Game Research/Design Publication

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I

Member of GAMA
'

35¢
Qfiurnpa
The Official Magazine of
The Europa System 9}er

INSIDE THIS ISSUE:

The Official U.S. OB/OA for Europa

The 1941 Kremlin Wargames
The Spanish Civil War
More First Divisions - The French
 Now, and for the future, Europa. . .

Europa on line
Game Research/Design and
GEnie the General Electric network information
exchange, have joined forces to give you
access to the best gaming system through your
computer and modem.
GR/D will now offer electronic Europa. Some of
these features will include:
GEnie
has a special
9In Game
Electronic mail
Library information
offer for Europa
players for a limited
99 Current Errata
Bulletin Board
of what's what
period of time... 9I» Opponents
National Real Time Conference
Wanted
Cost to join the 99 Magazine
Europa by Computer
- -
articles
GEnie network
$0 99 Coming events
Direct communication with GR/D
and anything else we can think
of .....

Here‘s how you join —

Call GEnie toll free at: 1-800-638-9636

The Europa sign—on lD is: XTX99610,Europa
When you call have your credit card or checking account number
and the sign-on lD ready to open your account and receive your
personal password from GEnie. GEnie will make electronic
transfers from your checking account if you don't want to use a
credit card. They will guide you through the setup and get you
on~line very quickly. Remember, joining fees are waived!

GR/DlS already on the bulletin board and we will be downloading

files to the library shortly. Our national conference will
commence in November. Watch for announcements on GEnie.
 36¢ (S'uropa flows
The Official Magazine of the (Sinatra System
N°- 9 September/October 1989
Gam5"32:2§:‘ch%;s.gn CONTENTS
P.O. BOX 591
GrlnnellI IA 50112 News from GR/D
by Winston Hamilton
EDITOR ................................................................. 2
Rick Gayler PO Box 2431
Facts Behind the Counters -and- Inside Europa
—

Opelika, AL 36801
by Shelby Stanton and John Astell ...................................................4
Assistant Editor
Deen Wood War Plans and the 1941 Kremlin Wargame
by Louis Rotundo................................................................................. 12
Editor Emeritus
Gary Stagliano
The Spanish Civil War
Colum n Ists by John J. Gee............................................................................ 22
Shelby Stanton
John Astell Rules Court
Louis Rotundo by Rick Gayler....................................................................................... 28
John J. Gee
David Hughes
More First Divisions - The French
Advertising Info Available from by David Hughes .................................................................................
32
GRD, PO Box 591, Grinnell, IA 50112
EXchange ...........................................................................................
35
Rule 6: Movement
If you change
your address let us CREDITS: Counter graphics, symbols, charts, and all the rest are by
know by writing to us at:
Winston Hamilton who sweated a load trying to get everything to fit. Printing is
GRD, PO Box 591, Gnnnell, IA 50112
done by Grinnell Graphix, Grinnell, IA. The magazine is produced on a MAC |I CX
with Ready Set Gonna; 4 and the other usual amount of software. Proof
Europa World Wide
reading
and suggestions by Darla Hamilton and Stephanie Meldrem. John Greer is still
In Australia: aiding our efforts on the cover with his keen eye for "good" stuff. Mark Van
Pacific Europa Players Roekel gets a nod for helping us get the GEnie connection, Tom Johnson for
353 Flinders Lane, Basement "volunteering" to help us set up the electronic connection for interested
Melbourne. Australia. 3000 computer Europa enthusiasts, Rick Gayler for spending a lot of time editing, his
wife, Joy, and my wife, Darla for understanding and support icr this work.
InGreat Britain: “Remember, when the enemy is in range of your guns, you are in range of his guns.”
Europa Association of the UK
62 Earlston Road - Wallasey FROM THE EDITOR: RICK GAYLER
Merseyside. England L45 SDZ Scorched Earth Play Balance The question of play balance in the game
FltE/SE/Urals is a hotly debated topic among Europa devotees. This is not
In Canada: surprising since SE is the most widely owned and frequently played title within
Europa Association of Canada the Europa series ot games. Furthermore, the Eastern Front is typically cited by
2047 34 Ave, SW historians as the field of combat upon which the ultimate outcome of the Sec-
Calgary, Alberta, Canada - T2T 2C4
ond World War in Europe was decided. And since at any given time the bulk oi
the Reich's armed forces were allocated to this front, it follows that it is around
In Spain
the battlefields of eastern Europe that the fortunes of Germany will most likely
Club Europa Espanole
revolve in future games of Grand Europa. Given the above, the issue of play bal-
Provenca 85, 08029 Barcelona
CONTINUED ON PAGE 19
‘

Spain
Page 2 - -
Shiva gram
by Winston Hamilton
Well. back in the groove again. We
had some delays last issue and just
could not get the magazine out on
time, but now we are back on
schedule again.
GEnie: GRID has concluded an
agreement with GEnie. which is short
for General Electric network
information exchange. This means
that GRID is now on a games bulletin
board. has a library that you can
browse through, and can schedule
national. real time conferences. This
service is something that l have
wanted to get going for some time
now. It means that anyone with a
computer. modem, and a few bucks
can get and give additional
information on and about Europa. We
have the means to upload and
download files. view electronic news.
discuss events, exchange ideas and
all the rest. Rick Gayler will also be
connected on-iine to this system.
which would speed Q&A exchanges.
among other things.
We plan to start a FltE/SE/Urals
game on the system as well. Tom
Johnson of Europafest lame will be
taking care of this aspect of our
computer efforts and he will have lots
of stuff regarding the hows and whys
to announce soon. GEnie has
offered those of us who play Europa a
good deal which you will find
presented in the ad in this issue of
TEN.
Some of the many services will
include: Access to the lead article
from the magazine as soon as it is in
final file form (which is usually about a
week or two before we publish);
current errata; product info; on-line
conferences; player contact service:
$m$
real time games; general information;
complaint department; idea
exchange; the dogma and heresy
column which will give gamers some
new rules to try; and any other good
ideas we or you can come up with to
utilize this service.
recommend that anyone with a
i
modem start getting connected with
GEnie as soon as possible.
Europafest II is coming in July of
1990. Details are being worked out at
this time. but we are definitely on our
way to Dallas for the second test. it
will be held in conjunction with the
annual DALCON. but we will be in a
separate facility and will have our own
convention area. There will be rooms
for the seminars. a dinner as at the
first test. and about 3,000 square feet
of gaming area. We plan to have
some special events set up for the
players. but more on that later.
John Astell. and are
Flick Gayler. I
committed to attend. There may be
some other special guests as well;
more news on that as it develops.
Origins will be held in Atlanta in 1990.
GRID will be there. The convention
will run through the July 4th weekend
as usual - the last of June. first part of
July. This will be a new convention
city for Origins and should be a great
time. GRID will be releasing For
Whom The Bell Tolls at that time.
and by then MM, FitE. and SE will
be available in addition to The Urals.
MM: Work is under way on the new
version of the game. As we have
discussed in previous issues there
will be new standard maps, new
counters. new rules. new charts. and
even new box art. This project will
constitute the first in the Collectors'
Series of games. We have had some
questions on how this series will differ
from the existing games: Will the
series be compatible with existing
titles? How many titles will be redone?
What is the cost???
The titles that will be redone top to
bottom, for sure. absolutely (maybe)
are: MM. FoF, Case White, WD,
Torch, NE, Narvik and TFH. This
means a rewrite of the rules, cleanup
of the counter errata. new maps. and
any other changes needed to bring
the game into line with other titles and
the new rules set. As far as the
monster games go, well... there is
need to redo the maps in FitE. SE
and The Urals. but no real need to
do all the counters again. or make
radical changes elsewhere. Look for
GRID to publish a module for the
changes in the monster games which
will keep the price down and cause a
minimum of disruption for the
transition. As the Collectors' Series
comes together we will be fitting in
Grand Europa mles as we can. This
will help get that system up’and
running as we progress. And
remember. until a project is near
completion we do not have the final
word on what is going to happen.
But. as always. you will be the first to
know since you read the magazine.
The tentative schedule GRID has
worked out will give you a new
Europa title each year for the next 4 to
5 years; plus at least one reissue of an
old title under the Collectors' Series,
six issues of the magazine. and
perhaps an additional reissue and
some special print publications during

the year. Typically we would like to
have a game out in the first quarter,
third quarter, and fourth quarter of
each year. It is a rigorous schedule for
us, but we believe we can make it.
Finally, we've received some mail from
players who want to know how to get
more folks to play Europa. In large
part this is up to1hose who currently
play Europa games. GRID wants to
spread the word about this system
and with the magazine now hitting
about 5,000 in circulation (not too
shabby, eh?), this is the best way to
reach people. We have created an
Association to encourage the
interaction of the gamers and the
games. We have some products
under discussion and review aimed at
new players, to jump-start players into
Europa. In aword, we here at GRID
would like everyone living in the
United States to buy and play Europa
and we certainly will entertain any
suggestions on how to do this trom
anyone who cares to write us. Tibor
Vari talked to me at Europafest about
a basic training manual for Europa
players which he would like to
produce. Great idea! Now, Tibor, it
you are reading this, let's see a
proposal. Sounds somewhat like
Book lof Grand Europa have talked
l
about before. David Berry had an
excellent starters' guide to Europa at
Origins in L.A., Tom Johnson has the
best demo of Europa l have ever
seen which he puts on at GENCON. It
is so good that we are going to export
Tom to Atlanta to mn it there. We will
consider anything rational and
marketplace-oriented to increase the
Europa population.
In 1991 we will be holding Europatest
in Baltimore.It will be the 50th
anniversary of Operation Barbarossa
and we are building Europa into
Origins as a central theme. it came up
in a discussion that Europa could
actually be voted into the Hall of Fame
by ballot during Origins '91. It sounds
like a good idea to me. Before there
was an Origins, there was Europa.
People who care about how this
game system works and want to
spread the ideas of Europa should
vote to have it put into the Hall of
Fame at Origins. We will tell you how
to do this in the next issue or two of
the magazine.
We will be ready to reply to "players
wanted" requests in 30 days. Here is
how it will work: You send us a
request and we will send you the
names by zip code of Association
members in the area(s) near you. We
will answer you only it you send us a
self-addressed, stamped envelope.
We hope that this solution will help.
We will also print free "opponents
wanted" ads for members. Restrict
this to six lines at 10 point type to fit
into the column format we have here
in the magazine (approximately 35-40
words).
There, that is all for now. See you in
TEN#10. There will be a special
Europa contest to find the hidden
message in next issue's cover - a pun
as it were. No, you don't have to play
the cover backwards to see it. This is
something Tom Johnson came up
with and it sounds like some fun.
Good luck working on the ghost.
Mea Culpa
Several informational errors and
omissions appear in the Wehrkreis
graphics which accompany Shelby
Stanton's "Facts Behind the
Counters" in TEN#8. These
occurred during the conversion of Mr.
Stanton's handcrawn maps into
graphical form and unfortunately were
not detected until after publication.
We apologize to Mr. Stanton and our
readers and submit this listing 01
corrections:
Wehrkrels I:The Schuberth
brigade should be political police,
while Nordost is an emergency
brigade.
Wehrkrels iv: The Elbe and
Oberheldacher brigades are both SS.
Wehrkreis
V: The southernmost
city on the map is Konstanz. The
Page 3
maneuver divisions are misnamed.
The one shown as Konigsbruck
should be Heuberg and the one
shown as Zeithain should be
Munsingen. The emergency
divisions are misnumbered. The 404
and 464 should be the 405 and 465
respectively.
Wehrkreis VII: The Bayernwald SA
division should be noted as
Jaeger
instead of political police.
Wehrkreis VIII: The Breslau
fortress unit should be a division
instead of a brigade.
Wehrkrels X: The Munster,
Munster-Nord, and Pullos divisions
are maneuver divisions.
Wehrkrels XI: The western city
should be Hannover and the eastern
one Magdeburg. The maneuver
divisions are misidentified. The 401
should be Altengrabow and the 461
should be Bergen.
Wehrkrels XVII: The southernmost
city is Wiener Neustadt.
Wehrkreis XVlll: Note the correct
spelling of Innsbruck.
Wehrkreis XX: The Westpreussen
and Weischel SS units are maneuver
units. 0
Coming Attractions
inthe next issue of The Europa
News A.E. Goodwin embarks
upon a tour of the Europa
seashore, Jeff Millefoglie
provides insights into the
design of For Whom the
Bell Tolls, John Astell
launches a series of articles on i
t
Soviet Guards units, plus our i
i
regular columns and much.
i
much more. Look for TEN #10
to arriveas an early Christmas
present in mid-December.
Page 4

@acté $¢Ifinb the (Snunteré

3n8ih¢ Europa
by Shelby Stanton and John Astell
EUROPA UNITED STATES 4 ETO(15-10) ||Jan44 Jun 43 convert to (10-8)
ORDER OF BATTLE 5 ETO (13-10) Mar44 35 ETO (10-8) Jun 44
PRESENTED HERE AND OFFICIAL: e ETO(13-10) Mar44 36 MTO(8—8) Ii Apr 43;
7 ETO(13~10)IIJun44 Jun 43 convert to (108);
Shelby and John have published the 8 ETO (13-10) H Nov44 ll Aug 44 transi to ETO
OB tor the U.S. in a combined column 9 ETO (13-10) Sep 44
this issue, It's official, enjoy.
42 ETO (8-8) II Jan 45
1o ETO (13-10) |lSep44 converted from TF Linden
11 ETO(13-10)llOct44 44 ETO (10-8) II Sep 44
Note: Months always represent the 12 ETO(13-10)Oct44
iirst turn of that month (i.e., Apr 44 =
45 MTO (10—8) Ii Jun 43
1
13 ETO(13-10) Feb 45 63 ETO (8-8) It Jan 45
April 1944), unless it is specified (as in 14 ETO (13-10) Nov 44
ii Apr 44).
convened irom TF Harris
1s ETO(13-10) ll Feb 45 65 ETO (8-8) It Jan 45
20 ETO (13-10) ll Feb 45 66 ETO (8-8) It Dec 44
Abbreviations Used: 69 ETO (8-8) It Dec 44
U.S. Marine Corps Division 70 ETO (88) “Jan 45
Abn = Airborne
converted from TF Herren
Arm = Armor Special amphibious contingency 71 ETO (10-8) Feb 45
.2

avail = available, availability forces (9—8) Jul 41 thru II Dec 41

Bn = Battalion
75 ETO (9-8) II Nov 44
76 ETO (8-8) It Dec 44
conv= converted Infantry Divisions 78 ETO (9-8) Nov 44
D = Division
79 ETO(9-8) Ii Apr44
Eng = Engineer 1
Special amphibious contingency 80 ETO (9-8) Jul 44
ETO = United Kingdom and forces (8-8) Jul 40 thru || Jun 42; 83 ETO (9—8) It Apr44
Northwestern Europe ETO (8-8) Aug 42;
Int = lntantry
84 ETO (9-8) Oct 44
Nov 42 transi to MTO; 85 MTO (9-8) Jan 44
Mtn = Mountain Jun 43 convert to (12-8);
MTO = Northwestern Africa and
86 ETC (8%) Mar 45
ll Nov 43 transi to ETC
87 ETO (9-8) It Nov 44
Mediterranean 2 ETO (11-8) ll Oct43 88 MTO (10-8) ll Dec 43
088 = Otiice 01 Strategic Studies 3 MTO (8-8) Nov 42; 89 ETO (8-8) ll Jan 45
P = Provisional Jun 43 convert to (11-8);
RCT = Regimental Combat Team
90 ETO (8-8) Apr 44
II
Aug 44 transi to ETC 91 MTO(9—8) ||Apr44
Rgt = Regiment 4 ETO (11-8) Feb 44 92 MTO (8-8) It Oct 44
SSF: Special Service Force 5 Iceland (8-8) It May 42 converted from TF Almond
TF = Task Force converted from 5/2, 5/10, 5/11; 94 ETO (8-8) It Aug 44
UK = United Kingdom Jun 43 convert to (11-8); 95 ETO (9—8) II Aug 44
II Aug 43 transt to ETC
97 ETO (8—8) Mar 45
Armor Divisions 8 ETO(11~8) ll Dec43 99 ETO (9-8) It Oct44
9 MTO (8-8) Nov 42; 100 ETO (10-8) Oct44 M
1 ETO (14-9-10) ll May 42; Jun 43 convert to (12-8); 102 ETO (9-8) It Sep 44
Nov 42 transi to MTO; Dec 43 transi to ETO 103 ETO (9-8) ”00144
Jun 43 convert to (17-10); 26 ETO (10-8) Sep 44 104 ETO (10-8) Sep 44
Jul 44 cadre convert to (15-10) 28 ETO(10-8) ll Oci43 106 ETO (8-8) H Nov 44
2 MTO (14-9-10) available for 29 ETO (8-8) II Oct 42;
assembly Jan 43; Jun 43 convert to (10-8) Mountain Division
Jun 43 convert to (17-10); 30 ETO (108) Mar44
Dec 43 transi to ETC 34 MTO (8-8) available ior
3 ETO (17-10) H Sep 43
10 MTO (10-8) M
Jan 45
assembly Jan 43;

Airborne Divisions
13 ETO (10-8) Feb 45
13 Abn Hq 0-5
13/326 Glider III 35
13/515 Para III 3-5
13/517 Para III 35
17 ETO (10-8) Sep 44
17 Abn Hq 0-5
17/194 Glider III 3-5
17/507 Para Ill 3—5
17/513 Para IN 3-5
82 MTO (108) II
May43
82 Abn Hq 05
82/325 Glider III 2-5
82/504 Para III 45
82/505 Para III 3-5
Dec 43 transt to ETO;
|| Dec 43 conv to (11-8):
82 Abn Hq 0-5
82/325 Glider III 3-5
82/504 Para Ill 45
82/505 Para III 3-5
101 ETO (11-8) 11
Sep 43
101 Abn Hq 0-5
101/327 Glider |I| 3-5
101/502 Para In 4-5
101/506 Para III 35
Replacement Division-Groups
(Forward Replacement Depots)
2 MTO(5—4)Apr43
3 ETO (5-4) Apr 44
8 MTO(5-4)Jan43
11 ETO (54) Jan 45
17 ETO (5-4) Aug 44
18 ETO (5-4) Sep 44
Training Division-Groups
(Replacement Conversion
Depots)
1 MTO (6-4) M
Jan 44
9 ETO (6-4) ll Aug 44
1 4 ETO (6—4) ll Aug 44
16 ETO (6-4) II Oct 44
19 ETO (6-4) ll Dec 44
24 MTO (6-4) ll Aug 44
27 MTO (6-4) ll Dec 44
6900 ETO (6-4) II Nov 44
6960 MTO (6-4) Jan 45
Infantry Task Force
Division-Groups
Almond MTO (58) Aug 44;
II Oct 44
conv to 92 Int D
Harris ETO (58) Dec 44;
ll Jan 45 convert to 63 Int D
Herren ETO (5-8) ll Dec 44;
II Jan 45 convert to 70 Int D 507 ETO (3-5) ll Dec 43;withdraw
Linden ETO (5-8) Dec 44;
II Jan 45 convert to 42 Int D 508 ETO (3-5) Jan 44
45 MTO (2-38) Nov 44
add to replacement pool
(ex»AA assets)
U.S. Marine Corps Brigade
1 Prov Special amphibious
contingency Iorces (4-8‘)
Jul 40 thru II Jun 41:
Iceland (48‘) Jul 41;
withdraw Mar 42
Mountain Commando Brigade
(U.S./Canadlan)
1 SSF MTO (66‘) Nov 43;
II Aug 44 transi to ETO;
Jan 45 cadre conv to 474 Int Rgt
Infantry (Reinforced Military
Police) Brigades
AAI MTO (3—5-8) Fixed Garrison.
Roma avail on/atter Mar 44
AAI = Allied Armies in Italy
SHAEF ETO (358) Fixed Garrison.
Versailles avail on/atter Mar 44
SHAEF = Supreme Headquarters
Allied Expeditionary Force
Ahwaz Iran/Iraq (3-5—8) Fixed
Garrison, Ahwaz District avail on/aiter
Feb 44
Gulf Iran/Iraq (3-5-8) Fixed Garrison,
Gulf District avail on/aiter Feb 44
Tehran Iran/Iraq (358) Fixed
Garrison. Tehran District avail on/after
Feb 44
053 Mountain Regiment
2677 MTO Special (4-8) II Jul 44
receive at any Allied»owned city in the
Page 5
MTO. Alternately, on the turn that the
Balkans are invaded, the I/SBS and
Il/SBS Para Cmdo an (088) are
received as reinforcements instead.
Parachute Regiments
501 ETO (3-5) Feb 44
Sep 44 (to 17 Abn D)
Optional withdrawal if 15 Abn D
is employed
517 MTO (3-5) Jun 44; ll Aug 44
transi to ETO;
withdraw Feb 45 (to 13 Abn D)
Motorized Intantry Regiment
473 MTO (310‘) II Jan 45 add to
replacement pool
(ex-AA assets)
Infantry
Regimental Combat Teams
3 ETO (4—8') II Mar 45
29 Iceland (4-8‘) II Aug 43;
Feb 44 transl to ETO
65 MTO (4-8') Apr 44;
Oct 44 transi to ETC
1 18 Iceland
(3-8) Il Aug 42;
Jun 43 convert to (4-8‘)
Nov 43 transl to ETO
156 ETO (48') Oct 42
159 ETO (4-8‘) U Mar 45
365 MTO (48“) Apr 44; Apr 45
special removal Irom
replacement pool/receive 224,
226 Const En Rgts
442 MTO (5-8") Jun 44
474 ETO (4-8‘) Jan 45
converted irom 1 SSF cadre i
Infantry Regiments
organic to Divisions l
5/2 Iceland (3-8) Mar 42;
I
ll May 42 convert to 5 Int D
5/10 Iceland (2-8) ll Sep 41;
ll May 42 convert to 5 Int D
5/11 Iceland (2-8) ll Apr 42;
II
May 42 convert to 5 Int D
34/133 MTO (28’) Jan 43; on/aiter
Jan 43 convert to 34 Int D
34/135 MTO (2—8“) Jan 43; on/aiter
Jan 43 convert to 34 Int D
Page 6
34/168 MTO (3-8‘) Nov 42; on/after
Jan 43 convert to 34 Int D
088 Mechanized Commando
Battalion
Sage MTO Special (1-10) Dec 42
receive in any
Allied-owned city in the
MTO; Jun 43 conv to
2671 Para Cmdo Bn (088)
035 Commando Battalion
AIC ETO Special (1 -8) Sep 44
receive at any Allied»owned
city in the ETC
NC = Advance Infiltration Contingent
085 High Mountain Battalion
ODAC MTO Special (1—8) Nov 44
receive at any
Allied-owned city in the MTO
ODAC = Operations Directorate
Assault Contingent
OSS Parachutist Commando
Battalions
33 Egypt (1-8) ll Jan 44
I/SBS MTO Special (1-5) received
as reinlorcements in lieu of
2677 088 Min Rgt on turn
that Balkans are invaded.
H/SBS MTO Special (1-5) received
along with l/SBS (above).
2671 MTO (1-8) Jun 43 convened
fm Sage Mech Cmdo Bn
(088)
888 = Strategic Balkans Services
Parachute Battalions
509 ETO (1-5) II Oct 42;
Nov 42 transi to MTO;
ll Aug 44 transt to ETO;
Mar 45 remove from
replacement pool
l/551 MTO (15) H May 44;
|| Aug 44 transl to ETO;
Jan 45 remove from
replacement pool
Glider Battalions
550 MTO (1.5)” May 44;
{Jr
Mar 45 remove from
replacement pool
Ranger Battalions
1 ETO Special (1-8)
receive in any
Allied-owned city in the UK;
Nov 42 transf to MTO
ETO (18) II Nov43
(on:
MTO Special (18) H May 43
receive in any
Allied-owned in the MTO
4 MTO Special (1 -8)Jun 43
receive in any
Allied-owned city in the MTO
5 ETO (1-8) Jan 44
M
29 ETO Special (1-8) ll Dec 42
receive in any
Allied~owned city in the UK
Infantry Battalions
99 ETO (1-8) ll Sep 43; Fourturns
after liberating Oslo, Norway,
convert to United Norway Int D
(7-8) as a conditional
reinlorcement.
100 MTO (1-8) ll Aug 43;
Aug 44 remove from
replacement pool
122 Egypt (18) ll Jan 44; Fourturns
after liberating Athinai, Greece,
convert to Royal Hellenic Int D
(7-8) as a conditional
reinforcement,
202 MTO(18) Dec 42;
ll Feb 44
remove im
replacement pool
367 MTO(1-6) ll Feb 43;
II Mar 43 transl to
Liberia;
ll Jan 44
transl to MTO; withdraw
Jan 45
Military Police
intantry Battalions
727 Iran/Iraq (1-8) Fixed Garrison,
Tehran District
avail ll Dec 42 thru ll Jan 44
788 Iran/Iraq (1—8) Fixed Garrison,
Ahwaz District
avail Aug 43 thru II Jan 44
Mechanized Cavalry Groups
2 ETO (3-2-10) Apr 44
ll
3
4
6
1 1
ETO
ETO
ETO
ETO
(3-2-10) Jul 44
(3210) ll Dec 43
(32—10) ll Oct 43
(3—2-10) it Oct 44
14 ETO (3-2-10) Sep 44
ll Jun 42 15 ETO (3-2—10) Mar 44
16 ETO (3-2-10) Dec 44
101 ETO (3—2—10) ll Nov 44
102 ETO(3-2-10) Jan44
converted from
|/102 Mech Cav Bn
106 ETO (3»2-10) ll Mar44
113 ETO (3-2-10) Feb 44
115 ETO (3-2-10) ll Jan45
Mechanized Cavalry
Reconnaissance Squadrons
36 ETO(1-10) it Oct 44
91 MTO (1-10) .Jan 43
117 ETO (1-10) Dec 43
converted from
ll/102 Mech Cav Bn
l/102 ETO (1-10) Oct 42;
Jan 44 convert to
102 Mech Cav Gp
ll/102 ETO (1-10) Oct 42:
Jan 43 transf to MTO;
Dec 43 convert to
117 Mech Cav Bn
Mechanized Intantry Battalion
526 ETO(1~10) IlApr44
Armor Groups
1 MTO (6~4-10) avail Jun 43;
ll Sep 44 trans! to ETO avail
2 MTO (6-4-10) avail Jun 43;
Il Dec 44 withdraw from
avail
3 ETO (6—4-10) avail Nov 43
6 ETO (6-4-10) avail Jan 44
M
7 ETO (6—4-10) avail Mar 44
8 ETO (6-4—10) avail Mar 44
9 ETO (6-4-10) avail Apr 44
10 ETO (6-4-10 avail Aug 44
1 1 ETO (6-4-10 avail Mar 44
1 2 ETO (6-4-10 avail II Oct 44
17 ETO (6-4-10 avail May 44
Armor Combat Commands
Z/CCA MTO (5-3-10‘) Nov 42;
on/aiter Jan 43 conv to 2 Arm D
2/CCB MTO (5-3-10‘) Dec 42;
on/after Jan 43 conv to 2 Arm D

2/000 MTO (3410‘) Jan 43;
on/atter Jan 43 conv to 2 Arm
Tank Battalions
Zebra
ETO (3-2-10) Mar 45;
hypothetical withdrawal
in Jul 45 if war continues
70 MTO (1-10) Feb 43;
ll Nov 43 transl to ETO;
Dec 43 conv to (2-1—1 0)
191 MTO (241-10) II Mar 43;
II
Aug 44 transl to ETO
701 ETO (2-1~10) Nov 44
converted 1m 701 Eng Tank Bn
702 ETO (2-1—10) May 44
707 ETO (2-1-10) Mar 44
709 ETO (21-10) Mar 44
712 ETO (21-10) Mar 44
717 ETO (2-1-10) Jan 45
735 ETO(2V1~10) Mar 44
736 ETO (21-10) Nov 44
convened 1m 736 Eng Tank Bn
737 ETO (21-10) Mar 44
740 ETO (2-1-10) Nov 44
convened int 740 Eng Tank Bn
741 ETO (21—10) It Nov 43
743 ETO (2-1-10) ll Nov 43
744 ETO (1-10) ll Jan 44
745
ETO(2-1—10)Sep 43
746 ETO (2-1-10) Ii Feb 44
747 ETO (2-1-10) Mar 44
748 ETO (2-1-10) Nov 44
converted 1m 748 Eng Tank Bn
749 ETO(2-1~10) Mar 44
750 ETO(2-1—10)ilSep 44
751 ETO (2-1-10) ll Aug 42;
ll Jan 43 transi to MTO
752 ETO (2-1-10) II Aug 42;
II
Jan 43 transf to MTO
753 MTO (21-10) Jun 43
755 ETO (2-1-10) ll Aug 42:
Jan 431ran51 to MTO
II
756 MTO (1-10) Nov 42;
Dec 43 convert to (2-1-10);
II
lI Aug 44 transt to ETO
757 MTO (1»10) II Mar 43:
ll Jan 44
conv to (21-10)
758 MTO (1-10) ll Nov 44
759 lceiand (1-10) Sep 42;
|| Aug 43 trans! to ETO
760 MTO (2 110) Feb 43
761 ETO (21 10))Sep 44
771 ETO 21-10) Sep 44
772 ETO (2-1—10) Feb 45
774 ETO (2-1--10) ll Jul 44
777 ETO (21--10) Jan 45
77a ETO(2-1-10) “Sep 44
D 781 ETO(2—1~10)Nov44
782 ETO(2»1-10) Jan 45
ll
784 ETO(2-1-10)llNov44
786 ETO (21-10) Dec 44
787 ETO(2-1-10)llMar45
Engineer Tank Battalions
701 ETO (1-10) May 44;
Nov 44 conven to 701 Tank Bn
736 ETO (1-10) Apr 44;
Nov 44 conven to 736 Tank Bn
738 ETO (1-10) May 44
739 ETO (1—10) Aug 44
740 ETO (1-10) Aug 44;
Nov 44 conven to 740 Tank Bn
748 ETO (1-10) Apr 44;
Nov 44 conven to 748 Tank Bn
Motorized Antitank
(Tank Destroyer) Groups
ETO (3»6-10) avail Sep 42;
1
II
Jan 43 transf to MTO avail;
ll Dec 43 transf to ETO avail
2 ETO (3-6-10) avail Jan 44
3 ETO (3—6-10) avail Nov 43
4 ETO (3-6-10) avail May 44
5 ETO (3-610) avail ll Jan 44
6 ETO (3610) avail Feb 44
7 ETO (3-6-10) avail |l Feb 44
8 ETO (3-6-10) avail ll Sep 44
9 ETO (346-10) avail ll May 44
1 2 ETO (3-6-10) avail Oct 44
1 6 ETO (3-64 0) avail Nov 44
20 ETO (3-6-10) avail it Oct 44
23 ETO (3-6-10) avail II Oct 44
Motorized Antltank (Tank
Destroyer) Battalions
601 ETO (1-2-10) Aug 42;
Nov 42 transf to MTO
602 ETO (1—2-10) Aug 44
604 ETO(1~2-10) |lApr44
605 ETO (1-2-10) Mar45
converted from 605 AT Bn
607 ETO (1-2-10) Nov44
converted from 607 AT Bn
609 ETO (1-2-10) lI Aug 44
610 ETO(1-210) Oct 44
convened lrorn 610 AT Bn
612 ETO (1-2-10) Dec44
convened fm 612 AT Bn
627 ETO (1-2-10) ll Nov44
628 ETO (1—2-10) Feb 44
Page 7
629 ETC (1--2- 10) Jan 44
630 ETC (1-2 10) IIJun44
631 ETC (1--2- 10) Aug 44
633 ETO (12- 10) II Apr45
634 ETO (12-10) Jan 44
635 ETO (1-2-10) || Feb44
636 MTO (1-2—10) ll Apr 43;
ll Aug 44 transl to ETO
638 ETO (1~2-10) ll Sep 44
643 ETO (1-2—10) Dec 44
converted from 643 AT Bn
644 ETO (1-2—10) ll Jan 44
645 MTO (1-2-10) Jun 43;
ll Aug 44 transt to ETO
654 ETO (1210) II Oct 43
656 ETO (12-10) Jan 45
661 ETO (1-2-10) ll Jan 45
691 ETO (12-10) Mar 45
convened from 691 AT Bn
692 ETO (1-2-10) Feb 45
convened from 692 AT Bn
701 ETO (1-2-10) I| Jun 42;
|| Dec 42 transf to MTO
702 ETO (1—240) II Feb 44
703 ETO (1-2-10) II Sep 43
704 ETO (1-2-10) Il Mar 44
705 ETO (12-10) May 44
771 ETO (1-210) Nov 43
773 ETO (1—2-10) ll Feb 44
774 ETO (1-2-10) || Jun 44
776 MTO (1-2-10) Feb 43;
Oct 44 transl to ETO
801 ETC (1 -2»1 0) Apr 45
convened lrom 801 AT Bn
802 ETO (1-2—10) Mar 45
converted from 802 AT Bn
803 ETO (1-210) Jul 43
804 ETO (1210) II Aug 42:
Apr 43 transl to MTO
808 ETO (1-2-10) Jan 45
converted from 808 AT Bn
809 ETO (1-2-10) Dec 44
811 ETO (1210) ll Sep 44
813 ETO (1-2-10) II Aug 42:
Il Dec 42 transl
to MTO
II Dec 43 transl to ETO
814 ETO (1-2-10) II Feb 44
817 ETC (1 210) Mar 45
convened lrom 817 AT Bn
818 ETO (1210) Nov 43
820 ETO (1-2-10) Mar 45
convened from 820 AT Bn
821 ETO (1-2-10) Dec 44
convened from 821 AT Bn
822 ETO (1-2-10) Apr 45
convened from 822 AT Bn
Page 8
823 ETO (1-2-10) Dec 44
convened irom 823 AT Bn
824 ETO (1--2»10) Mar 45
convened from 824 AT Bn
825 ETO (1-2—10) Jan 45
converted from 825 AT Bn
893 ETO (1-2-10) II Jan 44
894 ETO (1-2-10) I| Aug 42;
II
Jan 43 trans! to MTO
899 MTO (12—10) Feb 43;
II Dec 43 transi to ETO
Antitank (towed Tank
Destroyer) Battalions
605 ETO (18) || Dec 44;
Mar 45 convert to 605 TD Bn
607 ETO (18) U Apr 44;
Nov 44 convert to 607 TD Bn
610 ETO (18) II Jun 44;
Oct 44 convert to 610 TD Bn
612 ETO (1-8) It Apr 44;
Dec 44 convert to 612 TD Bn
614 ETO (1-8) Sep 44
643 ETO (1—8) H Sep 44;
Dec 44 convert to 643 TD Bn
648 ETO (178) II Dec44
679 ETO (1-8) II Jan 45
691 ETC (1 8) Aug 44;
Mar 45 convert to 691 TD Bn
892 ETO (1-8) ll Sep 44;
Feb 45 convert to 692 TD Bn
772 ETO (1—8) II Oct 44
801 ETO (18) Mar 44;
Apr 45 convert to 801 TD Bn
802 ETO (1-8) ll Apr 44;
Mar 45 convert to 802 TD Bn
805 ETO (1-8) II Aug 42;
M
Jan 43 transi to MTO
807 ETO (1-8) H Aug 44
808 ETO (1-8) H Aug 44;
Jan 45 convert to 808 TD Bn
817 ETO (18) Aug 44;
Mar 45 convert to 817 TD Bn
820 ETO (18)“ Oct 44;
Mar 45 convert to 820 TD Bn
821 ETO (1-8) U Apr 44;
Dec 44 convert to 821 TD Bn
822 ETO (1-8) Dec 44;
Apr 45 convert to 822 TD Bn
823 ETO (18) II Apr 44;
Dec 44 convert to 823 TD Bn
824 ETO (18) Nov 44;
Mar 45 convert to 824 TD Bn
825 ETO (1-8) Jun 44;
Jan 45 convert to 825 TD Bn
Corps Artillery 153 ETO (48) Mar 45
(Artillery Brigades) 173 ETO (4-3-8) Jul 44
174 ETO (4349) Jul 44
|| MTO (48) Sep 43 179 ETO (3-2-8) Aug 44
III ETO (58) Sep 44 183 ETO (6-4-8) Aug 44
IV MTO (5-8) Mar44 187 ETO (3-8) Feb 44
V ETO (4-8) Dec 43 188 ETO (3—2-8) Dec 43;
VI MTO (4-8) Sep 43; Apr 45 oonv to 214, 417 Art Gps
ll Aug 44 transt to ETO
190 ETO (3-8) Nov 43
VII ETO (4-8) Mar 44 converted int 190 Art FIgt
VIII ETO (48) Feb 44 194 MTO (4-2-8) Sep 43;
XII ETO (4-8) Apr 44 Oct 44 transf to ETO
XIII ETO (4-8) Jul 44 202 ETO (5-38) Jul 44
XV ETO (48) Feb 44 203 ETO (3-8) Aug 44
XVI ETO (4-8) Oct 44 204 ETO (3-2-8) Aug 44
XIX ETO (2—8) Jul 44 205 ETO (6-4-8) Jan 45
xx ETO (3—2-8) Jul 44 209 ETO (4-8) Mar 45
XX] ETO (4-8) Nov 44 210 ETO (848) Jan 45
)OGI ETO (85-8) II Dec 44 212 ETO (648) Feb 45
XXIII ETO (48) II Dec 44 214 ETO (238) Apr 45
converted 1m 1823 Art Gp
Siege Artillery Groups 219 ETC (8---4-8) Jan 45
220 ETC (8--4--8) Jan 45
402 ETO(3-2-8)May44 250 ETC (6--—48) Feb 45
404 ETO (3-2-8) Jul 44 252 ETC (6--48) Feb 45
333 ETC (3--28) Jul 44
Mountain Artillery Group 349 ETC (38) Oct 44
408 ETO (343) Nov 44
77 MTO (2-1-8) Mar44 411 ETO (3-8) Nov 44
converted from 77 Art
tht 417 ETO (2-3-8) Apr 45
converted 1m 188 Art Gp
Motorized Artillery Groups 422 ETO (32-8) Aug 44
423 MTO (4-3-8) Mar 45
5 MTO (23-10) Dec 42; 424 MTO (4-8) Sep 44
Dec 43 transf to ETC converted I‘m 35 Art Gp
6 MTO (2310) Sep 43; 428 MTO (4-3-8) Mar 45
II
Aug 44 transf to ETO
144 ETO (3-2-10) Jul 44 Artillery Regiments
177 ETO (2-3-10) Jul 44
195 ETO(3~10) Mar 44 17 ETO (2-8) ll Aug 42;
228 ETO(2—3-10)Feb44 Dec 42 trans! to MTO;
258 ETO (3-10) Feb 44 Mar 44 absorbed by 17 Art Gp
36 ETO (243) II Aug 42;
Artillery Groups Dec 42 transf to MTO;
Mar 44 absorbed by 17 Art Gp
17 MTO (6-4-8) 77 MTO (2-8) ll Feb 43;
converted from Mar 44 conv to 77 Art Gp
17, 36; 178 Art Rgts 178 ETO (2-8) II Aug 42;
18 ETO (6—4-8) Apr 44 Dec 42 transt to MTO;
so ETO (443-8) Dec 44 Mar 44 absorbed by 17 Art Gp
35 MTO (3-2-8) Sep 43; 190 ETO (2-8) Sep 42;
Sep 44 convert to 424 Art Go Nov 43 convert to 190 Art Gp
2
40 ETC (4 8) Apr44
46 ETC (3- 8) Jan 45 Siege Artillery Battalions
3
79 ETC (4- 8) Apr 44 (240mm)
119 ETC (5- 38) Jul 44
142 ETC (3--8) Feb 44 285 ETO (2-1-8) Aug 44
 Page 9

266 ETO(2-1»8) May44 18 ETO (3-10) Dec 44 209 ETO (1-8) II May 42;
267 ETO (2»1-8) Aug 44 19 ETO (3-10) Dec 44 Jan 43 transf to MTO;
269 ETO(2»1»8) May44 21 ETO (13—10) Mar 44 Mar 44 absorbed by
II
27o ETO (2—1~8) Apr 44 23 ETO (3-10) Nov 44 80 Hvy AA Gp
272 ETO(2-1-8)May44 24 ETO (13-10) Mar 44 213 MTO(1~8)II Nov42;
277 ETO (2—1—8) Jul 44 26 ETO (3-10) Jul 44 Apr 44 convert to AA points
278 ETO (2-1-8) Jul 44 27 ETO (3-10) Jul 44 505 ETO (1-8) H Dec 42:
533 ETO (21 -8 ) Apr45 31 ETO (3-10) Aug 44 Apr 43 transl to MTO;
539ETO(2 -1-8)Apr45 32 ETO (3-10) Oct 44 ll Mar 44 absorbed by
551 ETO (218) Apr45 34 ETO (21-10) Aug 44 80 Hvy AA Gp
552 ETC (2 1-8) Apr 45 38 ETO (3-10) Sep 44 508 MTO (1-8) H Mar43;
553 ETO (21-8) Apr45 80 MTO (3-10) ll Mar44 Il Jul 43 convert to
575 ETO(1-8) |l Nov 44 (8-inch Gun) convened from 62, 209, 505 106 Hvy AA Gp
697 MTO (2—1-8) Jan 44; AA Rgts;
Oct 44 transl to ETO ll Aug 44 trans! to ETO
698 MTO (2—1-8) Jan 44; Construction Brigades
91 MTO (3-10) ll May 44
Oct 44 transf to ETO converted from 1523 ETC (1 -2-8) Mar 45
67, 68, 90 AA Flgts; 1524 ETO (1-2-8) Apr 45
Mortar Battalions Sep 44 transl to ETO
92 ETO (310) ll Aug 43 Pipeline Construction
2 MTO (18) ll Jun 43; convened from 61 Hvy AA Rgt
ll Aug 44 transl to ETC Brigades
106 MTO (3-10) ”Jul 43
3 MTO (1-8) May 43; converted lrom 508 AA Rgt; ME Iran/Iraq (248) Jan 43
II
Aug 44 transl to ETO Dec 44 transi to ETO ME = Middle East
81 ETO (1-8) Nov 43 109 ETO (3-10) Dec 43
83 MTO (18) I! May 43; 113 ETO (3-10) Nov 44 NS ETO (0-2-6) Jul 44
ll Aug 44 transt to ETO
NS = Northern System
84 MTO(1-8) l|May43 Light Antiaircrafl Groups
86 ETO (18) May 44
PMP ETO (0-2-6) Jul 43
87 ETC (1 8) Apr 44 34 ETO (1-3-8) Il Aug 42; PMP = Provisional Military Pipeline
89 ETO(1-8) Dec44 Dec 42 transt to MTO;
90 ETO (18) Nov 44 May 43 convert to
H
PBS MTO (0-2-6) Feb 43
91 ETO(1- 8) IlOct44 8 Hvy AA Gp PBS = Peninsular Base Section
92 ETC (1 -8) ll Feb 44 2626 P MTO (1—38) ll Feb 43;
93 ETC (1 8) Feb 45 May 43 convert to 9 Hvy AA Gp
H
SS MTO (0-2-6) Jul 44
94 ETC (1 -8) Feb 45
95 ETO (1-8) Feb 45
83 = Southern System
Heavy Antlaircratt Regiments
96 ETO (18) II Feb 45
97 ETO (18) II Feb 45
Railroad Engineer Brigades
61 Iceland (1 -8) Mar 42;
99 MTO (1-8) Sep 44 Aug 43 transf to ETO; ADSEC-AETO (0-2-6) ll Aug 42
add to replacement pool Aug 43 convert to
II
ADSEC = Advanced Section
(ex-AA assets) 92 Hvy AA Gp
100 MTO (1-8) Sep 44 62 ETO (1—8) Sep 42; ADSEC-BETO (0-26) Nov 43
add to replacement pool ll Nov 42 transl to MTO;
(ex-AA assets) ll Mar 44 absorbed
by ADSEC-CETO (0-2—6) Jul 44
80 Hvy AA Gp
Heavy Antiaircratt Groups 67 MTO (143) Feb 43; SOLOC ETO (0-2-6) ll Jul 42;
II May 44 absorbed
by Dec 42 transl to MTO
MTO (3-10) ll May 43 91 Hvy AA Gp
\IJA

ETO (13-10) Nov 43

SOLOC = Southern Line of
68 MTO (1-8) Nov 42; Communications
a MTO (3-10) H May 43 ll May 44 absorbed
by
converted from 34 AA Gp; 91 Hvy AA Gp 1MRS ETO (0-2-6) Apr43
Nov 44 to ETC 74 MTO (143) ll May 43; MRS = Military Rail Service
9 MTO (3-10) ll May43 Apr 44 convert to AA points
convert from 2626 Prov AA Gp; 90 MTO (1-8) ll Apr 43; 2 MRS ETO
Nov 44 trans! to ETO It May 44 absorbed
(026) Jul 43
by
11 ETO (51-10) Jan 44 91 Hvy AA Gp
Page 10
3 MRSlran/lraq
—_
(0—2-6) ll
P MRS ETO (0-2-6) Apr 44
P MRS = Provisional Military
Rail Service
Port Construction and
Apr 44 rI 1120
Repair Groups
1051 MTO (1-3-6) Jun 43
convened from 39 Eng Rgt;
ll Aug 44 transt to ETO
1 053 ETO (136) Jul 43
1055 ETC (1 -3—6) 11
Oct 43
1 056 ETC (1 -3-6) Nov 43
1057 ETO (1-345) Apr 44
1 058 ETO (1 -3-6) Jan 44
1061 MTO (1-3-6) Apr 44;
Aug 44 transt to ETO
1067 ETO (1-3-6) Feb 45
Assault Engineer Groups
19 MTO (4-8) Mar 45
converted 1m 19 A5511 Eng Figt
3 6 ETO (4-8)I| Feb 45
convened from 36 Aslt Eng R91
40 ETO (443)" Feb 45
converted from 40 Aslt Eng Rgt
540 ETO (4-8) It Feb 45
convened lm 540 A511 Eng Rgt
1104 ETO (3-8) Feb 44
1106 ETO (3-8) Oct 43
1111 ETO (38) Dec 43
1121 ETO (3-8) Aug 43
convened from 112 Eng Rgt
1128 ETO (3-8) Dec 43
convened from 5 Eng Rgt
1171 MTO (3-8) ll Jan 44
convened lrom 20 Eng Rgt
Mountain Engineer Groups
591 MTO Special (2—3-6)
ll Oct 44 receive in any
Allied~owned city in the MTO;
|| Dec 44 transi to ETO
1108 MTO (2-3-6) Sep 43
Motorized Combat Engineer
Groups (Reinforced)
1102 ETO (2-10) Jan 44
1107 ETO (2-10) Apr 44
1110 ETO(2-3—10)Feb44
1115 ETO(2—10)Mar44
1117 ETO(2-10)Apr44
1135
1137
1139
1145
1148
1152
1
ETO (2-10) Jan 44
ETO (23-10) Jul 44
ETO (2310) Jul 44
ETO (2-10) Jul 44
ETO (23-10) Nov 44
ETO (2-3-10) Nov 44
ETO(2-10) Nov 44
1154 ETO (2-10) Dec 44
1159 ETO (23-10) Feb 45
1173 ETO (2-3—10) Nov 44
Combat Engineer Groups
1101 ETO (2-8) Jan 44
1103 ETO (28) Jan 44
1105 ETC (2-8) Oct 43
1109 ETO (28) Nov 43
11
1123 ETO (2-5) Nov 44
1124 ETO (2-8) Nov 44
1125 ETO (2-8) Dec 44
1127 ETO (28) Dec 44
1130 ETO (2-8) Nov 44
1131 ETO (2—8) Dec 44
1132 ETO (2-8) Dec 44
1133 ETC (2%) Dec 44
1134 ETO (2-8) May 44
1141 ETO (2-8) Sep 44
1142 ETO (2-8) Oct 44
1143 ETO (2-8) Aug 44
1144 ETO (2-8) Nov 44
1146 ETO (2-8) Nov 44
1147 ETO (2-3) Nov 44
1149 ETO (2-8) Nov 44
1150 ETO (2-8) Nov 44
1151 ETO (2-8) Nov 44
1153 ETO (2-8) Nov 44
1155 ETO (2—8) Jan 45
1158 ETO (2-8) Jan 45
1168 ETO (2-8) Dec 44 add to
replacement pool
(ex-AA assets)
1169 ETO (2-8) Apr 45
1172 ETO (2-8) Nov 44
1175 ETO (2-8) Jan 45 add to
replacement pool
(ex-AA assets)
1347 ETO (2-8) Nov 44
1348 ETO (2-8) Nov 44
Assault Engineer Regiments
19 ETO (3-8) Sep 42:
Il Nov 42
transt to MTO;
Mar 45 convert to
19 Mil Eng Go
36 MTO (3-8) H Nov 42;
ll Aug 44 lranst to ETO;
40
l
ll Feb 45 conven to
36 Aslt Eng Gp
MTO (38) ll Jun 43;
II Aug 44 transt to ETO:
ll Feb 45 conven to
4O Aslt Eng Gp
540 MTO (3-8) Nov 42;
llAug 44 transt to ETO:
IIFeb 45 convert to
540 Aslt Eng Gp
Railroad Engineer Regiment
94 MTO (0-1-6) Apr 43;
ll Sep 44 transl to ETO
Engineer Regiments
Iceland (23) ll Sep 41‘.
Dec 43 transf to ETO;
Dec 43 conven to 1128 Aslt
Eng Gp
20 MTO (2-8) ll Nov 42:
ll Jan 44 convento1171 Aslt
Eng Gp
39 MTO (2-8) Feb 43:
Jun 43 convert to 1051 PC & R
Gp
112 ETO (2-8) H May 42;
Aug 43 conven to 1121 Aslt
Eng Gp '
Construction Engineer
Regiments
21 MTO (0-1-8) Nov 42
38 Ascension Island (0-1—8) Apr 42;
II Aug 42 transi to West Africa;
withdraw Jan 44
41 Liberia (0-1-8) ll Jun 42;
Apr 43 transl to MTO;
II Oct 44 transt to ETO
92 ETO (0-1-8) II Jul 42;
ll Feb 43 transf to MTO
98 ETO (0441) Jul 42;11
II Feb 43 transi to MTO
224 MTO Special (0-1—8) Apr 45
receive at any Allied-owned city
in the MTO (ex-366 RCT)
226 MTO Special (0-1-8) Apr 45
receive at any Allied-owned city
inthe MTO (ex~366 RCT)
342 ETO (0-1-8) || Jul 42;
withdraw Nov 43
346 ETO (0—1»8) || Aug 42
351 ETO (0-1-8) Aug 43
 Page 11

352 Iran/Iraq (0-1-8) Mar 43;
withdraw Nov 44
354 ETO (0-1—8) Jul 43
363 Iran/Iraq (0-1-6) It May 43:
withdraw Feb 44
364 ETO (0-1—8) Aug 43
366 ETO(0-1~8) IlOct43
372 ETO (0-1-8) ll Aug 43
374 ETO (0-1—8) Feb 44
398 ETO (0-1-8) Aug 43
922 ETO (0-1-8) Sep 43
923 ETO (0-1-8) || Aug 43
924 ETO (0-1—8) Aug 43
925 ETO (0'1-8) Sep 43
926 ETO (0-1-8) Sep 43
1301 ETO (0-1-8) Apr 44
303 ETO (0-1-8) Apr 44
_1
1306 ETO (0—1-8) II Apr 44
1308 ETO (0-1-8) H May 44
1313 ETO (0—1-8) Feb 44
1314 ETO(0<1—8) Feb 44
1318 ETO(0A1-8) ll Nov 44
1323 ETO (0-1-8) Apr 44
1324 ETO (0-1-8) ll Nov 44
1325 ETO (0-1-8) Nov 44
1326 ETO(0~1-8) Mar 45
1330 ETO (0-1-8) Jan 45
1333 ETO (0-1—8) Dec 44
U.S. Navy Beach
(Amphibious Assault Engineer)
Battalions
6 MTO(1-5)Apr43
7 ETO(1-8)Apr44
HYPOTHETICAL IF WAR
CONTINUES:
Infantry Dlvisions
151 Eclipse (8-8) Aug 45
converted from any 3 Eng Grps
3d Eclipse (8—8) It Aug 45
converted from any 3 Eng Grps
9th Eclipse (8~8) Sep 45
125 ETO(4-8‘ H Jun 45
14o ETO(4-8‘ Jun 45
ll
144 ETO(4—8
1.
Jul45
||
174 ETO(4~8‘ II Ju|45
201 ETO(4-8' |l Aug 45
300 ETO (4-8' || Aug 45
Armor Groups
15 ETO(6.4-10)11May45
18 ETO(6>4-10)||Jun45
Tank Battalions
738 ETO (2-140) Jun 45
converted tm 738 Eng Tank Bn
739 ETO (21—10) Jun 45
converted tm 739 Eng Tank Bn
744 ETO (2-1—10) Jun 45
converted fm 744 Eng Tank Bn
758 MTO (2»1-10) Jul 45
convert fm 758 Tank Bn(1»10)
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Tank Destroyer Battalions
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 Page 12
r
23hr ‘JSIanB out: the
Quintin flargame
INTRODUCTION
in the two years since my article "War
Plans and the 1941 Kremlin
Wargame" first appeared in the
Journal of Strategic Studies, the
USSR has released an enormous
amount of new information about the
war. Fortunately, much of this material
merely confirms the basic conclusions
of my original article. it has now been
incorporated into my forthcoming
book. tentatively entitled Soviet
Strategy in the Great Patriotic War. At
the request of Winston Hamilton,
I
agreed to revise this older article to
share with the readers of TEN.
To update the article and keep its
enormous length under control, l
have deleted the original references
to the debate regarding B. Fugate's
book Operation Barbarossa (Novato,
1984). have done this for two
I
reasons. First and foremost, believe
I
by now the Soviet portions of that
book have been thoroughly
discredited. However, to assist the
reader l have retained the point by
point review of the Fugate errors. If
readers are interested in the other
participants in the original debate, I
would refer them to my 1987 article.
Secondly, in Europa terms, the
results of this article merit some
conclusions. These have included
l
as new closing paragraphs.
1941 WAR PLANS REVISITED
The debate over Soviet strategy in
1941 has recently seen a great deal
of review in the scholarly historical
journals. This review has centered on
the age-old questions of whether
Stalin anticipated a German attack on
the USSR or whether he was actually
.7
‘ 19‘“
by Louis Rotundo
preparing to attack Nazi Germany.
believe the latter proposition is simply
due to a gross misunderstanding of
Soviet strategy before the war.
Doctrine must have some relevance
to warplans. To analyze Soviet
warplans. it is necessary to look at the
preparations and wargames that
occurred during that fateful year
between June 1940 and June 1941.
The problem in drawing conclusions
about the course of the January
wargame is that little information is
currently available and of those
reports that do exist, most sources
present only a fragmentary picture.
Many of the attendees were either
ordered by Stalin to be executed or
were killed in combat during the war.
Few of the survivors wrote memoirs
and unfortunately, of those that did
survive, the reports generally
concentrate on the verbal interplay
between Stalin and his generals
rather than on the specific goals and
course of play of the wargame.
Therefore, to examine the January
wargame it is necessary to piece
together the various memoirs and
compare them to the operational
plans and the Fall field exercises as
outlined for Soviet defense.
Itwas common Soviet military practice
to hold annual conferences to report
on issues pertaining to military and
political training. Usually, these
meetings only included the top
officers of each military district. The
one for December, 1940 however,
was significantly different for four
reasons. First, this study conference
was the last major gathering before
the outbreak of war and was followed
by a strategic wargame in January.
Although General Staff exercises
I
continued, the roster of participants
revolved more around each individual
military district rather than the
strategic-operational review held in
December. Second, the numerous
participants involved included most of
the senior leadership in a multi-day
exercise with combined arms
interplay. Some members of the
Politburo also attended. Third, the
January wargame review was
conducted at the Kremlin and in front
of the assembled Politburo, Finally,
the events scheduled for the
wargame postulated the actual war
plans expected to be used by both
sides in the event of war. Each
reason, while not unique, serves to
interconnect and provide the
foundation for Soviet conduct of
operations in June 1941. As a result,
their importance to Soviet actions
upon the outbreak of war require
further analysis to define what did and
did not occur at the General Staff
wargames.
When the Soviet leadership
convened at the General Staff
headquarters on January 8, it was for
the purpose of playing two strategic»
operational wargames. In the first
wargame, Zhukov would command
the "Blue" side (Germany) with
Colonel General F.I. Kuznetsov,
commander of the Baltic Special MD,
as his Chief of Staff. They would be
opposed by the "Red" team (Russia)
commanded by then Colonel General
D.G. Pavlov with Major General V. Ye.
Klimovskikh, Chief of Staff of the
Western Military District, continuing to
serve in that capacity. Also, attending
the meeting were the Defense
Commissar, Marshal SK.
Timoshenko, the Chief of the General
Staff. General of the Army K.

Meretskov, and the various
commanders and staffs of the military
districts as well as some army
commanders and other ranking
service branch leaders. In his
memoirs, Zhukov discusses in
summary the outlines of the initial
January wargame. He informs us that
the scenario was based on the
probability of the German force as the
aggressor. Over 60 divisions were
assigned to the "Blue" player as
opposed to over 50 divisions to the
"Red" player. The "Blue" attack was
based on the General Staff analysis of
Nazi tactics as gathered from previous
campaigns of the war. Zhukov
indicates, and the comments made at
the December study conference
support the contention. that German
operational policies, as opposed to
execution, were well known and
realistically simulated by the "Blue"
player.
Of actual tactics, Zhukov provides
little information. However, V. Antilov
in Bessmert'nyi Podvig provides a
summary of the Zhukov war plan. By
that account, Zhukov formed three
powerful groupings to launch
simultaneous strikes north of the
Pripet Marshes. Zhukov informs us
that as a result of his attack, the "game
abounded in dramatic situations for
the eastern side. They proved to be
in many ways similar to what really
happened after June 22, 1941
The dramatic situations Zhukov
alludes to centered around the
encirclement and destruction of the
Soviet forces grouped around
Bialystok and Grodno. The powerful
blows of the "Blue" side resulted in a
breakout toward Lida, about 70 km
east of the frontier. At this point,
Fugate indicates the game was halted
since, "...the "Blues" had succeeded
in establishing the
necessary
prerequisites for a victory. In a swift
series of maneuvers, Zhukov had
once and for all exposed the fallacy of
a forward strategy that placed the
main part of the Red Army too close to
the demarcation line..." This analysis,
on its face, provides powerful support
forthe later development of a
defense in depth theory.
Unfortunately this conception is not
exactly what happened at the
wargame. Or more specifically, it is
only a part of what happened during
the first map exercise. As Zhukov
indicates, the purpose of the
wargame was not to test German
tactics, for these had been covered in
the December study conference.
The purpose of the January wargame
was for "...checking the practicability
and expediency of the main
provisions laid down in the plan for
cover and action by the troops in the
initial period of the war." in short, it
was to test the provisions for the
"Red" counterstrike and the
counteroffensive as laid down in the
Soviet operational plans. Thus, to
better understand the wargame an
analysis of the operational plans and
their development will provide the
basis for any useful examination.
During early 1940, Marshal B.
Shaposhnikov, then Chief of the
General Staff, had formulated an
operational plan that postulated the
main adversary as Germany and the
primary Nazi target as north of the
Pripet Marshes. However, another
source, S. lvanov in Nachal'nyi Period
Voiny, indicates a somewhat different
scenario in that the General Staff
believed the target of Germany to be
the Ukraine. Thus, they felt the
principle retaliatory Soviet force
should be deployed in the area north
of the Pripet for purposes of a
reactive attack. in either case, the
emphasis in both plans was to confine
the German attack to the border areas
and to launch a counterstrike. When
this operational plan was presented to
Stalin in September, 1940, he
expressed the opinion that the
German main effort would go toward
the south and it must be met by a
maximum Soviet response. Nor did
Stalin pull this opinion from thin air. In
April and May 1941, Soviet
intelligence agents in Switzerland and
Tokyo provided invasion dates and
target; both cited the Ukraine. Even
in May 1941, Golikov's GRU
continued to identify the main
- Page 13
German concentrations as opposite
the Ukraine. As a result, the General
Staff revised its plan and increased
the strength of the Kiev Special
Military District. After the September
meeting, the various military staffs
continued to labor to pull together a
cohesive operational program. A
target completion date of December
15 was set. if that date could be met,
it would allow the command
and staffs
of each military district to begin work
on their respective plans by January
tst. During the interim, district field
exercises would go forward. During
these District exercises, the scenario
always featured tactical and
operational counterstrikes by Soviet
forces. Mobile warfare was examined,
but many times as a part of offensives
on fortified locales, ratherthan in
open operations.
in reviewing this sequence of events,
the importance of these dates must
not be lost in relation to the various
events of the December-January
study conferences. Having
postulated a probable opponent, an
attack direction, and a method of
response, the leadership of the
Soviet Union prepared to meet in
December to analyze the result of
earlier reforms and to discuss the
latest trends in military thought. Prior
to the main army meetings, the navy
had gathered in October to review
combat operations in the recent
western campaigns. Specific
reference was made to Nazi air
operations and the assistance they
rendered to the Blitzkrieg. Note was
taken of problems in high-speed
operations. These meetings resulted
in follow-up conversations just priorto
the army meetings.
The study conference convened on
December 23 and closed on
December 29. After two days
(December 2324) of review on Red
Army training, the leadership devoted
four days (December 25-29) to the
study and analysis of detailed reports
on German and Soviet operational
doctrine. Specific reference was
made to Hitler's practice of flouting
Page 14
— 4-
the accepted standards of
international law regarding the
outbreak of war. Zhukov mentioned
both the power and the surprise of
the German method of attack.
Lieutenant General D. Kozlov, Chief
of the Air Defense Force (PVO) noted
the German practice of achieving air
superiority by surprise massed air
strikes. Additional reports dealt with
the new methods of mechanized
warfare and the problems of local
defense. Strategic defense was not
covered in the reports since this
would not be part of the Soviet plan.
Instead the subjects of these reports
tended to illustrate the offensive
thrust of the operational plan and by
implication identify the leadership that
would execute such a plan. That is,
the commanders of the Kiev Special
and Western Special MD and the
Chief of the Air Force Main
Directorate. At the conclusion, a
front-level wargame was held and this
was followed in January by the
strategic game at the General Staff
headquarters.
Throughout the time remaining
before the onset of the German
attack, the troops of the Red Army
continued to engage in field
exercises practicing the doctrine
outlined in the war plans. This
doctrine detailed primary weight to
the side on the offensive. As a result,
the proposition continued that it was
the Soviet side that would attack and
it was on German
territory that the war
would be fought. This view, notes
Vasilevskii of the General Staff, was
interpreted by some rather
"one—sidedly" and as a result it
"fostered delusions of an easy
victory." However, it also reveals
lessons that surely must have been
reinforced from the conduct of the
wargames. The plan that was to be
executed was the operational plan as
amended by Stalin and refined based
on the December-January
conferences
From February through April, 1941,
discussions were held at the highest
command and staff levels of the
Defense Commissariat and the military
districts to insure an understanding
of, and a compliance with the
provisions of the covering plans and
the mobilization effort. In summary
detail, the 1941 plan anticipated:
"...that the hostilities would begin with
our troops beating back enemy
attacks, that large air battles would
ensue from the very outset and the
enemy would seek to incapacitate our
airfields, debilitate the concentrations
of our troops, especially armor, cripple
our logistics and hit railway junctions
and major lrontline cities. For our part
we made provisions for our air units
acting in force to barthe enemy from
gaining the air superiority and to inflict
heavy losses on his ground forces.
We expected our border to be
attacked by ground forces comprising
large armor groups." This description
clearly indicates that the main
provisions of the German tactics were
known and countermeasures were
prepared to deal with them.
Vasilevskii states these
countermeasures envisioned that:
"The initial thrust was to be contained
by our rifle units and strongholds in
the border military districts acting
jointly with the border guards. In the
meantime, mechanized corps were to
counterattack from antitank lines and
set the stage for our decisive
offensive. it was planned that by the
beginning of the enemy oflensive our
troops moved from inside the country
would be deployed in the border
districts. It was also assumed that in
any eventuality our forces would
enter the hostilities fully prepared,
organized in formations as envisaged
by the plan and concentrated
beforehand."
in short, the plans said the USSR
would contain the German attack and
utilizing its massive armored reserves,
would launch a counterstrike. This
counterstrike would be followed by a
commitment of the second echelon
forces. These troops were expected
to be ready to intervene depending
on events, within several hours to
one day. The General Staff plan was a
proposal that fit the Soviet operational
spirit which stressed aggressive
action to defeat a potential foe. The
anticipated initial counterstrike
required massive preparations to
implement. The fact that time did not
permit their completion has tended to
distort the actual intent. However,
Ivanov clearly indicates the
importance of the border battle when
he states: "The entire system for
strategic deployment of the Armed
Forces was subordinated to this
concept." Fugate, however,
expressed the opposite opinion
when he states, "it seems ludicrous to
suppose the General Staff and Stalin
would have gambled on one major
battle in the frontier zone, especially
after Pavlov's failure in the January
wargames." His conception of the
above-cited remarks seems to
represent significant support for the
defense in depth theory. Yet, in point
of fact, the frontier battle is absolutely
what the General Staff was proposing!
Ivanov indicates the offensive nature
of the accepted General Staff view as:
powerful, retaliatory attacks
against the enemy at the start of the
war, in combination with the extensive
use of aviation and tanks, will be of
decisive (my emphasis) importance."
Thus, it is for that reason alone that
the Air Force was forward
concentrated, the supply dumps
located in the western districts as
opposed to on the Volga, and the
continuous flow of men and
equipment went fonuard. However.
no final concept of the retaliatory
strike was ever developed, thus
leaving doubt as to its actual capability
for implementation. Although Fugate
postulates that Stalin attached
"importance" to Zhukov's summation
on January 13th, it is difficult to
discern what could be stated to be
that weight. Since Zhukov reports
and Ivanov supports the fact that the
plan was not significantly changed,
merely refined, the border
fortifications not moved away from the
frontier nor work slowed, the troops
not redeployed away from the frontier
(indeed the opposite occurred) or
Pavlov sacked, the mass of evidence
indicates that neither a belated
defense in depth or a sacrifice of the
forward echelon was the plan. Since
the operational plan was not
changed, either something other
than a crushing defeat must have
occurred at the wargame or the
General Staff (Zhukov foremost) must
simply have chosen to ignore the
supposed lessons learned from the
game. Fugate believes that Zhukov
did not ignore the lesson as revealed
in the wargame. He states that
Zhukov reveals the defense in depth
theory through his comment: "in
recent years, it is common to blame
the High Command for not having
ordered our main forces to pull up
from the interior to repulse the
enemy. i do not venture to state what
would have happened if this were
done: whether the result would have
been better or worse. it is quite
possible that, being underequipped
with antitank and antiaircrait facilities
and being less mobile than the
enemy, our troops may have failed to
withstand the powerful slashing thrust
of the enemy panzer troops and may
therefore, have found themselves in
as grave a predicament as some of
the armies of the frontier districts.
How can one tell what may then have
developed at the approach to
Moscow and Leningrad, and the
south of the country."
However, a careful reading of this
passage reveals another
interpretation Zhukov was not saying
the troops should not have been
located forward Rather, his phrasing
seems to indicate the comment that
it's lucky they were not deployed
forward. Zhukov alludes to the
disasters on the frontier but only to
indicate it could have been much
worse if the General Staff had
followed the argument advanced in
[star/ya Velikoi Ofechesrvennoi Voiny
Sovetskogo Soyuza. 194145,
(fVOVSS), about the border
deployments. However, Fugate
seems to confuse what Zhukov
meant by "our main forces." it was not
the strategic echelon which could not
be ready until mobilized. Rather,
Zhukov refers to the second echelon
expected to be ready within one day
of the outbreak of war. in reality, as
will be discussed later, given the
numbers of units the General Staff
believed available to Germany. there
seemed no urgent need to pull these
units up to the frontier. indeed, if one
reads the next paragraph after the
above quoted text from Zhukov's
account, he seems to be specifically
positioning a hindsight justification.
His italicized remarkthat such a mass
msh to the border was what Germany
desired can be seen as the final slam
on the IVOVSS attack on his
preparations. However, Zhukov's
own quoted remarks to Stalin of June
22 argued for just such a course of
action. it appears as a major
discrepancy in Zhukov‘s memoirs.
Prior to the initiation of the strategic
wargame, Stalin on January 7
requested a meeting with
Timoshenko and Zhukov to discuss
the impending map exercises and the
just completed December study
conference. After criticizing
Timoshenko for dismissing the
attendees without clearing it with
Stalin, the dictator turned to the
anticipated wargame. The series of
questions that he asks indicates his
interest in the issues to be reviewed
in the map exercise. However,
contrary to Fugate's speculation
about why Zhukov was given the role
of aggressor, this action was
consistent with the intentions of the
game. Eremenko states that the
point of the proceedings was to assist
in understanding the Soviet plan and
the individual actions expected to
fulfill this plan. Since Pavlov was the
Western M.D. Commander it was
logical to anticipate he would
command his own forces. The
opposite is true for the Kiev MD. The
papers given at the study conference
acknowledged that these two
individuals were mobile force experts
and thus here was a chance to
practice what was required by the
operational plan. Although Stalin was
pleased with the selection of
commanders, the choice of remarks
framed as a question reveals the prior
nature of this decision. Fugate aside.
Stalin obviously did not know nor did
he select the mechanics or
commanders of the impending
exercise.
A hint as to the anticipated course of
the strategic wargame may be found
in Eremenko‘s memoirs. After the
December study conference,
Eremenko reports a wargame was
played entitled "An Offensive
Operation by a Fron This game
must have occurred December 30
since the lower staffs were dismissed
on New Years Eve. Within that game,
the "Eastern" side was tasked with
offensive efforts to "...breach a
deeply distributed defense and utilize
mobile formations to exploit the gap."
From the further comments made by
Eremenko, it can be assumed this
map exercise represemed a smaller
version dress rehearsal for the
January strategic games. From the
information available in Zhukov it is
obvious that Anfilov's scenario is
correct. The war game did open with
a powerful German attack. This attack
did create difficult situations for the
Red player (Pavlov). A review of the
records seems to reveal that if the
counteroffensive was even
attempted it must have failed since no
mention is made by either Zhukov,
Anfilov, Eremenko or Kazakov.
However, a clue exists as to why no
discussion appears in the published
records. Meretskov states: "i was
given 15-20 minutes to characterize
the December meeting... and the
January operational exercise. When i
went over to the exercise I only
managed to report on the actions of
the enemy (my emphasis), when
Stalin intermpted me and began
asking questions." Thus, without
discussion time, little of the Soviet
reactive efforts were covered. Since
most of the published accounts
discuss the interplay from Stalin's
questions, these omissions leave a
distortion of the result. Yet in spite of
the paucity of information, substantial
evidence exists of another result
beside the Zhukov victory scenario.
Simply put, it is that neither M.
Kazakov or Stalin allude to Zhukov‘s
victory in their remarks. Nor does
Zhukov claim in his memoirs that he
"won" the wargame.
Kazakov says, "strictly speaking, two
games were played on two different
strategic sectors, the Western and
the Southwestern." This is correct as
far as it goes, but different scenarios
must have been played out within
those games. Zhukov reports the
scenario that he won. To explain this
unexpected and certainly unpleasant
development, Meretskov, under
questioning, sought to pinpoint the
problem not as a flaw in positional
deployment but as an error in initial
Soviet strength. The Chief of Stafl
clearly indicated the Zhukov
breakthrough primarily rested on the
initial superiority of the "Blues,"
particularly in tanks and aircraft.
Zhukov readily acknowledged that
this superior strength "...explained
the decisive movement of the "Blues"
during the playing of the game (my
emphasis)." However, an obviously
irritated Stalin, dismayed by the poor
showing of the "Reds," cut him off
with the comment: "Don't forget that
its not only the arithmetical majority
but the skill of commanders and
troops that matters in battle."
Conversely, Kazakov reports the one
that Pavlov won. How do we know?
A careful reading of Kazkov‘s analysis
reveals he quotes Meretskov as
saying during the January 13
debriefing at the Kremlin that the
"Red" team with 60-65 divisions (not
50) conducting offensive (not
defensive) operations had overcome
the "Blue" team in the Western
sector. In summary, just the opposite
of what Zhukov reports. Obviously,
since we know only two wargames
occurred this must refer to the final
phase of game one.
When Stalin asked Meretskov how
this was done, the Chief of Staff cited
a reallocation of forces from quiet
sectors. This reallocation allowed
offensive operations by the "Red"
player in spite of the small margin of
superiority. The reallocation created
offensive possibilities due to the
existing Soviet belief that 1 1/2 of
their divisions could ovenivhelm one
German division. Since one Soviet
division could also defend against
2-3 German divisions it was possible
for the "Red" player to concentrate
reserves on the main axis for an
offensive assault. These reserves
became available through thinning
out the first echelon, potentially
accounting for the easy "Blue"
breakthrough. However, when
Meretskov reported this supposition,
he was not boasting, as Stalin
indicated, but more probably was
explaining the umpires' rules for the
game. During the discussion Stalin
seized the initiative by indicating the
lleeting nature of local superiority in
the mechanized age. However,
Stalin's viewpoint concerning reserve
mobility, while correct enough, did
not recognize the powerful nature of
the initial German thmsts. Nor did he
acknowledge the overwhelming
paralysis due to the air strikes and
communications disruptions that
accompanied previous German
attacks. However, the subsequent
events of 22 June, 1941 lend ample
proof that neither did anyone else in
the room fully comprehend the
disaster that could accompany such
miscalcuiations. For example, during
the December study conference,
Pavlov participated in the group
discussions with remarks that
supposedly disconcerted Kazakov.
That general reports Pavlov "...clearly
overstated the combat capabilities of
our tank troops. He said, ‘we are
rightly obliged to entrust the tank
corps with annihilating one—two
enemy tank or four-five enemy
infantry divisions,” If this attitude was
reflected by stretching the rules of
the wargame it becomes even more
understandable how the "Reds" were
able to win with a slight margin of
Superiority.
There is, however, an additional
explanation lorthe "Red" triumph.
Zhukov tells us that in the first
wargame Timoshenko, Meretskov,
and Col. General GM. Stern took a
hand in the 'action' in the south-
western direction. Two possibilities
emerge from that shrouded insight;
first, Zhukov thinned his forces
beyond prudence and thus the
counterstrike from the southwest
direction was successful; or second,
the breakthrough cited by Anfilov in
Bessmert'nyi Podvig might have
occurred against a very thin "Red"
covering force. Thus Pavlov
possessed ample reserves and used
them to launch a winning counter—
strike after the initial Zhukov success
in the wargame. In either case,
Kazakov tells us the final result; the
"Reds" overwhelmed the "Blues." It
is also equally obvious from the
detailed questions asked by Stalin
that he was uneasy over the course of
play in this scenario.
Two further points provide supporting
proof of a second scenario or phase
to the initial wargame aside from the
previous information. First, after such
a supposedly terrible defeat, why was
Pavlov not removed in the massive
immediate reshuffling of officers.
When Stalin questioned Pavlov it was
not the "Red" successes he wished
to discuss. Rather, it was the failure of
Pavlov to find solutions to the initial
attack of Zhukov. If no other scenario
had transpired what saved him from
dismissal? In supposition, Pavlov‘s
glib response was one issued by a
commander that had just executed
the General Staff operational plan and
won and whom the umpires had ruled
had acted correctly. After all, Pavlov
had contained the German thrust in
the border zone. Small initial failures
such as the inability to drive back
toward the German border during the
game were just accidents of war.
Two, Zhukov cites the lessons of the
December study conference as
becoming operative at a later date.
Aside from no major changes 10 the
strategic plan, he cites the
strengthening of frontier forces and
another round of large scale strategic
maneuvers as results of the
improvements to the plan.
 m
Additionally, new reserves were
deployed and a second echelon,
along the Dnepr-Dvina river line was
created. All of these efforts would
support an attempt to repair the
exposed weaknesses of what
othenuise tested as a good plan.
The detailed information in this article
lends powerful support to the thesis
of a Pavlov "victory". But there is
however, one further piece of
evidence that no disaster occurred in
the initial wargame. No records exist
of the actions in the second wargame
in the southwest direction.
based on the rehearsed warplans
However,
from the fall exercises in the Kiev
Military District and the recorded
comments in the January meeting, it
is apparent that the General Staff
proposed a "Red" offensive thrust by
Zhukov with Pavlov taking the "Blue"
team.
Thus when Meretskov began the
discussion of the second wargame,
Stalin again raised the question of
who won, but he framed it in a fashion
to confirm the previous supposition
that Pavlov, not Zhukov, triumphed in
the first wargame for his question is,
"Was it the ‘Reds' again (my
emphasis)?" Fugate's suppositions
aside, it is difficult to find evidence for
the crushing Zhukov victory or its
decisive impact on Soviet plans.
CONCLUSION
Even though Pavlov "won" the first
January strategic wargame, there was
little cause for overt celebration by
Stalin. Proof exists Stalin did not
interpret this as a victory both through
his substantial officer rotations and
the continued refinement of the war
plans. These efforts proceeded in
conjunction with massive efforts to
increase the security of the Soviet
Union. General Staff actions took
substance in the form of concrete
steps, to address the shortcomings of
the wargame. Broadly, these
remedial steps fell into two
categories. First, as Chief of Staff,
Zhukov continued to evince faith in
the provisions of the counterstrike
plan as evidenced by his preparations
overthe next five months. Far from
diverting forces as Fugate charges,
Zhukov continually urged Stalin to
increase the commitment of forces to
the forward echelon; a) both through
new units and through the call-up of
new manpower; b) through Zhukov‘s
redoubled efforts to finish the forward
fortified zones and by providing
40,000 border guards in May-June
alone: 0) along with Timoshenko, he
insured the spring maneuvers went
toward, not away from the border and
d) Zhukov's own comments both then
and now support his efforts to initiate
the rehearsed plan. As a result of the
physical efforts undertaken by Stalin
to insure the security of the warplan
both the Red Air Force and Soviet
ground troops focused on a closer
concentration on the border. For the
Air Force, based on the lessons
outlined in the December study
conference, the General Staff
anticipated that the massed use of
aviation would greatly assist the
offensive momentum of the expected
military operations. Similarly, the
need for forward deployment rested
Military Rifle
Districts Div.
Baltic Special 19
Western Special 24
Kiev/Odessa 45
Leningrad 1 5
Total 1 03
on the anticipated success of the
operational plan. lithe warplan had
tested poorly, it would have raised
troubling questions concerning that
fomard deployment of these assets.
However, just the opposite occurre .
Thus, steps were taken to allow this ’
concentration by extensive efforts to
increase the readiness of the western
district airfields. These steps
included not only expanding facilities,
but also involved hardening
runways,
and constructing new airfields.
two January wargames, 5080
Page 17
During the spring of 1941, over 250
existing airfields were overhauled
after April and an additional 164 new
airfields were built. Similarly, in the
divisions with no second echelon,
simulated both the offensive and the
defensive tasks required of the
Soviet forces. This latter effon was
not the intended result. A contrived
superiority, achieved by what Stalin
believed to be a dubious procedure
of thinning passive sectors, merely
confirmed his worst fears that more
needed to be done to prepare the
border areas. An obvious remedy
was to greatly increase in real life the
available level of Soviet forces utilized
in the strategic wargame. In doing
this, Stalin would insure an adequate
covering force and provide reserves
for the planned Soviet counterstrike.
By June 22, 1941 Stalin believed this
had been done against the
anticipated levels of German strength
as seen in the Soviet Deployment
Table.
The 170 divisions and two brigades
represented a massive increase over
the level of Soviet forces used in the
Tank Motor. Cavalry Rifle
Div. Div. Div. Bdes.
4 2 - 1
1 2 6 2 -
20 10 5 -
4 2 - 1
40 2 0 7 2
wargame. However, these forces
were not strime drawn up to defend
the border but rather were deployed
so as to create the necessary
reserves for the planned
counterstrike. By June 22, the Baltic
Special MD had six divisions, the
Western Special MD had six
independent corps (including two
mechanized), the Kiev Special MD
had four mechanized and five rifle
corps plus one cavalry division, and
the Odessa MD had two rifle corps in
Page 18 —
their operational reserves. Nor, was
this force the only Soviet troops in the
western districts. Beside the
enumerated units, 4 armies and 28
rifle divisions from the imerior military
districts were transferred to the
Dnepr-Divina; 100,000 men were
provided by the border troops and
the NKVD field units and the 1st
Brigade of Naval Infantry, five airborne
corps and ten antitank brigades were
also available for deployment.
By placing 69 divisions on the Soviet
border north of the Pripet Marshes,
and locating 80 divisions south of that
geographical dividing line, a clear
indication of Stalin's caution begins to
emerge. in total, approximately 200
Soviet divisions and several brigades
assembled within the five military
districts to defeat what was
anticipated to be a much lesser
number of German divisions. How
much less is indicated by Zhukov.
"Shortly before the war, Stalin, the
People's Commissar for Defense,
and the General Staff had believed
that the Nazi Command would keep
not less than 50 percent (my
emphasis) of its troops and its Air
Force in the West and the occupied
countries." During the invasion of
France and the Low Countries, the
German Army had utilized
approximately 135 divisions. Even if
Stalin was totally aware of the German
reorganization program carried out in
1940-41, he would only have "seen"
214 divisions. Thus 70-110 divisions
was the reasonable expectation for a
German assault force. However,
Germany utilized over 150 divisions in
the assault as well as over 30 allied
divisions and many brigades and
ancillary units. By comparison, the
170 divisions and 2 brigades of
Soviet troops no longer retained the
decisive edge, especially if they were
caught immobilized. This inability to
discern the true nature of the balance
simply added to the dislocation
caused by the failure to complete
mobilization.
Secondly, the General Staff knew the
10th Army in the Bialystok bulge was
in an exposed position. The war-
game had shown that quite clearly.
The problem was to strengthen it to
allow it to hold its position and funher
to deploy tactical reserves in the
Grodno-Suwalki and Brest directions
powerful enough to prevent the
encirclement of the two fonrvard
groupings. In the initial Zhukov
attack, the Blue forces only reached
Lida, 60-70 kilometers from the
border. To block a repeat of this
maneuver, the General Staff placed in
echelon the tactical reserves (13
Army) of the district, deployed on the
forward edge of the breakthrough
zone. Similarly, the General Staff
concentrated five mechanized corps
in this breakthrough areas, including
the very large 6th Mechanized Corps.
This corps contained along with 650
older tanks, 452 new T-34's and
KV-1, making it the most powerful
tank unit in the region. it was
intended by this offensive force
grouping to prevent a breakout
through massive counterstrikes, and
to keep intact beyond the battle zone
the second echelon forces umil
needed for the counteroffensive. As
a result, this Red Army deployment in
the bulge was not intended as a
Soviet neck in the noose, but rather
as the anvil to the anticipated
counterstrike's hammer. However,
the anvil retained powerful forces and
on June 23 attempted to repeat the
presumably practiced counterstrike
maneuvers. The attack by Lt. General
I. Boldin, Deputy Commander of the
Western M.D., contained two
mechanized corps and elements of
the 6th Cavalry Corp. This flank attack
failed, however due to the
unsatisfactory state of Soviet
communications caused by the
German air strikes. The allowance by
the rules of the January wargarnes of
absolute Soviet command/control
and the provision of leisurely time
constraints did not recur in the real
world of June 22, 1941. The final
result was a disaster of far larger
proportions that the Zhukov attack of
January, 1941 - a disaster that Stalin
believed he had avoided.
Allof the military plans floundered on
the failure of the political side to
correctly discern that no ultimatum
would be forthcoming from Nazi
Germany. This issue of a final warning
is more fully discussed in my article
"Stalin and the Outbreak of War in
1941" in the April 1989 issue of the
Journal of Contemporary History. The
significance of the failure to
adequately read the intelligence data
has been often discussed. In the
opinion of this author, Stalin's "failure"
is much too simplistic as a cause of
the Soviet debacle. Lost in the
debate is the issue of Soviet military
readiness, We‘re not talking about
lack of modern tanks or aircraft (for
certainly there were numerous
models of each), but more
significantly the logistics difficulties
that were to plague the Soviet armed
forces over the first two weeks, the
lack of adequate doctrine for
defensive operations that rendered
offensive attacks as the only Soviet
option during June - July, and the
burdensome bureaucracy that proved
a blessing once motivated, but
restricted all initiative in the early
going.
in Europa terms, the Red Army of
Fire In the East/Scorched
Earth bears only passing
resemblance to the real article. By
that don't mean to state that GDW
I
failed to produce a workable game
product. indeed what is wrong with
the package is that it affords too many
options. The Red Army simply could
not react in the fashion that i see
debated in TEN and ETO. Not
because it didn't, but because it
couldn't. The Red Air Force had no
command structure to allow it to
function in the masses that appear.
The Soviet logistics network put more
Red Army tanks out of commission in
the first two weeks than any part of
the Wehrmacht. The General Staff
did not know the conditions at the
front in any timely manner for hours
and even days after the Germans
moved. Thus, precise movements by
troops that deploy at the same speed
as the Germans and in the perfect
 locations to foil German initiative are
simply not related to Soviet
capabilities during the June -
September time period.
I
believe that more consideration is
needed on the issue of the opening
move and the requirements of Soviet
offensive operations. In the absence
of operational information, the
General Staff did what was rehearsed
pre-war by the troops. They
counterattacked on a Front scale. Try
that in Europa. It certainly opens the
options and it also eliminates the
need for a pre-invasion turn. Coupled
to Soviet air restrictions and ground
mobility penalties. it changes the
nature of the Red Army that is seen in
FitE.
In conclusion, these suggested areas
for new rules seem to favor Germany.
However, let me make clear that any
tampering with the mles which shifts
play balance towards a German victory
should be undertaken with
consideration. do not believe that
I
Germany was close to winning in
1941 and think such talk is based
merely on a German lack of
understanding of the reality that they
faced in December. As seen in my
article "The Creation of Soviet
Reserves and the 1941 Campaign"
(TEN #6), the true numbers against
Hitler were enormous even in 1941.
in game terms German strength gave
out not due to winter or misguided
-.
strategy. but rather because if was
.-._._.._...
inadequate. No amount of tinkering
with FltE/SE should look to alter that
fact.
N...
9 squads, there is no guarantee of
Louis Rotundo's Bio
appears on page 39
of the magazine.
FROM THE EDITOR - Cont
lance in SE would seem to be central
to play of the entire series.
There are undoubtedly as many
different opinions on this subject as
there are players. Because of this
lack of consensus, players are curious
to discover how their own
experiences compare to those of
others around the country. Are the
events transpiring on their game table
comparable to those of other games
in progress nationwide? Are there
new plans being developed and
refined which will revolutionize
offensive or defensive strategy in
SE? Are the rules accurate; that is,
do most games unfold and progress
within historical bounds? Does each
side have the proper chance to win?
Finally, which side is winning most
frequently and why?
in the next several issues of TEN we
plan to assemble input from the
readership on a wide spectrum of SE
play balance issues. Taken as a
whole this discussion should bring
the current state of play balance in
SE into sharper focus.
One perplexing complication
encountered when trying to assess
play balance is the requirement for
"equally skilled and committed
teams". In practice, this ideal is
impossible to achieve. Even in
solitaire play such things as fatigue,
inspiration, carelessness, and
unconscious bias, to name just a few
factors, can influence symmetry of
play. And if one could somehow
assemble two identically talented
reliable results. For example, a game
between "equal” players who were
not very good would probably
produce a game which would bear
little resemblance to one played by
uniformly excellent competitors.
There is no solution to this
imperfection; indeed, a very important
aspect of the debate is how evenly
matched the two historical "teams"
were. in the actual event were the
Germans a "crack" squad, while the
Soviets were competent, but less
highly skilled? Or did they just
possess less "play experience"?
Given these imponderables, let's take
a brief look at the issues to be
weighed.
First and perhaps most important,
what is the "correct" probability of a
German win? That is, what
percentage of games should end in
a German victory?
This raises the fundamental question
of whether a contest between equal
teams should ever produce an Axis
win. Louis Rotundo, one of this
country's most informed scholars on
Soviet potentials during World War II,
expresses the opinion that the
Germans never came close to winning
in Russia. The vast amounts of new
information released by the Soviets in
the last few years relative to their
troop strengths and equipment levels
have convinced him that only in light
of this new data may one begin to
grasp the true magnitude of the
margin by which the Germans were
overmatched. As for theories earlier
advanced by western historians about
a few extra weeks of clear weather or
less meddling from Hitler changing
the outcome, in the words of Mr.
Rotundo, "it just didn't matter!"
As Europa
gamers we don‘t seem to
have much trouble accepting the
inevitability of a Polish, French, or
Yugoslavian defeat at the hand of
Germany. Axis victories in these
campaigns are just a matter of time.
After all, this is what happened
historically. But laced with the
historical reality that Germany lost the
Eastern Campaign totally and
completely, the vast majority of us
argue that the Germans nonetheless
had a real chance for victory. And we
expect to find this chance present in
the game and with a rather high
probability. Othewvise, would we
really want to play the game
competitively? So one question we
should all ask ourselves is, "Under
Page 20

“
what circumstances, if any, could the
Germans have won the war
historically?"

Moving on, here are a few game

topics important to determining the
outcome of play in SE to be covered
in this project.

The expected losses of the Soviet

ground and air forces during the
combined Jun ll 41 turns will be
examined. This is important because
it sets the tone for the entire

Barbarossaoperation. What occurs

during this turn is a good barometer of
the ultimate outcome of the game.
Indeed, extremely experienced
veterans can often accurately predict
a winner based on observation of this
one turn.

Further evaluation will look into such

things as: What is the average
per—turn loss for each side? What is
the "normal" mix of combat odds
utilized (the road to Moscow is not
paved in 7-1's)? How close to the
order of battles for the 1942 Scenario
are most teams upon reaching Apr
42 in a campaign game of SE? How
are the Luftwaffe and VVS being
used? Do most groups play using
house rules or confine themselves to
I
previously requested to participate in
various playtests through other
channels. The answer is YES. The
kits will be supplied by GRID and as
mentioned there will be a nominal,
refundable fee charged. Contacting
GRID is essential to confirm your
desire to participate and ensure your
involvement in the process. Please
send a type-written request to GRID,
PO. Box 591, Grinnell, lA 50112,
ATI'N: Playtest. Specify the playtest
in which you wish to participate
(Second Front, For Whom the
Bell Tolls, The Winter War, or
Marlta-Merkur).
It is worth stating that playtesting is
serious business and,
properly, hard work. It
if

curiosity seekers. Europa playtests

are pivotal focal points in the
development of the individual games
done
is not for

and the series itself. The playtest of

Europa games is a very fundamental
part of the design process; it is how
things get decided. GDW and GRID
need the thoughtful input of people
(that is, gamers) in the field. As such
one should not enter this process
lightly, but with dedication to submit
the required reports and follow
instructions throughout the process.
_
in fact, it is not

omissions
onthe list at all! Well,
inevitably there were some errors and
in the Almanac. We will
present a comprehensive list of
adjustments in issue TEN #10.

Rick's Tricks
The sick trick for this issue is the
infamous "staging intercept". This
depravity is spawned through the
unholy alliance of the transfer and
interception missions. The villains
attempting this act will quickly gloss
over their crime by glibly stating that
the rules specify that a unit may stage
to an airbase within range of its
printed movement rating and then
initiate a non-transfer mission, one of
which is interception. The point they
choose to overlook is that staging is a
transfer mission and so must be flown
during the air movement step. The
preamble to Rule 20 states very
specifically that each mission lists
when the mission may be flown. And
transfer missions, and therefore
staging, may not be flown during the
Interceptor Movement Step.

The slick trick is to coordinate partisan

the "Rules As Written"? Which side
has the advantage in the game? Is
this realistic? What, if anything,
should be done to rectify the
situation? Finally, in games played to
a reasonable conclusion, how many
wins for each side have been
recorded?
We're convinced that this feedback
will be of great interest to readers,
and so we invite you to respond to
these topics. There is a great deal of
data out there which would be
instructive to all of us. Please share it
and your ideas with us.
A Note to Playtesters
Several people have asked if the
announcement in TEN #8 advising
prospective playtesters to contact
GRID applies to those people who
What is "Europa Order"?
Why, it‘s the sequence used to list
the cities within each country in John
Astell's Europa Almanac. As
mentioned in the Almanac "cities are
listed based on map orientation, from
map north to map south and, within a
hexrow, from map east to map west."
For instance, in the case of the USSR
if one assembles the Europa
maps
containing the Soviet Union in a
north-south orientation the
northernmost city would be first on
the list and the southernmost city last.
All cities listed before Moskva would
be north of it on the maps. The city of
Ryazan would be found east of
Roslavl since it is listed ahead of
Roslavl and is within the same
hexrow. Got it? BUT, you say, the
northernmost city in the USSR is
Murmansk, and it is not first on the list;
attacks with VVS air strikes,
particularly when using Rule 33. Note
that partisan attacks are resolved
during the initial phase and so
success (or lack thereof) will be seen
before the Soviets commit their air
units to missions that turn.
Normally, it is almost impossible to
catch a German fighter on the ground.
If threatened, the Huns will scramble
to another airbase or intercept a weak
target in range and return to base
afterthe Mission Resolution Step is
oven
To prevent this and give the Germans
something to think about in the
future, the Soviet team picks an Axis
fighter unit stationed in an
ungarrisoned reference city (or any
other ungarrisoned airbase with a
capacity of only 1), Such targets are
often found as the Axis strive to
provide fighter cover for the front line,
 Page 21

Ifthe partisan attack on the airbase is a

success, the lighter is rendered
PRODUCTS FROM GR/D
temporarily helpless. It's 1 capacity
field is reduced to 0 and so the unit The following is a complete listing of our
may not patrol, intercept. or scramble. products and services, and our address -
In other words, it is a sitting duck for
an enemy air unit bombing mission. It
is especially satisfying tor the Soviets Accessory Kits:
to swoop in and blow a high quality
German unit away with "I" class Kit 1, Fire in the East - $9.95
fighters. Kit 3, Narvik - $6.95
Kit 4, Scorched Earth - $6.95
Geography Quiz Answers: Kit 5, Spain - $7.95
The answers to A.E. Goodwin's Kit 6, Europa by Mail - $9.95
Europa Geography Quiz which
appears in this issue's "EXchange" Games: (Europa)
are:

1. Hex 2A:O126
The Urals (module) - $24.95
2. Hex 1323716 Fire in the East - $60.00
3. Hex 5815026 Scorched Earth (module) - $60.00
4. Map 13 - Initials RRB in the lower Narvik - $24.95
right-hand corner.
Games: (other)
EUROPA GHOSTS Aachen - $19.95
Gazala - $19.95
Since we were able to get The Cossacks Are Coming
back on the track so quickly
- $19.95
Duel tor Kharkov - $24.95
we will not put a ghost in
this issue to give you some The Europa Association (incl. Magazine) and
time to ponder the last Newsletters
ghost.
The Europa News (published 6 times a year).
Some have asked that we
include clues in the text of
Subscriptions available by membership in The
Europa Association - New members cost for 1989
each ghost. Well, if any of is $24.95, renewal for 1990 is $20.00. New
you listen to the CBC member dues for 1990 are $30.00.
Sunday morning show you
will know that they also Nuts &Bolts (back issues while they last)
have a mystery person you
have to guess based on
Single Issues: 2-3-4-5-6-8-12 & 18 - $3 each
Double Issues: 10/11-13/14-19/20-21/22 - $6 ea.
clues.
GEnie, Computer on Line Europa as per the ad
Ineach of the Ghost‘s that
have been published there appearing on the inside front cover.
are clues. Read them Order from:
carefully and you will see.
Game Research/Design
PO Box 591
Grinnell, IA 50112
.
Page 22
3f}: @ttaniéfi (Sihil 28“
The Spanish Civil War, fought
between July 17, 1936 and April 1,
1939, cost Spain over one—half million
people, and the Insurgent victory
placed the nation in a slate of
suspended animation for thiny years.
As the war progressed, it drew the
participation of thousands of
non-Spaniards. The supine and
hypocritical attitude of the western
democracies towards the intervention
by Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy on
the side of the Insurgents
encouraged the dictators in the belief
that they could do anything they
pleased.
BACKGROUND
The direct cause of the Spanish Civil
War was an attempted coup d’etat by
a portion of the army against a newly
elected government. The Spanish
Republic was only five years old in
1936; the venal monarchy of
Alphonso Xlll had been overthrown in
a bloodless revolution in April 1931.
But this revolution represented little
more than a change of
administrations, for Spain's social
problems went mostly unaddressed.
Spanish elections in February 1936
then gave victory to the Popular
Front, a coalition of socialist,
regionalist, and progressive parties,
and though the new administration‘s
program was hardly revolutionary, it
advocated a number of ideas hateful
to Spanish conservatives: universal
suffrage including women, free
education for all citizens, Basque and
Catalan autonomy, reduced military
spending, and other such subversive
concepts.
One problem area the Republic had
addressed was relonn of the army. In
By John J. Gee
1931, Spain's army numbered around
260,000, with one officer for every
eleven men and one general for
every 1,266. Grossly overstaffed,
many of the army's units were mere
phantoms, existing only to provide
employment for officers. The army
reform of 1931 reduced the army from
twenty-four divisions to eleven, but
these were real units of more or less
proper strength and composition.
The number of officers fell by around
12,000, but enlisted strength stayed
the same. As a result, Spain had
12,000 bored, unemployed military
men, many of whom occupied
themselves with conspiracies against
their former employer,
The main plotters of the 1936 coup
were two senior generals: Sanjuro, a
portly caricature of a Latin general
(then exiled in Portugal for another
less well-prepared revolt in 1932),
and the ascetic and studious Mola,
widely considered one of the army‘s
intellectuals. Most of the other
plotters were junior officers, many of
them attracted to Nazi Germany and
Fascist Italy and to fascism's Spanish
manifestation, the Falange, Dislike of
the new government was especially
strong among the officers of Spain's
colonial troops Belatedly joining the
plotters a month before the coup was
Spain's youngest general officer, a
cautious, apolitical man named
Franco. Franco had an excellent
reputation which he had earned
during the difficult wars in Morocco in
the 19205 as commander of the
Spanish Foreign Legion, an
organization similar to its French
model in its ferocity and disdain of
death. He joined the conspiracy on
the condition that he be given
command of the Army of Africa, as the
troops in Spanish Morocco were
called. The Army of Africa was certain
to rebel when the time came, and it
was the only part of the Spanish
armed forces ready for combat.
The rebellion started in Morocco on
July 17, 1936, and the garrisons on
the peninsula rose the following day.
However, much to the distress of the
conservatives, the rebellion failed or
didn't happen at all in much of the
country. After the first week, forces
loyal to the Republic still held about
two thirds of the country, including all
the large cities except Sevilla and
Zaragoza.
On the other hand, the Army's revolt
touched off a social revolution. The
trade unions and leftist political parties
largely seized control of the nation
from the indecisive government of
the Second Republic. A fearsome
reign of terror then swept all of Spain.
In rebel territory, it was a sentence of
death to hold a trade union card or to
have voted for a liberal or left political
party. In the area theoretically under
control of the government,
thousands of army officers, political
conservatives, and Catholic clergy
were murdered, while many
thousands more were imprisoned as
the Spanish poor took vengeance on
their class enemies.
A unique aspect of Spanish political
lifewas the large and dedicated
anarchist movement, Basically, these
people opposed all government, and
in Republican Spain in late 1936, their
ideal was almost attained. Many cities
and towns declared themselves
independent Republics, such as the
"Independent Republic of Malaga,"
and refused to acknowledge any

authority other than the local council.
They often seized all privately held
property for the free use of the public,
declared money illegal, and closed all
churches. The social disorder in the
Loyalist zone almost unraveled that
part of the Army which remained with
the government. All discipline and
cohesion was lost.
THE FIRST SIX MONTHS
Contrary to propaganda from both
sides, no foreign power was involved
in the uprising at the outset.
Although Fascist Italy had supplied a
few arms to Monarchist groups and
some members had undergone
officer training in Italy, there were no
hordes of Communist agitators or Nazi
Panzer troops. The Spanish people,
the trade unions, and leftist political
parties saved the Spanish Republic,
not the government, which hesitated
to take any action even in the face of
open rebellion. And it was the
Republic's own army which attacked
the government.
The Navy largely stayed loyal to the
Republic. Ship crews mutinied and
killed their officers who were, or were
thought to be, with the Insurgents.
Consequently, it was difficult to bring
the Army of Africa across the Straits of
.
Gibraltar to the mainland At this point
Mola and Franco (Sanjuro was killed in
a plane crash on the fourth day of the
rebellion) sent to Hitler and Mussolini
for assistance. Soon transport aircraft
arrived, which greatly aided Franco in
moving the disciplined, brave, and
savage Army of Africa to Spain.
These aircraft were followed by arms,
other supplies, and instructors. By
August 10, 1936, 9,000 men had
crossed over to Spain by air and by
running the inefficient Republican
blockade. The equally brave, but
chaotic Loyalist units, made up partly
of the remains of the old army and
partly of various union and political
party militias were absolutely no match
for Franco's Legionnaires and
Moorish mercenaries. By October,
the addition of more aircraft from Italy,
the concentration of the Insurgent
fleet, and the disorganization and
inefficiency of the Loyalist Navy gave
the control of the Straits to the rebels.
Franco‘s Army drove north and west
from Sevilla, routing the disorganized
opposition. Significant victories were
won at Merida, where a large force of
militia was routed, and at Badaioz.
which gave the insurgents complete
access to Portugal and its
sympathetic clerical'fascist
government. These victories of the
Army of Africa were always followed
by the murder of real or imagined
enemies. After the fall of Badajoz, a
particularly spectacular slaughter was
carried out in the bullring of the
Loyalist garrison after it had
surrendered. Franco‘s drive
continued throughout September,
closing on the capital at Madrid. On
September 27, his forces turned
aside briefly to relieve the isolated
rebel garrison of Toledo, which had
held out against an amateurish and
badly directed siege since July. Then
the seemingly invincible Army of
Africa turned on their primary target.
Madrid, whose capture would in all
probability end the war.
In the meantime, the Insurgents in the
northern part of the country had not
achieved the level of success their
friends in the south enjoyed.
However, on September 4, they did
capture lrun, thereby cutting off the
Loyalist areas along the Biscay coast
from overland communication with the
outside world. Nine days later, on
September 13, San Sebastian fell
undamaged into rebel hands. The
lighting in the north was more
restrained than that in the south ——
prisoners usually were not killed. in
the north, the ardently Catholic
Basques fought for their autonomy
against equally ardent Catholic
Carlists who were fighting to keep
Spain completely united.
Now was the Republican
it
government's turn to seek help from
outside. France's Popular Front
government wanted to help and
started to do so, but Great Britain‘s
Page 23
Conservative government, fearing
that the Spanish conflict 'might evolve
into a European war, prevailed upon
its ally to close the border with Spain
and to stop selling arms. Meanwhile,
U.S. isolationism was at its height, so
the United States decided to follow
Britain's lead.
The Republican government.
legitimately elected, was entitled by
international law to buy weapons to
defend itself. But no democratic
power would sell them arms. So
Spain‘s government turned to the
Soviet Union. Stalin responded to
the appeal by agreeing to sell
equipment to the Republic in
exchange for prepayment in gold.
Stalin thought the Spanish conflict
offered certain opportunities: he
could identify himself with democratic
forces, expand his influence, and
perhaps thwart the establishment of a
client state of Hitler and Mussolini. It
seemed possible also that he might
be able to rid himself of some of his
enemies on the Left, the anarchists
and those communists who did not
accept his leadership. The first
Russian supply ship arrived on
October 14. Offices were set up
through the Comintem to buy arms
and other supplies in European
capitals under various bogus
arrangements. An International
Brigade of volunteers was hastily
assembled to rally worldwide support
for the Republic.
But as the Nationalist army
approached the capital, their rapid
drive slowed to a crawl. in open
country, illoisciplined Republican
troops were a minor obstacle; in the
city. fighting became another matter.
Repeated attacks on Madrid‘s
suburbs brought minute gains at high
costs to Franco's hard-to-replace elite
troops. By early November, the Army
of Africa had fought its way into the
western part of Madrid and the
Republican government fled to
Valencia. On November 8, Franco‘s
forcesmustered all their strength and
attacked all along the front, centering
the main attack on the sprawling
Page 24
‘
campus of the University of Madrid.
The attack went nowhere, and by the
time it was called off, the last
remaining cadres of the old Army of
Africa had died.
Some Insurgent formations had
suffered 95 percent casualties since
the start of the war, and their
replacements, though often
dedicated, were not up to the
standards of prewar personnel. A
World War I-style battle of attrition
developed, with the Loyalists better
able to replace losses. Nationalist
gains would often be lost immediately
as the Republicans finally began to
learn how to counterattack.
Throughout the entire winter, Franco
attempted to capture, or at least cut
off, Madrid—but to no avail. This
defensive victory was of enormous
importance, for to have lost the capital
after so many other defeats in the
field would probably have precipitated
a collapse of Republican morale.
Moreover, capturing Madrid would
have brought diplomatic recognition
by the Great Powers of the Franco
regime and the attendant
legitimization of the rebellion.
FOREIGN INVOLVEMENT
Europe was faced with a large war in
Spain, a war that showed every sign
of lasting a long time, and the conflict
had already involved Germany, Italy,
and the Soviet Union. So the farce of
"nonimervention" was invented.
What this meant was that all the
powers of Europe agreed not to
supply arms or other war materials to
either side. After December 1936,
therefore, the Republic found it even
harder to get equipment from
anywhere except the Soviet Union.
Stalin, Hitler, and Mussolini, whose
governments were all signatories to
the Non-Intervention Agreement, all
had absolutely no intention of abiding
by it. The force behind this joke was
the Tory government of England
under Baldwin and later Chamberlain.
However, while England forced the
French and others to honor the
agreement, Italian submarines and
light surface units were sinking
merchant ships, many of them British,
outside Republican ports; the
once—peaceful Spanish skies were
filled with Russian, Italian, and German
planes; and thousands of foreigners
were entering Spain to fight for both
sides. The only country that refused
to go along with this charade was
Mexico, which to its credit supported
the Republic to the extent that its very
limited resources would allow.
The Non-Intervention Committee,
when it did anything, interfered with
the Republic's attempts to import
materials. Many people in the West
had been frightened by the social
revolution that started in the
Republican zone with the onset of
the war; they saw the Nationalists as a
force for order. It was perfectly fine
with many conservatives that the
Non-Intervention Committee applied
its rules only to the Republic.
Stalin continued sending arms to the
Republic, arms that were already paid
for since most of the Spanish gold
reserve, the fourth largest In the
world, had been sent to Moscow.
That part of the gold reserve sent to
France was impounded by the
Non-Intervention Committee and was
returned, to Franco, in August 1939.
Soviet influence grew as the Republic
became increasingly dependent on it
for everything. But the Soviet
Union's ability to help Spain was
limited, even with the best of
intentions, and Stalin's intentions
were not particularly good. Stalin
continually extracted more
concessions from the Republic,
including communist control of the
military intelligence service and the
police. Resistance to his demands
was met with threats or sometimes
actual delay of shipments. One of
Stalin's goals was the elimination of
the anti-Stalinist Communist party, the
P.O.U.M. It was dissolved after
trumped~up charges of treason and
secret contact with the fascists. Stalin
insisted that Soviet advisors and
Spanish Communist Party members
be given de facto command of much
of the Republic's army. Yet the actual
number of Russian participants was
never large, probably no more than
3,000 during the entire conflict, and
many of them were aircrew.
A much more numerically important
contribution was made by the
Internationals, probably around
45,000, plus 10,000 additional
noncombatants. Although the
Internationals began as a
Communist-sponsored organization,
it attracted
support from progressives
and antlfascists of all kinds. The
Moscow-aligned Spanish Communist
Party grew from a prewar membership
of around 40,000 to 250,000 in
March 1937. Most of the new
members were not workers at all, but
middle class—government officials,
small businessmen, and army officers
drawn to the party because of its great
influence, iron discipline, and
opposition to more radical groups.
Germany treated the war in Spain as a
laboratory of military experimentation
and a great place to train aircrew. The
Germans founded the Condor
Legion, a military advisory mission
with a combat component of armor
and aircraft. German aviators cycled
through Spain on six-month tours of
duty, gaining valuable experience
against a real, though weak enemy.
Interesting new methods were tried:
terror bombing, use of heavy
antiaircraft guns against tanks, direct
air support. and employment of
massed armor, although the inferiority
of German tanks at that time limited
the effectiveness of German-supplied
formations.
Germany learned many valuable
lessons in Spain. The strength of the
German contingent in Spain hovered
around 5,000 from January 1937 until
the end of the war in April 1939, with a
total of about 15,000 serving in
Spain. Germany's significant
contribution was in the area of
instructors, communications
equipment, technical services, and,
of course, aircrew. Hitler extracted his
price for aid to Franco, all of which was

supplied on credit. Germany wanted,
and got, virtual control of the
important Spanish mining industry. In
this way, Franco mortgaged his
country's future to the Third Reich
and was therefore a direct beneficiary
of the allied victory in 1945.
To Mussolini Spain offered an
opportunity to demonstrate the
power of Italy and the prowess of
ltalian arms. Italy sent a whole army
corps (Corpo di Truppi Voluntan) to
Spain in January-February 1937 and
maintained it there until the end of the
war. ltalian contributions to the
Nationalist war effort were at least as, if
not more, important than those of
Germany. Certainly Italy supplied
much more war material, and many
more ltalians, approximately 80,000,
went to Spain than Germans.
Although this would logically have
permitted Mussolini to exert great
influence, Italy maintained a hands~off
policy towards Spain and only made
efforts to see that it would someday
be paid forthe supplies provided. In
comparison to the Germans, even
these efforts were weak and
half»hearted. Italy made almost no
attempt to guarantee itself a favorable
position in the economy of postwar
Spain. The key to understanding
ltalian involvement in Spain is
Mussolini‘s ego rather than the
interests of the Italian state. The
ltalian military seemed to learn nothing
from its participation in the Spanish
conflict.
The first use of Mussolini's
'Iegionnaires" was in the attack on the
isolated Republican enclave of
Malaga in February 1937. The
anarchist-led (if that is the right word)
defense collapsed against the
Italians. Elated by this event,
Mussolini then wanted to win the war
for the Nationalists by capturing
Madrid. Franco had already realized
Madrid was not going to fall, but since
the ltalians were supplying a vast
amount of material on credit, he
decided to let Mussolini have the
"glory." The ensuing battle of
Guadalajara, which took place from
March 8 to 23, 1937, was a
catastrophe for the Italians. The
prisoners and equipment captured in
the Republican counterattack left no
doubt as to the scale of intervention
on the side of the Nationalists. Yet
even this revelation prompted no
response from the democracies, who
preferred the hypocrisy of
"nonintervention" to facing reality.
THE WAR IN THE SUMMER OF 1937
The war had stalemated around
Madrid. The Insurgents could not
take the capital, but they could take
the gobernitos of Asturias,
Santander, and the Basque
provinces of Viscaya and Guipuzcoa,
fanatically separatist areas in the north
along the Bay of Biscay. Much of
Spain‘s limited industry was located in
the Basque Provinces and Asturias
contained rich mineral deposits. It
took seven months forthe methodical
Franco to conquer the divided north.
During this campaign, the German
command experimented with the
effects of massed air attack on an
undefended town of no military
significance, Guernica. At the time,
Germany probably considered the
bombing a success, but history
characterizes the event as an
example of barbarism. The world was
horrified when it Ieamed of the attack,
and supporters of the Nationalists in
the West (including the Hearst papers
in the United States) achieved new
heights of invention as they tried to
deny that the bombing happened at
all.
During the spring and summer of
1937, the Republic launched a
number of offensives in an attempt to
save the North. The battles of
Segovia, Brunete, Belchite, and all
Loyalist offensives, for that matter,
followed a pattern: first, tactical
surprise, followed by a cautious and
confused advance soon stopped by
Nationalist reserves, then a Nationalist
counterattack which regained most of
the ground they had lost. The
Republican army had developed
offensive capability, but never
Page 25
possessed sufficient strength and
material to exploit an advance.
POLITICS
Politics, which played virtually no role
on the Nationalist side, often dictated
what the Loyalist armed forces did
and how they did it. Disunity among
the Republicans was one of the most
important reasons for their ultimate
loss of the war. The separatists in
various parts of Spain, Basques,
Asturians, Santanderos, and Catalans
resisted any and all infringements on
their sovereignty, making military
coordination difficult. The anarchists
were a disruptive force because they
wanted to make a social revolution at
the same time as the war was being
fought. The anti-Stalin Communists,
the P.O.U.M., concentrated in
Catalonia, usually aligned with the
anarchists in that they wanted social
revolution now, not later. The
Moscow-controlled Communists, now
300,000 strong, were
counter»revolutionary and
concentrated on military victory while
fighting an underground war against
the anarchists and those who they
called Trotskyists, which meant
anyone on the left who disagreed
with Stalin. The Socialists were split.
The revolutionary wing under Premier
Largo Caballero, who took office in
September 1936, was anti—Moscow
and anti—anarchist. The bourgeois
parties and the moderate wing of the
Socialists were aligned with the
Communists, for they did not want a
revolution at all.
These antagonisms erupted in an
uprising in Barcelona on May 3, 1937.
After bloody fighting, the rebellion
was defeated and the power of the
anarchists and Catalan separatists was
cunailed. The P.O.U.M. was blamed
for the uprising. lts militia was
dissolved and many of its members
were imprisoned. Largo Caballero
was replaced by Negrin, who was
dedicated to maintaining a good
relationship with Moscow. The capital
was moved from Valencia to
Barcelona to make clear who was in
charge there.
On the Nationalist side, Franco
dominated everything. He was
declared Head of State on
September 29, 1936. In April 1937,
he issued a decree unifying the
rnonarchist Carlists and the fascist
Falange into one authoritarian party
under himself as Caudillo (leader).
Anyone who opposed Franco in any
way was imprisoned. His only
significant rivals were both dead by
June 1937. General Mola had died in
an airplane crash, and Jose Antonio
Primo de Rivera, leader of the
Falange, had been shot by the
Republicans.
What passed for political life in the
Nationalist zone was a hunt for
"uh-Spanish elements." As the
rebels could not trust the people, a
deliberate policy of terror was
considered necessary. In each village
and town, all Republican officials, all
trade unionists, and all who had ever
played a role against the upper
classes were executed. Furthermore,
this policy was not discontinued at the
end of the war. While spontaneous
violence had almost completely
ended in the Loyalist zone after the
first three months, a policy of
retribution continued for years
following Franco's victory. Modern
Spanish sources indicate that more
Loyalists were executed or died in
prison after the civil war than died in
combat —- and battle deaths for the
government side exceeded
100,000.
THE ARAGON FRONT
After the fall of Asturias, the
Nationalist Army's elite units
concentrated in the Guadalajara area
with the intention of launching
another offensive against Madrid.
The Republicans forestalled Franco
with a surprise attack on the salient of
Teruel on December 15, 1937, a
battle which inflicted heavy losses on
the insurgents. Nationalist shock
troops were then redeployed, and a
three-month battle raged in the
frozen mountains around Teruel. The
battle was costly in lives and material
and once again demonstrated the
superiority of the Nationalist army in
the attack. Teruel was recaptured by
the Nationalists on February 21,
1938.
From then on the Nationalists were on
the offensive. The Nationalist army
was somewhat smaller than the
Republican, but much better supplied
with the necessities of modern war,
including ammunition, gasoline,
radios, range finders, and trucks. The
Nationalist air force was also much
better able to support its army and
Franco's allies had given him
command of the sea. Hitler and
Mussolini replaced the war materials
expended in the North and in the
Teruel battles. Republican losses
were largely not replaced. Franco
decided to use his shock troops
where they were at the end of the
battle for Teruel. A great and
devastating offensive was launched
down the Ebro Valley on March 9,
1938. The weakened Republicans
collapsed, and the Nationalist army
reached the Mediterranean coast on
April 15, 1938, dividing Republican
Spain in half. The Nationalist
headquarters announced that the war
was won, as they had before and
would again.
THE CZECH CRISIS
did seem, in April 1938, that the war
It
might be over. However, it was to last
another year. The Republic
underwent another of its political
crises, but the government emerged
stronger and completely committed to
carrying on the war. Even the
anarchists backed the government.
Franco's army turned south and drove
on the great city of Valencia. But the
attack went nowhere, bogged down
by a newly revitalized Republican
army. In Catalonia, new material
arrived from Russia, and the French
opened their border to let in arms and
oil. The Republican high command
decided on a gamble, an offensive in
late July across the Ebro River to
strike the rear of the Nationalists
intent on their drive towards Valencia.
The Battle of the Ebro that followed
was the same old story: initial
Republican success, then a stalemate
followed by a Nationalist
counteroffensive. But the
Nationalists abandoned their drive on
Valencia, and it took four months of
grinding fighting for Franco to
recapture what the Republicans had
taken in one week. The situation in
Spain again had reached a stalemate.
Now the Nationalists, too, were
exhausted, short of material and
morale.
Great events were happening in the
rest of Europe. The crisis caused by
Hitlers aggression against
Czechoslovakia brought hope to the
Republican government that the
democracies would aid them against
Hitlers protege, Franco. And it
seemed certain the outbreak of a
European war would bring aid against
the fascists. As a political gesture, the
Republic announced the withdrawal
of all foreigners fighting on their side.
Most actually left Spain. Not to be
outdone, the Nationalists announced
the same. A few Italians left. But the
Munich Agreement changed the
picture. The disgraceful sell-out of
the Czechs made Hitler realize he
need not fear that a general war would
grow out of Spain, no matter what he
did. It made Stalin realize he could
not hope for an alliance with Britain
and France against the Axis. He
began to negotiate with Hitler.
German material began to flow in great
quantities into Spain in late 1938, and
when the Nationalist offensive struck
across the River Segre on December
23, 1938, the Republican army caved
in. Tarragona fell on January 14, and
Barcelona fell, without a fight, on
January 26, 1939. Thousands of
refugees poured across the French
border, Nationalist troops reaching
the frontier on February 9. Franco
then controlled about two thirds of
Spain.

THE END OF THE WAR
In the end. the chronic disunity of the
Republican side brought it down.
The Republican armies still numbered
over 300,000 and could certainly
have fought on for many more
months. However, some officers of
this still-formidable force were
negotiating in secret with Franco.
Many officers were disturbed by the
powerful position of the communists
in the government. They hoped their
fellow officer Franco would come to
some compromise with them if they
got rid of the communists. Certainly, it
Franco had demonstrated any
willingness to show mercy and forgo
massive reprisals, the war would have
ended a year earlier. Feeling
themselves already defeated and
hoping vainly that Franco would prove
reasonable, much of the Army of the
Center revolted against its
government on March 4, 1939.
Communist-led units fought rebels in
and around Madrid, creating another
civil war within the civil war. This latest
crisis was the last straw for many
people in Republican Spain. A period
of confusion ensued, during which
the Nationalist armies simply
advanced, meeting almost no
resistance—aha demoralized and
betrayed Republican troops just
melted away. it was clear Franco
would not need to make any
concessions. For those who wished
to go down lighting, the coup had
only deprived them of the chance for
an honorable death. Tens of
thousands would soon die before
Franco's firing squads. When Madrid
was occupied on March 27,1939,
there was no resistance. On April 1,
the Nationalist radio announced,
truthfully this time, that the war had
ended.
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE
Extensive material about the Spanish
Civil War is available. Much of it,
unfortunately, is so partisan as to be
useless. The best general history is
The Spanish Republic and the Civil
War, 1931-1939, by Gabriel Jackson
(Princeton University Press, 1972).
The standard work is The Spanish
Civil War, by Hugh Thomas. The
Thomas book has gone through a
number of editions; the first edition
(1961) is beautifully written. The
1977 edition, published by Hamish
Hamilton, is much more thorough, but
not the pleasure to read that the first
was. A good recent pictorial history is
The Spanish Civil War, a History in
Pictures (WW. Norton. 1986).
There is little in English on the military
aspect of the war. Most of what does
exist is in the form of personal
memoirs. Ofthese, l highly
recommend Alvah Bessie‘s Men in
Battle (Chandler and Sharp, 1975) —
a great book. A good collection of
personal narratives is found in Ronald
Fraser‘s Blood of Spain (Pantheon,
1979). For Whom the Bell Tolls, by
Ernest Hemingway, is perhaps the
best novel to come out of the war. Q
WHO WAS WHO
IN THE SPANISH
CIVIL WAR?
Among the many confusing aspects
ot the Spanish Civil War are
determining who supported which
side and what they should be called.
Both sides included antagonistic
elements: fascists and Catholic
traditionalists on one side, anarchists
and gentlemanly republicans on the
other.
The Nationalists started using that
name soon after they had rebelled
against their government. They did
not like to be called Insurgents or
Rebels, though that is exactly what
they were. They represented
themselves as the true Spaniards, the
real legitimate government. They
followed this logic to a grotesque
extreme: over 100,000 people were
executed for siding with the Republic
and in most cases the formal charge
was "rebellion." Their enemy called
them fascists, which was fairly
accurate.
Page 27
The only political coloration of the
Nationalist side after General Franco
came to dominate it was provided by
the Spanish fascist party, the
Falange. Combining anticommunism,
radical social ideas, and extreme
patriotism, fascism had become
fashionable in Europe during the
19305. However, the Falange was a
facade, used only to involve the large
number of Spaniards who had
formerly been attracted to various
leftist groups. The egalitarianism and
socialist programs of fascist theory
had no place in Franco's hierarchical
and capitalist Spain.
The various monarchist groups in
Spain supported the Nationalists, as
did the Catholic Church. The Church
called the antigovernment forces
"crusaders" and excused or denied
the atrocities they committed. The
importance oi the support given by
the Church to the Nationalist cause
cannot be exaggerated. This suppon
made what was really an army revolt
against an elected government seem
legitimate. In the late 19705, in an
open letter to the Spanish people,
the Spanish Catholic Church
apologized for its activities during the
civil war.
Some monarchists supported the
return of Alphonso Xlll or his son. The
largest group of monarchists, the
Carlists, wanted a less liberal
monarchy. They wanted all religions
other than Catholicism banned and an
end to any sort of democracy. Their
militia, the Raquela, was used as
shock troops in the later two—thirds of
the war.
The other side called themselves
Republicans or Loyalists, neither of
which describes many of the groups
that supported the Republic.
Certainly the anarchists were neither
Republican nor loyal to the
government —— they opposed the
rebels as enemies of the working
class. Their enemy called them
"Reds," an appropriate designation
for the orthodox, Moscow-aligned
Communist parties, the radical
Page 28
Socialists, the followers of the
dissident Communist leader Trotsky,
and the anarchists. However, the
term certainly could not be applied to
the bourgeois parties, moderate
Socialists, and various separatist
groups, which taken all together
made up the majority of the
Republic's supporters.
Furthermore, in large parts of Spain,
regional loyalties transcended
politics. The Basque provinces were
generally conservative and probably
Spain's most Catholic area. The area
had voted solidly conservative in the
1936 elections. But the Nationalist's
complete rejection of the principle of
regional autonomy put the Basques
on the side of the radical Republic.
Catalonia also had an intense
secessionist sentiment. In the hectic
early days of social revolution in the
late summer of 1936, Catalan
extremists destroyed roads and
railroads in orderto separate their
homeland physically from the rest of
Spain.
’1
John J. Gee is the co—designer
(with Jeff Milletoglie) of a
Spanish Civil War game, "No
Pasaranl". His articles have
appeared in numerous
magazines. He has a degree
in history lrorn San Francisco
State University and has been
a wargamer for nearly 30 years.
John and Jeff are currently
working on the Europa game
For Whom The Bell Tolls.
23qu Quart
by Rick Gayler
Submit all rules questions to
Rick Gayler, Editor TEN , PO.
Box 2431, Opelika, AL 36801.
Please include a SASE and
phrase questions for a yes/no
response. Mention the rules
number where appropriate.
This is my first session of
"Rules Court" within these pag-
es, but it marks what should be
a long stay on the bench. l
have been "preparing" for this
job by bombarding John Astell
with innumerable queries over
the last seven years. Upon my
appointment to this task, John
laughed and said it served me
right. Anyway, [have a rather
extensive library of questions
and answers in reserve in ad-
dition to the current flow of
questions. The good news is
that there is plenty of material
for this column. The bad news
is that there are an awful lot of
folks out there confused about
proper play of Europa games.
I hope to be able to address
the questions which appear in
this column in a way that will
serve to enlighten.
It is inevitable that from time to
time I will geta ruling wrong. I
accept this as unavoidable;
even John Astell has made rul-
ing errors and reversed him—
selfover the years. I will seek
such guidance as is needed to
keep such missteps to a mini-
mum. Also, lmay occasionally
cover material previously print—
ed in other publications. My
operating procedure is to pro—
vide this information, even
though some of the readers
may have seen it elsewhere
previously. There are many
others who will not have seen
it, and it is
for the sake of these
folks that we print this material
again. In any case, such dupli—
cation should be very limited.
For those readers who have
submitted requests for opin-
ions on design, game play,
and the like along with your
rules questions, be advised
that such requests will slow
down my reply. I will eventual—
ly answer all this mail and do
my best to respond in a mean-
ingful manner, but in the inter-
im answers to your questions
will be delayed. would ad—
I
vise that in the future you seg-
regate this kind of dialogue
onto a page separate from the
rules questions. That way I
can return the rules questions
to you promptly and reply to
your discussion material as
time allows.
Europa Basic Concepts
Inexample #1, if the units in
hex C get a "DR" result, can
one 3-6 division retreat to hex
A and the other to hex B?
Yes, and note that in some
cases units must retreat to dif-
ferent hexes due to stacking
limits.
May both 3-6‘s retreat to the
same hex? Yes, so long as
stacking limits are obeyed.
Do units retreat as a stack or
individually? The best way to
handle this is as follows: All
units retreating to the same
hex retreat as a stack. An ex-
ample may serve to illustrate
the finer points of this answer.
Suppose a stack consisting of
a 12-10 Panzer XX and a 2-1-
10 assault gun battalion re-
ceives a "DH" result and must
retreat to an empty hex in ene-
my ZOC. The Panzer XX can
not retreat first (that is, inde-
pendently) and occupy the hex
with its Division Group, thus
providing the assault gun unit
with a safe haven using the
ability of German c/m units to
retreat through 2005 onto
friendly units. In this case, the
assault gun unit would be
eliminated and the Panzer XX
ago
2. Example
Hex A [German]
11-10, 10-10, 9-10 - XX's
3-10, 3-10, 2-10 - ill's
2-3-8, 2-3-8 - Ill's
Hex C [Soviet]
3-6 - xx
1-6 - |||
HexD IHexC
German 2x 3-6 Soviet
Attackers Rifle Divisions
would be reduced to DG and
retreat into the empty hex.
Do Zones of Control extend
into enemy occupied hexes at
all times, especially during re-
treats? Yes, however note
that for some game purposes
friendly 2005 are negated by
the presence of enemy units in
a hex, e.g. tracing supply lines.
For purposes of the following
question on overruns, assume
clear weather and terrain. In
example # 2, units in Hex B
can overrun Hex C and units in
hex A can move to Hex D and
then overrun Hex C. May
some or all of the "Hex A units"
overrun Hex C by going
through Hex B? The second
sentence of Rule 13 states ;
Hex B [German]
12-10, 12-10, 12-10 - XX's
3-10, 3-10 - Ill's
5-3-6, 5-3-8, 5-3-8 - Ill's
Hex D
Empty
4 Page 29
|HexA&B
Empty & No
Enemy ZOC
these units may not exceed
the stacking limit ofthe hex.
Does the phrase "these units"
apply only to the overrunning
units or to all units in the hex,
both those overrunning and
those not participating? lt ap-
plies to only those units partici-
pating in the overrun. Notice,
however, that stacking limits
must be observed at the end
of the movement and exploita-
tion phases; this might man-
date that some or all of the
overrunning or non-
participating units vacate the
hex. Here's a little more back-
ground on my decision: Over-
runs occur during the move-
ment and exploitation phases
and during these phases any
number of units may pass
through the same hex without
violating stacking limits. Con-
sider if Hex C were empty in-
stead of occupied. "Hex A
units" could certainly move
through the units in Hex B to
occupy an empty Hex C; why
then disallow them from mak-
ing an overrun of Hex C.
Are 200 and overrun move-
ment costs in addition to the
other terrain in the hex? Yes.
Page 30 ' '-
Scorched Earth
May a unit'begin a phase in
hex other than road or clear,
but still use admin. movement
it it does not subsequently
move into ineligible terrain or
across ineligible hexsides?
Yes, but note that this includes
ineligible hexsides of the hex
in which it begins the phase.
When using the "1/2+1" move-
ment rate in the Arctic, does
this effectively limit movement
to one hex? Yes.
Since interceptors may only in-
tercept at half range, is their re-
turn range limited to halt range
also? Yes, Rule 18 states that
when an air unit's movement
rating is modified based on the
mission it is flying, this is the
maximum number of hexes the
unit may use to fly from its
base to the target hex and the
maximum number of hexes the
unit may use when returning to
base. in the case of intercep—
tion this is half range.
Ifa fighter attacks a stack of
tour bombers and after the ex-
change ot fire the fighter unit is
unharmed, may it then attack
the second bomber, and then
the third, etc, this continuing
until the fighter is killed, abort-
ed, or returned? No. There
would be a single exchange
of fire between the fighter and
the one bomber it chose to at—
tack. The other three bombers
would not be involved in air
combat with that fighter during
that air combat resolution step.
When the surprise attack air
phase refers to tactical bomb—
a ing strength (Rule 31F2b) does
it mean the printed strength, or
the units' strength as modified
for flying the air unit bombing
mission (yielding a +1 for
Class "F" units)? The +1 ad-
justment is used for Class "F"
units participating in the sur-
prise attack against the Soviet
Air Force.
What happens when all the
breakdown counters of a divi-
sion are eliminated? It may
recombine in the replacement
pool at the appropriate time,
but is not required too, EX-
CEPT... see the next question.
May regiments of a Russian
fragile division be replaced?
No, in this case when all the
regiments are eliminated, they
are removed from the pool and
returned to the breakdown
box. The fragile division is
then permanently removed
from the replacement pool and
the appropriate 3-6 Rifle XX
substituted for it.
Does the "C" capability of the
Me109T have any significance
in the game? No, it has no
bearing on the play of SE.
Is a German foreign Group Al-
lowance increase treated any
differently from a normal GA in-
crease? No.
it an air unit is killed over water
does it still go into the EFT box
if within two hexes of friendly
land? Yes.
Can the KM commando's
"intrinsic transport" be attacked
by air units under Rule 38E
when it moves at sea? No.
Ifon Jun ll the Axis capture
major city hexes or successful-
ly bomb rail marshalling yards,
is the Soviet rail capacity for
Jun || reduced below 45 REs?
Yes.
itis very useful forthe Rus-
sians to keep rebuilding the 1-
2-8 motorcycle units during the
first winter. The alternative is
build tank brigades, but since
there is no AEC, these units'
extra defense strength point is
quite useful. Should these
units be fragile (replace with 1-
8 We III) or should there be a
limit on the number of m/c REs
replaced per month? In FitE
these units were replaced us-
ing infantry replacement
points; thus my counters are
rather dog~eared from over-
use. Even with the SE change
which now requires that these
units be replaced using armor
replacement points, most 80-
viet players appreciate the ex-
tra defensive "bangs for the
bucks " these provide. The
only limit on their replacement,
however, is that imposed by
the availability of armor HPs.
These units are not fragile.
Do naval units count towards
the stacking limits in any fash-
ion? How about river flotillas?
This has been asked and an-
swered before, but based on
the number of people still in-
quiring about this, it obviously
bears repeating. Naval units

(including river flotillas) do not
count toward the stacking lim—
its.
Do Soviet ZOCs extend across
the Rumanian border on the
Jun ll 41 Axis turn? Notdur—
ing the Surprise Attack Turn,
but since Axis units in Ruma-
nia can not move or attack dur—
ing this turn anyway, it hardly
matters. During the regular
Jun ll turn, Soviet 2005 do ex-
tend across the border as the
standard rules are then in ef—
fect and Flumania is at war with
the Soviet Union.
Do Finnish and Hungarian
ZOCs extend across their bor-
ders and affect adjacent Soviet
units during the Jun ll 41 turn?
No. Since movement at this
time across such border hex-
sides is prohibited due to neu-
trality rule 318, ZOCs do not
extend across per Rule 5.
Although a partisan may not
move or attempt sabotage on
the turn of recruitment. may it
attack a 0~strength unit that
turn. Yes.
In that case, may it advance af-
ter combat? Yes, as advance
after combat is not movement
per se.
other retreat routes are
it all
blocked by APZOCs, may a
partisan retreat through the
hex of the unit which is attack-
ing it? Yes.
May a unit use operational rail
movement to move adjacent to
(even over) a partisan and
then attack it? Yes.
May a partisan-occupied rail
hex be repaired or regauged
so long as the engineer per-
forming the construction does
not end its movement in the
hex? Yes.
Does RR artillery count against
the stacking in a hex? Is there
a limit to the number of RR ar-
tillery or rail-only units that can
be in a hex at the end of the
movement phase? Flail-only
units, including FIR artillery
units, are treated as any other
units for stacking purposes.
Is a rail-only unit required to
pay the entraining cost before
moving? Well, technically
yes. However, it may still
move up to 30 hexes opera-
tional rail, so it may be easier
to just consider such units per-
manently entrained.
Do reinforcements entering by
rail have to pay the 1 MP en-
training cost? Yes.
Please provide some more ex—
amples of Guards conversions
and the appropriate costs/
gains associated with these
conversions. Okay, here are
some examples:
1. Tank XXX to 15-12-8
11-8—8
Guards Tank XXX = 3 Arm
RPS.
2. 5-10 Guards Mot XX to 14-8
Guards Mech XXX = Free.
3. 24-8 Tank X to 3-2-8
Guards Tank X = No Cost
(2+ 1:3).
4. 3-2-8 Tank X to 3-2-8
Page 31
Guards Tank X = Yields 1 extra
Arm HP.
5. 6-6 Guards Flifle XX to 12-8
Guards Mech XXX = Free.
War in the Desert
Isthe supply condition of a unit
determined during the initial
phase still in effect during the
combat phase even though it
was cut off from a supply route
during the movement phase?
Yes. (BLK)
Can the limited Vichy French
engineering capability in the
Levant mentioned in rule 3203
be used while the Levant is
neutral? Non, monsieur.
(BLK)
InDavid Scheel's OB in The
Grenadier #23 for the "Italian
Offensive", John Astell showed
a VAL (1T1 2-2/14) aircraft ap—
pearing as part of RAF Egypt
initial forces Sep II 1940. This
is a transport with a bombing
strength of two tactical and
strategic bombing points. is
this correct? The VAL (which
stands for "Valentia"} was a
pre-war transport biplane. It
could carry 22 men and was
fitted with underwing racks ca-
pable of carrying a bomb load.
The above info is correct.
(JMA)
 Page 32
More First Divisions
Efic (great!)
David
After reading the articles on the First
Divisions already published in TEN,
the American, the German, and more
recently the Russian, felt inspired to
I
write about others much less signifi-
cant in Europa terms. These are the
First Divisions of the French Army.
Now admit that in a standard game of
I
Fall of France they will only last a
couple of turns, it that. Yet as Grand
Europa gets closer, at least, specu-
I
late on how effective the French Army
would be if it were left alone for much
of 1940, and what it probably would
have become in 1941.
The first point to remember is that af-
ter the debacle of 1940 everyone
zoomed in on the bad aspects of the
French. British officers described the
lousy (literally) condition of some of
the conscript units. German Panzer
experts patronizingly listed the tactical
weaknesses of French armor, and the
failure to concentrate tanks in a few
powerful formations. The Germans
—%
7-8
conveniently forgot that Panzer divi-
sions had been fought to a bloody
standstill in their sweep across North-
ern Belgium. The British preferred to
forget that Dunkirk had been defend-
ed by French troops, and that their fa-
mous counterattack at Arras (the one
where Rommel discovered you could
use 885 against Matildas) involved
more French tanks than British ones.
As far as the criticism of the distribu-
tion of tanks - has anyone ever ana-
by Hughes
lyzed, either in Europa terms or actual
tank count, the pattern in the German
Army in 1943 or later? suspect that
I
the widespread use of self-propelled
guns in infantry units and the vast
mass of Squ brigades, heavy tank
battalions, etc. adds up to a pattern
remarkably similar to that of the
French in 1940! The truth is that the
French Army, like most, had strong
and weak points. However, analyzing
the French Army will take more space
than is available in this article. Let's
just consider a few of its divisions, es-
pecially in terms of their Europa rat-
ings.
The 1 DIM {1re Division d'lnfanferie
Motor/see), or fst Motorized, is one
of these. In structure it is almost iden-
tical to a German motorized division of
the type found in Case White, that
is, before they were reduced in size
to two regiments in 1940. It was built
around three infantry regiments, each
of three battalions. The divisional anil-
lery was also comparable with 36
75mm, 12 105mm and 12155mm
guns, all either tracked or with tracked
prime movers with excellent cross—
country capability. Antitank strength
was very similar, a total of 60 pieces.
80 was its AA equipment, each of the
three regiments having a 20mm AA
detachment. lt scored over its Ger-
man opponent ln having a much
stronger recon element with a full es-
tablishment of 12 Panhard 178 ar-
mored cars and 20 AMR recon tanks.
All in all the 1 DIM was an excellent for-
mation. It should have been since the
French tended to concentrate their
best material in their Active (the 1 DIM
for example) and their First Line Re-
serve of "A" Divisions. Of course, this
inevitably meant that the Second Line
Divisions, the "B" Divisions (they are
mainly shown as 2-4 or 3-4 units in
FOP), were pitiable in both equip-
ment and troop quality. The Germans
divided up their assets far more equi-
tably between their Wei/e or 'Waves"
of divisions. Presumably the French
thought it was just bad luck that the di-
visions that ended up defending the
Meuse against the Panzers were
nearly all "B" class units!
All but one of the seven French mo-
torized divisions are rated at 7-8. The
exception is the 12 DIM, rated an 8—8
since it had an extra group of 155mm
howitzers. Equal to their German
equivalents of 1939 (7-10 in Case
White) in strength, they should in
theory have equal or better mobility,
This was reduced to an 8 movement
value to reflect the lethargic French
command style.
Before leaving the 1 DIM its regiments
bear looking at. These were the tst,
43rd, and 110th. The last two were
old enough, the 43rd first formed in
1638 as Royal-Vaisseaux (as the
name suggests, initially as Marines),
the 110th in 1773 as the Regiment
Pon-au-Prince. But the other regie
ment, the First, was something else.
It claimed direct descent
through the
Napoleonic 1st Regiment of the Line
back to 1585, when the Regiment Pi»
cardy, the oldest and most senior of
all French units, was formed. Enthu—
siasts even claimed continuity back to
1480, when the Bands de Picardie
were created. If so, this made the 151
Regiment of the fst Division the long»
est continually existing unit ever,
even outlasting the IV Macedonian
Legion of the Roman Army. With all
this military heritage, it is not surpris-
ing that the 1 DIM fought well, if futile»
ly, in the French Campaign (we often

forget that German and French casu-
alties were very high in 1940 - the
campaign, though short, was no walk»
over). Afterthe armistice its traditions
were assumed by the 9th Division Mi|i~
taire, a much weaker walking infantry
unit of Vichy France (a 4-6 in Europa
terms), which was forcibly disarmed by
the Germans in 1942. As for Picardy:
in 1942 it hid its colors, many of its
troops joining the resistance until it
was reformed in 1944. It was the
ONLY French regular infantry regiA
ment to be honored with the Croix de
Guerre (the equivalent of the Presi-
dential Unit Citation) for its services in
the Second World War. it is still the
tst Regiment, having celebrated its
500th anniversary in 1980.
The next "First" symbolizes the
French cavalry tradition as the 1 DlM
did that of the infantry. It is the 1 DLM
(1re Division Legere Mecanique).
Again we can find a close match in the
German Army. The 1 DLM resulted
from the conversion of some of the
French cavalry units to armor, just as
the three Light Divisions in Case
White represent a similar change by
the Germans. The three DLMs were
comparable to the three Light Divi-
sions in that they were designed to
perform the traditional cavalry role of
recon in strength. They were consid-
erably stronger in tank strength, hav~
ing a "battle" brigade of two regiments
with 80 H-35 and 80 8-35 tanks. in-
fantry strength was weaker with a sin-
gle regiment of "Mounted Dragoons",
which however also held 60 AMR re-
con tanks. In addition there was a
strong recon unit with 40 good Pan»
hard armored cars, and an artillery reg-
iment with 36mm, 75mm, and 105mm
guns using tracked vehicles. Europa
players who also dabble in Napoleon-
ics might be interested in the regi—
ments of the 1 DLM. The two tank
outlits were the 4th Cuirassiers and
the 18th Dragoons, the mounted in—
fantry were the 4th Dragoons and the
recon regiment was the 6th Cuirassi»
are. (The last seems wrong somehow
- it is difficult to visualize Cuirassiers as
skirmishers!)
The Europa ratings forthe DLMs re-
flect their similarity to the German
Light Divisions, forthe former a 7—9-
10, while the Light Divisions in Case
White are either 7-5—10 or 65-10.
Both are considered to be 1/2 AECA.
The French units are probably strong
enough in good tanks (remember the
Somua S 35 was probably the best all-
round tank available in 1940) to be full
AECA, but their doctrine discouraged
them from indulging in Blitzkrieg-like
attacks.
In May 1940 the three DLMs formed
part of the mass oi motorized troops
that rushed into Northern Belgium.
There, quite against doctrine, they
met, head-on, Panzer divisions rush-
ing the other way, The ensuing
punch-up is skimmed over in German
accounts, but ended with the mutual
decimation of DLMs and Panzers
alike. A week or so later the DLMs, by
now out off by the German drive to the
Channel coast, were heavily involved
in the counterattack at Arras and the
defense of Dunkirk. The DLM was
the most powerful formation in the
French Army, and the Germans were
most insistent that Vichy France be
prevented from relorming them after
the Armistice.
Our next "First" is the 1 DLC (1re Divi-
sion Legere de Cava/rie). its origin
was similar to that of many armies of
the time, The cavalry was influential,
prestigious, and deeply resented be-
ing converted en masse into a bunch
of dirty mechanics. Therefore the
French War Ministry, while insisting
that some units be converted to tanks
(hence the DLM), graciously allowed
many cavalry regiments to keep their
beloved steeds and pretty uniforms.
As a result there were in September
1939 three strong cavalry divisions
(they are 6-8 divisions in FoF), as well
Page 33
g
1DLC 1DC
5-8 6-8
as separate brigades. Two of these
are the 2-8 Spahi Brigades (Spahi was
the name for North African "native" ca-
valry). As an example, the 1 DC (1re
Division de Cavalrie) had, when it mo»
bilized at Orleans, tour cavalry regi-
ments in two brigades, the 1st Hus‘
sars and 8th Chasseurs in one, the
1st Chasseurs and 19th Dragoons in
the other. It also contained a large MG
battalion, a motorized infantry batta—
lion, and a strong AT detachment.
The artillery was mainly horse~drawn,
yet the division also contained its own
detachment of observation aircraft.
(So, by the way, did the DLMs - the
French Army at its best was very ad-
vanced. ) Allin all, more than just ca—
valry, hence the 68 rating of the 1
DC.
Afterthe Polish Campaign the most
blinkered cavalry officer had to recog»
nize that cavalry, even the 1st Hus-
sars, had little chance against Panz-
ers, so some changes were made. in
effect these increased the motorized
infantry element in the division at the
expense of the horsed cavalry. The
result was the DLC (Division Legere
de Cavalrie). Our example, the tst
DLC, was converted in March 1940. it
retained two cavalry units, the 1st
Chasseurs and 19th Dragoons, but
the motorized infantry was expanded
from a battalion to a full regiment, the
5th Dragoons. At the same time its
75mm artillery converted from horse-
drawn to tracked vehicles. It now
shows as a 5-8 cavalry XX. The Spa-
his, by the way, were left mounted;
presumably the French thought they
could not handle vehicles. The 1
DLC did not have a very “good" war.
Used as a screen for the 9th Army it
was quickly pushed back (like similarty
equipped Belgian units in the Ar-
 Page 34
‘
dennes) by the Panzer corps, while
its horsed units suffered heavily from
air attacks. The combination of a
horsed brigade with a motorized bri-
gade simply did not work. At least in
FoF French players have the option
of breaking 1 DLC down into a 2-8 Ca-
valry (useless), and a 2-10 Motorized
(a nice unit). After 1940 the Germans,
being no fools were quite happy to let
Vichy France maintain cavalry units!
1Mor
Q 1Co|
7-6
6-6
These "First" Divisions have no equiv-
alent in the German Army. Naturally,
since they are "Empire" troops and
Germany was stripped of all of its over-
seas possessions in 1919. The
French in 1939 retained their large
colonial areas and the Army relied
heavily on these "overseas" troops,
as they were called, to fill up the gaps
resulting from the wholesale slaugh~
ter of French metropolitan soldiers in
the Great War, John Astell explained
some of the features of these units in
the "Players Notes" to FoF, but since
they also appear in Western
Desert and Torch, and will do so in
Second Front, some additional
comments may help.
These "First Divisions" are closer to
British Empire troops than any other,
but not quite the same. For there was
one major difference between the
French and British Empires. The
French defined their territories as be—
ing part of France, and did not allow
the growth of independent self—
governing Dominions such as Austra—
lia and Canada They encouraged
French (Le. "white“) citizens to settle
in large numbers, and considered
them citizens of France with their own
representatives in the French Nation-
al Assembly. This policy remained in
effect after 1945, hence the bitter»
ness of the Algerian
present-day
civil war, and the
problems in French Sa-
moa. But enough of politics, the re-
sult was that French overseas divi~
sions were of two types.
One was very similar to the Indian
Army divisions of the British, com-
posed of regiments of native troops
officered by Frenchmen. Unlike the
British, however the French did not
1NA
6-6
"stiffen" the native units by brigading
them with "white" regiments. Two of
our "First Divisions" are of this type.
The French gave their native infantry
the title of Tiraiiieurs, the Napoleonic
term for Light Infantry, and distin-
guished them by the colony of origin.
They also believed (at least in theory)
that they could be classified by quality
- Moroccans the best, Algerians
next,
and last Tunisians. (The British had a
similar theory about their Indian
troops, distinguishing between the
"hard" northerners like Punjabi, Sikhs
and Pathans, and "soft" southerners
like Madrassi and Bengali. Both theo-
ries were rubbish, and really reflected
who had been the most recent ene—
mies - Pathans lor the British and Mo
roccans for the French.) Let's look
first at the 1 DINA (1re Division
D'Infanterie Nord-Africaine). An Ac-
tive Division stationed in Metropolitan
France, its three regiments were the 5
RTM (5th Moroccan), 27 RTA (Algeri—
an) and 28 Ft'lT (Tunisian). This is a
typical division, mainly horse-drawn.
In May 1940 like many other divisions
it lacked antiaircraft
‘
guns (it only had 3
20mm!) lts 6-6 rating is only justified
by the fact that it retained its original
sub-units; many similar divisions were
in the process of reorganization when
the German attack came.
The second division, the 1 DM (1re
Division Marocaine), was made of bet-
ter stuff. Its three regiments, the 1st,
2nd, and 7th R.T.M., were all Regular
units on active service in Morocco at
the start of the war - the French had
only completed the formal conquest
of the colony in the 19205, and there
were still rebels in action. guess it
I
was the French "North-West F rontier"
of the time. These were elite, well of-
ficered troops, hence the 76 rating,
and were rushed to France as fast as
possible. Incidentally, the MAIN con,
cern of the French Navy was to pro
tect the troops convoys from North
Africa against possible Italian intercep-
tion. A nice alternative for Grand Eu»
rope? Some players may wonder
why, considering the geography of
Morocco, the 1 DM is not a mountain
division, The reason is that there
WERE mountain troops from Moroc—
co, but they were not in TiraiI/eurs
Regiments, but organized into
Goums. Europa players will see them
in action in Second Front. After
the fall of France all the "native" regi—
ments were sent back to North Africa.
They formed the mass of the army
there, and appear in the OB in
Torch. Two oi the three regiments
of this division fought in France in
1944-45.
The second category of these
"overseas" units is represented by
the last division we will consider - the
t DIC ( 1 re Division D'Infanterie Colonie
ale). At the stat of the war it consist-
ed of three Colonial Regiments.
These were the formations in which
the white settlers served. Settlers
from North Africa were supposed to
be in Zouave Regiments. (American
Civil War buffs will recollectthat dress-
ing up in the fancy Zouave uniform
was popular in 1961). However, since
the division started the war in France,
there cannot have been settlers in it.
The answer is that these "Colonial"
Regiments were also designed to
guard other (outside North Africa) col-
onies of France. Therefore the cadre
of some regiments were regulars in
peacetime. These units had for most
of their history been called "Marine

Regiments". (Unlike British and US
Marines, French Marines formed part
of the Army. and are better described
as "overseas" regiments.) By 1940
many of the Colonial Regiments had
been swapped with native units of
other divisions, and the regiments of
the First Colonial were the 3 RIC (3rd
Colonial) and the 12 and 14 RTS
(12th and 14th Senegal). Senegal
was the generic name given to native
units from West Africa. The 1 BIG was
in poor shape in May 1940. still recov-
ering from having traded regiments
with other divisions the previous
month. as well as being short 50% of
its regimental antitank guns. Its per-
formance was not very impressive and
it should be rated
a 4-6 on the basis of
its May, 1940 quality. Its 6—6 rating re-
flects its starting strength, when all its
subunits were regular "Marines".
xx
Q would help a lot and I'm sure you'd get
DCR
1 more orders. How about it?
_L
2—9-8
Of course there is one "First" Division
missing - the 1 DCR (1re Division Cui-
rassee). Rightly so. because al-
though the constituent parts exist ~
the 4-2-8' 1/1 DCR (with 70 heavy
B.1 tanks), and the 2-8‘ 2/1 DCR (with
90 H.30 medium tanks) - the forma-
tion had only been created in Janu~
ary. and its tank battalions had previ-
ously operated in an infantry support
role. But it is pleasant for a French
player to contemplate what will hap-
pen if the German will only leave him
alone for a bit. After all, by the end of
1941 he will have 18 good tank and
mechanized divisions and 9 excellent
motorized ones. Just let the German
try knocking THAT out in two turns.
Who knows, in some Grand Europa
campaign the First Divisions talked
about here might have a battle-history
as good as the "Big Red One" orthe
1st Guards Motorized Rifle Division!
(I
EXchange
Gary Helmer
First, think it's great that you guys are
I 1
making Europa pans available, and
there are a number would like to
I
order, but how are we supposed to
remember which counters were in
which counter sheet in a game that
we bought years ago? Suppose my
cat ate the French Colonial divisions
from FoF. How do l know which one,
if
any. of the eight available counter
sheets contains these units? How
about publishing a one-time general
description of what each counter
sheet and map contains, e.g.: SE -
Europa sheet 52: Soviet: RR
engineers, corps markers, and air
units; and Map SB: northern Norway
and Sweden. western Finland. This
Secondly. have to speak up about a
I
disconcerting tendency in the last
couple of issues of TEN. subscribe
I
to TEN to get Europa news. articles,
errata. variants, etc.. so don't like
i
seeing space taken up by purely
historical articles such as Louis
Rotundo‘s article about Russian
reserves (#6) and Jack Radey's "The
Battle for Kiev" (#7). This is not meant
to detract from these authors' work.
nor from the great way that TEN has
expanded. Both articles were
interesting and liked having
I
Rotundo's bibliography, but that‘s not
my point. There are many other
periodicals that are available for "pure"
military history, and this is whereI
would like to find these articles. For
historical information presented in
TEN, prefer to see it more in the
I
fashion of Shelby Stanton's "Facts
Behind the Counters," Charles
Sharp's articles on Soviet artillery.
David Hughes' "'Mlssing' Units of the
British Army," etc.. in which the
historical information presented is
dlrectly related to or translated into
Page 35
Europa terms,
In shon. it t want military history.
can
(and do) go to the many other
sources available. but nowadays only
in the pages oi TEN and ETO can I
get the Europa goodies look forward
l
to each issue. Let's not torget that
the 'E' is the most important
component of TEN!
The Europa game map display,
which appears on the inside back
cover of TEN #8 and at the end of
John Astell‘s Europa Almanac,
should provide adequate assistance
in determining which areas are
covered by the various maps.
Conveying the contents of the
numerous counter sheets is another
matter. Since many sheets contain
quite a variety of counters, describing
what is on each sheet is not always as
easy as in your example. And if a
Soviet air unit were lost, there are
several sheets containing these; how
does one know which of them is
needed?
Itis recommended practice to make
photostatic copies of all counter
sheets prior to punching to be filed
for future reference. This is helpful in
several regards. not the least of which
is tracking potentially "missing” units.
Recognizing that many Europa
gamers have not done this, we are
considering publishing 50%
reductions of the fronts of the
existing Europa counter sheets in a
future issue of the magazine it there is
enough interest out there. We would
appreciate hearing our readers’
opinions on this proposal.
We are disappointed to hear that you
take exception to the appearance of
"pure" military history articles in TEN,
but there are no plans to change the
nature of our current article mix. We
will continue to solicit and print articles
Page 36
such as this issue’s ”The Spanish
Civil War“ by John Gee. While we
concur with you about "the 'E’ thing",
and are on guard against drifting into
the mainstream, as The Grenadier
did, we disagree with your contention
that such articles are not directly
related to Europa. We feel that
interesting historical articles on the
subject of World War II in Europe by
Europa savants such as Messrs.
Rotunda, Radey, Gee, and Prieskop
are an integral part of a well-rounded
magazine on the Europa system.
Louis Rotundo
It was with
a great deal of interest that
read the recent article on Soviet
artillery by my good friend Charles
Sharp. Given the usual depth of his
excellent research, it is with a large
degree a hesitation that l suggest an
additional review of that ground.
However, thought your readers
I
might enjoy some further information
on this subject.
In Soviet prevwar doctrine, fire
destruction of enemy forces was to
be carried out throughout the entire
depth of the enemy defenses. The
main role in that activity was assigned
to artillery. Artillery was split into two
components, the organic artillery and
the artillery of the RGK (High
Command Fleserves), later RVGK.
The artillery organic to formations is
se|f~explanatory.
The RVGK artillery was designed as
qualitative. quantitative, and
Military Cannon Howitzer
Districts
Regts Regts
Leningrad 2 5
Baltic - 3
Western 3 7
Kiev 3 1 D
Odessa 1 1
Other 8.
Reserves 5 34
Total 1 4 60
sometimes simply as special,
reinforcements It was to include
ground and antiaircraft guns. Under
pre-war doctrine there were no
provisions to establish RGK antitank
units. However, the stunning results
of the German attacks in the West
repudiated this thesis. But, itwas
only in April 1941 that such units
began to be formed.
At the outbreak of the war, there were
74 (not 73) RGK artillery units. These
were broken down as shown on the
Soviet Artillery Chan below.
I
The problems for Soviet artillery on
June 22, aside from many units being
deployed away from the border, were
compounded by the lack of traction
and the absence of air cover or air
defense. The shortage of traction
can be traced to the dispersal of the
artillery weapons to the field tiring
ranges for summer maneuvers and
firing exercises. The prime movers
were then loaned to the construction
forces working on the "Fortified
Areas" along the border. This
situation of course presupposed that
all tractors even existed. For
example, in the ten antitank brigades
the level of motorization on June 22,
1941 was only 20%. Similarly, the
lack of antiaircraft guns could not be
made good as they simply did not
exist. Within the Red Army as a
whole, against a total TO&E of 4,900
AA guns in the rifle divisions and
corps, there were only 1,382 guns.
AT lndep Indep
an
Bdes Mtr Art an
- 1 - of use and the danger was great
2 - - that they would be lost in the
3 1 1 fluid frontline situation. At the
5 - 4 outbreak of war, there were 14
- - 1
- 7 6 howitzer battalions, and 11
1 0 9 1 2
These problems never occur in game
terms as they did in real life. For
instance, German air units destroyed
the Soviet counteroffensives of June
23 on Western Front while at the
same time they established clear air
supremacy and disrupted Soviet
railroads. Nor in game terms is Soviet
mobility as handicapped as it was in
the real world of summer 1941.
These are issues that should be
addressed in any reasonable scenario
of that campaign.
Concurrent with the problem of
mobility was the profound shortages
of shells. This problem resulted less
from negligence in production,
although severe shortages had been
indicated to the General Staff as far
back as 1940, but rather coincided
with the overrunning of the many
supply dumps in the western districts.
These dumps were not mobile and
thus fell easy prey to the advancing
Nazi forces. In total, 30% of all
ammunition supplies were
concentrated, and lost, in just ten
dumps. Over 50% of Soviet fuel was
lost in the eight days, June 22 - 29.
As a result, Soviet artillery continued
to experience severe shortages of
ammo, Soviet troops suffered
equipment losses sirrply from lack of
fuel, and Soviet forces experienced a
lack of combat power merely by
neglect. It was not until August that
many of these problems began to be
addressed.
In the course of the border battles,
the Soviets suffered heavy losses in
artillery. The RVGK large caliber
artillery (280mm mortars and
lndep Hvy 305mm howitzers) were
Art an withdrawn simply because they
were not mobile enough to be
heavy gun artillery regiments
and 2 battalions, 13 heavy
mortar battalions.
At the start of the war, there

were no rocket units in the Red Army.
However, the growth of this handy
weapon was quite rapid. By
December 1, seven regiments and 52
battalions (total equivalent 24
regiments) had been activated. By
May1, 1942 it was up to 72
equivalent regiments and by
mid-November it was 138 equivalent
regiments
In spite of the new production and the
careful attempts to conserve artillery.
the overall quantity in the Fronts by
September 1, 1941 when compared
to July 1, showed a decrease by a
factor of two. By October 1, it had
declined by a factor of 2.5.
At the start of the war, there were
4,854 guns/mortars in the RVGK. By
December 1, this number had grown
to 5,704. As the new production
came on line, the corresponding
artillery totals showed a rapid
increase. By May 1, 1942 it was
10,080 and by the time of Stalingrad
the total was 18,133.
By the late summer, the General Staff
determined that the large
brigade-type AT units were
cumbersome and unmanageable.
Except for the 14th AT Brigade
(formed in Leningrad during the war),
they were broken up. From these
formations and new equipment, 72
AT regiments of the RVGK were
formed (4, 5, or 6 four gun batteries)
during the last six months of 1941. in
July - August alone, 42 regiments
were created. In total, these AT units
constituted 2,903 guns or 69% of the
RVGK (4,252 guns).
The RVGK mortar units were also
broken up since the 48 mortar units
proved very difficult to handle. In
January, 1942 they were
deconstituted and 20 mortar units
were created. By April there were 49
RVGK regiments and by September,
70.
ingame terms, this information may
be useful to players who wish to
overhaul the units listed on the OB.
However, caution any playerthat raw
I
numbers reflect little in Soviet reality
since many units "hid" undertalse
size titles. Secondly, numbers of
weapons mean little if they are not
mobile and lack fire control and
communications.
Ben Knight
I
find the Europa font difficult to read.
For instance, is TEN #7 page 24
Appeals or Uppeals? ls page 10
Kalmuck or Kalmuct? Yes, the
Europa font is visually stimulating, but
it is also hard to read.
We feel the Europa font (”Fraktur
scrip " to the rest of the world) adds a
great deal of distinction and flavor to
the magazine. However, as you note
it can be difficult to read sometimes.
Why, it even makes the word
Wehrkreis appear to be misspelled
in the article title of TEN #8'5 "Facts
Behind the Counters".
A.E. Goodwin
Now that it's revealed that all the
German security divisions actually do
have three REs in game terms, I
wonder what went into the Hungarian
security divisions (3—5) and light
divisions (4—6) which show up in the
game. Historically, these were two
regiment divisions, also.
Here's a little Europa Geography quiz
for all of you:
1. Where does the single "wooded
intermittent lake" hex appear on the
game maps?
2. Where does the only "forest
rough" hex appear on the game
maps?
3. What is the only hex on the game
maps with a river running through the
center of the hex?
4. Which is the only map which is
signed by the drafter'?
Answers appear at the end of "From
the Editor".
— Page 37
Jay Kaufman
The Urals is outstanding! In a
recent issue of ETO, Bill Stone wrote
that in terms of physical quality, the
only glitch he identified was that TU's
shade of blue was darker than that of
the rest of the series. My copy is
darker than the blue appearing in
SE's maps, but my SE maps' blue is
lighter than that in FitE, so guess
I
everything is evening out. The
obvious questions of utility (what do
we really need them for) and usability
(how do we set 'em up and still reach
Gorkiy) are real. But any Europa fan
who sees the maps has to have them,
will make do one way or another, and
it Is nice to just sit far
away from the
Axis player humming the
internationaie while he gropes around
near Mogilev. sincerely hope TEN
I
will devote some space to The
Urals; I'm often more hobbyist than
gamer and can get as much pleasure
from reading about a game as i
sometimes do from playing one.
Since few of us will ever actually "play"
The Urals, reading about the effects
of the new maps and rules on play
may be all the direct pleasure to be
gained. Most interesting would be an
analysis of the new "Industrial Fiules"
concerning energy supply-lines.
TEN has also become a first-class
operation. The physical quality is
obviously the biggest improvement,
but the articles. especially those by
John Astell, Charles Sharp, and
Shelby Stanton have reached a high,
professional level. One comment:
could you please always include clues
about the identity of Europa ghosts?
The latest one (Litvinov) was much
harder, and less interesting since only
the fellow's mug shot appeared.
The preview of future counter types
was very interesting, but think have
I l
a better suggestion for Political
Police. The symbol recommend
I
(which it not apparent represents a
flashlight) was among those listed in a
set of rules for some modern
miniatures game. It’s intended, in that
game anyway, Ior psychological
warfare troops, but think the symbol
I
 Page 38
is creepier than that; imagine NKVD
I
or Gestapo men giving some partisan
the third degree!
1%
Actually, the symbol for psychological
warfare units represents a blaring laud
speaker, no doubt inspired by
German "Phoney War“ tactics
employed along the French border,
rather than a flashlight.
Meanwhile, there are several articles
on the various materials contained in
The Urals under development. And
thanks for the prod for more "ghost
clues"; check out this issue.
James Douglas
I
picked up The Europa News for the
first time today (#7) and was generally
pleased with its form and content.
The production quality (printing,
graphics) is very good and the articles
well written. lwill, however, make a
few (?) critical comments.
You make some reference to
members of "The Europa
Association“, but omit to tell new
readers how to join that association or
give an address for further details.
Just because you know what the
address is does not mean that
everyone knows! As a Europa player
since the middle 70's have watched
I
the modules come out with eager
anticipation, but We never heard of
The Europa Association (don't make
too many assumptions about your
readers' involvement with
organizations).
This problem with addresses is also to
be found in GR/D's new game. The
Urals, which recemly purchased.
I
Much as looked was unable to find
I I
any address 01 any type (for GRID) in
the rules, on the box, or even hidden
on the maps. This is poor practice.
Also might
I
suggest that in the future
you shouldn't print things like the map
of Eau Claire on the back of the mail-in
registration form. Once the form is
mailed in, the map is no longer
available, making me wonder why it
was printed in the first place. Printing
tear/cut out forms in the magazine
requires that buyers mutilate their
magazines to use them, something
which many people will be reluctant to
do. The same problem applies to the
Europa Parts order form.
By letting readers write out their
orders on some convenient piece of
their own paper, the magazine need
not be mutilated. That also leads to
more room for articles/ads without
adding additional pages.
Finally, thirty lashes to the person
who decided to run that silly letter
from Jay Kaufman (TEN #7,
"EXchange"). His description of the
working of the V-3 gun is TOTALLY
WRONG! By printing the letter
without correction you have now
entered into the minds of your less
technically inclined readers some very
erroneous ideas on the workings of
artillery. The side barrels contained
NO projectiles, only powder charges.
When the projectile passed each
one, the hot gases behind it ignited
these side charges, which increased
the bore pressure, giving an
increased push to the shell. The very
idea of little projectiles being fired into
the backside of a bigger one is totally
stupid.
Technical items such as the workings
of the V-3 CAN be checked and
inaccurate impressions being held by
readers should be corrected, not just
dismissed or given with such
descriptions as "so interesting I
wanted to share it". If you aren't
familiar with something like this, am I
sure that there are many others in the
Europa community who DO know
something about artillery. Next time
ask somebody.
Don't be put off by the rather negative
comments above. like the issue.
I I
would be grateful for information on
subscription rates and details on
membership in The Europa
Association.
Ouch, thirty times,f There's never an
artilleryman around when I need one.
Thanks for setting the record straight.
Your remarks about The Association
and addresses are well taken; we will
ensure that such information is always
included in each issue of the
magazine and all future games. We
tend to think of our customers as
close friends and so forget that there
are many out there who are
happening upon us for the first time.
Sorry for any frustration we might
have caused.
As for cutting up the magazine, we
assume that people will make a
photocopy of order and registration
forms, and fill those out and send
them in so as not to mutilate their
issues of TEN. By all means, if you
don‘t have access to a copy machine
and don 't want to cut or tear out a
page containing such information,
make a handwritten or typed facsimile
and send that in to us instead. That
should work just fine if you write
neatly.
James Gayler
Based on the Scorched Earth
reports have been hearing, there
I
seem to be more German victories
occurring out there than Soviet ones.
And now the recent mling on railroad
engineers would seem to be the final
blow to Soviet chances of victory.
Therefore, are we in the gaming
community to sit back and say "History
was a mistake - the Nazis should have
won"? must ask that the SE rules
I
be balanced again; it now appears the
pendulum has swung too far in the
Axis direction since the days of HE.
Here's a few areas where feel the
I
Soviets could be given the boost

they appear to need:
1. Make more of the rocket artillery
regiments combat/motorized and
have these appear sooner in the
game. so that some will be available to
exploit with the tank brigades during
late 1941 and early 1942, have tell
I
these units were shortchanged in the
mobility department ever since the
days of DNO/UNT, when they were
all classified as combat/motorized.
2. Allow the Soviets to rebuild some
of their fragile units during the game.
A limited amount, such as at least one
division per month, would seem to be
reasonable. There were some
seasoned veterans in the Soviet
Army, units which fought in Poland,
the Winter War, and against Japan - it
would follow that there should be
some cadres around which elite rifle
divisions could be reformed.
3. order to give the Soviets a
In
weapon to properly combat the
hordes of new railroad engineer
battalions, use of partisan rule 40
should be made mandatory. Even
this may not be able to stop the rapid
advance of the Eisenbahntruppe,
now so fast as to be ahistorical.
4. The combination of devaluing the
river flotillas and giving the Axis a
means of unlimited bombing of the
Red fleet at virtually no cost if it dares
to leave port (the air-naval interaction
rule 38E) was too large a swing toward
the Reich. This situation needs to be
reassessed.
The rules forgive the Germans, but
not so the Red Army. Despite the
"hordes" of Red reinforcements, it
doesn't seem to matter. Recent play
balance sees the Germans in
command by late 1941 and the Reds
are unable to turn the tide. By April
'42 the game is lost to the Soviets
under normal playing conditions with
competent commanders. Therefore,
must ask that Mr. Astell review the
situation to ensure that the game can
be evenly played.
By the way, what is the prize for
getting the correct answer to "Ghosts
of Europa"and other such contests?
The prize is $1,000,000 or mention in
the magazine - our choice. By the
way, Ben Knight recently advised me
that we failed to mention one of the
people who correctly identified the
picture of King Zog shown in TEN
#5. This astute but inadvertently
overlooked reader was Jim
Parmenter. We hope he enjoys his
prize.
Here is the opening salvo of the SE
debate mentioned elsewhere in
these pages.
Scorched Earth
Play Balance Debate
We need your views, data, and input
on the current status of play balance
in Scorched Earth. Topics to be
discussed are:
- How do you presently assess the
play balance of Scorched Earth?
Between "equal" teams, which side
do you believe will win the game most
frequently '2
- What should the "historical" play bal—
ance be? That is. what percentage of
games played do you feel should re-
sult in a Soviet or German victory?
. Which side won those SE games
you have seen played to a reasonable
conclusion? Were the two sides
"balanced" in these games?
- In games you have witnessed what
were the Soviet ground losses for the
two Jun II 41 turns? What were the re-
sults of the Surprise Air Attack?
- In games you have observed what
were the average per-turn losses for
each side? What was the mix of com-
bat odds utilized? How were the air
I
forces used? Have you ever com-
pared the actual forces in an ongoing
SE game to those listed in the 1942
Scenario upon reaching Apr 42?l
Page 39
- Are house rules employed by your
group? If so, is this done for play bal—
ance purposes?
This and anything else you wish to
contribute on the subject will be
greatly appreciated. Send your re-
sponses to: Rick Gayler, P.O.
Box 2431, Opelika, AL 36801
ATTN: Play Balance.
AboutLoub Roumdo
Louis is a graduate of the University of
Central Florida, where he received a
Master of Public Policy degree in
1975. In the course of a diverse oa-
reer Louis has been a staff assistant
to a US. Senator, Special Assistant to
the Director of the Florida Solar Ener»
gy Center, and most recently Special
Assistant to the President at the Uni-
versity of Central Florida in Orlando.
He is currently sell-employed as a pri-
vate consultant to a variety of govern-
ment and business clients,
In the field of military history, Louis
has conducted lectures on Soviet
Combat Studies, has been a consul-
tant for the CIA, and is on the Editorial
Board of the Journal of Soviet Military
Studies. Louis has one book current-
Iy published, Battle for Stalingrad:
The Soviet General Staff Analysis of
the Battle on the Volga, ed. Pergam-
on-Brassey, 1989. Two additional
books with the working titles Soviet
Strategy in the Great Patriotic War and
The Dawn of Supersonic Flight: The
X-1 at Pinecastle, are under prepara-
tion. Both are scheduled for publica~
tion in 1990.
Louis has also authored a number of
articles and papers on Soviet conduct
of strategy during World War II, includ-
ing "The Creation of Soviet Reserves
and the 1941 Campaign", which ap-
peared in TEN #6 and the M/litary Af-
fairs Journal.
 E.T.O.
The Independent EuropaTM Newsletter
C/O Bill Stone, 590 Graymont Drive, Santa Rosa CA 95409

After many years as an Europa gamer — including five

years as a partner at Game Designers‘
Workshop — in 1985 put together ETO, an amateur newsletter devoted to exploring,
I

understanding, and
enjoying the Europa series of games. Fifty issues later, we’re still going strong.

Every issue of ETO packs informa-

tive, thought-provoking, and entertaining
Europa features:

I Reviews.
51:53
9-1 0
i—
2-3-8
m
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1
~65
1 0-8

I Analysis of rules systems.

I Tactical and strategic advice. .éli @< Size HE
1-8 2_1_1 O 1_10 1-0-8
I Historical background.
I
I Experimental rules. ”& fit
O

Xe fl]:
15-8 2-8 1 -4 1-6
I Orders of battle.
I Scenarios and Training Exercises.
Other regular features include an up-to-the-minute “News & Rumors &
Answer Exchange" with official rule interpretations, and “Battlefield Bulletins.” Gossip" column, "Question &

Readers also participate in a lively “Forum" column whose contributors include

Astell, Ben Knight, Franklyn G. Prieskop, John Gee, Paul F. X. experts such as John
Dunigan. Fred Helfferich, Shelby Stanton,
Charles C. Sharp, A. E. Goodwin, David Berry, Ken Kettering, and Louis
Rotundo.
In addition, our new ”Project 50" series
commemorates the 50th anniversary of key events in World
War ll with special OBs, scenarios, rules modules,
chronologies, lists, and more. For example: ETO
#47 featured “Britain on the Eve Of War" with complete Army, reading
RAF, and RN 08s; #48 covered the Polish
Armed Forces in 1939; and #49 presented the Soviet OB from 1939 to
1941.
Now in its fifth year, ETO averages 24-32
pages per issue and
comes out every fourto five weeks by first class mail. For subscrip»
tions and back numbers, each issue costs just $2.00.
Nominee,
Best Amateur ETO. When it comes to Europa gaming, there is no
better source of facts and informed opinion in an amateur
Game Magazine publication.
1985
1986 Stone, editor & publisher
——Bili

1987 eneflaLmQrerée-‘saimsre‘sehd more“ '

1988 information“ are available:

»;

entequest; " -

Opinions expressed in E TO are not necessarily those of GDWOI (3RD.

Europa Is a trademark of Game Designers' Workshop, Inc.
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NEW FOR FAL

We’re pleased to announce our fall line up of quality boardgames. When
you add these new titles to our current list of exciting modern wargames,
you can see that Game Designers’ Workshop really meets a store’s needs
for good, easy—to—learn, fun-to—play gamesNgw forfgll are:
A House Divided, Strategic game of the American Civil War.
Blue Max, Tactical biplane fighter combat game.
Temple Of the Beastmen. Shifting maze boardgame of
19thrcentury Mars!
But don’t forget our list of modern warganles as well:
H ar p 0 0n . The modern naval wargame. Designed by best-selling
author Larry Bond (Red Phoenix and Red Storm Rising). Harpoon, with
an introduction by Tom Clancy deals with the details of modern naval
combat. Includes a Hunt For Red October scenario (don’t forget that the
H14 at For Red October movie comes out this fall).

Team Yankee. Tactical game of World War 111 tank action. This
awardewinning game based on Harold Coyle’s best—seller gives real
insight into how modern land warfare works.
Air Superiority. Modern jet combat. Designed by a fighter pilot
to show how air combat works.
Finally, our stand-out role—playing game for those who read the sci-fi
classics in their youth:

Space: 1889. Science-fiction rolerplaying in a more civilized time.

Travel to the classic canals of Mars, swamps of Venus, and caverns of
Luna. This Victorian—era game recaptures the essence of a bygone era.
Look for Game Designers’ Workshop for the best in games.