Unpopular Pessimism
Why CIA Analysts Were So Doubtful About Vietnam
Harold P. Ford 1
''
It is well documented and
well known that for
decades CIA analysts were
skeptical of official
pronouncements about the
Vietnam war and
consistently fairly
pessimistic about the
outlook for light at the end
of the tunnel.
''
Harold P. Ford held senior positions
in both the National Intelligence
Council and the Directorate of
Operations.
In traveling through Tonkin, every vil­
lage flew the Viet Minh flag, and had
armed soldiers, many with Japanese
weapons taken in raids. The women
and children were also organized, and
all were enthusiastic in their support.
The important thing is that all were
cognizant ofthefact that independence
was not to be gained in a day, and
were prepared to continue their strug­
gle for years. In the rural areas, I found
not one instance ofopposition to the
Viet Minh, even among former govern­
ment officials.
055 report, October 19452
It is well documented and well
known that for decades CIA analysts
were skeptical of official pronounce­
ments about the Vietnam war and
consistently fairly pessimistic about
the outlook for "light at the end of
the tunnel." Less well known is why
the Agency's analysts were so doubt­
ful, especially because CIA was all the
while a central player in US opera­
tional efforts to create and strengthen
South Vietnam. Thus, it is important
to examine the sources of CIA ana­
lyses' doubts about successive
administrations' repeated assurances
and claims.
Not all CIA analysts thought alike,
and at times there were substantial
differences of view. Skepticism and
pessimism about Vietnam were
present chiefly among chose officers
who produced finished intelligence
in the form of National Intelligence
Estimates and in Intelligence Direc­
torate (then the DOI) publications:
that is, analyses in che Office of
National Estimates (ONE), the
Office of [Economic] Research and
Reports, and the South Vietnam
Branch of the Office of Current
Intelligence (OCI). Such views were
generally a bit less evident among
officers of the North Vietnam
Branch of OCI, many of whom had
been transferred there from previous
Soviet and North Korean assign­
ments. The situation among the
Agency's operational offices at home
and abroad was mixed: some enthusi­
astically shared official White House
views, while ochers were remarkably
caustic. In more than a few cases, the
Intelligence Community's (IC) coor­
dination processes and top CIA
officers muted doubts about Viet­
nam expressed in CIA's analytic
ranks, yet the finished intelligence
produced by the DOI and ONE
maintained definitely pessimistic,
skeptical tones over the years.
The danger always existed that indi­
vidual CIA analysts could get locked
into constant dark points of view,
reluctant to accept new evidence to
the contrary. Also, at times some
CIA analysts overreacted to certain
assertive personalities from other
offices who happened to be arguing
wholly unsupportable optimism. And
there were a few occasions where
CIA judgments on Vietnam badly
missed the boat, or where Agency
judgments were too wishy-washy to
serve the needs of policymaking or,
in a handful of cases, where analytic
officers caved in to pressures from
above and produced mistakenly rosy
judgments. Despite these hazards,
and, as Robert McNamara's recent
85
Vietnam

f
The fact that CIA

judgments were often more

candid than those of most
book In Retrospect maintains, the other offices was due in
rivals, the VM/VC dominated
war™s outcome many of the
justified the countryside. Local populations
CIA analysts™ doubts and warnings. important measure to the seldom volunteered intelligence to
the French, the South Vietnamese,
Officials in other entities, especially
bureaucratic advantage the or the Americans about CommunistŠ
in the Department of State™s Bureau Agency™s culture and led forces in their midst.
of Intelligence and Research, often
purpose afforded.
came up with similar doubting judg Then, too, the VM™s 1954 victory
ments. At times, their doubts also the French Dien Bien Phu
were shared by certain officers in 9~ over at

and the end of French rule had been

DIA and elsewhere in the Depart tremendous boosts to nationalist sen

ment of Defense and

by certain timent and Ho Chi Minh™s status

junior and field

grade intelligence and popularity. At that time, most
France™s fight against the Commu
officers in Vietnam. CIA™s analysts observers of Indochina affairs, includ
nist-led Viet Minh (VM) and how
had no special sources of data not ing US intelligence agencies, judged
such unfounded optimism had con
available to other US Government that if nationwide elections were
tributed to the French defeat. CIA
offices, no unique analytic methodol held, the VM would win by a large
analysts subsequently witnessed near-
ogies, precomputer-age Window
no
identical patterns in much of the US margin.
95s. The Agency™s analysts simply, if
distilled their many
military and diplomatic reporting
unscientifically, from Saigon. In addition, they were
A similar view was even shared by
sources of doubt into judgments that DCI Allen Dulles, who, according to
at times told confidentially by mid
often did not square with official pro the record of a 1954 NSC meeting,
nouncementsŠa record which the
dle-grade US military and Mission told that senior group that fThe
officers of such practices. A few CIA
authors of The Pentagon Papers and most disheartening feature of the
other historians have
analysts served in Vietnam and expe
numerous news from Indochina. was the evi
rienced firsthand such distortion by . .

documented. dence that the majority of the people

some senior US officials there. The
in Vietnam supported the Vietminh
resulting candor of CIA judgments
The following principal factors and rebels.f4 South Vietnam™s Ngo Dinh
flowed also from the fact that the
forces are among the many reasons Diem (with subtle US backing) sub
reports Headquarters analysts
for the doubts exhibited by so many sequently proceeded to frustrate the
received from CIA™s Saigon station
of CIA™s Vietnam analysts: holding of elections, and this
were much more factual andexacting
in their demanded authenticity than strengthened the determination of
CIA™s cultural advantages. The fact VM forces to continue subverting all
was much of the other reporting
that CIA judgments often were more Vietnam in order to redress their
from Vietnam.
candid than those of most other grievance at being robbed of what
offices was due in important measure they felt had been their victory in the
to the bureaucratic advantage the Recognition of the Vietnamese field and at Geneva.

Agency™s culture and purpose Communists™ (VC) enormous

afforded. The job of CIA analysts advantages. CIA™s analysts were And one of the greatest advantages
was to tell it like it is, freer from the aware that the basic stimulus among Ho™s movement enjoyed, at times
policy pressures with which their col the politically conscious Vietnamese indicated in reporting from the field,
leagues in Defense, the military wasnationalism and that, following were the subversive assets the VM
intelligence agencies, and, lesser
to a World War II, the VM had largely and the VC had throughout South
extent, the
Department of State had captured the nationalist movement. Vietnam. Thousands of their agents
to contend.3 Many CIA Vietnam ana Ho Chi Minh™s apparatus came to be and sleepers existed throughout
lysts had been working on Indochina better led, better organized, and South Vietnam™s Government,
problems for some time, often longer more united than any other of the armed forces, and security/intelli
than military intelligence offic
most competing, divided nationalist Viet gence organizations. The dramatic
ers. Those Agency officers were namese parties. Through a extent of that advantage was not

familiar with how intelligence report combination of some reforms and revealed until the fall of Saigon
ing had been distorted during ruthless elimination of political in 1975, when events disclosed

86
 Vietnam

CIA analysts (as well as

intelligence officers from
other agencies) repeatedly
how thoroughly the enemy had units; and how the enemy had
warned decisionmakers
penetrated the society of South Viet stunned the world by overwhelming
namŠincluding some American that such US military the French forces at Dien Bien Phu.
offices there. Because Agency officers bur were not
escalation would not in
dened with the operational task of
Recognition of VM/VC determina itself save South Vietnam training and developing South Viet
tion South
to meet namese armed forces, they were
to try
unless it were accompanied
Vietnamese and US escalation, and much freer of certain views more
willingness to suffer great damage, by substantial political- prevalent among US
military person
if necessary, in order to win even social progress in Saigon nel, such disdaining the French
as

tual victory. CIA analysts widely experience, maintaining that US mili

appreciated the fact that the enemy and especially in the tary know-how could prevail, and
saw its battle as a long-range conflict
villages. trying to impose upon Saigon gov
and was prepared to go the distance. ernments US military tactics that

To sustain VM/VC morale, Hanoi better suited to European battle

repeatedly invoked past victorious
9~ were

fields.S Such appreciation by CIA

Vietnamese heroes, even ancient officers found reflection both in the
ones who for nearly a thousand years field and at Headquarters: in CIA
maintained that the war had to be that lost
had fought Chinese pressures to counterinsurgency measures
won. Agency officers made this their effectiveness when later taken
dominate Indochina. Like those
point to policymakers through clan the US
heroes, Hanoi was confident that its over by military, and in
destine service reports, DDI and
many advantages in the field and the numerous Headquarters analyses
ONE memos, National Intelligence that judged that US military tactics
power of its forces to endure would
in time frustrate more powerful, less
Estimates (NIEs), participation in
were not substantially reducing the

outside powers and J CS games and in NSC-sanc

war
enemy™s ability and determination to
patient cause
tioned working groups, and, in the continue the
them eventually to quit. For decades, war.

CIA analysts again and again told end, warnings by DCI John
McCone. But no one in the adminis
policymakers that the enemy would Moreover, many Agency analysts
tration wanted to listen. It was not
doubtless persevere, counterescalate were sensitive to the geographic and
until about 1966 that frustrations in
as best it could, and do so despite suf terrain features in Indochina that
the field caused certain previous
fering heavy damage. shielded enemy supply lines from
senior true believers to begin defect
outer view and helped enemy guer

Such doubts ing in place, especially Secretary of rilla tactics but impeded US
Agency analysts™ were
Defense McNamara, whose In Retro
especially marked during the months mechanized forces. CIA analysts long
spect now holds that CIA warnings
in 1964 and 1965, when President at Indochina assignments recalled
had been correct all along and that
Johnson™s administration was stum how reluctant the JCS and the US
he and his policymaking colleagues
bling towardcarrying the war to Army had been in 1954 to try to bail
had been fwrong, terribly wrong.f
North Vietnam and committing US out the French militarily at Dien
combat forces in the South. During Bien Phu, in part because US mili
that time, and in the face of pres Recognition of the great difficul tary studies had concluded that
sures to fget on the team,f CIA ties French and American military Indochina™s location and terrain were
analysts (as well intelligence offic
as measures encountered in trying to not suited forready supply or effec
ersfrom other agencies) repeatedly combat VM/VC political-military tive US military action. These
warned decisionmakers that such US warfare. Virtually all CIA Vietnam analysts also recalled, as most policy-
military escalation would not in officers, in the field and in Washing makers by the early 1960s seemingly
itself save South Vietnam unless it ton, remained strongly influenced by did not, how reluctant US Army
were accompanied by substantial the French defeat in Indochina. leaders had been to become engaged
political-social progress in Saigon They recognized how ill-suited in war in Indochina, and how at the
and especially in the villages of French military tactics had been for time the JCS had held that fFrom
South Vietnam, where virtually all fighting the enemy; how the VM the point of view of the United
CIA officers at all levels had long had chewed up elite French military States, with reference to the Far East

87
Vietnam

We do not believe that the

loss of South Vietnam and
Laos would be followed by
as a whole, Indochina is devoid of conflicting nationalistic elementsŠ
the rapid, successive
decisive military objectives, and the as the later wars of Communist
allocation of n-iore than token US communization of China versus Communist North
armed forces to the area would be a Vietnam and Communist Cambodia
the other states of the Far
serious diversion of limited US versus Communist North Vietnam
capabilities.f6 East. illustrated.

Similar views following US expan These judgments contributed to~the

sion of the war to the North in
1965, together with available posi
tive evidence, led most CIAŠand
DIAŠanalysts to conclude that,
despite US bombing efforts, the level
of Hanoi™s arms shipments to the
VC were continuing to rise. Subse
quent accounts by Johnson
administration decisionmakers
firm that those reports had a
definitely depressing influence upon
their earlier certainties, and, in some
cases, were instrumental in causing
some of those policymakers to lower
their previous enthusiasm about the
war™s prospects.
doubts held by certain CIA analysts,
especially within ONE, that the loss
of Vietnam would inexorably lead to
much impactŠthat the Sino-Soviet
alliance was coming apart at the
the loss of all Southeast Asia and the
seams; that the USSR and China US defense position in the far
Pacific. The doubts went unvoiced
were competitive with respect to the
for years in the face of repeated
Vietnam war; and that their develop
embraces of the domino thesis by
ing estrangement offered US
con senior officials of the Truman, Eisen
administrations an exploitable oppor
hower, Kennedy, and Johnson
tunity. The principal exceptions to
these views within CIA were largely
administrations. Then, when finally
asked by the White House in mid-
confined to certain counterintelli
1964 for its view of the domino the
gence officers who, even after the
sis, ONE replied heretically that
Sino-Soviet firefights that occurred
fWe do not believe that the loss of
along the Ussuri River border in
South Vietnam and Laos would be
1969, continued to maintain that
followed by the rapid, successive
the Sino-Soviet estrangement was a

Rejection of official claims that communization of the other states of

plot to deceive the West.8 the Far East ~
The of
Moscow and Beijing were direct impact
ing the enemy war effort and that those doubts on policymakers was nil.
international Communism was a Those CIA analysts who rejected the
monolith. Many senior policymak official view that Moscow and Recognition of the fact that South
ers judged for years that the enemy™s Beijing were largely running the Vietnam remained a fragile entity
war effort in Vietnam was being run Vietnam war effort based their skepti whose ability to effectively
cope
by fthe Communist bloc.f One such cism on several sources. One was with the VC should not be overes

example: Gen. Lyman Lemnitzer, at appreciation of the degree of inde timated. These views, held widely
the timeJCS Chairman, stated in pendence from outside Communist among CIA analysts, if less so

1962 that Vietnam™s fall was fa control Ho Chi Minh™s movement

among CIA operations officers, for
planned phase in the Communist and fledgling government had headlong
ran repeated
into
years
timetable for world dominationf and enjoyed all along. Another was the assertions by successive US adminis
that the adverse effects of Vietnam™s fact that, following the French defeat trations that Saigon™s military
fall would be felt as far away as at Dien Bien Phu, Moscow and effectiveness rising. Subsequent
was

Africa.7 By contrast, virtually all CIA Beijing could have given Hanoi more events validated such CIA judg
officers held that available evidence support at 19 54™s Geneva Confer ments: former NSC staff officer
clearlyindicated that, although the ence than they did. There also was Chester L. Cooper, for example,
USSR and Communist China were evidence that all along the Soviets later recorded that, as of 1962, fThe
giving Hanoi defense assistance, the had less interest in promoting Com fact was that the war was not going
Vietnam war was Hanoi™s show and munist aims in Indochina than in well, the Vietnamese Army was not

had been from the outset. Moreover, buttressing Communist Party for taking kindly to American advice,
with the exception largely of one tunes in France and Western and Diem was not following through
CIA office, Agency analysts had been Europe. Most CIA analysts held that on his promises to liberalize his
way ahead of the rest of the IC in the various Communist movements regime or increase its effective
pointing outŠfor years without in Southeast Asia each contained ness.f0 In addition, over the years

88
 Vietnam

For years, CIA™s messages

did not find
ready response
downtown because they
much field reporting underscored Aseas of Doubt
were up against fearful
the fact that President Diem™s gov
ernment did not enjoy wide support odds These, then, were the principal areas

in Vietnam™s villages. His govern of doubt that for years lay behind so
ment was a minority Catholic one in
Buddhist
9, many CIA analyses of the outlook in
Vietnam. Except for those occasions
a predominantly country)™
Diem was not a dynamic leader, and where Agency officers produced
he could compete with the wide
not
doing a good job of converting the flawed accounts or rosied up their
spread popularity Ho Chi Minh ARVN into an effective fighting force. judgments to meet pressures from
enjoyed. He was remote from the above, the areas of doubt translated
people, as attested even by Lyndon into the following fairly stark mes
Suchsensitivity was particularly
Johnson in early 1961 while still sages to successive policymakers:
in early 1963, when
registered
Vice President:
DCI McCone, the JCS, CINCPAC,
1. Do not underestimate the enemy™s
MACV, the US Embassy in Saigon,
A final indication of the danger and other took strength, ruthlessness, nationalist
policymakers
is the fact that the
appeal, and pervasive undercover
ordina~ypeo umbrage at a draft NIE which ONE
assets throughout South Vietnam.
pie of the ofSouth
cities and the IC™s working-level officers
Vietnam] and probably even had agreed upon. It held that among
2. Do not underestimate the enemy™s
more of the ru ral areas are
Vietnam™s fvery great weaknessesf
and firm resilience and staying power. He is in
starved for Ieadershz~ with under were a lack of faggressive
for the long run and is confident that
standing and warmth. There is leadership at all levels of command,
US morale will give way before his
an enormous popular enthusiasm poor morale among the troops, lack
will. He will keep coming despite
of between peasant and soldier,
trust
and great popular power waiting casualties. If we escalate, he will
poor tactical use of available forces, a
huge
to be brought forth by friendly
too.
very inadequate intelligence system,
personal political leadership. But and obvious Communist penetration
it cannot be evoked by men in
of the South Vietnamese military 3. Do not overestimate the degree to
white linen suits whose contact
which will
organization.f3 airpower disrupt North
with the ordinary people is Vietnam™s support of the VC or will
largely through the rolled-up win cause Hanoi to back off from such

dows of a Mercedes-Benz.™2 Those criticisms by Community ana

Subsequently published
indicate that MACV and Mission
officersoccasionally voiced despair
support.
lysts raised a firestorm of protest
among the policymaking officers. 4. Do not overestimate the military
documents They brought such pressure on
DCI McCone and ONE that the lat
and political potential of our South
Vietnamese ally/creation.
at ter caved in and agreed to a rewritten,

the Government of South Vietnam™s (53-63), in

decidedly more rosy NIE
(GVN) lack of military and political which the earlier criticisms of the 5. The war is essentially a political
confine their that cannot be won by military
progress, but tended
war
to ARVN were muted and the tone of
means alone. It will have to be won
doubts to official, classified channels. the Estimate changed: the first sen

Public official admission oi serious tence of the revised NIE now read, largely by the South Vietnamese in
GVN Even the villages of South Vietnam.
shortcomings was rare. fWe believe that Communist
more so, senior US military figures, progress has been blunted in South
at home and in the field, were almost Vietnam] and that the situation is 6. The war is essentially a civil war,

reluctant admit that for This of from Hanoi, Communist

always to improving.f4 was not one run not a

bloc plot the will of America

years South Vietnamese military And less
CIA™s proudest moments. to test

units (the ARVN), usually much bet than four weeks later, serious riots to support its allies.
terarmed than the enemy, were no began in Hue which introduced the
match for the VC. Criticisms of chain of events that culminated in 7. Winning the hearts and minds of
ARVN shortcomings were especially the self-immolation of Buddhist the Vietnamese is a tough task. Most
off limits, lest there be an implication monks and the murder of President Vietnamese simply want to be left
that US military advisers were not Diem. alone, and most do not identify with
89
VIetnam

f
Perhaps the most potent
hurdle for intelligence...
was the fact that the
Saigon. And many are either too
decisions on what to do in
10.Caught up by their commit
attracted to the VC or too afraid to ments and operational enthusiasm,
volunteer much information about Vietnam were not taking most senior policymakers did not

the VC presence in their midst. want to hear doubts from below.

place within a vacuum but
They tended to ignore such views,
in ahighly charged especially those of more junior
What CIA Analyses Were Up experts unknown to them. Witness
political arena. McNamara™s subsequently telling us
Against
that there were no experts on Viet

For years, CIA™s messages did not

‚9 nam)6 And Gen. William E. DePuy

find ready response downtown (1988): fWe did intervene on behalf

of a very weak and dubious regime,
because they were up against fearful
albeit better than Communism, but
odds. Outweighing intelligence facts had not. We would succeed because
very dubious in terms of political
and judgments were many views, fac of our superior firepower.
weight and meaning. But I don™t
tors, and forces which for years
remember anybody saying that. Do
obtained widely among the best and
6. Top officials believed that sus you? Nobody. Not even the experts,
the brightest of our decisionmakers:
the scholastics and academ
tained US bombing programs will not even

disrupt North Vietnam™s supply ics said that.f™7 Or, at times,

1. World Communism is essentially
routes to the VC, and would cause policymakers denounced dissenters
monolithic, and the Vietnam war is
Hanoi to back off for fear of losing for fnot being on the teamf; or froze
part of a world conspiracy run from
such industrial it has out doubters, as President Johnson
Moscow and Beijing. development as

achieved. did with the dissenting DCI

McCone; or sent doubters to new,
2. Khrushchev and the Russians are
State did
Siberia-type assignments, as

testing us: if the United States does 7. Many senior decisionmakers were with Southeast Asia expert Paul
not fulfill its stated commitments in confident that Vietnam™s enormous
Kattenburg.
Vietnam, our credibility among our complications could be reduced to
allies elsewhere in the world will suf systems analysis and statistical mea 11. Intelligence was only one of the
fer seriously. sures such as body countsŠattitudes
many forces that crowded in upon
epitomized by Secretary of Defense policymakers. In addition, those deci
3. Vietnam is the first domino. If it McNamara™s oft-cited assurance sionmakers were aware of
goes, the rest of Southeast Asia, as (1962) that fevery quantitative mea dimensions of which intelligence
well as America™s strategic position in sure we have shows we™re winning officers were not. The record shows
the far Pacific, will crumble. this war.f that their chief concern
clearly was

the US position in the world, not

4. Top policymakers werereceptive Vietnam per Se, and that in their

the views of progress
8. Senior policymakØrs were too
to given them harassed and bogged down in their
view Vietnam was so vital to broad
for years by senior military and Mis US interests that we had to make a
many day-to-day tactical responsibili
sion officers, views that in many strong stand there.
ties to give intelligence or the longer
cases were distorted, optimistic ver

sions of candid range consequences of US initiatives

more appraisals in Vietnam the careful attention
12. Perhaps the most potent hurdle
initially registered by more-junior those matters deserved.
for intelligence, however, was the
officers in the field who were closer fact that the decisions on what to do
the
to scene. in Vietnam were not taking place
9. There existed among senior policy- within a vacuum but in a highly
5. There was a profound hubris makers what a US ArmyŠsponsored charged political arena. For some

among top policymakers. They history has since called fa massive years, the Democratic Party had
believed their made-in-America and all-encompassingf American been vulnerable for having flostf
schemes would work in Vietnam, ignorance of Vietnamese history and China and having been fsoftf in
where similar schemes by the French society. ‚~‚
Korea. Presidents Kennedy and

90
 Vietnam

Johnson repeatedly stated that they policymakers. Vietnam analysts Ł dealing with Vietnam. .. .
In
were not going to be the US Presi sometimes got locked into mindsets. addition to estimates, ONE pro
dents who flostf Vietnam and This contributed to their being duced 51 Memorandums for the
Southeast Asia. wrong occasion. Sometimes very
on DCI concerning Vietnam over
wrongŠespecially in not sounding the same period. Indeed, ONE
clear alerts that the enemy was about published more on Vietnam than
Classic Analytic Hazards to launch an unprecedented Tet any other single subject.2™
offensive in early 1968, and in later
In short, the often pessimistic intelli underestimating the amount of NIE 35/1, 1952]: Through mid-
judgments that CIA and other North Vietnamese military support
gence 1952, the probable outlook in
being funneled the VC through
analysts gave our Vietnam decision- to
Indochina is one of gradual deteriora
makers the years did not have
over
Cambodia.
tion of the Franco-Vietnamese
much impact, except on those military position... The longer .

occasions where senior consumers Not least, at all times

had a analysts term outlook is for continued
-

could intelligence to buttress much easier time of it than did har

use
improvement in the combat effective
their own or where they
arguments, ried decisionmakers: analysts operated ness of the Viet Minh and an
had come to question the more opti in protected, quiet atmosphere,
a increased Viet Minh pressure against
niistic reports they had been receiving whereas policymakers were beset by a the Franco-Viethamese defenses.
from other sources, or where they weak Vietnamese ally, a tough Viet Unless present trends are reversed,
had begun to doubt their own earlier namese enemy, and a US public that this with
growing pressure, coupled
enthusiasms. There has indeed sel could not stay the distance in what the difficulties which France may
dom been a better
example than came to be regarded, correctly or not, continue to face in supporting major
Vietnam of the eternal occupational unwinnable efforts in both Europe and
as an war.
military
hazards intelligence analysts face: that Indochina, may lead to an eventual
the judgments they deliver do not French withdrawal from Indochina.22
necessarily enjoy careful, rational
study, but disappear into a highly
NIE 91, 1953]: If present trends
politicized, sometimes chaotic process Illustrative Quotations
where forces other than intelligence
continuethrough mid-1954, the
French Union political and military
judgments often carry the day.
CIA Intelligence Memorandum, position may subsequently deterio
This is what CIA and other 1950]: The Vietnamese insurgents rate very rapidly.23
analysts
are predominantly nationalists rather
experienced during long years of
the
than Communists, but Communist
the war in Vietnam, breaking their (Senator) John F. Kennedy, 1954]:
lances in leadership of the movement is firmly of the belief that
trying to penetrate policy- I am frankly no
established. These insurgents
makers™ consciousness that the actual
. . .

amount of American military assis

have long controlled most of the inte
facts of life were more grim than tance in Indochina can conquer an
rior of Vietnam. Before 1954, they
those senior consumers gen~rally enemy which is everywhere and at
will probably have gained control of
appreciated. Even so, those analysts the same time nowhere, fan enemy
most, if not all, of Indochina.f
performed well in trying to produce of the peoplef which has the sympa
candid appraisalsŠinasmuch as the thy and covert support of the people.
principal calling for intelligence ana General Bruce Palmer, Jr.]: The first In November of 1951, I reported
national estimate on Indochina, NIE
lysts at any one time is to try to tell it upon my return from the Far East as
like it is, to remain a unique calling 5, 29 December 1950, fIndochina: follows: fIn Indochina we have allied
within a policymaking process over Current Situation and Probably Devel ourselves to the desperate effort of a
burdened with prior commitments, opments,f ...
was a very pessimistic French regime to hang on to the rem
20
and estimate. nants of empire. There is no broad,
emotion, special pleading,
18
hubris. general support of the native
General Palmer]: During the period Vietnam Government among the
Yet analysts have to keep in mind 1950ŠOctober 1964, ONE pro people of that area . .
To try to
. .

that hubris is not a monopoly of duced forty-eight (NIEs and SNIEs) win military victory] apart from and

91
Vietnam

in defiance of innately nationalistic seldom equaled the motivation of the be won only by the will, energy, and
aims spells foredoomed failure.f24 VC and the NVA North Vietnam political acumen of the resisting
ese]. . .
the ARVN was losing the war governments themselves. US power
Former CIA officer Joseph Burkhal just the way the French had lost the can supplement and enlarge their

terSmith]: I was stationed in war, and for many of the same power, but it cannot be substituted.
Singapore then 19541, and British reasons.28 Even if the US could defeat the Com

intelligence officers told me that they munists militarily by a massive

thought the United States was mad Former Director of the CORDS injection of its own forces, the odds
to prop up South Vietnam.25 program in South Vietnam, Amb. are that what it would win would be,
Robert W. Komer]: In the first anal not a political victory which created
Gen. Bruce Palmer]: Overall, the sit ysis, the US effort in Vietnam failed a stable and independent govern

uation in Vietnam inherited by the largely because it could not suffi ment, but an uneasy and costly
United States from France in 1955 ciently revamp or adequately colony.3~
was disadvantageous, if not hopeless. substitute for a South Vietnamese
It is difficult to escape the conclusion leadership, administration, and Judgment by the intelligence panel
that the United States in deliberately armed forces inadequate to the task. of an NSC interagency working
pushing the French out of the way As George Ball put it in his well- group, March 1964]: It is not likely
and replacing them in Vietnam acted known 1964 memorandum on fCut that North Vietnam would (if it
unwisely.26 ting Our Losses in South Vietnam,f could) call off the
war in the South

fHanoi has a government and a pur even though US actions systemati

ONE Memorandum, 1960]: The pose and discipline. The
a cally bombing North Vietnam]
catalog of public discontent in g‚ overnment™ in Saigon is a travesty. would in time have serious economic
South Vietnam] includes a wide In a very teal South Vietnam
sense, and political impact. Overt action
spread dislike and distrust of Ngo is a country with an army and no against North Vietnam would be
family rule tightly central
. . .
Diem™s government.f29 unlikely to produce reduction in
ized control and his unwillingness to VC activity sufficiently to make vic
delegate authority. the growing . .
The authors of The Pentagon tory on the ground possible in South
evidence of corruption in high Papers]: In this instance, and as we Vietnam unless accompanied by new

places; the harsh manner in which will see, later, the Intelligence Com US bolstering actions in South Viet

many persons, particularly the peas munity™s estimates of the likely nam and considerable improvement

ants, have been forced to contribute results of US moves are conspicu in the government there.32
their labor to government programs ously more pessimistic (and more

Ł Ł Ł
and the government™s increasing realistic) than the other staff papers NSC Action Memorandum 288, 17
resort to harsh measures as a means presented to the President. This March 1964]: We seek an indepen
of stifling criticism.27 SNIE October 1961] was based on dent non-Communist South
the assumption that the SEATO Vietnam. . . .
Unless we can achieve
Gen. William E. DePuy]: Well, force would total about 25,000 men. this objective in South Vietnam,
there wasn™t a Vietnamese govern It is hard to imagine a more sharp almost all Southeast Asia will proba
ment as such. There was a military contrast between this paper, which bly fall under Communist
junta that ran the country. Most of foresees rioserious impact on the dominance. accommodate to
. .

the senior Vietnamese officers, as VC] insurgency from proposed Communism so as to remove

you know, had served in the French intervention, and Supplemental effective US and anti-Communist
Army. A lot of them had been ser Note 2, to be quoted next the influence. or fall under the domi
. .

geants. Politically, they were inept. JCS estimate that 40,000 US forces nation of forces not now explicitly
The various efforts at pacification will be needed to clean up the Viet Communist but likely then to
required a cohesive, efficient govern Cong threat.f3° become so. Even the Philippines
. . .

ment which
simply did not exist. would become shaky, and the threat
Furthermore, corruption was ram ONE Memorandum, 1962]: The to India on the west, Australia and
pant. There was coup after coup, and teal threat, and the heart of the bat New Zealand the south, and Tai to

militarily, defeat after defeat. tle, is in the villages and jungles of wan, Korea, and Japan to the north
The basic motivation of the ARVN Vietnam and Laos. That battle can and east would be greatly increased.33

92
 Vietnam

ONE Memorandum for the Direc there isenough military-political about high terms. The chances
our

tor, June 1964]: We do not believe potential in South Vietnam to make are considerably better than even
that the loss of South Vietnam and the whole Vietnam effort worthwhile. that the United States will in the end
Laos would be followed by the rapid, Otherwise, the United States would have disengage in Vietnam, and
to

successive communization of the only be exercising its great, but irrele do considerably short of our
so

other states of the Far East. With . . . vant, armed strength.35 present objectives37
the possible exception of Cambodia,
it is likely that no nation in the area The authors of The Pentagon Gen. Bruce Palmer]: In late 1965]
would quickly succumb to Commu Papers]: However, the intelligence W. W. Rostow requested an analysis
nism as a result of the fall of Laos panel of an NSC interagency work of the probable political and social
and South Vietnam. Furthermore, a ing group, November 1964] did not effect of a postulated escalation of the
continuation of the spread of Com concede very strong chances for US air offensive. CIA™s somber reply
munism in the area would not be breaking the will of Hanoi by insti was that even an escalation against all

inexorable, and any spread which did tuting program of sustained US

a major economic targets in North
occur would take timeŠtime in bombing of North Vietnam]. They Vietnam would not substantially
which the total situation might thought it quite likely that the DRV affect Hanoi™s ability to supply its
change in any of a number of ways was willing to suffer damage fin the forces in South Vietnam, nor would
unfavorable to the Communist course of a test of wills with the it be likely to persuade the Hanoi
cause. Moreover] the extent to
. . . United States over the course of regime negotiate. Similar judg
to

which individual countries would events in South Vietnam. The ments were to be repeated
move away from the US towards the consistently by CIA for the next sev
panel also viewed Hanoi as estimat
Communists would be significantly ing that the United States™ will to eral years.38
affected by the substance and manner maintain resistance in Southeast Asia
of US policy in the area following could in time be erodedŠthat the General Palmer]: With respect to
the loss of Laos and South Vietnam.34 recent US election would provide the Vietnam, the head of the CIA was
Johnson administration with fgreater up against a formidable array of
CIA officers™ comment on JCS war- policy flexibilityf than it previously senior policymakers all strong . . .

April 1964]: Widespread at the felt it had. 36 personalities who knew how to exer
game,
war games were facile assumptions cise the clout of their respective
that attacks against the North would ONE officer memorandum of April offices . . . .
But] McNamara was not

weaken DRV capability to support 1965, written shortly after President entirely satisfied with his intelligence
the war in South Vietnam, and that Johnson™s decision to begin bombing from the Defense Department and
such attacks would cause the DRV North Vietnam and committing US beginning in late 1965, relied more
leadership to call off the VC. Both troops to combat in the South]: This and more on the CIA for what he
assumptions are highly dubious, troubled essay proceeds from a deep believed were more objective and
given the nature of the VC war. concern that becoming pro
we are accurate intelligence judgments.39
The impact of US public and Con gressively divorced from reality in
gressional and world] opinion was Vietnam, that we are proceeding Former NSC staff officer Chester L.
seriously underestimated. . . .
There with far
more courage than wis Cooper]: It is revealing that Presi
would be widespread concern that domŠtoward unknown ends. dent Johnson™s memoirs, which are
the US risking major war, in
was There seems to be a congenital Amer replete with references to and long
behalf of a society that did not seem ican disposition to underestimate quotations from documents which
anxious to save itself, and by means Asian enemies. We doing so now.
are influenced his thinking and decisions
not at effect their
all certain to We cannot afford so precious a lux on Vietnam, contain not a single ref
desired ends in the South. In sum, we ury. Earlier, dispassionate estimates, erence to a National Intelligence
feel that US thinking should grind in war games, and the like told us that Estimate or, indeed, to any other
more careful consideration than has the DRV/VC would persist in the intelligence analysis. Except for Secre
taken place to date. This does not face of such pressures as we are now tary McNamara, who became a

mean that the United States should exerting on them. Yet we now seem frequent requester and an avid reader
not move against the DRy, but that to expect them to come running to of Estimates dealing with Soviet mili
we do so only if it looks as if the conference table, ready to talk tary capabilities and with the

93
Vietnam

Vietnam situation, and McGeorge 3. There were a few occasions where contrast, other offices of CIA™s
certain Directors of Central Intelli clandestine service had for a decade
Bundy, the ONE had a thin audi
the gence (DCIs) brought pressure on before 1969 been doing a superb job
ence during Johnson
administration.40 Agency officers to make their Viet of reporting serious backstage rifts in
nam analyses more palatable to the Sino-Soviet relationship.
policymakers. In addition, numer
ous authorities attest that George A.
From a US Army-sponsored history 9. Memorandum to DCI John
Carver, who CIA™s Special Assis
was
McCone, 9 June 1964. FRUS,
(1985)]: Added to this propensity to
tant for Vietnam Affairs (SAVA) for
make of noth 1964-68, Vol. 1, p. 485. See fuller
try to something out
several years following 1966 and
quotation in Illustrative
ing was an ignorance of
American who enjoyed remarkable entree
Quotations section. Without quot
Vietnamese history and society so among the USG™s top decisionmak that part of this memorandum,
ing
massive and all-encompassing that ers, fairly regularly gave them more Robert McNamara claimed that
optimistic judgments than CIA™s
two decades of federally funded fel ONE supported the domino thesis.
analysts were holding at the time.
lowships, crash
language programs, In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Les
television specials, and campus teach- sonsof Vietnam (New York: Times
ins made hardly a dent If there 4. Report of NSC meeting of 4 Febru Books, 1995), pp. 124-125.
. . . .

ary 1954. Foreign Relations of the

is any lesson to be drawn from the
United States, 1952-1954, Volume 10. The Lost Crusade: America
tale of American involve- Cooper,
unhappy XIII, Indochina, Part I, p. 1,014. in Vietnam (New York: Dodd,
merit in Vietnam it is that, (Hereafter, FRUS.) Mead & Co., 1970), p. 196.
. . . .

before the United States sets out to in the

(Emphases original).
make something out of nothing in 5. As of 1959, for example, CiA™s
some other corner of the world, Saigon station officers were dis Because of the of
11. most people
American leaders might consider the traught because the US military Vietnam were Buddhists, President
historical and social factors advisory group was bent upon train Eisenhower] asked whether it
ing the nascent South Vietnamese possible good find
involved.4™ was to a

armed forces in corps maneuvers, Buddhist leader to whip up some

rather than in effective small-unit real fervor .
It was pointed our
. . .

counterinsurgency tactics. (This to the President that, unhappily,

observation is from the author™s per Buddha a pacifist rather than
NOTES was a

1. Editor™s Note: The author of this
study drafted his first National Intel
ligence Estimate on Indochina in
1952, and subsequently had
Vietnam-related duties as staff chief
of CIA™s Office of National Esti
mates and as a CIA representative to
certain interagency working bodies.
Since retiring from CIA in 1986,
when he was Acting Chairman of
CIA™s National Intelligence Coun
cil, he has prepared classified studies
on Vietnam for CIA™s History Staff.
2. OSS (Secret Intelligence Branch),
fPolitical Information from
Swift],f 17 October 1945; Appendix
to Causes, Origins, and Lessons of the
Vietnam War, Hearings Before the
Senate Committee on Foreign Rela
tions, 92nd Congress, 2nd Session,
9, 10, and 11 May 1972 (USGPO,
1973), p. 319.
sonal experience.)
6. JCS Chairman Adm. Arthur
Radford, Memorandum to the
Secretary of Defense, 20 May 1954.
FRUS, 1952-1954, Volume XIII,
Indochina, Part 2, p. 1,591.
7. Lemnitzer, Memorandum for the
Secretary of Defense, 13 January
1962. US Department of Defense,
United States- Vietnam Relations,
1945-67 (The Pentagon Papers),
Book 12, fUS Involvement in the
War, Internal Documents, The
Kennedy Administration: January
196 1-November 1963,f Book II,
pp. 449, 450.
8. The author™s personal experience. In
holding their dissenting views, these
counterintelligence officers and their
boss, James Angleton, had been
heavily influenced by the testimony
of a defecting Soviet officer. By
fighter (laughter).f Report of NSC
meeting of 4 February 1954. FRUS,
1952-54, Volume XIII, Indochina,
Part I, p. 1,014.
12. Trip Report by the Vice President,
May 1961. FRUS, 1961 -63, Vol. I,
p. 154.
13. Harold P. Ford, fThe US Decision
toGo Big in Vietnam,f Studies in
Intelligence, Vol. 29, No. 1 (Spring
1985), p. 3. (Originally Secret,
declassified 27 August 1986).
14. CIA was nor the only recipient of
such policymaker wrath. Eight
months after the above episode,
INR issued a sharp critique of
claimed ARVN military progress
which fevoked a monumental out
cryf from Secretary McNamara and
Gen. Maxwell Taylor. McNamara
phoned Secretary Rusk, denouncing
INR for second-guessing military

94
 Vietnam

analysis; Rusk apologized to 23. P

f robable Developments in Indo 1964. FRUS, 1964-68, Vietnam,
McNamara. Thomas L. Hughes china Through Mid-1954,f 4 June Vol. I, p. 154.
(who had been INR™s chief at the 1953. FRUS, 1952-54, Vol. XIII,
time), fExperiencing McNamara,f p. 594. 34. As quoted in FRUS, 1964-68,
Foreign Policy, No. 100 (Fall 1995), Vol. 1, p. 485.
pp. 161-162. 24. Congressional Record -
Senate, 6 April
1954, p. 4,673. 35. Memorandum for the Record sent
15. Ronald H. Spector, Advice and Sup to the DCI by an ONE analyst and

port: The Early Years of the United 25. fNation-Builders, Old Pros, Paramil an FE operations officer], fCom
States Army in Vietnam, 1941-60, ment on the Vietnam War Games,
itary Boys, and Misplaced Persons,f
rev. ed. (New York: The Free Press, SIGMA 1-64, 6-9 April, 1964,f 16
The Washington Monthly, February
1985), xi. 1964. As
pp. x,
1978, p.25. April quoted in Ford,
fThe US Decision to Go Big in Viet
16. In Retrospect, (passim). nam,f pp. 7-8.
26. fUS Intelligence and Vietnam,
p. 23.
17. Statement made 1 August 1988, to 36. Gravel, ed., Vol. III, p. 213. The
William C. Gibbons, principal author of this article chaired that
27. Memorandum for the DCI,
author of The US Government and intelligence panel.
the Vietnam War: Executive and Leg
fApproaching Crisis in South Viet
nam?,f 28 July 1960. (Originally
islative Roles and Relationships, Part 37. Memorandum sent to the DCI,
Secret; declassified 6 November
III, January-July 1965, prepared for fInto the Valley,f 8 April 1965, as
1980).
the Senate Committee on Foreign cited in Ford, fThe US Decision to
Relations by the Congressional Go Big in Vietnam,f pp. 10, 11.
Research Service, Library of Con 28. Lt. Cols. Romie L. Brownlee and
William J. Mullen III, An Oral His
gress, (USGPO, 1988), p. 455. 38. fUS and Vietnam,f
General DePuy had been J-3 of Gen tocy of General William E. DePuy, Intelligence
USA, Retired (Carlisle Barracks, p. 43.
eral Westmoreland™s MACV, and
later commanded the 1st Division in Pennsylvania: United States Military
History Institute, n.d.), p. 123. 39. Palmer, The 25-Year War: America™s
Vietnam.
Militacy Role in Vietnam (New York:
Simon & Schuster, Inc., 1984),
18. See the Illustrative Quotations 29. Robert Komer, Bureaucracy at War:
US Performance in the Vietnam Con p. 166.
section.
flict (Westview Press, 1986), p. 21.
40. Cooper, fThe CIA and Decision-
19. Intelligence Memorandum No. 271: Making,f Foreign Affairs, January
fInitial Alignments in the Event of 30. (Gov™t ed.), Book II, pp. 82, 83.
1972, p. 227.
War Before 1954,f 24 March 1950.
(Initially Secret, declassified 4 Janu 31. Memorandum for the Director,
1978). fThe Communist Threat in South
41. Ronald H. Spector, Advice and Sup
ary
port: The Early Years of the United
eastAsia,f 24 May 1962. (Originally States Army in Vietnam, 1941-60,
20. fUS Intelligence and Vietnam,f Confidential; declassified 25 June
rev. ed. (New York: The Free Press,
Studies in Intelligence (special issue, 1980).
1985), pp. x, xi.
1984), p. 14. (Initially Secret, subse
quently declassified). General in The
32. As quoted Pentagon Papers,
Palmer had been General Westmore
Gravel, ed. (Boston: Beacon Press,
land™s Deputy in Vietnam and Army 1975), Vol. III, p. 156. The author
Vice Chief of Staff. After retiring, he of this article was a CIA member of
was amember of the DCI™s Senior that working group.
Review Panel.

33. As quoted in The Pentagon Papers

21. fUS Intelligence and Vietnam,f York: Bantam/New York
(New
p. 12. Times, ed., 1971), pp. 283, 285.
That of NSC 288 repeated,
portion
22. f robable Developments in Indo
P verbatim, which Secretary of
a text

china Through Mid-1952,f 3 Defense McNamara had written the

March 1952. FRUS, 1952-54, Vol. day before. McNamara, Memoran
XIII, pp. 54, 55. dum to the President, 16 March

95