CS Tae ae a ©rd es s iy aT el GERMAN DEFENDERS German defence infaney brigade infancy divisions oldies) and ewo armoured divi Divisional AREAS 729 GR oase of the Infanteriedivision (352° Infantry Division): 914 GR. GR,O16GR, 256 1439 Osc Bn, 1352 AR Beowees ix and Carentan, including, Omaha le ‘contained many combat veterans, unl ion (716* Infantry. Divi 736 GR, n.I7IGAR, Easter end of landing zones, including mo landing. Division): 1057 GR 103@GR, 191 AR Inerior of tie Cotetin Repnsula A regular fan sion, tae and equipped 0 be tarapored bys Fallechiomjigerepimene (6 Parachute Regiment): The pars feta Arched 91, Llandciio, Coca.” (GR < Grama Regine, Of Bn = rh Coser, Ak Willey Regimens PCR 2 Po i RD Pine” Regn Baralion, Panzer Arty Regiment © Barns i rg Co oo Anon +0 eb Brisish invasion fore i, federal bike pa ig A ee | oo we i qi Bosc A S ‘ . A ve A Ye cd in che Allee’ planned landing revs consisced of four infaneay divisions (7,500 to 12-500 soldies), with another 1 (112 to 180 anks ara 17,000 soldiers) in reserve behind these areas. The rw, landing areas counterattacked aswell Mosite Reserves Panzerdivision 21" Armoured Division): 22 PR, 125 PGR, XGR, 155 PAR, Near Cien asa mobile sciking f ilerjugend’SS-Panzerdivision(12*SS Armoured Division S-PGR, 26 SS-PGR, 12 SS-PAR. Liseswe to th southeast of Caen. Itsoficers and NCO': were long serving ¥elers, but the junios soldiers had all een recited directly rom she Miler Youth movement a the age of seventeen 30. Schnellebrigade (30% Mobile Brigade) Taree bicycle banal Eee rye Cee “ADJACENT AREAS (Other divisions occupied he aces ao 243. Infamteriedivision (243 Infant IR, 922.GR, 243 Ak, W d the landing, 20s ry Division): 920. GR, Pacevin PeninsulaTHE CAMPAIGN FOR NORMANDY, JUNE-AUGUST 1944 ‘When: Jaron Mos, Pil Yates Béitr: Peer Simonovich, Jhin-Paul Besigne Assan Wer: Richaed Chambers, Jonathos Forse, ic, Andy Bakes, Steven Prk Chee Brick: John Hunton, Nea Smith Miniatures Desig: Evan Allen, Richard Carlisle Covey and Internal Ar: Vincent Wa Minustres Paring Wayne Turner, Jeremy Pace Temain Modelling: Dale Pepperell. Phrzognepy: Bawefrone Stadio eo ~ Coming Ashore Disembarking. Returning for More DD Tanks on Floating Anillery. DUKW Amphibious Trucks Naval Gunfire Support. © Mission: Hit the Beach.. © Modelling Beaches . ‘The Battle for Utah Beach Ucah Beach Map US 4" Infancy Division a German 709. Infanteriedivision. (2 * — Weapons of D-Day: Obstacles.. © Hobart’ Funnies. AVRE Special Rules... Mine Fiail Special Ruies..... “The Battle for Sword Beach. Queen Red Beach Maponin ‘This isa supplement for Haves Of War. the World Wer Il miniatures game. A.copy ofthe rulebook for Flames Of Wer is necessary o fully use che contents ofthis book. Pheyten Grnap:Buciland Cy Guaed (Damian eid) Dawgs of War Stephon Pa, Group Nort and the Penida Practrians (Chis Sue, Rocky Mountsin Regus (Tony Asmscong ‘Sydney FOW Syaicate (Kim Alberto Photserp National Library of New Zea, Imperial War Vaceur, Borngton Tank Muzeazs, -Auslan War Memosid Roger Key Private Colleton, NARA: National Archives OF Canad, swern:nay2modelaker com, Us Army Signal Corps British 3 Division : German 716, Infanteriedivision... ‘The Normandy Campaign .reneenr Bocage . Bocage Rules Crossing Bocage. Secing ‘Darough Bocage ... Taking Cowersrnsansse Shooting Over Bocage Anillexy Assaulting in Bocage Narrow Lanes... Gapping Hedgetows.. Modelling Bocayge manson Fighting in the Bocage Close in Fighting, Arrillesy Deploymens RESERVES sorsnseesne Weapons of D-Day: German Tanks. Axis of Attack: The Bréville Gap. Weapons of D-Day: Allied Tanks... Axis of Attack Cutting The Cotentin: ‘Weapons of D-Day: Allied Tanls....r:mee “All rights reserved, No pare of this publication may heacproduiced, stozed in a retrieval sytem, or rransmitced, in any form or hy. | cane without ene prinrirteen permission of the publisher, nor be otherwise crculzel jn any form of nding. or cover oxher than in which iis published and wishoura similar condivios being imposed on the subsequent purchaser eae es‘naw behind chem. ‘the greatese amphibious " ing months of he Briish and American Governments finally agreed to a Ihscale invasion of G nc 4 France provisionally scheduled for May 1944. In 1, US General Dwight D Eisenhower was ap- ¢ Commander of Supreme Headquarters ch planning Sir Besnard jeneral Omar Bradley and che British Second Miles Dempsey. The 2 ded at o ‘Army under ‘Army under ieuenant-Genera Si foressi spearheads would have to land on ating the way for other ‘push inland TARGET NORMANDY “The Allies chose Normandy for che landings, racher chan the shortest romie across the English Channel ftom Dover 10> himself suspected that Noumar a any invasion but, unusually, allow |imself co be persuaded otherwise by his generals. To scin f lies launched « major deveptio plan, Operation Fortitude, using double agents, fake signal evs stories, broadcasts and dummy encamp red on creating the i é ‘Army Group, FUSAG, supposedly 30 divisions stationed in south-ents England under the BRiTisH | CORPS ‘CROCKERCee el ‘ommand oF Gencsal George S “the Germans weie “Fomipleccly taken in, Even after the Normarily lanchngs had taken place, Hider rcfised 10 allow reinforcements 10 be ed from the Pas de Calais regio Fanidings were merely a diversionary acack believing that the THE ATLANTIC WALL While che Allies laid theic plans and marshalled cher fozces the defenders of Hiders Atlansitwall, che coastal fort fications of North Western Burope, wore not idle. Since 4942 Generalfldmarschall Gerd von Rundstede had been Oherbefelshaber (OB) West, commanding all German Forces in France, Holland and Belgium. This included Army Group By which contolled Seventh Army, defending Britany and ‘Normandy, and Fifteenth Army in the Pas de Calais segion, “Ap: November 1943, command of Army Group B was given to. Generaljeldmarschall Roramal, the famed ‘Desert Fox, ‘yith orders to ready the neglected coastal defences for the ) “org expected invasion. Rommel added strong points and took steps to deny fclds o airborne invaders. Well sited anti- tank obstacles and extensive mineficlds were conscructed to hinder the invaders. However, weaknesses remained. ‘the defences along this parc of the coast mostiy had to tely on ocKrench, Russian and Czech weapons, and cof defence in depth once the initial obsolescene there was a notable coastal ‘crust’ was broken. ‘0 infanery regiments ofv attached Ost battalions made up of former Soviet soli “The all-important aroused divisions, critical to the succes of any couneerattack in the event of an invasion, were non rally part of Panzergruppe West, directly conerolled by @ West. However, Rommel did manage to get three armou divisions placed under his direct control “This confusing German command structure, and the fo obsain the authori tions, was to significantly hamper the Gesman abiliey to real swiftly when the time came. On the day of the ims = von Runstedts efforts to move 1 S5-Pumeerkorps (1 S$ Pan Corps) closer to the invasion beaches had to await Hit the Allied air forces had smashed the French raihvay system, reducingits capacity to move eroopsto the eont. The Germans were forced 10 commit che few remaining Luffoafe aiteraft to its defence against overwhelming odds. The Lafiweaffe was crushed in the process. On the day of the invasion the Allied air forces would have the skis vo eherselves, ce oes neon foie ce ed Loot Nise COLLINS prom Retold Ielcog4s D-Day approached, the went in the English Channel worsened forcing General Eisenhower to postpone the Thadinas by 24 hows. Finally, after consulting the mercorolo 8 Eisenhower made the fateful decision. The westher was aor perfect, bur it would have wo do-—the invasion was on The poor weather had lulled the defanders Inia « Glse sense ff security Asthe invasion gocunder way many of the senior _ Geasian commanders were absent fzom their posts, aiending Peginc in Renncs or on heave ia Bjunaety wid ceewiere _ AIRBORNE INVASION carly hours af D-Day, patatsaopers of three airborne ivisions—che US 82H All American’ and 101" ‘Screaming agles’ Aicborne Divisions, and the ‘Red Devile’ of the British 6” Airborne Division dropped into Normandy «0 | secute the flanks of the seabomne landings. The most foita- fate landed near theie drop zines, but many were dispersed, 48.2 esl: of low cloud and anti-aitcrate fire insula, on the western Hank of the jon beaches, dhe US airborne divisions secuned key areas inlacd of Utah Beach. On the eastern flank, the Brisk parse “Gopers struck at cargers beeween the Orne and Dives rivers YVissl bridges over the Orne and Caen Canal were seized by |) sn audacious glider assault at the outset of the operation. Although nor always successful, the parachute and glider landings proved crucial in confusing and delaying the | German defenders, socicing inland routes from the invasion Peesches and capturing key bridges and crossroads 0300 hours, neatly rwo thousand Allied medium and “bombers hammered the German coastal defences. This ‘onslaught was followed by a massive aaval bont- Som sven Battleships, 18 crisers, 43 dessroyers [Eusboats and monitors, A follow-up tid by another American bombers wrought yet more destruction RNE LANDINGS cover of darkness chausands of landing craft ap- the Normandy coastlinc. The Allied amphibious ‘west to east they were codenamed: Utah and Oniaha-—the = fanding beaches of che US First Army-—and Gold, Juno and Sword—the landing beaches for the Brith and Canadian troops of che British Second Army: UTAH sah Beach, at the base of the Cosentin Peninsula, was wide ‘ana flat and behind che beach was a marshy plain shachad ‘been deliberstely loaded by dhe defenders. The Americans cdected to land an hour calir than she Brivish, using the lower dde 10 overcome the problems of submerged beach obsnicles designed t0 destioy landing cafe. At 0630 hones, under cover of a bombardment from rocker-fring landing ‘raf, 8” Regimental Combat Team (RCT) of 41" Tafanery Division led the beach assanh, A navigacion error put the toops ashore two ehousand yards south of the piojected landing site, Forticously, howeves, the German dlfences were even seeaker inthis seco of the beach. Supported by amphibfous Sherman DP ranks (28 of the 32 launched made ‘is ashore) the infanery’ quickly over- swhelmed 919. Grenadieregiment of 702. Infunseriedivision “The 4 Infantry Division secuted its objectives at 2 cost of 200 casuals far fewer than anticipated. As the rest ofthe US VII Goups poured ashore, the Division linked up with paratroopers of the 101” Airborne Division who had seized the exits From the flooded plato farther infand. OMAHA Tn contrast with Utah, the going ar Omaha Beach was much, tougher for che assaulting American troops, Bad weadier ‘meant thar tides were running higher, swamping landing cafe and pushing them onto submerged obsczeles. Preparacory fite fad missed most of the beach defences, sted on a high blafe overlooking the beach and losses co enemy fire were heavy, swith most of the corsbar engineers and supporting Sherinan DD sans loss hefare they reached che shoreline To further complicate marters, the assaulting troops of 16*RCT, fom the veteran 1 ‘Rig Red One! Infantry Division, and 116" RCT, ftom the inexperienced 29 "Bluy and Grey’ lnfiney Division, found dhemseves. facing not only the anticipated 726. Grenedierrginiem of 716:ee es who had odupied the beich defences underecred by Alicd intel = igence, The assault forces were pinned down on the beach | “unsil nid afternoon, suffering heavy casalees, By nightfall they had advanced no mots than 2,000 yards inland. ‘A few miles t the west, nctr che Vire River estuary dividing. Omaha and Utah, the 24 Ranger Baetalion carried onc & ‘daring sssaulc from the sea ditectly sup the cliff at Poinve du Hoc, Theniissionwasincended toknockoura Geemancosstal Jpawcery chactheatencd the invasion bcathes. Howevet, alter © successful bur costly assaul, she rangers discovered that the coastal guns had afteady been removed by the Germans, GOLD ‘Ac 07725 hous she fies: roops from the British Second Army began landing. Ac Gold Beach, 69.and 231 Brigade: Sof 50* (Northumberland) Division lead che assaule support foom commandos, avillery and specialist armous the mine-clearing, flame-throwing and engineering funnies allocated ta the British beaches. The invaders made good Dprogecss against che defenders from 736. Grensaerregiment BF 716. Infanceviedivision. By extly aleerason, all of 50% Division was ashore, with elements of 7° Armoured Disic landing behind chem later in che day. JUNO Tmimediaeely co the exst of 50% Division, ie was the task of thie 7 and 8 Béigade Groups of 3% Canadian Division 10 storm ashore at Juno Beach. ‘The Canadians were supported the commandos of 4 Special Service Brigade. Mindful jf the debacle at Dicppe in 1942 which had cost so many Canadian lives, the Canadians anticipated heavy casualcies EE lnithe event, their objectives were aken with compara- © “vely lighe casualties after hard Sighting agsinsc clei 736, Grenadieregiment of 716. Infanteriedivision. By-mid afternoon the entice 3% Canadian Division was ashore, quickly linking up with 50 Divison. At the easternmost beach of the invasion, Sword Beach. & Brignde Group of Brissh 5° Division ted che assault 9 ported by the commandos of | Special Service Brigid ‘The landings sulfered from high tides caused by the badd ay weather and also rough resiseance from German of the 736, Grenadierregimens of 716. Infanneriedisita The Bauish oops fought cheie way through che Be defences and hegan fo explo inland, On the German an effective strength of only twa bactlions 3" Division had been allocated very ambitious objective inchiding the eapuure of the city of Cacn, 2 crucial road rail junetion some ten miles inland. ‘The Division duly cleared the invasion beack and linked up wich the paraioopers of the 6* Airborne Divkion, having advanced some 6 mule inland —one of the furdbex advances on D-Day “The unexpected arrival of 2/, Pancerdivision xopped 3 Dive. ‘sion's advance and shrew them on the defensive. A strong dence by the Brigh and Canadian divisions prevented Panaerdivision from expliting is succes, despite reac the sea berveen Jano and Sword Beaches. However attack had frustrazed the initial drive on Caen. Their {o capture Caen vas to have far reaching consequences che Allies. NIGHTFALL, 6 JUNE By nga on 6 june the Ales wore ashore, br som places their beachhead was ne deeper than 2000 9. Cenain vital D-Day objestivesmost nocably Caen—had fot been caprured, Yet enough men and material had beet = Sree fat lool Comae breed oa ta push them back ince the sea, Sil, the tsk cha ay bef the Allied forces ws considetsble. They must link op she beachheads, pore Cherboorg (che only major port in the sm cegion) © guarantee resupply, and push inland co Caen ond St ing through the diffcule bpeage Coutts) Sage side of Normandy and inso she more open retain beyauide |= of Normandy carrying Tio (o) DAY: NTN v7, ING CRAFT, ASSAULT (LCA) ‘British Landing Craft, Assaulcisa small, 40'/12.5mlong, den vessel designed to transport a 37-man eile platoon {o9p transports off shore to the invasion beaches, Re Tow profile of the LGA makes it a small carget for de- aiding gon. Unfortunately the low flat bow tends to throw sheets of water over the landing craft, soaking che shiv Pring men packed inside E Upon reaching che beach the craft is grounded, ewo bullet Goof steel doors are thrown open and the sroops storm Eashore covered by a Bren light-machine-gun firing from an B asmoused position beside she ramp. The narrowness of the Hamp (only 414 feex/1.37m wide) berween the coxswain and gun is perhaps the vessel’ greats weakness, LCA, produced by the shousands, provided the majority Pinlaneey assault boars on D-Day. Creed by. the Royal fay, they provided invaluable service during the invasion sh, Canadian, and American Jops ashore. The Rangers making the famous assault on ine dis Hoc were landed by Royal Navy LCN, The Landing Craft, Tank was initially designed in 1940, Te was intended for ceansporting tanks on combined op- ‘rations caids on Fortress Europe. Evencually eight diferent models of LCT would be buile, the mos: common being the American-buile Mark IV, Depending upon the mark, the oT can carry up w nine canks, although chose transport: g the larger of Hobart ‘Funnies’ only carry four vehicles tebe) When loading, the vehicles were backed onto the deck of the FPCT in the reverse onder in which dhey will disembark upon 1¢ Beach, iotigh purpose-built co transport ranks, vehicles and “pplies LCT’s can perform a number of oles. For example, ‘Normandy. the LCT’s carrying M7 Priest scl propelled ins fired a run-in shoor’, This carefully rehearsed artillery Tbarrage is fied from 2 moving LCT onto the beaches to support che ist landing waves. ‘A number of specialized variants have been made including the Landing Craft, Pak (LCF) with eight 20mm Oe guns and four 2 pounder ‘pom-pom’ guns, and the Landing Ceaft, Gun (LCG) with two 4.7 inch destroyer guns to fire directly in support of the assault troops. Perhaps the most dramatic version of the LCT, is the Landing Craft, Rocker (LCR) which fires over 1000 60-pound rockers in a single devastating salvo. tn LANDING CRAFT, VEHICLE, PERSONNEL (LCVP), ‘The American Landing Craft, Vehicle, Personnel (LCVD) is leo known as the ‘Higgins Boat’ after its designer, Andrew Higgins. He used his experience of local boats. designed 10 operate in the swamps and shallow waters of Lonistana’ to develop and produce landing craft. These were uscd to teanspore oops during amphibious assaults n North Alvis, Sicily, Irly and are now giving good service n Normand in design «0 the LCA, the LCVP has a higher profile and better handling making ic more seaworthy (and drier for its cargo of soldiers). A wide armoured bow ramp allows the assault platoon carried in a Higgins Boat ¢o exic the landing, ale quicldy under fire, presenting less ofa massed targer for the waiting enemy. It aso means that the same craft can be sed in the follow-on saves w bring Jeeps and other supplies to shore, Sinai The men ate (ppically carried across the channel in larger ships and chen climb down ners to drop ineo che heaving boats, The assaule sroops ate arranged in the LCVD in a pre- determined order to make the most of the platoons weapons and skills when chey hit the beach, ‘The Supreme Allied Commander, Gencsal Eisenhower himself staced, “Andrew Higgins ... is the man who won the war for us. If Higgins had not designed and buile chose LCVP%s, we never could have landed over an open beach. “The whole seategy of the war would have been differnt OM SOURHERN ENG! :AN Deabe an easy one. Your enemy is well trained, well equipped, and battle-hardened, He will fight frce men of the world are marching together to victory. I have full confidence in your courage devotion ts duty, and skill in batcle, We will accept nothing less than full senhower, SHAEF the landing craft had strug-§ An almighty boom shook the bunker, and the lights gled through the heavy surf Sergeant Harmon locks at went out. Oberfeldwebel Moltke peered out of the et eens Mie ee kee ee Pe ee ene Mente Mtn eee een 2 tiny boat, drenching the men with salty brine. “Good [Ja storm-tossed grey sea filled with the dark shapes of thing ie’ summer’, thinks Harmon. “This be hell in [ships of every size, battleships, destroyers, transports. cers Ploughing slowly but inexorably toward the beach were ‘Ovethead, planes drone on in ceaseless waves. Once Cee ene Teena ae ee Me) ‘Closer this time... much closer. Columas of smoke are WE “Scheie!” snapped Grenadier Polk as, inthe half billowing from the bluffs evidence ofthe pummelling Wf light, he dropped the spare barrel for the machine- eer ree accent ie: Meter etc Mera mic ned Pee eC c ie | Meters Pets Gees recs: emnne His thoughts are shattered by the 2ip of bullets over M_firing positions, ‘Steady fellows, steady. We are ready for head, several clanging off the chin iron sides of the and feneeet ey jing craft. ‘Keep your heads down boys, and get read) But were they ready he wondered, All spring he and his ae LC a a ae mien had toiled with those girders and stakes upon the Pr Steeda) ake eh eee Game Cn eee ec ee ee Une ate eae rae See ra ere opera reer | comer or er cee at eee teeter eee ero Met tere cerietsa a ac Pee a ee een em Mice a ey cea emer ee eee eeraries remnvatt a pinned t these beaches until the counterattack came TF 60! GO! GO! Ger chose legs moving bellows M_and pushed them backimio these Pee M eet eo te: MMU er ent sn ace ects een ee eee cmt “Landing craft 400 metres. Free fire! Th infarmaric your Flames OF W To imake the es for conducting an amp fe the Beach mi fm bales for yo 2 BE Baile of Sword Beach. Youll ao find es noe corical information on cal inform“specific rertain—a beach eo land on. You can either a fully-modelled beach (see pages 18 and 19 for ideas) ply use a strip of blue cloth for the sea and a step of id-colouted clock for the beach. able needs a small-area of sea at che edge of the table 1g Way t0 surf crashing on the beach. Between the beach B sed the hinterland, chore are usually sand dines, a bank or Sal, cliffs, or marshes. You will ned. side table to hold sfeoops sil in theie ships off che rable as well SEA ZONE “The sez zone is where landing craft load up and line up for Ahir nin in ro she besch, Te should be abou 4-67/10-15cmn décp, just big enough for she landing craft wo ft “Tihs sucf zone covers the last few mertes of set up «0 the spent obese the lending cafe ea Te should ao be 4.67/10. 15cm decp, again just enough space forthe landing E zit as they beach to dischasge tele cargo. jhe the sea rone, the surf zone is Tmpassable to all reams SRL amphibious vices _ BEACH ZONE G The teach zone starts fiom the shallow water ac che Asiiding-craft ramp and goes up The acarest armoured troops were 21. Pancerdiriséon som = of Caen. This division was faily well equipped aid tripod, re VET CORPS CUR hut could not be expected to reach the beach in strength am Luna late in che afternoon, % Whatever the outcome, Sword Beach vas looking te Be a hard fight and the troops Jeo it. Major ‘Banger King commanding. A Company of the East Yorks, lke Wolfe a0 8 Quebec, read to his men as she landing ctalt approached = she beach. Shakespeare stering speech from King Henne echoed in theis ears as they stormed ashore “On, on, you nobles English! Whose blaod is fs from fathers of war proof, Fathers that, like so manny Alexanders, Have in these pare from morn rill com foughs, And sheabid their swords for lack of argument Tce you stared eke greyhounds in the clip, Straining upon the sare. The game’ afpor Fallow your spirit, and upon this charge Cry ‘God for Har, England, and Sains Gearge! REFIGHTING QUEEN RED “The battle for Queen Red Beach was 2 dramacic exam ple of courage under fire and the value of specialised Se ete cee en ea Cee een cece et cee ee oe ee ee ares standing in ener fre ac Seow all of the importaac f ere Cuan. ei oethe Germans) are_ for midable. Only Strongpaint C sea wall bun Cod is prorected “wire and ernches mal “ienpe sngpoint is mainly ac centre andBRITISH ye DIVISION. EAST YORKSHIRE REGT, 8" BDE Baualion HQ ‘A Cémpany B Company C Company | ap D Company (Pioneer) Plarson pany, 2"! Bo, ‘The Middlesex Regr | #5 vasery, 20 Ancirnke Regs RA V6 (Highland) Fld Rege, RA B Squadron 13/18 Hussars 77% Assaule Squadron, RE A Squadton, 22" Dragoons 2 Troop, 4 Gonimando RIFLE COMPANY (Continent 1 Company HQ Rille Pltoon (ar fall seeengch) Riffe Platoon (at full strength) Rifle Platoon (at fall strengeh) Rifle Platoon (at full suengeh) Pioncer Platoon (at full strength) MMG Platoon (at fll strength with ‘Anci-tanls platoon (SP), RA (eich foule Mil Fel Baaery, RA (oth one Gun Troup of Priest 8? gums) ‘Aniouted Flaroor Gril chic ‘Commando Platoon (with Lighe SMG teams) Tha platoon must GERMAN 716. INFANTERIEDIVISION 11/736. GRENADIERREGIMENT Bhyfillong* upp Gen “i geKompanie Stongpoint Cod) 12 Kompante (Stongpoines Cod and Sole) Pee Panzer Aitilletiesiment (Stongpoint Daimler) ‘ALARMHEITEN 4, Kompanie, 736. Grenadiestegiment 3/642. Ost Basillon 736. Sturmeug 2ug (Strongpoint Cod) 3. Kompanic, 22. Panzerregimen, 21. Panveedivision ‘Company HQ (with one HMG team attached, Mortar Section (attached to Grenadier Platoon, ar) ‘Grenadier Platoon (at full strength, a) Machine-gun Platoon (with theee HMG ream, at to Grenadier platoon ac) ‘Anti-tank Gan Platoon (evo 7.5cin Pak97/B8 puns, a ‘Arillery Battery (off table, Observertexims a6 QV8L(D) RESERVES ee - ‘Grenadier Platoon (ar full strengrh) . ‘ Grenadier Platoon (at full strength, ned as Reluctanc Tinea) Seat Poon (ne Sead with Riis an! Parztknacker SMG) Panzex Phtooa (four Panzec IV tanks rated Confident Veteran) oe Dir Ps tb a er a tr The German defenders wee from 1. Batuillon, 786. Grenadieregimehs of 716 Infuneriedivatan, All of the di puns were mainly uasippor WHAT IF BATTLES While the foras shown above represent the forces thar = actually landed on Queen Red Beach and those thar opposed jem, you can also play the scenario with different forces to ‘0 how the batcle would have cured oot ifthe commanders fad ebmmirted diffecene forces o the battle. sesDec0s EREDTSH VITE CORPS LAUNCHES OPERATION EPSOM 70 deployed well forward where they could fre on che defendersas ciey landed, The immediately avaiable reserves | ‘Ap Allied force attacking at Queen Red Beach should ‘6 2100 points based on an Infantry Company. ‘An Asi fore should consist of 1200 poins b MIE CAENeas FAO 3BEACHHEAD yn of 7 June, 1944, found the Alties ashore, bur their toe- ‘on the Normandy coast was precarious, The German snders continued Rommel’: strategy of forward defence, holding che Allies wo cheir landing areas as much as possible ile massing forces for the counteractack thar would throw Allies into the sea. The Normandy Bocage—narrow lanes, Fimpenctrable hedges and small felds—proved excellent ive Yertain, The Bocage dominated the invasion atea to ‘depth of up 10 50 miles, except on both flanks. Allis peessed on, capruring the town of Bayeux and king all of che beachheads, save that of VII Corps ac Usah, H the 156,000 men landed by sea and air on D-Day iself, approximately 10,000 had become casualties, heavy, but far Blower than was expected, New divisions would land every lay for che newt few weeks as the Allies attempted ro build leit Forces faster chan che Germans could contain them. foweren German forces, despite being hampered by con- fiuous Allied air attacks and pactisan activiey, rushed to seal (ff the invasion beaches. 12, Uiclugend” SS Panzerdsvision ((.2 Hider Youth’ Armoured Division) joined 21. Panzer- “dieision in a0 actempt to testa igs D-Day counterarcack, Bb Heavy pressure fiom the Brissh 3° Division and the “Canadian 3% Division forced chem ono the dofesive F Nonetheless, cheiccombined stengeh fruscacad ai efforts to ‘ake Caen. “the arrival of Panzer Lebr Division (the Armoured eee Oe src w bck Grouch ticketed ate “Balish 50” Division foughe chem to 2 sandscll and freed Ghiem on ro che defensive as well. B On the American right flank, 709. Infantericdivision E1709" {ofantry Division) and 91, Luftlandedivision (an army ficion lightly-equipped for rapid movement by ai) contin- Heed their bale againsc che 4" Iwv and 90* “Tough Ombres Divisions in the Utah beachhead. Once the location of the Tindings was clear, 23. Infanteriealvsion moved across from Ae other side of the Cotentin Peninsula co join them. The U eteran 6. Fellchirmiagerregimeat (6° Parachute Regiment) tinder Oberst Von der Heydie sealed off the base of the -ontinuing its batle with the American 82° ‘All Germans held it, the beachheads remained separated id could be deste with one ac a time, Rommel ordered Fallckirmborp: (01 Parachute Corps) to Carentan with the elementsof ts 3. Fllichirmjagerdvision 3" Parachute jan). There it was joined by £7. ‘Gorz von Berlichingen’ Pancergcnadierdivision (17° $8. Motorised Infantry vision) and che remnants of 352, Infanteriedivision te- Feating ftom Omaha Beach. The German High Command had committed all of its ‘mobile reserves, but far ftom pushing the Allies back inco the sea, choy were bately containing them. Carencan fll ar dawn 9n 12 June, afer a nigh long asca by the 101 Airborne Division supported by naval gunfire and artillery. They held ic against counteranacks by 17, $S-Penzergrenadiondvision, enabling the Americans «0 link up the Omaha and Urah beachheads. Hitler, meanwhile, issued an order forbidding. any withdrawal. The inicative was firmly in Allied hands Even while ie fight to link the beachheads was being fought, the push for Se L6 vias under way. The US V Corps with the YBig Red One’, 28 Indian Head’ and 29° ‘Blue and Grey’ Divisions headed inland from Omaha making good progress as the Germans withdrew to better defensive lines. By 13 June, the defenders, aldiough strecched almost to breaking had halted the Americans shore of St. Lé on the: Fille River. Their tenacious defence and the difficulr bocage tercain had frustrated all efforts aca breakrhough OPERATION PERCH—VILLERS BOCAGE The British 78 Ammoured Division, the famed ‘Desert Rats, Janded their Fist elements on D-Day. After days of hard fighting, they discovered a widening gap developing beeween the Panzer Echr Division acing ther and the 352. Infanterie- division in the US sector on 12 June. The nexe day an almost ‘unopposed advance through the gap put the lead elements of the 7 Armoured Division into Villets Bocage. Bold action by a handful of Tiger tanks from 101. SSschwere Panaerabicilung 101" SS Heavy ‘Tank Barcalion) led by Obersturmfubrer Wieernann, a celebrated Viger Ace, destroyed the leading companies. With ehe arrival of 2 Pencerdivision and cauncerattacks by Panzer Lehr, German pressure forced theisolated 7 Acmoured Division 1 withdraw. After days of continuous heavy German attacks, che Desert Rats recurned to British lines 09 17 Jusc, ite breakthrough pinched ou. CUTTING THE COTENTIN The US 4% Division’ thnuse norrhwards co Cherbourg was proceeding slowly, so on 9 June Bradley changed serategy: Instead of going north, US VIT Corps. under ‘Lightning Joe’ Collins would drive hard across the Corencin Peninsula ‘urting Cherbourg off from reinforcement, ‘the US 9" ‘Old Reliable’ Division reached Bareville on the west eoist fon 17 June, cutting off the remains of 7, 243, and 709 Infanteriedivsionen in the Cotenin Peninsula HEDGEROW HELL On 14 June the First US Army reorganised. A new Vill Corps faced south at the base of the Cotentin Peninsula and the new XIX Corps took over the centre while V Corps remained on the eastern flank adjacent ro the British sector. All chice comps renewed the thrust southwards on 16 June bur by 20 June cheir arcacks had again been contained after an advance of several miles.fee Srielgannrs the Wise proving 352, Infanteriedividion was teinforced by bactlegroups from ‘wo more infancey divisions allowing ir to continue holding, shelve, ven if only juse THE GREAT STORM By 17 June, che Allies bad landed 557,000 tnops, 81,000 ‘ychiclesand 183,000 rons of supplies. They were winning the race to build up theie forces faster than the Germans cou scinforce theirs. tn this they: were helped by FUSAG, che ‘icritious Firsc US Atmy Group under General Parson, Allied deception measures kept the Germans expecting FUSAG to. faunch the ‘rea’ invasion in che Pas de Caleis, forcing them to hold their reserves hack to oppose it. Meanwhile the German. divisions accually commied in Normandy were paying deatly in che axtricional hartles, exposed to air attack and aaval gunfire a they were, However all was nos wall. The Overlord plan called for Caen = and Cherbourg 9 be taken by June 23 and Se. 18 soon alter. So far none ofthesehad yer been taken, Unless the Allies could ‘make faster progress, thece was a danger that the Germans ‘ould bring in more divisions, sealing the beachhad off, and ‘causing a prolonged stalemate. To make mavtets worse, the ‘Allied buildup as hindered by a great storm chat lashed the invasion beaches from 18 vo 21 June. The storm severcly damaged the two floating ‘Mulberry Harbours che Allies jhad buile on the landing beaches, disrupting the kinding of additional divisions and the stockpiling of supplics, as well as grounding air suppor. CHERBOURG “The lar: week of June saw renewed efforts by boch Allied ariics to capture Cherbourg, St. 18 and Caen. On che ‘western flank the US VI Comps twened «0 Bight ies way up ile Corentin Peninsula toward Cherbourg, finally taking the port on 27 hune after a week-long barele amongse the ruins ofthe city. Unfortunately the combination of G: demolitions and the barde choronghly destroyed the port. Te was not undil che end of Sepeember thar it reached its al capacity supplying the Allied advance ‘OPERATION EPSOM—| While Bradley Dempsey’s British Second Army made another deserm auempt on Cacn in what would be the third biggest baetle of the was, Operation Epsom. On 26 june, the Brith VIL Corps atcacked 12. ‘Hitlerjugend’ S5:Pancerdivision the carnfielts west of Caen. The plin was i cross the A don and caprute Hill 112 before swings ‘Corps a day eaclier secured che flanks of the operation. Pounded by 4 preparatory bombardment from over 7 gitns, the young grenadiers of Hivlerrugend fought ‘in tec every village, Despite counterattacks by Panae? Leb 4 and Fees Panserdivisionen, and che newly-arrived 2. ©. heavy counterastacks by 1 SS-Pancertors, wo mote § armoured divisions transferred fom Hungary, dhveatened the flanks of the operation. Faced with elements of armoured divisions, VIII Corps polled the 11* Arina While fling to take Caen, Epsom did keep the Ge command focused! on theit vulnerable cight Flank. God tank country beyond Caen meant that any brealtheouigh here would be cacastrophie, 0 all available armoured fo ‘were committed ro the battles around Caen, With finde to winforce she American sector, they could only nd hope on ther left @ank, rusting the Becage to conta the US Fine Army. GENERAL OFFENSIVE ‘With Cherbourg taken and Epsom eccupying che Gen reserves, the US Pitse Array curved south to secure St and prepare for the breakout. The US XIX Corps renewed. its offensive on 29 June with an attack on Villiers Possand by 3 Armored Division followed by 29% and 30" Divisions)rps, Progress cheough the Bocage was still frustratingly ain castalcies heavy throughout the first week of July She Geemans reaceed to the US advance by replacing Panzer abr, sweakened by 2 month of combat on che British front, Meth 275, Infontriedivsion, Thus freed up, Parzer Lehr Americans tcacted quickly and lalead the Geman | crate before eveing the ovn acs Fy RAF Bomber Command. The strike caused huge damage {0 the city and its inhabitants, but the resistance encoun- From 12, $S-Pancérdivision showed the delendets were Canadian Division of che Bricish 1 Corps ‘out the defending fegiment of 16, Felddivision (L) Foes Fad Die) sda of Can north of |b 10 July, the Bricish VIII Comps launched Operation Hupiter, which recook the nomhern slopes of Hill 112 ar great © -c9, but the southern slopes remained in German hands E With such slow progress by both the US and British armies, Bad a exsaley rate that was quicidy exhausting cher reacrves © dé siained manpower, thethreac ofa stalemate was looming. “Politicians and che Press were demanding a beeakehrough. To {Break the stalemate, m:jor operations were planned for mid- Ply for che US and British armies, Before they could launch Heir parc of che operation, the Americans had o capuure Sc. fe which had cluded them for over a month. division off che bill by nightfall. With Hill 192 cleared 29% Division attacked on 15 July, finally capeuring St. L& oa 18 July OPERATION GOODWOOD Both the British and US breakout operations had been planned for 18 Tuly, but delays in taking St. 16 meant chae the British operation would have co begin first in onder t0 pin down the German armoured forces while the US Fist Army completed the caprure of St. L6 and prepared thetr ‘own operation. A Beish breakout was unlikely in chese ‘Grcumstances, with at least six German armoured divisions and three Tiger heavy rank battalions committed to holding she crivieal British Front. ‘There was litte choice though, as holding the German armoured divisions in place was viral if the Americans were co break our. In the British sector, the complex Operasion Goodwood sung into action. A subsidiary ateack by XXX Corgs and XI Cotps, Operation Greenline, began on the night oF 15 July, pinning down the chree armoured divisions of 11 SS- Panzerkorps around the old Epsom salient and drawing in 1. SS-Panzerdivision as well, This assaule was the prelude Goadwood proper, which commenced on 18 July, aier over thousand Allied heavy and medium bombers pounded de ilanks of the attack, The main punch by the Bucsh VIAL Comps involved over 750 ranks in three armoured divisions ariacking on a narrow front, with 250 mote with 1 Coxps and II Canadian Corps on the flanks. ‘This attack was sup- porred by 750 field and m ‘what would be the second biggest rank batele of the wat. al guns, and fighter-bombers in ‘The artack began well with the 11! Armoured Division ‘once again reaching the operation's objective of Bourgébus Ridge. Ac this point Montgomery made several ill-judged! statements to the press overstating the suecess of che opera tion. This gave considerable ammunition to his cries when traffic jams in the crowded Ome bridgchead delayed the Guards and 7 Armouced Divisions’ auacks, allowing the Germans 10 counterattack in strength, By the end of che day chtee German armoured divisions backed by Tiger tanks and massed 88mm guns had brought the offensive w a hale pushing che British off Boungébus Ridgo,Deo We hae Bec ad Tanks for the extent of the gains, Only 160 British tanks had been desteoyed, while the Germans had lost a similac Eamber the Briish tanks were quickly replaced, but the F Germans could not make good heir losses. Fie auracks continued wich Operation Spring (conducted. Ss oby, the newly-accvaied Fst Canadian my) forcing che (Germans to chrow theit armoured divisions into the meat grinder once again, with no chance to rest and rebuild, The German armoured divisions preparing to move to she US © ecco, where a breakout through the paper thin German line ‘was imminent, were forced «o remain in the British sector. OPERATION COBRA he stage was now set for Operation Cobra, the American breakout. Tike Goodwood, the plan involved saturation “bombing on a narrow Front opsosice che US Vil Corps. This “was to be followed with an infanury assaule backed by che ovo strongest armoured divisions in existence, the 20 ‘Hell sen Wheels and 34 Spearhead” Aemored Divisions. After a © false sare on 24 July when the bombing hit the American, ‘assault waves, Operation Cobra began on 25 July. While bombing again hit cheir own infantry, the effect of owo days ~ of bombing on Panzer Lebr was catastrophic Th defen asaulting infantry pressed chrough the German es, their success exploited by 26 Armored Division on 26 July. which broke through into open councey on 2 © ause-soad frontage. With no asmouted rescrves, dhe Germans seguld do nothing ta stop the sickle becoming a flood. _The US VIII Gorps joined che aerack eaprurinng Courances con 28 July. On 30 fuibs Aveanches fell and the Allies were Finally our of Normandy. In less chan a week, VEU! Comps had advanced further shan it had in the previous rwo months of hhaed figheing. With FUSAG no longer needed and the US Anmy about ro Fgh in oo diferent diections at once, 3 Augustsaw Gencral Parton. appointed to command a new US Thied Army with VAM Corps and the new XV and XX Garps containing the bulk of the US armoured divisions. VU Corps swept inte Brivany isolating che ports of Si, Malo, Brest, Lorient and Ph ‘Sui Nazaire by 7 August, _ OPERATION BLUECOAT “The British fad noc heen idle ether. By 30 July, the three armoured divisions of che British Second Army had been swansferred west adjacent so the American sectos. There they auacked alongside US V Comps towards Vire and Ment incon in Operation Bluecoae. 1 SS-Panzerkorps swung west to block this move, bus XXX Comps took Mone Pinson on . 5) 6 August, the same day Vite was taken by the US XIX Corps, © the German lefe flank had completely crumbled. The US Third Army had reached Le Mans and Nantes decp behind thei flank on 8 August. Only desperate measures could stop “the Allies south of che Seine. MORTAIN COUNTERATTACK © Hiller, sliemed ar the breakthrough, ordered all of the © German armoured divisions out of she line to mass for a supplies in Nesmandy. Insufficient infantry feliewe dle armoured units, and constant Allied armoured divisions out ofthe line, The troops that cou mustered amounted t lite more chan strong batslio tlegroups from six differen divisions, amounting to ma han 185 tanks in cova, les than one fell-atrengeh August, hitsing the US 30° Infantry Division hard the town of Mortain, With daybreak, the Geranan assault, s America infantry staunchly 10 key positions. Only limited peneteation was made very heavy losses for the attackers. Despite advice: his generals urging a withdrawal to the Seine River, ordered the army hold thelz ground, i OPERATIONS TOTALIZE & TRACTABLE ‘This played straight into the Allies hands. While t Third Army encircled the Germans From the souch, cheie Army and the British Second Army pushed them e “This left che Hust Canadian Army ro close che neck pocks rat had forme ‘The Fire Canadian Army lamched Opention et aimed Palaige oi 8 Aupuse. Ununually they ae dense clmnsof ranks in the dar of night, eal objective on L1 August. On 12 August, the US XV. reached Argentan south of Falaise. ‘The Canadian resumed on 14 Auguse with Operation Tractable, brea through te Fatale on 17 August. The concentrated Germ forces wore now squeezed into = pocket, with the Fala the only way ous. THE FALAISE Pocket 1 Anjust, Hier authorised retest Rom the poke, BE war too late. The Canadians moved s0 lose the gape ceeding by 20 August, with the * Polih Aumioured Di taking 4 cecal role in the bixce fighting. By 22 A resistance within the pocker had ceased THE SEINE AND PARIS ‘While the Falaise Gap was being closed, the US XV had handed Argentan over to the US V Corps and f east Its 79° "Cross of Lorraine Division wa the first ae the Seine on 19 August. On 25 August, D+80, the 24 Armouced Division hadithe honour of liberating Paris. B then all for Allied armies had closed up on the Seine ten days ahead of the schedule set by General Montgom original plan for Operation Overlord OF the approximately one million men who faust Germany (by no. means all of them German) d Normandy campaign, nearly. 240,000 were cast a Further 200,000 prisoners or missing, ‘Ihe cost h ‘high, but the Normandy Campaign was undoubted Allied victory."BOCAGE e Boeage i a area coveting the southern and western part PNonmandy. Ic is made up of many small inegular fields Prete ty che hedgerows thar givethe areaits name, Bocage iedgerows have thick stone banks, formed when the felds ki cleared in antiquiey, topped by dense hedges of crees Bees VE Ie title cayrcy ere axccllene for ksepine? from straying, they ate almost impassable to vehicles ep't0 troops on foor they present a major obstacle. “The area is rural, 40 most toads are sinall lanes designed for horse-drawn carts, barely wide enough for a motorised wehicle. The main roads between the towns are wider and ‘more modem, bur few and far beoween, Roads are usually banked up on both sides and lined with tes, The Farmers of the area mostly raise catle co make the famous cheeses of the region and grow apples to make into potent Calvados brandy. Crops like corn and wheat are mainly 1e- seticred to the fates open areas around C- sprite area ofa batale fough in the Bacage should be cove age hedgerows. | #er055 by 8-16"/20-40em long, They are usually encirely sur- Frounded by bocage hedgerows with few gates shrough the Drinks. Some folds do not have a gate sc all, ust an opening Be Barely vide enough co pass a wheelbarrov: or cow: Apart from a few wider main roads, most of the roads in che hocage are narrow lanes. Typically they have bocage hedge- rows pressing in fiom horh sides and are not wide enough for anyching bigger chan 2 jeep to pass another vehicle. Often ‘tees fiom the sides of the lane meet overhead. “The farm buildings ate usually made of the seme grey stone as the hedgerow banks. ‘The dle-roofed houses are rather phin with litde in the way of decoration to break their square lines.Xero aa nse Figheing in bocage is essentially the same as fighting anywhere else. However, the restricted fields of fire difficulty of manocuvre require careful tactics to overcome, Lan 4 Hedgerows are she defining fearure of the bocage. They make ‘Osscountry movement a nightmare and give the enemy plenty of caves and concealment. CROSSING BOCAGE The banks of hocage hedgerows are tone walls 6 fees (1.8m) Zr mote rll and up vo twice that thick. The roots of the tees “growing on the banks bind dhera together into an impen- cxrable mass, Bocace hedgerows are Very Diffenlt Going, bu are bpasahle fo Cavalry and seam: wh Remote contol Demelision Casvier. Thi means shat anly tps on foot and Fully racked ‘armoured vebicies an ones thereat al, alchough Fully-eracked ebicles need a Skill est to do so. Overloaded tchictes must reall succersful Skill tests to ois Bacage hedgerows. ln wdiition, the hedgerows are xo evergrosin thet teams met Shirt their movement adjacent 10 a bocuge hedgerow £0 cross i, ‘andl mast stop sheir movement on reaching a bocage bedgerou swith a platoon taking several turns to cress edgeraw as each echelon moves upto the ‘his can result in dijointed moveme hedgerow avd crosies tn sm ‘Teams cannoe end a Step sting on a bocage hedgerow. They ‘nase be on one side or the other ara clearly ether adjacent to phe bedgerow or back from it. 244D455e US TROOPS GATES While gates are much easier to uavel th narrow and overgrown, making negotiating Gases in bocage hedgeroes are Difficult Goines rows, reas must start sheir moventensaajacent am its and musr sp heir movement on reaching a BELLY UP! ‘Tanks seuck on Bocage hedgerows usually f scranded wich their nose poincing.to thesky pointing to the enemy? Any Armoured vebicle Bogged Dewn om a bea sues ts Side armotr rating as in Front armoue bit from she front, The bit sill counts as being ‘armour, just witha lower armous raring SEEING THROUGH BOCAG Bocage hedgerows are very tall and shiek, coral vision. Everything, on the other side is hidden frome Since Bocage hedgerows are railer than any tank, adjacent ta a Bacage hedgerow can see or be seem Bocage hedgerows provide Concealnent far any tea through them, exceps by a seam that is iself adjacena same hedgerons Foen the gates tend 10 be overgrown ard Oh ‘nv the same manner as the bedgeraus 1 10-0 bocage hedgerow can sec anything ome ashe side of the hedgerows even if the enemy are adjacent carne bedgerom farther alg it. A rave adjecent 0 the ow of tuo Irdgeros can sce acres either of them as crass she interioction ino the field diaganall across from A ream adja. Raa NeM Levan crete Sire ate CAPIURE HILLBrim targets for councer-fie, Ties raised positions suc as church sealer ean we over ‘eary bucage hedgerows. As with any high ground. you will teed 0 look fm the miniatures passion 10 determine what is ‘Wpible. Remember a team shat sat least half hidden by terain Tined hedgerows make ie difientr nevaled from aircraft BN only do bocage hedgerows conceal troops from air hey eso hide incoming sireraft from anti-aircraft gons, auillery sarts falling Biouaze hedgerows provide bailletproof cover against shooting Poin the other side, but no protection against artillery fire, Airerifi. 0» fre fiom seams adjacent 1 that hedgerow, Gates rovide no protection a al. The heighe and thickness of bocage hedgerows causes problems for ow slung guinsas their crews must painstakingly break a gap for them co shoot dough. On the other hand; ‘most other weapons can see over the bank or dmb up i fat enough wa shoot. ‘Any team can shoot through a distant bocage hedgerow at « ‘eum adjacent to that hedgerow or shoot through Bocage hedge rows they are adjacent to ARTILLERY Because of the isk of their rounds hitting the tees alongs the bocage when they fre, gunners need 0 give some leeway basween themselves and'a bocage hedgerow when choosing firing positions : Teams fring an Artillery, Bombardinent mist be at leat 4 'll0em back from a bedgere zo fre a bombardment over i. ASSAULTING IN BOCAGE Assaults in bocagecouintey are nocbayoner charges, but rather close-range grenade battles, ‘Ihe impenetrable hedgerow berween you and the enemy makes sure ofthis. ASSAULTING A DEFENDED HEDGEROW the mose common form of assaules in bocage conintry are sseaul against defended hedgerows “The hey 10 this oype of ast is 40 remeimber that teams in contact with a hocage hedgerow are deemed to be in contact swith enemy reams immediately acrus the hedgerow from ther. ‘his sre of fit tends to be messy ar it an be difcule to mass “against the enemy asthe width ofthe hedgerow will mean that seams nat in contact with the enemy will probably. be more than 2'!5em from them arid wnable to fight EUR ew aa adel‘hedgerow into an open feld. ete i is importans to remember thar teams that cannot be = inem do no restrict movement [fan enemy team ti mot adjacent fea hedgeron, i cance prevent tars from moving up t0 that hudgens hove shey can see ie and lasch an ascaele Somevimes when launching an asaultacross1a wide obstacle lke a ibedgeraw, there init enough space 10 fit an acwaulting team: becween the enemy team and the hedgerows In this case, place fhe team somewhere canveniens (such as on she hedgerow) until it lear space advance or falls back across the Bedgerow, As the frst line of troops gnes over the hedgerows the following. mous wil mave up so asta be adjacent, and sbus able so sas the hedgerot, when the time cames for you to continue the caigut by counteratzacking ‘One thing to be aware of is that unless you are adjacent to a hedgerow, you cannot cross it when breaking off This can lave Jove srapped if ot are ave careful TANKS ASSAULTING IN BOCAGE Hlocage i totally unsuited to tank assaults. Not only are tanks likely to be ambushed ar short range, bu they have great dif ficalry in crossing the hedgerows to get atthe enemy: Once Ahey clear a section of hedgerow and cross howeress tanks can. rampage along the enemy side almost at will Tatts felting crass the hedgerow will need to make Skill Test each round ofthe ascauds to noid Bogeing Down as normal for assauteing sacros Very Difficle Going Remenibes, i is aio posible to push into the enemy positions if ‘jos are victorious allowing your troops to force their way across he hedgerow and fight on she enemy side. Onée acriss your tats will no longer need n make Skill Pe tassel PIONEERS ‘The most obviens method of gapping 2 hedgerow is blowing aihole in ic with a large explosive charge. Pioneer tearm may demolish a section of hedgerow creasing 2 Diffculr Going gap 2°IScm ‘wide, Gaps in hedgerows are not subject ro any of she rules for bocage hedgerows and do not provide cisher concealment or bullesproafcovee To create a gap ‘4 Pioneer tear mucs start the turn adjacent to the hedgerow ag nos Pinned Down They do not move in the Movement ep, but ecrent as ming. Tnssead of shooting they rll a Skill Tei io create she gap. Due tn limited supplies of explosions, @ ‘plssoon may only attempt 40 areate one gap per turn, but ah gillisional team on each side of and adjacent to the gapping eamnady abso roll Skill Tess 1 create the gap. Ip any team Secaad, then ihe gap is created, INIoEUNTS narrow lanes often found in bocage country are ‘ust be on a one team fiontage. They present addi problems for vebieles as they ean neither pass nor ti them. A team in a narrow lane is considered t0 be adjacent Aedlgerous on bath sides of the rnd. lane. A vebicle in a narrow lane can only fre hul- mount tweapons at targets on the same roed or adjacent 10 the he bounding the road, their budl to the side without crossing the hedgerow ita sadjacen: field, BULLDOZERS Tank-mounted dozer blades were found to be a quick an effective way of gapping hedgerows, Bulldosers wee the rales on page 215 of the Flames OF Nava rulebook 1 gap bocage hedgerows : DEMOLITION CARRIERS Although the Getmans rarely used them for this purpose, a THe ll. cre elt bee bce cape A Remte-Consollel Demolitina Carrer (xe page 216 af Hi rulebook) detonated adjacent to a Bocage hedgernw that 1 succesful Firepower Test wing is second frepower rasa creates a 2'15cynceide gop that is Diffcule Going = a PAGE 45 fi RLOUSLY INJURED IN AULTED ATR ATTACK +4