279 m from the
that as well as close to the explosion, people can suffer from a center of the explosion, there is a 50% probability of this occurring.
Fig. 12 Probability of fatalities/injuries due to exposing 60 s to thermal resulted from BLEVE

versus distance

Fig. 13 Probability of lung hemorrhage, eardrum rupture, glass breakage, and structure
damage due to the overpressure resulted from VCE versus distance
Fig. 14 Risk assessment matrix (flash fire scenario)
Table 15 summarizes the impact (50% probability of damage) due than 400 m. Holdern and Reeves [58] recommended that the evacu-
to a VCE. ation distances for a fire involving a liquefied gas vessel should be
The impact of the overpressure on structures can be predicted based on the projectile range rather than the thermal hazard range
using Eq. (A74). It is obvious from Fig. 13 that severe damage because the potential projectile range exceeds the thermal radiation
would occur within 20 m of the explosion (probability of structural hazard range. Birk and Cunningham [54] suggested that, where pos-
damage ≈ 100%), whereas at 78 m, there is a 50% probability of sible, personnel should be evacuated to a distance greater than 15–30
structural damage. times the fireball’s radius.
According to Eq. (A60), the velocity of the fragments would be
3.4.3 Effects Due to Fragments. It is possible to study the beha- 117.73 m/s. According to Eq. (A78), the probability of a fatal injury
vior and estimate the impact of the fragments scattered by an explo- for someone hit by such a fragment (mass > 4.5 kg) would be 100%.
sion. The effect of such fragments depends on their shape, mass,
number, and velocity and on the distance from the center of the explo-
sion. In an analysis of the projectiles generated by the explosion of a 3.5 Risk Assessment Matrix. A risk matrix can be used to
determine the level of risk resulting from the outcomes of the
1.1 m3 tank and according to Birk and Cunningham [54], most (80–
90%) of the projected fragments landed within four times the fireball
radius, and some fragments traveled up to 15 times the radius. In very Table 15 Summary of the impact (50% probability of damage) of
rare cases, fragments traveled up to 30 times the radius of the fireball. the peak overpressure on people and structures resulting from
This meant that 80–90% of the fragments landed within 114.8 m of the explosion of a 1.1 m3 transformer
the explosion, some traveled up to 430.5 m, and a very few fragments
Impact Peak overpressure, Po (kPa) Distance (m)
traveled up to 861 m. In another study, Edwards et al. [56] indicated
that the majority of fragments would land within 700 m. In some Eardrum rupture 43.15 46.37
instances, fragments have been observed to land over 1 km from Lung hemorrhage 103.43 (center of the explosion) 0
the explosion, as it occurred in Mexico City in 1985. Pettitt et al. Glass breakage 3.94 279
[57] stated that the range of fragments could vary from a few Structures damage 19,200 78.07
meters to about 1 km, although most fragments do not travel more

Fig. 15 Risk assessment matrix (pool fire scenario)

Fig. 16 Risk assessment matrix (jet fire scenario)
Fig. 17 Risk assessment matrix (BLEVE scenario)
Fig. 18 Risk assessment matrix (lung hemorrhage due to explosion scenario)

Fig. 19 Risk assessment matrix (ear drum rupture due to explosion scenario)
Fig. 20 Risk assessment matrix (glass breakage due to explosion scenario)
Fig. 21 Risk assessment matrix (structures damage due to explosion scenario)
previous scenarios. The risks are evaluated based on their likeli- radiation generated by BLEVE are usually very strong, so the risk
hoods and impacts. As mentioned earlier, thermal radiation from will be extremely high.
flash fire is usually not significant, so the risk will be low according An explosion can cause various types of injuries and damage,
to Fig. 14. including lung hemorrhage, eardrum rupture, glass breakage, and
The scenario of a pool fire can occur in electrical substations for damage to structures. The risk assessment matrices for these four
several reasons, as mentioned earlier. The radiant energy of the pool types of scenarios are illustrated by Figs. 18–21 respectively.
fire was calculated in Sec. 3.3.3.2, and according to Fig. 9, the
impact was severe for the close range (<5 m) from the center of
the pool fire. Therefore, according to Fig. 15, the risk will be
high. Conversely, the jet fire scenario occurs less frequently than 4 Conclusion
the pool fire scenario. As with the previous scenarios, the risk In this study, the risks and consequences associated with fires and
will be high according to Fig. 16. explosions in electrical substations were studied. A sample of waste
As mentioned in Sec. 2.3, a BLEVE event can occur in electrical oil was collected from an electrical substation in Riyadh, and the
substations for several reasons. Since several BLEVE accidents composition of the sample was analyzed using GC-MS. The flam-
have already been reported in substations, the probability of occur- mability diagram method was employed to determine whether a
rence in Fig. 17 is chosen as possible. The blast waves and thermal flammable mixture is present during the transformer operations.

The results showed that the vapor mixture is not flammable at (vi) It is recommended that a drain be constructed around the
25 °C. The results of the consequence modeling revealed that the transformer to collect and drain any oil that may leak,
peak overpressure produced by an explosion could cause severe which could result in an accumulation of mineral oil in
damage to structures within a radius of 50 m. Moreover, the the drainage system.
thermal radiation emitted by a BLEVE/fireball would produce (vii) Sufficient monitoring sensors should be installed in the
serious injuries up to a distance of 140 m. compartment, where the transformer is located to detect
The findings and lessons learned from this study can be summa- the composition of any flammable mixtures generated.
rized as follows:
When fires and explosions occur in electrical substations, the
consequences can be severe. Therefore, engineers must consider
(i) As transformers become older, fires may occur more fre-
sufficient safety distances when installing these equipment to
quently due to internal defects, malfunctions in bushings,
reduce the impact on people in the vicinity.
or tap changers. Therefore, transformers must be inspected
frequently.
(ii) Transformer oil should not be allowed to discharge onto
the ground in electrical substations during the replace- Conflict of Interest

ment of old oil with new oil as oil on the ground could There are no conflicts of interest. This article does not include
ignite because of direct contact with fire. In addition, in research in which human participants were involved. Informed
enclosed spaces, the waste oil may form a flammable consent not applicable. This article does not include any research
mixture that can easily burn in the presence of any igni- in which animal participants were involved.
tion source.
(iii) Mineral oil is classified as a nonflammable (noncombusti-
ble) liquid. However, it can become flammable if exposed
to heat. If these oils burn, the consequences are usually dire. Appendix A
(iv) Indoor substation transformers should be equipped with a Transformer Type and Size Detailed Calculations. The
good mechanical ventilation system to prevent the forma- power transformer consists of several parts and components, as
tion and accumulation of flammable vapor–air mixtures. shown in Fig. 22.
(v) High-temperature activities such as welding should not be The transformer tank accommodates the core-and-coil assembly,
performed near transformers located in enclosed spaces, tap changer with connections, oil filling, bushings, and associated
especially if there is any indication of an oil leak. Oil fittings. The oil used to fill the transformer tank is class-1 mineral
leaking from transformers contains hydrocarbon com- oil that complies with IEC 60296 and ASTM D3487 international
pounds that can vaporize and form a flammable mixture, standards. The transformer tanks are made of 3 mm-thick mild
especially in enclosed spaces. steel and are designed to be capable of withstanding an internal
Fig. 22 Power transformer major elements

pressure of up to 30 kPa without permanent deformation. The tank If the conservator tank is assumed to be 35% full, the capacity of
is provided with a pressure relief vent to prevent rupturing of the the conservator tank Vc = 100/0.35 = 303 L (0.303 m3).
transformer. It also has a temperature indicator with a range of A fuel leak can occur anywhere in the main tank or conservator
0 °C‒120 °C for making readings of the oil temperature [60]. Trans- tank. Assuming the worst-case scenario, all of the stored oil will
formers of this type are suitable for both indoor and outdoor use and leak from the main tank and conservator tank. This means that
are designed to comply with the following maximum temperature 1100 L of oil will leak onto the floor of the transformer building.
limits [60]: The mass of the conservator tank, mc, can be calculated as
follows:
• Top oil = 45 °C maximum The total volume of the shell of the conservator tank, Vcs, is
• Winding = 50 °C maximum expressed as follows:
• Hot spot = 98 °C maximum
• Average temperature due to short circuit = 250 °C maximum. Vcs = π × L × t(d − t)
The transformer is installed inside a compartment that has the fol- where L is the length of the tank, cm, and t is the thickness of the
lowing dimensions and properties: tank (3 mm) [33].
Thus,

Width, wc = 4 m
Length, Lc = 5 m Vcs = π × 1.53 × 0.003(0.50 − 0.003) = 0.007 m3
Height, hc = 3 m
Interior lining thickness, δ = 30 cm
mc = Vcs × ρSS
Ambient air temperature, Ta = 25 °C.
where ρSS is the density of stainless steel (7800 kg/m3). Thus,
The transformer tank consists of an irregular steel box. However,
in this study, it was assumed that the box was a cube holding 1000 L mc = 0.007 × 7800 = 54.6 kg
of oil. The conservator tank, in contrast, has a cylindrical shape
(length = 153 cm; diameter = 50 m) and is only partly filled with The mass of the main tank, mm, can be calculated as follows:
oil (Fig. 23). The total volume of the 3 mm shell of the main tank, Vms, is
The transformer tank is connected by pipework to the conservator expressed as follows:
tank. Usually the conservator tank is filled about 25–35% full, and
the volume of oil in the conservator tank will then be 10–12% of the Vms = Vm − V2 = [(1 + 0.003) × (1 + 0.003)
volume in the main tank [33]. × (1 + 0.003)]−[1 × 1 × 1] = 0.009 m3
The volume of the conservator tank, Vc, can be determined as
follows. → mm = 0.009 × 7800 = 70.2 kg
Assuming that the volume of the oil in the conservator tank is Thus, the total mass of the two vessels = 54.6 + 70.2 = 124.8 kg.
10% of the volume in the main tank, the volume of oil Vo = 0.1 ×
1000 = 100 L.
This means that the total amount of oil is 1000 L (main tank) +
100 L (conservator tank) = 1100 L. Lower Flammability Limit, Upper Flammability Limit, and
Limiting Oxygen Concentration. For many hydrocarbon
vapors, Jones [61] found that the flammability limits are function
of the stoichiometric concentration of fuel:
0.55(100)
LFL = (A1)
4.76m + 1.19x − 2.38y + 1
3.50(100)
UFL = (A2)
4.76m + 1.19x − 2.38y + 1
where LFL is lower flammable limits (vol%), UFL is the upper
flammable limits (vol%), and m, x, and y can be found according
to the following combustion reaction equation:
x
Cm Hx Oy + zO2 mCO2 + H2 O (A3)
2
Here, z is equivalent moles O2/moles fuel:
x y
z=m+ − (A4)
4 2
Le Chatelier [62] suggested correlations for estimating the LFL
and UFL of vapor mixtures.
1
LFLmix = (A5)
(yi /LFLi )
1
UFLmix = (A6)
(yi /UFLi )
where LFLi is the lower flammability limit of fuel component i
(vol%), UFLi is the upper flammability limit of fuel component i
Fig. 23 Transformer tanks dimensions: (a) conservator tank (vol%), yi is the mole fraction of component i on a combustible
and (b) main tank basis, and n is combustible species number.

A simple model for predicting the LOC was proposed by Evaporation or Boiling. The evaporation rate for liquids with
Bodurtha [63]: boiling points close or higher than ambient temperature, and the
pool area is large, can be determined using Eq. (A14) [67,68]:
LOC = z(LFL) (A7)
Mwt K Ae Psat
The LOC for mixtures can be determined using the following Qm = (A14)
equations [64]: Rg T L
where Qm is the evaporation rate (mass/time), Mwt is the pure mate-
yi zi yi zi
LOCmix = = (A8) rial molecular mass (mass/mole), K is the mass transfer coefficient
yi /L∗i yi zi /LOCi (length/time), Ae is the exposure area (length2), Psat is the saturation
vapor pressure of the liquid (force/area), and TL is the liquid temper-
LOCi
L∗i = (A9) ature (deg).
zi The mass transfer coefficient, K, can be calculated using Eq.
where LOCmix is the LOC for the fuel mixture (vol%), zi is the stoi- (A15) [67,68]:
chiometric molar ratio of oxygen to fuel mixture for compound i, 1/3

and LOCi is the LOC for compound i (vol%) Eq. (A7). Mo
K = Ko (A15)
Mwt
Consequence Analysis where Ko is a reference mass transfer coefficient (length/time), Mo is
Outflow Rates. The outflow rate is affected by the physical state a reference molecular mass (mass/mole), and Mwt is the molecular
of the stored material and the characteristics of the failure. A release mass of species (mass/mole).
may consist of liquid, gas/vapor, or both phases [65]. Water, which has a mass transfer coefficient of 0.83 cm/s, is
usually used as the reference substance.
Gas/Vapor Outflow. The majority of gas discharges from Fires

process plant leaks are initially sonic. Rate equations for sonic
and subsonic discharges through an orifice were introduced by dif- Jet Fires. Important calculations for jet fires are flame size and
ferent authors [26,38,65–67]. For free expansion leak (subsonic shape, flame tilt, and thermal radiation assessment [26,69].
flow):

Flame Shape. The model recommended by Hawthorn et al. [70]

2 γ M γ 2/γ (γ+1)/γ can be utilized to predict the length of the jet flame originating from
p p
Gv = Cd A p − (A10) a gaseous discharge:
Rg T γ − 1 pa pa

L 5.3 Tad. Ma 0.5
where Gv is the gas/vapor flowrate (mass/time), Cd is the discharge = Ct + (1 − Ct ) (A16)
De Ct αTv Mf
coefficient (dimensionless), A is the hole cross-sectional area
(length2), p is the upstream pressure (force/area), pa is the where De is the initial diameter of the jet (length), Ct is the mole
ambient pressure (force/area), γ is the heat capacity ratio (unitless), ratio of fuel to reactants (‒), α is the ratio of the number of moles
M is the gas molecular weight (kg/kg · mol), and Rg is the gas cons- of reactants to moles of products (‒), Tad. is the flame temperature
tant (pressure-volume/mole-deg). (deg), Tv is the initial temperature of the jet fuel (deg), Ma is the
For sonic (choked) flow, molecular mass of the air (mass/mole), and Mf is the molecular
0.5 mass of the fuel (mass/mole).
γM 2 (γ+1)/(γ−1) Because Ct ≪ 1, α = 1, and for most actual fuels Tad./Tv it ranges
Gv = C d A p (A11) between 7 and 9 [71], Eq. (A.16) can be simplified to:
RT γ + 1

L − s 15 Ma 0.5
Liquid Outflow. Discharge of liquids from a hole in a vessel can = (A17)
De Ct Mf
be computed using the Bernoulli and Torricelli equation
[26,38,65–67]: Andreassen et al. [69] reported that for choked releases, the exit
0.5 diameter should be replaced by a hypothetical nozzle that has a dia-
2(p − pa )
GL = Cd Aρ + 2gh (A12) meter, Def, given by:
ρ
γ+1
where GL is the liquid flowrate (mass/time), ρ is the liquid density Def 1 2 + (γ − 1)Mef2 4(γ−1)
= (A18)
(mass/volume), h is the static head of the liquid (length), and g is the De Mef γ+1
gravitational acceleration (length/time2).
where Mef is the effective Mach number, which can be calculated
Flashing and Evaporation by:
Flashing. The fraction of the liquid that flashes during a super-

γ−1

2 pv γ
Mef =
heated liquid released to atmospheric pressure can be calculated
−1 (A19)
using Eq. (A13) [67]: γ−1 pa
(T − Tb )
Fv = C p (A13) where pv is the upstream pressure at the event orifice (force/area).
h fg Kent [59] suggested a model to predict the lift-off distance, s:
where Cp is the liquid heat capacity averaged over T to Tb (energy/ 6.4π De ue
mass deg), T is the liquid initial temperature (deg), Tb is the liquid s= (A20)
4 ua
atmospheric boiling point (deg), hfg is the liquid latent heat of
vaporization at Tb (energy/mass), and Fv is fraction of the liquid where ue is the exit velocity (m/s), and ua is the average jet velocity
vaporized (‒). (length/time) = 0.4ue.

The exit velocity can be determined by: The partial pressure of water, Pw, can be calculated as follows

[26]:
γ−1 2
ue = Mef γRT/ 1 + Mef (A21) 5328
2 Pw = 101325 (RH) exp 14.4114 − (A31)
Ta
where T is the upstream gas temperature (deg). where RH is the relative humidity (percent).
Heat Transfer Assessment. Thermal radiation from jet fires can View Factor. Predicting thermal radiation emitted by fire
be predicted using two models, namely, point source and solid requires information on the view factor between the fire and the
flame models [26,72]. Point source model overestimates the inten- target [74]. The view factor depends on the shape of the flame,
sity of thermal radiation at locations close to the fire because in the the distance between the flame front and the receiving target, and
near field, the radiation is greatly influenced by the flame size, the position of the receiver. Equation (A32) can be used to
shape, tilt, and orientation of the observer. predict the view factor [26]:
The radiative heat flux to a target, Q, may be expressed as 1

follows: F= (A32)
4π x2
q
Q= (A22)
4πx2
− Pool Fire. The most important calculations for pool fire are as
′′
q = f m ΔHc (A23) follows: pool size, flame height, burning rate, atmospheric transmis-
sivity, flame emissive power, view factor, and thermal radiation
where q is the energy released by radiation (kW), x is the distance assessment [26,38,65,66,75–78].
from the flame center (m), f is the fraction of the heat released as
radiation (–), and ΔHc is the heat of combustion of the fuel (kJ/kg). Pool Size and Flame Height. The size of the pond depends on
The solid flame model is the most popular and used method, whether there are barriers located in the place where the spilled
which gives the most accurate and reliable results. This model liquid collected [69]. Mudan and Croce [79] provided a correlation
assuming the flame to have a shape as a cylinder with an equivalent for the prediction of the maximum pool diameter (Eq. (A.33)):
diameter Deq.:

.

Deq. = L2 + 2Ac − L (A24) VL
Dmax = 2 . (A33)
πy
where Ac is the surface area of the frustum of the cone (length2), .
which can be calculated by: where VL is the volumetric flowrate of the spilled liquid (volume/
.

time), and y is the liquid burning rate (length/time).
W2 − W1 2 The area of a pool fire can be calculated as follows:
Ac = 0.25(W12 + W22 ) + 0.5(W1 + W2 ) L2 + (A25)
2 πD2p
Ap = (A34)
The flame surface emissive power, Ep (energy/area), can be pre- 4
dicted using Eq. (A26) [69]: where Dp is the pool diameter (length).
. Thomas [80] introduced a correlation that is widely used to deter-
fR m ΔH
Ep = (A26) mine the flame length:
Af
0.61
where fR is the radiative fraction (‒). H mB
= 42 (A35)
The surface area for the jet frustum fire is given by Andreassen Dp ρa gDp
et al. [69]:
where H is the visible flame length (m), Dp is the equivalent pool
diameter (m), mB is the mass burning rate (kg/m2 s) and this is
π 2 π W2 − W1 2
Af = (W1 + W2 ) + (W1 + W2 ) L2 +
2
(A27) assumed as 0.039 for mineral oil [75,81], ρa is the air density
4 2 2
(1.23 kg/m3), and g is the gravitational acceleration (9.81 m/s2).
Chamberlain [73] suggested the following equation to calculate fR:
Flame Surface Emissive Power. The temperature and emissivity
fR = 0.21e−0.00323 uj + 0.11 (A28) are usually considered the main parameters contributed to the radi-
ation from hot gases or flames. The emissivity is the ability of a hot
The radiant heat flux to a target at a certain distance from the gas gas to emit heat by radiation [76]. The surface emissive power
outlet can be estimated using Eq. (A29) [72]: depends on the type of the fuel and the size of the fire. Mudan
and Croce [82] provided the correlation to predict the emissive
Qj = Ep Fτ (A29)
power:
where τ is the atmospheric transmissivity (‒), which can be calculated
by Eq. (A30), and F is the view factor (‒), which can be calculated by E = Emax e−sDp + Es (1 − e−sDp ) (A36)
Eq. (A32). 2
where E is the average emissive power (kW/m ), Emax is the
maximum emissive power of the luminous spots (≈140 kW/m2),
Atmospheric Transmissivity. The atmospheric transmissivity Es is the emissive power of smoke (≈20 kW/m2), and s is an exper-
calculation is needed to determine the radiant heat flux. The simpli- imental parameter (0.12 m−1).
fied empirical equation is expressed as follows [26]:
Geometric View Factor. The view factor can be predicted using
τ = 2.02(Pw x)−0.09 (A30) the same model proposed in jet fire section Eq. (A32).
where Pw is the partial pressure of water (Pascals, N/m2) and x is the Received Thermal Flux. The thermal flux emitted from pool fire
length of the path from the target to the surface of the (m). can be calculated using the solid flame model Eq. (A29).

Heat Release Rate. For most organic liquids, the pool fire heat where Frad is the radiation fraction (dimensionless). A value of
release rate is well correlated by the model of Stroup et.al. [75]: 0.25–0.4 of the fuel heat of combustion can be suggested [85].
To calculate the geometric view factor of the fireball, the shape of
qr = mB ΔHc (1 − e−kβ Dp ) Adike (A37) the fireball was assumed to have a perfect sphere shape [26,86]:
where qr is the pool fire heat release rate (kW), mB is the burning x(D/2)2
rate per unit area (kg/m2 s), ΔHc is the heat of combustion of fuel F= (A46)
(L2 + H 2 )3/2
(kJ/kg), Adike is the surface area of pool fire (m2), and kβ is the
empirical constant (m−1). where D is the diameter of the fireball (m), x is the distance from a
It has been found that liquid swimming pool fires are usually not point at the ground directly below the fireball center to the observer
dangerous when their diameter is smaller than about 0.2 m [76]. at the ground level, and H is the center height of the fireball (m).
Burning Duration. The following expression can be used to cal- Corner Fires. Walls and corners will have major impacts on the
culate the burning duration of a fixed volume of fuel [76,81]: spread and growth of fire as they will cause reduction of air entrain-
ment available for a flame or plume. This will lengthen the flame

4V
tb = (A38) and cause the temperature in the plume to be higher than it will
πD2p ν be in the open [75,81]. Hasemi and Tokunaga [87,88] provided a
correlation to estimate the corner fire flame height:
where tb is the pool fire burning rate time), V is the liquid volume
(volume), Dp is the pool diameter (length), and ν is the rate of Hf (corner) = 0.075(qr )3/5 (A47)
burning (regression rate), (length/time).
The following expression can be used to determine the burning where Hf (corner) is the corner fire flame height (m) and qr is the fire
rate [76,81]: heat release rate (kW).
mB
ν= (A39)
ρ Hot Gas Layer Temperature in a Close Compartment. A corre-
lation to predict the temperature of the hot gases in a closed doors
where ρ is the liquid fuel density (mass/volume). compartment is proposed by Beyler [89]:
BLEVE/Fireball. BLEVE is an explosion caused by a sudden 2K2 √ √
ΔTg = 2 K1 t − 1 + e−k1 t (A48)
failure of a tank containing a liquid at a temperature well above K1
its boiling point. This is usually occurred as a result of overheating
due to an external fire such as a pool fire or jet fire [83]. Upon vessel where
failure, a blast wave, flying missiles, and fireball will usually be √ .
resulted [26]. 2 0.4 kρc AT Q
K1 = and K2 = (A49)
m cp m cp
Fireball Diameter, Duration, and Fireball Height. Many corre- and ΔTg is the upper layer gas temperature rise above ambient (Tg −
lations for the fireball dimensions and durations have been pub- Ta) (K), k is the interior lining thermal conductivity (kW/m K), ρ is
lished in different literature [26,38,65,84]. These models use the the interior lining density (kg/m3), c is the interior lining thermal
amount of the flammable liquid in the fireball to predict the diameter .
capacity (kJ/kg K), Q is the fire heat release rate (kW), m is the
and duration of the fireball. Equations (A40)–(A43) are used to cal-
gas mass in the compartment (kg), cp is the air specific heat
culate the maximum diameter, center height, and duration of the
(kJ/kg k), and t is the exposure time (s).
fireball [26]:
The interior surface area of the compartment [76,81]:
Dmax = 5.8M 1/3 (A40)
AT = [2(wc × lc ) + 2(hc × wc ) + 2(hc × lc )] (A50)
tBLEVE = 0.45M 1/3
for M < 30,000 kg (A41) 2
where AT in the interior surface area of the compartment (m ), wc is
the width of the compartment (m), lc is the length of the compart-
tBLEVE = 2.6M 1/6 for M > 30,000 kg (A42) ment (m), and hc is the height of the compartment (m).
Pressure Rise in a Closed Compartment Due to Fires. The

HBLEVE = 0.75Dmax (A43) maximum pressure difference inside a close compartment resulted
where Dmax is the maximum fireball diameter (m), M is the initial from the expansion of gases is given by Eq. (A51) [90]:
mass of flammable liquid (kg), tBLEVE is the fireball combustion P − Pa t
duration (s), and HBLEVE is the center height of the fireball (m). = (A51)
Pa Vc ρa cv Ta
Thermal Radiation. The thermal radiation release from the fire- where P is the compartment pressure attributed to combustion
ball and received by a given target might be calculated by Eq. (atm), Pa is the initial atmospheric pressure (atm), t is the time
(A29). This model requires the atmospheric transmissivity, the after ignition (s), Vc is the volume of the compartment (m3), ρa is
flame surface emissive power, and the view factors. Atmospheric the ambient air density (kg/m3), cv is the constant volume specific
transmissivity can be calculated from Eq. (A30). The bath length, heats of air (kJ/kg K), and Ta is the ambient temperature (K).
x, from the target to the flame surface is given by [26]:
x = [HBLEVE
2
+ r 2 ]0.5 − [0.5Dmax ] (A44) Explosion Modeling
Calculating thermal radiation also requires a prediction of the Pressure Rise. The pressure rise caused by the expansion of the
surface emitted flux, Ep [26]: gases can be calculated through the following equation [75]:

Frad M ΔHc Tad
Ep = (A45) Pmax = Pa (A52)
π(Dmax )2 tBELVE Ta

where Pmax is the maximum pressure at end of combustion (kPa), Pa
is the initial ambient atmospheric pressure prior to ignition (kPa),
Tad is the adiabatic flame temperature of burned gas (K), and Ta
is the ambient temperature (K).
Blast Wave Energy in a Confined Explosion. When a large

amount of evaporated flammable gas escapes from a closed vessel
into the atmosphere, it mixes with air and then ignites, causing an
explosion. The energy released by the rupture of a pressurized
vessel can be calculated using Eq. (A53) [75,81]:
E = ∝ ΔHc mf (A53)
where E is the blast wave energy (kJ), α = yield, ΔHc is enthalpy
of combustion (kJ/kg), and mf is the mass of flammable vapor

released (kg).
The yield, α, is usually in the range of 1% for unconfined mass
releases, to 100% for confined vapor releases [91].
The TNT equivalent mass is calculated as follows [26]:
η m ΔHc
mTNT = (A54)
ETNT
where mTNT is the equivalent mass of TNT (kg), η is the explosion
yield factor (1–10%), m is the mass of the explosive (kg), and ETNT
is the heat of combustion of TNT (kJ/kg).
Peak Overpressure. Several models were previously published

to predict the peak overpressure induced by explosions. The TNT Fig. 24 The scaled peak side-on overpressure versus the
equivalence model, the TNO multi-energy model, and the Baker– scaled distance [26,92]
Strehlow method are the most popular and widely used methods.
The TNO multi-energy model and the Baker–Strehlow method
are more accurate than the TNT method, and thus, the TNO multi-
energy model has been chosen to be used in the overpressure pre- Consequently, the volume of the vapor cloud in the congested
diction in this work. area can be estimated as follows:
E
Vcloud = (A59)
TNO Multi-Energy Method. TNO multi-energy method devel- 35
oped by Van den Berg [92] defines the peak overpressure and the
positive phase duration as a function of the distance to the cloud. Vessel Fragments. Baker et al. [95] developed a technique for
A combustion energy scaled distance related to the distance from predicting initial fragment velocities for spherical or cylindrical
the center of the explosion can be defined as follows [92]: vessels bursting into equal fragments. The dimensionless velocity
r (the y-axis in Fig. 26) is given by:
=
R (A55)
(E/pa )1/3
νi
is the scaled distance from the charge (dimensionless), r is (A60)
where R Ka0
the distance from the to the center of the explosion (m), and E is the
explosion energy (J ). where νi is the fragment velocity (length/time), a0 is the speed of
Once the scaled distance has been calculated, the scaled overpres- sound of the initial gas in the vessel (length/time), and K is a correc-
sure can be obtained from Fig. 24. tion factor for unequal mass fragments, as shown in Fig. 26.
The blast peak side-on overpressure is calculated from the scaled
The scaled pressure in Fig. 27 is given by Eq. (A61) [55]:
overpressure. This is given by Eq. (A56) [65,92]:
po = Δp · pa (A56) (P − Pa )V
P= (A61)
Mc a20
The positive phase duration is given by [65,92]:
where P is the scaled pressure (unitless), P is the bursting pressure
(E/ pa )1/3
td = td (A57) of the vessel (force/area), V is the vessel volume (length3), and Mc is
c0 the mass of the vessel (mass).
where po is the peak overpressure (Pa), Δp is the scaled overpres- For an ideal gas, the speed of sound can be determined using
sure (dimensionless), td is the positive-phase duration (s), td is the Eq. (A62) [55]:
scaled positive-phase duration (dimensionless), and c0 is the
ambient speed of sound (m/s) (Fig. 25). TγRg 1/2
For most hydrocarbon the total combustion of a stoichiometric a0 = (A62)
Mwt
hydrocarbon/air mixture can be estimated as follows [93,94]:
E = 3.5Vcloud (A58) where T is the absolute temperature (temperature), γ is the heat
capacity ratio of the gas in the vessel (unitless), Rg is the ideal
where E is the energy of the explosion (mJ) and Vcloud is the volume gas constant (pressure—volume/mole deg), and Mwt is the molecu-
of the vapor cloud in the congested area (m3). lar mass of the gas in the vessel (mass/mole).

Fig. 25 The scaled positive-phase duration as a function of the scaled distance [26,92]
Fig. 27 Adjustment factor for unequal mass fragments [55]
Fig. 26 Scaled fragment velocity versus scaled pressure [55]

Vulnerability. To estimate the effects of an accident on people
and the damage it can cause, the best method is probit analysis.
Probit analysis analyzes the relationship between a stimulus
The data in Fig. 25 can be fitted by the following equation [55]: (dose) and the quantal response [97,98]. The relationship between
the probit variable (Y ) and the probability (Pr) is expressed as
K = 1.306 × (mass fraction of each fragment) + 0.308446 follows [98,99]:
(A63)
Y −5 |Y − 5|
Pr = 50 1 + erf √ (A66)
The following equations were proposed by Baum [95] and Birk |Y − 5| 2
[96] to predict the distance the projectiles reached from rupture of
cylindrical tanks: where erf is the error function.
The probit variable, Y, can be calculated using the following
expression [98,99]:
For tanks with capacity < 5m3 : r = 90 × M 0.33 (A64)
Y = a + b ln V (A67)
For tanks with capacity > 5m : r = 465 × M
3 0.1
(A65) where a and b are constants that are experimentally determined
from experimentation with animals, or, in some cases from informa-
where M is the mass of material contained in the tank (kg) and is the tion on accidents, and V is a measure of intensity of the damaging
distance (m). effect.

Table 16 Transformation of probit values to percentages of [26,38,103]. The probit equation for eardrum rupture is given by
mortality [98,100] Eq. (A71) [26,99,103]:
% 0 2 4 6 8
Y = −15.6 + 1.93 ln p0 (A71)
0 – 2.95 3.25 3.45 3.59
10 3.72 3.82 3.92 4.01 4.08 where P0 is the overpressure.
20 4.16 4.23 4.29 4.36 4.42 Eisenberg et al. [99] presented a probit equation for estimating
30 4.48 4.53 4.59 4.64 4.69 mortality due to lung hemorrhage:
40 4.75 4.80 4.85 4.90 4.95
50 5.00 5.05 5.10 5.15 5.20
60 5.25 5.31 5.36 5.41 5.47 Y = −77.1 + 6.9 ln p0 (A72)
70 5.52 5.58 5.64 5.71 5.77
80 5.84 5.92 5.99 6.08 6.18 Fugelso et al. [103] introduced a probit relation for estimation of
90 6.28 6.41 6.55 6.75 7.05 glass breakage due to explosion:
99 7.33 7.41 7.46 7.65 7.88

Y = −18.1 + 2.79 ln p0 (A73)
The following probit equation has been proposed to predict the

Equation (A67) is used to calculate the effects caused by acci- structural damage induced by explosion [26,99]:
dents such as fire, explosion, and toxic emissions. Hence, the calcu-
lated effect can be converted into percentages using Eq. (A67) or Y = −23.8 + 2.92 ln p0 (A74)
Table 16.
Damage From Fires. The heat radiation emitted by fires can

cause different kinds of damage to the human body. Burns of Effects of Fragmentation. The danger distance can be estimated
human skin tissue are usually classified as first-, second-, and third- using the following model [104]:
degree burns. Eisenberg et al. [99] developed a probit model that
can be used to predict the probability of fatality due to thermal radi-
ation Eq. (A68): rd = 634 (m)1/6 (A75)
where rd is danger distance (m) and m is the explosive weight (kg).

Y = −36.38 + 2.56 ln (Q4/3 t) (A68) Kinney and Graham [105] recommended the following formula
for estimating the adequate safety distance:
The probit equations for nonfatal injury are expressed as follows
[38]: 1/3
rs = 120 mTNT (A76)
First-degree burns:
where rs is the safety distance for preventing missile damage to per-
Y = −39.83 + 3.02 ln (Q4/3 t) (A69) sonnel (90 m minimum).
Van Den Bosch and Weterings [65] suggested two correlations to
Second-degree burns: calculate the probability of fatality from missiles generated by
explosion. For fragments between 0.1 kg and 4.5 kg, the probit is
Y = −43.14 + 3.02 ln (Q4/3 t) (A70) related to kinetic energy, such that:
Fire risk assessment requires a relationship between the thermal Y = −17.56 + 5.3 ln S (for fragments mass 0.1 kg to 4.5 kg)
dose and the effects on people. High thermal radiation caused by
fires, such as fireball, may extend a great distance above the (A77)
ground, making it relatively difficult to avoid and protect against
its hazard. Table 17 summarizes the effects of thermal radiation Y = −13.196 + 10.54 ln V (for fragments mass > 4.5 kg) (A78)
on humans and structures [38,101,102].
where
Damage From Explosions 1
S = mf V 2 (A79)
Effects of Overpressure. The main direct effects of overpressure 2
to humans are eardrum damage, lung damage, injury due to the dis- mf is mass of the fragment (kg) and V is velocity of the fragment
placement of the whole body, and injury from shattered glasses (m/s).
Table 17 Thermal radiation effects [38,101,102]
Heat Flux
(kW/m2) Observed effect
35–37.5 Sufficient to cause damage to process equipment. Cellulosic material will pilot ignite within one minute’s exposure.
23–25 Spontaneous ignition of wood after long exposure. Unprotected steel will reach thermal stress temperatures, which can cause failures.
Pressure vessel needs to be relieved or failure will occur.
12.6 Thin steel with insulation on the side away from the fire may reach a thermal stress level high enough to cause structural failure.
Minimum energy required for piloted ignition of wood and melting of plastic tubing.
9.5 Pain threshold reached after 8 s; second-degree burns after 20
4.0 Sufficient to cause pain to a person if unable to reach cover within 20 s; however, blistering of the skin (second-degree burns) is likely;
0% lethality.
1.6 Will cause no discomfort for long exposure.

014501-24 / Vol. 1, 2022
Appendix B
Table 18 Results of the GC–MS analysis of the waste oil sample

Peak NO. Compound name Matching (%) Formula MWt. B.P. (°C) RT (min) Peak area Peak area (%) Height Height (%) A/H
1 2-Methylheptane 93 C8H18 114.229 116 3.038 1,333,733 1.6 953,669 1.63 1.4
2 3-Methylheptane 92 C8H18 114.229 118–120 3.102 1,514,215 1.82 1,069,228 1.83 1.42
3 3-Hexanone 96 C6H12O 100.159 119–121 3.2 1,645,426 1.98 1,670,582 2.86 0.98
4 2-Hexanone 95 C6H12O 100.159 126–127 3.235 1,900,678 2.28 2,033,300 3.49 0.93
5 3-Hexanol 95 C6H14O 102.175 134–136 3.276 1,088,195 1.31 1,211,727 2.08 0.9
6 2-Hexanol 96 C6H14O 102.175 137–138 3.312 2,171,816 2.61 1,917,967 3.29 1.13
7 1,2-Ethanediol, monoacetate 97 C4H8O3 104.104 182 3.748 11,912,231 14.3 5,429,415 9.31 2.19
8 2-(2-Hydroxyethoxy)ethyl acetate 96 C6H12O4 148.157 231.0 ± 15.0 6.226 981,744 1.18 701,412 1.2 1.4
9 1H-Indene, octahydro-2,2,4,4,7,7-hexamethyl-, trans 90 C15H28 208.383 239.4 ± 7.0 8.229 589,528 0.71 362,600 0.62 1.63
10 8a-Ethyl-1,1,4a,6-tetramethyldecahydronaphthalene 86 C16H30 222.409 262.6 ± 7.0 8.327 1,004,418 1.21 559,432 0.96 1.8
11 Pentadecane 89 C15H32 212.415 269–270 8.491 1,493,917 1.8 654,652 1.12 2.28
12 Pentadecane, 7-methyl- 88 C16H34 226.441 277.1 ± 7.0 8.864 1,681,742 2.02 1,275,482 2.19 1.32
13 Pentadecanal 86 C15H30O 226.398 285.1 ± 3.0 8.939 1,756,809 2.11 1,446,909 2.48 1.21
14 Hexadecane 92 C16H34 226.441 287 9.131 4,196,804 5.05 2,482,436 4.26 1.69
15 Hexadecane, 7-methyl 93 C17H36 240.468 292.1 ± 7.0 9.198 3,082,664 3.71 1,670,522 2.86 1.85
16 Hexadecanal 86 C16H32O 240.425 297.8 ± 3.0 9.804 2,156,241 2.59 1,414,717 2.43 1.52
17 Pentadecane, 2,6,10,14-tetramethyl 92 C19H40 268.521 296 9.86 4,304,652 5.17 3,039,718 5.21 1.42
18 Heptadecane 89 C17H36 240.468 302 10.175 5,813,963 6.99 3,692,456 6.33 1.57
19 Octadecane 89 C18H38 254.494 317 10.487 4,515,057 5.43 3,505,287 6.01 1.29
20 7-Hexadecenal 83 C16H30O 238.409 330.9 ± 21.0 10.528 9,858,275 11.85 8,069,971 13.85 1.22
21 3,7,11,15-Tetramethyl-2-hexadecen-1-ol 82 C20H40O 296.531 335.5 10.807 1,590,231 1.91 1,078,325 1.85 1.47
22 2-Dodecen-1-yl(-)succinic anhydride 84 C16H26O3 266.376 348.4 10.921 1,046,211 1.26 760,195 1.3 1.38
23 E-10,13,13-Trimethyl-11-tetradecen-1-ol acetate 84 C19H36O2 296.488 352.5 ± 11.0 11.079 3,872,794 4.66 2,370,335 4.06 1.63
24 Heneicosane 92 C21H44 296.574 356.1 ± 5.0 11.144 6,552,576 7.88 5,089,582 8.72 1.29
25 Oxirane, hexadecyl 85 C18H36O 268.478 357.9 11.61 1,318,585 1.59 981,399 1.68 1.34
26 1-Henicosanol 85 C21H44O 312.573 366.1 ± 5.0 11.64 1,121,472 1.35 1,332,543 2.28 0.84
27 9-Tricosene, (Z) 83 C23H46 322.611 399.4 ± 9.0 11.723 866,486 1.04 638,466 1.09 1.36
28 1-Hexacosene 83 C26H52 364.691 405.6 ± 8.0 11.855 730,027 0.88 575,830 0.99 1.27
29 E,E,Z-1,3,12-Nonadecatriene-5,14-diol 85 C19H34O2 294.472 420.4 ± 30.0 13.357 903,866 1.09 724,847 1.24 1.25
30 Supraene 94 C30H50 410.718 458.3207 15.945 2,179,551 2.62 1,623,853 2.78 1.34
Transactions of the ASME
ASME Open Journal of Engineering

Table 19 Details of the calculations of the LFL, UFL, and LOC of each component of the waste oil sample and of the mixture
Upper val. of
Vap. P. (Psat) Vap. P. (Psat)
Peak mmHg at mmHg at Mass Xi/ Mole Fr. Yi LFL UFL Yi / Yi/ LOC [z/(1+z)] ∑(yi*z)/
No. Compound name Area 25 °C) 25 °C) fr.Xi MWt. Xi (vol%) Xi*P sat (vol%) Yi (%) (%) LFL UFL z (vol%) *100 ∑yi*z LOCi
1 2-Methylheptane 1,333,733 20.5 ± 0.1 20.60 0.01603 0.0001 2.6034 53.6297 0.0706 0.1897 0.90 5.80 0.2108 0.0327 12.5 11.25 92.59 2.37 0.2108
2 3-Methylheptane 1,514,215 19.6 ± 0.1 19.70 0.01820 0.0002 2.9557 58.2268 0.0766 0.2060 0.90 7.20 0.2289 0.0286 12.5 11.25 92.59 2.58 0.2289
3 3-Hexanone 1,645,426 12.1 ± 0.2 12.30 0.01978 0.0002 3.6630 45.0546 0.0593 0.1594 1.30 7.70 0.1226 0.0207 8.5 11.05 89.47 1.35 0.1226
4 2-Hexanone 1,900,678 11.0 11.00 0.02285 0.0002 4.2312 46.5432 0.0612 0.1647 1.20 8.00 0.1372 0.0206 8.5 10.20 89.47 1.40 0.1372
5 3-Hexanol 1,088,195 3.4 ± 0.5 3.90 0.01308 0.0001 2.3747 9.2613 0.0122 0.0328 1.29 8.03 0.0254 0.0041 9 11.61 90.00 0.29 0.0254
6 2-Hexanol 2,171,816 2.6 ± 0.5 3.10 0.02611 0.0003 4.7394 14.6922 0.0193 0.0520 1.29 8.03 0.0403 0.0065 9 11.61 90.00 0.47 0.0403
7 1,2-Ethanediol, monoacetate 11,912,231 0.2 ± 0.8 1.00 0.14320 0.0014 25.5136 25.5136 0.0336 0.0903 2.45 15.61 0.0368 0.0058 4.5 11.03 81.82 0.41 0.0368
8 2-(2-Hydroxyethoxy)ethyl acetate 981,744 0.0 ± 1.0 1.00 0.01180 0.0001 1.4775 1.4775 0.0019 0.0052 1.60 10.20 0.0033 0.0005 7 11.20 87.50 0.04 0.0033
9 1H-Indene, 589,528 0.1 ± 0.2 1.20 0.00709 0.0000 0.6308 0.7570 0.0010 0.0027 0.52 3.31 0.0052 0.0008 22 11.44 95.65 0.06 0.0052
octahydro-2,2,4,4,7,7-hexamethyl-, trans
10 8a-Ethyl-1,1, 1,004,418 0.0 ± 0.3 0.30 0.01207 0.0001 1.0069 0.3021 0.0004 0.0011 0.49 3.10 0.0022 0.0003 23.5 11.52 95.92 0.03 0.0022
4a,6-tetramethyldecahydronaphthalene
11 Pentadecane 1,493,917 0.0 ± 0.3 0.30 0.01796 0.0001 1.5681 0.4704 0.0006 0.0017 0.50 4.30 0.0033 0.0004 23 11.50 95.83 0.04 0.0033
12 Pentadecane, 7-methyl- 1,681,742 0.0 ± 0.3 0.30 0.02022 0.0001 1.6560 0.4968 0.0007 0.0018 0.47 2.98 0.0037 0.0006 24.5 11.52 96.08 0.04 0.0037
13 Pentadecanal 1,756,809 0.0 ± 0.6 0.60 0.02112 0.0001 1.7302 1.0381 0.0014 0.0037 0.65 4.42 0.0056 0.0008 22 14.31 95.65 0.08 0.0056
14 Hexadecane 4,196,804 0.0 ± 0.3 0.30 0.05045 0.0002 4.1325 1.2397 0.0016 0.0044 0.50 4.20 0.0088 0.0010 24.5 12.25 96.08 0.11 0.0088
15 Hexadecane, 7-methyl- 3,082,664 0.0 ± 0.3 0.30 0.03706 0.0002 2.8583 0.8575 0.0011 0.0030 0.44 2.81 0.0069 0.0011 26 11.44 96.30 0.08 0.0069
16 Hexadecanal 2,156,241 0.0 ± 0.6 0.60 0.02592 0.0001 1.9997 1.1998 0.0016 0.0042 0.49 3.10 0.0087 0.0014 23.5 11.52 95.92 0.10 0.0087
17 Pentadecane, 2,6,10,14-tetramethyl- 4,304,652 0.0 ± 0.3 0.30 0.05175 0.0002 3.5744 1.0723 0.0014 0.0038 0.39 2.52 0.0097 0.0015 29 11.31 96.67 0.11 0.0097
18 Heptadecane 5,813,963 0.0 ± 0.3 0.30 0.06989 0.0003 5.3909 1.6173 0.0021 0.0057 0.50 4.00 0.0114 0.0014 26 13.00 96.30 0.15 0.0114
19 Octadecane 4,515,057 0.0 ± 0.3 0.30 0.05428 0.0002 3.9558 1.1867 0.0016 0.0042 0.40 3.90 0.0105 0.0011 27.5 11.00 96.49 0.12 0.0105
20 7-Hexadecenal 9,858,275 0.0 ± 0.7 0.70 0.11851 0.0005 9.2198 6.4539 0.0085 0.0228 0.50 3.17 0.0457 0.0072 23 11.50 95.83 0.53 0.0457
21 3,7,11,15-Tetramethyl-2-hexadecen-1-ol 1,590,231 0.0 ± 1.6 1.60 0.01912 0.0001 1.1957 1.9132 0.0025 0.0068 0.39 2.48 0.0174 0.0027 29.5 11.51 96.72 0.20 0.0174
22 2-Dodecen-1-yl(-)succinic anhydride 1,046,211 0.0 ± 0.7 0.70 0.01258 0.0000 0.8757 0.6130 0.0008 0.0022 0.54 3.47 0.0040 0.0006 21 11.34 95.45 0.05 0.0040
23 E-10,13,13-Trimethyl-11-tetradecen-1-ol 3,872,794 0.0 ± 0.8 0.80 0.04656 0.0002 2.9125 2.3300 0.0031 0.0082 0.42 2.70 0.0196 0.0031 27 11.34 96.43 0.22 0.0196
acetate
24 Heneicosane 6,552,576 0.0 ± 0.4 0.40 0.07877 0.0003 4.9263 1.9705 0.0026 0.0070 0.40 3.60 0.0174 0.0019 32 12.80 96.97 0.22 0.0174
25 Oxirane, hexadecyl- 1,318,585 0.0 ± 0.7 0.70 0.01585 0.0001 1.0951 0.7666 0.0010 0.0027 0.43 2.75 0.0063 0.0010 26.5 11.40 96.36 0.07 0.0063
26 1-Henicosanol 1,121,472 0.0 ± 1.8 1.80 0.01348 0.0000 0.8000 1.4400 0.0019 0.0051 0.36 2.32 0.0142 0.0022 31.5 11.34 96.92 0.16 0.0142
27 9-Tricosene, (Z)- 866,486 0.0 ± 0.4 0.40 0.01042 0.0000 0.5989 0.2395 0.0003 0.0008 0.33 2.12 0.0026 0.0004 34.5 11.39 97.18 0.03 0.0026
28 1-Hexacosene 730,027 0.0 ± 0.4 0.40 0.00878 0.0000 0.4463 0.1785 0.0002 0.0006 0.21 3.32 0.0030 0.0002 39 8.11 97.50 0.02 0.0030
2022, Vol. 1 / 014501-25
29 E,E,Z-1,3,12-Nonadecatriene-5,14-diol 903,866 0.0 ± 2.2 2.20 0.01087 0.0000 0.6844 1.5057 0.0020 0.0053 0.43 2.75 0.0124 0.0019 26.5 11.40 96.36 0.14 0.0124
30 Supraene 2,179,551 0.0 ± 0.5 0.50 0.02620 0.0001 1.1832 0.5916 0.0008 0.0021 0.27 1.72 0.0078 0.0012 42.5 11.48 97.70 0.09 0.0078
Total 83,183,907 1.00 0.0054 100.00 282.64 0.3719 1.00 1.0317 0.1524 343.58 2833.77 11.55 1.0317
Average 11.45 94.46
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Fire and Explosion Risks and Consequences in Electrical Substations—A

Article · April 2022

Ionic liquid for biomedical applications View project

1- Separation of aromatics/aliphatic using ionic liquids View project

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Fig. 2 GC-MS analysis for the waste oil sample

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Heat capacity ratio 1.009

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Compartment height, m 6 Input data

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Fig. 9 Probability of fatalities/injuries due to exposing 60 s to thermal resulted from pool

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Thermal radiation, Thermal radiation,

First degree burns 3.17 14.6 First-degree burns 3.17 12.22

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Fig. 12 Probability of fatalities/injuries due to exposing 60 s to thermal resulted from BLEVE

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Fig. 14 Risk assessment matrix (ﬂash ﬁre scenario)

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Fig. 17 Risk assessment matrix (BLEVE scenario)

Fig. 18 Risk assessment matrix (lung hemorrhage due to explosion scenario)

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Fig. 20 Risk assessment matrix (glass breakage due to explosion scenario)

Fig. 21 Risk assessment matrix (structures damage due to explosion scenario)

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Fig. 22 Power transformer major elements

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Gas/Vapor Outﬂow. The majority of gas discharges from Fires

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Pressure Rise in a Closed Compartment Due to Fires. The

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Blast Wave Energy in a Conﬁned Explosion. When a large

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Peak Overpressure. Several models were previously published

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Fig. 27 Adjustment factor for unequal mass fragments [55]

Fig. 26 Scaled fragment velocity versus scaled pressure [55]

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The following probit equation has been proposed to predict the

Damage From Fires. The heat radiation emitted by ﬁres can