CASE # 5 Yngson vs. Secretary of Agriculture G.R. No.

L-36847
FACTS::
In case at bar, the subject to be matter are the same mangrove swamps with an area of about
66 hectares, more or less, situated in sitio Urbaso, barrio Mabini, municipality of Escalante,
province of the Negros Occidental. In view of the potentialities and possibilities of said area for
fishpond purposes, several persons filed their applications with the Bureau of Fisheries, to utilize
the same for said purposes. The first applicant was Teofila Longno de Ligasan who filed her
application, followed by Custodio Doromal. Both applications were rejected, however, because
said area were then still considered as communal forest and therefore not yet available for
fishpond purposes. Petitioner-appellant Serafin B. Yngson filed a similar application for
fishpond permit with the Bureau of Fisheries followed by those of the respondents-appellees,
Anita de Gonzales and Jose M. Lopez, who filed their respective applications with the same
bureau. When the applications were filed by the involve parties in the instant case, said area was
not yet available for fishpond purposes and the same was only released for said purpose. The
conflicting claims of the aforesaid parties were brought to the attention of the Director of the
Bureau of Fisheries , awarding the whole area in favor of the petitioner-appellant and rejecting
the claims of the respondents. Meanwhile, Appellants Anita V. de Gonzales and Jose M. Lopez
appealed the order of the Director of Fisheries to the Department of Agriculture and Natural
Resources where their appeals were docketed as D.A.N.R. Cases Nos. 901 and 901-A, the
Honorable Secretary of the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources set aside the order
of the Director of the Bureau of Fisheries and caused the division of the area in question into
three portions giving each party an area of one-third (1/3) of the whole area covered by their
respective applications. The petitioner-appellant asked that the orders of the public respondents
be declared null and void and that the order of the Director of Fisheries awarding the entire area
to him be reinstated.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Priority Rule established in fishery administrative order no 14. is
applicable to fishpond applications?
RULING:
No, The mangrove swampland was released and made available for fishpond purposes only on
January 14, 1954. It is clear, therefore, that all five applications were filed prematurely. There
was no land available for lease permits and conversion into fishponds at the time all five
applicants filed their applications. After the area was opened for development, the Director of
Fisheries inexplicably gave due course to Yngson’s application and rejected those of Anita V.
Gonzales and Jose M. Lopez. The reason given was Yngson’s priority of application. The rule
must be reiterated that the construction of the officer charged with implementing and enforcing
the provision of a statute should be given controlling weight.
All the applications being premature, not one of the applicants can claim to have a
preferential right over another. The priority given in paragraph (d) of Section 14 is only for those
applications filed so close in time to the actual opening of the swampland for disposition and
utilization, within a period of one year, as to be given some kind of administrative preferential
treatment. Whether or not the administrative agencies could validly issue such an administrative
order is not challenged in this case. The validity of paragraph is not in issue because petitioner-
appellant Yngson is clearly not covered by the provision. His application was filed almost two
years before the release of the area for fishpond purposes. The private respondents, who filed
their applications within the one year period, do not object to sharing the area with the petitioner-
appellant, in spite of the fact that the latter has apparently the least right to the fishpond leases.
As a matter of fact, the respondent Secretary’s order states that all three applications must be
considered as having been filed at the same time on the day the area was released to the Bureau
of Fisheries and to share the lease of the 66 hectares among the three of them equally. The
private respondents accept this order. They pray that the decision of the lower court be affirmed
in toto. And the The motion for contempt is denied for lack of merit.

CASE # 6 Federation of Coron et al VS<the secretary of the department of environment

and natural resouces and department of agrarian reform

FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari
seeking to declare as
unconstitutional Section 3 (a) of
PD
No. 705, otherwise known as
the Forestry Reform Code of
the Philippines.
Petitioners Federation of Coron,
Busuanga, Palawan Farmer’s
Association, Inc (FCBPFAI)
and Sandigan ng mga
Bukidnon Coro, Inc.,
(SAMBICO) are federations
consisting of
fanners in Palawan. Sometime
in 2002, the farm lands
occupied by the members of
SAMBICO in Sitio Dipangan
and Langka, Brgy. Bintuan,
Coron, Palawan were placed
under
the coverage of the
Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program (CARP) by the
Department
of Agrarian Reform (DAR).
The lands placed under CARP
had titles in the name of
Mercury
Group of Companies.
However, the implementation of
the CARP over the subject
lands was stopped because
the said lands were unclassified
forest land under Sec. 3(a) of
P.D. No. 705 and thus, are
inalienable and belong to the
government. As these are forest
lands, they are under the
administration of the
Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) and
not
the DAR.
The members of the Samahan
ng Magsasaka ng Sto. Nino
(SAMMASA) alleged that they
farmed the lands. Farming was
their means of livelihood even
before their barangay was
established in the 1960s.
Sometime in 1980, the farm
lands they tilled were placed
under
the coverage of CARP. The
land tilled by the farmers was
originally titled under the name
of a certain Jose Sandoval.
However, the land distribution
was stopped under the CARP
because the DENR stated that
the said lands were unclassified
forest land under Sec. 3(a)
of P.D. No. 705 and these forest
lands belong to the government.
Hence, this petition to declare
Sec. 3(a) of P.D. No. 705
unconstitutional.
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari seeking to declare as unconstitutional Section 3 (a) of PD No.
705, otherwise known as the Forestry Reform Code of the Philippines. Petitioners Federation of
Coron, Busuanga, Palawan Farmer’s Association, Inc and Sandigan ng mga Bukidnon Coro,
Inc., are federations consisting of fanners in Palawan. Sometime in 2002, the farm lands
occupied by the members of SAMBICO in Sitio Dipangan and Langka, Brgy. Bintuan, Coron,
Palawan were placed under the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program by the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). The lands placed under CARP had titles in the name of
Mercury Group of Companies. However, the implementation of the CARP over the subject lands
was stopped because the said lands were unclassified forest land under Sec. 3(a) of P.D. No. 705
and thus, are inalienable and belong to the government. As these are forest lands, they are under
the administration of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources and not the DAR.
The members of the Samahan ng Magsasaka ng Sto. Nino alleged that they farmed the lands.
Farming was their means of livelihood even before their barangay was established in the 1960s.
Sometime in 1980, the farm lands they tilled were placed under the coverage of CARP. The land
tilled by the farmers was originally titled under the name of a certain Jose Sandoval. However,
the land distribution was stopped under the CARP because the DENR stated that the said lands
were unclassified forest land under Sec. 3(a) of P.D. No. 705 and these forest lands belong to the
government. Hence, this petition to declare Sec. 3(a) of P.D. No. 705 unconstitutional.
ISSUES: Whether or not Section 3 (a) of PD No. 705 is unconstitutional?
RULING: Section 3 (a) PD No. 705 is constitutional. Section 3(a) PD No. 705 provides
that public forest is the mass of lands of the public domain which has not been the subject of the
present system of classification for the determination of which lands are needed for forest
purposes and which are not. The Court finds that petitioners failed to discharge the heavy burden
in assailing the constitutionality of the law. Section 3 (a) of P.D. No. 705 is consistent with the
constitution, which adapted the Regalian Doctrine that all land of public domain belongs to the
State. Under the Regalian Doctrine, which is embodied in our Constitution, all lands of the
public domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to any ownership of
land. All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to
the State. Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable
agricultural land or alienated to a private person by the State remain part of the inalienable public
domain. Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified as alienable or disposable to a
private person by the State, it remains part of the inalienable public domain. Property of the
public domain is beyond the commerce of man and not susceptible of private appropriation
and acquisitive prescription. Occupation thereof in the concept of owner no matter how
long cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title. The burden of proof in
overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public domain is on
the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the
land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this presumption,
incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject of the application (or claim) is
alienable or disposable. In the case at bar, as petitioners failed to assail Sec. 3(a) of P.D.
No. 705, which is consistent with the Regalian Doctrine, wherein the subject lands
remain within the ownership of the State. To repeat, the burden of proof in overcoming the
presumption of state ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the person applying for
registration that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. Unless public land
is shown to have been reclassified as alienable or disposable to a private person by the
State, it remains part of the inalienable public domain. Property of the public domain is beyond
the commerce of man and not susceptible of private appropriation and acquisitive prescription.
Occupation thereof in the concept of owner no matter how long cannot ripen into ownership and
be registered as a title. In other words, petitioners have no vested right over the subject lands
because these unclassified lands belong to the State, hence, no private right was violated by the
State. Verily, Sec. 3(a) of P.D. No. 705 is not unconstitutional because it merely enforces the
Regalian Doctrine in favor of the State. No amount of possession will expose the subject lands
to private ownership. Petitioners should not seek to devoid the said statutory provision;
instead, they should proceed to the Executive Department, through the Secretary of
DENR, to establish that the subject unclassified forest lands must be re-classified to
alienable and disposable lands of public domain. Only when the lands of public domain are
classified as alienable or disposable, may petitioners assert their property rights over the
subject lands.

CASE # 7 Secretary of the Denr vs. Yap

Case Digest: Secretary of DENR v. Yap, et al. (G.R. No. 167707, October 8, 2008)
FACTS:
The CA affirmed RTC Kalibo’s decision to grant the petition for declaratory relief filed by
Boracay Mayor Jose Yap et al. and ordered the survey of Boracay for titling purposes.
On Nov. 10, 1978, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1801 declaring Boracay Island as a
tourist zone and marine reserve. Respondents claimed that Proc. No. 1801 precluded them from
filing an application for a judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling
purposes.
RTC Kalibo’s granted the petition for declaratory relief filed by Boracay Mayor Jose Yap et al.
and ordered the survey of Boracay for titling purposes.
The Republic, through the OSG, opposed the petition countering that Boracay Island was an
unclassified land of the public domain. It formed part of the mass of lands classified as “public
forest,” which was not available for disposition pursuant to section 3(a) of PD No. 705 or the
Revised Forestry Code.
Respondents claimed that they themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest had been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation in Boracay since June 12,
1945 or earlier and have been paying realty taxes.
The OSG maintained that respondents’ right to judicial confirmation of title was governed by CA
No. 141 (Public Land Act) and PD No. 705 and not PD No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82.
Since Boracay Island had not been classified as alienable and disposable, whatever possession
they had cannot ripen into ownership.
The CA affirmed respondents’ right to have their occupied lands titled in their name. It ruled that
neither Proclamation No. 1801 nor PTA Circular No. 3-82 mentioned that lands in Boracay were
inalienable or could not be the subject of disposition and that the Circular itself recognized
private ownership of lands.
ISSUE:
Whether unclassified lands of the public domain are automatically deemed agricultural land,
therefore alienable and disposable
FACTS:
The CA affirmed RTC Kalibo’s decision to grant the petition for declaratory relief filed by
Boracay Mayor Jose Yap et al. and ordered the survey of Boracay for titling purposes. Then-
President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1801 declaring Boracay Island as a tourist zone and
marine reserve. Respondents claimed that Proc. No. 1801 precluded them from filing an
application for a judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes.
RTC Kalibo’s granted the petition for declaratory relief filed by Boracay Mayor Jose Yap et al.
and ordered the survey of Boracay for titling purposes. The Republic, through the OSG, opposed
the petition countering that Boracay Island was an unclassified land of the public domain. It
formed part of the mass of lands classified as “public forest,” which was not available for
disposition pursuant to section 3(a) of PD No. 705 or the Revised Forestry Code. Respondents
claimed that they themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest had been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation in Boracay since June 12, 1945
or earlier and have been paying realty taxes. The OSG maintained that respondents’ right to
judicial confirmation of title was governed by CANo. 141 (Public Land Act) and PD No. 705
and not PD No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82. Since Boracay Island had not been classified
as alienable and disposable, whatever possession they had cannot ripen into ownership. The CA
affirmed respondents’ right to have their occupied lands titled in their name. It ruled that neither
Proclamation No. 1801 nor PTA Circular No. 3-82 mentioned that lands in Boracay were
inalienable or could not be the subject of disposition and that the Circular itself recognized
private ownership of lands.
ISSUE: Whether unclassified lands of the public domain are automatically deemed agricultural
land, therefore alienable and disposable?
HELD:
No. Private claimants are not entitled to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under
CA No. 141 to which they are governed (not PD 1801). Neither do they have vested rights over
RULING:
No. Private claimants are not entitled to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title
under CA No. 141 to which they are governed (not PD 1801). Neither do they have vested rights
over the occupied lands under the said law. A positive act declaring land as alienable and
disposable isrequired.2 requisites for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title under
CA No. 141, namely:
(1) CONE of the subject land by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest under a bona
fide claim of ownership since time immemorial or from June 12, 1945 (absent); and
(2) the classification of the land as alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
(absent).In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action, report,
statute, or certification was presented to the Court. Proclamation No. 1801 convert portions of
Boracay Island into an agricultural land. Private claimants’ continued possession under Act No.
926 (now Public Land Act) does not create a presumption that the land is alienable. The island
remained an unclassified land of the public domain and, applying the Regalian doctrine, is
considered State property.
the occupied lands under the said law. A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable
is
required.
2 requisites for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title under CA No. 141, namely:
(1) CONE of the subject land by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest under a bona
fide claim of ownership since time immemorial or from June 12, 1945 (absent); and
(2) the classification of the land as alienable and disposable land of the public domain. (absent)
CASE # 8 Chavez v. Public Estates Authority and AMARI Coastal G.R. No. 133250

FACTS:

Through PD No. 1084, the Public Estates Authority (PEA) was tasked by former president
and dictator Ferdinand Marcos, to reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas and to
develop, improve, acquire, lease and sell any and all kinds of lands. As a result, an amendment
was made on a previous contract with Construction and Development Corporation of the
Philippines. Prior to PEA, CDCP was tasked to reclaim certain forshore and offshore areas of
Manila Bay. The amended contract now directed CDCP to transfer to PEA all the development
rights, title, interest and partitipation of CDCP in the reclamation. Under former President Cory
Aquino, titles of parcels of land reclaimed under Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation
Project were transferred to PEA. These covered three reclaimed islands known as the “Freedom
Islands.” PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with AMARI, a private
corporation to develop the Freedom Islands, notably the reclamation of an additional 250 ha of
submerged areas surrounding these islands to complete the plan. The JVA was entered into
through negotiation without public bidding. Former President Fidel Ramos then approved the
JVA. Controvery broke out when then Senate President Ernesto Maceda denouced the JVA as
the grandmother of all scams. The Senate conducted a joint investigation and concluded that the
reclaimed lands PEA seeks to transfer to AMARI under the JVA are lands of public domain
which the government has not classified as alienable lands and therefore PEA cannot alienate
these lands. Moreover, the certificates of title covering the Freedom Islands were void, and that
the JVA itself was illegal.

In his capacity as taxpayer, petitioner Frank Chavez filed a petition for mandamus with
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. He
argued that the government will lose billions of pesos in the JVA. He sought for the public
disclosure of the renegotiation of the JVA, invoking Constitutional right of the people to
information on matters of public concern. He also alleged that the JVA is against the
Constitutional prohibition on the sale of alienable lands of the public domain to public
corporations. A year after the filing of the petition, PEA and AMARI signed the Amended Joint
Venture Agreement. Former President Estrada signed the Amended JVA.

ISSUES:
Whether the amended JVA violates the Constitution. -- YES.
Whether information on ongoing negotiations may be disclosed to the public. --  NO.
RULING:

The Amended JVA covers a reclamation area of 750 hectares. Only 157. 84 ha have been
reclaimed. The rest are still submerged areas forming part of Manila Bay. Under the agreement,
AMARI will shoulder the reclamation of the freedom island and it will get 70% of the usable
area. AMARI will acquire and own a maximum of 367.5 hectares of reclaimed land which will
be titled in its name. PD No 1085, coupled with President Aquino’s actual issuance of a special
patent covering the Freedom Islands, is equivalent to an official proclamation classifying the
Freedom Islands as alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. Freedom Islands are thus
alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, open to disposition or concession to qualified
parties. However, at this time, the Freedom Islands were no longer part of Manila Bay but part of
the land mass after PEA had already reclaimed it. However, the additional 592.15 ha are still
submerged and forming part of the Manila Bay. There is also no legislative or presidential act
regarding these remaining areas.
Also, the mere physical act of reclamation of PEA of foreshore or submerged areas does not
make the reclaimed lands alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, much less
patrimonial lands of PEA. It still needs the authorization of DENR, which classifies lands of
public domain into alienable or disposable lands subject to the President’s approval.

A private corporation, even one that undertakes the physical reclamation of a government
BOT project, cannot acquire reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain in view of the
constitutional ban. Ownership of PEA of the said lands of public domain does not convert them
to private lands. Jurisprudence holding that there is conversion to private land upon the grant of
the patent or issuance of the certificate of title does not apply to government units like PEA.

The rationale behind ban on corporation acquiring, except through lease, alienable lands of
public domain is to equitably diffuse land ownership or to encourage "owner-cultivatorship and
the economic family-size farm" and to prevent a recurrence of cases like the instant case. Huge
landholdings spawn social unrest. In practice, this ban strengthens limitation on individuals from
acquiring more than the allowed area by simply stting up a corporation to acquire more land.
CASE # 9 Republic v. City of Parañaque, G.R. No. 191109,

FACTS:
The Public Estates Authority is a government corporation created by virtue of Presidential
Decree No. 1084 which took... effect on February 4, 1977 to provide a coordinated, economical
and efficient reclamation of lands, and the administration and operation of lands belonging to,
managed and/or operated by, the government with the object of maximizing their utilization and
hastening their... development consistent with public interest.
Byvirtue of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 525 issued by then President Ferdinand Marcos,
PEA was designated as the agency primarily responsible for integrating, directing and
coordinating all reclamation projects for and on behalf of the National Government. On October
26, 2004, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued E.O. No. 380 transforming PEA into
PRA, which shall perform all the powers and functions of the PEA relating to reclamation
activities. By virtue of its mandate, PRA reclaimed several portions of the foreshore and offshore
areas of Manila Bay, including those located in Parañaque City, and was issued Original
Certificates of Title and Transfer Certificates of Title over the reclaimed lands. Then Parañaque
City Treasurer Liberato M. Carabeo issued Warrants of Levy on PRA's reclaimed properties
located in Parañaque City based on the assessment for delinquent real property taxes made by
then Parañaque City Assessor Soledad Medina Cue for tax years 2001 and 2002.
The RTC rendered its decision dismissing PRA's petition. In ruling that PRA was not exempt
from payment of real property taxes, the RTC reasoned out that it was a GOCC under Section 3
of P.D. No. 1084. It was organized as a stock corporation because it had an... authorized capital
stock divided into no par value shares. In fact, PRA admitted its corporate personality and that
said properties were registered in its name as shown by the certificates of title. Therefore, as a
GOCC, local tax exemption is withdrawn by virtue of Section 193... of Republic Act No. 7160
Local Government Code, which was the prevailing law in 2001 and 2002 with respect to real
property taxation. The RTC also ruled that the tax exemption claimed by PRA under E.O. No.
654 had already been expressly repealed by R.A. No. 7160 and that PRA failed to comply with
the procedural requirements in Section 206 thereof.
It insists that it may not be classified as a non-stock corporation because it has no members and it
is not organized for charitable, religious, educational, professional, cultural, recreational,
fraternal, literary, scientific, social, civil service, or similar purposes, like trade, industry,
agriculture and like chambers as provided in Section 88 of the Corporation Code. Moreover,
PRA points out that it was not created to compete in the market place as there was no competing
reclamation company operated by the private sector. Also, while PRA is vested with corporate
powers under P.D. No. 1084, such circumstance does not make it a corporation but merely an
incorporated instrumentality and that the mere fact that an incorporated instrumentality of the
National Government holds title to real property does not make said instrumentality a GOCC.
Section 48, Chapter 12, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987 recognizes a... scenario
where a piece of land owned by the Republic is titled in the name of a department, agency or
instrumentality.
 Thus, PRA insists that, as an incorporated instrumentality of the National Government, it is
exempt from payment of real property tax except when the beneficial use of the real property is
granted to a taxable person. PRA claims that based on Section 133(o) of the LGC, local...
governments cannot tax the national government which delegate to local governments the power
to tax. Hence, the assessment of real property taxes made on said lands, as well as the levy
thereon, and the public sale thereof, including the issuance of the certificates of sale in favor of...
the respondent Parañaque City, are invalid and of no force and effect.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the Trial Court erred when it failed to consider that reclaimed lands are
part of the public domain?
RULING:
Yes, the trial court erred in failing to consider that reclaimed lands are part of public
domain and hence, exempted from real property tax. The Court finds merit in the petition. In the
case at bench, PRA is not a GOCC because it is neither a stock nor a non-stock corporation. It
cannot be considered as a stock corporation because although it has a capital stock divided into
no par value shares as provided in Section 7. of P.D. No. 1084, it is not authorized to distribute
dividends, surplus allotments or profits to stockholders. There is no provision whatsoever in P.D.
No. 1084 or in any of the subsequent executive issuances pertaining to PRA, particularly, E.O.
No. 525 that authorizes PRA to distribute dividends, surplus allotments or profits to its
stockholders. PRA cannot be considered a non-stock corporation either because it does not have
members. A non-stock corporation must have members. Moreover, it was not organized for any
of the purposes mentioned in Section 88 of the Corporation Code. Specifically, it was created to
manage all government reclamation projects.
Likewise, it is worthy to mention Section 14, Chapter 4, Title I, Book III of the
Administrative Code of 1987, thus:
SEC 14. Power to Reserve Lands of the Public and Private Dominion of the Government.-
(1) The President shall have the power to reserve for settlement or public use, and for specific
public purposes, any of the lands of the public domain, the use of which is not otherwise directed
by law. The reserved land shall thereafter remain subject to the specific public purpose indicated
until otherwise provided by law or proclamation.

Reclaimed lands such as the subject lands in issue are reserved lands for public use. They are
properties of public dominion. The ownership of such lands remains with the State unless they
are withdrawn by law or presidential proclamation from public use.
Under Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, the foreshore and submerged areas of
Manila Bay are part of the "lands of the public domain, waters and other natural resources" and
consequently "owned by the State." As such, foreshore and submerged areas "shall not be
alienated," unless they are classified as "agricultural lands" of the public domain. The mere
reclamation of these areas by PEA does not convert these inalienable natural resources of the
State into alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. There must be... a law or
presidential proclamation officially classifying these reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable
and open to disposition or concession. Moreover, these reclaimed lands cannot be classified as
alienable or disposable if the law has reserved them for some public or quasi-public use.
As the Court has repeatedly ruled, properties of public dominion are not subject to execution
or foreclosure sale.
Thus, the assessment, levy and foreclosure made on the subject reclaimed lands by
respondent, as well as the issuances of certificates of title in favor of respondent, are without
basis.

CASE # 10 Republic vs. Heirs of Daquer, G.R. No. 193657

FACTS
Ignacio Daquer Husband of Fernanda Abela, applied for a homestead patent grant over Lot
No. H-19731, situated at Brgy. Corong-Corong, Centro, Bacuit, Palawan. The Provincial
Environment and Natural Resources Officer, by the Director of the Bureau of Lands' authority,
approved Daquer's application and issued him Homestead Patent No. V- 67820, covering an area
of65,273 square meters. Thereafter, Homestead Patent No. was transmitted to the Registrar of
Deeds of Palawan for registration. After registration, Original Certificate of Title was issued
under Daquer'sname. But a year later, Daquer passed away. He was survived by his children,
who were his legal heirs. Subsequently, the Department Secretary and the Undersecretary for
Legal Affairs of the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources instructed the Community
Environment and Natural Resource Office to submit an inventory of suspected spurious titles
cases which may fall within timberland and classified public forest. Pursuant to their directive,
Mariano Lilang, Jr., Land Management Officer III of CENRO, Taytay, Palawan,conducted an
investigation to determine whether lands covered by approved patent applications were
indeedalienable or disposable. Upon investigation, Lilang discovered that the land covered by
Homestead Application No. 197317 and OCT No. G-3287 fell within the zone of unclassified
public forest. Consequently, the Republic filed a Complaint for Cancellation of Free Patent,
Original Certificate of Title and Reversion of land to public domain on April 1, 2003. It argued
that Lot No. H-19731 could not have been validly registered because it fell within the forest or
timberland zone. It stated that the Director of the Lands andManagement Bureau was bereft of
any jurisdiction over public forests or any lands incapable of registration. Itclaimed that until and
unless these lands were reclassified and considered disposable and alienable, occupying them in
the concept of an owner, no matter how long, could not ripen into ownership. RTC ruled against
the Republic. CA affirmed.
ISSUES: Whether or not the issuance of Homestead Patent was jurisdictionally defective as Lot
No. H-19731 was still part of the inalienable public land when Homestead Application No.
197317 was granted?
RULING:
YES. In this case, the records are bereft of any evidence showing that the land has been
classified as alienable and disposable. Heirs of Daquer presented no proof to show that a law or
official proclamation had been issued declaring the land covered by Homestead Patent No. V-
67820 to be alienable and disposable. Having failed to overcome the burden of proving that the
land covered by Homestead Patent is alienable and disposable, the presumption that it is an
inalienable land of the public domain remains.

CASE # 11 Chavez v. National Housing Authority, R-II Builders, et 4. al, G.R. No. 164527
FACTS:
Former Solicitor General Francisco Chavez, filed a petition to raise constitutional issues on
the JVA entered by National Housing Authority and R-II Builders, Inc. Then-President Cory
Aquino issued Memorandum order No. 161 to directly approve the implementation of the
Comprehensive and Integrated Metropolitan Manila Waste Management Plan. Within this
moment, Smokey Mountain, a prominent slum in Tondo, Manila, are being made residence of
many Filipinos residing in a informal settlement.
As presented in said order, NHA prepared feasibility studies to turn the dumpsite into low-
cost housing project, thru the Smokey Mountain Development and Reclamation Project. To
made this possible,RA 6957 (Build-Operate-Transfer Law) was passed, declaring the importance
of private sectors as contractors in government projects. Thereafter, Aquino proclaimed MO 415
applying RA 6957 to SMDRP, among others. The same MO also established EXECOM and
TECHCOM in the execution and evaluation of the plan, respectively, to be assisted by the Public
Estates Authority. Notices of public bidding to become NHA’s venture partner for SMDRP were
published in newspapers in 1992, from which R-II Builders, Inc. (RBI) won the bidding process.
Then-President Ramos authorized NHA to enter into a Joint Venture Agreement with RBI.
Under the JVA, the project involves the clearing of Smokey Mountain for eventual
development into a low cost housing complex and industrial/commercial site. RBI is expected to
fully finance the development of Smokey Mountain and reclaim 40 hectares of the land at the
Manila Bay Area. The latter together with the commercial area to be built on Smokey Mountain
will be owned by RBI as enabling components. If the project is revoked or terminated by the
Government through no fault of RBI or by mutual agreement, the Government shall compensate
RBI for its actual expenses incurred in the Project plus a reasonable rate of return not exceeding
that stated in the feasibility study and in the contract as of the date of such revocation,
cancellation, or termination on a schedule to be agreed upon by both parties.
Due to the recommendations done by the DENR after evaluations done, the JVA was
amended and restated (now ARJVA) to accommodate the design changes and additional work to
be done to successfully implement the project. The reclaimed land as enabling component was
increased from 40 hectares to 79 hectares, which was supported by the issuance of Proclamation
No. 465 by President Ramos. Subsequently, the Clean Air Act was passed by the legislature
which made the establishment of an incinerator illegal, making the off-site dumpsite at Smokey
Mountain necessary. The project was suspended, later reconstituted by President Estrada in MO
No. 33, the NHA and RBI executed a Memorandum of Agreement whereby both parties agreed
to terminate the JVA and subsequent agreements. During this time, NHA reported that 34
temporary housing structures and 21 permanent housing structures had been turned over by RBI.

ISSUES: Whether or not respondents NHA and RBI have been granted the power and authority
to reclaim lands of the public domain as this power is vested exclusively in PEA as claimed by
petitioner?
Whether or not respondents NHA and RBI were given the power and authority by
DENR to reclaim foreshore and submerged lands?
Whether or not respondent RBI can acquire reclaimed foreshore and submerged lands
considered as alienable and outside the commerce of man?
Whether respondent RBI can acquire reclaimed lands when there was no declaration that said
lands are no longer needed for public use
Whether there is a law authorizing sale of reclaimed lands
Whether the transfer of reclaimed lands to RBI was done by public bidding
 Whether RBI, being a private corporation, is barred by the Constitution to acquire
lands of public domain
Whether respondents can be compelled to disclose all information related to the
SMDRP
Whether the operative fact doctrine applies to the instant position
RULING:
Executive Order 525 reads that the PEA shall be primarily responsible for integrating,
directing, and coordinating all reclamation projects for and on behalf of the National
Government. This does not mean that it shall be responsible for all. The requisites for a valid
and legal reclamation project are approval by the President (which were provided for by MOs),
favorable recommendation of PEA, and undertaken either by PEA or entity under contract of
PEA or by the National Government Agency. Notwithstanding the need for DENR permission,
the DENR is deemed to have granted the authority to reclaim in the Smokey Mountain Project
for the DENR is one of the members of the EXECOM which provides reviews for the project.
ECCs and Special Patent Orders were given by the DENR which are exercises of its power of
supervision over the project. Furthermore, it was the President via the abovementioned MOs that
originally authorized the reclamation. It must be noted that the reclamation of lands of public
domain is reposed first in the Philippine President. The reclaimed lands were classified alienable
and disposable via MO 415 issued by President Aquino and Proclamation Nos. 39 and 465 by
President Ramos.
Despite not having an explicit declaration, the lands have been deemed to be no longer needed
for public use as stated in Proclamation No. 39 that these are to be “disposed to qualified
beneficiaries.” Furthermore, these lands have already been necessarily reclassified as alienable
and disposable lands under the BOT law. Letter I of Sec. 6 of PD 757 clearly states that the NHA
can acquire property rights and interests and encumber or otherwise dispose of them as it may
deem appropriate. There is no doubt that respondent NHA conducted a public bidding of the
right to become its joint venture partner in the Smokey Mountain Project. It was noted that
notices were published in national newspapers. The bidding proper was done by the Bids and
Awards Committee on RA 6957 as amended by RA 7718 explicitly states that a contractor can
be paid “a portion as percentage of the reclaimed land” subject to the constitutional requirement
that only Filipino citizens or corporation with at least 60% Filipino equity can acquire the same.
In addition, when the lands were transferred to the NHA, these were considered Patrimonial
lands of the state, by which it has the power to sell the same to any qualified person. This relief
must be granted. It is the right of the Filipino people to information on matters of public
concerned as stated in Article II, Sec. 28, and Article III, Sec. 7 of the 1987 Constitution. When
the petitioner filed the case, the JVA had already been terminated by virtue of MOA between
RBI and NHA. The properties and rights in question after the passage of around 10 years from
the start of the project’s implementation cannot be disturbed or questioned. The petitioner, being
the Solicitor General at the time SMDRP was formulated, had ample opportunity to question the
said project, but did not do so. The moment to challenge has passed.