China Influence in The Region, and Australia Perpective Towards it

Nope, protectors only by military means. Australia has an interest in a stable,

inclusive, multipolar regional order where small and middle powers have agency and
have our interests and sensitivities protected. In other words, we have an
interest.Inavoiding hegemony in the Indo Pacific and at the moment it looks like
China has ambitions to dominate. To be the hegemon in the region. I think Australia
also has an interest in maintaining a rules based order, original order where
countries adhere to.International law where there is mutual respect and where we
respect the equality of nations big and small.And again, I think those interests
converge with Indonesians and Australia also has interests in protecting its national
values and identity.

And again like Indonesia, Australia is a democracy, very perhaps sometimes

loud and noisy democracy.Put a very proud democracy and very proud of values like
equality, freedom of expression, the rule of law.ETC and those values at home are
very important where national identity, so any threat to those values is also a threat
to our interests. So that helps explain a little bit about Australian Indo Pacific and it's
important to remember that because we have a very.Unusual country, we hav e a
very large territory but a very small population. Australia requires partnerships,
alliances and partnerships to protect its security even more than do some other
countries.OK, my Third Point is to talk about China. China's objective interests. And
by that I mean, let's just look as if we were from another planet. Look at China and
imagine what should this country want. Will need as its national interests.I think firstly
the fact that China has such a large population in such a proud, civilizational and
cultural history.End has, if you like limited resource is these are all reasons why
China has it listed in its national development above all.

I think that if you were asking me this question 1015 twenty years ago.I would
have said China's number one interest is national development and that is a good
thing. It's an interest that is consistent with all of our interests to provide for the
needs and the dignity of its population.And to achieve that, China should have a
stable regional security environment. China needs a stable regional security
environment for its internal development.But moving to my fourth point, what does
China want now?
 I think that is where part of the problem arises, because I do think that there is
a tension between China's objective interests in national development and it's.Its
desires, its strategic ambitions and I think a lot of that relates to the political system.
It relates to the Leninists one party state, the power of the Communist Party and it
applies in particular to the way that Xi Jinping The Chinese leader and his leadership
circle the strategic elite, a choosing to define Chinas national interests, and they're
choosing increasingly to define those interests in terms of the power and the
control.of the Chinese Communist Party and the authoritarian, even totalitarian
political system in China, and that has a very complex and I think negative connexion
with a lot of China's increasingly ambitious.Even sometimes aggressive behaviour in
the Indo Pacific internationally and so The Chinese national objectives now that
we're seeing and that I think have been written about very convincingly in books like
the long game by the American analyst Rush Doshi, recommend that book very
much so be cause.He very convincingly and with a lot of evidence, including Chinese
language evidence demonstrates how China's ambitions have changed over the
past 20 years to become essentially to replace the United States as the dominant
power in the Indo Pacific.And to take risks in relations with other countries to assert
dominance over them countries like India, Japan, Vietnam, the Philippines,
Indonesia, Australia and others.

So I think that there is a very painful and difficult connexion between the
ambition for.Authoritarian political control at home, in China, and assertive, even
aggressive action internationally abroad that that explains why some of China's
international behaviour.Is actually not in China's objective. National interest is not
good for stability. It's not good for development. It's not good for the future
opportunities of the Chinese population. And as economic growth has slowed in
China over the past five years.These nationalist ambitions have become much
stronger and much more difficult to deal with. Now, of course, your country
encounters this in the maritime domain. The South China Sea machinists Australia
encounters this increasingly.In the economic domain, the domain of economic
collision and political interference, and I will come to that a little bit later on. So this
journey over the past 20 years, this evolution, if you like or decline in China's
worldview.We've seen, I guess, several stories. Maybe three stories occur
simultaneously. We've seen the Chinese Communist Party state become more
ambitious, confident, powerful, and somewhat aggressive. We've seen at the same
time the United States.Go through different phases of difficulty, which have, I think,
sometimes encouraged China to be ambitious becausr under President Obama, the
Chinese party state became convinced that America was weak and retreating.Under
Donald Trump, the Chinese party state saw America as being a poor leader of others
in the Indo Pacific, even though some of trumps policies were quite strong and
forceful against China.

And now under President Biden, the Chinese party state is trying to
understand.Is America serious about projecting power in the Indo Pacific or is
America going to continue to lose confidence in itself? That's a big question mark
that we should, but we should talk about another point of the evolution of the past 20
years. I think has been the breakdown.Of win win globalisation? I mean yes, we
have an interconnected economic system. Yes, the Indo Pacific has become more
connected but at the same time we have seen nations increasingly used economics
as tools of leverage infrastructure.For example, loans the belt and road technology.
Economic coercion. All of these tools or levers have been used for national
advantage, which is not the traditional liberal economic understanding of
globalisation. And all of these trends have occured.At the same time, meanwhile,
other countries, middle powers in the Indo Pacific have shown their own ambition,
their own agency, their own determination to protect their interests. That makes for a
very complicated mix, and it explains the contest for the Indo Pacific, but our
countries are now.Involved in.So to my six point, which is mapping Chinas influence
today.

I mentioned four dimensions military Geo economics, including technology

diplomacy and sharp power.Firstly, if you look at the Indo Pacific or the world, indeed
the Indo Pacific is the large central region centre of gravity in the world order. China's
power is not evenly distributed, so I guess that's good news for countries that want to
protect their interests.China cannot exert equal coercive influence against every
other country at the same time. It has to make choices and I think it is fair to say that
China's military modernization is more concentrated in East Asia than it is
in.Southeast Asia or the Indian Ocean or the Pacific nonetheless.You know, we all
know that China's military has modernised rapidly over the past 20 years. That had
increasingly involved power projection capabilities. Very strong maritime forces, in
particular strong missile capabilities. Strong cyber capabilities.And the objectives of
what we need to understand because I think on the one hand China is divide.
Designing a force that can confront the United States in the Western Pacific. But the
further South and southwest and southeast Chinese forces go relatively.Baby come.I
guess not as powerful against a great power.

So for example in the Indian Ocean, China will have a Navy that may be quite
useful for coercing small countries, but will not on its own be able to dominate the
Indian Ocean. And that's why.It makes sense for middle powers to strengthen their
own capabilities, to provide balance, either independently or in support of the U. S
Some alliance system. Secondly, Anan I should note that.China's military
modernization. While on the one hand, it is designed for warfighting, it is designed
for deterrence and coercion. For example, in a Taiwan scenario.

At the same time, it's a military that the Chinese leadership would prefer not to
use.They've been very careful not to engage in major combat operations for many,
many years because there is some degree of risk and uncertainty about how
effectively they will actually perform. The Chinese Government has raised the
expectations of the Chinese people that they have the best military in the world.And
that they can protect China's interest anywhere. But the reality is they don't know
and they would much prefer to win without fighting. And so that's the that is the place
of risk management and risk manipulation that the United States and other countries
need to work with.And we've seen already in Japan, for example, where japon
Japanese military and Coast Guard have resisted China's naval incursions we've
seen in India on the border where the Chinese army has resisted Chinas incursions
that when other countries take a stand, sometimes China.

Recalculates it does not necessarily proceed with with aggression the Geo
economic and technology component of the China's influence in some ways is
actually more important than the military component and from an Australian
perspective, it's the most important lever at the moment that is China using.The
scale of its economy, the scale of its infrastructure, its lending to others to achieve
influence and on the one hand I can understand the logic of the belt and road. I can
understand why many countries have taken advantage of the Belt and Road.For
their own developmental needs, their own infrastructure needs. But the challenge
here is to ensure that China cannot use those projects for leverage. For example, the
threat to withdraw support or to withdraw funding if a country is
politically.Uncooperative with China, the technology dimension of the belt and road is
really important. Many of us focus on the infrastructure, reports the railways and so
forth. Electricity, but in fact.It's the digital connectivity that digital Silk Road undersea
cables, telecommunications networks, digital standard setting that is just as
important, and that in fact country.

Other countries have the opportunity to balance Chinese power in, and one
interesting case study at the moment.Is the decision by the Australian company
Telstra to purchase Digicell, the telecommunications provider in Papua New Guinea
and the South Pacific?With support from the Australian Government and one effect
of that of course will be to prevent dominance by China or the telecommunications
system in the Pacific. So that's very important. Example of Geo, economic
competition and a demonstration that sometimes China does not get what it wants. If
middle powers are willing to.Intervene.Diplomacy is the third pillar of China's
influence that I'd like to mention.You know, and we know that I know has become
much better at diplomacy over the past 25 years.

I remember in the 1990s being involved in ASEAN Regional Forum

engagements with China, where many countries including Australia. We were
encouraging China to become more active to step out.Under the diplomatic stage,
we want you in the regional community, and I think we still ideally would want China
in our regional community. But some of us were a little naive or surprised at how
rapidly and effectively China invested in its diplomatic.Infrastructure invested in its
ability to use regional institutions to China's advantage, including to use regional
institutions to block agreements to block good initiatives that could be used to
constrain Chinese power. So, for example, Azean colleagues know better than me
how?

Chinese diplomacy for many years prevented progress on the negotiation of a

South China Sea code of conduct until China had preceded with the island building
in the South China Sea. And now of course, a code of conduct could be in China's
favour.If we're not careful, so China has become very effective with diplomatic
institution building, bilateral diplomacy, multilateral diplomacy, putting its people into
high level positions in international organisations such as the World Health
Organisation. This does not mean that.Not gonna can dominate all of the regional
institutions or there not to virtually institutions, but it does mean that countries like
ours, Australia, Indonesia and others we have to look at multilateral diplomacy now.
Without naivet E we have to look at multilateral diplomacy.As a place where nations
compete and we're joining together, we may be able to limit China's influence and
ensure that multilateral organisations work fairly and in the interests of many not just
of one power.And last of all, the fourth pillar.Some of Chinas influence sharp power
that is a creative.Term that was invented a few years ago to describe foreign
interference and influenced operations, particularly inside democracies.And China
does have a very wellfunded and effective sharp power apparatus regionally and
globally. It's the combination of traditional intelligence, the Chinese intelligence
community. As many of us know, has become much more.Effective and resource
incapable over the past 10 to 15 years. It's to be taken very, very seriously indeed.
But it's a combination of that traditional intelligence in a Chinese with Chinese
characteristics, whether it's human intelligence, signals, intelligence, or combination
of both.With a grey form of interference, intelligence gathering, potential sabotage,
and that is essentially the use of agents of influence, including in diaspora
communities in organisations that created and supported by the United Front Work
Department and as we all know, the United front is a an organ of the Chinese state.

Affectively, a partner institution of the Communist Party that has a history

going back to the 1930s, and many of us were naive to think.It had disappeared or
gone away. It's becoming the past five years are much more overt tool of Chinese
influence. Now on the one hand we could say sharp power isn't such a bad thing. If
China is using non military non lethal. Ways of exerting influence? Is that OK? And in
a country like Australia where we're very proud of the multicultural fabric of our
society, we have many Australians of Chinese origin. We cherish them and respect
them and value them as fellow citizens. Eat risky for government to say to warn.That
within those communities there are agents of influence, but.These are the
circumstances that the Chinese Communist Party has exploited over the years, and
so the challenge for us now is how do we build resistance and resilience in our
democracies without betraying our democratic values in order to neutralise or limit
that use.Of sharp power, and that's where the Australian experience, so I think is
really important and interesting. If you study and I'll move to that now. Australia's
response, my final point.
 Australia's response to Chinese influence in the Indo Pacific in recent
years.Books are being written about this now and the books are very different. Some
books.Talk about how, how appropriate and necessary Australia's response to
Chinese power has been. Other books say that it's the problem is exaggerated that
Australia is being paranoid. Maybe the truth is somewhere in between.Although I
think on balance that Australia has done the right thing to protect its institutions and
its interests.About five years ago, the so called reality cheque began in Australia,
China relations as journalists, in particular as a Free Press began to uncover stories,
well researched, stories about influence and interference operations.Inside
Australian political parties.But the United Front and its proxies and agents also
activities to interfere with the freedoms of students and academics in Australian
universities and to interfere with community groups in the Chinese diaspora
community in Australia. The objective.

I would argue was about extending the Communist parties control into the
diaspora community and neutralising Australia's ability to be an independent power
in the Indo Pacific or Australia's ability to be an American ally at effective American
ally.In the end I Pacific. This was a web of influence that had evolved over maybe
10-15 years.And the reality cheque involved intelligence investigations, media
revelations, articles by journalists. It involves laws, legislation to criminalise fine
interference activities and legislation to oblige.Transparency by politicians by
businesses by prominent individuals, transparency in their relationships with foreign
governments.I think that's a good thing.The rules are complicated and they are
currently being reviewed. Maybe they are too complicated, but the principle was the
right one and that is some acts of foreign influence are OK.

All diplomats exert influence, it's their job, but some acts go into a covert
collusive.Or corrupt space and become interference and those should be
criminalised. Another important element of Australia's push back, a reality cheque
has been limiting the way in which China can use technology in our critical
infrastructure.Against their interests, and that is to ensure, for example, that critical
infrastructure like telecommunications or electricity in particular and the Internet of
Things, cannot be dominated by companies that can be.Pressured by the Chinese
government into obeying the instructions of the Chinese state, and that's why
Australia took the decision to stop by away from purchasing our 5G network three
years ago.China does not like this and I think that although Australia, China relations
should be about mutual respect, that relationship has become a very difficult
relationship in recent years. Last year, Australia took a stand.To call for an
international inquiry into the origins of Code 19, we all want to know what are the
origins of COVID-19.

But Australia was the first country, perhaps bravely to cool for that inquiry.
Perhaps our diplomacy was a little bit clumsy.In the way we did that, but it was the
right thing to do, and for the Chinese Communist Party, that was the final.Threshold
that was the last straw that was the reason why China began to openly use
economic coercion against us. That lever influence we've spoken about. I'm going to
finish in just a moment. I want to say two more things. Three more things. One is that
the economic China's economic coercion campaign against Australia?

Is a very important experiment to study because I think it is failing

and.Surprisingly, the tariffs and the other economic measures that China has taken
against our agriculture and our coal and wine and various industries have mostly
backfired on China. Yes, it is inflicted some economic pain.In Australia, but our
farmers in particular, finding new markets that are growing new crops, they're
diversifying very rapidly, and their trust in China is broken. Our coal, which China
prevented from being imported, sat.In ships at sea for a year 18 months, some of
that Cole is now being offloaded into China. Be cause of China's energy shortages.
So that makes China look a little bit foolish and.

Our government now is thinking very hard about national economic resilience
in ways that we did not think two years ago. Three years ago, five years ago. So I
think China has done itself some harm with this campaign of economic coercion and
many other countries now are watching the Australian experience. And studying it
carefully. But the other point that I was going to mention, the final point is about
Australia's military response now. Australia is not a major military power, but there's
there is no question in my mind that China is the number one reason why the
Australian military is modernising quite substantially, and in particular that we are
investing. In the deterrence and warfighting capabilities advanced capabilities quite
rapidly. One interesting example of that, of course, is the acquisition of missile
capabilities, conventional missile capabilities. Another example, not so rapid. Is of
course the nuclear powered submarine announcement August now that will take
many, many years before we have capability and it is controversial in many
countries, including in this country, but it makes sense on balance if we think that
China.

Could become a coercive military threat to Australia in the future. And if we

think that China could become a coercive military threat to our friends and partners
in the region. At the same time, Australia is particularly interested in ensuring that no
country he can dominate what we call our maritime approaches. In other words, the
waters to the north, the northwest, the northeast of Australia The South Pacific, for
example, having studied the example of the Second World War, we want to ensure
that no country can lodge its forces can base its military forces close to Australian
territory, and that's one reason why Australia has become very focused on the South
Pacific in recent years I will stop there. I've spoken for a long time and I love to have
now some healthy discussion. Thank you. Thank you very much Professor Medical
for such an insightful lecture today an I think we now have about 3030 minutes
before Professor method has to go because he has another agenda. So I'd like to
straight to the Q&A session of discussion session. I think I've got some students
would like to ask question maybe i would like to start with.

To understand, i mean i think Australia wants Indonesia to have a good

reputation in all of its provinces.And as you know, we have a history.Around East
Timor in the late 1990s, where there was very strong Australian popular pressure for
the Australian government's role in the United Nations process in the United Nations
Mission there, but.It's not the same as the situation in West Papua from an
Australian public or political or policy POV, so I think that this situation could be. It
could be an irritant in the bilateral relationship, but it's not going to be a
fundamental.Problem and I think we can. We can be realistic about that of course.It's
it's not surprising that you don't hear criticism from China on issues related to human
rights or sovereignty.But that's not the point. I think if China, if China in the future has
an interest in coercing Indonesia or any other country in South Southeast Asia, then
China will take advantage of any situation. So I do think.I I do think we have to be
careful there.

I would also note that the criticism of China by activists in Australia is much
much louder than the criticism of Indonesia and interesting. On the other two
questions, Orcus, the Australia United States UK Technology Partnership.It is partly
about nuclear powered submarines for Australia. That will be a long and difficult
ambition that will take many many years. And as you know we are currently having
difficulties in the relationship with France as a consequence of that, but our
government is.Absolutely serious about acquiring responsibly nuclear powered
submarines. But August is much bigger than that. August is about combining the
really the technology, the defence and security technology infrastructure of these
three powers, Australia.United States in the United Kingdom.4.

A few reasons. One reason is to make Australia Amor capable country. So if

Australia becomes more capable in critical technologies in cyber security and
quantum in Undercity technologies in space, etc, then I think Australia can be a
more.Capable an incredible partner for other countries in the region. We can be
more useful friend for Indonesia or for azean as we become more powerful and
these other technologies. So that's one benefit.Of August to Southeast Asia. Another
benefit is that the technology sharing under orders, not the submarines, but
everything else.Cyber quantum space etc. All of that other technology sharing. Yes,
initially it will be the three orcas countries, but at the moment I think it is quite
possible that August could be the core of a larger cooperative arrangement. In other
words, we could find ourselves cooperating with.Other countries, in addition to
walkers on those issues, quad countries, but also potential partners elsewhere in
Asia or the world.And that could be good for Southeast Asian partners to finally. But
but but I should say that Australia does need to do better with its diplomacy on
explaining all of this in Southeast Asia, and the fact that our Foreign Minister, I think
is visiting the region this week or next week is good thing.Finally, on Xi Jinping
leader for life perhaps. How does that relate to Chinese policy? I think you
mentioned economic policy, debt policy, infrastructure, Belton road, but I would look
at Chinese policy more generally, I think.

The.Possibility the prospect of Xi Jinping, becoming leader for life effectively

is a very dangerous thing. It's it, could. It could well happen next year. We will know
with the People's Congress next year and.If.If China finds a way to allow him a third
term, or indeed to allow him affectively leader for life status, then that is going to be
very bad. For China's interest in the long run because one day there will be a
transition. He will die or fall from power wonder.Meaning.And if there is no
succession plan, then there could be instability in China.I don't know.I think all but on
the other hand, if somehow the party begins to correct its position next year and
become a little bit more collective in its leadership and move away from the
unquestioning support of C Jinping's.Autocratic ambitions, then we may also see
some course correction in Chinese policy and all of these are good reasons for our
countries to push back against Chinese power. To signal that we have influence, we
have interests too.I'll stop there, thank you.OK, thank you, professor myself. We still
have some time. I would like to invite Director 13 or bank card deck to convey his
questions.I. Yes.no.Thank you for him. Opportunity.It is.Thank you for your
comprehensive explanation. Mystery Mecca, an I'm very interested to.i asked.

Thank You