Disability & Society

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Why we do not need a ‘stronger’ social model of

disability

Christopher A. Riddle

To cite this article: Christopher A. Riddle (2020) Why we do not need a ‘stronger’ social model of
disability, Disability & Society, 35:9, 1509-1513, DOI: 10.1080/09687599.2020.1809349

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09687599.2020.1809349

Published online: 27 Aug 2020.

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DISABILITY & SOCIETY
2020, VOL. 35, NO. 9, 1509–1513
https://doi.org/10.1080/09687599.2020.1809349

CURRENT ISSUE

Why we do not need a ‘stronger’ social model

of disability
Christopher A. Riddle
Philosophy, Utica College, Utica, NY, USA

ABSTRACT ARTICLE HISTORY

Recent calls to amend the social model of disability to Received 27 February 2020
articulate and defend a broader set of rights for people Accepted 10 August 2020
with disabilities should be met with critical reflection. For
KEYWORDS
example, Berghs et al. suggest a move to a ‘stronger’ social
social model; definition;
model - one that acts as a response to the threats against human rights;
disabled people’s human rights. While the article brings to interactional; justice
the forefront the many violations of human rights present
in the lives of people with disabilities, it nonetheless mis-
characterizes the solution. While people with disabilities do
face tremendous injustices, many of which can rightly be
thought of as violations of human rights, the proper target
of our concern should be on how we conceptualize
the notions of equality and justice to inform sound policy,
and not on how we model the experience of disability.
I suggest these arguments put the cart before the horse.

Introduction
Berghs et al. (2019) support the claim that a model of disability ‘should be a
means to change society (and its collective values), in addition to upholding
the human dignity of disabled people’s lives in every aspect of society’
(1037). They do so by demonstrating first, the historical successes of the
social model with respect to engaging in emancipatory scholarship and pol-
icy change, and second, the desire of politically and socially active disabled
people to continue to improve the material lives of people with disabilities.
More concretely, Berghs et al. (2019) focus on the denial of fundamental
human rights for people with disabilities and suggest that a social model
more aligned with an agenda for change – a more active social model – be
implemented and adopted that is more able to reflect fundamental values
fought hardly for that are reflected in many national and international docu-
ments, laws, and monitoring tools. In other words still, while the social
model may have been fundamental in getting people with disabilities

CONTACT Christopher A. Riddle cariddle@utica.edu

ß 2020 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
1510 C. A. RIDDLE

recognized in an importantly more robust manner than mere medical or

individualized conceptions of disability or impairment, it may very well be
time to transition to a model more capable of defending and implementing
these rights, rather than merely providing a grounds for their consideration.
Berghs et al. (2019) call this model a ‘stronger’ social model: a social model
of human rights.
While Berghs et al. have adopted a unique perspective on the question or
debate concerning models of disability, their call to revise the social model
of disability is not new. Responses to critiques of the social model have often
been formulated around a defense of the ontological commitments of it,
while expanding or moving forward with political, moral, or legal rights to
be secured for people with disabilities. My brief argument sets out to dem-
onstrate that such a move is problematic. I suggest that to model one’s
ontological commitments alongside their political, is to put the cart before
the horse.

Modeling disability
The Union of the Physically Impaired Against Segregation (UPIAS) (1976)
argued convincingly and forcefully against the medicalized understanding of
the experience of disability reflected through a medical model. Importantly
however, as Berghs et al. (2019) concede, even UPIAS’s seminal work was
first and foremost, about the manner in which ‘disability is understood’
(1035). Later however, they question, alongside Levitt (2017), whether the
current adaptation of the social model is ‘fit for the purpose’ (1036), where
purpose is meant to be interpreted as the securing of human rights and the
fighting against the rolling back of the welfare state that negatively affects
many people with disabilities. Put succinctly, Berghs et al. run two arguments
together. First, there is the matter of understanding disability. Second, there
is the matter of justifying, and enforcing or ensuring, rights for disabled peo-
ple. Calls for a stronger social model conflate these two distinct purposes
and commit those making such endorsements to tie political or justice-based
valuations to ontological ones about the experience of disability.
Berghs et al. (2019) argue for a model of disability to change ‘society to
become more inclusive’ (1037). Even though Berghs et al. (2019) rightly iden-
tify how the human rights of people with disabilities are being ‘denied and
eroded by society’ (1037) and that what is at stake is very fundamental
(indeed they call these failings ‘very basic, [or] the right to live and have a dig-
nified life as a human being’ (1037)), they acknowledge quite explicitly that
what they are discussing is ‘a matter of justice’ (Berghs et al. 2019, 1037).
What does it mean for one to acknowledge that the call for a stronger
social model revolves around fundamental or basic matters of justice? What
 DISABILITY & SOCIETY 1511

does it mean to not critique the ontology of a model of disability, but

instead, its political usefulness? I suggest it implies a failure to recognize that
these justice-based obligations that we are so clearly failing to assure for
people with disabilities are matters to be assured after we correctly model
the experience of disability. In other words still, the purpose of a model of
disability is what UPIAS suggested: to understand the experience of disabil-
ity. A model is designed to clarify an experience or phenomenon, and in the
context of disability, an accurate model of disability is one that most aptly
characterizes what it is like to live with a disability. The valuable shift from
the medical model to the social model surely had the incidental benefit of
empowering and mobilizing many people with disabilities, but it was a far
superior model because it more accurately reflected the experience of dis-
ability itself. A focus solely on medical or individual features of the experi-
ence of disability was harmful because it was incorrect – it failed to model
the actual experience of disability. What emerged from a shift to the social
model of disability was an acknowledgement of a much more robust set of
circumstances that impact the lives of people with disabilities; a shift was
made from solely medical influences on the experience of disability, to the
social, political, legal, and attitudinal experiences that so dramatically affect
the lived experiences of people with disabilities. The reason the social model
is a better model of disability is not because of its political commitments,
but because of its ontological ones. In other words, the social model of dis-
ability is superior to the medical model because it more accurately corre-
sponds to reality – it has a more sound ontological foundation. To deny this
shift is of political import would be churlish, but one must acknowledge that
it is of political import because its ontology was better, not because it
smuggled matters of justice into its model.
Indeed, a model is determined as more or less true or valuable on the
basis of its correspondence to defensible or sound premises, not desirable
ones. A model or ‘account of disability should not factor in political or socio-
logical factors’ (Riddle, 2013, 28), and ‘the aim of any model of disability,
properly conceived, involves articulating the origin of disadvantage that may
or may not emerge from disability’ (Riddle 2020, 229). Making what Vehmas
and Watson (2014) call ‘hidden ethical judgements’ (640) involves the smug-
gling in of normative judgments, implicitly, and without justification, instead
of simply relying upon facts and commitments further down the ontological
ladder (Vehmas 2008).

Disability justice
If the goal of modeling an experience is to accurately reflect its reality, then
the goal of justice, properly conceived, picks up where the modeling of an
1512 C. A. RIDDLE

experience ends. Justice-based discourse includes both a scope, and a cur-

rency question. More pointedly, when asking questions about justice and
human rights, one asks first, whether the agent in question resides within
the scope of things to whom we have these obligations, and second, what
those obligations look like given our answer to the first question. One
begins to see quite quickly how justice-based discourse is reliant upon an
accurate modeling of the experiences of those it seeks to promote justice
for. These enterprises are practically, intimately entwined, but importantly,
conceptually distinct. Without a clear understanding of what the experi-
ence of disability entails, it is difficult to conceptualize what just institu-
tions would look like to support disability justice, and even more difficult
to implement, monitor, and enforce those institutional structures to sup-
port the promotion of the rights of people with disabilities. If one insists
on running arguments of justice alongside questions concerning the ontol-
ogy of disability, one risks obfuscating fundamental issues and experien-
ces. If one is truly interested in the assuring of rights, the promoting of
equality, and the formulating of just institutions, one needs to secure
accurate answers to the question of the experience of disability, prior to
engaging with justice-based concerns. Indeed, the inclusion of justice-
based concerns at the lower level of the ontological ladder, while
undoubtedly good-natured in design, makes it more difficult for those
attempting to account for the experiences and injustices present in the
lives of people with disabilities.
Asking those engaged in justice-based discourse to work with a model
of disability that has built-in normative judgements is like asking a chef to
prepare a meal with ingredients that are already seasoned or combined
into a meal itself. Surely a chef is better situated to make a delicious dish
with raw ingredients, unadulterated by a vision or design imposed upon
them from another. In an analogous manner, policy-makers or those
engaged in discussions of justice or rights are more likely to arrange just
institutional practices if they are working with uncoloured or unbiased
models of disability. In one instance, one is confined to the restrictions
imposed upon them by others, and in the other instance, one is free to
work with foundational materials that aren’t confused or complicated by
the work of those that came before.
Of course, the parsing of the ontological and the political here relies upon
an actual benevolent agent to do the policy work. One can see the desire to
run the ontological alongside the political for fear of others failing to do
adequate work on securing the rights of people with disabilities (as has long
been the case). That said, one only risks policies being even more harmful to
people with disabilities if the modeling is confusing the ontological with
the political.
 DISABILITY & SOCIETY 1513

Concluding remarks
While clearly good-spirited, recent calls to adjust or strengthen the social
model seem to be misguided. Placing an emphasis on the manner in which
one wants disability to be modeled or conceptualized fails at the intended
task of articulating the actual experience of disability. Models of disability
should not contain implicit normative evaluations and instead, should rely
upon an unwavering dedication to get the ontology of disability correct.
Therefore, we do not need a stronger social model of disability, we need a
more robust conception of justice.

ORCID
Christopher A. Riddle http://orcid.org/0000-0002-1262-0499

References
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