Electrical Power and Energy Systems 116 (2020) 105551

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Electrical Power and Energy Systems

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/ijepes

Novel method for adaptive relay protection in distribution systems with T

electronically-coupled DERs
Luka Strezoski, Izabela Stefani , Dusko Bekut
⁎

Department of Power, Electronic and Telecommunication Engineering, Faculty of Technical Sciences, University of Novi Sad, Novi Sad, Serbia
Schneider Electric DMS, Novi Sad, Serbia

ARTICLE INFO ABSTRACT

Keywords: In this paper, a novel adaptive relay protection coordination method for large-scale distribution systems with
Distribution energy resources electronically-coupled distributed energy resources (DERs) is proposed. Electronically-coupled DERs cannot be
Distribution management system represented with the traditional fault models, nor the traditional relay protection coordination methods can be
Relay protection used for systems with these DERs. Therefore, highly precise models of electronically-coupled DERs for relay
protection purposes are developed. Afterwards, a novel method for adaptive relay protection coordination in
systems with high penetration of these DERs is proposed. The proposed method considers DER disconnection
times, as defined in Fault Ride Through requirements, as well as accurate models for electronically-coupled
DERs, dependable on fault severity. The accuracy of the method is verified on the IEEE 37 distribution system
test example, as well as on one real-life 186-bus feeder. Afterwards, the computation time required for complete
calculation is measured for several large-scale systems, with up to 5320 three-phase busses. Advantages of the
proposed method relative to existing ones are clearly illustrated.

1. Introduction
The aim of this paper is to develop an accurate and easy-to-imple-
ment Adaptive Relay Protection Coordination method for large-scale,
radial or weakly-meshed, distribution systems with high penetration of
electronically-coupled distribution energy resources (DERs). Adaptive
Relay Protection Coordination is one of the most important Distribution
Management System (DMS) power applications, as it is used for co-
ordinating the protective devices in the system and thus, the accuracy
of this application is of essential importance for safe and secure op-
eration of the entire system.
Until last ten years, distribution systems were either passive or they
contained only traditional synchronous/induction distribution gen-
erators (DGs) directly connected to the system. These systems are
termed traditional distribution systems in this paper. Fault models of
synchronous and induction machines are well-established and verified
through power system practice for over half a century [1,2]. They
consist of voltage sources behind (sub-transient, transient, or steady-
state) impedances, and they usually generate fault currents with values
multiple times higher than their rated currents [1,2]. However, in re-
cent years connection of DERs through power electronic devices has
become highly popular, mainly as this allows a much better control of
DERs in both normal and faulted conditions [3–5]. Emerging DERs can
be partially electronically-coupled (Doubly Fed Induction Machines –
DFIMs) or completely electronically-coupled (Inverter Based DERs –
IBDERs). Nonetheless, the responses of DFIMs and IBDERs to system
faults are completely different from traditional synchronous/induction
machines [3–5].
The DFIM’s fault response depends on the severity of the fault and
on the device used for the protection of the power converter [6,7]. In
cases of severe faults, the converter protection short-circuits the rotor
and DFIM’s fault response becomes like the traditional induction ma-
chine’s [6,7]. However, when the fault is not as severe (faults located
electrically distant from the machine), DFIM manages to maintain a
pre-fault control with a magnitude of its rated value [6–8]. On the other
hand, IBDERs are completely electronically-coupled, so their fault re-
sponse is always controlled and limited to predefined values. Hence,
electronically-coupled DERs cannot be represented with the traditional
models in fault calculations. As the coordination of the protective de-
vices directly depends on the fault calculation results, using traditional
fault modeling and calculations for systems with electronically-coupled
DERs may induce malfunction of the protective devices and conse-
quently cause a serious damage to the system elements.
Accurate methods for relay protection coordination for passive

⁎
Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: lukastrezoski@uns.ac.rs (L. Strezoski), izabela.stefani@schneider-electric-dms.com (I. Stefani),
dusko.bekut@schneider-electric-dms.com (D. Bekut).

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijepes.2019.105551
Received 29 January 2019; Received in revised form 1 August 2019; Accepted 12 September 2019
Available online 17 September 2019
0142-0615/ © 2019 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
L. Strezoski, et al.
distribution systems are well-established and successfully used in the
last several decades [9,10]. However, with emergence of DGs based on
synchronous/induction machines directly connected to the grid, these
methods became inapplicable [11–13]. DGs can cause several issues
that did not exist in passive systems, such as islanded operation, and
blinding of the protection devices [14,15]. Therefore, different relay
protection methods for distribution systems with synchronous/induc-
tion machines directly connected to the system were developed in
[11–13] to solve these issues. However, these methods do not account
for electronically-coupled DERs, with their considerably different fault
currents.
As IBDERs cannot be integrated into the traditional fault calcula-
tions, novel fault calculation methods for distribution systems with
IBDERs were developed in [16–19]. In most of these papers, IBDERs
were modeled as constant current sources where currents are in phase
with the voltages at their points of common coupling (PCCs). However,
the Fault Ride Through (FRT) and Reactive Current Injection require-
ments from Distribution Codes require from IBDERs to inject reactive
current component through the fault period, to support the voltage
recovery process [20–22]. Therefore, the IBDER fault models need to
consider the reactive current injection requirement [20–22]. On the
other hand, the fault calculation methods for distribution systems with
DFIMs were developed in [23–25]. However, it is assumed in these
references that DFIMs will always lose their control during a fault, and
thus they are represented with the models same as the traditional in-
duction machines. It is shown in [17] that this assumption can cause
serious calculation errors in cases of non-severe faults because in these
cases DFIMs can manage to control their fault currents. Therefore, for
relay protection purposes, DFIM fault modeling needs to be highly ac-
curate and to consider both severe and non-severe fault cases for each
DFIM.
In [26–28] new relay protection methods for distribution systems
with IBDERs were proposed. However, these references do not provide
accurate models for IBDERs, as they only consider that the IBDER fault
currents are limited to 1.5 of their rated currents and do not provide
precise ratios of their active to reactive parts. Moreover, the protection
methods proposed in these references are based on assumption of
adding protective devices on almost all line-sections in the system.
Although this practice would certainly provide a secure operation of the
system, adding so many protective devices would be extremely costly
and it is not realistic in real-life distribution systems. The usual practice
in distribution systems is to place protective devices at the feeder head,
and in cases of very long feeders, they can be placed at the feeder halves
and at the beginnings of some critical laterals [9,10].
In [23,29,30] relay protection methods for distribution systems with
DFIMs were proposed. However, similar to the fault calculation
methods previously discussed, in references [23,29,30] is assumed that
DFIMs always lose their fault current control and they were modeled
same as induction machines. Only in Ref. [23] it is stated that during
the non-severe faults, DFIMs will maintain the control of their fault
currents, but the models proposed in this reference are developed in
time-domain, and therefore fault calculations with these models would
be extremely time-consuming and inapplicable for relay protection
methods for large-scale systems. Moreover, methods from [23,29,30]
are also based on assumption that protective devices exist on almost
every line-section in the system, which is not realistic.
The motivation for this research was the lack of practically applic-
able methods for coordination of protective devices in distribution
systems with electronically-coupled DERs. Therefore, the main objec-
tives of this paper are: (1) To develop highly precise models for IBDERs
and DFIMs suitable for relay protection purposes, that will provide
accurate results in cases of both severe and non-severe faults; (2) Based
on the developed models, to propose a practically applicable method
for adaptive coordination of the protective devices, which does not
require high investments in new devices, but at the same time is suf-
ficiently fast and accurate, and able to clear faults anywhere in the
2
Electrical Power and Energy Systems 116 (2020) 105551
system. Setting and sensitivity analysis of the relays is beyond the scope
of the paper, as the main focus is on proper coordination of the pro-
tective devices.
The proposed method iteratively calculates the faulted system state,
and based on the results of each iteration, it adapts the IBDER and DFIM
models. In that way, the proposed method is able to precisely calculate
fault currents through the protective devices, and to adapt their settings
iteratively. In each iteration, the severity of the fault regarding every
DER is estimated based on the voltage drop at their PCCs, and fault
models are adapted consequently. Moreover, the proposed method
takes into account the DER disconnection times and constructs appro-
priate time-intervals accordingly. Finally, the method adapts the cal-
culated fault currents through the protective devices in accordance to
constructed time-intervals, which ensures a high level of accuracy.
The contributions of the Adaptive Relay Protection method pro-
posed in this paper are as follows: (1) The method uses IBDER fault
models based on the FRT requirements for reactive current injection.
These models are iteratively adapted to meet the requirements with a
high precision; (2) The method uses DFIM fault models considering
both severe and non-severe faults regarding each DFIM, and based on
the fault severity these models are iteratively adapted to accurately
represent every possible case; (3) The FRT requirements for DER dis-
connection times regarding IBDERs and DFIMs are considered in the
proposed method; (4) Based on DER disconnection times, highly ac-
curate time-intervals are constructed, in which the fault currents
through the protective devices may considerably change, before the
relay operates. Based on these time-intervals and the corresponding
fault current values, the relay operation times are iteratively calculated
with a high precision, which consequently ensures highly accurate co-
ordination of protective devices; (5) The proposed method is fast and
suitable for large-scale distribution systems’ real-time applications.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the
FRT requirements for electronically-coupled DERs are briefly explained.
IBDER and DFIM fault models for relay protection methods are pro-
posed in Section 3. In Section 4, a novel Adaptive Relay Protection for
large-scale distribution systems with high penetration of electronically-
coupled DERs is proposed. Results are presented and discussed in
Section 5. The paper is concluded in Section 6.
2. The FRT requirements for electronically-coupled DERs
Electronically-coupled DERs should support distribution system
during the faulted conditions [20]. To comply with this notion, these
DERs should stay connected to the system during a fault, and support
the distribution system voltage if possible. The way of passing through
the fault, which causes the voltage drop at the generator's PCC, without
being disconnected from the system, is called the FRT capability [20].
Modern grid codes, such as German [21], Irish [22], Danish [20], etc.
have the FRT requirements well-defined. Because of the increasing
number of electronically-coupled DERs worldwide, most of the other
countries will most likely start introducing the FRT requirements to
their distribution codes as well. The FRT requirements of German dis-
tribution code are presented in Fig. 1. FRT requirements of other
countries are very similar, and the only differences are values of the
operation times [20].
Besides staying connected to the grid during the fault, distribution
codes require from electronically-coupled DERs to support distribution
system with injecting reactive power throughout the duration of the
fault, in order to help the faster voltage recovery [20]. Reactive current
at DER’s PCC is defined as a current that leads the voltage at the PCC for
an angle of . In other words, it is a current that multiplied with the
2
voltage at the PCC produces injecting of a purely reactive power into
the system [20–22]. Distribution codes require from electronically-
coupled DERs to provide reactive current at their PCCs with a con-
tribution of at least 2% of the rated current per percent of the voltage
L. Strezoski, et al.
Fig. 1. The German FRT requirements [21].
Fig. 2. Requirements for a reactive current injection [20].
drop [20–22]. This requirement is presented in Fig. 2. However, DERs
should control their fault currents within the strictly defined limits to
protect vulnerable power electronic devices [6–8]. The current limit
differs with different manufacturers, but does not exceed 150% of the
rated current [6–8]. Therefore, in cases of severe voltage drops (more
than 75%), their reactive currents cannot exceed this limit.
In accordance with the previous subsections, the two main FRT
requirements regarding the electronically-coupled DERs are [20–22]:
1. To remain connected to the distribution system during the fault –
disconnection times are defined based on the voltage drops at the
DERs’ PCCs (in case of German FRT requirements, DERs need to stay
connected even if this voltage drops to zero – first 150 ms from
Fig. 1);
2. To inject a reactive current (reactive power) into the distribution
system to support the voltage during faults. The reactive component
of the fault current is defined based voltage drops at the DERs’ PCCs
[6–8].
Based on these requirements, in the next section the fault models for
electronically-coupled DERs suitable for relay protection calculations
are proposed.
3. Models for electronically-coupled DERs for relay protection
calculations
In this section, IBDER and DFIM fault models suitable for relay
3
Electrical Power and Energy Systems 116 (2020) 105551
protection calculations are derived. These models are in a full com-
pliance with the FRT requirements. Regarding DFIM models, they are
also flexible and iteratively adapted based on the fault severity esti-
mation.
3.1. The IBDER models for relay protection calculations
In [31,32] the IBDER models for fault calculations based on the
requirements for reactive current injection were proposed. However,
models proposed in these references are calculated based on the ap-
proximations of the voltages at IBDERs’ PCCs, that are estimated in the
first iteration of the fault calculation, and they are not modified further.
Nonetheless, calculated voltages at the IBDERs’ PCCs change after each
iteration, and as the models depend on these voltages, they should also
change consequently. Moreover, the FRT requirements for DER dis-
connection times (Fig. 1) were not considered in these references. As
the coordination of the protection equipment requires highly precise
models, the IBDER models proposed in this paper are adapted after each
iteration of the fault calculation, considering updated values of the
voltages at their PCCs. Also, as the protection devices react after pre-
defined time-intervals, the models proposed in this paper consider the
FRT requirements for DER disconnection times. This is highly important
as disconnection times depend on the voltages at DERs’ PCCs (Fig. 1),
and DERs at different locations relative to the fault location have dif-
ferent disconnection times. Therefore, the currents through the pro-
tection devices highly depend on which DERs will stay connected and
which will be disconnected after some time.
The IBDERs inject symmetrical currents even in case of unbalanced
faults and they react exclusively on the positive sequence voltage drop
at their PCCs [3–8]. Only in some rare cases of microgrid im-
plementation, inverters can be set to inject negative sequence currents,
to be used as signals that the microgrid switched from grid-tied to is-
landed operation [35], but this is beyond the scope of this paper as
microgrids were not considered in the paper. Thus, inverters present an
open circuit in the negative sequence. Also, the inverters considered in
this paper are three-phase, ungrounded, so they always present an open
circuit in the zero sequence.
Accordingly, the models used in this paper consist of ideal current
sources, in positive sequence only. Also, the IBDERs inject fault currents
with predefined limits that do not exceed 1.5 of their rated currents
[3–8]. While the current limit is known, the ratios of their active to
reactive parts are not known in advance, and need to be iteratively
calculated.
In the first iteration of the fault calculation [18], all IBDERs are
modeled as ideal current sources with the values of their pre-fault
pre
currents: I IBDERi , i = 1, 2, NIBDER , where NIBDER is the number of all
IBDERs in the system. After the first iteration, initial approximations of
+1
voltages at the PCCs of all IBDERs (VPCCi, i = 1, 2, NIBDER ) are known.
+1
Based on the phase angles of voltages VPCCi, the initial approximations
react1
of phase angles of reactive currents (I IBDERi ) of all IBDERs are calculated
as follows:
1
= 1
, i = 1, , NIBDER
Ireact i Vi
2 (1)
where 1
Ireact i are the phase angles of the initial approximations of the
IBDERs’ reactive currents, and Vi
1
are phase angles of the voltages VPCCi .
+1
The ratios between rated voltages at the IBDERs’ PCCs (VPCCrated
+
i ) and
+h
magnitudes of the h-th iteration of voltages VPCCi are calculated for all
IBDERs, as follows:
+h
h VPCC i
rVPCCi = , i = 1, , NIBDER
+
VPCCratedi (2)
Based on the calculated ratios i,
in the h-th iteration, the h-th
h
rVPCC
iteration of DERs’ disconnection times are calculated in accordance
with the FRT requirements – Fig. 1. In this paper, the German FRT
L. Strezoski, et al. Electrical Power and Energy Systems 116 (2020) 105551

requirements are used, as the strictest, and the DERs’ disconnection crowbar will be activated if the voltage at the DFIM’s PCC falls below
times are calculated as follows (Fig. 1): the threshold value, which amounts 70% of the rated voltage [17]. It
1500 150 h should be noted that this threshold can differ for different DFIM man-
tih = 150 + rVPCCi [ms], i = 1, , NIBDER ufacturers, but this can be easily modified within the proposed method.
0.9 (3)
If the voltage at the DFIM’s PCC remains above the threshold value, the
for all DERs on which the voltages are below 90% of the rated values. DFIM will manage to control its fault current. On the other hand, when
DERs on which the voltages are above 90% of their rated values should the chopper protection is used, a better grid support such as the FRT, is
stay connected throughout the whole fault period (Fig. 1). The im- achieved during a fault by keeping the rotor’s converter active, but still
portant thing to note at this place is that these models are easily ad- limiting the currents to protect the power converter [7,8,17,23]. In this
justable to any other Grid Code’ FRT requirements. The only difference case, the converter will continue to control the DFIM’s fault current
would be in the time values in Eq. (3) – 1500 ms and 150 ms, in the case regardless of the fault severity, and it should be modeled in the same
of the German FRT requirements (Fig. 1). way as the IBDER [7,8,17,23]. In this case also, DFIM’s fault current is
The ratios between magnitudes of h-th iteration of reactive currents limited to no more than 1.5 of its rated value.
and rated currents for all the IBDERs are equal to 2rVPCC
h
i: The above discussion shows that it is not possible to know in ad-
reacth vance which models should be used for every DFIM on the feeder (as it
IIBDER i
is not known in advance how significant will be voltage drops caused by
h
= 2rVPCCi, i = 1, , NIBDER
rated
IIBDER (4)
i
different faults). This is a significant discrepancy relative to the tradi-
The h-th iteration of magnitudes of reactive currents of all the tional modeling for fault calculations, where the model for every ele-
IBDERs are calculated as follows: ment is always known in advance.
Therefore, in this paper, in the first iteration of the fault calculation,
reacth
IIBDER h rated
i = 2rVPCCi IIBDERi i = 1, , NIBDER (5) all DFIMs are modeled as ideal current sources with the values of their
pre
Finally, the magnitudes of h-th iteration of reactive currents of all pre-fault currents: I DFIMi, i = 1, 2, NDFIM , where NDFIM is the number
IBDERs are compared with their predefined fault current limits (IIBDER of all DFIMs in the system. After the first iteration, initial approxima-
i ),
max
+1
and based on that comparison, the h-th iteration of fault currents of all tions of voltages at the PCCs of all DFIMs (VPCCi, i = 1, 2, NDFIM) are
fh
the IBDERs (I IBDERi ) are calculated as follows: known. These voltages are compared with the threshold values de-
scribed above, and based on this comparison the appropriate models
max
> IIBDERi
fh max
I IBDERi = IIBDER j h are adopted:
ie
Ireact i
reacth
IIBDER i ff h h
max acth j reacth j
IIBDERi I IBDERi = IIBDER ie
Vi + IIBDER ie
Ireact i
(6) 1. If the crowbar is used for the converter’s protection:
+1
a. If the voltage VPCCi stays above the threshold value of the i-th DFIM,
2
then the DFIM’s model should be controlled current source, same as
acth max reacth
(7)
where IIBDER 2
i = (IIBDERi) (IIBDER i ) , i = 1, , NIBDER
the IBDER. Note that in this case, the DFIM’s model exists only in the
The (h + 1)-th iterations of the IBDER models are obtained by using
positive sequence.
values of (h + 1)-th iterations of voltages of faulted system busses, +1
b. If the voltage VPCCi drops below the threshold value of the i-th DFIM,
calculated with the fault calculation procedure proposed in [18], and
then the DFIM’s model should be same as the traditional induction
briefly described in Section 3.3.
machine. In this case, DFIM’s model has all three sequence com-
When the fault calculation procedure converges, the values of
ponents (positive, negative, and zero).
IBDERs’ fault currents from the last iteration are adopted as their final
values. The convergence criterion for the fault calculation is defined in
As the voltages at DFIMs’ PCCs are changing from iteration to
[18], and consists of the difference of state variables (voltages) of two
h+1 h iteration during the iterative fault calculation, and some of them that
successive iterations (Ui Ui < ), where denotes the convergence were above threshold values can drop below in the successive itera-
criterion. tions, and vice-versa, DFIM models should also change. Therefore, in
the following iterations, voltages at DFIMs’ PCCs are checked for this
3.2. The DFIM models for relay protection calculations possibility. If this change happens, the DFIM’s model is changed back to
the appropriate model. This is in order to calculate the DFIM’s model
DFIMs are the most complex for modeling, as their models for fault with the highest precision, and to enter the relay protection calculation
calculation (and consequently for relay protection calculations) depend with the precise model that accurately represent the actual DFIM’s fault
on the severity of the fault and on the device used for the protection of response.
the converter [6–8]. The converter’s power electronics are sensitive to
the above-rated currents, and therefore they need to be protected [6–8]. 2. If the chopper is used for the converter’s protection, DFIMs manage
There are two main protection devices used in DFIMs: crowbar and to control their fault currents regardless of the fault severity, and
chopper [6–8]. they are modeled same as IBDERs in all cases.
When the crowbar is used for the converter’s protection, it short-
circuits the rotor’s terminals when the fault is severe [6–8]. If this In cases when the DFIMs’ fault responses are controlled, and DFIMs
happens, the DFIM’s fault response becomes same as the traditional are represented with models same as IBDERs (cases 1b and 2, above),
induction machine’s response, and therefore the model used for DFIM in DER disconnection times from FRT requirements are considered for
this case should be same as the model of the induction machine [3,6–8]. DFIMs also.
In this case, DFIMs inject fault currents with values multiple times From the above discussion, it is obvious that DFIMs present a par-
higher than their rated currents. However, if the fault is not as severe ticular challenge for the relay protection coordination. As their fault
(e.g. if it happens far from the DFIM), the crowbar will not react and the responses, and consequently their models for fault calculations, highly
converter will continue to control the injected current [7,8]. In this depend on the fault severity, the calculated currents through the pro-
case, the DFIM’s model is same as the model of the IBDER, explained in tective equipment can change considerably depending on the fault lo-
the previous section. In this case, DFIM’s fault current is limited to no cation and its proximity to DFIMs. Therefore, in the relay protection
more than 1.5 of its rated value. coordination method proposed in this paper, these facts are considered,
In this paper, the severity of the fault is estimated using the voltage and consequently highly precise results are obtained.
at the DFIM’s PCC, in accordance with [7,8,17]. It is assumed that the

4
L. Strezoski, et al.
Fig. 3. Block-diagram of the fault calculation procedure with iterative calcu-
lation of DFIM and IBDER fault currents.
As per our knowledge, none of the existing relay protection methods
consider these features.
3.3. The fault calculation procedure
The fault calculation procedure used in this paper was proposed in
[18], and it is thoroughly explained in that reference. Thus, it is not
presented here in detail.
However, it is important to note that unlike in [18], the IBDER and
DFIM models are considered more precisely in this paper, as their va-
lues are iteratively modified, as well as because DER disconnection
times are calculated and considered in the proposed method. As pre-
viously discussed, these features are highly important for relay pro-
tection coordination. When the fault current at the fault location is
calculated as in [18], the faulted system state is iteratively calculated by
using the Improved Backward/Forward Procedure (IBFS) [18]. Unlike
in [18], the fault models for IBDERs and DFIMs are modified after each
iteration, as explained in Sections 3.1 and 3.2.
Fig. 3 presents the block-diagram of the complete fault calculation
procedure, with the iterative calculation of IBDER and DFIM fault
currents, as proposed in this paper.
5
Electrical Power and Energy Systems 116 (2020) 105551
4. Novel method for adaptive relay protection coordination
Setting the overcurrent relays implies selecting the pickup setting
and time/current characteristic which defines operation time for the
fault current [9,10]. Pickup setting is determined based on the max-
imum loading through protective device considering maximum accep-
table overload limit above the rated current [9,10]. Time/current
characteristic and the time dial setting should be adjusted so that the
corresponding relay operates before the upstream (backup) relay for a
fault inside its protection zone.
Time dial is selected to obtain appropriate coordination between
devices for maximum fault current through the relay furthest away
from the source, for the selected relay characteristic. Maximum fault
current through the relay will be achieved for a case when all down-
stream DERs are disconnected and all upstream DERs are connected,
and the fault is simulated at the device’s location [9,10]. Required
operating time of the backup relay should be greater than the operating
time of the main relay by coordination time interval (CTI) for maximum
fault current at the relay location. With the known operating time of the
backup relay and known maximal fault current, required time dial
setting can be calculated.
Once the settings of protective relays are selected, coordination
should be checked for the actual topology of distribution feeder (with
all DERs in operation). Now the coordination of the protective relays
should be checked against fault current level for the fault at the end of
relay’s protection zone [9,10].
The traditional procedure for setting and coordination of protective
devices is described in detail in [9,10], for traditional distribution
systems. However, traditional relay protection methods, aimed for
passive distribution systems, or even methods for distribution systems
with synchronous/induction generators, cannot be applied for emer-
ging systems with high penetration of IBDERs and DFIMs, as discussed
in the Introduction. Therefore, in this paper a novel relay protection
method for adaptive setting and coordination of protective devices is
proposed to accurately consider emerging systems with high penetra-
tion of electronically-coupled DERs.
4.1. The proposed adaptive relay protection method
In distribution systems with electronically-coupled DERs the fault
current level changes considerably before a relay operates due to DERs’
disconnections based on the FRT characteristic (Fig. 1). Therefore,
unlike in traditional methods, the coordination of protective devices
must be considered and adapted in time-intervals with different fault
current levels which may change before the relay operates. Hence, in
this paper the time-intervals are introduced and determined sequen-
tially, based on DER disconnection times. The relay operating times also
need to be re-calculated every time when fault current through the
protective device changes due to DERs’ disconnections.
As the German FRT requirements are used in this paper (Fig. 1), in
the first 150 ms after the fault occurrence, all DERs should stay con-
nected to the system. Therefore, the first 150 ms is the first time-in-
terval of interest. Note that in case of any other FRT requirements, the
actual duration of this interval can be easily modified. In the first time-
interval, one entire iterative fault calculation is performed, and the
adequate models for all IBDERs and DFIMs are determined. Moreover,
disconnection times of all DERs are calculated, using Eq. (3): ti, i = 1,
…,NIBDER. Let us consider coordination between a pair of main (Relay
2) and backup relay (Relay1). The fault current through Relay 2 in this
1 1
time-interval is marked with I Relay2 . When the current I Relay2 is calcu-
lated, operating time tRelay2 can be determined from the relay’s time/
1
current characteristic [9]. In the same way, the operating time of Relay
1 – tRelay1
1
can be determined and checked if coordination between re-
lays is satisfied in accordance to the required coordination time interval
(CTI). If the coordination is not satisfied (tRelay 2 < CTI ), tRelay1
1 1 1
1 tRelay
L. Strezoski, et al.
must be increased to the next dial value from the relay characteristic.
If the time tRelay2
1
is lower than 150 ms, then the protection operates
before any of DERs disconnects from the grid, and the calculation
method ends at this point.
However, if time tRelay2
1
is higher than 150 ms, then the second time-
interval of interest is defined as an interval between 150 ms and tRelay21
. 2. DFIM models, dependable on the fault severity, are precisely con-
As there is a possibility that in the period between 150 ms and tRelay2 1 sidered in the proposed method.
some of the electronically-coupled DERs should disconnect (their dis-
connection times are inside this interval), one more iterative fault cal-
culation is required for the second time-interval of interest. The second
fault calculation is performed without the electronically-coupled DERs
which should be disconnected between 150 ms and tRelay2 1
. After this
calculation, currents through the protective relays in the second time-
2 2
interval are re-calculated, and they are marked with I Relay2 and I Relay1 ,
respectively. Based on these fault current values, the operating times
2
tRelay2 and tRelay1
2
are updated accordingly. The next step is to check if
some of the remaining DERs should disconnect between 150 ms and
2
tRelay2 . If not, the procedure is finished and the accurate setting times for
Relay 2 and Relay 1, respectively, are tRelay22
and tRelay1
2
. protection methods lead to inaccurate results, as it is presented in the
If some of DERs should disconnect between 150 ms and tRelay2 2
, then
the entire process is repeated. This process is repeated until in two
consecutive time-intervals, none of the remaining DERs should dis-
connect. This process should be repeated for each pair of main-backup
relays on the feeder.
The same method can be performed for recloser-fuse coordination to
adjust recloser settings so that a fuse saving or a fuse blowing scheme is
achieved. The above-described algorithm of the proposed method, for
one pair of protective devices, is presented in the block-diagram in
Fig. 4.
Note that the appropriate DFIM fault models, dependable on the
fault severity (Section 3.2), as well as the appropriate IBDER models,
based on the FRT requirements (Section 3.1) are fully considered in the
proposed method through the fault calculation procedure depicted in
Fig. 3. These features are not added to the block-diagram in Fig. 4 to
avoid overburdening the diagram.
From the above discussion, the following contributions of the pro-
posed method can be derived:
Fig. 4. Relay protection coordination block diagram.
6
Electrical Power and Energy Systems 116 (2020) 105551
1. Electronically-coupled DERs’ disconnection times, as defined in FRT
requirements, are clearly considered. Based on these disconnection
times, time-intervals in which fault current values may change
considerably are constructed and integrated into the proposed
method.
3. IBDER and DFIM models, dependable on the voltage drop at their
PCCs, are iteratively adapted and precisely calculated in the fault
calculation within the proposed method.
4. Protection operating times are calculated with high precision, as
they are iteratively adapted based on the fault current calculation
results that highly depend on the accurate models and DER dis-
connection times that are considered through the introduced time-
intervals with high precision by the proposed method. These fea-
tures ensure highly accurate coordination of the protective devices.
Neglection of the above listed features by the traditional relay
following section of this paper.
5. Results and discussion
The proposed method was first tested on the IEEE 37 feeder – Fig. 5
[38]. The feeder was modified as follows: (1) Nine DERs were added to
buses 724, 725, 729, 727, 736, 728, 708, 735 and 736, they supply
almost 50% of the total load in the normal operating conditions and
there is a load in every bus, except in DER buses; (2) The feeder op-
erates at nominal voltage 20 kV; (3) All line sections are three-phase,
with the mutually equal parameters; (4) Relay R1 is located at the line
section between buses 701 and 702 (feeder head), and relay R2 is lo-
cated at the line section between buses 730 and 709 (approximately
half of the feeder); (5) There are three fuses which are located between
busses 709 and 731, 711 and 741, as well as 708 and 732; (6) Loads are
modeled as constant impedances; (7) The source network is of infinite
power (source impedance at the bus 709 is equal to zero);
DERs located at buses 724, 725, 729, 727, and 736 are DFIMs, while
the remaining DERs are IBDERs.
All DFIMs have the same parameters: rated power equal to
3.96 MW, starting current and rated current ratio is 8, Rg/Xg = 0.1.
Their positive and negative impedances (in transient period), scaled to
Fig. 5. IEEE 37 Test Feeder.
L. Strezoski, et al.
20 kV voltage level are: Z = (0.418 + j4.187) Ohm. They are con-
sidered to be ungrounded, so in the zero sequence they present an open
circuit. All IBDER have the mutually same parameters, with their rated
currents equal to 350 A.
Relay’s curve is represented with the following equation [34]:
19.61
T = D· + 0.491
M2 1
Recloser’s fast curve – 133 (C) is represented with the following
equation [36]:
8.76047
T = 0.1· + 0.029977
M1.80788 0.380004
Recloser’s slow curve – 138 (W) is represented with the following
equation [36]:
15.4628
T = 1· + 0.056438
M1.6209 0.345703
where
T - operating time of relay,
I fault
M - Current in multiples of relay setting (= I ,
setting
D - dial (for R2 = 0.5, while for R1 = 3).
Relay and recloser pickup settings are determined based on the
maximal loading through line sections where they are located.
Calculated pickup settings for relays R1 and R2 are 500A and 200A,
respectively. Standard IEEE Very inverse characteristic [33] is selected
for both relays. Relay R2 is considered as the last protection on the
feeder, and per setting procedure, time dial is selected at minimum
allowed value to ensure that faults are cleared as fast as possible. In that
regard, selected time dial is 0.5 s [33]. Time dial for relay R1 is de-
termined to ensure coordination with downstream relay R1 for the
maximum fault current at relay R2 location. Minimum acceptable CTI is
0.4 s [33]. As discussed in previous section, the maximal fault current at
relay R2 location (node 730) is calculated considering that all DFIMs
and IBDERs downstream the relay R2 are disconnected. Calculated fault
current at fault location is 7236A, while fault currents through relays
R1 and R2 are 5852A and 7236A, respectively. To ensure proper co-
ordination between R1 and R2 with CTI of 0.4 s for calculated fault
currents through relays, time dial of relay R1 should be set at 3 s as
minimum [33]. After the relays’ settings for maximum fault current
values are selected, it is proceeded with determining protection co-
ordination between relays in presence of IBDERs and DFIMs.
To validate the proposed method, protection coordination is ana-
lyzed by the proposed method and compared with results obtained by
using standard relay protection method [9], where DFIMs are modeled
by admittances and which does not consider DER disconnection times.
Fault is simulated at the end of relay R2 protection zone (bus 741). As
three-phase short-circuit causes the highest fault currents among the
standard fault types, and because relay operating time enters the sa-
turation for higher fault currents, the protection coordination is per-
formed for three-phase short-circuit, as the most critical case.
Initial fault current at fault location, calculated in the first iteration
of the proposed method, was 3918A, while fault currents through relays
R1 and R2 were 1993A and 2641A, respectively. Operating times of
relays R1 and R2 were 4.442 s and 0.547 s, respectively. In the fol-
lowing iterations, based on the calculated voltages at DFIMs’ locations,
models for four DFIMs at locations 727, 729, 725, and 724 were swit-
ched to IBDER models. Moreover, based on the calculated voltages at
locations where IBDERs and DFIMs modeled as IBDERs were connected,
the disconnection times were calculated and presented in time line in
Fig. 6 below along with relays’ operating times.
As can be seen from the above timeline, DERs located at busses 735
(DER 8) and 738 (DER 9) should be disconnected in the period between
Electrical Power and Energy Systems 116 (2020) 105551
Fig. 6. DERs’ disconnection time.
0.150 s and R2 relay’s operating time of 0.547 s, so one more iterative
(8)
fault calculation is performed without these DERs. After this calcula-
tion, currents through the protective relays R1 and R2 were 2084A and
2718A, respectively. Based on these fault current values, the operating
times of relays R1 and R2 are 4.084 s and 0.544 s, respectively. The new
operating time of relay R2 is 0.544 s and as can be seen from Fig. 6,
(9)
there are no electronically-coupled DERs which would disconnect be-
fore this time lapses, so these operating times are adopted as final va-
lues.
On the other hand, fault current values calculated by standard
method [9] were significantly higher than obtained with the proposed
(10)
method. The fault current at the fault location, calculated with the
standard method, is 6660A, while fault current values through relays
R1 and R2 are 3953A and 5265A, respectively. Corresponding oper-
ating times of relays R1 and R2 are consequently equal to 0.956 s and
0.505 s, respectively.
Results of this comparison are presented in Table 1, while the relay
characteristics [33] and fault current results calculated by novel and
standard methods are presented in Fig. 7.
The proposed method was further tested to verify recloser-fuse co-
ordination between recloser located at the line section between busses
730 and 709 and fuse located at the line section between busses 711
and 741. Recloser’s pickup settings is determined based on maximal
loading at its location. Calculated pickup setting for recloser is 200A.
Two operations are selected for recloser: fast and slow. Traditional re-
closer characteristics 138 (W) [34] and 133 (C) [34] are selected for
slow and fast operation, respectively. Recloser is considered as the last
protection on the feeder, and per setting procedure, time dial is selected
at minimum allowed value to ensure that faults are cleared as fast as
possible. In that regard, selected time dial for fast and slow character-
istics are 0.1 and 1 [34], respectively. It is considered that fuse operates
by minimum and total melting time characteristics for 65A rated cur-
rent. Recloser-fuse coordination is verified for the fault at bus 741.
Calculated fault current through recloser, fuse and at fault location
as well as calculated fast and slow operating times of recloser and fuse
melting time per the proposed and standard method [9] are shown in
Table 2. Marks RCL slow, RCL fast, and Fuse in Table 2 correspond to
recloser’s slow and fast characteristics, and fuse, respectively.
During the calculation by the proposed method, based on the cal-
culated voltages at DFIMs’ locations, models for four DFIMs at locations
727, 729, 725, and 724 were changed into IBDER models. Moreover,
recloser’s fast operating time and fuse’s melting time are lower than
FRT disconnection time, so all DERs should stay connected during the
calculation.
Calculated fault current at fault location is 3918 A, while fault
currents through recloser and fuse are 2641 A and 3918 A, respectively.
Fast operating time of recloser and fuse’s melting time is 0.009 s and
0.051 s, respectively.
On the other hand, short-circuit currents calculated by standard
Table 1
Comparison of results provided by the proposed method and standard proce-
dure for protection coordination.
Novel Operating time by Standard Operating time by
method [kA] novel method [s] method [kA] standard method [s]
R1 2.084 4.084 3.953 0.956
R2 2.718 0.544 5.265 0.505
Ifault 3.622 / 6.661 /
CTI / 3.54 / 0.451
7
L. Strezoski, et al. Electrical Power and Energy Systems 116 (2020) 105551

Afterwards, the proposed method is verified on one real-life dis-

tribution feeder with 186 busses – Fig. 9 [37].
The feeder was modified from the original state as follows: (1) all
line sections are three-phase with mutually equal series parameters
(Z = 0.09 + j0.36), shunt impedances are neglected; (2) Relay R1 is
located at the line section between buses 0 and 1, and relay R2 is lo-
cated at the line section between buses 52 and 53; (3) Six DFIMs are
located at buses 22, 28 36, 45, 130, and 141, whereas three IBDERs are
located at buses 63, 73, and 77. All DFIMs have the same parameters:
rated power equal to 1 MW, starting current and rated current ratio is 8,
Rg/Xg = 0.1. Equivalent impedances of DFIMs, as well as of the supply
network are taken same as for the previous example. All IBDERs have
mutually the same parameters, with rated current of 25A (rated power
is 500 kW). The three-phase short-circuit is simulated at the end of the
feeder – bus 147.
Calculated pickup settings for relays R1 and R2 are 500A and 200A,
respectively. Standard IEEE Very inverse characteristic is selected for
both relays [33]. Time dials are selected at 0.5 and 2 for relay R2 and
Fig. 7. Relays’ characteristic with calculated fault current values using novel
R1, respectively. Relay R2 is considered as the last protection on the
and standard method.
feeder, and per setting procedure, time dial is selected at minimum
allowed value to ensure that faults are cleared as fast as possible. In that
Table 2 regard, selected time dial is 0.5 s [33]. Time dial for relay R1 is de-
Comparison of results provided by Novel method and standard procedure for termined to ensure coordination with downstream relay R1 for the
recloser-fuse coordination. maximum fault current at relay R2 location. Minimum acceptable CTI is
Novel Operating time Standard Operating time by 0.4 s [33]. As discussed in previous example, the maximal fault current
method by novel method method [kA] standard method at relay R2 location (node 52) is calculated considering that all DFIMs
[kA] [s] [s]
and IBDERs downstream the relay R2 are disconnected. Calculated fault
RCL slow 2641.8 0.293 5265 0.134 current at fault location is 7040, while fault currents through relays R1
RCL fast 2641.8 0.009 5265 0.005 and R2 are 4114A and 7040A, respectively. To ensure proper co-
Fuse 3918 0.051 6661 0.035 ordination between R1 and R2 with CTI of 0.4 s for calculated fault
Ifault 3918 / 6661 / currents through relays, time dial of relay R1 should be set at 3 s [33].
CTI / 0.042 / 0.030
After the relays’ settings are selected, it is proceeded with de-
termining protection coordination between relays in presence of
method are significantly greater than these currents obtained by the IBDERs and DFIMs. Results obtained by the proposed method are pre-
proposed method. Therefore, coordination of protective devices (re- sented in Table 3. In Table 3, the relay currents, their operating times,
closer and fuses) is analyzed in the area of higher fault currents where CTI, as well as the CPU time for the complete execution of the method
coordination of devices can be critical. From the results obtained by are presented.
standard method, coordination between fuse and recloser may be Finally, the computation times required for execution of the pro-
compromised since fuse’s melting time is closer to recloser’s fast oper- posed method, for several large-scale feeders are presented in Table 4.
ating time. To avoid miscoordination in the area of high fault currents, These feeders are obtained by multiplying the original IEEE 37 test
characteristics should be adjusted by selecting higher value of time dial feeder and in that way gradually increasing the number of nodes. Note
which means higher operating time and consequently, the longer fault that because of the DER disconnection times, the entire fault calculation
clearing time. is performed two times for all three cases, and the entire method is
Recloser and fuse characteristics [34] and fault current results cal- repeated for every main-backup relay pair. Tests were carried out on a
culated by novel and standard methods are presented in Fig. 8. PC, Intel i3 – 2330 M, 4 GB RAM. All calculation procedures were in-
house developed and programmed in FORTRAN 2008.
From the presented results, the following can be concluded:

Fig. 8. Recloser and fuse characteristic with calculated fault current values
using novel and standard method.
1. From the results presented in Table 1 it is clear that the fault cur-
rents calculated by the standard method are significantly higher
than when calculated by the method proposed in this paper. The
fault current through relay R2 when calculated by standard method
is almost two times higher than when calculated by the proposed
method. It is because the standard method does not consider accu-
rate models for DFIMs, nor DER disconnection times, as defined in
FRT requirements. This consequently causes inaccurate calculation
of the relay operation times, when calculated by the standard
method. Consequently, coordination between relays, if set up by the
results obtained by the standard method, is critical due to very small
CTI between relays’ operating times for corresponding fault cur-
rents. These incorrect results may lead to incorrect protection co-
ordination which may cause high damages to the system elements.
These shortcomings are avoided with the method proposed in this
paper, by using accurate DER models, as well as accurate DER dis-
connection times. This is clear from the results in Table 1.
2. Moreover, as can be seen from Table 1, the operating time of the

8
L. Strezoski, et al. Electrical Power and Energy Systems 116 (2020) 105551

Fig. 9. Real Life 186-bus Feeder.

Table 3 execution time of the proposed method is less than 2.5 ms.
Relay protection analysis on a real-life distribution feeder. 5. Finally, Table 4 shows that despite being robust and very accurate,
Current [kA] Operating time of relays CPU time for the method the proposed method has a low execution time even in cases of
[s] execution [ms] large-scale distribution systems with a high penetration of DERs,
with several main-backup relay pairs. The proposed method calcu-
2375 3.219 2.23
IR1 lates the complete setting and coordination of the protective
2460 0.556 /
IR2 equipment in a system with 5320 nodes, 200 DERs, and 5 main-
2486 / /
Ifault backup relay pairs, in less than 430 ms. This makes the proposed
CTI 2.66 /
method particularly useful for online applications, such as Adaptive
Relay Protection in emerging, large-scale distribution systems, with
high penetration of electronically-coupled DERs.
Table 4
Required computation times for large-scale systems.
System Number of Number of main- Number of Execution Time 6. Conclusion
Busses backup relay pairs DERs [ms]

A 500 2 4 13.24 In this paper an accurate, efficient and easy-to-implement Adaptive

B 1250 4 50 85.28 Relay Protection method for large-scale distribution systems, with high
C 5320 5 200 426.73 penetration of electronically-coupled DERs is proposed.
The proposed method iteratively adapts calculated fault currents
through protection devices, based on three important factors: (1)
backup relay (R1), when calculated by the proposed method, based
Accurate DFIM models dependable on the specific fault’s severity; (2)
on the accurate fault currents and the selected relay characteristic,
Accurate IBDER models, dependable on the voltage drop at their PCCs;
can be quite long – more than 4 s. This can consequently indicate
and (3) DERs’ disconnection time-intervals, as defined in FRT require-
protection engineers to consider changing the selected relay char-
ments. These features make the proposed method unique among all
acteristic to the more appropriate one. This feature is also over-
distribution system relay protection methods, which provides a sig-
looked by the standard method.
nificant advantage in applications for emerging distribution systems
3. From the results in Table 2, it can be observed that when the relay
with high penetration of electronically-coupled DERs.
coordination is calculated with standard methods, due to the ne-
Finally, the proposed method is extremely time-efficient and sui-
glection of the accurate DFIM models and disconnection times dic-
table for integration in industry-grade DMS software solutions for real-
tated by the FRT requirements, the calculated fault currents through
time calculations of large-scale systems.
protective devices are extremely high and inaccurate. Consequently,
coordination of protective devices (recloser and fuses) is analyzed in
the area of high fault currents, where coordination of devices can be
Declaration of Competing Interest
critical. This problem is clearly illustrated in Table 2 and Fig. 8,
where can be seen that fuse’s melting time is very close to recloser’s
The authors declare that they have no known competing financial
fast operating time which may jeopardize coordination between
interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influ-
these devices. On the other hand, the method proposed in this paper
ence the work reported in this paper.
considers accurate models of electronically-coupled DERs, as well as
precise FRT requirements, and therefore the coordination of pro-
tective devices, when obtained by the proposed method, is highly
Acknowledgements
accurate and precise.
4. From the Table 3 it is clear that the proposed method is fully capable
The authors would like to thank the Ministry of Education and
to determine the proper relay setting and coordination in real-life
Science of the Republic of Serbia for its support to this research through
distribution feeders, in a very short execution time. The main relay
the Project III-42004.
clears the fault in less than 0.6 s and the CTI is satisfied. The full

9
L. Strezoski, et al.
References
[1] Anderson PM. Analysis of Faulted Power Systems. New York, NY, USA: IEEE Press;
1995.
[2] Bergen R, Vittal V. Power System Analysis. 2nd Ed. New Jersey: Prentice Hall; 2000.
[3] Boutsika TN, Papathanassiou SA. Short circuit calculations in network with dis-
tributed generation. Electr Power Syst Res 2008;78:1181–91.
[4] Kramer W, Chakraborty S, Kroposki B, Thomas H. Advanced Power Electronic
Interfaces for Distributed Energy Systems. National Renewable Energy Laboratory.
Report TP-581-42672. 2008.
[5] Van Tu D, Chaitusaney S, Yokoyama A. Maximum-allowable distributed generation
considering fault ride-through requirement and reach reduction of utility relay.
IEEE Trans Power Del 2014;29(2):534–41.
[6] Walling RA, Reichard ML. Short Circuit Behavior of Wind Turbine Generators. Proc.
2009 IEEE Annual Conference for Protective Relay Engineers, College Station, TX.
2009.
[7] Joint Working Group, “Fault Current Contribution from Wind Plants”, Report to the
T&D Committee of the IEEE Power and Energy Society, Pro Relay, 2015.
[8] Williams JR, Karlson B. Wind Power Plant Short-Circuit Modeling Guide.
Albuquerque, NM: Sandia Nat. Lab; 2012.
[9] Gers JM, Holmes EJ. Protection of Electricity Distribution Networks. 2nd Ed.
London, UK: The Institution of Electrical Engineers; 2004.
[10] Horowitz SH, Phadke AG. Power System Relaying. 4th Ed. West Sussex, UK: John
Willey and Sons; 2014.
[11] Wan H, Li KK, Wong KP. An adaptive multiagent approach to protection relay co-
ordination with distributed generators in industrial power distribution system. IEEE
Trans Ind Appl 2010;46(5):2118–24.
[12] Zeineldin HH, Sharaf HM, Ibrahim DK, El-Zahab EEA. Optimal protection co-
ordination for meshed distribution systems with DG using dual setting directional
over-current relays. IEEE Trans Smart Grid 2015;6(1):115–23.
[13] Zhan H, et al. Relay protection coordination integrated optimal placement and
sizing of distributed generation sources in distribution networks. IEEE Trans Smart
Grid 2016;7(1):55–65.
[14] Boljevic S, Conlon MF. Fault Current Level Issues for Urban Distribution Network
with High Penetration of Distributed Generation. Proc. The 6th Conf. on the
European Energy Market. 2009. p. 1–6.
[15] Girgis A, Brahma S. Effect of distributed generation on protective device co-
ordination in distribution system. LESCOPE 01. 2001 Large Engineering Systems
Conference on Power Engineering. Conference Proceedings. Halifax, NS, Canada.
2001. p. 115–9.
[16] Wang Q, Zhou N, Ye L. Fault analysis for distribution networks with current-con-
trolled three-phase inverter-interfaced distributed generators. IEEE Trans Power
Deliv 2015;30(3):1532–42.
[17] Strezoski L, Prica M, Loparo KA. Generalized Δ-circuit concept for integration of
distributed generators in online short-circuit calculations. IEEE Trans Power Syst
July 2017;32(4):3237–45.
[18] Strezoski L, Prica M, Loparo KA. Sequence domain calculation of active unbalanced
distribution systems affected by complex short circuits. IEEE Trans Power Syst
March 2018;33(2):1891–902.
[19] Baran ME, El-Markaby IM. Fault analysis on distribution feeders with distributed
generators. IEEE Trans Power Syst 2005;20(4):1757–64.
10
Electrical Power and Energy Systems 116 (2020) 105551
[20] Tsili M, Papathanassiou S. A review of grid code technical requirements for wind
farms. IET Renew Power Gen 2009;3(3):308–32.
[21] Bundesverband der Energie und Wasserwirtschaft (BDWE): Guideline for gen-
erating plants connection to and parallel operation with the medium-voltage net-
work, Berlin, BDEW, 2008.
[22] Distribution System Operators – ESB Networks, Irish Distribution Code, Feb. 2015.
[23] Kong X, Zhang Z, Yin X, Wen M. Study of fault current characteristics of the DFIG
considering dynamic response of the RSC. IEEE Trans Energy Convers
2014;29(2):278–87.
[24] Hooshyar A, Azzouz MA, El-Saadany EF. Three-phase fault direction identification
for distribution systems with DFIG-based wind DG. IEEE Trans Sustain Energy
2014;5(3):747–56.
[25] Zhang J, Zhang B, Hao Z. Equivalent circuit of DFIG with crowbar protection for
relay protection analysis. 13th International Conference on Development in Power
System Protection 2016 (DPSP), Edinburgh. 2016. p. 1–5.
[26] Cintuglu MH, Ma T, Mohammed OA. Protection of autonomous microgrids using
agent-based distributed communication. IEEE Trans Power Deliv
2017;32(1):351–60.
[27] Muda H, Jena P. Superimposed adaptive sequence current based microgrid pro-
tection: a new technique. IEEE Trans Power Deliv 2017;32(2):757–67.
[28] Zarei SF, Parniani M. A comprehensive digital protection scheme for low-voltage
microgrids with inverter-based and conventional distributed generations. IEEE
Trans Power Deliv Feb. 2017;32(1):441–52.
[29] Chen S, Tai N, Fan C, Liu J, Hong S. Adaptive distance protection for grounded fault
of lines connected with doubly-fed induction generators. IET Gener, Trans Distrib
2017;11(6):1513–20.
[30] Saleh KA, El Moursi MS, Zeineldin HH. A new protection scheme considering fault
ride through requirements for transmission level interconnected wind parks. IEEE
Trans Ind Inf 2015;11(6):1324–33.
[31] Strezoski LV, Prica MD, Katic VA, Dumnic B. Short-circuit modeling of inverter
based distributed generators considering the FRT requirements. 2016 North
American Power Symposium (NAPS), Denver, CO. 2016. p. 1–6.
[32] Strezoski L, Katic V, Dumnic B, Prica M. The sub-transient, transient, and steady-
state models for three-phase inverter based distributed generators for the purpose of
real-time short-circuit analysis. Mediterranean Conference on Power Generation,
Transmission, Distribution and Energy Conversion (MedPower 2016), Belgrade.
2016. p. 1–8.
[33] IEEE Standard Inverse-Time Characteristic Equations for Overcurrent Relays,“ in
IEEE Std C37.112-1996 , vol., no., pp.i-, 1997. doi: 10.1109/IEEESTD.1997.81576.
[34] Schweizer Engineering Laboratories (SEL), “Advanced Recloser Control”. Available
online at: https://cdn.selinc.com/assets/Literature/Product%20Literature/Data
%20Sheets/651R_DS_20160715.pdf?v=20160815-175229.
[35] Kamh MZ, Iravani R. Unbalanced model and powerflow analysis of micro-grids and
active distribution systems. IEEE Trans Power Deliv 2010;25(4):2851–8.
[36] ABB PCD Control Protection Curves, Available online at: https://library.e.abb.com/
public/1bc69ae25de85ac585256c44005e98c4/PCD%20Protection%20Curves.pdf.
[37] Krsman V, Saric A. Verification and estimation of phase connectivity and power
injections in distribution network. Electric Power System Res 2017;143(1):281–91.
[38] IEEE Test Feeders, Available online at: http://sites.ieee.org/pes-testfeeders/
resources/.