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Technology Qualification of Tendon Connectors For Deep and Ultra Deep Water Application
Technology Qualification of Tendon Connectors For Deep and Ultra Deep Water Application
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Technology Qualification of Tendon Connectors for Deep and Ultra Deep Water
Application
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This paper was prepared for presentation at the Offshore Technology Conference Brasil held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 27–29 October 2015.
This paper was selected for presentation by an OTC program committee following review of information contained in an abstract submitted by the author(s). Contents
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any position of the Offshore Technology Conference, its officers, or members. Electronic reproduction, distribution, or storage of any part of this paper without the
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Abstract
When new technology is deployed, it is critical to have the confidence that it will perform safely and as
reliably as designed. For many years, DNV GL has helped companies that develop new technologies to
implement a systematic, risk based Technology Qualification process (DNV RP-A203, 2013) [1]. The
objective of this process is to ensure that all identified risks are properly addressed and the system
performs the duties for which it was designed to. The field example described in this paper is based on
Moho Nord’s TLP located offshore Africa at 1,050 meters of water depth.
Hutshinson, contracted by Hyundai Heavy Industries (HHI) and Total in 2013, supplied the complete
scope of connectors for the project. The overall qualification process covered a solution to install a
tension leg platform in deep water, which required the utilization of a tendon connector system. It
consisted of a Tendon Top Connector (TTC), Tendon Bottom Connector (TBC) and Intermediate
Tendon Coupling (ITC). The focus of this paper will be the TBC which connected the TLP tendons to
the sea floor. Although Hutchinson has supplied this type of connection for many years, this was the
first time it was used for TLP application.
This paper provides an overview of Hutchinson’s TBC, and the main steps covered by DNV GL’s
Technology Qualification process, as well as the results obtained. The understanding of the novel
elements of this technology was obtained through a system to component assessment.
The execution of the TBC Technology Qualification Plan carried out activities addressing the failure
modes defined for the novel components. All qualification activities were documented, and the data
generated collected to ensure its traceability and to determine the performance margin for each failure
mode. The performance assessment was carried out to ultimately compare the available qualification
evidence against the boundary conditions established in the technology qualification basis, confirming
that the technology had met or exceeded all of the requirements. Once the TQ process was completed,
the equipment was considered as fully qualified within the intended application.
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Introduction
Developing new concepts and technology is vital for the oil and gas industry to meet the increasingly
challenging requirements for production in ultra-deep water fields. Bringing this technology to the
market with confidence relies on Technology Qualification (TQ). For the technology, identified
uncertainties need to be analyzed by specialists with expertise in each specific area and then evaluated
on a deeper level (i.e. individual components) to identify the risks that each new concept/new
application (for existing equipment) pose to people, the environment and the assets for which they
support. In order to consider Hutchinson’s TBC as qualified and ready to be deployed for Moho Nord
TLP application, a systematic risk-based process was followed to quantify the new aspects involved in
the technology with focus on the new application. For this purpose, a technology qualification process
based on the recognized industry recommended practice DNV RP A-203 [1], was followed.
1. The Rotating latch-type connector has been used in offshore industry for years. The concept is field
proven and has been chosen for many projects involving free standing or hybrid risers. The typical
design for the TBC is presented in Figure 1 below.
Bottom extension
Bottom shrould
Bottom receptacle
Secondary Locking
System
2. The bottom receptacle consists of a core pipe with upper and lower ramps which force the male
connector head to rotate when forced axially into the receptacle during connection and disconnection
sequences. The shoulders in the receptacle, which interface with the load bearing connector load ring
of the male connector are designed to sustain the full static and fatigue loading throughout the life of
the platform. The Receptacle is also equipped with a locking system (SLS) avoiding disconnection
during the service life. The system provides automatic reengagement of the male connector in
response to a vertical downward movement of the structure to which it is attached, i.e. the Tendon.
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3. The male connection head is composed of a connector load ring which interfaces with the shoulders
of the receptacle and transmits all loading from the tendon to the foundation during the platform
service life. The other component is the Bottom Shroud equipped with actuation lugs that slide onto
receptacle ramps to make the connector head rotate and align Connector Load Ring shoulders with
Receptacle shoulders. The typical latch and unlatch sequences for the TBC from the interaction of
the male connector with the receptacle can be seen in Figure 2 and Figure 3 below.
Figure 2: Typical TBC Latch Sequence Figure 3: Typical TBC Unlatch Sequence
4. The flexible element or Laminated Elastomeric Components (LEC) is located between the Tendon
Bottom Extension (TBE) and connector load ring. It is the most critical component of the TLP
tendon as it allows for angular deflections and reduces the stresses between the tendon and the
foundation by elastomeric shear deformation. It also provides flexibility for rotation and relief of the
bending/cyclic (i.e. fatigue) stresses during the design life of the installed connection. The flexible
element is made of successive metal and elastomer layers bonded together in a spherical
arrangement, creating a flexible spherical bearing. This arrangement is able to withstand the required
compression load (tendon tension) for which it is designed, in all load cases (i.e. Operating, Extreme,
and Survival). It is the key element that allows the relative motions between the Tendon and its
foundation. It will also provide by the same principle, a margin with respect to the foundation
installation without creating an excessive bending moment in the Tendon.
The work process consists of a number of steps with milestones at which DNV GL may issue a
Statement or Certificate. These Statements and Certificates provide the technology owner and potential
users with an understanding of the level of review that has been performed. At the end of the process, a
Technology Certificate may be issued by DNV GL confirming compliance with the functional
requirements and specified reliability targets by reviewing that the evidence adequately documents
performance according to the qualification basis and acceptance criteria. The technology is considered
qualified for its intended use when the failure modes that have been identified through the systematic
process outlined in Technology Qualification, have been properly addressed, and the supporting
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evidence substantiates that the technology fulfills all stated functional requirements and meets the stated
reliability target.
The Technology Qualification Process, according to DNV RP A-203 [1], comprises the following main
steps visualized in Figure 4:
1. Technology Qualification Basis: Describes the technology, functions, intended use, as well as the
expectations of its performance and the qualification targets.
2. Technology Assessment: Categorizes the degree of novelty to focus the efforts where the related
uncertainty is most significant and identifies key challenges that the new technology or application
poses.
3. Threat Assessment: Identifies potential failure modes, mechanisms and their associated risks.
4. Technology Qualification Plan: Qualification activities necessary to mitigate the identified risks.
5. Execution of the plan: Executes the activities specified in the Technology Qualification Plan.
Evidence is collected through experience, numerical analyses and tests.
6. Performance Assessment: Assess whether the evidence produced meets the requirements of the
Technology Qualification Basis.
Technology Assessment categorizes each element into the categories presented in Table 1.
New 3 4 4
Table 1: Technology Classification
From the Technology Assessment (DNV RP A-203 [1]) performed for the TBC, the main elements were
categorized as 2, 3 and 4 representing a technology with new technical uncertainties/challenges that
needed to be addressed through further qualification processes. Due to the fact that the TBC was being
considered for a new application for the first time, most of the connector as a whole was classified in the
2 to 4 range. Table 2 below lists the main items which were subjected to the further qualification
assessment.
Threat Assessment
The objective of this step was to identify relevant failure modes with underlying failure mechanisms for
the novel technology elements, and assess the associated risks. It is used as the basis for defining and
prioritizing the activities in the Technology Qualification Plan.
The inputs to the threat assessment are the Technology Qualification Basis (DNV RP A-203 [1]) and the
list of the novel technology elements developed in the Technology Assessment. The output is a failure
mode register containing all identified failure modes of concern and their associated risks. Risk is
defined by the failure probability and consequence of failure.
In order to perform the risk ranking associated to the technology qualification for the TBC, a FMECA
methodology was chosen. Prior to the identification of failure modes various classes of probability and
classes reflecting the consequence severity were defined through a risk matrix agreed to be referenced
for risk evaluation. The risk of a failure mode is the combined probability and consequence.
6 OTC-26146-MS
Hutchinson’s TBC was divided into the sub-systems shown in Table 2 prior to the session. Each
individual component was then analyzed to identify all possible failure modes associated with the sub-
systems. The identified failure modes were then assessed with regards to the possible consequences,
likelihood of occurrence, and criticality, using the agreed risk matrix shown above. Existing safeguards
already within the equipment or system were then identified and any additional action items required to
mitigate the identified risk were agreed and recorded. These additional action items were meant for
hazards that were identified as having insufficient existing control measures in place or where all
involved parties felt improvements could be achieved. The criticality rating (L, M, H) assigned to each
failure mode generally dictated the level of action required to mitigate the identified risk.
After completion of the FMECA, all of the failure modes were registered and addressed/mitigated
through the use of appropriate actions and documentation during the execution of the qualification
process. The documentation allowed for the tracking and maintenance of traceability of any and all
changes that occurred. Table 3 below, shows a few of the failure modes defined for the TBC technology
associated with the qualification plan.
The limiting critical parameter items List for the TBC was developed as a joint effort between DNV GL
and Hutchinson, based on the failure modes found during the threat assessment stage (see previous
section). A sample of the list developed for the TBC is presented in Table 4, below.
The selection of qualification methods and required scope depends on the risk of the associated failure
mode, technology category, and level of confidence in the methods.
OTC-26146-MS 7
The qualification activities must account for the effects of uncertainties in the critical parameters
(parameter effects). If a proven numerical or analytical model exists to simulate a failure mechanism in
the intended environment, that model can be used to assess the parameter effects associated with that
failure mechanism. If no applicable model exists for the parameter effects then it can be developed. The
validity of the new model shall be proven through qualification activities.
For each failure mode identified for the TBC, a qualified margin to failure was established by
recognized methods and criteria. The selection of the qualification methods was described in
Hutchinson’s Qualification Plan [4]. Qualification methods have involved FE structural analysis, fatigue
analysis, specifications and procedures, QA/QC, experiment testing, load tests and small and full scale
fatigue testing. An example of the load test performed on the TBC receptacle used for the Moho Nord
project can be seen in Figure 5 below.
DNV GL cross-referenced each activity in Hutchinson’s qualification plan [4] to the Critical Parameter
Management Table in order to verify that failure modes of concern were properly covered and results
provided from the qualification execution could be properly compared to the criteria used. Further,
relevant documentation related to each item in the qualification plan was reviewed, commented and
followed up by Hutchinson and DNV GL.
Performance Assessment
The objective of Performance Assessment (DNV RP A-203 [1]) is to measure success by reviewing the
available qualification evidence against the Technology Qualification Basis. The final iteration implies
confirmation that the technology meets all its requirements, and both risk and uncertainty have been
reduced to acceptable levels. In earlier iterations, where health, safety or the environment shall not be
compromised, a Performance Assessment can include a judgment that the risk and uncertainty relating
to the remaining part of the Technology Qualification Plan (TQP) [4] is acceptable.
The purpose of the Performance Assessment is to provide confidence and remove uncertainty from the
links between the evidence, failure modes and the requirements in the Technology Qualification Basis.
If the assessment concludes that some functional requirements of the technology are not met, risk
control options (modification of the technology) and further qualification activities can be identified.
This can include tightening of the operating envelope, or to enhance inspection, maintenance and repair
strategies to meet the requirements based on the existing evidence.
Relevant documentation addressing the failure modes of concern were reviewed, including design
analysis, testing reports, procedures and specifications. Emphasis was given on reviewing
8 OTC-26146-MS
documentation related to “medium” and “high” risk items in the original FMECA. Some of the “low”
risk documents have been commented, while others have been considered for information/background
only. Documents have been reviewed with regard to elements of “new technology” and from the
viewpoint of technology qualification. Many aspects of the engineering design verification were covered
by DNV GL class involvement for the Moho Nord project. Qualification conclusions represent a safe
service envelope, which permits safe operation at an acceptable level of risk of the TBC for the
operating environment/envelope of which it is intended to be used.
The process executed confirms that the qualification of Hutchinson’s TBC has been conducted in
accordance with DNV-RP-A203 [1] and reached its expectations and targets. Based on the evidence and
documentation presented, and results obtained throughout the execution of the Technology qualification
process, DNV GL considers Hutchinson’s TBC technology as its intended use, according to the
definition found in DNV-DSS-401, Technology Qualification Management [2]. Furthermore, based on
the experiences gained by Hutchinson during the execution of the Moho Nord project, it has been
decided to extend the qualification range of the complete tendon connector package to meet the ever
increasing demand for larger platforms and higher loads (i.e. tension). In order to do this, Hutchinson
has begun execution of an extensive qualification process for its enhanced connectors development
including the performance of the same type of TQ process with DNV GL in accordance with DNV-RP-
A203 [1].
Nomenclature
FMECA: Failure Mode Evaluation and Criticality Analysis
LEC: Laminated Elastomeric Component
SLS: Secondary Locking System
TBC: Tendon Bottom Connector
TBE: Tendon Bottom Extension
TLP: Tension Leg Platform
TQ: Technology Qualification
TQP: Technology Qualification Plan
Acknowledgments
DNV GL would like to thank Hutchinson for the permission to publish this paper.
Reference
[1] DNV GL, Det Norske Veritas, Recommended Practice DNV-RP-A203, Technology Qualification, October 2013.
[2] DNV GL, Det Norske Veritas, Service Specification DNV-DSS-401, Technology Qualification Management, December 2012.
[5] American Petroleum Institute, API Recommended Practice (RP) 2T, Planning, Designing, and Constructing Tension Leg Platforms,
Third Edition, July 2010.