NATURAL RESOURCES

Republic vs Naguiat

Justice Gracia

FACTS:

 Celestina Naguiat filed an application for registration to 4 parcels of land in Panan, Botolan Zambales
on December 29, 1989.
 She alleges that she is the owner of the said parcels of land having acquired them from LID Corporation,
which likewise acquired the land from Demetrio Calderon, Josefina Moraga and Fausto Monje and their
predecessors in interest who have been in possession of the land for 30 years; and that to the best of her
knowledge, said lots suffer no mortgage or encumbrance of whatever kind nor is there any person
having any interest, legal or equitable, or in possession thereof.
 The Republic filed an opposition to the application on the ground that neither the applicant nor her
predecessor in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
oocupation of the lands in question since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto;
 That the parcels of land applied for are part of the public domain belonging to the Republic not subject
to private appropriation.
 Trial Court rendered Judgement in favor of Celestina, adjudicating unto her parcels of land in question
and decreeing the registration in her name;

CA affirmed Trial Courts decision

ISSUE: WON, lands in question cease to have the status of forest or other inalienable lands of the public
domain?

RULING:

No, The said areas are still classified as forest land. The issue of whether or not respondent and her
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, exclusive and continuous possession of the parcels of land in
question is of little moment. For, unclassified land cannot be acquired by adverse occupation or possession;
occupation thereof in the concept of owner, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership and be registered
as title.

A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply
because loggers or settlers have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may
actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not
have to be on mountains or in out of the way places. The classification is merely descriptive of its legal nature
or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like.

Under Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, which embodies the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the
public domain belong to the State the source of any asserted right to ownership of land. All lands not appearing
to be clearly of private dominion presumptively belong to the State. Accordingly, public lands not shown to
have been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land or alienated to a private person by the State
remain part of the inalienable public domain. Under Section 6 of the Public Land Act, the prerogative of
classifying or reclassifying lands of the public domain, i.e., from forest or mineral to agricultural and vice versa,
belongs to the Executive Branch of the government and not the court.
YSMAEL, JR & CO. Vs. DEPUTY SECRETARY, DENR, DIR. OF FORESTRY

JUSTICE COURTS

FACTS:

 Petitioner entered into a TLA with the DANR on October 12, 1965, wherein it was issued license to cut,
collect and remove timber except prohibited species within a specified portion of public forest land with
an area of 52,920 hectares in the municipality of Maddela, Nueva Ecija; from October 12, 1965 to June
30, 1990.
 On August 18, 1983, the Dir. Of the Bureau of Forest Development issued a memorandum stopping all
logging operations in Nueva Vizcaya and Quirino provinces, and cancelling the logging concession of
petitioner and 9 other forest concessionaires.
 Petitioner sought for reconsideration of the directive of the Bureau;
 Thereafter, approximately half of the area formerly covered by petitioners TLA was reawarded to Twin
Peaks Development and Reality Corporation under TLA No. 356 which was set to expire on July 31,
2009, the other half was allowed to by logged by Filipinas Loggers, Inc, without the benefit of a formal
award or license.
 Petitioner further alleges that the latter entities were controlled and owned by relatives and cronies of
deposed Pres. Marcos.
 The Ministry ruled thereafter denying petitioners request; they ruled that a timber license was not a
contract, but only a privilege which could be withdrawn whenever public interest or welfare so
demands.

ISSUES: WON, TLA no. 356 is null and void.

RULING: Public respondents herein, upon whose shoulders rests the task of implementing the policy to
develop and conserve the country's natural resources, have indicated an ongoing department evaluation of all
timber license agreements entered into, and permits or licenses issued, under the previous dispensation. In fact,
both the executive and legislative departments of the incumbent administration are presently taking stock of its
environmental policies with regard to the utilization of timber lands and developing an agenda for future
programs for their conservation and rehabilitation.

The ongoing administrative reassessment is apparently in response to the renewed and growing global concern
over the despoliation of forest lands and the utter disregard of their crucial role in sustaining a balanced
ecological system. The legitimacy of such concern can hardly be disputed, most especially in this country. The
Court takes judicial notice of the profligate waste of the country's forest resources which has not only resulted in
the irreversible loss of flora and fauna peculiar to the region, but has produced even more disastrous and lasting
economic and social effects. The delicate balance of nature having been upset, a vicious cycle of floods and
droughts has been triggered and the supply of food and energy resources required by the people seriously
depleted.

While there is a desire to harness natural resources to amass profit and to meet the country's immediate financial
requirements, the more essential need to ensure future generations of Filipinos of their survival in a viable
environment demands effective and circumspect action from the government to check further denudation of
whatever remains of the forest lands. Nothing less is expected of the government, in view of the clear
constitutional command to maintain a balanced and healthful ecology. Section 16 of Article II of the 1987
Constitution provides:

SEC. 16. The State shall protect and promote the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in
accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.

Thus, while the administration grapples with the complex and multifarious problems caused by unbridled
exploitation of these resources, the judiciary will stand clear. A long line of cases establish the basic rule that
the courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies
entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the special technical knowledge and training of such
agencies. More so where, as in the present case, the interests of a private logging company are pitted against
that of the public at large on the pressing public policy issue of forest conservation. For this Court recognizes
the wide latitude of discretion possessed by the government in determining the appropriate actions to be taken
to preserve and manage natural resources, and the proper parties who should enjoy the privilege of utilizing
these resources. Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by which the
State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. And
it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to qualified entities, and do
not vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the particular concession area and the forest products
therein. They may be validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive when national
interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed contracts within the purview of the due process of law clause
[See Sections 3 (ee) and 20 of Pres. Decree No. 705, as amended.
In fine, the legal precepts highlighted in the foregoing discussion more than suffice to justify the Court's
refusal to interfere in the DENR evaluation of timber licenses and permits issued under the previous regime, or
to pre-empt the adoption of appropriate corrective measures by the department.

Nevertheless, the Court cannot help but express its concern regarding alleged irregularities in the issuance of
timber license agreements to a number of logging concessionaires.

The grant of licenses or permits to exploit the country's timber resources, if done in contravention of the
procedure outlined in the law, or as a result of fraud and undue influence exerted on department officials, is
indicative of an arbitrary and whimsical exercise of the State's power to regulate the use and exploitation of
forest resources. The alleged practice of bestowing "special favors" to preferred individuals, regardless of merit,
would be an abuse of this power. And this Court will not be a party to a flagrant mockery of the avowed public
policy of conservation enshrined in the 1987 Constitution. Therefore, should the appropriate case be brought
showing a clear grave abuse of discretion on the part of officials in the DENR and related bureaus with respect
to the implementation of this public policy, the Court win not hesitate to step in and wield its authority, when
invoked, in the exercise of judicial powers under the Constitution [Section 1, Article VIII].

However, petitioner having failed to make out a case showing grave abuse of discretion on the part of public
respondents herein, the Court finds no basis to issue a writ of certiorari and to grant any of the affirmative
reliefs sought. WHEREFORE, the present petition is DISMISSED.
 

HEIRS OF JOSE AMUNATEGUI VS. DIRECTOR FORESTRY

JUSTICE GUTIERREZ

FACTS:

 These are two petitions for review on certiorari questioning the decision of the CA which declared the
disputed property as forest land, not subject to titling in favor of private persons. These petitions have
their genesis in an application for confirmation of imperfect title and its registration filed with the Court
of First Instance of Capiz. The parcel of land sought to be registered is known as Lot No. 885 of the
Cadastral Survey of Pilar, Capiz, and has an area of 645,703 square meters.
 Petitioners Roque Borre and Melquiades Borre, filed the application for registration. In due time, the
heirs of Jose Amunategui filed an opposition to the application of Roque and Melquiades Borre. At the
same time, they prayed that the title to a portion of Lot No. 885 of Pilar Cadastre containing 527,747
square meters be confirmed and registered in the names of said Heirs of Jose Amunategui.
  The Director of Forestry, through the Prov. Fiscal of Capiz, also filed an opposition to the application
for registration of title claiming that the land was mangrove swamp which was still classified as forest
land and part of the public domain. 
 Another oppositor, Emeterio Bereber filed his opposition insofar as a portion of Lot No. 885 containing
117,956 square meters was concerned
 Applicant-petitioner Roque Borre sold whatever rights and interests he may have on Lot No. 885 to
Angel Alpasan. The latter also filed an opposition, claiming that he is entitled to have said lot registered
in his name.
 After trial, the Court of First Instance of Capiz adjudicated 117,956 square meters to Emeterio Bereber
and the rest of the land containing 527,747 square meters was adjudicated in the proportion of 5/6 share
to Angel Alpasan and 1/6 share to Melquiades Borre.
  A petition for review on certiorari was filed by the Heirs of Jose Amunategui contending that the
disputed lot had been in the possession of private persons for over 30 years and therefore in accordance
with Republic Act No. 1942, said lot could still be the subject of registration and confirmation of title in
the name of a private person in accordance with Act No. 496 known as the Land Registration Act. 
 Another petition for review on certiorari was filed by Roque Borre and Encarnacion Delfin, contending
that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing their complaint against the Heirs of
Jose Amunategui. 
 The Borre complaint was for the annulment of the deed of absolute sale of Lot No. 885 executed by
them in favor of the Heirs of Amunategui.
 The complaint was dismissed on the basis of the CA’s decision that the disputed lot is part of the public
domain. 
 The Heirs of Jose Amunategui maintain that Lot No. 885 cannot be classified as forest land because it is
not thickly forested but is a “mangrove swamp”.
 Although conceding that a "mangrove swamp" is included in the classification of forest land in
accordance with Section 1820 of the Revised Administrative Code, the petitioners argue that no big trees
classified in Section 1821 of said Code as first, second and third groups are found on the land in
question. Furthermore, they contend that Lot 885, even if it is a mangrove swamp, is still subject to land
registration proceedings because the property had been in actual possession of private persons for many
years, and therefore, said land was already "private land" better adapted and more valuable for
agricultural than for forest purposes and not required by the public interests to be kept under forest
classification.

ISSUE:  Whether or not Lot No. 885 is public forest land, not capable of registration in the names of the private
applicants.

 RULING: A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification
simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest
land may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. “Forest
lands” do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees,
nipa palms, and other trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest land. The
classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land
actually looks like. Unless and until the land classified as “forest” is released in an official proclamation to that
effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on
confirmation of imperfect title do not apply. Possession of forest lands, no matter how long, cannot ripen into
private ownership. It bears emphasizing that a positive act of Government is needed to declassify land which is
classified as forest and to convert it into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.

The fact that no trees enumerated in Section 1821 of the Revised Administrative Code are found in Lot
No. 885 does not divest such land of its being classified as forest land, much less as land of the public domain.
The appellate court found that in 1912, the land must have been a virgin forest as stated by Emeterio Bereber’s
witness Deogracias Gavacao, and that as late as 1926, it must have been a thickly forested area as testified by
Jaime Bertolde. The opposition of the Director of Forestry was strengthened by the appellate court’s finding
that timber licenses had to be issued to certain licensees and even Jose Amunategui himself took the trouble to
ask for a license to cut timber within the area. It was only sometime in 1950 that the property was converted
into fishpond but only after a previous warning from the District Forester that the same could not be done
because it was classified as “public forest.”
The record show that Lot 885 never ceased to be classified as forest land of the public domain.

The court affirmed the finding that property Lot No. 885 is part of the public domain, classified as
public forest land.  Petitions were DISMISSED.
MUSTANG LUMBER vs FACTORAN

JUSTICE DAVIDE

FACTS:

 Petitioner, a domestic corporation with principal office at Nos. 1350-1352 Juan Luna Street, Tondo,
Manila, and with a lumberyard at Fortune Street, Fortune Village, Paseo de Blas, Valenzuela, Metro
Manila, was duly registered as a lumber dealer with the Bureau of Forest Development (BFD).
 On 1 April 1990, acting on an information that a huge stockpile of narra flitches, shorts, and slabs were
seen inside the lumberyard of the petitioner in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, the SAID organized a team of
foresters and policemen and sent it to conduct surveillance at the said lumberyard. In the course thereof,
the team members saw coming out from the lumberyard the petitioner's truck, with Plate No. CCK-322,
loaded with lauan and almaciga lumber of assorted sizes and dimensions. Since the driver could not
produce the required invoices and transport documents, the team seized the truck together with its cargo
and impounded them at the DENR compound at Visayas Avenue, Quezon City.[1] The team was not able
to gain entry into the premises because of the refusal of the owner.

 On the basis of that resolution, an information was filed on 5 June 1991 by the DOJ with Branch 172 of
the RTC of Valenzuela, charging Ri Chuy Po with the violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as
amended, which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 324-V-91 (hereinafter, the CRIMINAL CASE). The
accusatory portion of the information reads as follows:
 That on or about the 3rd day of April 1990, or prior to or subsequent thereto, within the premises and
vicinity of Mustang Lumber, Inc. in Fortune Village, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there wilfully, feloniously
and unlawfully, have in his possession truckloads of almaciga and lauan and approximately 200,000 bd.
ft. of lumber and shorts of various species including almaciga and supa, without the legal documents as
required under existing forest laws and regulations.
 On 7 July 1991, accused Ri Chuy Po filed in the CRIMINAL CASE a Motion to Quash and/or to
Suspend Proceedings based on the following grounds: (a) the information does not charge an offense, for
possession of lumber, as opposed to timber, is not penalized in Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, and
even granting arguendo that lumber falls within the purview of the said section, the same may not be used in
evidence against him for they were taken by virtue of an illegal seizure;
 Respondent Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong granted the motion to quash and dismissed the case
on the ground that “possession of lumber without the legal documents required by forest laws and regulations is
not a crime”.

ISSUE: WON, Respondent Judge is correct?

RULING: NO,
Respondent Ri Chuy Po is charged with the violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by E.O.
No. 277, which provides:

SEC. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products Without License. Any person
who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from
alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other forest
products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished
with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, That in the case of
partnerships, associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or
possession shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported
without further proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation.

q) Forest product means timber, pulpwood, firewood, bark, tree top, resin, gum, wood, oil, honey, beeswax,
nipa, rattan, or other forest growth such as grass, shrub, and flowering plant, the associated water, fish, game,
scenic, historical, recreational and geological resources in forest lands.

It follows then that lumber is only one of the items covered by the information. The public and the private
respondents obviously miscomprehended the averments in the information. Accordingly, even if lumber is not
included in Section 68, the other items therein as noted above fall within the ambit of the said section, and as to
them, the information validly charges an offense.
Our respected brother, Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, suggests in his dissenting opinion that this Court go
beyond the four corners of the information for enlightenment as to whether the information exclusively refers
to lumber. With the aid of the pleadings and the annexes thereto, he arrives at the conclusion that only lumber
has been envisioned in the indictment.
The Revised Forestry Code contains no definition of either timber or lumber. While the former is included
in forest products as defined in paragraph (q) of Section 3, the latter is found in paragraph (aa) of the same
section in the definition of Processing plant; which reads:

(aa) Processing plant is any mechanical set-up, machine or combination of machine used for the processing of
logs and other forest raw materials into lumber, veneer, plywood, wallboard, block-board, paper board, pulp,
paper or other finished wood products.

This simply means that lumber is a processed log or processed forest raw material. Clearly, the Code uses
the term lumber in its ordinary or common usage. In the 1993 copyright edition of Webster's Third New
International Dictionary, lumber is defined, inter alia, as timber or logs after being prepared for the market.
[32]
 Simply put, lumber is a processed log or timber.
It is settled that in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, words and phrases used in a statute
should be given their plain, ordinary, and common usage meaning. [33] And insofar as possession of timber
without the required legal documents is concerned, Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, makes no
distinction between raw or processed timber. Neither should we. Ubi lex non distanguit nec nos distinguere
debemus.
Indisputably, respondent Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong of Branch 172 of the RTC of Valenzuela, Metro
Manila, committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the motion to quash the information in the CRIMINAL
CASE and in dismissing the said case.
The court also held that the seizure of items and the truck carrying the same was done lawfully as it falls under
lawful warrantless searches. Search of moving vehicles is one of the exceptions to the general rule that searches
must be done with a warrant. Furthermore, such search and seizure was a valid exercise of the power vested
upon the forest officer or employee by Section 80 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by P.D. No. 1775.

Finally, the court stressed petitioner’s violation of Section 68-A of P.D. No. 705. The court held that Secretary
Factoran or his authorized representative indeed had the authority to seize the Lumber since petitioner’s license,
at the time of seizure, was still suspended. Thus, petitioner was in illegal possession of the seized articles.

The Court ruled against petitioner in all three consolidated cases.

WENCESLAO VINZONS TAN VS DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY

JUSTICE MAKASIAR

FACTS:

 Sometime in April 1961, the Bureau of Forestry issued Notice No. 2087, advertising for public bidding a
certain tract of public forest land situated in Olongapo, Zambales, provided tenders were received on or
before May 22, 1961. This public forest land, consisting of 6,420 hectares, is located within the former
U.S. Naval Reservation comprising 7,252 hectares of timberland, which was turned over by the United
States Government to the Philippine Government.
 On May 5, 1961, petitioner-appellant Wenceslao Vinzons Tan submitted his application in due form
after paying the necessary fees and posting tile required bond therefor. Nine other applicants submitted
their offers before the deadline 
 Finally, of the ten persons who submitted proposed the area was awarded to herein petitioner-appellant
Wenceslao Vinzons Tan, on April 15, 1963 by the Bureau of Forestry. Against this award, bidders
Ravago Commercial Company and Jorge Lao Happick filed motions for reconsideration which were
denied by the Director of Forestry on December 6, 1963.
  On May 30, 1963, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources Benjamin M. Gozon — who
succeeded Secretary Cesar M. Fortich in office — issued General Memorandum Order No. 46, series of
1963, limiting the authority of the Secretary to order new TLA to not more than 3,000 hectares, and
extension of ordinary timer licenses to 5,000 hectares.
 Thereafter, Jose Y. Feliciano was appointed as Acting secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources,
replacing secretary Benjamin M. Gozon. Upon assumption of office he Immediately promulgate on
December 19, 19b3 General memorandum Order No. 60, revoking the authority delegated to the
Director of Forestry, under General Memorandum order No. 46, to grant ordinary timber licenses, which
order took effect on the same day, December 19, 1963.
 On the same date that the above-quoted memorandum took effect, December 19, 1963, Ordinary Timber
License No. 20-'64 (NEW) dated April 22, 1963, in the name of Wenceslao Vinzons Tan, was signed by
then Acting Director of Forestry Estanislao R. Bernal without the approval of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources. On January 6, 1964, the license was released by the Office of the
Director of Forestry. It was not signed by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources as
required by Order No. 60  .
 On February 12, 1964, Ravago Commercial Company wrote a letter to the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources shall be considered by tile Natural Resources praying that OTI No. 20-'64 in the
name of Wenceslao V. Tan be cancelled or revoked on the ground that the grant thereof was irregular,
anomalous and contrary to existing forestry laws, rules and regulations.
 On March 9, 1964, acting on the said representation made by Ravago Commercial Company, the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources promulgated an order declaring Ordinary Timber
License No. 20-'64 issued in the name of Wenceslao Vinzons Tan, as having been issued by the Director
of Forestry without authority, and is therefore void ab initio. 

ISSUE: WON, the OLI issued to petitioner is void ab inito.

RULING: The release of the license on January 6, 1964, gives rise to the impression that it was ante-dated to
December 19, 1963 on which date the authority of the Director of Forestry was revoked. But, what is of greatest
importance is the date of the release or issuance, and not the date of the signing of the license. While petitioner-
appellant's timber license might have been signed on December 19, 1963 it was released only on January 6,
1964. Before its release, no right is acquired by the licensee. As pointed out by the trial court, the Director of
Forestry had no longer any authority to release the license on January 6, 1964. Therefore, petitioner-appellant
had not acquired any legal right under such void license.

Granting arguendo, that petitioner-appellant's timber license is valid, still respondents-appellees can
validly revoke his timber license. As pointed out earlier, paragraph 27 of the rules and regulations included in
the ordinary timber license states: "The terms and conditions of this license are subject to change at the
discretion of the Director of Forestry, and that this license may be made to expire at an earlier date, when
public interests so require" (Exh. D, p. 22, CFI rec.). A timber license is an instrument by which the State
regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. A timber
license is not a contract within the purview of the due process clause; it is only a license or privilege, which can
be validly withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this ceise

"A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract
between the authority, federal, state, or municipal, granting it and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it
property or a property right, nor does it create a vested right; nor is it taxation" (37 C.J. 168). Thus, this Court
held that the granting of license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights.

The welfare of the people is the supreme law. Thus, no franchise or right can be availed of to defeat the
proper exercise of police power. The State has inherent power enabling it to prohibit all things hurtful to
comfort, safety, and welfare of society.

Thus, "this Court had rigorously adhered to the principle of conserving forest resources, as corollary to
which the alleged right to them of private individuals or entities was meticulously inquired into and more often
than not rejected. We do so again". WE reiterate our fidelity to the basic policy of conserving the national
patrimony as ordained by the Constitution.