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Approach Guardrail Transition for Concrete Safety Shape Barriers

Article  in  Transportation Research Record Journal of the Transportation Research Board · January 1998
DOI: 10.3141/1647-14

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TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH RECORD 1647 Paper No. 98-0824 111

Approach Guardrail Transition for


Concrete Safety Shape Barriers
RONALD K. FALLER, JOHN D. REID, AND JOHN R. ROHDE

An approach guardrail transition for use with concrete safety shape bar- designs supported by wood posts and attached to a vertical concrete
riers was developed and crash-tested. The transition was constructed with parapet (3,4). This design was unique because the first post adjacent
two nested thrie-beam rails, measuring 2.66 mm thick, and supported by to the end of the bridge was left out to represent a common field
nine W150 × 13.5 steel posts. Post spacings consisted of one at 292 mm,
problem in which a concrete footing prevents installing the post.
five at 476 mm, and three at 952 mm. Structural tube spacer blockouts
were used in the transition system. The system successfully met the Test In a second study, several W-beam and thrie-beam approach guard-
Level 3 requirements specified in NCHRP Report 350: Recommended rail transition designs, supported by wood and steel posts, were tested
Procedures for the Safety Performance Evaluation of Highway Features. according to the NCHRP Report 230 criteria (5,6). The transition
designs were attached to both straight and tapered concrete wing walls.
This research was conducted at the Southwest Research Institute
In 1996, the state highway departments of Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota,
(SwRI) and was sponsored by the Federal Highway Administration.
Missouri, Nebraska, South Dakota, and Wisconsin requested that
Subsequently, the results of these two efforts were included in
the Midwest Roadside Safety Facility (MwRSF) develop an approach
FHWA’s technical advisory on guardrail transitions (7), as well as
guardrail transition to meet the Test Level 3 (TL-3) criteria provided
published in AASHTO’s Roadside Design Guide (8,9). Later, the
in NCHRP Report 350: Recommended Procedures for the Safety
results of other research studies on approach guardrail transitions
Performance Evaluation of Highway Features (1). The two primary
were published by FHWA in a second technical advisory on guardrail
design guidelines were that the transition be constructed with
transitions (10).
W150 × 13.5 steel posts and that it be usable for concrete safety
shape barriers.
Design considerations for the transition included safety, economy,
NCHRP Report 350 Test Results
structural integrity, constructability, and maintenance. The tasks to
be performed included reviewing the existing transition designs for
Since the inception of the NCHRP Report 350 guidelines, only three
the member states of the Pooled Fund Program, selecting a specific
research studies, all in 1994, have been performed to develop, test,
barrier shape, redesigning and/or modifying the selected barrier’s
and evaluate thrie-beam approach guardrail transitions attached to
end section (i.e., steel reinforcement and geometry), analyzing and
concrete safety shape parapets according to the TL-3 criteria.
designing the approach guardrail transition using steel posts, and
Researchers at MwRSF, in cooperation with the Midwest States
crash-testing the new design. The final design and full-scale testing,
Regional Pooled Fund Program, successfully developed and tested an
which successfully met all NCHRP Report 350 requirements, are
approach guardrail transition for use with the single-slope concrete
described in this paper.
median barrier (11,12). The transition was constructed with 3.43-mm-
thick thrie-beam rails and was supported by nine W150 × 13.5 steel
LITERATURE REVIEW posts. Post spacings consisted of one at 292 mm, five at 476 mm, and
three at 952 mm. Specially designed steel structural tube blockouts
NCHRP Report 230 Test Results were used to connect the thrie-beam rail to the steel posts.
An approach guardrail transition for use with the New Jersey safety
Over the years, several research studies have been conducted shape barrier was tested according to TL-3 of NCHRP Report 350 at
to develop, test, and evaluate the safety performance of approach SwRI (13). During the impact, the pickup truck was contained; but
guardrail transition designs. Many of these transition designs suc- after redirection, the vehicle rolled onto its side. Thus, the test failed
cessfully passed the safety standards published in NCHRP Report NCHRP Report 350 requirements. The transition was constructed
230: Recommended Procedures for the Safety Performance Evalu- with two 2.66-mm-thick nested thrie-beam rails and was supported by
ation of Highway Appurtenances that were based on impacts with eight 152-mm by 203-mm timber posts. Post spacings consisted of
passenger cars (2). one at 292 mm, three at 476 mm, and four at 952 mm. In 1993,
Two of these research studies are noted for having a significant MwRSF crash-tested a transition that attached to a New Jersey safety
impact on transition designs used throughout the United States after shape concrete end section similar to that used by SwRI according to
1988. First, researchers at the University of Nebraska, in coopera- the NCHRP Report 230 safety standards. This NCHRP Report 230
tion with the Nebraska Department of Roads, performed several crash test was performed unsuccessfully with a 2041-kg sedan
crash tests on thrie-beam and W-beam approach guardrail transition impacting a thrie-beam approach guardrail transition, revealing a
potential for wheel snagging on the concrete end section (14).
Midwest Roadside Safety Facility, Center for Infrastructure Research, Civil Researchers at the Texas Transportation Institute successfully
Engineering Department, University of Nebraska–Lincoln, 1901 Y Street, designed and tested an approach guardrail transition for use with a
Building C, Lincoln, NE 68588-0601. concrete safety shape barrier according to TL-3 of NCHRP Report
112 Paper No. 98-0824 TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH RECORD 1647

350 (15). The transition was constructed with a 3.43-mm-thick thrie- ment, and material specifications. Many of these designs involve
beam rail and two nested 3.43-mm-thick W-beam to thrie-beam tran- warping the safety shape into a vertical wall before the approach
sition sections and was supported by six 178-mm-diameter timber railing is attached. Other designs incorporate large flared sections
posts. Post spacings consisted of four at 476 mm, one at 952 mm, and that move the end of the concrete section away from the face of the
one at 1905 mm. The cylindrical wood posts made this transition approach railing. All of these designs require special formwork to
unacceptable for the Pooled Fund Program states. construct, greatly increasing the cost of these transition designs. Our
design objective was to develop a standardized concrete end section
accommodating the member states’ existing standard bridge plans
TEST REQUIREMENTS and eliminating the need for special forming, thus substantially
reducing construction costs.
Longitudinal barriers, such as approach guardrail transitions, must For the standardized design shown in Figures 1 and 2, the end sec-
satisfy the requirements provided in NCHRP Report 350 to be tions of the New Jersey safety shape barrier were modified to pre-
accepted for use on new construction projects or as a replacement for vent vehicle snagging and to increase its structural capacity in the
existing transition designs not meeting current safety standards. critical regions. To minimize the potential for wheel snagging on the
According to Test Level 3 of NCHRP Report 350, approach guardrail concrete end section, Styrofoam inserts were utilized in standard
transitions must be subjected to two full-scale vehicle crash tests: safety shape barrier forms to produce a simple termination geome-
(a) a 2000-kg pickup truck impacting at a speed of 100 km/h and at try without costly formwork. Because of high lateral forces imparted
an angle of 25 degrees and (b) an 820-kg small car impacting at a to the concrete end section, the longitudinal and vertical reinforce-
speed of 100 km/h and at an angle of 20 degrees. However, thrie- ment at the end was modified to increase the structural capacity. An
beam barriers struck by small cars have been shown to meet safety ultimate strength analysis or yield line analysis was used to deter-
performance standards and to be essentially rigid (16–18), with no mine the required steel reinforcement for the last 4572 mm of con-
significant potential for occupant risk problems arising from wheel crete barrier (21,22). The size and spacing of the longitudinal and
snagging on the posts or on the concrete parapet’s end section. There- vertical reinforcement in the last 1675 mm of the New Jersey safety
fore, the 820-kg small car crash test was deemed unnecessary for this shape is shown in Figures 1 and 2.
project. The test fixture was a 4572-mm-long concrete section anchored to
an existing concrete foundation. ASTM A615M (Grade 60) steel
reinforcement was used throughout the concrete barrier. All concrete
SAFETY SHAPE BARRIER (30 percent limestone and 70 percent sand-gravel mix) had minimum
28-day concrete compressive strengths of 41.37 MPa.
Background

A review of the Pooled Fund Program states’ transition designs for APPROACH GUARDRAIL TRANSITION
use with safety shape bridge rails indicated that many different (DESIGN NO. 1)
design details are incorporated by the states. Since all of the existing
designs would be required to be redesigned and retested to NCHRP The total length of the installation was 25 340 mm. The test installa-
Report 350 standards, there was an opportunity to greatly reduce total
tion, as shown in Figures 3 and 4, consisted of seven major structural
development costs and possibly cut construction costs by developing
components: (a) a 4572-mm-long New Jersey safety shape end sec-
a single, concrete safety shape end section and transition that all
tion, (b) a 4572-mm-long by 102-mm-high by 178-mm-wide tri-
member states could adopt.
angular curb, (c) an 813-mm-long steel thrie beam to New Jersey
safety shape connector plate (NJ connector plate), (d ) a thrie-beam ter-
minal connector, (e) two nested 3810-mm-long thrie-beam rail sec-
New Jersey Safety Shape
tions (2.66 mm), ( f) a 1905-mm-long W-beam to thrie-beam transition
section (2.66 mm), and (g) a 15 240-mm-long W-beam rail section
It was determined that all seven member states were currently using
New Jersey safety shape bridge railings and barriers, and that only (2.66 mm) attached to a simulated anchorage device.
one state was also using the F-shape barrier configuration. This fact, A painted NJ connector plate connected the thrie-beam rail to
coupled with our belief that the new design could be modified for the New Jersey safety shape end section, as shown in Figures 3–5.
use with the F-shape with only minor modifications to the concrete The NJ connector plate was fabricated with 6.35-mm-thick ASTM
end section and guardrail attachment hardware, led to the selection A36 steel. External dimensions were 813 mm long by 534 mm
of the New Jersey safety shape for this design. Since the F-shape deep. A long, sloped section was placed on the end of the connec-
offers a slight improvement in safety performance from the New tor plate to eliminate any potential for vehicle snagging resulting
Jersey safety shape with its slight reduction in vehicle roll angles, from a reverse hit impact. Five 22-mm-diameter by 305-mm-long
vehicular climb heights, and increased vehicle stability (19,20), the ASTM A325 bolts connected the NJ connector plate to the concrete
researchers believe that its use with the new transition design would safety shape.
not require additional testing. The system was constructed with 17 guardrail posts, as shown in
Figure 3. Post Nos. 1 through 15 consisted of galvanized, ASTM
A36 steel W150 × 13.5 sections measuring 1829 mm long. Post Nos.
End Section Design 16 and 17 were timber posts measuring 140 mm wide by 190 mm
deep by 1080 mm long and were placed in steel foundation tubes.
The initial investigation of the member states’ concrete end section The timber posts and foundation tubes were part of an anchorage
designs showed significant differences in geometries, reinforce- system used to develop the required tensile capacity of the guardrail.
Faller et al. Paper No. 98-0824 113

FIGURE 1 Design details for New Jersey concrete safety shape end section, Design No. 1.

Lap-splice connections between the rail sections were configured to COMPUTER SIMULATION
reduce vehicle snagging at the splice during the crash tests.
The soil embedment depths for Post Nos. 1–7, 8, and 9–15 were Computer simulation modeling, with BARRIER VII (23), was per-
1092 mm, 1080 mm, and 1132 mm, respectively. For Post Nos. 1–7, formed to analyze and predict the dynamic performance of various
a structural tube spacer blockout, developed previously at MwRSF approach guardrail transition alternatives attached to the New Jersey
(2,3), was chosen for use with thrie-beam guardrail, as shown in Fig- safety shape concrete end section before full-scale vehicle crash test-
ures 3 and 4. The tube spacer was selected since it eliminates prob- ing. The simulations were conducted modeling a 2000-kg pickup
lems associated with the torsional collapse commonly observed to truck impacting at a speed of 100 km/h and at an angle of 25 degrees.
occur with open W-shape blockouts. At Post No. 8, W150 × 13.5 by Computer simulation was also used to determine the critical impact
435-mm-long spacer blockouts were used. For Post Nos. 9–15, point (CIP) for the approach guardrail transition. The CIP was based
W150 × 13.5 by 337-mm-long spacer blockouts were used and with on the impact condition that produced the greatest potential for wheel-
steel W-beam backup plates at all post locations except at rail assembly snagging on the lower blunt-end face on the upstream end
splices. The steel posts were placed in a compacted coarse, crushed- of the New Jersey concrete safety shape, occurring in combination
limestone material that met Grading B of AASHTO M147-65 with the maximum lateral dynamic rail deflection. The researchers
(1990) as found in NCHRP Report 350. However, the soil-aggregate believe that wheel snag distances in excess of 51 mm for the steel
material was relatively poorly graded within specification limits, rim results in an increased potential for snagging and contact on the
consisting of the maximum amount of larger-size aggregates and the blunt-end face of the concrete barrier. As previously discussed, the
minimum amount of medium-size aggregates and fines in an attempt size of the blunt-end face was reduced by incorporating a Styrofoam
to test in a worst-case scenario. insert in the end of the standard safety shape form. The results of the
Curbs are often used to provide roadway drainage near the ends computer simulations indicated that the greatest potential for wheel
of a bridge in the transition region. Therefore, a triangular-shape snagging on the upstream end of the concrete end section would occur
concrete curb, as shown in Figures 3 and 5, was constructed below with an impact between Post Nos. 5 and 6 or 2435 mm upstream from
the thrie-beam rail to determine if the curb would adversely affect the end of the concrete barrier. For the impact between Post Nos. 5
the safety performance of the new transition design. and 6, wheel snag distances for the outer tire and inner steel rim
114 Paper No. 98-0824 TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH RECORD 1647

FIGURE 2 Reinforcement details, Design No. 1.

were calculated to be approximately 99 mm and 47 mm, respectively. pitched upward moderately, allowing the left-rear corner of the
For this impact location, the predicted maximum lateral dynamic rail bumper to mount the top of the thrie beam and contact the spacer
deflection was 191 mm, as measured to the center height of the rail. blocks. At 0.422 s after impact, the vehicle exited the barrier at an
angle of 16.2 degrees and a speed of 64.7 km/h. Subsequently, the
left-front wheel assembly contacted the ground with significant
CRASH TEST NO. 1 (TEST ITNJ-1) vehicular motions, including counterclockwise vehicle roll, down-
ward pitching, and clockwise yawing. These angular motions
The 1994-kg pickup truck impacted the approach guardrail transition caused the pickup truck to roll over two and a half times.
(Design No. 1) at a speed of 99.9 km/h and an angle of 25 degrees. Figure 7 shows the extensive vehicle damage and moderate barrier
A summary of the test results and the sequential photographs are damage. Barrier damage consisted mostly of deformed thrie beam,
shown in Figure 6. wheel contact on the lower upstream face of the concrete end section,
Initial impact occurred at the midspan between Post Nos. 5 and 6 and cracking in the concrete end section. The vehicle came to rest
or 2435 mm upstream from the end of the concrete barrier. For the 38.71 m downstream and 15.85 m away from the traffic-side face of
impact sequence, large lateral dynamic and permanent set barrier the barrier, as measured from impact.
deflections occurred, as shown in Figures 6 and 7, as evidenced by The analysis of the test results for Test ITNJ-1 showed that the bar-
the sharp crease formed in the thrie-beam rail at the end of the con- rier satisfactorily contained the vehicle but inadequately redirected the
crete barrier. During vehicle redirection, the pickup truck’s left- vehicle since the vehicle did not remain upright after collision with
front quarter panel extended over the thrie beam, contacting the top the barrier. After collision, the vehicle’s trajectory intruded into adja-
corner of the spacer blocks, as well as the top edge of the concrete cent traffic lanes. In addition, the vehicle’s exit angle was greater than
end section. This contact caused moderate tearing of the sheet metal 60 percent of the impact angle. Therefore, Test ITNJ-1 conducted on
and downward forces applied to the left-front corner of the vehicle. Design No. 1 was determined to be unacceptable according to the
During vehicle tail slap with the barrier, the rear end of the vehicle NCHRP Report 350 criteria.
FIGURE 3 Installation layout and design details, Design No. 1.
116 Paper No. 98-0824 TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH RECORD 1647

(a) (c)

(b) (d)

FIGURE 4 Approach guardrail transition to concrete safety shape end section, Design No. 1.

DISCUSSION AND MODIFICATIONS After this investigation, we believed that the safety performance
(DESIGN NO. 2) of the approach guardrail transition (Design No. 1) could be signif-
icantly improved with a reduction in dynamic and permanent set
Following the unsuccessful crash test of Design No. 1, it was neces- barrier deflections. Therefore, several alternatives were investigated
sary to determine the cause of the poor barrier performance and sub- for stiffening the approach guardrail system, such as lengthening
sequent vehicle rollover so that design modifications could be made the steel posts in the critical region, incorporating a rub rail below
to the system. A careful examination of the damaged barrier system the thrie beam, adding a stiffened beam on the backside of the steel
and an analysis of the test results revealed that the dynamic and per- posts and concrete end section, attaching soil paddles of various
manent set barrier deflections were greater than those predicted. It is sizes to the steel posts, and choosing a stiffer crushed-limestone
believed that these excessive barrier deflections occurred due to post- backfill.
soil forces significantly lower than expected. These lower post-soil Following a limited series of dynamic component tests using a
forces may be attributed to the use of a relatively poorly graded, bogie vehicle impacting posts placed in various NCHRP Report 350
coarse crushed-limestone material meeting NCHRP Report 350 soils and an analytical investigation using BARRIER VII, two major
specifications. modifications were made to the approach guardrail transition sys-
As a result of the extensive vehicle penetration into the barrier tem. First, the embedment depth of Post Nos. 1–7 were increased by
system, the pickup truck was redirected out of the barrier system at 152 mm, resulting in a total embedment depth of 1245 mm. Second,
a higher than normal exit angle, with significant roll, pitch, and yaw the relatively poorly graded aggregate material was replaced with a
angular motions, resulting in vehicle rollover. In addition, the well-graded crushed-limestone material. In addition, a 25-mm cham-
increased vehicle penetration and minor pocketing led to higher than fer was placed on the front vertical edge of the concrete safety
expected impact forces being applied to the concrete end section, shape’s upstream end. These modifications, incorporated in Design
resulting in cracking of the safety shape barrier. No. 2, are shown in Figure 8.
Faller et al. Paper No. 98-0824 117

FIGURE 5 New Jersey connector plate, Design No. 1.

CRASH TEST NO. 2 (TEST ITNJ-2) Vehicle damage was moderate, as shown in Figure 10. The left-
front wheel assembly was deformed and pushed backward into the
The 1977-kg pickup truck impacted the approach guardrail transition fire wall. Longitudinal deformations, due to vehicle-rail interlock,
(Design No. 2) at a speed of 101.6 km/h and an angle of 25.7 degrees. were observed along the entire left side of the vehicle. Maximum
A summary of the test results and the sequential photographs are occupant compartment deformations to the floorboard, fire wall, or
shown in Figure 9. both in the lateral, longitudinal, and vertical directions were 95 mm,
Initial impact occurred at the midspan Between Post Nos. 5 and 6 83 mm, and 83 mm, respectively.
or 2435 mm upstream from the end of the concrete barrier. For the Barrier damage was also moderate, as shown in Figure 10. Barrier
impact sequence, only moderate lateral dynamic and permanent set damage consisted mostly of deformed thrie beam and wheel contact
barrier deflections were encountered, as shown in Figures 9 and 10. on the lower upstream face of the concrete end section. No cracking
During vehicle redirection, the pickup truck’s left-front quarter panel was observed in the concrete end section. The vehicle came to rest
extended over the thrie beam, contacting the top corner of the spacer 76.8 m downstream and 11.2 m behind the barrier, as measured from
blocks, as well as the top edge of the concrete end section. This con- impact.
tact caused moderate tearing of the sheet metal and downward forces The analysis of the test results for Test ITNJ-2 showed that the
applied to the left-front corner of the vehicle. During vehicle tail slap barrier adequately contained and redirected the vehicle with con-
with the barrier, the rear end of the vehicle pitched upward slightly, trolled lateral displacement of the barrier. Minor deformations to the
however, the left-rear corner of the bumper did not mount the top of occupant compartment were evident but not considered excessive
the thrie beam nor contact the spacer blocks. Subsequently, the vehi- enough to cause serious injuries to the occupants. The vehicle
cle began to roll counterclockwise toward the barrier with the right- remained upright both during and after the collision. Vehicle roll,
side wheels becoming airborne. At 0.329 s after impact, the vehicle pitch, and yaw angular displacements were noted, but they were
exited the barrier at an angle of 6.9 degrees and a speed of 70.8 km/h. deemed acceptable because they did not adversely influence occu-
As the vehicle exited the barrier, the left-front wheel assembly con- pant safety criteria or cause rollover. After collision, the vehicle’s
tacted the ground but with minor counterclockwise vehicle roll, trajectory intruded slightly into adjacent traffic lanes but was deter-
resulting in a smooth and stable vehicle redirection. mined to be acceptable. In addition, the vehicle’s exit angle was less
118 Paper No. 98-0824 TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH RECORD 1647

FIGURE 6 Summary of test results and sequential photographs, Test ITNJ-1 (Design No. 1).

than 60 percent of the impact angle. Therefore, Test ITNJ-2 con- the modified system and was determined to be acceptable according
ducted on Design No. 2 was determined to be acceptable according to the safety performance criteria presented in NCHRP Report 350.
to the NCHRP Report 350 criteria. Thus, an approach guardrail transition for use with the New Jersey
concrete safety shape barrier has been successfully developed and
meets current safety standards.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS It is believed that only minor modifications to the new design will
be required to accommodate the F-shape concrete barrier. Addition-
An approach guardrail transition, consisting of thrie-beam guardrail, ally, it is believed that no further testing will be required since the
steel posts, structural tube spacer blockouts, and a New Jersey con- F-shape is considered to behave slightly better than the New Jersey
nector plate, was developed and full-scale vehicle crash-tested for shape in crash testing (19,20).
use with the New Jersey concrete safety shape barrier. Two full-scale
vehicle crash tests were performed according to TL-3 of NCHRP
Report 350. The first crash test, Test ITNJ-1, failed due to vehicle ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
rollover as a result of lower than expected post-soil forces, which
resulted in excessive barrier deflections causing a higher than normal The authors wish to acknowledge several sources that made this
exit angle occurring simultaneously with significant roll, pitch, and project possible: the Midwest States Regional Pooled Fund Program
yaw angular motions. (funded by the Iowa Department of Transportation, Kansas Depart-
Based on knowledge gained from Test ITNJ-1, the approach ment of Transportation, Minnesota Department of Transportation,
guardrail transition system was redesigned. The primary changes Missouri Department of Transportation, Nebraska Department of
were to use longer posts and a stiffer NCHRP Report 350 crushed- Roads, South Dakota Department of Transportation, and Wisconsin
limestone backfill. A second test, Test ITNJ-2, was performed on Department of Transportation) for sponsoring this project; MwRSF
(a) (c)

(b) (d)

FIGURE 7 Vehicle and barrier damage, Test ITNJ-1 (Design No. 1).

FIGURE 8 Barrier and post modifications, Design No. 2.


FIGURE 9 Summary of test results and sequential photographs, Test ITNJ-2 (Design No. 2).

(a) (b)

FIGURE 10 Vehicle and barrier damage, Test ITNJ-2 (Design No. 2). (continued on next page)
Faller et al. Paper No. 98-0824 121

(c) (d)

FIGURE 10 (Continued )

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