G.R. No.

L-36847 July 20, 1983

SERAFIN B. YNGSON, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
THE HON. SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE and NATURAL RESOURCES, ANITA V. DE
GONZALES and JOSE M. LOPEZ, defendants-appellees.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental which upheld
the orders of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Office of the President
regarding the disposition of swamplands for conversion into fishponds. Originally taken to the Court
of Appeals, the case was elevated to this Court on a finding that only a pure question of law was
involved in the appeal.

There is no dispute over the facts. The Court of Appeals adopted the statement of facts in the
Solicitor-General's brief. We do the same:

The subject matter of the case at bar are the same mangrove swamps with an area
of about 66 hectares, more or less, situated in sitio Urbaso, barrio Mabini,
municipality of Escalante, province of the Negros Occidental. In view of the
potentialities and possibilities of said area for fishpond purposes, several persons
filed their applications with the Bureau of Fisheries, to utilize the same for said
purposes. The first applicant was Teofila Longno de Ligasan who filed her application
on January 14, 1946, followed by Custodio Doromal who filed his on October 28,
1947. Both applications were rejected, however, because said area were then still
considered as communal forest and therefore not yet available for fishpond
purposes.

On March 19, 1952, petitioner-appellant Serafin B. Yngson filed a similar application

for fishpond permit with the Bureau of Fisheries followed by those of the
respondents-appellees, Anita de Gonzales and Jose M. Lopez, who filed their
respective applications with the same bureau on March 19 and April 24, 1953. When
the applications were filed by the aforesaid parties in the instant case, said area was
not yet available for fishpond purposes and the same was only released for said
purpose on January 14, 1954. The conflicting claims of the aforesaid parties were
brought to the attention of the Director of the Bureau of Fisheries who issued an
order on April 10, 1954 awarding the whole area in favor of the petitioner-appellant
and rejecting the claims of the respondents-appellees (pp. 1-3, Rec. on Appeal).
Appellants Anita V. de Gonzales and Jose M. Lopez appealed the order of the
Director of Fisheries to the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources where
their appeals were docketed as D.A.N.R. Cases Nos. 901 and 901-A (p. 3, Rec. on
Appeal).

In an order dated April 5, 1955, the Honorable Secretary of the Department of

Agriculture and Natural Resources set aside the order of the Director of the Bureau
of Fisheries and caused the division of the area in question into three portions giving
each party an area of one-third (1/3) of the whole area covered by their respective
applications (pp. 4-5, Rec. on Appeal). Appellant filed a petition for review dated July
6, 1955 from the aforesaid order of the Department of Agriculture and Natural
 Resources but the same was dismissed by the Office of the President of the
Philippines on December 20, 1955 (pp. 5-8, Rec. on Appeal). A motion for
reconsideration filed by the appellant on February 15, 1956 was likewise denied on
August 3, 1956. A second and third motion for reconsiderations filed by the appellant
was also denied on August 5, 1958 and October 26, 1960, respectively (p. 18, Rec.
on Appeal).

Not satisfied with one-third of the 66 hectares, Mr. Yngson filed a petition for certiorari with the Court
of First Instance against the Executive Secretary, Office of the President, the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, Anita V. Gonzales, and Jose M. Lopez.

The petitioner-appellant asked that the orders of the public respondents be declared null and void
and that the order of the Director of Fisheries awarding the entire area to him be reinstated.

The Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental dismissed the petition on the ground that plaintiff
had not established such "capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment" on the part of the
Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Office of the President of the Philippines
as to constitute grave abuse of discretion justifying review by the courts in a special civil action.

The plaintiff-appellant made the following assignments of errors:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PLAINTIFF HAS NOT ESTABLISHED
SUCH 'CAPRICIOUS AND WHIMSICAL EXERCISE OF JUDGMENT ON THE PART OF THE
DEFENDANTS- APPELLEES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES
AND THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES AS TO CONSTITUTE GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION, JUSTIFYING REVIEW THEREOF IN A SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION BY
THE COURT.

II

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE RULE OF THE DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES

ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICES IN EFFECT ITSELF HOLDING THAT THE 'PRIORITY RULE'
ESTABLISHED IN PARAGRAPHS (a) AND (d), SECTION 14, FISHERY ADMINISTRATIVE
ORDER NO. 14 IS NOT APPLICABLE TO FISHPOND APPLICATIONS FILED PRIOR TO THE
CERTIFICATION OF THE BUREAU OF FORESTRY THAT THE AREA APPLIED FOR IS
AVAILABLE FOR FISHPOND PURPOSES; IN TREATING THE APPLICATIONS OF THE
APPELLANT AND THAT OF THE APPELLEES LOPEZ AND GONZALES ON EQUAL FOOTING
ONLY AND IN ORDERING THE DIVISION OF THE AREA INVOLVED IN THESE APPLICATIONS
INTO THREE EQUAL PARTS AWARDING ONE-THIRD SHARE EACH TO THESE APPLICANTS.

III

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT.

Did the administrative agencies having jurisdiction over leases of public lands for development into
fishponds gravely abuse their discretion in interpreting and applying their own rules? This is the only
issue in this case.

The pertinent provisions of Fisheries Administrative Order No. 14 read:

 SEC. 14. Priority Right of Application-In determining the priority of application or right
to a permit or lease the following rules shall be observed:

(a) When two or more applications are filed for the same area, which is unoccupied
and unimproved, the first applicant shall have the right of preference thereto.

xxx xxx xxx

(d) A holder of fishpond application which has been rejected or cancelled by the
Director of Fisheries by reason of the fact that the area covered thereby has been
certified by the Director of Forestry as not available for fishpond purposes, SHALL
NOT LOSE his right as a PRIOR APPLICANT therefore, if LATER ON, the area
applied for is certified by the Director of Forestry as available for fishpond purposes,
provided that not more than one (1) year has expired since the rejection or
cancellation of his application, in which case, his fishpond application which was
rejected or cancelled before, shall be reinstated and given due course, and all other
fishpond applications filed for the same area shall be rejected.

The five applicants for the 66 hectares of swampland filed their applications on the following dates:

1. Teofila L. de Ligasan — January 14, 1946.

2. Custodio Doromal — October 28, 1947

3. Serafin B. Yngson — March 19, 1952

4. Anita V. Gonzales — March 19, 1953

5. Jose M. Lopez — April 24, 1953

The mangrove swampland was released and made available for fishpond purposes only on January
14, 1954. It is clear, therefore, that all five applications were filed prematurely. There was no land
available for lease permits and cnversion into fishponds at the time all five applicants filed their
applications.

After the area was opened for development, the Director of Fisheries inexplicably gave due course
to Yngzon's application and rejected those of Anita V. Gonzales and Jose M. Lopez. The reason
given was Yngzon's priority of application.

We see no error in the decision of the lower court. The administrative authorities committed no grave
abuse of discretion.

It is elementary in the law governing the disposition of lands of the public domain that until timber or
forest lands are released as disposable and alienable neither the Bureau of Lands nor the Bureau of
Fisheries has authority to lease, grant, sell, or otherwise dispose of these lands for homesteads,
sales patents, leases for grazing or other purposes, fishpond leases, and other modes of utilization.
(Mapa v. Insular Government, 10 Phil. 175; Ankron v. Government of the Philippine Islands, 40 Phil.
10; Vda. de Alfafara v. Mapa, 95 Phil. 125; Director of Forestry v. Muñoz, 23 SCRA 1184).
The Bureau of Fisheries has no jurisdiction to administer and dispose of swamplands or mangrove
lands forming part of the public domain while such lands are still classified as forest land or
timberland and not released for fishery or other purposes.

All the applications being premature, not one of the applicants can claim to have a preferential right
over another. The priority given in paragraph "d" of Section 14 is only for those applications filed so
close in time to the actual opening of the swampland for disposition and utilization, within a period of
one year, as to be given some kind of administrative preferential treatment. Whether or not the
administrative agencies could validly issue such an administrative order is not challenged in this
case. The validity of paragraph "d" is not in issue because petitioner-appellant Yngson is clearly not
covered by the provision. His application was filed almost two years before the release of the area
for fishpond purposes. The private respondents, who filed their applications within the one-year
period, do not object to sharing the area with the petitioner-appellant, in spite of the fact that the
latter has apparently the least right to the fishpond leases. As a matter of fact, the respondent
Secretary's order states that all three applications must be considered as having been filed at the
same time on the day the area was released to the Bureau of Fisheries and to share the lease of the
66 hectares among the three of them equally. The private respondents accept this order. They pray
that the decision of the lower court be affirmed in toto.

The Office of the President holds the view that the only purpose of the provision in question is to
redeem a rejected premature application and to consider it filed as of the date the area was released
and not to grant a premature application a better right over another of the same category. We find
such an interpretation as an exercise of sound discretion which should not be disturbed. In the case
of Salaria v. Buenviaje (81 SCRA 722) we reiterated the rule that the construction of the officer
charged with implementing and enforcing the provision of a statute should be given controlling
weight. Similarly, in Pastor v. Echavez (79 SCRA 220) we held that in the absence of a clear
showing of abuse, the discretion of the appropriate department head must be respected. The
records show that the above rulings should also apply to the present case.

During the pendency of this petition, petitioner Yngson filed a motion to have Patricio Bayoborda,
Rene Amamio, and nine other respondents, declared in contempt of court. Petitioner charged that
Bayoborda and Amamio entered the property in controversy and without petitioner's consent, laid
stakes on the ground alleging that the same were boundaries of the areas they were claiming; that
the other respondents likewise entered the property on different dates and destroyed petitioner's hut
and the uppermost part of his fishpond and started to build houses and to occupy the same. In their
comment, the respondents in the contempt motion denied petitioner's charges. Bayoborda and
Amamio stated that they were bona-fide applicants for fishpond purposes of areas outside the 22
hectares alloted for the petitioner and that they were authorized to place placards in the areas they
applied for. As evidence the respondents attached a copy of the resolution of the Presidential Action
Committee on Land Problems (PACLAP) showing that their applications have been duly received
and acknowledged by the latter and in compliance with government regulations, they placed markers
and signs in their respective boundaries. The resolution likewise stated that these markers and signs
were subsequently destroyed and later on Mr. Yngson started development by building dikes in the
area applied for, which he has no authority to do so due to the present conflict. The resolution further
prohibited Yngson from constructing any improvements in any area outside his 22 hectares and also
prohibited Bayoborda and Amamio from entering and making constructions in the applied for areas
pending the issuance of their permits.

The petitioner has failed to show that the acts committed by the respondents were a direct
disturbance in the proper administration of justice and processes of the law which constitutes
contempt of court. If there were any violations of petitioner's rights, he should resort to PACLAP
which issued the resolution between him and respondents or file, as he alleged he did, a criminal
complaint or other action before the courts. The motion also raises factual considerations including
boundaries and geographical locations more proper for a trial court.

We have held that contempt of court presupposes contumacious and arrogant defiance of the court.
(De Midgely v. Ferandos, 64 SCRA 23; Matutina v. Judge Buslon, 109 Phil. 140,142)

The petitioner has failed to show a contempt of court which we can take cognizance of and punish. If
any of his property or other rights over his one-third's share of the disputed property are violated, he
can pursue the correct action before the proper lower court.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED. The motion for contempt is also
DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner-appellant.

SO ORDERED.