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EVIDENCE RECIT Q: Section 1 defines Evidence is the “means” does this mean
ATTY. MACABBABAD
(Source: ROC, lectures, Rem Law Reviewer: Albano, Red Book
2020/21)
RULE 128: GENERAL PROVISIONS
SECTION 1. Evidence Defined. — Evidence is the means, sanctioned
by these [R]ules, of ascertaining in a judicial proceeding the truth
respecting a matter of fact.
SECTION 2. Scope. — The rules of evidence shall be the same in all
courts and in all trials and hearings, except as otherwise provided by
law or these [R]ules.
SECTION 3. Admissibility of Evidence. — Evidence is admissible
when it is relevant to the issue and not excluded by the Constitution,
the law or these Rules.
SECTION 4. Relevancy; Collateral Matters. — Evidence must have
such a relation to the fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or
non- existence. Evidence on collateral matters shall not be allowed,
except when it tends in any reasonable degree to establish the
probability or improbability of the fact in issue
Evidence
It is the means sanctioned by these rules, of ascertaining in a judicial
proceeding the truth respecting a matter of fact. [Sec. 1 Rule 128]
When is evidence admissible?
It is admissible when:
1. it is relevant to the issue
2. NOT excluded by the Constitution or the Rules
AQUINO, ALYSSA M.
the procedural aspect or only those objects that may be submitted
in court?
ANSWER: It means both the procedural aspect and those that may be
submitted in court for judicial administration. The case of Bustos v.
Lucero defines evidence and the SC in this case defines it as more of a
procedural law, but to my mind, the SC erred in deleting the word
RULES in equating the same.
MEANS= Procedure given by the rules of court ho to establish a fact, or
present an evidence to establish a particular fact
SANCTIONED BY THESE RULES: implementing rules and guidelines,
how to present evidence, how to handle evidence
RECIT Q: Third important aspect in the definition is “to know the
truth in a judicial proceeding.” What kind of truth?
ANSWER: I think the book of Riano provides to know the legal truth
and the actual truth since the findings of the court depends only on the
evidences presented before it.
(Sir) Because knowing the actual truth may not be easily achieved
because of the complexities and the limitations provided by the ROC |
ACTUAL TRUTH= what actually happened
RECIT Q: What is the legal truth?
ANSWER: It is the truth that is based on the evidence presented to the
court.
How is admissibility determined?
1. Relevance- When the evidence has such a relation to the fact in
issue as to induce belief in its existence or non- existence
2. Competence- Not excluded by the Constitution, the law, or the
Rules
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What is the rule of relevancy of evidence? (Wigmore) Evidence, otherwise improper, is admitted to contradict
It must have a relation to the fact in issue as to induce belief in its another improper evidence introduced by the other party.
existence or non-existence. It is a question of whether or not the
circumstance (or evidence) is to be considered at all. (Materiality + Which proceeding is the law on evidence applicable?
PROBATIVE value) Judicial proceedings are of THREE KINDS ONL Y
1. Civil action – which is of two kinds:
NOTE: Evidence on collateral matters shall NOT be allowed EXCEPT a. ordinary civil action, and
when it tends in any reasonable degree to establish the probability or b. special civil action
improbability of the fact in issue (Sec. 4) 2. Criminal action
3. Special Proceeding [Sec. 3, Rule 1]
What are collateral matters?
Matters other than the fact in issue and which are offered as a basis JUDICIAL PROCEEDING- court proceedings in a strictest meaning.
for inference as to the existence or non-existence of the facts in issue From first level court to SC.
[tends to clutter the court if ALLOWED]
What are instances when the technical rules of evidence are not
What is Multiple Admissibility applicable?
Where the evidence is relevant and competent for two or more 1. Election cases
purposes, such evidence should be admitted for any or all the purposes 2. Land Registration
for which it is offered, provided it satisfies all the requisites of law for 3. Cadastral
its admissibility therefor 4. Naturalization
5. Insolvency
What is Conditional Admissibility 6. Other cases
Where the evidence at the time of its offer appears to be immaterial or 7. Labor Tribunal and proceedings before administrative bodies
irrelevant unless it is connected with the other facts to be subsequently 8. Preliminary investigations
proved, such evidence may be received on condition that the other
facts will be proved thereafter; otherwise, the evidence already given RECIT Q: What is the nature of the Rules of Evidence, can it be
shall be stricken out (ex: a copy of a writing may not be considered waived?
competent evidence until the original is proven to be lost or destroyed) ANSWER: Yes. The ROC is procedural thus, it may be waived.
Basis: Article 6, NCC (must not transgress public policy, public morals,
What is Curative Admissibility etc.) or when justice so requires, it may not be waived.
The right of a party to introduce incompetent evidence in his behalf
where the court has admitted incompetent evidence adduced by the What is the difference between proof and evidence?
adverse party PROOF EVIDENCE

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Effect/ result of evidence Medium or means by which a
(MATERIAL) fact is proved or disproved How may an extra judicial confession be admissible in evidence
against the accused?
Probative effect of evidence and Medium of proof 1. Must be voluntary
it is the persuasion of the mind 2. Must be made with the assistance of a competent and independent
resulting from consideration of counsel
the evidence 3. Express
4. In Writing
What is the difference between factum probandum and factum
probans 2. Statutory Exclusionary Rules
FACTUM PROBANS FACTUM PROBANDUM a. Lack of documentary stamp tax to documents required to have one
Material evidencing the It is the ultimate fact of makes such document inadmissible as evidence in court until the
proposition proposition sought to be requisite stamp/s shall have been affixed thereto and cancelled [Sec.
established 201, NIRC];
It is the evidentiary fact by which It is the fact which is in issue and b. Any communication obtained by a person, not being authorized by all
factum probandum is established to which evidence is directed the parties to any private communication, by tapping any wire/cable or
Evidentiary fact Ultimate fact using any other device/arrangement to secretly
overhear/intercept/record such information by using any device, shall
not be admissible in evidence in any hearing or investigation [Secs. 1
Exclusionary rules of evidence
and 4, R.A. 4200 (Wire-Tapping Act)]
1. Constitutional Exclusionary Rule:
What is the exclusionary rule?
Note: There must be a law that renders the evidence inadmissible
Provides that any evidence violated through Sec. 3 of the Bill of Rights
is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
3. Exclusions under the Rules on Evidence
• Original document rule (previously best evidence rule)
What is inadmissible for any proceeding?
• Hearsay evidence rule
Art III, Sec 2 (unreasonable searches and seizure)
Art III, Sec 3 (privacy of communication and correspondence) • Offer of compromise in civil cases

4. Exclusions under Court issuances

What is inadmissible against the accused, but may be used by the
• Rule on Electronic Evidence, e.g. compliance with authentication
offended party in a suit for damages against the violator
requirements for electronic evidence
-Art III, Sec 12 (right to counsel, prohibition on torture, force, violence,
• Rule on Examination of a Child Witness, e.g. sexual abuse shield rule
threat, intimidation or other means which vitiate the free will;
• Judicial Affidavit Rule
prohibition on secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado)
-Art III, Sec 17 (right against self-incrimination)

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Burden of Proof V. Burden of Evidence
Burden of Proof – onus probandi; obligation of the party in a litigation 1. Direct Evidence one which proves the existence
to persuade the court of the fact in issue or non-existence of the fact
Burden of Evidence – obligation of the party to go forward with the 2. Indirect Evidence also known as circumstantial
evidence to over throw the prima facie evidence against him evidence. It consists of
inferences drawn from facts
Who has the burden of proof? known.
Civil Case 3. Relevant Evidence evidence having any value in
plaintiff (to prove his cause of action) reason as tending to prove any
defendant (only in affirmative defense) matter provable in an action.
Criminal Case 4. Material Evidence when it is directed to prove a fact
prosecution (yes) in issue as determined by the
accused (no) rules of substantive law and
Admin Case pleadings
complainant (to prove his COA) 5. Competent Evidence when it is not excluded by law
respondent (only in affirmative defense) 6. Rebutting Evidence that which is given to repel,
counteract, or disprove facts
What is the Hierarchy of Evidence? given in evidence
1. Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt 7. Preliminary or Best and affording the greatest certainty
- Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree Secondary Evidence of the fact in question;
of proof as, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute Secondary evidence- sense of
certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or that degree of proof
inferiority and indicates a
which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind
superior source of information. It
2. Clear and Convincing Evidence
- Clear and convincing evidence is more than mere is only admitted if better
evidence is NOT available.
preponderance, but not to the extent of such certainty as is required
beyond reasonable doubt as in criminal cases 8. Expert Evidence testimony of one possessing
3. Preponderance of Evidence knowledge that is not usually
-Means that the evidence adduced by one side is, as a whole, acquired by an ordinary person.
superior to or has greater weight than that of the other 9. Prima Facie Evidence Evidence which is standing alone
4. Substantial Evidence unexplained or uncontroverted, is
-It is the amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind sufficient to maintain the
might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. proposition affirmed.
10. Conclusive Evidence Evidence is
What are the kinds of evidence? INCONTROVERTIBLE/

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INDISPUTABLE/ Proves the fact in dispute Proof of facts from which, taken
INCONTESTATBLE without the aid of any inference collectively, the existence of a
or presumption particular fact in dispute may be
When may rules of evidence be waived? inferred as a necessary or
If, according to the well-established doctrine, the parties may waive probable consequence. Indirectly
such rules during the trial of a case, there is no reason why they cannot proves a fact in issue, such that
make the waiver in a contract (ex. a contract of insurance requiring the the fact finder must draw
testimony of eyewitness as the only evidence admissible concerning inference or reason from
the death of the insured person). circumstantial evidence

However, if the rule of evidence waived by the parties has been Requisites to warrant a conviction based on circumstantial
established on grounds of public policy, the waiver is void (ex. waiver evidence
of the privilege against the disclosure of state secrets). a. there is more than one circumstance;
b. the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
To where does the Rules of Court not apply? c. the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce
1. Election cases conviction beyond reasonable doubt [Sec. 4, Rule 133]
2. Land Registration cases
3. Naturalization cases NOTE: The totality of the evidence must constitute an unbroken chain
4. Insolvency case showing the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt [People v.
5. Cadastral cases Matito, G.R. No. 144405 (2004)]
6. Other cases by analogy
What is the difference between POSITIVE and NEGATIVE
What do you mean by “by analogy?” Is there a difference between EVIDENCE?
“by analogy” and “suppletory character?” POSITIVE NEGATIVE
By analogy means that the ROC will be applied only if there is Witness affirms that a certain Witness states he/she did not
insufficiency in the applicable law, provided that there is substantial state of facts did exist or that a see or does not know of the
similarity obtaining in both cases. certain event happened. occurrence of a fact

Suppletory means that there is insufficiency in the applicable law. What is the difference between COMPETENT AND CREDIBLE
EVIDENCE?
Difference between DIRECT and CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE COMPETENT CREDIBLE
DIRECT CIRCUMSTANTIAL -Not excluded by the -Refers to probative value or
Constitution, the law, or the convincing weight
Rules [Sec. 3, Rule 128]

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-Determined by the prevailing Weight involves the effect of 2. CUMULATIVE EVIDENCE
exclusionary rules of evidence evidence admitted, its tendency -additional evidence of the same kind establishing the same
to convince and persuade. It is point or factual issue
not determined mathematically 3. POSITIVE EVIDENCE
by the numerical superiority of -where the witness declares affirmatively that a certain event
the witnesses testifying to a happened or did not happen
given fact, but depends upon its 4. CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE
practical effect in inducing belief -one where the law does not allow it to be contradicted
on the part of the judge trying 5. PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE
the case [Francisco 11, 1996 Ed.] -one which sufficiently establishes a particular fact until
Note: contradicted or rebutted by evidence
Exclusionary rules may affect
due process. To the extent that NOTE: a confession against a co-accused is HEARSAY, HOWEVER< it
they might prejudice substantive may be utilized s a corroborative evidence to prove the existence of a
rights, therefore, they cannot be conspiracy among the accused in committing a crime. (NOT absolute)
made to apply retroactively
What is substantial evidence?
What is the equiponderance of evidence rule? It is defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable man might
When the scale stands upon an equipoise, the court will find for the accept as ADEQUATE to support a conclusion.
defendant. The plaintiff must rely on the strength of his evidence and
NOT on the weakness of defendant’s claim. What are the 2 axioms of admissibility of evidence?
1. NONE but facts having rational probative value are admissible=
How is circumstantial evidence established? AXIOM OF RELEVANCY
It is established by the simple deduction based on REASONABLE 2. All facts having rational probative value are admissible when
INFERENCE from a series of facts or circumstances some specific rule forbids= AXIOM OF COMPETENCY

If Evidence is admissible, does it automatically follow that it has What are the classes of evidence? [according to form]
probative weight? 1. Real Evidence
No, because the issue of Probative Weight is dependent upon judicial 2. Documentary Evidence
evaluation. 3. Testimonial Evidence

What are the classes of evidence and give an example of each: If evidence is admissible, does it mean it has probative value?
1. CORROBORATIVE EVIDENCE
-an additional evidence of different character to the same point

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NO. Admissibility has nothing to do with weight or the probative value.
Its admission is NOT a guarantee that it will be considered by the court.
Weight is dependent upon the court.
Is evidence obtained through entrapment and instigation
admissible?
ENTRAPMENT INSTIGATION
Admissible Inadmissible
Criminal intent is with the Merely lured into the commission
accused of an offense
Legally obtained Illegally obtained
A Policeman instigated X, he asked to buy 100 grams of shabu,
when X was giving the Police the shabu, he was immediately
handcuffed. During the trial, the Police was presented as witness
and he is identifying the 100 grams of shabu during the trial. May
the shabu be considered evidence? If yes, Why? If no, why not?
No, because instigation is not allowed by the law; the evidence is
inadmissible because it is incompetent having violated an exclusionary
rule.
(Continuation of the above problem) X was already arrested and
brought in the Police Station. While being investigated, X admitted
that he sells shabu. He told the police of the hiding place of the
other shabu and so the police went to X’s house to get the 400
grams of shabu. So in the police station, 2 things happened: (1) a
written confession made by X admitting that he sell shabu and (2)
that he admitted to the existence of the 400 grams of shabu. Trial
came, the police is now presenting the confession and the 400
grames of shabu; is it admissible?
No, because such confession was not made in the presence of a
lawyer; it is not evidence. As for the 400 grams of shabu, it is still
inadmissible; it is not a waiver of his right. Any waiver during the
custodial investigation must be made in the presence of a counsel;
AQUINO, ALYSSA M.
otherwise any evidence obtained in violation of this rule is inadmissible
because it is incompetent having been covered by the Exclusionary
Rules.
Is evidence obtained without search warrant admissible?
Generally no because it is the fruit from a poisonous tree, HOWEVER, if
it was made during a flagarante delicto arrest—ADMISSIBLE.
If A and B were married and B was suspecting that her husband
was keeping a mistress so she raided his office and obtained info
that he has a mistress. Are the documents admissible in evidence?
No. In privacy of communication and correspondence.
May a mentally retarded testify?
YES. It does not affect credibility so long as the testimony is
straightforward, candid, and unflawed by inconsistencies or
contradictions in its material points. Their acceptance will depend on
the quality of her perceptions and manner she can make them known
to the court.
Difference between actual knowledge and judicial knowledge?
A fact may be personally known to a judge and YET IMPROPER for
judicial notice, in the same manner that a fact may be personally
unknown to the judge and YET PROPER for judicial notice.
State the effect of judicial admission by a lawyer during the trial
Judicial admissions made by counsel during the trial are BINDING and
CONCLUSIVE on his client.
RULE 129: WHAT NEED NOT BE PROVED?
“Manifesta Non Indigent Provatione” – What is known need not be
proved
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SECTION 1. Judicial Notice, When Mandatory. — A court shall take
judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the existence
and territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of
government and symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the
admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political
constitution and history of the Philippines, official acts of the
legislative, executive and judicial departments of the National
Government of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time,
and the geographical divisions. (1a)
SECTION 2. Judicial Notice, When Discretionary. — A court may take
judicial notice of matters which are of public knowledge, or are capable
of unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to judges
because of their judicial functions. (2)
SECTION 3. Judicial Notice, When Hearing Necessary. — During the
pre-trial and the trial, the court, motu proprio or upon motion, shall hear
the parties on the propriety of taking judicial notice of any matter.
Before judgment or on appeal, the court, motu proprio or upon motion,
may take judicial notice of any matter and shall hear the parties
thereon if such matter is decisive of a material issue in the case. (3a)
SECTION 4. Judicial Admissions. — An admission,oral or written,
made by [the] party in the course of the proceedings in the same case,
does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by
showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that the imputed
admission was not, in fact, made.
What need not be proved?
-Facts of Judicial Notice
-Judicial Admissions
-Conclusive Presumptions
AQUINO, ALYSSA M.
Note: Evidence is also not required when the issue is purely a
question of law. The definition of “evidence” in Sec. 1, Rule 128
refers to “a matter of fact”.
What is judicial notice?
It is the cognizance which courts may take, WITHOUT PROOF, of facts
which they are bound or are supposed to know by virtue of their office.
What is the function of judicial notice?
It displaces evidence since, as it stands for proof, it fulfills the object
which evidence is designed to fulfill and makes evidence unnecessary.
Principle of judicial notice
Reasons of convenience and expediency
Principle of notoriety: Everyone knowz.
When is judicial notice discretionary?
A court may take judicial notice of matters which are of public
knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable demonstration, or ought
to be known to judges because of their judicial functions.
Is there anything needed to prove admission in the course of
proceedings in court?
An admission, written or verbal, made by a party in the course of the
proceedings in the same case, DOES NOT REQUIRE PROOF.
When is there necessity for a hearing in case the court takes
judicial notice of any matter?
-During the pre-trial and the trial, the court motu propio or upon
motion, shall hear the parties on the propriety of taking judicial notice
of any matter
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-before judgement or on appeal, the court motu propio or upon motion, judicial notice Assume to be discretionary → hearing.
may take judicial notice of any matter and shall hear the parties
thereon if such matter is decisive of a material issue in the case. Judicial Admissions:
GENERAL RULE: When made in open court (verbal) or in the course of
Kinds of Judicial Notice: the proceedings (written) in the same case, does not require proof.
Mandatory Discretionary
(a) existence and territorial (a) which are of public EXCEPTION: The admission may be contradicted only by showing that
extent of states, their knowledge, or it was made through:
(1) political history (b) capable to unquestionable (1) palpable mistake or
(2) forms of government demonstration, or (2) that no such admission was made.
(3) symbols of nationality, (c) ought to be known to judges (3) in civil cases: in pretrial if it results in manifest injustice
(b) the law of nations because of their judicial (4) in crim cases: when the pre-trial agreement is NOT signed by the
(c) the admiralty and maritime functions Lor any other matters lawyer and the party.
courts of the world and their
seals (hearing is necessary) Judicial Admission: An admission, verbal or written, made by the party
(d) the political constitution and in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require
history of the Philippines proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was
(e) the official acts of legislative, made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made
executive and judicial
departments of the Philippines Material Allegations
(f) the laws of nature GENERAL RULE: Material averment in the complaint, shall be deemed
(g) the measure of time, and admitted when not specifically denied.
(h) the geographical divisions. EXCEPTION: The amount of unliquidated damages, need not be
specifically denied. (Rule 8, Section 11)
What is the difference between judicial notice and judicial
knowledge? Allegations of Usury Allegations of usury in a complaint to recover
Judicial Notice- those which are mandatory to be known by the judge usurious interest are deemed admitted if not denied under oath. (Rule
because of its principle of notoriety 8, Section 11)

Judicial Knowledge- something that is personal to the judge.
[Nagkataon lang na alam niya]
What should be done if there is doubt if it is judicial notice or not
-Presumed AGAINST judicial notice. File motion to take/move it as
What is the effect of a pre-trial admission in a civil case?
-Admission made in stipulation of facts by parties in the pre-trial are
treated as judicial admissions.
→ if in a criminal case?

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-only becomes admissible if it is reduced in writing and signed by the
accused and counsel.
QUESTION: An original complaint that has been amended; are the
contents of the original complaint a Judicial Admission?
ANSWER: No, it is considered as an Extra-Judicial Admission and if you
want the court to take this in evidence you have to offer this as an
Exhibit. The Amended Complaint need not be presented, because the
Court can take JN of that.
THEORY OF ADOPTIVE ADMISSION:
An adoptive admission is a party’s reaction to a statement or action
by another person when it is reasonable to treat the party’s reaction
as an admission of something stated or implied by the other person.
The basis for admissibility of admissions made vicariously is that
arising from the ratification or adoption by the party of the statements
which the other person had made.
DOCTRINE OF PROCESSUAL PRESUMPTION
HIERARCHY OF EVIDENCE:
1. Proof beyond reasonable doubt
2. Clear and convincing evidence
3. Preponderance of evidence
4. Substantial evidence
What is a judicial admission?
ANSWER: It is an oral or written admission made by the party in the
course of the proceedings in the same case.
QUESTION: What is this Implied Admission Rule?
ANSWER: When an action or defense is founded upon a written
instrument, copied in or attached to the corresponding pleading as
provided in the preceding section, the genuineness and due execution
of the instrument shall be deemed admitted unless the adverse party,
AQUINO, ALYSSA M.
under oath, specifically denies them, and sets forth what he claims to
be the facts; but the requirement of an oath does not apply when the
adverse party does not appear to be a party to the instrument or when
compliance with an order for an inspection of the original instrument is
refused. (Sec. 8, Rule 8, ROC)
Note: An answer that is not verified partake the nature of an Implied
Admission. Verification is only needed in an actionable document
wherein you are a party thereto, you are a signatory.
5 EFFECTS OF AN IMPLIED ADMISSION
1. The party whose signature it bears admits that he signs it
2. That it was signed by another for him with his authority (midterm
question)
3. That at the time it was signed it was in words and figures exactly as
set out in the pleading of the party relying upon it
4. The document was delivered
5. That the formal requisites of law – seal, acknowledgement or
revenue stamp – which it lacks, are waived by him
RULE 130: RULES OF ADMISSIBILITY
What are objects as evidence?
-Objects are those that are addressed to the senses of the court
-When it is relevant to the court, it may be EXHIBITED, EXAMINED, OR
VIEWED by the court.
What do documents consist of?
1. Writings
2. Recordings
3. Photographs
i) Pictures
ii) Drawings
iii) Stored images
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iv) Xray films It refers to the real thing itself and it consists of tangible things, not
v) Motion pictures/ videos merely perceptions of the witness and a recollection of those
4. Any Material containing: perceptions.
i) Letters
ii) Words Object evidence is not visual alone. It covers the entire range of human
iii) Sounds senses: hearing, taste, smell, and touch.
iv) Numbers Note: the right against self-incrimination CANNOT be invoked against
v) Figures object evidence
vi) Symbols
vii) Other mode of written expression offered as proof LIMITATION ON THE USE OF OBJECT EVIDENCE:
The court MAY refuse the introduction of object evidence and rely on
DOCUMENT DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE testimonial evidence alone if:
Any deed, instrument or any duly Documents as evidence consist 1. The exhibition of such object is contrary to morals or
authorized paper by which of writing or any material decency;
something is proved, evidenced containing letters, words, 2. To require its being viewed in court or in an ocular inspection
or set forth numbers, figures, symbols or would result in delays, inconvenience, unnecessary expenses out of
other modes of written proportion to the evidentiary value of such object;
[DIPPES- deed, instrument, expression offered as proof of 3. Such object evidence would be confusing or misleading, as
paper, proved, evidenced, their contents. when the purpose is to prove the former condition of the object and
& set forth] there is no preliminary showing that there has been no substantial
change in said condition
OBJECT (REAL) EVIDENCE 4. The testimonial or documentary evidence already presented
clearly portrays the object in question as to render a view thereof
SECTION 1. Object as Evidence. — Objects as evidence are those unnecessary
addressed to the senses of the court. When an object is relevant to the
fact in issue, it may be exhibited to, examined or viewed by the court Note: Even if the object is repulsive or indecent, if a view of the same is
necessary in the interest of justice, such evidence may still be exhibited
NATURE OF OBJECT EVIDENCE but the court may exclude the public from such view
Objects as evidence are those addressed to the senses of the court.
When an object is relevant to the fact in issue, it may be exhibited to, REQUISITES OF ADMISSIBILITY
examined or viewed by the court. (Rule 130, Sec. 1) 1. The object must be relevant to the fact in issue;
2. The object must be authenticated before it is admitted;
3. The authentication must be made by a competent witness;
4. The object must be formally offered in evidence.

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Reason for Admissibility
The evidence of one’s own senses furnishes the strongest probability of
the existence of any sensible fact.
AUTHENTICATION
-To be admissible in evidence, the object sought to be offered must be
shown to have been the very thing that is the subject matter of the
lawsuit or the very one involved to prove an issue in the case.
-Authentication by a competent witness is essential to the admissibility
of the object evidence. After authentication, the object needs to be
formally offered in evidence.
Requisites for the admissibility of tape recording
1. A showing that the recording was capable of taking testimony
2. A showing that the operator of the recording device is
competent
3. Establishment of the authenticity and correctness of recording
4. A showing that no changes, deletions, or additions have been
made on the recordings
5. A showing of the manner of preservation of the recording
6. Identification of speakers
7. A showing that the testimony elicited was voluntarily made
without any kind of inducement
Categories of object evidence:
1. Unique objects or those that have readily identifiable marks
2. Objects made unique or those that are made readily identifiable
3. Non-unique objects or those with no identifying marks.
Two classifications:
a. Actual physical or “autopic” evidence – those which have a
direct relation or part in the fact or incident sought to be proven and
AQUINO, ALYSSA M.
those brought to the court for personal examination by the presiding
magistrate;
b. Demonstrative Evidence
Those which represent the actual or physical object (or event in case of
pictures or videos) being offered to support or draw an inference or to
aid in comprehending the verbal testimony of a witness
Note: REENACTMENTS are object evidence since they are exhibited,
examined, and viewed by the court.
CHAIN OF CUSTODY: means the duly recorded authorized movements
and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of
dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time
of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to
safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction.
As a general rule, four links in the chain of custody of the confiscated
item must be established:
1. First, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug
recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer;
2. Second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the
apprehending officer to the investigating officer;
3. Third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug
to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and
4. Fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug
seized from the forensic chemist to the court. [People v.
Gayoso, G.R. No. 206590 (2017)
CASES: Flores y De Leon v. People
G.R. No. 222861, [April 23, 2018].
DOCTRINE: In People v. Tandoy , the Court held that the best evidence
rule applies only when the contents of the document are the subject of
inquiry. Where the issue is only as to whether or not such document
12
 HENLIN NOTES
was actually executed, or exists, or in the circumstances relevant to or
surrounding its execution, the best evidence rule does not apply and
testimonial evidence is admissible.
FACTS: Roderick France figured in a vehicular accident with a
passenger jeepney. France and the jeepney driver proceeded to the
Kamuning Police Station. At the station, PO2 Flores investigated the
incident. France was told to return to the station and prepare the
amount of P2,000.00 so he can get back his driver’s license. Because
France could not raise the said amount in two days, he was told by PO2
Flores to just return on the third day. Subsequently, a Traffic Violation
Receipt was issued and signed by PO2 Flores who told France that the
same would serve as the latter’s temporary driver’s license. Sensing
that something was not right, France went to the headquarters of the
PAOCTF to file a complaint against PO2 Flores. Headed by PO2 Ilao,
the PAOCTF team proceeded to Kamuning Police Station together with
France. When France entered the station, PO2 Flores asked him if he
brought with him the money. After an hour, PO2 Flores called France to
his table. He opened a drawer and told France to drop the money
inside. PO2 Flores then counted the money inside the drawer using his
left hand. As soon as France asked for his driver’s license, the PAOCTF
team suddenly materialized at the scene through PO2 Ilao’s
prearranged signal. They arrested PO2 Flores and confiscated the
things inside his drawer including the marked money. Flores interposed
the defense of denial and “frame-up.” He adduced his own testimony
and the testimonies of Robert Pancipanci and photographer Toto
Ronaldo.
ISSUE: Whether or not photocopies of the marked money may be
admitted as evidence.
RULING: Yes, the photocopies of the marked many may be admitted as
evidence. In People v. Tandoy, the Court held that the best evidence
rule applies only when the contents of the document are the subject of
AQUINO, ALYSSA M.
inquiry. Where the issue is only as to whether or not such document
was actually executed, or exists, or in the circumstances relevant to or
surrounding its execution, the best evidence rule does not apply, and
testimonial evidence is admissible. In this case, the marked money was
presented by the prosecution solely for the purpose of establishing its
existence and not its contents. Therefore, other substitute evidence,
like a xerox copy thereof, is admissible without the need of accounting
for the original.
The presence of ultraviolet fluorescent powder is not an indispensable
evidence to prove that the appellant received the marked money.
Moreover, there is no rule requiring that the police officers must apply
fluorescent powder to the buy-bust money to prove the commission of
the offense. In fact, the failure of the police operatives to use
fluorescent powder on the boodle money is not an indication that the
entrapment operation did not take place. Both the courts a quo did not
even give much weight on the laboratory report. The CA instead
stressed on the straightforward, candid and categorical testimony of
France, corroborated by PO2 Ilao, as to how petitioner took the money
of France in exchange for the latter's driver's license. The laboratory
report is merely a corroborative evidence which is not material enough
to alter the judgment either way.
Braza v. City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City
G.R. No. 181174, [December 4, 2009], 622 PHIL 654-660)
DOCTRINE: Under Rule 108, only corrections of entries because of
clerical errors are permissible. A clerical error is one which is visible to
the eyes or obvious to the understanding; an error made by a clerk or a
transcriber; a mistake in copying or writing, or a harmless change such
as a correction of name that is clearly misspelled or of a misstatement
of the occupation of the parent. Substantial or contentious alterations
may be allowed only in adversarial proceedings, in which all interested
parties are impleaded and due process is properly observed.
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 HENLIN NOTES
FACTS: Ma. Cristina Torres Braza and Pablo Sicad Braza, Jr. were
married on January 4, 1978. The union bore 3 children. After some time,
Pablo died in a vehicular accident in Indonesia. During Pablo’s wake in
the Philippines, Lucille Titular began introducing minor Patrick Alvin
Titular Braza as her and Pablo's son. Consequently, Ma. Cristina made
inquiries in the course of which she obtained Patrick's birth certificate
from the Local Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental.
Such birth certificate stated, among others, that Patrick was
acknowledged by Pablo and was legitimated by virtue of the
subsequent marriage of his parents on April 22, 1998. Ma. Cristina
likewise obtained a copy of the marriage contract between Pablo and
Lucille. Considering the foregoing, Ma. Cristina filed a petition to
correct the entries in the birth record of Patrick in the Local Civil
Register. Contending that Patrick could not have been legitimated by
the supposed marriage between Lucille and Pablo, said marriage being
bigamous on account of the valid and subsisting marriage between Ma.
Cristina and Pablo, petitioners prayed for (1) the correction of the
entries in Patrick's birth record with respect to his legitimation, the
name of the father and his acknowledgment, and the use of the last
name "Braza"; 2) a directive to submit Patrick to DNA testing to
determine his paternity and filiation; and 3) the declaration of nullity of
the legitimation of Patrick and, for this purpose, the declaration of the
marriage of Lucille and Pablo as bigamous. The trial court dismissed
the petition, holding that in a special proceeding for correction of entry,
the court, which is not acting as a Family Court, has no jurisdiction over
an action to annul the marriage of Lucille and Pablo, impugn the
legitimacy of Patrick, and order Patrick to be subjected to a DNA test.
The controversy should be ventilated in an ordinary adversarial action.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction to annul the marriage
of respondent and impugn legitimacy of respondent’s child in a petition
to correct entries in local civil register
AQUINO, ALYSSA M.
RULING: No. In a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule
108, the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages and rule on
legitimacy and filiation. Under these rules, only correction of clerical,
spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the civil registry
may be allowed. A clerical error is one which is visible to the eyes or
obvious to the understanding; an error made by a clerk or a transcriber;
a mistake in copying or writing, or a harmless change such as a
correction of name that is clearly misspelled or of a misstatement of
the occupation of the parent. Substantial or contentious alterations
may be allowed only in adversarial proceedings, in which all interested
parties are impleaded and due process is properly observed. As
applied, the petitioners seek to nullify the marriage of respondent and
Pablo and impugn their child’s filiation and to subject him to DNA
testing. They contend that these are merely incidental to the main
petition which is correction of entry under Rule 108
The allegations of the petition filed before the TC clearly show that
petitioner’s seek to nullify the marriage between Pablo and Lucille on
the ground that is bigamous and impugn Patrick’s filiation in
connection with which they ask the court to order Patrick to be
subjected to a DNA test.
Herrera v. Alba
G.R. No. 148220, [June 15, 2005], 499 PHIL 185-206.
DOCTRINE: The right against self-incrimination is a prohibition on the
use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communication
(testimonial evidence) from a defendant, not an exclusion of evidence
taken from his body when it may be material.
FACTS: On 14 May 1998, then thirteen-year-old Rosendo Alba
(respondent), represented by his mother Armi Alba, filed before the trial
14
 HENLIN NOTES
court a petition for compulsory recognition, support and damages
against the petitioner. Petitioner denied that he is the biological father
of the respondent. Petitioner also denied physical contact with the
respondent's mother. Respondent filed a motion to direct the taking of
DNA paternity testing to abbreviate the proceedings.
Petitioner opposed DNA paternity testing and contended that it has not
gained acceptability. Petitioner further argued that DNA paternity
testing violates his right against self-incrimination.
The trial court granted respondents motion to conduct DNA paternity
testing on petitioner, respondent and Armi Alba. Petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration and he asserted that under the present
circumstances, the DNA test [he] is compelled to take would be
inconclusive, irrelevant and the coercive process to obtain the requisite
specimen, unconstitutional. The trial court denied petitioner’s MR.
On 18 July 2000, petitioner filed before the appellate court a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Petitioner
maintained his previous objections to the taking of DNA paternity
testing. The appellate court stated that the proposed DNA paternity
testing does not violate his right against self-incrimination because the
right applies only to testimonial compulsion.
ISSUE: Whether or not DNA paternity testing violates the accused’s
right against self- incrimination?
RULING: NO. Section 17, Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution provides
that no person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
Petitioner asserts that obtaining samples from him for DNA testing
violates his right against self-incrimination. Petitioner ignores our
earlier pronouncements that the privilege is applicable only to
testimonial evidence.
AQUINO, ALYSSA M.
Obtaining DNA samples from an accused in a criminal case or from the
respondent in a paternity case, contrary to the belief of respondent in
this action, will not violate the right against self-incrimination. This
privilege applies only to evidence that is communicative in essence
taken under duress. The Supreme Court has ruled that the right against
self- incrimination is just a prohibition on the use of physical or moral
compulsion to extort communication (testimonial evidence) from a
defendant, not an exclusion of evidence taken from his body when it
may be material. As such, a defendant can be required to submit to a
test to extract virus from his body; the substance emitting from the
body of the accused was received as evidence for acts of
lasciviousness; morphine forced out of the mouth was received as
proof; an order by the judge for the witness to put on pair of pants for
size was; and the court can compel a woman accused of adultery to
submit for pregnancy test, since the gist of the privilege is the
restriction on testimonial compulsion.
The policy of the Family Code to liberalize the rule on the investigation
of the paternity and filiation of children, especially of illegitimate
children, is without prejudice to the right of the putative parent to claim
his or her own defenses. Where the evidence to aid this investigation is
obtainable through the facilities of modern science and technology,
such evidence should be considered subject to the limits established by
the law, rules, and jurisprudence.
A. DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE
SECTION 2. Documentary Evidence. — Documents as evidence
consist of writings, recordings, photographs or any material containing
letters, words, sounds, numbers, figures, symbols, or their equivalent,
or other modes of written expression offered as proof of their contents.
Photographs include still pictures, drawings, stored images, x-ray films,
motion pictures or videos.
15
 HENLIN NOTES
What is documentary evidence?
-Consist of writings, recordings, photographs, or any material
containing letters, words, sounds, numbers, figures, symbols, or their
equivalent, or other modes of written expressions offered as proof of
their contents. [Sec. 2, Rule 130] If offered for some other purpose,
they constitute object evidence.
-Photographs include still pictures, drawings, stored images, x-ray
films, motion pictures or videos. [Sec. 2, Rule 130]
QUESTION: What are requites for admissibility for documentary
evidence to be admissible?
ANSWER:
1. It must be relevant
2. It must be authenticated
3. The authentication must be made by a competent witness
4. The object must be formally offered in evidence.
B. 1 ORIGINAL DOCUMENT RULE:
SECTION 3. Original Document Must be Produced; Exceptions. —
When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, writing,
recording, photograph or other record, no evidence is admissible other
than the original document itself, except in the following cases:
(a) When the original is lost or destroyed, or cannot be
produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror’
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of
the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to
produce it after reasonable notice, or the original cannot be obtained by
local judicial processes or procedures;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other
documents which cannot be examined in court without great loss of
time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the
general result of the whole;
AQUINO, ALYSSA M.
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a
public officer or is recorded in a public office; and
€ When the original is not closely-related to a controlling issue.
SECTION 4. Original of Document. —
(a) An "original" of a document is the document itself or any
counterpart intended to have the same effect by a person executing or
issuing it. An "original" of a photograph includes the negative or any
print therefrom. If data is stored in a computer or similar device, any
printout or other output readable by sight or other means, shown to
reflect the data accurately, is an "original."
(b) A "duplicate" is a counterpart produced by the same
impression as the original, or from the same matrix, or by means of
photography, including enlargements and miniatures, or by mechanical
or electronic re- recording, or by chemical reproduction, or by other
equivalent techniques which accurately reproduce the original.
(c) A duplicate is admissible to the same extent as an original
unless (1) a genuine question is raised as to the authenticity of the
original, or (2) in the circumstances, it is unjust or inequitable to admit
the duplicate in lieu of the original.
What is the original document rule?
When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, writing,
recording, photograph, or other record, no evidence is admissible other
than the original document itself [Sec. 3, Rule 130]
Note: Original document rule is a rule on admissibility (competence).
This rule replaced the Best Evidence Rule.
Where the issue is only as to whether such document was actually
executed, or exists, or on the circumstances relevant to or surrounding
its execution, the best evidence rule (now original document rule) does
not apply and testimonial evidence is admissible. Any other
substitutionary evidence is likewise admissible without need for
16
 HENLIN NOTES
accounting for the original. [Republic v. Gimenez, G.R. No. 174673
(2016)]
5 EXCEPTIONS TO THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT RULE:
[IMPORTANT: MEMORIZE] →CLAPCO
1. Original is LOST or DESTROYED or CANNOT be produced in court
without bad faith on the part of the offeror
2. When the original is in custody or under the control of the party
against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce
it after reasonable notice, or the original CANNOT be obtained by
local judicial process or procedures
3. When the original consists of numerous accounts or other
documents which cannot be examined in court without great loss of
time and the fact sought to be established for them is only the general
result of the whole.
4. When the original is a public record in the custody of a public
officer or is recorded in public office.
5. When the original is not closely-related to a controlling issue.
PURPOSE of ODR:
-Applied to prove the contents of a document NOT the truth thereof.
In invoking ODR, they must prove that the originals had been lost or
destroyed [any under CLAPCO] after reasonable diligence and good
faith in searching for them.
Affidavits and depositions are considered as not being the best
evidence, hence not admissible if the affiants or deponents are
available as witnesses
The best evidence rule (now original document rule) does not apply to
all types of evidence. It does not comprehend object and testimonial
evidence.
AQUINO, ALYSSA M.
Meaning of Original Document and Duplicate
Original—the document itself or any counterpart intended to have the
same effect by a person executing or issuing it.
An “original” of a photograph includes the negative or any print
therefrom.
If data is stored in a computer or similar device, any printout or
other output readable by sight or other means, shown to reflect the
data accurately, is an “original”. [Sec. 4, Rule 130]
Duplicate—counterpart produced by:
a. the same impression as the original, or from the same matrix;
b. means of photography, including enlargements and miniatures;
c. mechanical or electronic recording;
d. chemical reproduction;
e. or other equivalent techniques which accurately reproduce the
original.
General Rule: A duplicate is admissible to the same extent as an
original.
Exceptions:
1. a general question is raised as to the authenticity of the
original; or
2. in the circumstances, it is unjust or inequitable to admit the
duplicate in lieu of the original.
Berboso v. Cabral
G.R. No. 204617, [July 10, 2017], 813 PHIL 405-423.
FACTS: The case is all about the subject land awarded to Alejandro by
the DAR through PD 27 and by virtue of CLT. This was registered in RD
of Meycauyan, Bulacan. Alejandro then fully complied with all the
requirements for the final grant of title and the RD of Meycauyan,
17
 HENLIN NOTES
Bulacan prepared and issue the TCT in the name of Alejandro.
Respondent in this case filed with the DAR PARAB to cancel the EP
Nos. 445829 ad 445830. Alejandro died and was substituted by his
heirs. TCT Nos. EP-46 and EP 47 were cancelled and were replaced by
TCT Nos. 263885 (M) and 263886 (M) in the name of the heirs of
Alejandro. The PARAB decided in favor of Alejandro regarding the
validity pf EP Nos. 445829 and EP Nos. 445830 hence, respondent
Cabral appeal to the DARAB but was denied. Cabral then elevated the
case to CA but the CA affirmed the decision of PARAB and DARAB.
Hence, the respondent brought the case to the Supreme Court. The
Supreme Court denied with finality the MR of respondent. The PARAB
granted the second petition of respondent and petitioner in this case
appealed the PARAB’s decision to DARAB which was granted.
Respondent appealed the decision of DARAB to CA and the latter
reversed the DARAB and reinstated PARAB’s decision. Hence, this
petition
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent was able to prove that petitioner
violated prohibition on the sale of the subject land?
RULING: The court ruled that respondent failed to prove that petitioner
violated the prohibition on the sale of subject land. The basic rule on
evidence provides that each party must prove their affirmative
allegation. It is the party who alleges the affirmative fact has the
burden of proving the same because mere allegation of fact is not
considered evidence. In the given case, it was the respondent who
alleged that petitioner sold the portion of the subject land to Fernando
as evidenced by Kasunduan. Here, respondent must prove that the sale
actually existed between Fernando and petitioner and it should not
petitioner who will prove that there is no sale. The court found that the
Kasunduan was just a photocopy and hence, it cannot be admitted to
prove contents. For a documentary evidence, the best evidence to
produced is the contents of the document by providing the production
of the document itself to the exclusion of the secondary or
AQUINO, ALYSSA M.
substitutionary evidence. In rule 130, Section 5 of the rules of court, it
provides that the offeror may prove the original document by a copy or
recital of its content in some authentic document. It can also be by
testimony of witnesses in the order stated. However, in this case,
responded failed to prove the original existence of Kasunduan. In the
same way, respondent failed to explain why there is only a photocopy
of the Kasunduan. Further, the respondent failed to prove the contents
of Kasunduan as stated in the rule of court. Therefore, the Kasunduan
cannot be admitted to prove that there is indeed a sale between
petitioner and Fernando.
GUMABON V. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK
G.R. NO. 202514, [JULY 25, 2016]
FACTS: Anna Marie filed a complaint against PNB and PNB manager
Silverio Fernandez. The case was rooted from PNB’s refusal to release
Anna Marie from the consolidated savings account in a two foreign
exchange time deposits. Anna Marie together with her mother and
Gumabons siblings deposited with PNB Delta Branch. Anna Marie
decided to consolidate the eight savings accounts from The Gumabons
and to withdraw P 2, 727, 235.85 to help her sister’s financial needs.
Anna Marie called Salvoro to facilitiate the consolidation and
withdrawal. She presented her two FXCTDs and after a month, the PNB
finally consolidated the savings accounts and issued a passbook. Anna
Marie executed a Deed of Waiver and Quitclaim to settle all the
questions regarding the consolidation of saving accounts.
The PNB sent letters to anna Marie informing her that the bank is
refusing to honor its obligation under FXCTD and that the bank is
withholding the release of the balance of the consolidated savings
account. The PNB argued that Anna Marie, pre-terminated, withdrew
and or debited the sums against her deposit. Anna Marie filed before
he RTC a complaint for sum of money and damages against PNB and
Fernandez.
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 HENLIN NOTES
The RTC ruled in favor of Anna Marie. On appeal the CA reversed the
RTC ruling. Hence, the present petititon.
ISSUE: Whether or not PNB established the fact of payment to Anna
Marie
RULING: The court ruled that PNB failed to establish the fact of
payment to Anna Marie in FXCTD Nos. 993902 and 993992 an SA No.
6121200. It is a settled rule in evidence that the one who alleges the
payment has the burden of proving it. In the same way, the burden of
proving that the debt had been discharged by payment rest on the
debtor once the debt’s existence is fully established by the evidence on
record. In this case, it is the PNB who has the burden of proving
payment. The PNB alleged that it had already paid the balance of
consolidated savings account. That it presented to Anna Marie the
manager’s check to prove that Anna Marie purchased the check using
the amounts covered y Gumabon’s two savings account. The bank also
presented miscellaneous ticket to prove that Anna Marie’s withdrawal
from savings account. The RTC denied these evidence since it was
mere photocopy. The rules of court provide that the evidence to be
admissible, the same must met the two qualifications, which includes
relevance and competence. In relation to this, the rules of court provide
that the best evidence rule provides that the original copy of the
document must be given whenever the content of document is under
inquiry.
CALIMAG V. HEIRS OF MACAPAZ
GR. NO. 191936
FACTS: Virginia Calimag co-owned a property with Silvestra Macapaz.
The said property was duly registered to Calimag and Silvestra. It
appeared in the certificate of title an annotation of an Adverse Claim of
Fidela, spouse of Silvestra’s brother, Anastacio, Sr. It was asserted
AQUINO, ALYSSA M.
therein the rights and interests of Fidela over a portion of the said
property.
In November 2002, Silvestra died without issue. The certificate of title
under Calimag and Silvestra was then cancelled and a new one was
issued in the name of Calimag by virtue of a Deed of Sale whereby
Silvestra allegedly sold her portion to the former. An affidavit
purportedly executed by Calimag and Silvestra was submitted for the
purpose of cancelling the original title. It was stated therein that the
affidavit of adverse claim filed by Fidela was not signed by the Deputy
Register of Deeds of Makati City, making the same legally ineffective.
In September 2005, Fidela passed away.
In December 2005, Anastacio, Jr., one of the children of Anastacio, Sr.
and Fidela, filed a criminal complaint for falsification of public
documents against Calimag. Said criminal charges was later on
dismissed. Asserting that they are the heirs of Silvestra, Anastacio, Jr.
and Alicia instituted an action for the annulment of deed of sale and for
the cancellation of title against Calimag. In her answer, Calimag
averred that Anastacio, Jr. and Alicia have no legal capacity to institute
said civil action on the ground that they are illegitimate children of
Anastacio, Sr.
In September 2007, the RTC ruled in favor of Anastacio, Jr. and Alicia
declaring the Deed of Sale null and void and ordering the Registry of
Deeds to cancel the title issued in the name of Calimag and to reinstate
the title in the name of Calimag and Silvestra. It found that the Deed of
Sale was a forgery considering that Silvestra died about three years
before the execution of the Deed of Sale. On the issue of legal capacity,
the RTC stated that the marriage between Anastacio, Sr. and Fidela is
evidenced by the certificate of marriage. In the birth certificates of
Anastacio, Jr. and Alicia, Fidela and Anastacio, Sr. were indicated as the
mother and the father. In October 2009, the CA affirmed the decision of
the RTC. It sustained the RTC ruling that the cancellation of the original
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 HENLIN NOTES
title and the issuance of the new one was obtained through forgery.
The CA likewise concurred with the ruling of the trial court sustaining
the legitimate filiation of Anastacio, Jr. and Alicia to Silvestra’s brother,
Anastacio, Sr. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether Anastacio, Jr. and Alicia are legitimate heirs of
Anastacio, Sr. and Fidela.
RULING: YES. The documents presented as proof of marriage between
Anastacio, Sr. and Fidela, namely: (1) fax or photocopy of the marriage
contract and (2) canonical certificate of marriage, cannot be used as
legal basis to establish the fact of marriage without running afoul with
the Rules on Evidence of the Revised Rules of Court. On the other
hand, a canonical certificate of marriage is not a public document. They
are private writings and their authenticity must therefore be proved as
are all other private writings in accordance with the rules of evidence.
Accordingly, since there is no showing that the authenticity and due
execution of the canonical certificate of marriage of Anastacio, Sr. and
Fidela was duly proven, it cannot be admitted in evidence.
Notwithstanding, it is well-settled that other proofs can be offered to
establish the fact of a solemnized marriage. Jurisprudence teaches that
the fact of marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other than the
marriage certificate. Hence, even a person’s birth certificate may be
recognized as competent evidence of the marriage between his
parents.
Thus, in order to prove their legitimate filiation, the respondents
presented their respective Certificates of Live Birth issued by the
National Statistics Office where Fidela signed as the Informant in item
no. 17 of both documents.
A certificate of live birth is a public document that consists of entries
(regarding the facts of birth) in public records (Civil Registry) made in
AQUINO, ALYSSA M.
the performance of a duty by a public officer (Civil Registrar).” Thus,
being public documents, the respondents’ certificates of live birth are
presumed valid, and are prima facie evidence of the truth of the facts
stated in them.
The Court finds that the Anastacio, Jr.’s and Alicia’s certificates of live
birth were duly executed consistent with the provision of the law
respecting the registration of birth of legitimate children. The fact that
only the signatures of Fidela appear on said documents is of no
moment because Fidela only signed as the declarant or informant of
Anastacio, Jr.’s and Alicia’s fact of birth as legitimate children.
Nonetheless, the certificates of live birth also intimate that Anastacio,
Sr. and Fidela had openly cohabited as husband and wife for a number
of years, as a result of which they had two children — the second child,
Anastacio, Jr. being born more than three years after their first child,
Alicia. Verily, such a fact is admissible proof to establish the validity of
marriage.
PEOPLE V. MABALO Y BACANI
G.R. NO. 238839, [FEBRUARY 27, 2019].
DOCTRINE: Without the Certificate of Live Birth and other means by
which AAA’s age as alleged in the Information could have been
ascertained beyond doubt, the Court is constrained to agree with the
CA and deem the crime committed as Simple Rape.
A victim of rape would not come out in the open if her motive were
anything other than to obtain justice. Her testimony as to who abused
her is credible where she has absolutely no motive to incriminate and
testify against the accused.
FACTS: An information was filed against Anthony Mabalo y Bacani for
the crime of rape. Mabalo sexually assaulted AAA and when AAA told
her mother about the incident, they went to the station and executed a
20
 HENLIN NOTES
sworn statement. AAA was then given a general physical examination
and an anogenital examination at the Philippine General Hospital. The
Final Medico-legal Report yielded the following findings: “anogenital
findings are diagnostic of blunt force or penetrating trauma.” During his
arraignment, Mabalo pleaded not guilty.
During the trial, the prosecution presented the testimonies of AAA, the
police officers and the medico legal. Mabalo denied raping AAA
claiming that he was selling breakfast meals during the time the
incident happened.
In September 2016, the RTC rendered its judgment finding Mabalo
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged against him. In
October 2018, the CA, upon appeal of Mabalo, dismissed the same and
found the latter guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Simple
Rape. It ruled that even though the prosecution failed to prove that AAA
was a minor at the time the incident took place, appellant may still be
convicted of simple rape as all the elements of the said crime have
been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether the prosecution failed to establish AAA’s minority.
(2) Whether AAA’s testimony is credible.
RULING:
(1) No. Although the Information alleged that AAA was 14 years old at
the time of the incident, no proof was presented to attest the truth of
such statement.
Without the Certificate of Live Birth and other means by which AAA’s
age as alleged in the Information could have been ascertained beyond
doubt, the Court is constrained to agree with the CA and deem the
crime committed as Simple Rape.
AQUINO, ALYSSA M.
(2) Yes. The determination of the credibility of the offended party’s
testimony is a most basic consideration in every prosecution for rape,
for the lone testimony of the victim, if credible, is sufficient to sustain
the verdict of conviction. As in most rape cases, the ultimate issue in
this case is credibility. In this regard, when the issue is one of
credibility of witnesses, appellate courts will generally not disturb the
findings of the trial court, considering that the latter is in a better
position to decide the question as it heard the witnesses themselves
and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during trial.
The exceptions to the rule are when such evaluation was reached
arbitrarily, or when the trial court overlooked, misunderstood or
misapplied some facts or circumstance of weight and substance which
could affect the result of the case. Here, AAA related her painful ordeal
in a clear and unwavering manner.
In addition, such positive identification of the appellant as the one who
raped her is corroborated by the result of the medico-legal examination
conducted on her.
Again, it must be remembered that, when a woman says that she has
been raped, she says, in effect, all that is necessary to show that she
has indeed been raped. A victim of rape would not come out in the
open if her motive were anything other than to obtain justice. Her
testimony as to who abused her is credible where she has absolutely
no motive to incriminate and testify against the accused.
SPOUSES PARAS V. KIMWA CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT
CORP.
G.R. NO. 171601, [APRIL 8, 2015]
DOCTRINE: Two (2) things must be established for parol evidence to
be admitted: first, that the existence of any of the four (4) exceptions
has been put in issue in a party’s pleading or has not been objected to
by the adverse party; and second, that the parol evidence sought to be
21
 HENLIN NOTES
presented serves to form the basis of the conclusion proposed by the
presenting party.
FACTS: Paras was a concessionaire of sand and gravel while Kimwa is
a construction firm that sells aggregates in Cebu. Based on their
petition, Kimwa allegedly asked that it be “assured” of 40,000 cubic
meters worth of aggregates. Lucia countered that her concession area
was due to be rechanneled on May 15, 1995, when her Special Permit
expires. Therefore, Lucia emphasized that she would only be willing to
enter into a contract with Kimwa PROVIDED that they would be able to
haul 40,000 cubic meters of aggregates. Kimwa subsequently reassured
Luca that it will only take 2-3 months to haul the aggregates.
However, Kimwa was able to extract and haul 10,000 cubic meters of
aggregates. After extracting and hauling this quantity, Kimwa allegedly
transferred to the concession area of a certain Mrs. Remedios dela
Torre in violation of their Agreement and stopped hauling the remaining
30,000 cubic meters of aggregates. Paras addressed demand letters to
Kimwa but it was unheeded. Kimwa, on the other hand, asserted that
the Agreement articulated the parties’ true intent that 40,000 cubic
meters was a maximum limit and that May 15, 1995 was never set as a
deadline. Invoking the Parol Evidence Rule, they insisted that Spouses
Paras were barred from introducing evidence which would show that
the parties had agreed differently.
The Regional Trial Court rendered the Decision in favor of Spouses
Paras. The Agreement stipulated that the allotted aggregates were set
aside exclusively for Kimwa. They also held that it is contrary to human
experience for Kimwa to enter into an agreement with Lucia without
verifying their authority as a concessionaire. Also, based on her special
permit, Lucia’s authority expires in 6 months and that Kimwa must have
been informed that it would need 40,000 cubic meters of aggregates
before its expiry. As they failed to haul 30,000 cubic meters of
aggregates, the RTC held that Kimwa is liable for a total sum of
AQUINO, ALYSSA M.
P720,000.00 which is the remaining amount of aggregates they failed to
deliver.
However, on appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the Regional Trial
Court’s Decision. It faulted the trial court for basing its findings on
evidence presented which were supposedly in violation of the Parol
Evidence Rule. It noted that the Agreement was clear that Kimwa was
under no obligation to haul 40,000 cubic meters of aggregates by May
15, 1995. In a subsequent Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied
reconsideration to Spouses Paras. Hence, the petition.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT KIMWA IS LIABLE FOR THEIR FAILURE TO
HAUL THE REMAINING AGGREGATES WHICH VIOLATES THEIR THE
AGREEMENT
RULING: Yes. Respondent Kimwa is liable for failing to haul the
remainder of the quantity which it was obliged to acquire from
petitioner Lucia Paras. As provided under Rule 130, Section 9 of the
Revised Rules on Evidence provides for the Parol Evidence Rule, the
rule on admissibility of documentary evidence when the terms of an
agreement have been reduced into writing.
However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the
terms of written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading:
(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written
agreement;
(b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and
agreement of the parties thereto;
(c) The validity of the written agreement; or
(d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their
successors in interest after the execution of the written agreement. The
term “agreement” includes wills.
22
 HENLIN NOTES
This, however, is merely a general rule. Provided that a party puts in
issue in its pleading any of the four (4) items enumerated in the second
paragraph of Rule 130, Section 9, “a party may present evidence to
modify, explain or add to the terms of the agreement[.]” Raising any of
these items as an issue in a pleading such that it falls under the
exception is not limited to the party initiating an action.
In sum, two (2) things must be established for parol evidence to be
admitted:
First, that the existence of any of the four (4) exceptions has
been put in issue in a party’s pleading or has not been objected to by
the adverse party; and
Second, that the parol evidence sought to be presented serves
to form the basis of the conclusion proposed by the presenting party.
Contrary to the Court of Appeal’s conclusion, Petitioners Spouses Paras
pleaded in the Complaint they filed before the trial court a mistake or
imperfection in the Agreement, as well as the Agreement’s failure to
express the true intent of the parties. Further, respondent Kimwa,
through its Answer, also responded to petitioners Spouses Paras’
pleading of these issues. This is, thus, an exceptional case allowing
admission of parol evidence.
Considering how the Agreement’s mistake, imperfection, or supposed
failure to express the parties’ true intent was successfully put in issue
in petitioners Spouses Paras’ Complaint (and even responded to by
respondent Kimwa in its Answer), this case falls under the exceptions
provided by Rule 130, Section 9 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.
Accordingly, the testimonial and documentary parol evidence sought to
be introduced by petitioners Spouses Paras, which attest to these
supposed flaws and what they aver to have been the parties’ true
intent, may be admitted and considered.
AQUINO, ALYSSA M.
In the Pre-Trial Order that was issued by the RTC, respondent admitted
being issued a copy of petitioner’s Special Permit. Having been
admittedly furnished a copy of this Special Permit, respondent Kimwa
was well aware that a total of only about 40,000 cubic meters of
aggregates may be extracted by petitioner Lucia from the permitted
area, and that petitioner Lucia Paras' operations cannot extend beyond
May 15, 1995, when the Special Permit expires. The condition that the
Special Permit shall be valid for only six (6) months from November 14,
1994 lends credence to petitioners Spouses Paras' assertion that, in
entering into the Agreement with respondent Kimwa, petitioner Lucia
Paras did so because of respondent Kimwa's promise that hauling can
be completed by May 15, 1995.
Bound as she was by the Special Permit, petitioner Lucia Paras needed
to make it eminently clear to any party she was transacting with that
she could supply aggregates only up to May 15, 1995 and that the other
party's hauling must be completed by May 15, 1995. She was merely
acting with due diligence, for otherwise, any contract she would enter
into would be negated; any commitment she would make beyond May
15, 1995 would make her guilty of misrepresentation. Evidence
supports petitioners Spouses Paras' position that respondent Kimwa
was obliged to haul 40,000 cubic meters of aggregates on or before
May 15, 1995. As it admittedly hauled only 10,000 cubic meters,
respondent Kimwa is liable for breach of contract in respect of the
remaining 30,000 cubic meters.
SHEMBERG MARKETING CORP. V. CITIBANK
G.R. NO. 216029, [SEPTEMBER 4, 2019].
DOCTRINE: Under the Parol Evidence Rule, the terms of a written
contract are deemed conclusive between the parties and evidence
aliunde is inadmissible to change the terms embodied in the document.
However, this is not absolute. There are 4 exceptions to the Parol
Evidence Rule:
23
 HENLIN NOTES
A. An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written
agreement;
B. The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and
agreement of the parties thereto
C. The validity of the written agreement;
D. The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their
successors in interest after the execution of the written agreement
FACTS: In 1996, Shemberg Marketing Corporation executed a real
estate mortgage over a parcel of land in Mandaue City to secure loan
accommodations amounting to P28,242,000 in favor of Citibank.
Eventually, Citibank sent a demand letter to Shemberg requiring the
latter to pay its outstanding balance under the promissory note they
issued or otherwise foreclosure proceedings will be initiated.
However, Shemberg defaulted in payments and an extrajudicial sale of
the lot was made. Upon learning such, Shemberg filed a complaint to
nullify the contract of real estate mortgage arguing that it is void for
lack of consideration since Citibank failed to comply with its
commitment to renew and increase their credit line in the bank.
Citibank, on the other hand, argued that they required the execution of
the real estate mortgage in order to provide additional security due to
their subsisting chattel mortgage. Shemberg also had an outstanding
balance of USD 390,000 (PHP 28,242,000.00). RTC ruled that the
mortgage is void due to lack of consideration HOWEVER, CA reversed
such. They argued that the real estate mortgage is valid and it secured
Shemberg’s present and future obligations with the bank. At the time of
the mortgage, Shemberg had an existing obligation totalling to
P58,232,200.00
ISSUE: WHETHER THE REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE IS VALID AND
BINDING BETWEEN THE PARTIES
AQUINO, ALYSSA M.
RULING: Yes. The real estate mortgage was executed to secure loan
accommodations to Shemberg who currently owes PHP58,232,200 to
Citibank. It only means that in case of default, Citibank can enforce the
mortgage to the maximum amount of P28,242,000.00, which is the total
liquidation value of the mortgaged properties. The court finds no merit
to Shemberg’s contention that the real consideration for the real estate
mortgage was the renewal and increase of its credit line to the bank.
Under Sec. 9 Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, it is provided that:
Evidence of written agreements. – When the terms of an agreement
have been reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the
terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their
successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the
contents of the written agreement.
Under the Parol Evidence Rule, the terms of a written contract are
deemed conclusive between the parties and evidence aliunde is
inadmissible to change the terms embodied in the document. However,
this is not absolute. There are 4 exceptions to the Parol Evidence Rule:
A. An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written
agreement;
B. The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and
agreement of the parties thereto
C. The validity of the written agreement;
D. The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their
successors in interest after the execution of the written agreement
In this case, the first and second exception do not apply because the
real estate mortgage contract was able to clearly and succinctly state
the terms of the mortgage. The third one also does not apply because
the purpose of Shemberg is not to invalidate the contract, but rather,
show that Citibank failed in their commitment to increase their credit
line. Lastly, the fourth one also does not apply because there is no
24
 HENLIN NOTES
other agreement or terms apart from what was indicated in the real
estate mortgage contract.
Therefore, the decision of the CA stands. The real estate mortgage are
binding and conclusive on both parties.
B.2 SECONDARY EVIDENCE
SECTION 5. When Original Document is Unavailable. — When the
original document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in
court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the
cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his or her part, may
prove its contents by a copy, or by recital of its contents in some
authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order
stated.
SECTION 6. When Original Document is in Adverse Party's Custody or
Control. — If the document is in the custody or under the control of the
adverse party, he or she must have reasonable notice to produce it. If
after such notice and after satisfactory proof of its existence, he or she
fails to produce the document, secondary evidence may be presented
as in the case of its loss.
SECTION 7. Summaries. — When the contents of documents, records,
photographs, or numerous accounts are voluminous and cannot be
examined in court without great loss of time, and the fact sought to be
established is only the general result of the whole, the contents of such
evidence may be presented in the form of a chart, summary, or
calculation.
The originals shall be available for examination or copying, or both, by
the adverse party at a reasonable time and place. The court may order
that they be produced in court. (n)
AQUINO, ALYSSA M.
SECTION 8. Evidence Admissible When Original Document is a
Public Record. — When the original of a document is in the custody of
a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be
proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody
thereof.
SECTION 9. Party Who Calls for Document Not Bound to Offer It. —
A party who calls for the production of a document and inspects the
same is not obliged to offer it as evidence.
The following are the exceptions to the original document rule:
1. When the original is unavailable
-When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in
court;
-Upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its
unavailability; and
-Without bad faith on the offeror’s part
What to present to prove contents (in this order)
1. A copy;
2. A recital of its contents in some authentic document; or
3. The testimony of witnesses [Rule 130, Sec. 5]
As an exception, what secondary evidence may be admitted when
the original document is voluminous?
-Evidence in the form of a chart, summary, or calculation, presenting
the contents of the original chart may be admitted.
How may a public document be proved?
-If it is in the custody of a public officer then its contents may be
proved by a certified true copy issued by the public officer in custody
thereof.
25
 HENLIN NOTES
As an exception, what secondary evidence may be allowed when
the original document is a public record?
-Certified copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof may be
allowed.
ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE:
-Information or the representation of information, data, figures,
symbols, or other modes of written expression, described, or however
presented, by which a right is established or an obligation is
extinguished.
Electronic data message: information generated, sent, received or
stored by electronic, optical, or similar means.
What is the probative value of electronic documents?
It is the functional equivalent of a paper based document.
How is electronic evidence proved?
-The admissibility and evidentiary weight of an electronic evidence may
be established by an affidavit stating facts of direct personal
knowledge of the affiant or based on authentic records.
-The affidavit must affirmatively show the competence of the affiant to
testify on the matters contained therein.
How may the authenticity of electronic documents be proved?
1. By evidence that it had been digitally signed by the person purported
to have signed the same.
2. By evidence that other appropriate security procedures or devices
may be authorized by the SC or by law for authentication of electronic
documents were applied to the document.
3. By other evidence showing its integrity and reliability to the
satisfaction of the judge.
AQUINO, ALYSSA M.
May an audio, photographic, and video evidence of acts be
admissible?
-Yes, provided it shall be shown, presented, or displayed to the court
and shall be identified, explained, or authenticated by the person who
made the recording or by some other person competent to testify on
the accuracy thereof.
IMPORTANT:
What should a party comply with in order that secondary evidence
may be presented?
1. Existence
2. Execution
3. Loss or destruction of the original OR the reason for its non-
production in court
4. Contents [on the part of the offeror, the absence of bad faith to
which the unavailability of the original can be attributed]
B.3 PAROL EVIDENCE RULE
SECTION 10. Evidence of Written Agreements. — When the terms of
an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is considered as
containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, as between the
parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms
other than the contents of the written agreement.
However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the
terms of the written agreement if he or she puts in issue in a verified
pleading:
a. An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written
agreement;
b. The failure of the written agreement to express the true
intent and agreement of the parties thereto;
c. The validity of the written agreement; or
26
 HENLIN NOTES
d. The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their
successors in interest after the execution of the written agreement.
The term "agreement" includes wills.
Parol evidence
When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is
considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be,
between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of
such terms other than the contents of the written agreements.
General Rule
When the terms of an agreement (including wills) have been reduced to
writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and
there can be, as between the parties and their successors in interest,
no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written
agreement [Sec. 10, Rule 130]
The parol evidence rule forbids any addition to or contradiction of the
terms of a written instrument by testimony or other evidence purporting
to show that, at or before the execution of the parties' written
agreement, other or different terms were agreed upon by the parties,
varying the purport of the written contract. [Felix Plazo Urban Poor
Settlers v. Lipat, G.R. No. 182409 (2017)]
Where not applicable
It does not apply when third parties are involved or those not privy to
the written instrument in question and does not base a claim or assent
a right originating in the instrument [Lechugas v. C.A., G.R. No. L-
39972 & L-40300 (1986)]
b. When Parol Evidence Can Be Introduced
AQUINO, ALYSSA M.
How Parol Evidence Can Be Introduced General rule: Ground/s for
presenting parol evidence is put in issue in a verified pleading [Sec. 10,
Rule 130]
Exception: If the facts in the pleadings all lead to the fact that it is
being put in issue then the Parol Evidence exception may apply [Sps.
Paras v. Kimwa Corporation, G. R. No. 171601 (2015)]
In sum, two (2) things must be established for parol evidence to be
admitted:
1. That the existence of any of the four (4) exceptions has been
put in issue in a party's pleading or has not been objected to by
the adverse party; and
2. That the parol evidence sought to be presented serves to form
the basis of the conclusion proposed by the presenting party.
[Sps. Paras v. Kimwa Corporation, G. R. No. 171601 (2015)]
(Formally introduce evidence)
IMPORTANT: When Can Parole Evidence Can Be Introduced
1. Intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written
agreement
2. Failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and
agreement of the parties thereto
3. Validity of the written agreement
4. Existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their
successors-in-interest after the execution of the written
agreement.
INTRINSIC AMBIGUITY, MISTAKE OR IMPERFECTION IN THE
WRITTEN AGREEMENT
27
 HENLIN NOTES
Intrinsic ambiguity (latent)– writing admits of two constructions, both 5. Fraud in inducement
of which are in harmony with the language used [Ignacio v. Rementeria,
99 Phil. 1054 ORIGINAL DOCUMENT RULE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE
Contemplates the situation Presupposes that the original
The document is clear on its face, but matters outside the agreement wherein the original writing is not document is available in court
create the ambiguity (Ex. “I bequeath this land to my cousin George.” available and/or there is a
However, the testator has two cousins named George) dispute as to whether said
writing is the original
Note: American jurisprudence also refers to a situation where an Prohibits the introduction of Prohibits the varying of the terms
ambiguity partakes of the nature of both patent and latent ambiguity, substitutionary evidence in lieu of a written agreement
that is, an intermediate ambiguity, because the words of the writing, of the original document
though seemingly clear and with a settled meaning, is actually regardless of WON it varies the
equivocal and admits of two interpretations. Parol evidence, in such a contents of the original
case is admissible to clarify the ambiguity. Applies to all kinds of writings, Applies only to documents
recordings, photographs, or any contractual in nature and to wills
Mistake refers to mistake of fact which is mutual to the parties [BPI v. material containing letters,
Fidelity and Surety, Co., G.R. No. L-26743 (1927)] words, sounds, numbers, figures,
symbols, or their equivalent, or
Imperfection includes an inaccurate statement in the agreement or other modes of written
incompleteness in the writing, or the presence of inconsistent expression offered as proof of
provisions [2 Regalado 732, 2008 Ed.] their contents
Can be invoked by any party to Can be invoked only when the
FAILURE OF THE WRITTEN AGREEMENT TO EXPRESS THE TRUE an action regardless of WON controversy is between the
INTENT AND AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES THERETO such party participated in the parties to the written agreement,
writing involved their privies or any party directly
Purpose affected thereby.
To enable court to ascertain the true intention of the parties
Does PER apply only to the parties in a document?
VALIDITY OF THE WRITTEN AGREEMENT No. It applies to parties and their successors-in-interest (like privies of
Parol evidence may be admitted to show: persons that would be direct affected by the document)

1. True consideration of a contract PER V. Statute of frauds

2. Want/Illegality of consideration SOF: Instances where the document can no longer be presented
3. Incapacity of parties PER: Question is only to vary and contradict the terms of an agreement.
4. Fictitious/absolutely simulated contract

AQUINO, ALYSSA M. 28
 HENLIN NOTES
[PER is NOT applicable in receipts; it is only an evidence of the fact of
payment. ]
What is authentication?
-It is the process of proving the due execution and genuineness of a
private document
What are the kinds of documents?
-Public
-Private
What is a public document?
1. Written official acts or records of the sovereign authority,
official bodies, and tribunals and public officers, whether of the
Philippines of a foreign country.
2. Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last
wills and statements
3. Documents that are considered public documents under
treaties and conventions which are in force between the PH and the
country source.
4. Public records, kept in the Philippines, or private documents
required by law to be entered therein.
What is a private document?
-It is any document which is not considered a public one.
When must a private writing be authenticated?
-When it is offered in evidence as authentic
Does the language in which a document is written affects its
admissibility?
-Yes. If a document is written in an unofficial language, it shall not be
AQUINO, ALYSSA M.
admitted as evidence unless accompanied with a transaction into
English or Filipino.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK V. CUA
G.R. NO. 199161, [APRIL 18, 2018].
DOCTRINE: Rule 130, Section 9 (10) of the Rules of Court provides for
the parol evidence rule which states that when the terms of an
agreement have been reduced into writing, it is considered as
containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the
parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms
other than the contents of the written agreement. This rule admits
exceptions. A party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to
the terms of a written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading any
of the following:
(a) an intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written
agreement; (b) the failure of the written agreement to express the true
intent and agreement of the parties thereto;
(c) the validity of the written agreement; or
(d) the existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their
successors- in-interest after the execution of the written agreement.
However, to overcome the presumption that the written agreement
contains all the terms of the agreement, the parol evidence must be
clear and convincing and of such sufficient credibility as to overturn the
written agreement
However, to overcome the presumption that the written agreement
contains all the terms of the agreement, the parol evidence must be
clear and convincing and of such sufficient credibility as to overturn the
written agreement.
FACTS: On 9 February 2005, herein respondent James T. Cua (James)
filed a Complaint for Sum of Money with Damages against herein
29
 HENLIN NOTES
petitioner Philippine National Bank (PNB). In said Complaint, James
averred that since 1996, he and his brother, Antonio T. Cua (Antonio)
maintained a US Dollar Savings Time Deposit with PNB, Sucat,
Parañaque branch, evidenced by Certificate of Time Deposit (CTD) No.
B-630178 issued on 9 December 2002 and which replaced CTD No. B-
658788. CTD No. B-630178 has a face value of US$50,860.53. James
continued that he and Antonio had the practice of pre- signing loan
application documents with PNB for the purpose of having a standby
loan or ready money available anytime.
On 6 May 2004, James learned that he had a loan obligation with PNB
which had allegedly become due and demandable. He maintained,
however, that although he had pre-signed loan documents for pre-
arranged loans with his time deposit as collateral, he had never availed
of its proceeds. Sometime in September 2004, to see if his dollar time
deposit was still existing and in order to revive his cash-strapped
machine shop business, James requested from PNB the release of
P500,000.00 to be secured by CTD No. B- 630178. To his surprise, PNB
rejected his loan application which refusal, he claims, caused damage
and prejudice in terms of lost business opportunity and loss of income
in the amount of more or less P1,000,000.00.
James inquired about the reason for the denial of his application. In a
letter-reply dated 17 November 2004, PNB, through its vice president,
explained that his dollar time deposit had been applied in payment to
the loans he had with the bank, in accordance with the loan application
and other documents he had executed.
James then demanded release of his entire dollar deposit asserting that
he never made use of any loan amount from his pre-arranged loan, and
that it was in September 2004 that he requested for the release of the
proceeds of his pre-arranged loan. However, PNB averred in its Answer
that James already made use of his hold-out facility and received
proceeds of his loan. PNB further denied James' allegation that he
AQUINO, ALYSSA M.
merely pre-signed the loan documents in order to have a stand-by loan.
As its affirmative defense, PNB claimed that James, in fact, applied for
and was extended four (4) separate loans, and it was only upon failure
of James to pay upon demand was his time deposit applied to his loan.
Trial on the merits ensued, and James testified alleging that he did not
sign any document evidence receipt of the loan. While PNB presented
two witnesses that testified on various dates that James entered into
loan transactions with PNB and presented promissory notes allegedly
signed by James. The lower court ruled in favor of James stating that
that the burden of proof shifted from James to PNB when the latter
asserted an affirmative defense – that the loan proceeds were released
to James and, thus, PNB properly applied his time deposit as payment
of his unpaid loan in accordance with the provisions of the promissory
note. PNB, however, failed to substantiate this affirmative defense,
which was further affirmed by the CA. Hence, the petition for review
filed by PNB.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent was able to prove by clear and
conclusive evidence sufficient to overthrow the presumption that the
written agreement contains all the terms of the agreement by parol
evidence.
RULING: No, the respondent was not able to prove by clear and
convincing evidence the presumption that the written agreement
contains all the terms of the agreement. In fact, James does not deny
that he executed several promissory notes in favor of PNB, albeit that
the promissory notes were pre-signed. However, nothing in the
promissory notes would suggest that it was executed merely to secure
future loans. In fact, it is clear from the wordings used therein that
James acknowledged receipt of the proceeds of the loan. The said
promissory note provides:
30
 HENLIN NOTES
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, I/We, solidarily promise to pay to the order of
the PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK (the "BANK") on the stipulated due
date/s the sum of Pesos DOLLARS: FIFTY THOUSAND ONLY (P
$50,000.00 ) (the "Loan"), together with interest at 3.85% p.a. per
annum.
A promissory note is a solemn acknowledgment of a debt and a formal
commitment to repay it on the date and under the conditions agreed
upon by the borrower and the lender.
A person who signs such an instrument is bound to honor it as a
legitimate obligation duly assumed by him through the signature he
affixes thereto as a token of his good faith. If he reneges on his promise
without cause, he forfeits the sympathy and assistance of this Court
and deserves instead its sharp repudiation. The promissory note is the
best evidence to prove the existence of the loan.
To overcome the presumption that the written agreement contains all
the terms of the agreement, the parol evidence must be clear and
convincing and of such sufficient credibility as to overturn the written
agreement.
In this case, James' uncorroborated allegation that the loan documents
were merely pre- signed for future loans is far from being the clear and
convincing evidence necessary to defeat the terms of the written
instrument. Thus, there is no reason to deviate from the terms of the
loan as appearing on PN No. 0011628152240006. Consequently, the
trial and appellate courts erred when they considered James'
unsubstantiated claim over the terms of the promissory note and ruled
that PNB failed to prove James' receipt of the loan proceeds.
4. Interpretation of Documents
AQUINO, ALYSSA M.
SECTION11. Interpretation of a Writing According to Its Legal
Meaning. — The language of a writing is to be interpreted according to
the legal meaning it bears in the place of its execution, unless the
parties intended otherwise.
SECTION12. Instrument Construed so as to Give Effect to All
Provisions. — In the construction of an instrument[,] where there are
several provisions or particulars, such a construction is, if possible, to
be adopted as will give effect to all.
SECTION13. Interpretation According to Intention; General and
Particular Provisions. — In the construction of an instrument, the
intention of the parties is to be pursued; and when a general and a
particular provision are inconsistent, the latter is paramount to the
former. So a particular intent will control a general one that is
inconsistent with it.
SECTION 14. Interpretation According to Circumstances. — For the
proper construction of an instrument, the circumstances under which it
was made, including the situation of the subject thereof and of the
parties to it, may be shown, so that the judge may be placed in the
position of those whose language he or she is to interpret.
SECTION15. Peculiar Signification of Terms. — The terms of a
writing are presumed to have been used in their primary and general
acceptation, but evidence is admissible to show that they have a local,
technical, or otherwise peculiar signification, and were so used and
understood in the particular instance, in which case the agreement
must be construed accordingly.
SECTION 16. Written Words Control Printed. — When an instrument
consists partly of written words and partly of a printed form, and the
two [(2)] are inconsistent, the former controls the latter.
31
 HENLIN NOTES
SECTION 17. Experts and Interpreters to be Used in Explaining
Certain Writings. — When the characters in which an instrument is
written are difficult to be deciphered, or the language is not understood
by the court, the evidence of persons skilled in deciphering the
characters, or who understand the language, is admissible to declare
the characters or the meaning of the language.
SECTION 18. Of Two Constructions, Which Preferred. — When the
terms of an agreement have been intended in a different sense by the
different parties to it, that sense is to prevail against either party in
which he or she supposed the other understood it, and when different
constructions of a provision are otherwise equally proper, that is to be
taken which is the most favorable to the party in whose favor the
provision was made.
SECTION 19. Construction in Favor of Natural Right. — When an
instrument is equally susceptible of two [(2)] interpretations, one [(1)]
in favor of natural right and the other against it, the former is to be
adopted.
SECTION 20. Interpretation According to Usage. — An instrument
may be construed according to usage, in order to determine its true
character.
C1. QUALIFICATION OF WITNESS
C. TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE
1. Qualification of Witnesses
SECTION 21. Witnesses; Their Qualifications. — All persons who can
perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to others,
may be witnesses.
AQUINO, ALYSSA M.
Religious or political belief, interest in the outcome of the case, or
conviction of a crime, unless otherwise provided by law, shall not be a
ground for disqualification.
SECTION 22. Testimony Confined to Personal Knowledge . — A
witness can testify only to those facts which he or she knows of his or
her personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his or her own
perception.
SECTION 23. Disqualification by Reason of Marriage. — During their
marriage, the husband or the wife cannot testify against the other
without the consent of the affected spouse, except in a civil case by
one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by
one against the other or the latter's direct descendants or ascendants.
SECTION 24. Disqualification by Reason of Privileged
Communication[s]. — The following persons cannot testify as to
matters learned in confidence in the following cases
(A) The husband or the wife, during or after the marriage,
cannot be examined without the consent of the other as to any
communication received in confidence by one from the other during the
marriage except in a civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal
case for a crime committed by one against the other or the latter's
direct descendants or ascendants.
(B) An attorney or person reasonably believed by the client to
be licensed to engage in the practice of law cannot, without the
consent of the client, be examined as to any communication made by
the client to him or her, or his or her advice given thereon in the course
of, or with a view to, professional employment, nor can an attorney's
secretary, stenographer, or c l e r k , or other persons assisting the
attorney be examined without the consent of the client and hisor her
employer, concerning any fact the knowledge of which has been
acquired in such capacity, except in the following cases:
32
 HENLIN NOTES
i. Furtherance of crime or fraud. If the services or advice
of the lawyer were sought or obtained to enable or aid anyone to
commit or plan to commit what the client knew or reasonably should
have known to be a crime or fraud;
ii. Claimants through same deceased client. As to a
communication relevant to an issue between parties who claim through
the same deceased client, regardless of whether the claims are by
testate or intestate or by inter vivos transaction;
iii. Breach of duty by lawyer or client. As to a
communication relevant to an issue of breach of duty by the lawyer to
his or her client. or by the client to his or her lawyer;
iv. Document attested by the lawyer. As to a
communication relevant to an issue concerning an attested document
to which the lawyer is an attesting witness; or
v. Joint clients. As to a communication relevant to a
matter of common interest between two [(2)] or more clients if the
communication was made by any of them to a lawyer retained or
consulted in common, when offered in an action between any of the
clients, unless they have expressly agreed otherwise.
(C) A physician, psychotherapist or person reasonably believed
by the patient to be authorized to practice medicine or psychotherapy
cannot in a civil case, without the consent of the patient, be examined
as to any confidential communication made for the purpose of
diagnosis or treatment of the patient's physical, mental or emotional
condition, including alcohol or drug addiction, between the patient and
his or her physician or psychotherapist. This privilege also applies to
persons, including members of the patient's family, who have
participated in the diagnosis or treatment of the patient under the
direction of the physician or psychotherapist.
A "psychotherapist" is:
(a) A person licensed to practice medicine engaged in
the diagnosis or treatment of a mental or emotional condition, or
AQUINO, ALYSSA M.
(b) A person licensed as a psychologist by the
government while similarly engaged.
(D) A minister, priest or person reasonably believed to be so
cannot, without the consent of the affected person, be examined as to
any communication or confession made to or any advice given by him
or her, in his or her professional character, in the course of discipline
enjoined by the church to which the minister or priest belongs.
(E)A public officer cannot be examined during r after his or her
tenure as to communications made to him or her in official confidence,
when the court finds that the public interest would suffer by the
disclosure.
The communication shall remain privileged, even in the hands of a third
person who may have obtained the information, provided that the
original parties to the communication took reasonable precaution to
protect its confidentiality. (24a)
Who may be a witness?
-All persons who can perceive, and perceiving, be made known their
perception to others may be witnesses.
[ASSESS THE QUALITY OF PERCEPTION AND THE MANNER BY
WHICH THE PERCEPTION IS MADE IN COURT]
What is testimonial evidence?
Evidence elicited from the mouth of a witness as distinguished from
real and documentary evidence.
Nature of testimonial evidence:
1. Oral
2. Writing
33
 HENLIN NOTES
When may a conviction of a crime disqualify a witness from an offense unless otherwise provided by law.
testifying? 5. Not to give an answer which will tend to degrade his reputation,
1. Those convicted of falsification of documents, perjury or false unless it to be the very fact at issue or to a fact from which the fact in
testimony cannot be a witness to a will during probate proceedings only issue would be presumed. But a witness must answer to the fact of his
(Art. 821, NCC) previous final conviction for an offense.
2. Those convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude cannot become
a state witness Order in the examination of an individual witness:
1. Direct examination by the proponent
Disqualification of witnesses: 2. Cross examination by the opponent
a. Disqualification by reason of marriage 3. Re-direct examination by the proponent
b. Disqualification by reason of privileged communications; Rule on 4. Re-cross examination by the opponent
third parties
i. Husband and wife What is a leading question?
ii. Attorney and client -It is a question which suggests to the witnesses the answer which the
iii. Physician and patient examining party desires.
iv. Priest and penitent
v. Public officers Are leading questions allowed?
c. Parental and Filial Privilege Rule GR: No.
d. Trade Secrets XPNs:
1. On cross examination
EXAMINATION OF A WITNESS: 2. On preliminary matters
A. Rights and obligations of a witness: 3. When there is a difficulty in getting direct and intelligible
May a witness refuse a question that establishes a claim against answers from a witness who is ignorant, or a child of tender years, or is
him? of feeble mind, or a deaf-mute
-NO. As a rule, a witness must answer questions, although his answer 4. Of an unwilling or hostile witness
may tend to establish a claim against him, subject to the rights of a 5. Of a witness who is an adverse party or an officer, director, or
witness. managing agent of a public or private corporation or of a partnership or
association which is an adverse party.
What are the rights of a witness:
1. To be protected from irrelevant, improper, or insulting questions, and What is a misleading question?
from harsh or insulting demeanor. -It is one which assumes as true a fact not yet testified to by the
2. Not to be detained longer than the interests of justice require witness, or contrary to that which he has previously stated.
3. Not to be examined except only as to matters pertinent to the issue
4. Not the give an answer which will tend to subject him to a penalty for

AQUINO, ALYSSA M. 34
 HENLIN NOTES
Impeachment of a witness: himself or protect himself from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or
Modes of impeaching a witness: discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or condition.
1. By contradictory evidence
2. By evidence that his general reputation for truth, honesty, or integrity Basic requirements of a child’s competency as a witness:
is bad 1. Capacity of observation
3. By evidence that he has made at other times statements inconsistent 2. Capacity of recollection
with his present testimony. 3. Capacity of communication

Who may impeach a witness? When is a child’s hearsay testimony admissible?

-A witness may be impeached by the party against whom he was
called.
In impeaching a witness, when may evidence of conviction of a
crime be admitted?
-It may be admitted if:
-the crime is punishable by penalty in excess of 1 year
-if the crime involves moral turpitude, regardless of the penalty.
[It may NOT be admitted if the conviction is subject of an amnesty or
annulment]
1. The child describes any act or attempted act of child abuse
2. Before such hearsay statement may be admitted, its proponent shall
make known to the adverse party the intention to offer such statement
and its particulars
3. When available, the child is present at the presentation of the
hearsay statement for cross-examination. When the child is
unavailable.
4. In ruling on the admissibility of such hearsay statement for cross
examination, the court shall consider the time, content, and
circumstances as indicia of reliability.

May a party impeach his own witness? PEOPLE V. SOTA

GR: NO.
XPN:
1. When the witness is unwilling or a hostile witness
2. A witness who is an adverse party or an officer, director, or managing
agent of a public or private corporation or of a partnership or
association which is an adverse party.
CHILD WITNESS
Who is a child witness:
-A child witness is any person who at the time of giving testimony is
below the age of 18 years. In child abuse cases, a child includes one
over 18 years but is found by the court as unable to fully take care of
G.R. NO. 203121, [NOVEMBER 29, 2017]
DOCTRINE: Credible witness and credible testimony are the two
essential elements for determining the weight of a particular testimony.
Evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a
credible witness but must be credible in itself, such as the common
experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under
the circumstances.
FACTS: Golem Sota and Amidal Gadjali were both charged and
convicted before the RTC with murder and arson committed on or
about November 19, 1999 in Labason, Zamboanga Del Norte, against
Artemio Eba. The prosecution presented two witnesses, Jocelyn and

AQUINO, ALYSSA M. 35
 HENLIN NOTES
Abelardo, the daughter and son of the victim. Jocelyn testified she knew
both of the accused because they were friends of her father's, and that
she saw the two accused accompanied by other people who demanded
food from her father. The latter agreed but stated that he would hand
over the food through the window and that he would not go out of his
house out of fear, because they were armed. The two accused
demanded that Artemio open the door or they would burn the house
down, but the victim refused, which prompted them to shoot the victim
and thereafter burn the house down. Golem Sota testified that he was
at home because he had chicken pox, and Amidal Gadjali stated that he
had no ill feelings toward the deceased and Eusebio approached him
the day of the incident asking if he knew someone who could kill his
father, and that Jocelyn was able to recognize him at that fateful night
because he was there to warn her and Artemio to run. The lower court
ruled that both accused were guilty of murder and arson, which was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Both accused thus filed an appeal
with the Supreme Court stating that the court failed to prove their guilt
beyond reasonable doubt because the witness Jocelyn, failed to
elucidate who were the actual perpetrators and how the alleged crimes
were carried out.
ISSUE: Whether or not Jocelyn can be considered as a credible
witness.
RULING: Yes. Credible witness and credible testimony are the two
essential elements for determining the weight of a particular testimony.
Evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a
credible witness but must be credible in itself, such as the common
experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under
the circumstances. Although Jocelyn was only twelve years old when
the incident happened and when called to the witness stand, the Court
takes note of the truth that she possessed all the qualification and
none of the disqualification to testify in these cases, viz:
AQUINO, ALYSSA M.
Section 20. Witnesses; their qualifications. - Except as provided in the
next succeeding section, all persons who can perceive, and perceiving,
can make known their perception to others, may be witnesses.
Religious or political belief, interest in the outcome of the case, or
conviction of crime unless otherwise provided by law, shall not be a
ground for disqualification.
Jocelyn's young age had no bearing on her qualification to testify on
what happened that night on 19 November 1999. As the rules show,
anyone who is sensible and aware of a relevant event or incident, and
can communicate such awareness, experience, or observation to others
can be a witness. Significantly, even under the crucible of an intense
cross-examination, Jocelyn never wavered in her narration as to the
incidents that led to the killing of Artemio and the burning of their
house, and in the affirmative identification of Sota and Gadjadli as two
of the five persons who were responsible for these crimes. Thus,
proving beyond reasonable doubt, the guilt of both accused. Golem
Sota and Amidal Gadjali.
DST MOVERS CORP. V. PEOPLE'S GENERAL INSURANCE CORP.
G.R. NO. 198627, [JANUARY 13, 2016], 778 PHIL 235-253.
DOCTRINE: A determination of where the preponderance of evidence
lies is a factual issue which, as a rule, cannot be entertained in a Rule
45 petition. When, however, the sole basis of the trial court for ruling on
this issue is evidence that should not have been admitted for being
hearsay, this court will embark on its own factual analysis and will, if
necessary, reverse the rulings of the lower courts. A traffic accident
investigation report prepared by a police officer relying solely on the
account of a supposed eyewitness and not on his or her personal
knowledge is not evidence that is admissible as an exception to the
Hearsay Rule.
36
 HENLIN NOTES
FACTS: An accident occurred involving a Honda civic driven by Adeline
Yuboco Dela Cruz, a truck allegedly belonging to DST Movers, and a
Mitsubishi Lancer driven by Harrison Tuquero Valdez. It was alleged
that the truck hit the Honda Civic and pushed it forward, thereby hitting
the Mitsubishi Lancer. The driver of the truck then allegedly escaped.
An investigation report was prepared by PO2 Tomas describing the
involved Honda civic and Mitsubishi Lancer, their drivers, and damaged
sustained but on the trucks description the driver was stated as
unidentified and the damaged was undetermined. The Honda Civic was
covered by PGIC’s insurance and paid its owner the entire amount of
the insurance. PGIC then filed a complaint for sum of money against
DST movers.
In its answer DST Movers acknowledged that it was the owner of the
truck, however it claimed that the truck did not make any trips on the
day of the alleged accident. They supported their claims with copies of
invoices and receipts and vouchers relating to repairs and maintenance
procedures that were undertaken on the truck on specific dates which
included the date when the accident occurred.
The MTC Manila ruled in favor of PGIC. On appeal the MTC manila
ruling was affirmed by the RTC Manila in favor of PGIC. DST Movers
then filed before the CA a petition for review under Rule 42. The CA
denied DST Movers’ Motion for Reconsideration.
Hence, DST Movers filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule
45 before the SC. In the petition DST Movers insisted that its liability
was not established by a preponderance of evidence. Specifically, it
faults the Metropolitan Trial Court for ruling in favor of PGIC despite
how its version of events was supported by nothing more the Traffic
Accident Investigation Report. It asserts that reliance on this Report
was misplaced as it was supposedly "improperly identified [and]
uncorroborated.”
AQUINO, ALYSSA M.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner DST Movers Corporation’s liability was
established by a preponderance of evidence. Subsumed in this is
whether it was an error for the Metropolitan Trial Court to admit and
lend evidentiary weight to the piece of evidence chiefly relied upon by
respondent People’s General Insurance Corporation: The Traffic
Accident Investigation Report prepared by PO2 Tomas.
RULING: No. The Traffic Accident Investigation Report prepared by
PO2 Tomas should not have been admitted and accorded weight by the
Metropolitan Trial Court as it was "improperly identified [and]
uncorroborated." Petitioner, in effect, asserts that the non-
presentation in court of PO2 Tomas, the officer who prepared the
report, was fatal to respondent’s cause.
In the first place, this Report should not have been admitted as
evidence for violating the Hearsay Rule. Bereft of evidentiary basis, the
conclusion of the lower courts cannot stand as it has been reduced to
conjecture. Thus, we reverse this conclusion.
Rule 130, Section 36 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides for the
Hearsay Rule. It renders inadmissible as evidence out-of-court
statements made by persons who are not presented as witnesses but
are offered as proof of the matters stated.
SECTION 36. Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge;
hearsay excluded. — A witness can testify only to those facts which he
knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his
own perception, except as otherwise provided in these rules.
SECTION 44. Entries in official records. — Entries in official records
made in the performance of his duty by a public officer of the
Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially
enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.
37
 HENLIN NOTES
The statements made by this court in Standard Insurance are on point:
[F]or the Traffic Accident Investigation Report to be admissible as
prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated, the following requisites
must be present:
. . . (a) that the entry was made by a public officer or by another person
specially enjoined by law to do so; (b) that it was made by the public
officer in the performance of his duties, or by such other person in the
performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and (c) that the public
officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him
stated, which must have been acquired by him personally or through
official information
Regrettably, in this case, petitioner failed to prove the third requisite
cited above. As correctly noted by the courts below, while the Traffic
Accident Investigation Report was exhibited as evidence, the
investigating officer who prepared the same was not presented in court
to testify that he had sufficient knowledge of the facts therein stated,
and that he acquired them personally or through official information.
Neither was there any explanation as to why such officer was not
presented. We cannot simply assume, in the absence of proof, that the
account of the incident stated in the report was based on the personal
knowledge of the investigating officer who prepared it.
Thus, while petitioner presented its assured to testify on the events
that transpired during the vehicular collision, his lone testimony,
unsupported by other preponderant evidence, fails to sufficiently
establish petitioner's claim that respondents' negligence was, indeed,
the proximate cause of the damage sustained by Cham's vehicle.
Respondent presented proof of the occurrence of an accident that
damaged Fidel Yuboco’s Honda Civic sedan, that the sedan was
insured by respondent, and that respondent paid Fidel Yuboco’s
insurance claims. As to the identity, however, of the vehicle or of the
AQUINO, ALYSSA M.
person responsible for the damage sustained by the sedan, all that
respondent relies on is the Report prepared by PO2 Tomas.
It is plain to see that the matters indicated in the Report are not
matters that were personally known to PO2 Tomas. The Report is
candid in admitting that the matters it states were merely reported to
PO2 Tomas by "G. Simbahon of PNCC/SLEX." It was this "G.
Simbahon," not PO2 Tomas, who had personal knowledge of the facts
stated in the Report. Thus, even as the Report embodies entries made
by a public officer in the performance of his duties, it fails to satisfy the
third requisite for admissibility for entries in official records as an
exception to the Hearsay Rule.
To be admitted as evidence, it was thus imperative for the person who
prepared the Report—PO2 Tomas—to have himself presented as a
witness and then testify on his Report. However, even as the Report
would have been admitted as evidence, PO2 Tomas’ testimony would
not have sufficed in establishing the identity of the motor vehicle
and/or the person responsible for the damage sustained by the sedan.
For this purpose, the testimony of G. Simbahon was necessary.
As the sole evidence relied upon by respondent as to the identity of the
responsible motor vehicle or person has been rendered unworthy of
even the slightest judicial consideration, there is no basis for holding-
as the Metropolitan Trial Court did-that the motor vehicle responsible
for the damage sustained by the sedan was owned by petitioner. Not
only this, petitioner has even adduced proof that on February 28, 2002,
its Isuzu Elf truck with plate number UAL-295 was undergoing repairs
and maintenance and, thus, could not have been at the South Luzon
Expressway. The weight of evidence is clearly in petitioner's favor.
ESPINELI V. PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 179535, [JUNE 9, 2014], 735 PHIL 530-546.
38
 HENLIN NOTES
DOCTRINE: Regardless of the truth or falsity of a statement, when
what is relevant is the fact that such statement has been made, the
hearsay rule does not apply and the statement may be shown. As a
matter of fact, evidence as to the making of the statement is not
secondary but primary, for the statement itself may constitute a fact in
issue or is circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such a fact.
This is known as the DOCTRINE OF INDEPENDENTLY RELEVANT
STATEMENTS.
FACTS: Accused together with Sotero and three others shot Alberto
Berbon with the use of firearms, causing his instantaneous death, and
thereafter immediately fled the crime scene on board a waiting car. An
Information for Murder was filed before RTC. Meanwhile, the NBI
arrested Reyes for another crime. He confided to the NBI that he was
willing to give vital information regarding the Berbon case. Reyes
claimed that he saw accused and Sotero board a red car while armed
with a .45 caliber firearm and armalite, and that accused told Sotero
that “ayaw ko nang abutin pa ng bukas yang si Berbon.” Subsequently,
Reyes jumped bail and was never again heard of. NBI Agent Segunial
reduced his statement into writing and testified on these facts during
the trial. Prosecution also presented a witness who testified that he
sold his Red Ford Escort car to three persons and identified the said car
from the photographs. Accused filed a Demurrer to Evidence without
leave of court.
RTC convicted the accused for Murder. On appeal, CA convicted the
accused for Homicide. Accused filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari.
Petitioner anchors his quest for the reversal of his conviction on the
alleged erroneous admission in evidence of the Sinumpaang Salaysay
of Reyes for being hearsay and inadmissible. He avers that the said
sworn statement should not been given probative value because its
contents were neither confirmed nor authenticated by the affiant. He
emphasizes that there was no direct evidence linking him to the crime.
AQUINO, ALYSSA M.
ISSUE: Whether the testimony of NBI Agent Segunial can be regarded
as hearsay evidence
RULING: No. NBI Agent Segunial testified that he had investigated
Reyes and reduced the latter’s statement into writing declaring, among
others, that Reyes overheard petitioner telling Sotero “Ayaw ko nang
abutin pa ng bukas yang si Berbon” and saw them armed with .45
caliber pistol and an armalite, respectively, before boarding a red car.
Petitioner insists that the said sworn statement belongs to the category
of hearsay evidence and therefore inadmissible. He asserts that its
contents were never confirmed or authenticated by Reyes, thus, it lacks
probative value.
The hearsay evidence rule as provided under Section 36, Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 36. Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge;
hearsay excluded. – A witness can testify only to those facts which he
knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his
own perception, except as otherwise provided in these rules. Evidence
is hearsay when its probative force depends in whole or in part on the
competency and credibility of some persons other than the witness by
whom it is sought to produce.
However, while the testimony of a witness regarding a statement made
by another person given for the purpose of establishing the truth of the
fact asserted in the statement is clearly hearsay evidence, it is
otherwise if the purpose of placing the statement on the record is
merely to establish the fact that the statement, or the tenor of such
statement, was made. Regardless of the truth or falsity of a statement,
when what is relevant is the fact that such a statement has been made,
the hearsay rule does not apply and the statement may be shown. As a
matter of fact, evidence as to the making of the statement is not
secondary but primary, for the statement itself may constitute a fact in
issue or is circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such a fact.
39
 HENLIN NOTES
This is known as the DOCTRINE OF INDEPENDENTLY RELEVANT
STATEMENTS.
In the present case, the testimony of NBI Agent Segunial cannot be
regarded as hearsay evidence. This is considering that it was not
presented to prove the truth of such a statement but only for the
purpose of establishing that Reyes executed a sworn statement
containing such narration of facts. This is clear from the offer of the
witness’ oral testimony. What the prosecution sought to be admitted
was the fact that Reyes made such narration of facts in his sworn
statement and not necessarily to prove the truth thereof. Thus, the
testimony of NBI Agent Segunial is in the nature of an independently
relevant statement where what is relevant is the fact that Reyes made
such statement and the truth and falsity thereof is immaterial. In such a
case, the statement of the witness is admissible as evidence and the
hearsay rule does not apply.
ALVAREZ V. RAMIREZ
G.R. NO. 143439, [OCTOBER 14, 2005], 509 PHIL 650-658.
DOCTRINE: The better rule is that, when an offense directly attacks,
or directly and vitally impairs, the conjugal relation, it comes within
the exception to the statute that one shall not be a witness against the
other except in a criminal prosecution for a crime committed by one
against the other.
FACTS: Accused was charged with arson for setting fire in his sister-
in-law’s house while the latter’s family is inside including the former’s
estranged wife. During trial, his wife Esperanza was presented as
witness to prove that the accused Maximo Alvarez committed all the
elements of the crime being charged.
Petitioner filed a motion to disqualify Esperanza from testifying against
him pursuant to Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court on marital
AQUINO, ALYSSA M.
disqualification. Trial court granted the motion and disqualified
Esperanza. The prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration but was
denied in the other assailed Order dated October 19,1999. This
prompted respondent Susan Ramirez to file with the CA a Petition for
Certiorari. On May 31, 2000, the Appellate Court rendered a Decision
nullifying and setting aside the assailed Orders issued by the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether or not a wife is disqualified to testify against her
husband to prove a crime committed purposely committed to injure the
former.
RULING: No. Section 22, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court
provides that during their marriage, neither the husband nor the wife
may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected
spouse, except in a civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal
case for a crime committed by one against the other or the latter's
direct descendants or ascendants. The reasons given for the rule are:
(1) There is identity of interests between husband and wife; (2) If one
were to testify for or against the other, there is consequent danger of
perjury; (3)The policy of the law is to guard the security and
confidences of private life, even at the risk of an occasional failure of
justice, and to prevent domestic disunion and unhappiness; and (4)
Where there is want of domestic tranquility there is danger of punishing
one spouse through the hostile testimony of the other.
But like all other general rules, the marital disqualification rule has its
own exceptions, both in civil actions between the spouses and in
criminal cases for offenses committed by one against the other. For
instance, where the marital and domestic relations are so strained that
there is no more harmony to be preserved nor peace and tranquility
which may be disturbed, the reason based upon such harmony and
tranquility fails. In such a case, identity of interests disappears and the
consequent danger of perjury based on that identity is non-existent.
Likewise, in such a situation, the security and confidences of private
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life, which the law aims at protecting, will be nothing but ideals, which
through their absence, merely leave a void in the unhappy home.
The act of private respondent in setting fire to the house of his sister-
in-law Susan Ramirez, knowing fully well that his wife was there, and in
fact with the alleged intent of injuring the latter, is an act totally alien to
the harmony and confidences of marital relation which the
disqualification primarily seeks to protect.
DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS V. BCA INTERNATIONAL
CORP.
G.R. NO. 210858, [JUNE 29, 2016].
DOCTRINE: The privileged character of the information does not end
when an agency has adopted a definite proposition or when a contract
has been perfected or consummated; otherwise, the purpose of the
privilege will be defeated. The deliberative process privilege applies if
its purpose is served, that is, “to protect the frank exchange of ideas
and opinions critical to the government’s decision-making process
where disclosure would discourage such discussion in the future.”
FACTS: In an Amended Build-Operate-Transfer Agreement
(Agreement), petitioner Department of Foreign Affairs awarded the
Machine Readable Passport and Visa Project (MRP/V) Project to
respondent BCA International Corporation (BCA). During the
implementation of the MRP/V Project, DFA sought to terminate the
Agreement. However, BCA opposed the termination and filed a Request
for Arbitration.
An ad hoc arbitral tribunal was constituted. In an Order dated 15 April
2013, the arbitral tribunal approved BCA's request to apply in court for
the issuance of subpoena, subject to the conditions that the application
will not affect its proceedings and the hearing set in October 2013 will
proceed whether the witnesses attend or not.
AQUINO, ALYSSA M.
BCA filed before the RTC a Petition for Assistance in Taking Evidence
pursuant to the IRR of the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004
(RA 9285). BCA sought the issuance of subpoena ad testificandum and
subpoena duces tecum to the witnesses and documents in their
custody. DFA alleged that the presentation of the witnesses and
documents was prohibited by law and protected by the deliberative
process privilege.
The RTC ruled in favor of BCA and held that the evidence sought to be
produced was no longer covered by the deliberative process privilege.
RTC issued the subpoena duces tecum and subpoena ad testificandum.
DFA: filed a motion to quash the subpoena duces tecum and subpoena
ad testificandum. RTC denied the motion to quash and held that the
motion was actually a motion for reconsideration, which is prohibited
under Rule 9 .9 of the Special ADR Rules.
DFA Undersecretary Ebdalin, MRP/V Project Manager Atty. Mauricio
and DTI Representative Luisito Ucab testified before the arbitral
tribunal pursuant to the subpoena. The RTC denied the motion for
reconsideration, ruling that the motion became moot with the
appearance of the witnesses during the arbitration hearings.
ISSUE: Whether the evidence sought to be subpoenaed is covered by
the deliberative process privilege.
RULING: The privileged character of the information does not end
when an agency has adopted a definite proposition or when a contract
has been perfected or consummated; otherwise, the purpose of the
privilege will be defeated.
The deliberative process privilege applies if its purpose is served, that
is, to protect the frank exchange of ideas and opinions critical to the
government’s decision-making process where disclosure would
discourage such discussion in the future. Two fundamental
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requirements must be met for the deliberative process privilege to be
invoked. First, the communication must be predecisional, i.e.,
“antecedent to the adoption of an agency policy.” Second, the
communication must be deliberative, i.e., “a direct part of the
deliberative process in that it makes recommendations or expresses
opinions on legal or policy matters.” Thus, the deliberative process
privilege exempts materials that are ‘predecisional’ and ‘deliberative,’
but requires disclosure of policy statements and final opinions that
have the force of law or explain actions that an agency has already
taken.
As a qualified privilege, the burden falls upon the government agency
asserting the deliberative process privilege to prove that the
information in question satisfies both requirements—predecisional and
deliberative. It may be overcome upon a showing that the discoverant’s
interests in disclosure of the materials outweigh the government’s
interests in their confidentiality.
Here, considering that both BCA’s and DFA’s assertions of subpoena of
evidence and the deliberative process privilege are broad and lack
specificity, the Court is unable to determine whether the evidence
sought to be produced is covered by the deliberative process privilege.
The parties are directed to specify their claims before the RTC and,
thereafter, the RTC shall determine which evidence is covered by the
deliberative process privilege, if there is any, based on the standards
provided in this Decision. It is necessary to consider the circumstances
surrounding the demand for the evidence to determine whether or not
its production is injurious to the consultative functions of government
that the privilege of nondisclosure protects.
LEE V. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. NO. 177861, [JULY 13, 2010], 639 PHIL 78-85.
AQUINO, ALYSSA M.
DOCTRINE: Filial privilege cannot apply to stepmothers and
stepdaughters because the rule applies only to “direct” ascendants and
descendants, a family tie connected by a common ancestry. A
stepdaughter has no common ancestry by her stepmother.
FACTS: Spouses Lee Tek Sheng (Lee) and Keh Shiok Cheng (Keh)
entered the Philippines as immigrants from China and had 11 children,
collectively the Lee-Keh children. Lee brought from China a woman
named Tiu Chuan (Tiu), supposedly to serve as housemaid.
Respondent Lee-Keh children believe that Tiu moved into another
property of Lee and had a relation with him.
Shortly after Keh died, the Lee-Keh children learned that Tiu’s children
with Lee claimed that they, too, were children of Lee and Keh. The Lee-
Keh children requested the National Bureau of Investigation to
investigate the matter, and the NBI concluded in its report that the
mother of the 8 children is certainly not Keh, but a much younger
woman, most probably Tiu.
The Lee-Keh children filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court for
the deletion from the certificate of live birth of petitioner Emma Lee,
one of Lee’s other children, the name Keh and replace the same with
name Tiu to indicate her true mother’s name. The Lee- Keh children
likewise filed with the RTC an ex parte request for the issuance of a
subpoena duces ad testificandum to compel Tiu, Emma Lee’s
presumed mother, to testify in the case. The RTC granted the motion
but Tiu moved to quash the subpoena, claiming that it was oppressive
and violated Section 25, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the rule on
parental privilege, she being Emma Lee’s stepmother.
The Court of Appeals ruled that only a subpoena duces tecum, not a
subpoena ad testificandum, may be quashed for being oppressive or
unreasonable under Section 4, Rule 21 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
The CA also held that Tiu’s advanced age alone does not render her
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incapable of testifying. The party seeking to quash the subpoena for
that reason must prove that she would be unable to withstand the
rigors of trial, something that petitioner Emma Lee failed to do.
ISSUE: Whether a stepmother may be compelled to testify against a
stepdaughter.
RULING: Yes. Section 25, Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence reads:
“SECTION 25. Parental and filial privilege.—No person may be
compelled to testify against his parents, other direct ascendants,
children or other direct descendants.”
The above is an adaptation from a similar provision in Article 315 of the
Civil Code that applies only in criminal cases. But those who revised the
Rules of Civil Procedure chose to extend the prohibition to all kinds of
actions, whether civil, criminal, or administrative, filed against parents
and other direct ascendants or descendants.
But here Tiu, who invokes the filial privilege, claims that she is the
stepmother of petitioner Emma Lee. The privilege cannot apply to them
because the rule applies only to direct ascendants and descendants, a
family tie connected by a common ancestry. A stepdaughter has no
common ancestry by her stepmother. Article 965 thus provides: Art.
965. The direct line is either descending or ascending. The former
unites the head of the family with those who descend from him. The
latter binds a person with those from whom he descends.
Consequently, Tiu can be compelled to testify against petitioner Emma
Lee.
C2. TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGE
SECTION 25. Parental and Filial Privilege. — No person shall be
compelled to testify against his or her parents, other direct ascendants,
children or other direct descendants, except when such testimony is
AQUINO, ALYSSA M.
indispensable in a crime against that person or by one parent against
the other. (25a)
SECTION 26. Privilege Relating to Trade Secrets. — A person cannot
be compelled to testify about any trade secret, unless the non-
disclosure will conceal fraud or otherwise work injustice. When
disclosure is directed, the court shall take such protective measure as
the interest of the owner of the trade secret and of the parties and the
furtherance of justice may require
A. DISQUALIFICATION BY REASON OF MARRIAGE
May a husband and wife testify against each other?
GR: the husband or the wife cannot testify against each other during
the marriage and without the consent of the affected spouse
XPNS:
i. in a civil case by one against the other
ii. In a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the
other or the latter’s direct descendants or ascendants.
B. DISQUALIFICATION BY REASON OF PRIVILEGED
COMMUNICATIONS; RULE ON THIRD PARTIES
DISQUALIFICATIONS:
1. By reason of marriage
2. By reason of privileged communication
i. Husband-wife
ii. Atty-client
iii. Physician-patient
iv. Public officer
→ XPNS: [for privileged communications]
-in furtherance of a crime or fraud
-claimants through the same deceased client
-Breach of duty by lawyer of client
-document attested by the lawyer
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-joint clients
What is the common denominator in the disqualification by reason
of privileged communication?
The matters which are learned in confidence by the person who is
disqualified to testify.
i. HUSBAND AND WIFE:
[same as above]
What is the purpose?
-Protection of privileged communication between spouses.
-consequent danger of perjury
-guard the security and confidences of private life
What are the requisites of marital disqualification?
1. Marital status
2. There must be a communication given
3. Communication is given confidentially
4. It was given during marriage.
Can the marital privilege rule be waived?
Yes: by the consent of the giver spouse.
Does the privilege survive the death of the giver spouse?
No.
ii. ATTORNEY AND CLIENT EXCEPTIONS:
Is a person assisting a lawyer covered by the AC privileged
communication rule?
-Yes, A lawyer cannot testify as to any confidential communication
given in the course of a professional employment WITHOUT THE
CONSENT OF THE CLIENT. This rule covers persons assisting the
AQUINO, ALYSSA M.
lawyer. In such a case, they cannot testify without the consent of both
the lawyer and the client.
When may an attorney testify on confidential communication?
1. When the services of the lawyer were sought in furtherance of crime
or fraud
2. When the communication is relevant to an issue between claimants
of the same deceased client
3. When the communication is relevant to an issue of breach of duty by
lawyer or client.
4. When the communication is relevant to an issue concerning
documents attested by the lawyer.
5. When the communication is relevant to joint clients
iii. PHYSICIAN AND PATIENT
-for civil case only
May a patient’s family member who participated in the treatment of
the patient, under the direction of a physician, validly testify,
without the patient’s consent, on a confidential physician-patient
communication?
-No. Physicians CANNOT without patient’s consent, testify on
confidential communication concerning diagnosis and treatment of
patient likewise applies to persons who participated in the diagnosis or
treatment of the patient under the direction of the physician.
iv. PRIEST AND PENITENT
Is penitent’s confession considered as privileged communication?
-Yes. A priest, or any person reasonably believed to be a priest or
minister, cannot testify as to any communication, confession or advice
given in his or her professional character, in the course of his discipline,
without the penitent’s consent.
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v. PUBLIC OFFICERS
May a public officer, after his tenure, already testify on a privileged
communication?
-No. Public officers, both during or after his or her tenure, cannot
testify on confidential communication of public interest.
May a 3rd person who obtained what is otherwise a privileged
communication of public officers testify on such matter?
-No. The disqualification by reason of privileged communication of
public officers covers third person, who may have obtained the
information, when the original parties protected its confidentiality.
C. PARENTAL AND FILIAL PRIVILEGE RULE:
What is parental and filial privilege rule?
-No one can be compelled to testify against his or her parents, other
direct ascendants, children, other direct ascendants.
→ XPN:
i. a crime against that person
ii. A crime by one parent against the other
D. TRADE SECRETS:
What is the trade secrets privilege rule?
-Generally, a person cannot be compelled to testify about any trade
secret.
→ XPN: when the non-disclosure will conceal fraud or
otherwise work injustice.
AIR PHILIPPINES CORPORATION V. PENNSWELL, INC.
G.R. NO. 172835, DECEMBER 13, 2007.
DOCTRINE: Trade secrets are considered privileged matters, which the
Rules of Court do not permit disclosure. The privilege is not absolute
and the trial court may compel disclosure where it is indispensable for
doing justice.
AQUINO, ALYSSA M.
FACTS: Petitioner Air Philippines Corp. is engaged in the business of
air transportation services. On the other hand, respondent Pennswell,
Inc. is engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling industrial
chemicals, solvents, and special lubricants. On various dates, the
respondent delivered and sold to the petitioner various goods in trade.
Petitioner's total outstanding obligation amounted to P449,864.98. Due
to failure of the petitioner to comply with its obligation, respondent filed
a Complaint for a Sum of Money. Petitioner contends that its refusal is
justifiable. Petitioner alleged that it was defrauded in the amount of
P592,000.00 by respondent for its previous sale of items. Said items
were misrepresented by respondent as belonging to a new line, but
were in truth and in fact, identical with products petitioner had
previously purchased from respondent. Petitioner asserted that it was
deceived by respondent which merely altered the names and labels of
such goods. During the pendency of the trial, petitioner filed a Motion
to Compel respondent to give a detailed list of the ingredients and
chemical components of the products, which the RTC granted in its
Order. The respondent sought reconsideration of the foregoing Order,
contending that it cannot be compelled to disclose the chemical
components sought because the matter is confidential and constituted
a trade secret which respondent cannot be forced to divulge. The RTC,
in its Order, reversed itself, finding that the chemical components are
respondent's trade secrets and are privileged in character. Thus,
petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals, but
the same was denied.
ISSUE: Whether the chemical components or ingredients of
respondent's products are trade secrets or industrial secrets that are
not subject to compulsory disclosure.
RULING: Petition DENIED. Rule 27 of the Rules of Court permits
parties to inspect documents or things upon a showing of good cause
before the court in which an action is pending. It sets an unequivocal
proviso that the documents, papers, books, accounts, letters,
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photographs, objects or tangible things that may be produced and
inspected should not be privileged. The documents must not be
privileged against disclosure. On the ground of public policy, the rules
providing for production and inspection of books and papers do not
authorize the production or inspection of privileged matter; that is,
books and papers which, because of their confidential and privileged
character, could not be received in evidence.
Such a condition is in addition to the requisite that the items be
specifically described, and must constitute or contain evidence material
to any matter involved in the action and which are in the party’s
possession, custody or control.
Section 24 of Rule 130 draws the types of disqualification by reason of
privileged communication, to wit: (a) communication between husband
and wife; (b) communication between attorney and client; (c)
communication between physician and patient; (d) communication
between priest and penitent; and (e) public officers and public interest.
There are, however, other privileged matters that are not mentioned by
Rule 130. Among them are the following: (a) editors may not be
compelled to disclose the source of published news; (b) voters may not
be compelled to disclose for whom they voted; (c) trade secrets; (d)
information contained in tax census returns; and (d) bank deposits.
A trade secret is defined as a plan or process, tool, mechanism or
compound known only to its owner and those of his employees to
whom it is necessary to confide it. The definition also extends to a
secret formula or process not patented, but known only to certain
individuals using it in compounding some article of trade having a
commercial value. A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern,
device, or compilation of information that: (1) is used in one's business;
and (2) gives the employer an opportunity to obtain an advantage over
competitors who do not possess the information. Generally, a trade
secret is a process or device intended for continuous use in the
AQUINO, ALYSSA M.
operation of the business, for example, a machine or formula, but can
be a price list or catalogue or specialized customer list. It is indubitable
that trade secrets constitute proprietary rights. The inventor,
discoverer, or possessor of a trade secret or similar innovation has
rights therein which may be treated as property, and ordinarily an
injunction will be granted to prevent the disclosure of the trade secret
by one who obtained the information "in confidence" or through a
"confidential relationship."
Indeed, the privilege is not absolute; the trial court may compel
disclosure where it is indispensable for doing justice. The Court does
not, however, find reason to except Penswell’s trade secrets from the
application of the rule on privilege. The revelation of Penswell’s trade
secrets serves no better purpose for the disposition of the main case
pending with the RTC. As can be gleaned from the facts, Air Philippines
received Penswell’s goods in trade in the normal course of business. To
be sure, there are defenses under the laws of contracts and sales
available to Air Philippines. On the other hand, the greater interest of
justice ought to favor Penswell as the holder of trade secrets. Trade
secrets should receive greater protection from discovery, because they
derive economic value from being generally unknown and not readily
ascertainable by the public. To the mind of this Court, Air Philippines
was not able to show a compelling reason for us to lift the veil of
confidentiality which shields Penswell’s trade secrets. Air Philippines’
invocation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 8203 or the Special
Law on Counterfeit Drugs, requiring the disclosure of the active
ingredients of a drug is also on faulty ground. Penswell’s products are
outside the scope of the cited law. They do not come within the
purview of a drug which, as defined therein, refers to any chemical
compound or biological substance, other than food, that is intended for
use in the treatment, prevention or diagnosis of disease in man or
animals. What is clear is that the chemical formulation of Penswell’s
products is not known to the general public and is unique only to it.
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AYALA LAND & CAPITOL CITIFARMS, INC. V. CASTILLO
G.R. NO. 178110, [JANUARY 12, 2016], 777 PHIL 99-143.
DOCTRINE: The act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant
fact may be given in evidence against him.
FACTS: Petitioner CCFI owned two parcels of land with a total area of
221 which was mortgaged in favor of one of its creditors, Manila
Banking Corporation (MBC). When MBC was placed under receivership,
DAR issued a Notice of Coverage placing the property under
compulsory acquisition under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
of 1988. In the meantime, CCFI was unable to comply with its mortgage
obligations to MBC. The latter foreclosed on the lien, and the land was
awarded to it in an auction sale. On 29 August 1995, the Supreme Court
in G.R. Nos. 85960 and 92610 allowed the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas,
as receiver, to sell the assets of the Manila Banking Corporation
(MBC), including the subject property, to a third party. Pursuant to the
Court's Resolution, a "Deed of Absolute Sale” over the property was
executed in favor of Ayala Land, Inc. (ALI) in December 1995.
In a Resolution dated 27 July 1999, the Court considered G.R. Nos.
85960 and 92610 closed and terminated.
On 13 August 2003, the Petition for Revocation filed by Lamberto Javier,
et al. — was also deemed closed as far as the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) was concerned. The Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance
was also directed to issue a Certificate of Finality of the Order dated 26
September 2002 issued by former DAR Secretary Hernani Braganza
reversing the revocation of the Conversion Order.
On 15 June 2011, this Court promulgated a Decision granting the
Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by ALI and CCFI, and reversing
the CA Decision. The Court thereby upheld the Conversion Order issued
AQUINO, ALYSSA M.
by then DAR Secretary Ernesto Garilao on 31 October 1997, as well as
the Decision of the Office of the President (OP) affirming the Order.
Respondents Simeona Castillo, et al. filed a Motion for Reconsideration
presenting the same arguments they raised in their Comment. The
Court then issued a Resolution requiring petitioners, the BSP and the
DAR, which was represented by the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), to file their respective Comments on the Motion for
Reconsideration. On 10 January 2012, the general counsel of the BSP
submitted a Manifestation. It explained that its interest in the case
stemmed from its receivership- liquidation of the MBC, particularly the
settlement of the latter's obligations to the BSP. As discussed in the
Decision, the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 85960 allowed petitioner CCFI,
as the mortgage debtor of MBC, to sell its assets, including the subject
landholding,
"at their fair market value, under the best terms and condition and for
the highest price under current real estate appraisals." Counsel for the
BSP posited that its interest in the case ended upon the sale of the
subject land to ALI, after which the BSP entered into a settlement
scheme with MBC.
On the same date, petitioner ALI filed its Opposition to the Motion for
Reconsideration. Petitioner ALI's Manifestation and Motion apprising
the Court that several individuals who affixed their signatures to the
verification portion of the Motion for Reconsideration were NOT
petitioners in the Petition for Revocation filed with the DAR. According
to petitioners, these repeated defects in the pleadings filed by
respondents show a blatant disregard for the rule requiring proper
verification, and which justify the outright denial of the Motion for
Reconsideration.
Respondents failed to address the issue of improper verification in their
Comment. Instead, they merely rehashed their arguments in the Motion
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for Reconsideration. The Court denied the respondents’ Motion for
reconsideration because of the repeated refutation of their theory that
the Conversion Order should be revoked because the sale between
CCFI and ALI was illegal and CCFI committed misrepresentation in its
application for conversion, respondents have based their arguments by
simply latching on to a baseless phrase found in the CA Decision: "no
less than the cited DAR Administrative Order No. 12 enjoins the
conversion of lands directly under a notice of acquisition." A careful
reading shows that the CA did not discuss or even refer to the provision
that allegedly disallows applications for conversion. Assuming that a
conversion order may be revoked if a notice of acquisition has already
been issued, the court still cannot grant respondent's MR, because
what has been presented before the DAR, the OP, the CA, and this
Court is just the notice of coverage. The Court went over the records
and found no admissible proof presented to support respondents' claim
that a Notice of Acquisition had been issued. What was attached to the
Petition for Review filed before the CA was a mere photocopy of the
Notice of Coverage. The purported Notice of Acquisition was never
offered in evidence before the DAR and never became part of the
records even at the proceedings a quo. Hence, we found that the CA
committed reversible error when it gave credence to a mere assertion
of the tenant-farmers.
As contended by the OSG and as exhaustively discussed in Supreme
Court’s Decision, the CA decided an issue raised for the first time on
appeal. It held that the DAR had issued a Notice of Acquisition, which
served as a perpetual ban on the conversion of the subject lands.
However, respondents never attached a copy, certified or otherwise, to
their 1) Petition for Revocation, 2) Motions for Reconsideration in the
proceedings a quo, or 3) Appeal Memorandum to the OP. This is
because they never raised the purpose of the notice as an issue in their
Petition for Revocation of the Conversion Order or in their Motion for
Reconsideration before the OP.
AQUINO, ALYSSA M.
ISSUE: Whether or not said Notice is considered as admission of a
party or against interest.
RULING: The Court ruled in the negative and explained that the
concept of admissions against interest is governed by Section 26 of
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
Sec. 26. Admissions of a party. — The act, declaration or omission of a
party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him.
The above rule considers admissions against interest as admissible
evidence, but does not dispense with the requirement that the
admission be offered in evidence. In this case, precisely because
respondents did not raise the issue at all, petitioners did not have any
opportunity to inspect or question the authenticity and due execution of
the documents. It would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play,
justice, and due process to suddenly reverse the decisions of three
DAR Secretaries and the Office of the President based on an alleged
document — especially if that document has not been presented,
authenticated, or offered in evidence — without giving the other party
any opportunity to contradict the purported admission.
CCFI, much less ALI, cannot be bound to whatever inference is being
made only now on the purported CCFI letter requesting the lifting of the
Notice of Acquisition. They had never been apprised throughout the
administrative proceedings of its alleged existence, nor of the inference
sought to be drawn therefrom. They were never given the chance to
inspect the document as any piece of evidence should be so subjected.
Further, it must be noted that the letter does not identify the document
itself, i.e., the Notice of Acquisition, as to date, as to signatory, as to
amount tendered. It only asks that the Notice of Acquisition be lifted. It
is probable, if this letter is genuine, that the alleged representative of
CCFI was referring to the Notice of Coverage, which is an admitted fact,
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and is precisely the reason why the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas had to
ask for, and was granted, permission by this Court in G.R. Nos. 85960
and 92610 to sell the land. It is a serious error for the CA to base its
ruling on a conclusion of fact not supported by the records of this case
— whether before us, the CA, the OP, or the DAR. This point becomes
all the more crucial, as the CA admitted it would have upheld the
findings of the DAR and the OP, were it not for the Notice of
Acquisition:
At the concluding part of its discussion, it alluded to another
memorandum circular of the DAR (Memorandum Circular No. 11-79)
that land use conversion may be allowed when it is by reason of the
changes in the predominant land use brought about by urban
development. It then pointed to the fact that the close proximity of the
province of Cavite to Metro Manila has opened it to the effects of
modernization and urbanization. It warned that we would only succeed
in hindering progress if under these conditions we would still insist on
CARP coverage.
The argument is valid if the agricultural land is still not subjected to
compulsory acquisition under CARP. But as we saw, there has already
been a notice of coverage and notice of acquisition issued for the
property.
C3. ADMISSIONS AND CONFESSIONS
SECTION 27. Admission of a Party. — The act, declaration or
omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence
against him or her. (26a)
SECTION 28. Offer of Compromise Not Admissible. — In civil cases,
an offer of compromise is not an admission of any liability, and is not
admissible in evidence against the offeror. Neither is evidence of
conduct nor statements made in compromise negotiations admissible,
AQUINO, ALYSSA M.
except evidence otherwise discoverable or offered for another purpose,
such as proving bias or prejudice of a witness, negativing a contention
of undue delay, or proving an effort to obstruct a criminal investigation
or prosecution.
In criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offenses (criminal
negligence) or those allowed by law to be compromised, an offer of
compromise by the accused may be received in evidence as an implied
admission of guilt.
A plea of guilty later withdrawn or an unaccepted offer of a plea of
guilty to a lesser offense is not admissible in evidence against the
accused who made the plea or offer. Neither is any statement made in
the course of plea bargaining with the prosecution, which does not
result in a plea of guilty or which results in a plea of guilty later
withdrawn, admissible.
An offer to pay[,] or the payment of medical, hospital or other expenses
occasioned by an injury[,] is not admissible in evidence as proof of civil
or criminal liability for the injury. (27a)
SECTION 29. Admission by Third Party. — The rights of a party
cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another,
except as hereinafter provided. (28)
SECTION 30. Admission by Co-Partner or Agent. — The act or
declaration of a partner or agent authorized by the party to make a
statement concerning the subject, or within the scope of hisor her
authority[,] and during the existence of the partnership or agency, may
be given in evidence against such party after the partnership or agency
is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The same rule
applies to the act or declaration of a joint owner, joint debtor, or other
person jointly interested with the party. (29a)
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SECTION 31. Admission by Conspirator. — The act or declaration of a EXTRAJUDICIAL ADMISSIONS
conspirator in furtherance of the conspiracy and during its existence →Any statement of fact made by a party against his interest or
may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the unfavorable to the conclusion for which he contends or is inconsistent
conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act of declaration. with the facts alleged by him.
(30a) →A statement by the accused, direct or implied, of facts pertinent to
the issue, and tending in connection with proof of other facts, to prove
SECTION 32. Admission by Privies. — Where one derives title to his guilt. [People v. Lorenzo, G.R. No. 110107 (1995)]
property from another, the latter's act, declaration, or omission, in
relation to the property, is evidence against the former [if done] while RES INTER ALIOS ACTA RULE
the latter was holding the title. (31a) State the res inter alios acta rule:
1. The rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act,
SECTION 33. Admission by Silence. — An act or declaration made in declaration, or omission of another, except as provided in the Rules of
the presence and within the hearing or observation of a party who does Court.
or says nothing when the act or declaration is such as naturally to call 2. Evidence of a previous conduct or similar act at one time is
for action or comment if not true, and when proper and possible for him not admissible to prove that one did or did not do the same or similar
or her to do so, may be given in evidence against him or her. (32a) thing at another time; but it may be received to prove a specific intent
or knowledge, identity, plan, system, scheme, habit, custom, or usage
SECTION 34. Confession. — The declaration of an accused and the like.
acknowledging his or her guilt of the offense charged, or of any offense
necessarily included therein, may be given in evidence against him or Requisites for Admissibility
her. (33a) 1. They must involve matters of fact;
2. They must be categorical and definite;
ADMISSION BY A PARTY 3. They must be knowingly and voluntarily made; and
Elements: 4. Is adverse to admitter’s interests [2 Regalado 754, 2008 Ed.]
1. The act, declaration or omission
2. Of a party Effect of an Admission
3. As to a relevant fact It may be given in evidence against the admitter.
4. Against his or her interest [Sec. 27, Rule 130] Flight from justice is an admission by conduct and circumstantial
5. Made out of court (Those made in court are governed by Sec.4, Rule evidence of consciousness of guilt.
129.)
6. Offered and presented in court in an admissible manner (e.g. non- JUDICIAL EXTRAJUDICIAL
hearsay) Made in connection with a Any other admission [Secs. 27
judicial proceeding in which it is and 33, Rule 130]
offered [Sec. 4, Rule 129]

AQUINO, ALYSSA M. 50
 HENLIN NOTES
Out of court declaration as to give him an opportunity to
-Subject to cross examination explain before such admissions
-Not subject to cross are offered in evidence.
examination
Does not require proof [Sec. 4, Must still be formally offered in SEC. 28:
Rule 129] evidence (Note the language of CIVIL CASES EFFECT:
Sec. 27, Rule 130: “may be given Offer of compromise =NOT an admission of liability
in evidence”) =NOT admissible in evidence against the
May be conclusive unless Rebuttable offeror
contradicted [Sec. 4, Rule 129] Evidence of Conduct GR: NOT ADMISSIBLE
May be written, oral express or May be written, oral express or OR XPN:
implied [Sec. 4, Rule 129; Sec. implied [Sec. 4, Rule 129; Sec. Statements made in → evidence otherwise discoverable
27, Rule 130] 27, Rule 130] compromise → offered for another purpose (proving
negotiations bias or prejudice of a witness negativing
TYPES OF ADMISSION: a contention of undue delay)
JUDICIAL Made in the course of judicial proceedings → proving an effort to obstruct a criminal
EXTRA-JUDICIAL Made out of court or even in a proceeding investigation or prosecution
other than the one under consideration
EXPRESS Positive Statement/ Act CRIMINAL CASES EFFECT:
IMPLIED Declarations/acts of a person Offer of compromise by the accused GR: implied admission of
guilt
What are self-serving declarations? XPN:
Unsworn statements made by the declarant out of court and which are → those involving quasi-
favorable to his interest. It is one made by a party in his own interest at offenses (criminal
some place and time out of court and it does not include testimony negligence)
which he gives as a witness in a trial → those allowed by law to
be compromised
INTRODUCTION OF ADMISSION • Plea of guilty later withdrawn NOT ADMISSIBLE
AS INDEPENDENT EVIDENCE Admissions are original evidence • Unaccepted offer of a plea of
and no foundation is necessary guilty to a lesser offense
for their introduction in evidence • Any statement made in the
AS IMPEACHING EVIDENCE A proper foundation must be laid course of plea bargaining with
by calling the attention of such the prosecution which:
party to his former statement so

AQUINO, ALYSSA M. 51
 HENLIN NOTES
i) DOES not result in a plea
of guilty
ii) Or Which results in a plea
of guilty later withdrawn,
admissible.
Offer of compromise: admissibility/ inadmissibility
-circumstances of the case
-intent of the party making the offer should be considered
Plea of forgiveness: admission of guilt
ADMISSION BY A THIRD PARTY:
DOCTRINE OF ADOPTIVE ADMISSION:
→ A third party’s statement becomes the admission of the party
embracing or espousing it.
→ A party’s rection to a statement or action by another person when it
is reasonable to treat the party’s reaction as an admission of something
stated or implied by the other person.
May the admission of a person prejudice the right of another?
GR: No. The rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act,
declaration, or omission of another.
XPNs:
→ Act or declaration of a partner or agent within the scope of
his authority and during the existence of the partnership or agency
→ Act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy
and during its existence
→ When one derives title to property from another, the act,
declaration, or omission of the latter while holding the title in relation
to the property is evidence against the former
Example of acts, declarations, or omissions of a party which may be
given in evidence against him:
1. Flight (inconsistent with the innocence of the accused)
AQUINO, ALYSSA M.
2. Failure to deny charges despite the fact that he was confronted
twice
3. The fact that the driver stated before the police that he ran over an
old woman. (extrajudicial confession is admissible against him)
4. Spontaneous statements made NOT elicited through investigations
or questioning but given in ordinary manner where accused orally
admitted that he killed the victims.
[GR] General rule: The rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an
act, declaration, or omission of another [Sec. 29, Rule 130]
Admission by a third party is inadmissible as against another. The act,
declaration or omission of another is generally irrelevant, and that in
justice, a person should not be bound by the acts of mere unauthorized
strangers.
The rule is well-settled that a party is not bound by any agreement of
which he has no knowledge and to which he has not given his consent
and that his rights cannot be prejudiced by the declaration, act or
omission of another, except by virtue of a particular relation between
them.
Exceptions:
1. Partner’s or Agent’s Admission [Sec. 30, Rule 130]
2. Admission by conspirator [Sec. 31, Rule 130]
3. Admission by privies [Sec. 32, Rule 130]
Basis of exception:
A third party may be so united in interest with the party-opponent that
the other person’s admissions may be receivable against the party
himself. The term “privy” is the orthodox catchword for the relation.
Note: the res inter alios acta rule only applies to extrajudicial
declarations (admissions and confessions). However, when the
declarant repeats his extrajudicial declaration in open court and his co-
52
 HENLIN NOTES
accused are given the opportunity to cross-examine him, the CONFESSIONS:
declaration becomes admissible against the co-accused. Requisites for admissibility of a confession:
1. Confession must be voluntary
ADMISSION BY A CO-PARTNER OR AGENT: 2. Confession must be made with the assistance of a competent and
When is an admission by a co-partner or agent admissible as independent counsel
against a party in the case? 3. Confession must be express
-It is admissible when the admission is made by the agent or partner 4. Confession must be in writing
who was actin within the scope of his authority and during the
existence of the partnership or agency. The partnership or agency must Is a party’s confession admissible?
be shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. -Yes. If such confession is the declaration of an accused
acknowledging his or her guilt of the offense charged, or of any offense
ADMISSION BY A CONSPIRATOR: necessarily included therein, then it may be given in evidence against
When is an admission by a conspirator admissible as against a party him/her.
in the case?
-It is admissible when it is made by a conspirator in furtherance of the TAMARGO V. AWINGAN
conspiracy and during its existence. The conspiracy must be shown by
evidence other than such act or declaration. G.R. NO. 177727, [JANUARY 19, 2010], 624 PHIL 312-329.

ADMISSION BY PRIVIES: DOCTRINE: An exception to the res inter alios acta rule is an
What is an admission by privies? admission made by conspirator under Sec 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of
-It is an admission made by a predecessor if interest, while the Court: Admission by conspirator.- The act or declaration of a
predecessor in interest is holding the property title, in relation to the conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence, may be
property. given in evidence against co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown
by evidence other than such act or declaration.
ADMISSION BY SILENCE:
When can a party’s silence be considered as an admission? This rule prescribes that the act or declaration of the conspirator
-A party’s silence with regard to a statement may be admissible when relating to the conspiracy and during its existence may be given in
the following requisites concur: evidence against co-conspirators provided that the conspiracy is shown
1. An act or declaration made in the presence and within the by independent evidence aside from the extrajudicial confession.
hearing or observation of such party
2. Such statement, if untrue, calls for action or comment on the FACTS: Atty . Franklin V. Tamargo and his 8-year-old daughter were
part of the party shot and killed in 2003. The police had no leads on the perpetrators of
3. The party does or says nothing the crime until a certain Reynaldo Geron surfaced and executed an
affidavit wherein he stated that a certain Lucio Columna told him

AQUINO, ALYSSA M. 53
 HENLIN NOTES
during a drinking spree that Atty. Tamargo was ordered killed by Lloyd
Antiporda and the Columna was one of those who killed Atty. Tamargo.
Columna was arrested.
On March 8, 2004, Columna executed an affidavit wherein he admitted
his participation as “look out” during the shooting and implicated
Romulo Awingan as the gunman and one Richard Mecate. He also
tagged as masterminds Licerio Antiporda, Jr. and his son, Lloyd
Antiporda, ex mayor and mayor, respectively, of Buguey, Cagayan.
Pursuant to this affidavit, petitioner Harold V. Tamargo (brother of Atty.
Tamargo) filed a complaint against those implicated by Columna in the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila. Columna affirmed his affidavit
before the investigating prosecutor.
During the preliminary investigation, Licerio presented Columna’s
handwritten letter wherein the latter disowned the contents of his
earlier affidavit and narrated how he had been tortured until he signed
the extrajudicial confession. Licerio also submitted an affidavit of
Columna dated May 25, 2004 wherein the latter essentially repeated
the statements in his written letter. The investigating prosecutor set a
clarificatory hearing so that Columna could clarify his contradictory
affidavits and unsolicited letter. During the hearing, Columna
categorically admitted the authorship and voluntariness of the
unsolicited letter. Thus, the investigating prosecutor recommended the
dismissal of the charges.
In another handwritten letter addressed to City Prosecutor, however,
Columna said he was only forced to withdraw all his statements against
respondents during the clarificatory hearing because of the threats to
his life inside the jail. The Regional Trial Court judge denied the motion
to withdraw the information’s and held that based on March 8, 2004
affidavit which Columna affirmed before the investigating prosecutor,
there was probable cause to hold the accused for trial. The Court of
AQUINO, ALYSSA M.
Appeals reversed the decision. Tamargo appealed. Petitioner argues
that, based on the independent assessment of the Judge Daguna, there
was probable cause on the earlier affidavit of Columna. Awingan and
Antoporda’s on the other hand, contend that Columna’s extrajudicial
confession was inadmissible against them because of the rule on res
inter alios acta.
ISSUE: Whether or not the admission of Columna is admissible against
Awingan and Antipordas.
RULING: NO. Columna’s extrajudicial confession in his March 8. 2004
affidavit was not admissible as evidence against the respondents in
view of the rule on res inter alios acta. The rule on res inter alios acta
provides that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act,
declaration, or omission of another. Consequently, an extrajudicial
confession id binding only on the confessant, is not admissible against
his co-accused and is considered as hearsay against them. An
exception to the res inter alios acta rule is an admission made by
conspirator under Sec 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court: Admission by
conspirator.- The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the
conspiracy and during its existence, may be given in evidence against
co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than
such act or declaration.
This rule prescribes that the act or declaration of the conspirator
relating to the conspiracy and during its existence may be given in
evidence against co-conspirators provided that the conspiracy is shown
by independent evidence aside from the extrajudicial confession. Thus,
in order that the admission of a conspirator may be received against his
or her co- conspirators, it is necessary that:
(a) the conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than the admission
itself
(b) the admission relates to the common object and
54
 HENLIN NOTES
(c) it has been made while the declarant was engaged in carrying out
the conspiracy.
Otherwise, it cannot be used against the alleged co-conspirators
without violating their constitutional right to be confronted with the
witnesses against them and to cross-examine them. Here, aside from
the extrajudicial confession, which was later on recanted, no other
piece of evidence was presented to prove the alleged conspiracy. There
was no other prosecution evidence, direct or circumstantial, which the
extrajudicial confession could corroborate. Therefore, the recanted
confession of Columna, which was the sole evidence against
respondents, had no probative value and was inadmissible as evidence
against them.
PEOPLE V. CONSTANCIO Y BACUNGAY
G.R. NO. 206226, [APRIL 4, 2016].
DOCTRINE: The general rule is that an extra-judicial confession is
binding only on the confessant and is inadmissible in evidence against
his co-accused since it is considered hearsay against them However, as
an exception to this rule, the Court has held that an extra-judicial
confession is admissible against a co-accused when it is used as
circumstantial evidence to show the probability of participation of said
co-accused in the crime.
FACTS: It appears that on March 10, 2001, "AAA" went to Alabang
Town Center with her friends Dacanay and Golez. After parting ways
with them, "AAA" was about to board her car when she found herself
confronted by Berry then armed with a knife, who was then in the
company of Constancio, Pagkalinawan, Darden and alias "Burog."
These five forcibly seized "AAA's" car and drove her to Constancio'
house where she was raped and killed.
AQUINO, ALYSSA M.
In the course of an interview with ABS-CBN Reporter Amparo, Berry
revealed that while "AAA's" car was parked in Constancio' garage, the
said car was moving and shaking with "AAA" inside. This led him to
suspect that something was already happening; that when the door of
the car was opened, (Berry) saw that "AAA" was without her
underwear; and that Constancio then uttered the words, "wala na,"
indicating that "AAA" was already dead.
"AAA's" body was then placed inside the trunk of her car. Adarna, a
tricycle driver, saw Berry, Constancio, and their other companions,
throw something over a bridge which turned out to be "AAA's body
upon investigation by the authorities.
On the evening of March 12, 2001, Bales almost became the next victim
when Berry and his companions who were still using "AAA's" car,
attempted to abduct her. Fortunately for Bales, a barangay tanod was
present at the scene and was able to foil the abduction when he
shouted at the malefactors and startled them. Nonetheless, Bales' bag
was taken during this incident.
Eventually, Berry and Constancio were arrested after an informant
surfaced and identified them as "AAA's" assailants. The informant
came out after Mayor Marquez offered a reward for information leading
to the identity of persons responsible for "AAA's" rape-slay.
During the custodial investigation, where Atty. Suarez advised him of
his constitutional rights and the consequences of his statements, Berry
executed an extrajudicial confession which was embodied in a
Sinumpaang Salaysay. Berry also confessed to Amparo during an
interview that he did take part in the execution of the crime At the trial,
however, Berry denounced the Sinumpaang Salaysay as false, and
claimed that he was coerced into signing the same.
55
 HENLIN NOTES
For his part, Constancio contended that he was in Baguio at the time of
the commission of the crime. Both appellants denied the charges
against them. These two also asserted that Berry's extrajudicial
confession was inadmissible in evidence.
Issue: Whether or not Court of Appeals erred in declaring Berry’s
extrajudicial confession admissible in evidence and in considering it
against co-accused Constancio.
RULING: In this case, while there was no direct proof of a previous
agreement to rape and kill "AAA," it was nonetheless clear from Berry's
conduct that he acted in concerted effort and was united in intent, aim
and purpose in executing the group's criminal design. This was
established by Adarna's testimony stating that he saw Berry throw the
body of "AAA" over a bridge and that he was in "AAA's" car the night
she was killed. By helping his cousin and co-accused Constahcio
dispose of the body of "AAA," Berry became 'a co-conspirator by direct
participation. It is immaterial that Berry was merely present at the
scene of the crime since it is settled that in conspiracy, the act of one is
the act of all. If it is true that Berry was not privy to the plan of raping
and killing "AAA," he should have prevented the same from happening
or at the very least, left the group and reported the crime to the
authorities. Berry did neither and he even helped Constancio dispose of
"AAA's" body. Clearly, Berry, by his overt acts, became a co-conspirator
by directly participating in the execution of the criminal design.
On the other hand, Constancio argues that Berry's confession is
inadmissible in evidence against him under the principle of res inter
alios acta found in Section 28, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which
provides that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act,
declaration, or omission of another. Our ruling in Tamargo v. Awingan
pertinently explains the reason for this rule:
AQUINO, ALYSSA M.
On a principle of good faith and mutual convenience, a man's own acts
are binding upon himself, and are evidence against him. So are his
conduct and declarations. Yet it would not only be rightly inconvenient,
but also manifestly unjust, that a man should be bound by the acts of
mere unauthorized strangers; and if a party ought not to be bound by
the acts of strangers, neither ought their acts or conduct be used as
evidence against him.
The general rule is that an extra-judicial confession is binding only on
the confessant and is inadmissible in evidence against his co-accused
since it is considered hearsay against them. However, as an exception
to this rule, the Court has held that an extra-judicial confession is
admissible against a co-accused when it is used as circumstantial
evidence to show the probability of participation of said co-accused in
the crime.
Significantly, Constancio was positively identified as among those who
threw the body of "AAA" over a bridge. It is significant to note that
eyewitness Adarna also attests that Constancio was riding in the very
same car where "AAA" was raped and killed. This fact leaves this Court
without a doubt that Constancio is guilty of the crime charged as the
same qualifies as circumstantial evidence showing his participation in
the execution of the crime.
YAPYUCO Y ENRIQUEZ V. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. NOS. 120744-46, 122677 & 122776, [JUNE 25, 2012]
DOCTRINE: The extrajudicial confession or admission of one accused
is admissible only against said accused but is inadmissible against the
other accused.
FACTS: The cases are predicated on a shooting incident which caused
the death of Licup and injured Villanueva. The accused who are all
petitioners were Yapyuco, Cunanan and Puno who were members of
56
 HENLIN NOTES
the Integrated National Police; Mario Reyes who was the barangay
captain of Del Carmen; Andres Reyes and Manguerra, members of the
Civil Home Defense Force (CHDF). They were all charged with murder,
multiple attempted murder, and frustrated murder in three
Informations. There is contention here who among the petitioners
discharged the bullets that caused the eventual death of Licup and
injured Villanueva. Of all the accused, only Yapyuco took the stand for
the defense in Sandiganbayan. Cunanan and Puno did not take the
witness stand but adopted the testimony of Yapyuco as well as the
latter’s documentary evidence. Mario Reyes, Andres Reyes, and
Manguera, waived their right to present evidence and submitted their
memorandum as told. Yapyuco, in his testimony explained that their
presence at the shooting incident was in response to the information
relayed to them that armed rebel elements on board a vehicle were
reportedly spotted in Barangay Quebiawan. The accused police officers
admit that it was not by accident or mistake but by deliberation that the
shooting transpired when it became apparent that the suspect vehicle
was attempting to flee. In brief, their team was forced to fire at the said
vehicle when it accelerated after warning shots were fired in air and
when it ignored Yapyuco’s signal for it to stop. Yapyuco’s open court
declaration, which was adopted by Cunanan and Puno, is that he twice
discharged his firearm: first, to give warning to the subject jeepney
after it allegedly failed to stop when flagged down and second, at the
tires thereof when it came clear that it was trying to escape. He
suggested that the bullets which hit the passenger side of the ill-fated
jeepney could have come only from the CHDFs posted inside the yard
of Naron’s house where Manguerra, Mario Reyes and Andres Reyes
admitted having taken post while awaiting the arrival of the suspect
vehicle. The forensic chemist’s report pertaining to the examination of
the Tamaraw jeepney affirms the irreducible fact that the CHDFs
posted within the yard of Naron’s house had indeed sprayed bullets at
the said vehicle. Manguerra, Mario Reyes and Andres Reyes seek to
insulate themselves by arguing that such finding cannot be applied to
them as it is evidence adduced in a separate trial.
AQUINO, ALYSSA M.
ISSUE: Whether or not the evidence adduced before the
Sandiganbayan as well as the findings based thereon are binding on
Mario Reyes, Andres Reyes and Manguerra.
RULING: Yes. The extrajudicial confession or admission of one
accused is admissible only against said accused but is inadmissible
against the other accused. But if the declarant or admitter repeats in
court his extrajudicial admission, as Yapyuco did in this case, during
the trial and the other accused is accorded the opportunity to cross-
examine the admitter, the admission is admissible against both
accused because then, it is transposed into a judicial admission. It is
thus perplexing why, despite the extrajudicial statements of Cunanan,
Puno and Yapyuco, as well as the latter’s testimony implicating them in
the incident, they still had chosen to waive their right to present
evidence when, in fact, they could have shown detailed proof of their
participation or non-participation in the offenses charged. We,
therefore, reject their claim that they had been denied due process in
this regard, as they opted not to testify and be cross-examined by the
prosecution as to the truthfulness in their affidavits and, accordingly,
disprove the inculpatory admissions of their co-accused.
PEOPLE V. REYES Y PAJE
G.R. NO. 178300, [MARCH 17, 2009], 600 PHIL 738-789
DOCTRINE: Where the prosecution has sufficiently established that
the respective extrajudicial confessions of the accused were obtained
in accordance with the constitutional guarantees, these confessions
are admissible, and are evidence of a high order.
FACTS: In an information filed against Domingo Reyes y Paje, Alvin
Arnaldo y Avena and Joselito Flores y Victorio, it was alleged that by
means of force and intimidation and with use of firearms, they carried
away members of the Yao family against their will and consent on
board their Mazda MVP van for the purpose of extorting money in the
57
 HENLIN NOTES
amount of Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00). Chua Ong Ping Sim and
Raymond Yao, members of the family, were strangled to death during
their detention. The accused were charged for the crime of kidnapping
for ransom with homicide.
During prosecution the witnesses testified that Arnaldo surrendered to
the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF) at Camp
Crame, Quezon City. Thereupon, with the assistance of Atty. Uminga,
he executed a written extra-judicial confession narrating his
participation in the incident. Arnaldo identified Reyes and Flores,
Pataray and a certain Tata and Akey as his co-participants in the
incident. Arnaldo also described the physical features of his cohorts
and revealed their whereabouts. Agents of the PAOCTF also arrested
Flores. Flores, with the assistance of Atty. Rous, executed a written
extrajudicial confession detailing his participation in the incident.
Flores identified Reyes and Arnaldo, Pataray and a certain Tata and
Akey as his co-participants in the incident. Flores was subsequently
identified in a police line-up by Yao San, Robert and Abagatnan as one
of their kidnappers.
On the other hand, the defense presented their testimonies, denied any
liability and interposed alibis and the defense of frame-up. Arnaldo
denied having met with Atty. Uminga and insisted that he was not
assisted by the latter when he was forced by the PAOCTF to make a
written extrajudicial confession on the kidnapping of the Yao family. On
the other hand, Reyes testified that he had no involvement in the
kidnapping of the family and that Arnaldo implicated him in the
kidnapping of the family because Arnaldo held a grudge against him.
For his part, Flores testified that he was forced to sign a document
which he later found out to be a written extrajudicial confession, and
that he never met nor did he know Atty. Rous.
ISSUE: Whether or not the extrajudicial confessions of Arnaldo and
Flores should be given weight and credence.
AQUINO, ALYSSA M.
RULING: Yes. Where the prosecution has sufficiently established that
the respective extrajudicial confessions of the accused were obtained
in accordance with the constitutional guarantees, these confessions
are admissible, and are evidence of a high order. Since the prosecution
has sufficiently established that the respective extra-judicial
confessions of appellant Arnaldo and appellant Flores were obtained in
accordance with the constitutional guarantees, these confessions are
admissible. They are evidence of a high order because of the strong
presumption that no person of normal mind would deliberately and
knowingly confess to a crime, unless prompted by truth and
conscience. Consequently, the burden of proving that undue pressure
or duress was used to procure the confessions rests on Arnaldo and
Flores.
PEOPLE V. GUTING Y TOMAS
G.R. NO. 205412, [SEPTEMBER 9, 2015], 769 PHIL 538-555.

DOCTRINE: Custodial investigation commences when a person is
taken into custody and is singled out as a suspect in the commission of
a crime under investigation and the police officers begin to ask
questions on the suspect’s participation therein and which tend to elicit
an admission. Applying the foregoing definitions, Guting was not under
custodial investigation when he admitted, without assistance of
counsel, to PO1 Torre and PO1 Macusi that he stabbed his father to
death. Guting’s verbal confession was so spontaneously and voluntarily
given and was not elicited through questioning by the police
authorities.
FACTS: Prosecution witnesses, PO1 Fidel Torre testified that on the
rainy afternoon of July 30, 2005, at around 5:00 o’clock, he and PO1
Alexis Macusi were standing in front of the Camiling Police Station
when accused-appellant, Adrian Guting, all wet from the rain and with
a bladed weapon in his hand, suddenly approached them and told them
that he had stabbed his father. Hearing accused appellant’s statement,
58
 HENLIN NOTES
PO1 Torre immediately got the bladed weapon from Guting and turned
it over to PO1 Macusi for proper disposition. PO1 Macusi corroborated
PO1 Torre’s testimony. PO1 Macusi narrated that Guting suddenly
appeared before them at the Police Station, all wet and holding a knife.
Guting proclaimed that his father was already dead. Unsuspecting, PO1
Macusi asked him who killed his father. Guting answered,“Sinaksak ko
po yong tatay ko! Napatay ko na po!” Thereafter, the police officers
went to the residence of Jose Guting, accused appellant’s father, to
verify the reported crime, while other police officers informed the
deceased’s wife, Flora, Emerlito, another son, who were still at the
market. While waiting for Flora and Emerlito, the police officers
inquired from the neighbors if anybody had witnessed the crime, but no
one did. When Flora and Emerlito arrived, they entered the house and
saw Jose’s lifeless body with blood still oozing from his wounds. They
immediately brought Jose to the hospital where he was pronounced
dead on arrival. Subsequently, Flora and Emerlito executed the
irrespective Sinumpaang Salaysay and filed a case for Parricide against
Guting. The RTC found Guting guilty of Parricide based on his verbal
admission that he killed his father, Jose. Even assuming that accused-
appellant’s admission was inadmissible in evidence, the RTC adjudged
that the prosecution was still able to establish sufficient circumstantial
evidence which, taken collectively, pointed to accused-appellant as the
perpetrator of the brutal killing of his father. Guting appealed his
conviction before the Court of Appeals which affirmed the RTC
decision. Hence this appeal where Guting argues that his oral
confession to PO1 Torre and PO1 Macusi, without the assistance of
counsel, is inadmissible in evidence for having been made in blatant
violation of his constitutional right under Article III, Section 12 of the
1987 Constitution:
1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense
shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to
have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice.
If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be
AQUINO, ALYSSA M.
provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and
in the presence of counsel. xxxx
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section
17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
ISSUE: Whether Guting’s oral confession without the assistance of
counsel is admissible in evidence.
HELD: YES. Article III of the 1987 Constitution pertains to “custodial
investigation.” Custodial investigation commences when a person is
taken into custody and is singled out as a suspect in the commission of
a crime under investigation and the police officers begin to ask
questions on the suspect’s participation therein and which tend to elicit
an admission. As expounded in People v. Marra: Custodial
investigation involves any questioning initiated by law enforcement
officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. It is only after
the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime
and begins to focus on a particular suspect, the suspect is taken into
custody, and the police carries out a process of interrogations that
lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements that the rule begins to
operate.
Applying the foregoing definitions, Guting was not under custodial
investigation when he admitted, without assistance of counsel, to PO1
Torre and PO1 Macusi that he stabbed his father to death. Guting’s
verbal confession was so spontaneously and voluntarily given and was
not elicited through questioning by the police authorities. It may be true
that PO1 Macusi asked Guting who killed his father, but PO1 Macusi
only did so in response to Guting’s initial declaration that his father was
already dead. At that point, PO1 Macusi still had no idea who actually
committed the crime and did not consider Guting as the suspect in his
father’s killing. Guting was also merely standing before PO1Torre and
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PO1 Macusi in front of the Camiling Police Station and was not yet in
police custody.
C4. PREVIOUS CONDUCT AS EVIDENCE
SECTION 35. Similar Acts as Evidence. — Evidence that one did or
did not do a certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he
or she did or did not do the same or similar thing at another time; but it
may be received to prove a specific intent or knowledge, identity, plan,
system, scheme, habit, custom or usage, and the like. (34a)
SECTION 36. Unaccepted Offer. — An offer in writing to pay a
particular sum of money or to deliver a written instrument or specific
personal property is, if rejected without valid cause, equivalent to the
actual production and tender of the money, instrument, or property.
State the rule on admissibility of evidence of similar acts by a party:
-Generally, evidence of a previous conduct or similar act at one time is
not admissible to prove that one did or did not do the same or similar
thing at another time.
However, it may be received to prove a specific intent or
knowledge, identity, plan, system, scheme, habit, custom, or usage and
the like.
Is an offer of compromise admissible?
Civil case: No. Such offer of compromise is not an admission of any
liability, and is not admissible in evidence against the offeror.
Criminal case: Yes. An offer of compromise by the accused may be
received an evidence as an implied admission of guilt.
→XPN: quasi offenses OR those allowed by law to be
compromised.
C5. HEARSAY
AQUINO, ALYSSA M.
SECTION 37. Hearsay. — Hearsay is a statement other than one made
by the declarant while testifying at a trial or hearing, offered to prove
the truth of the facts asserted therein. A statement is (1) an oral or
written assertion or (2) a non-verbal conduct of a person, if it is
intended by him or her as an assertion. Hearsay evidence is
inadmissible except as otherwise provided in these Rules.
A statement is not hearsay if the declarant testifies at the trial or
hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement,
and the statement is (a) inconsistent with the declarant's testimony,
and was given under oath subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial,
hearing, or other proceeding, or in a deposition; (b) consistent with the
declarant's testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied
charge against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper influence
or motive; or (c) one of identification of a person made after perceiving
him or her.
What is hearsay?
Hearsay is a statement other than one made by the declarant while
testifying at a trial or hearing, offered to prove the truth of the facts
asserted therein
EAGLE RIDGE GOLF & COUNTRY CLUB V. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. NO. 178989, [MARCH 18, 2010], 630 PHIL 108-135.
DOCTRINE: It is settled that affidavits partake the nature of hearsay
evidence, since they are not generally prepared by the affiant but by
another who uses his own language in writing the affiant’s statement,
which may thus be either omitted or misunderstood by the one writing
them.
FACTS: At least 20% of Eagle Ridge’s rank-and-file employees—the
percentage threshold required under Article 234(c) of the Labor Code
for union registration—had a meeting where they organized themselves
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into an independent labor union, named “Eagle Ridge Employees
Union” (EREU), elected a set of officers, and ratified their constitution
and by-laws. Later on, EREU formally applied for registration before the
DOLE Regional Office IV. In time, DOLE RO IV granted the application
and issued EREU Registration Certificate. The EREU then filed a
petition for certification election in Eagle Ridge Golf & Country Club.
Eagle Ridge opposed this petition, followed by its filing of a petition for
the cancellation of EREU’S Registration Certificate. Eagle Ridge’s
petition ascribed misrepresentation, false statement, or fraud to EREU
in connection with the adoption of its constitution and by- laws, the
numerical composition of the Union, and the election of its officers.
Eagle Ridge contended, among others, that five employees who
attended the organizational meeting had manifested the desire to
withdraw from the union. The five executed individual affidavits or
Sinumpaang Salaysay on February 15, 2006, attesting that they arrived
late at said meeting which they claimed to be drinking spree; that they
did not know that the documents they signed on that occasion
pertained to the organization of a union; and that they now wanted to
be excluded from the Union. The withdrawal of the five, Eagle Ridge
maintained, effectively reduced the union membership to 20 or 21,
either of which is below the mandatory minimum 20% membership
requirement under Art. 234(c) of the Labor Code. Reckoned from 112
rank-and-file employees of Eagle Ridge, the required number would be
22 or 23 employees.
As a counterpoint, EREU, argued among others that the retraction of 5
union members should not be given any credence for the reasons that:
(a) the sworn statements of the five retracting union members sans
other affirmative evidence presented hardly qualify as clear and
credible evidence considering the joint affidavits of the other members
attesting to the orderly conduct of the organizational meeting; and the
retracting members did not deny signing the union documents.
Furthermore, to rebut the allegations in the affidavits of retraction of
AQUINO, ALYSSA M.
the five union members, EREU presented the Sama-Samang
Sinumpaang Salaysay of 12 union members executed in 2 different
dates and the Sworn
Statement of the Union’s legal counsel. These affidavits attested to the
orderly and proper proceedings of the organizational meeting on
December 6, 2005. Eagle Ridge presented another Sinumpaang
Salaysay of retraction of another union member. The membership of
EREU had thus been further reduced to only 19 or 20. This same
member was listed in the first Sama-Samang Sinumpaang Salaysay
presented by the Union but did not sign it.
ISSUE: Whether the affidavits of retraction executed by six union
members have probative value.
RULING: NO. In the more meaty issue of the affidavits of retraction
executed by six union members, we hold that the probative value of
these affidavits cannot overcome those of the supporting affidavits of
12 union members and their counsel as to the proceedings and the
conduct of the organizational meeting on December 6, 2005. The DOLE
Regional Director and the BLR OIC Director obviously erred in giving
credence to the affidavits of retraction, but not according the same
treatment to the supporting affidavits. The six affiants of the affidavits
of retraction were not presented in a hearing before the Hearing Officer
(DOLE Regional Director), as required under the Rules Implementing
Book V of the Labor Code covering Labor Relations. Said Rules is
embodied in Department Order No. (DO) 40-03:
“Section 11. Affirmation of testimonial evidence.—Any affidavit
submitted by a party to prove his/her claims or defenses shall be re-
affirmed by the presentation of the affiant before the Med-Arbiter or
Hearing Officer, as the case may be. Any affidavit submitted without
the re-affirmation of the affiant during a scheduled hearing shall
not be admitted in evidence, except when the party against whom the
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affidavit is being offered admits all allegations therein and waives the
examination of the affiant.”
It is settled that affidavits partake the nature of hearsay evidence, since
they are not generally prepared by the affiant but by another who uses
his own language in writing the affiant’s statement, which may thus be
either omitted or misunderstood by the one writing them. The above
rule affirms the general requirement in adversarial proceedings for the
examination of the affiant by the party against whom the affidavit is
offered.
In the instant case, itis required for affiants to re-affirm the contents of
their affidavits during the hearing of the instant case for them to be
examined by the opposing party, i.e., the Union. For their non-
presentation and consonant to the above-quoted rule, the six affidavits
of retraction are inadmissible as evidence against the Union in the
instant case. Moreover, the affidavit and joint-affidavits presented by
the Union before the DOLE Regional Director were duly re-affirmed in
the hearing of March 20, 2006 by the affiants. Thus, a reversible error
was committed by the DOLE Regional Director and the BLR OIC
Director in giving credence to the inadmissible affidavits of retraction
presented by Eagle Ridge while not giving credence to the duly re-
affirmed affidavits presented by the Union. Evidently, the allegations in
the six affidavits of retraction have no probative value and at the very
least cannot outweigh the rebutting attestations of the duly re-affirmed
affidavits presented by the Union.
C6. EXCEPTIONS TO THE HEARSAY RULE
A. Dying declaration
B. Statement of decedent or person of unsound mind
C. Declaration against interest
D. Act or declaration about pedigree
E. Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree
AQUINO, ALYSSA M.
F. Common reputation
G. Part of res gestae
H. Records of regularly conducted business activity
I. Entries in official records
J. Commercial lists and the like
K. Learned treaties
L. testimony or deposition at a former proceeding
M. Residual exception
1. DEAD MAN’S STATUTE (Dying declaration under Sec. 38)
SECTION 38. Dying Declaration. — The declaration of a dying person,
made under the consciousness of an impending death, may be received
in any case wherein his or her death is the subject of inquiry, as
evidence of the cause and surrounding circumstances of such death.
Requisites before a dying declaration may be admissible in evidence:
a. concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the
declarant’s death
b. at the time of the statement, the declarant is at the state of
impending death
c. the declarant is competent as a witness
d. the declaration is offered in a criminal case for homicide,
murder, or parricide in which the declarant is a victim
[does not involve pecuniary; penal interests only]
Note: He need not state that he was at the brink of death.
PEOPLE V. BADILLOS
G.R. NO. 215732 , [JUNE 6, 2018]
DOCTRINE: For a statement to be considered part of res gestae, the
following elements must concur: (a) the principal act, the res gestae, is
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a startling occurrence; (b) the statement was made before the
declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (c) the statement
concerns the occurrence in question and its immediate attending
circumstances
FACTS: On 5 November 2007, Christopher and a "John Doe" were
charged with murder for the killing of Alex H. Gregory (Alex) in an
Information.That [o]n or about the 11 day of August 2007 the above-
named accused, conspiring and helping each other, armed with a knife
and with intent to kill one Alex H. Gregory, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with treachery attack, assault and stab with
the said knife and hit with a piece of wood the said Alex H. Gregory,
hitting the latter on the left portion of his chest, thereby inflicting upon
him serious physical injuries which directly caused his death.
The prosecution presented three (3) witnesses, namely: Domingo C.
Gregory (Domingo), Jonathan Gregory (Jonathan), and Elsa H. Gregory
(Elsa).
Domingo testified that on 11 August 2007.Christopher and an
unidentified person appeared in front of them. Christopher was armed
with a bladed weapon, while the unidentified person held a wooden
club more particularly described as a "dos por dos." The unidentified
person struck Alex with the wooden club three times hitting him on the
nape and at the back of his head. Christopher followed by stabbing Alex
once in his left chest.
Jonathan testified that at around 7:00 P.M. or 8:00 P.M. on 11 August
2007, he was in their house at Barangay Malibo Matanda when his
comadre, Cecilia, came and informed him that his brother, Alex, was
stabbed After hearing the news, he immediately rushed to his brother
on his motorcycle. There, he saw Alex bloodied, sprawled on the
ground, and almost dying or "naghihingalo." While in this condition, Alex
told him that he was stabbed by "Boyet" whose real name was
AQUINO, ALYSSA M.
Christopher. After a while, a police mobile arrived and brought Alex to
the hospital. Alex, however, died on the same night.
Jonathan explained that they had known Christopher even before the
incident because he was their neighbor at Barangay Batia when they
were residing here.
The medico-legal report prepared by the forensic physician, P/Supt.
Belgira, revealed that Alex sustained multiple abrasions on his head
and a stab wound on his left pectoral region. P/Supt. Belgira concluded
that the cause of death was the stab wound.
The defense presented Christopher, his cousin Myrna Acedillo (Myrna),
and his uncle Alex Rapsing (Rapsing) as witnesses. Their testimonies
sought to establish the defense of alibi, as follows:
Christopher denied that he had anything to do with the death of Alex.
He insisted that he could not have stabbed Alex as he was far from the
scene of the crime at that time. While he admitted knowing Domingo as
he was a former neighbor, he denied meeting Alex prior to 11 August
2007.
Myrna testified that it was past 7:30 P.M. when Christopher arrived at
her house. Christopher sought Myrna's help in borrowing money. At
around 8:00 P.M., Myrna accompanied Christopher to borrow money
from a certain "Digoy." Thereafter, they returned to Myrna's house
where Christopher spent the night and stayed until the following
morning.
In its decision, the RTC found Christopher guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of murder. It was convinced that the prosecution
was able to prove the identity of Christopher as the person who
stabbed and killed Alex. Moreover, the trial court considered Alex's
statement to Jonathan as a dying declaration pointing to Christopher as
his assailant. It did not give credence to Christopher's defense of alibi
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noting the failure to demonstrate physical impossibility of his presence
at the crime scene at the time of the incident.
CA RULING: In its decision, the CA affirmed the 21 September 2012
RTC decision. The appellate court opined that the trial court properly
considered Alex's last words to his brother as a dying declaration. It
also ruled that Christopher's alibi cannot prevail over his positive
identification by Domingo as the person who killed the victim, and
Alex's dying declaration pointing to Christopher as the perpetrator.
ISSUE: Whether the trial and appellate courts erred in convicting
accused-appellant Christopher Badillos for the crime charged when his
guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt
RULING: The appeal lacks merit.
Alex's declaration cannot be considered as a dying declaration;
admissible as part of res gestae.
A dying declaration is admissible in evidence if the following
circumstances are present: (1) it concerns the cause and the
surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death; (2) it is made
when death appears to be imminent and the declarant is under a
consciousness of impending death; (3) the declarant would have been
competent to testify had he or she survived; and (4) the dying
declaration is offered in a case in which the subject of the inquiry
involves the declarant's death.36 In order to make a dying declaration
admissible, a fixed belief in inevitable and imminent death must be
entered into by the declarant. It is the declarant's belief of his
impending death and not the rapid succession of his death in point of
fact that renders his declaration admissible as a dying declaration. The
test is whether the declarant has abandoned all hopes of survival and
looks on death as certainly impending.
AQUINO, ALYSSA M.
While Jonathan was under the impression that his brother was in the
throes of death, it does not appear that the declarant himself was
conscious of his impending death. The fact that Alex was ripping his
shirt while he uttered the name of his assailant is not sufficient to
qualify such as a dying declaration.
Nevertheless, while Alex's statement does not qualify as a dying
declaration, the same may still be admitted as an exception to the
hearsay rule for being part of res gestae. For a statement to be
considered part of res gestae, the following elements must concur: (a)
the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (b) the
statement was made before the declarant had time to contrive or
devise; and (c) the statement concerns the occurrence in question and
its immediate attending circumstances. All the foregoing elements are
present in this case.
First, the stabbing incident constituted the startling occurrence.
Second, there was no sufficient time for Alex to contrive or devise a
falsehood when he uttered the name of his assailant to Jonathan.
Between the infliction of the mortal wound upon Alex and his statement
surrounding this incident, at most two hours had elapsed. This interval
of time is hardly sufficient to conjure up a story or concoct and contrive
a falsehood given that even an interval of four hours is still considered
as nearly contemporaneous to the startling occurrence. Lastly, the
statement concerned the circumstances surrounding the stabbing of
Alex.
2. STATEMENT OF DECEDENT OR PERSON OF UNSOUND MIND
(Sec 39)
SECTION 39. Statement of Decedent or Person of Unsound Mind. —
In an action against an executor or administrator or other
representative of a deceased person, or against a person of unsound
mind, upon a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased
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person or against such person of unsound mind, where a party or
assignor of a party or a person in whose behalf a case is prosecuted
testifies on a matter of fact occurring before the death of the deceased
person or before the person became of unsound mind, any statement of
the deceased or the person of unsound mind, may be received in
evidence if the statement was made upon the personal knowledge of
the deceased or the person of unsound mind at a time when the matter
had been recently perceived by him or her and while his or her
recollection was clear. Such statement, however, is inadmissible if
made under circumstances indicating its lack of trustworthiness.
3. DECLARATION AGAINST INTEREST
SECTION 40. Declaration against Interest. — The declaration made
by a person deceased or unable to testify against the interest of the
declarant, if the fact asserted in the declaration was at the time it was
made so far contrary to the declarant's own interest that a reasonable
person in his or her position would not have made the declaration
unless he or she believed it to be true, may be received in evidence
against himself or herself or his or her successors in interest and
against third persons. A statement tending to expose the declarant to
criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible
unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness
of the statement.
Requisites in order for declaration against interest to be admissible:
a. Declarant is DEAD or UNABLE to testify
b. It relates to the fact against the interest of the declarant
c. At the time he made such declaration, the declarant was
AWARE that the same was contrary to his interest
d. That the declarant had NO motive to testify and believed such
declaration to be true.
AQUINO, ALYSSA M.
When can a statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal
liability be admissible?
If it exposes the declarant to criminal liability and offered to exculpate
the accused = NOT admissible UNLESS → corroborating
circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement.
Purpose of the amendment [second sentence]
-not admissible because declarant cannot be cross examined
Declaration against interest v. Admissions
4. ACT OR DECLARATION ABOUT PEDGIREE
SECTION 41. Act or Declaration About Pedigree. — The act or
declaration of a person deceased or unable to testify, in respect to the
pedigree of another person related to him or her by birth[,] adoption, or
marriage or, in the absence thereof, with whose family he or she was so
intimately associated as to be likely to have accurate information
concerning his or her pedigree, may be received in evidence where it
occurred before the controversy, and the relationship between the two
[(2)] persons is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.
The word "pedigree" includes relationship, family genealogy, birth,
marriage, death, the dates when and the places where these facts
occurred, and the names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of
family history intimately connected with pedigree
Pedigree: History of family descent which is transmitted from one
generation to another by both oral and written declarations and
traditions.
The word “pedigree” includes relationship, family genealogy, birth,
marriage, death, the dates when and the places where these facts
occurred, and the names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of
family history intimately connected with pedigree. (Rule 130, Sec. 41)
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Reasons for admissibility: based on the principle that they are natural
expressions of persons who must know the truth regarding one’s
pedigree.
Requisites in order an act or declaration about pedigree be made
admissible:
a. Declarant is dead and unable to testify
b. Declarant must be related to the person whose pedigree is
the subject of inquiry
c. Such relationship must be shown in by evidence other than
the declaration
d. Pedigree of a person must be an issue
e. Declaration must have been made “ANTE LITEM MOTAM” or
before any controversy regarding such has risen.
What are the relationships contemplated under this rule?
1. By birth
2. By adoption
3. By marriage
4. In the absence thereof, with whose family he or she was intimately
associated as to be likely to have accurate information concerning his
or her pedigree.
NEPOMUCENO V. LOPEZ
G.R. NO. 181258, [MARCH 18, 2010], 630 PHIL 135-145
DOCTRINE: The issue of paternity still has to be resolved by such
conventional evidence as the relevant incriminating verbal and written
acts by the putative father. Under Article 278 of the New Civil Code,
voluntary recognition by a parent shall be made in the record of birth, a
will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing. To
be effective, the claim of filiation must be made by the putative father
himself and the writing must be the writing of the putative father. A
AQUINO, ALYSSA M.
notarial agreement to support a child whose filiation is admitted by the
putative father was considered acceptable evidence.
FACTS: Respondent Arhbencel Ann Lopez (Arhbencel), represented by
her mother Araceli Lopez (Araceli), filed a Complaint for recognition
and support against Ben-Hur Nepomuceno.
Arhbencel claimed to have been begotten out of an extramarital affair
of petitioner with Araceli, that petitioner refused to affix his signature
on her Certificate of Birth and that, by a handwritten note petitioner
nevertheless obligated himself to give her financial support.
Arhbencel prayed that petitioner be ordered to: (1) recognize her as his
child, (2) give her support pendente lite in the increased amount and
(3) give her adequate monthly financial support until she reaches the
age of majority.
Petitioner countered that Araceli had not proven that he was the father
of Arhbencel; and that he was only forced to execute the handwritten
note on account of threats.
The trial court held that, among other things, Arhbencel’s Certificate of
Birth was not prima facie evidence of her filiation to petitioner as it did
not bear petitioner’s signature; that petitioner’s handwritten
undertaking to provide support did not contain a categorical
acknowledgment that Arhbencel is his child; and that there was no
showing that petitioner performed any overt act of acknowledgment of
Arhbencel as his illegitimate child after the execution of the note.
Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision, declared Arhbencel
to be petitioner’s illegitimate daughter. The appellate court found that
from petitioner’s payment of Araceli’s hospital bills when she gave birth
to Arhbencel and his subsequent commitment to provide monthly
financial support, the only logical conclusion to be drawn was that he
was Arhbencel’s father; that petitioner merely acted in bad faith in
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omitting a statement of paternity in his handwritten undertaking to
provide financial support; and that the amount of ₱8,000 a month was
reasonable for Arhbencel’s subsistence and not burdensome for
petitioner in view of his income.
ISSUE: Whether or not the hand written note by the petitioner is a
competent evidence to establish filiation with the respondent.
RULING: In Pe Lim v. CA, a case petitioner often cites, we stated that
the issue of paternity still has to be resolved by such conventional
evidence as the relevant incriminating verbal and written acts by the
putative father. Under Article 278 of the New Civil Code, voluntary
recognition by a parent shall be made in the record of birth, a will, a
statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing. To be
effective, the claim of filiation must be made by the putative father
himself and the writing must be the writing of the putative father. A
notarial agreement to support a child whose filiation is admitted by the
putative father was considered acceptable evidence. Letters to the
mother vowing to be a good father to the child and pictures of the
putative father cuddling the child on various occasions, together with
the certificate of live birth, proved filiation. However, a student
permanent record, a written consent to a father's operation, or a
marriage contract where the putative father gave consent, cannot be
taken as authentic writing. Standing alone, neither a certificate of
baptism nor family pictures are sufficient to establish filiation. In the
present case, Arhbencel relies, in the main, on the handwritten note
executed by petitioner.
The note does not contain any statement whatsoever about
Arhbencel’s filiation to petitioner. It is, therefore, not within the ambit of
Article 172(2) vis-à-vis Article 175 of the Family Code which admits as
competent evidence of illegitimate filiation an admission of filiation in a
private handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned.
AQUINO, ALYSSA M.
The note cannot also be accorded the same weight as the notarial
agreement to support the child referred to in Herrera. For it is not even
notarized. And Herrera instructs that the notarial agreement must be
accompanied by the putative father’s admission of filiation to be an
acceptable evidence of filiation. Here, however, not only has petitioner
not admitted filiation through contemporaneous actions. He has
consistently denied it.
The only other documentary evidence submitted by Arhbencel, a copy
of her Certificate of Birth, has no probative value to establish filiation to
petitioner, the latter not having signed the same.
At bottom, all that Arhbencel really has is petitioner’s handwritten
undertaking to provide financial support to her which, without more,
fails to establish her claim of filiation. The Court is mindful that the
best interests of the child in cases involving paternity and filiation
should be advanced. It is, however, just as mindful of the disturbance
that unfounded paternity suits cause to the privacy and peace of the
putative father’s legitimate family.
5. FAMILY REPUTATION OR TRADITION REGARDING PEDIGREE
[traditionary evidence rule]
SECTION 42. Family Reputation or Tradition Regarding Pedigree . —
The reputation or tradition existing in a family previous to the
controversy, in respect to the pedigree of any one of its members, may
be received in evidence if the witness testifying thereon be also a
member of the family, either by consanguinity[,] affinity, or adoption.
Entries in family bibles or other family books or charts, engraving on
rings, family portraits and the like, may be received as evidence of
pedigree.
Requisites before such may be made admissible:
a. reputation or tradition must have been formed BEFORE the
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controversy (Ante litem motam)
b. reputation or tradition is one EXISTING in the family whose
pedigree is in question.
c. Witness testifying to the reputation of a person is a MEMBER
of the family either by consanguinity, affinity, or adoption
d. there is CONTROVERSY regarding the pedigree of a member
of a family.
What are other pieces of evidence that can be used to establish
pedigree?
1. Family bible
2. Family books or charts
3. Engravings on rings
4. Family portraits and the like.
Sec. 41 V. Sec. 42
6. COMMON REPUTATION
SECTION 43. Common Reputation. — Common reputation existing
previous to the controversy, as to boundaries of or customs affecting
lands in the community and reputation as to events of general history
important to the community, or respecting marriage or moral character,
may be given in evidence. Monuments and inscriptions in public places
may be received as evidence of common reputation.
-reputation existing previous to the controversy as to the:
→ Boundaries of or customs affecting lands in the community
and reputation as to the events of general history important to the
community
→ Respecting marriage or moral character
Note: Monuments and inscriptions in public places may be received as
evidence of common reputation.
Note: Common reputation is the definite opinion of the community in
which the fact to be proved is known or exists. It means the general or
substantially undivided reputation, as distinguished from a partial or
CHARACTER REPUTATION
Refers to the inherent qualities Applies to the opinion which
of a person. It means that which others may have formed and
a person really is. expressed of his character. It
means that which a person is
reputed to be.
qualified one, although it need not be unanimous.
Requisites for admissibility of common reputation:
As to events of general history:
1. The facts must be of public or general interest;
2. The reputation must have been formed among a class of persons
who were in a position to have some sources of information and to
contribute intelligently to the formation of the opinion; and
3. The reputation must have been existing previous to the controversy.
In respecting marriage:
1. The common reputation must have been formed previous to the
controversy; and
2. The reputation must have been formed among a class of persons
who were in a position to have some sources of information and to
contribute intelligently to the formation of the opinion
In respecting moral character:
1. That it is the reputation in the place where the person in question is
best known; and
2. That it was formed previous to the controversy.
7. PART OF RES GESTAE

AQUINO, ALYSSA M. 68
 HENLIN NOTES
SECTION 44. Part of the Res Gestae. — Statements made by a 2. Verbal Acts: Utterances which accompany some equivocal act or
person while a startling occurrence is taking place or immediately prior conduct to which the utterances give a legal effect.
or subsequent thereto[,] under the stress of excitement caused by the A verbal act presupposes conduct that is equivocal or ambiguous, one
occurrence with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given in which, in itself, does not signify anything when taken separately. It only
evidence as part of the res gestae. So, also, statements accompanying acquires a meaning, specifically what the rules call a legal significance,
an equivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a legal significance, only because of the statements that accompany the act.
may be received as part of the res gestae.
SPONTANEOUS STATEMENTS VERBAL ACTS
-Latin: “Things Done” Res gestae is the startling Res gestae is the equivocal act
-As an exception to the hearsay rule, it refers to statements made by a occurrence
person WHILE a startling occurrence is taking place or immediately Statement may be made prior, or Statement must be
prior or subsequent thereto, under the stress of excitement caused by immediately after, the startling contemporaneous with or must
the occurrence with respect to the circumstances thereof. occurrence accompany the equivocal act.

Requisites of res gestae How do you determine if an act is SPONTANEOUSLY made?

a. the principal act or the res gestae be a STARTLING
occurrence
b. statement is SPONTANEOUS or was made before the
declarant had time to contrive or devise.
c. statement must concern the occurrence in question and its
immediately attending circumstances.
d. mental condition and physical condition of the witness
1. Time that lapsed between the occurrence of the act and the
making of the statement.
2. Place where the statement is made
3. Condition of the declarant when the statement was given.
4. Presence or absence of any intervening event between the
occurrence and statement relative thereto.
5. Nature and the circumstance of the statement itself.

Is a long lapse of time between the act and declaration enough to
disqualify such as part of the res gestae?
No. The principle still stands that such declaration was made under the
influence of a startling event witnessed by the person who made the
declaration before he can create a story or concoct a fabricated claim
without any undue influence in obtaining it.
Types of res gestae utterances:
1. Spontaneous Statements: Applies to the opinion which others may
have formed and expressed of his character. It means that which a person
is reputed to be.
RES GESTAE DYING DECLARATION
Statement may be made
DOCTRINE OF INDEPENDENTLY RELEVANT STATEMENTS:
The hearsay rule DO NOT apply where only the fact that such
statements were made is RELEVANT and the truth or falsity thereof is
IMMATERIAL
EXAMPLE: part of res gestae --hysterical grandmother was already
dead. NOT hearsay: statement of a nurse who said that the

AQUINO, ALYSSA M. 69
 HENLIN NOTES
grandmother was hysterical—GM cannot be presented because she
was already dead.
8. RECORDS OF REGULARLY CONDUCTED BUSINESS ACTIVITY
SECTION 45. Records of Regularly Conducted Business Activity. —
A memorandum, report, record or data compilation of acts, events,
conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made by writing, typing, electronic,
optical or other similar means at or near the time of or from
transmission or supply of information by a person with knowledge
thereof, and kept in the regular course or conduct of a business activity,
and such was the regular practice to make the memorandum, report,
record, or data compilation by electronic, optical or similar means, all of
which are shown by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified
witnesses, is excepted from the rule on hearsay evidence.
A memorandum, report, record or data compilation of acts, events,
conditions, opinions or diagnoses, made by writing, typing, electronic,
optical or other similar means at or near the time of or from
transmission or supply of information -
1. By a person with knowledge thereof and
2. Kept in the regular course or conduct of a business activity and
3. Such was the regular practice to make the memorandum,
report, record or data compilation by electronic, optical or
similar means
4. All of which are shown by the testimony of the custodian or
other qualified witnesses,
- is excepted from the rule of hearsay evidence
Two persons covered: ENTRANT and WITNESS
RAMIRO LIM & SONS AGRICULTURAL CO., INC. V. GUILARAN
G.R. NO. 221967, [FEBRUARY 6, 2019]
AQUINO, ALYSSA M.
DOCTRINE: While it is true that entries in the payrolls enjoy the
presumption of regularity, 18 it is merely a disputable presumption that
may be overthrown by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.
FACTS: Respondents filed complaints for illegal dismissal against
petitioners. They alleged that they were agricultural workers of the
petitioners, employed to work in all the agricultural stages of work on
its 84-hectare hacienda. Respondents also alleged that they were paid
on a mixed pakyaw and daily basis.
The Labor Arbiter and the NLRC dismissed the complaints. In the
petition for certiorari filed before the CA, it ruled that since the
respondents have been performing services necessary and desirable to
the business which are badges of regular employment, even though
they did not work throughout the year and the employment depended
on a specific season, the CA granted the reinstatement and payment of
full backwages based on the latest Wage Order. The case was
remanded to the Labor Arbiter for the computation of back wages.
Meanwhile, petitioners filed a petition for review on certiorari to the
Supreme Court (this Court), but was denied for failure to sufficiently
show any reversible error to warrant the exercise of its discretionary
appellate jurisdiction. The Resolution of this Court denying the petition
attained finality on 17 November 2009.
In an Order dated 29 March 2010, the Labor Arbiter adopted the
computation of the Fiscal Examiner who awarded to respondents their
backwages. The award was based on the mandated rates provided by
law for the period from 2000 until December 2009, and was limited to
six months of work per year, considering that sugarcane farming is not
continuous the whole year round.
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Petitioners filed a Memorandum of Appeal to the NLRC. They claimed
that respondents barely worked, and thus, are not entitled to the
computation of six months pay per year.
The NLRC annulled and set aside the Order of the Labor Arbiter finding
that the computation used was erroneous. The NLRC upheld the
validity of the payrolls submitted by petitioners, which showed that as
pakyaw workers, respondents did not observe the regular eight hour
work daily for the tasks given to them. Based on the voluminous
records submitted by the petitioners, the NLRC found that not all of the
respondents worked for at least six months in the last six years prior to
their dismissal.
The Motion for Reconsiderationfiled by respondents was denied by the
NLRC. Thereafter, respondents filed a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 before the CA.
The CA reversed and set aside the Decision of the NLRC and reinstated
the Order of the Labor Arbiter. The CA disregarded the payrolls
presented by petitioners as these payrolls were self-serving, unreliable,
and unsubstantial evidence. The inconsistencies in the signatures of
respondents were so questionable to the naked eye that the CA found
that its genuineness is doubtful.
In a Resolution, the CA denied the Motion for Partial
Reconsiderationfiled by petitioners
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in disregarding the payroll
submitted by the petitioner in computing the backwages of the
respondents.
a. Whether the entries in the payrolls enjoy the presumption of
regularity. b. Define prima facie evidence.
AQUINO, ALYSSA M.
RULING: No. While it is true that entries in the payrolls enjoy the
presumption of regularity, it is merely a disputable presumption that
may be overthrown by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.
Section 43 of Rule 143 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 43. Entries in the course of business. — Entries made at, or
near the time of transactions to which they refer, by a person
deceased, or unable to testify, who was in a position to know the facts
therein stated, may be received as prima facie evidence, if such person
made the entries in his professional capacity or in the performance of
duty and in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty.
A presumption is merely an assumption of fact that the law requires to
be made based on another fact or group of facts. It is an inference as to
the existence of a fact that is not actually known, but arises from its
usual connection with another fact, or a conjecture based on past
experience as to what the ordinary human affairs take. Moreover, prima
facie evidence is defined as evidence which, if unexplained or
uncontradicted, is sufficient to sustain a judgment in favor of the issue
it supports, but which may be contradicted by other evidence.Thus,
prima facie evidence is not conclusive or absolute evidence to the
contrary may be presented by the party disputing the assumption of
fact made by inference of law and the court may validly consider such.
In this case, we find that the CA did not err when it found that the
inconsistencies in the signatures of respondents are so questionable to
the naked eye that there exists doubt on their genuineness. After a
painstaking scrutiny of the voluminous records, it found inconsistencies
in the signatures.
Thus, while the payrolls in question enjoyed the presumption of
regularity as entries made in the course of business, this presumption
of regularity was effectively overthrown by evidence to the contrary.
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MALAYAN INSURANCE CO., INC. V. ALBERTO
G.R. NO. 194320, [FEBRUARY 1, 2012], 680 PHIL 813-830.
DOCTRINE: As a rule of evidence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is
peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes that prima facie
negligence may be established without direct proof and furnishes a
substitute for specific proof of... negligence.
Under the doctrine of res ipsa... loquitur, which means, literally, the
thing or transaction speaks for itself, or in one jurisdiction, that the
thing or instrumentality speaks for itself, the facts or circumstances
accompanying an injury may be such as to raise a presumption, or at
least permit an inference... of negligence on the part of the defendant,
or some other person who is charged with negligence
To reiterate, res ipsa loquitur is a rule of necessity which applies where
evidence is absent or not readily... available.
partly based upon the theory that the defendant in charge of the
instrumentality which causes the injury either knows the cause of the
accident or has the best opportunity of ascertaining it and that the
plaintiff has... no such knowledge, and, therefore, is compelled to allege
negligence in general terms and to rely upon the proof of the happening
of the accident in order to establish negligence.
requisites for the application of the res ipsa loquitur rule are the
following: (1) the accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur
unless someone is negligent; (2) the instrumentality or agency which
caused the injury was under the... exclusive control of the person
charged with negligence; and (3) the injury suffered must not have
been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the
person injured.
AQUINO, ALYSSA M.
It is worth mentioning that just like any other disputable presumptions
or inferences, the presumption of negligence may be rebutted or
overcome by other evidence to the contrary.
FACTS: All three (3) vehicles were at a halt along EDSA facing the
south direction when the Fuzo Cargo Truck simultaneously bumped the
rear portion of the Mitsubishi Galant and the rear left portion of the
Nissan Bus. Due to the strong impact, these two vehicles were shoved
forward and the... front left portion of the Mitsubishi Galant rammed
into the rear right portion of the Isuzu Tanker.
Maintaining that it has been subrogated to the rights and interests of
the assured by operation of law upon its payment to the latter, Malayan
Insurance sent several demand letters to respondents Rodelio Alberto
(Alberto) and Enrico Alberto Reyes (Reyes), the registered owner... and
the driver, respectively, of the Fuzo Cargo Truck, requiring them to pay
the amount it had paid to the assured. When respondents refused to
settle their liability, Malayan Insurance was constrained to file a
complaint for damages for gross negligence against... respondents.
respondents asserted that they cannot be held liable for the vehicular
accident, since its proximate cause was the reckless driving of the
Nissan Bus driver. The speeding bus, coming from the service road of
EDSA, maneuvered its way towards the... middle lane without due
regard to Reyes' right of way. When the Nissan Bus abruptly stopped,
Reyes stepped hard on the brakes but the braking action could not
cope with the inertia and failed to gain sufficient traction. Trial court, in
Civil Case No. 99-95885, ruled in favor of Malayan Insurance and
declared respondents liable for damages
Malayan Insurance contends that, even without the presentation of the
police investigator who prepared the police report, said report is still
admissible in evidence, especially since respondents failed to make a
timely objection to its presentation in evidence.[16] Respondents
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counter that since the police report was never confirmed by the
investigating police officer, it cannot be considered as part of the
evidence on record.
Malayan Insurance contends that since Reyes, the driver of the Fuzo
Cargo truck, bumped the rear of the Mitsubishi Galant, he is presumed
to be negligent unless proved otherwise. It further contends that
respondents failed to present any evidence to overturn the presumption
of... negligence.[26] Contrarily, respondents claim that since Malayan
Insurance did not present any witness who shall affirm any negligent
act of Reyes in driving the Fuzo Cargo truck before and after the
incident, there is no evidence which would show... negligence on the
part of respondents.
ISSUE: Whether the ca is correct in dismissing the complaint for failure
of malayan insurance to overcome the burden of proof required to
establish the negligence of respondents.
RULING: Yes. Here, there is no dispute that SPO1 Dungga, the on-the-
spot investigator, prepared the report, and he did so in the performance
of his duty. However, what is not clear is whether SPO1 Dungga had
sufficient personal knowledge of the facts contained in his report. Thus,
the... third requisite is lacking.
Respondents failed to make a timely objection to the police report's
presentation in evidence; thus, they are deemed to have waived their
right to do so.[25] As a result, the police report is still admissible in
evidence.
the Fuzo Cargo Truck would not have had hit the rear end of the
Mitsubishi Galant unless someone is negligent. Also, the Fuzo Cargo
Truck was under the exclusive control of its driver, Reyes. Even if
respondents avert liability by putting the blame on the Nissan Bus
driver, still, this allegation was self-serving and totally unfounded.
AQUINO, ALYSSA M.
Finally, no contributory negligence was attributed to the driver of the
Mitsubishi Galant. Consequently, all the requisites for the application of
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur are... present, thereby creating a
reasonable presumption of negligence on the part of respondents.
It is unfortunate, however, that respondents failed to present any
evidence before the trial court.
Thus, the presumption of negligence remains. Consequently, the CA
erred in dismissing the complaint for Malayan Insurance's adverted
failure to prove negligence on the part of respondents.
Under the rules of evidence, a witness can testify only to those facts
which the witness knows of his or her personal knowledge, that is,
which are derived from the witness' own perception.
"Hearsay is not limited to oral testimony or statements; the general rule
that excludes hearsay as evidence applies to written, as well as oral
statements."... requisites for the admissibility in evidence, as an
exception to the hearsay rule of entries in official records, thus: (a) that
the entry was made by a public officer or by another person... specially
enjoined by law to do so; (b) that it was made by the public officer in
the performance of his or her duties, or by such other person in the
performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and (c) that the public
officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the... facts by him or
her stated, which must have been acquired by the public officer or
other person personally or through official information.
The presentation of the police report itself is admissible as an
exception to the hearsay rule even if the police investigator who
prepared it was not presented in court, as long as the above requisites
could be adequately proved.
9. ENTRIES IN OFFICIAL RECORDS [Sec. 46]
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SECTION 46. ENTRIES IN OFFICIAL RECORDS- Entries in official
records made in the performance of his or her duty by a public officer
of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially
enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.
(Rule 130 Sec. 46)
Requisites for admissibility:
1. That the entry was made by:
a. A public officer, or
b. Another person, specially enjoined by law to do so;
2. That it was made by the public officer in the performance of his or
her duties, or by such other person in the performance of a duty
specially enjoined by law; and
3. That the public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of
the facts stated by him or her, which must have been acquired by him
or her personally or through official information. (Africa v. Caltex, G.R.
No. L- 12986, 1966)
Note: NOT necessary to show that the person is UNAVAILBLE because
he is EXCUSED from appearing in court in order for public business to
not be interrupted.
Example: physicians in a government hospital
What is the probative value?
-prima facie evidence of the facts
10. COMMERCIAL LISTS AND THE LIKE [Sec. 47]
SECTION 47. Commercial Lists and the Like. -- Evidence of
statements of matters of interest to persons engaged in an occupation
contained in a list, register, periodical, or other published compilation is
admissible as tending to prove the truth of any relevant matter so
stated if that compilation is published for use by persons engaged in
that occupation and is generally used and relied upon by them therein.
AQUINO, ALYSSA M.
Requisites for Admissibility:
1. It is a statement of a matter of interest to persons engaged in
an occupation;
2. Such statement is contained in a list, register, periodical or
other published compilation;
3. That compilation is published for the use of persons engaged in
that occupation, and
4. That compilation is generally used and relied upon by persons
in the same occupation (Rule 130, Sec. 47)
Examples:
1. Trade journals
2. Table of mortality compiled by life insurance companies
3. Abstracts of title compiled by reputable title examining
institutions or individuals
4. Business directories
What is the probative value:
11. LEARNED TREATISE: [discretionary judicial notice]
SECTION 48. Learned Treatises -- A published treatise, periodical or
pamphlet on a subject of history, law, science, or art is admissible as
tending to prove the truth of a matter stated therein if the court takes
judicial notice, or a witness expert in the subject testifies, that the
writer of the statement in the treatise, periodical or pamphlet is
recognized in his or her profession or calling as expert in the subject.
(Rule 130, Sec. 48)
Requisites:
1. There is a published treatise, periodical or pamphlet on a subject of
history, law, science, or art
2. It is offered to prove the truth of a matter stated therein
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3. The court takes judicial notice, or a witness expert in the subject
testifies, that the writer of the statement in the treatise, periodical or
pamphlet is recognized in his profession or calling as expert in the
subject. (Rule 130, Sec. 48)
Learned Treatises are Admissible Only if:
1. The court takes judicial notice that the writer is recognized in
his profession as expert in the subject; or
2. A witness who is an expert on the subject testifies that the
writer of the statement is recognized in his profession as expert
in the subject.
ARREZA V. TOYO
G.R. NO. 213198, [JULY 1, 2019]
DOCTRINE: Philippine courts do not take judicial notice of foreign
judgments and laws. They must be proven as fact under our rules on
evidence. A divorce decree obtained abroad is deemed a foreign
judgment, hence the indispensable need to have it pleaded and proved
before its legal effects may be extended to the Filipino spouse.
FACTS: On April 1, 1991, Genevieve, a Filipino citizen, and Tetsushi
Toyo (Tetsushi), a Japanese citizen, were married in Quezon City. They
bore a child whom they named Keiichi Toyo. After 19 years of marriage,
the two filed a Notification of Divorce by Agreement, which the Mayor
of Konohana-ku, Osaka City, Japan received on February 4, 2011. It was
later recorded in Tetsushi's family register as certified by the Mayor of
Toyonaka City, Osaka Fu. On May 24, 2012, Genevieve filed before the
Regional Trial Court a Petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce
and declaration of capacity to remarry. In support of her Petition,
Genevieve submitted a copy of their Divorce Certificate, Tetsushi's
Family Register, the Certificate of Acceptance of the Notification of
Divorce, and an English translation of the Civil Code of Japan, among
AQUINO, ALYSSA M.
others. After finding the Petition sufficient in form and substance, the
Regional Trial Court set the case for hearing on October 16, 2012. On
the day of the hearing, no one appeared to oppose the Petition. After
the jurisdictional requirements were established and marked, trial on
the merits ensued.
On February 14, 2014, the Regional Trial Court rendered a Judgment
denying Genevieve's Petition. It decreed that while the pieces of
evidence presented by Genevieve proved that their divorce agreement
was accepted by the local government of Japan, she nevertheless failed
to prove the copy of Japan's law. The Regional Trial Court noted that
the copy of the Civil Code of Japan and its English translation
submitted by Genevieve were not duly authenticated by the Philippine
Consul in Japan, the Japanese Consul in Manila, or the Department of
Foreign Affairs.
Aggrieved, Genevieve filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but it was
denied in the Regional Trial Court's June 11, 2014 Resolution.
Thus, Genevieve filed before this Court the present Petition for Review
on Certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in not considering the
English translation of the Japan Civil Code as a learned treatise and in
refusing to take judicial notice of its authors' credentials?
RULING: The Regional Trial Court did not erred in considering the
English translation as a learned treatise.
Neither can the English translation be considered as a learned treatise.
Under the Rules of Court, "a witness can testify only to those facts
which he knows of his/her personal knowledge". The evidence is
hearsay when it is not what the witness knows himself/herself but of
what he/she has heard from others. The rule excluding hearsay
evidence is not limited to oral testimony or statements, but also covers
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written statements. The rule is that hearsay evidence "is devoid of
probative value”. However, a published treatise may be admitted as
tending to prove the truth of its content if: (1) the court takes judicial
notice; or (2) an expert witness testifies that the writer is recognized in
his or her profession as an expert in the subject.
The English translation submitted by petitioner was published by
Eibun-Horei-Sha, Inc., a private company in Japan engaged in
publishing English translation of Japanese laws, which came to be
known as the EHS Law Bulletin Series. However, these translations are
"not advertised as a source of official translations of Japanese laws;"
rather, it is in the KANPO or the Official Gazette where all official laws
and regulations are published, albeit in Japanese.
Accordingly, the English translation submitted by petitioner is not an
official publication exempted from the requirement of authentication.
SECTION 49. Testimony or Deposition at a Former Proceeding. —
The testimony or deposition of a witness deceased or out of the
Philippines or who cannot, with due diligence, be found therein, or is
unavailable or otherwise unable to testify, given in a former case or
proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving the same parties and
subject matter, may be given in evidence against the adverse party who
had the opportunity to cross- examine him or her. (47a)
SALES V. SABINO
G.R. NO. 133154, [DECEMBER 9, 2005], 513 PHIL 203-210.
DOCTRINE: While depositions may be used as evidence in court
proceedings, they are generally not meant to be a substitute for the
actual testimony in open court of a party or witness. Stated a bit
differently, a deposition is not to be used when the deponent is at
hand. However, depositions may be used without the deponent being
called to the witness stand by the proponent, provided the existence of
AQUINO, ALYSSA M.
certain conditions is first satisfactorily established. Five (5) exceptions
for the admissibility of a deposition are listed in Section 4, Rule 23 of
the Rules of Court. Among these is when the witness is out of the
Philippines.
FACTS: Respondent Cyril A. Sabino filed an amended complaint for
damages against, among others, herein petitioner Jowel Sales, driver of
the vehicle involved in the accident which ultimately caused the death
of respondent’s son, Elbert at RTC Pasig City.
Deposition on oral examination of Buaneres Corral and later marked as
her exhibits "DD" and "EE" which were also formally offered by
respondent and a certification from the Bureau of Immigration attesting
to the May 28, 1996 departure for abroad of Buaneres Corral via Flight
No. PR 658 marked as exhibit “BB”.
Petitioner opposed the admission of exhibit. "DD" and "EE" and even
asked that they be expunged from the records on the ground that the
jurisdictional requirements for their admission under Section 4, Rule 23
of the Rules of Court, infra, were not complied with. He also
downplayed the evidentiary value of Exhibit "BB" for reasons he would
repeat in this petition.
However, the trial court admitted the exhibits. With his motion for
reconsideration, petitioner went on certiorari to the Court of Appeals,
imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in
admitting in evidence the deposition taken from Buaneres Corral.
The trial court upheld and effectively denied due course to and
dismissed petitioner’s recourse, explaining on the ground of estoppels.
His motion for reconsideration having been denied by the appellate
court in its equally assailed resolution, petitioner is now with us via the
instant petition, raising the following issues of his own formulation.
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ISSUE: Whether Rule 24 (now Section 3) of the Revised Rules of Court
were satisfied by the respondent when it presented a certification
attesting to the fact that deponent has left the country but silent as to
whether or not at the time his... deposition was offered in evidence is in
the Philippines.
RULING: NO. Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court, upon which
petitioner mounts his challenge to the admission in evidence of the
subject deposition provides that:
At the trial, any part or all of a deposition, so far as admissible under
the rules of evidence, may be used against any party who was present
or represented at the taking of the deposition or who had due notice
thereof, in accordance with. The deposition of a witness, whether or not
a party, may be used by any party for any purpose if the court finds:
1. That the witness is dead; or
2. That the witness resides at a distance more than one hundred
(100) kilometers from the place of trial or hearing, or is out of
the Philippines, unless it appears that his absence was
procured by the party offering the deposition; or that the
witness is unable to attend or testify because of age, sickness,
infirmity, or imprisonment; or
3. That the party offering the deposition... has been unable to
procure the attendance of the witness by subpoena; or
4. Upon application and notice, that such exception circumstances
exist and with due regard to the importance of presenting the
testimony of witnesses orally in open court, to allow the
deposition to be... used.
It is petitioner's posture that none of the above conditions exists in this
case to justify the admission in evidence.
AQUINO, ALYSSA M.
Hence, it was error for the appellate court to have upheld the admission
thereof by the trial court. While depositions may be used as evidence in
court proceedings, they are generally not meant to be a substitute for
the actual testimony in open court of a party or witness.
Indeed, any deposition offered during a trial to prove the facts therein
set out, in lieu of the actual oral testimony of the deponent in open
court, may be opposed and excluded on the ground of hearsay.
However, depositions may be used without the deponent being called
to the witness stand by the proponent, provided the existence of
certain conditions is first satisfactorily established. Five (5) exceptions
for the admissibility of a deposition are listed in Section 4, Rule 23,
supra, of the Rules of Court.
Among these is when the witness is out of the Philippines. In gist, it
provides that, while errors and irregularities in depositions as to notice,
qualifications of the officer conducting the deposition, and manner of
taking the deposition are deemed waived if not objected to before or
during the taking of the deposition, objections to the competency of a
witness or the competency, relevancy, or materiality of testimony may
be made for the first time at the trial and need not be made at the time
of the taking of the deposition, unless they could be obviated at that
point. While perhaps a bit anti-climactic to state at this point, certiorari
will not lie against an order admitting or rejecting a deposition in
evidence, the remedy being an appeal from the final judgment.
For this singular reason alone, the appellate court could have already
dismissed herein petitioner's invocation of its certiorari jurisdiction.
CASUMPANG V. CORTEJO
G.R. NOS. 171127, 171217 & 17122, [MARCH 11, 2015], 752 PHIL
379-433.
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DOCTRINE: The competence of an expert witness is a matter for the
trial court to decide upon the exercise of its discretion. The test of
qualification is necessarily a relative one, depending upon the subject
matter of the investigation and the fitness of the expert witness. In our
jurisdiction, the criterion remains to be the expert witness’ special
knowledge experience and practical training that qualify him/her to
explain highly technical medical matters to the Court. It is the
specialist’s knowledge of the requisite subject matter, rather than
his/her specialty that determines his/her qualification to testify.
FACTS: Mrs. Cortejo brought her 11 year old son, Edmer to the
emergency room of San Juan de Dios Hospital (SJDH) because of
difficulty in breathing, chest pain, stomach pain and fever. Dr. Livelo
initially examined Edmer and diagnosed him with “bronchopneumonia”
and gave him antibiotic medication to lessen hi fever and to loosen his
phlegm. Mrs. Cortejo, availing of the benefits of their health care plan
was referred to Dr. Casumpang who is a pediatrician accredited with
Fortune Care. Dr. Casumpang examined Edmer using stethoscope and
confirmed the initial diagnosis of bronchopneumonia. The following
day, Edmer had fever, throat irritation, chest and stomach pain but Dr.
Casumpang simply nodded and reassured Mrs. Cortejo that Edmer’s
illness is bronchopneumonia. Later in the morning, Edmer vomited
blood so the father requested for a doctor at the nurse station. Dr.
Miranda examined Edmer and after conducting physical checkup, she
found that Edmer had a low-grade non-continuing fever and rashes
that were not typical of dengue fever. Later in the afternoon, Edmer
once again vomited blood. Dr. Miranda suspected that Edmer was
afflicted with dengue so she inserted a plastic tube in his nose, drained
the liquid from his stomach with ice and cold normal saline solution and
thereafter conducted a tourniquet test, which turned out to be negative.
She then called Dr. Casumpang to inform him of the patient’s condition.
The blood test results came in later and Dr. Miranda informed Edmer’s
parents that he was suffering from “Dengue Hemorrhagic Fever”. An
hour later, Dr. Casumpang recommended patient’s transfer to Intensive
AQUINO, ALYSSA M.
Care Unit (ICU) but since it was full, the doctor suggested that they
hire a private nurse. However, the respondent insisted on transferring
his son to Makati Medical Center. Upon arrival, Dr. Casumpang
immediately gave the attending physician Edmer’s clinical history. The
attending physical diagnosed Edmer with “Dengue Fever Stage IV” that
was in irreversible stage. Edmer died at 4:00 AM of April 14, 1988. The
respondents filed and action for damages against SJDH and its
attending physicians, Dr. Casumpang and Dr. Miranda before the RTC
of Makati City. The RTC ruled in favor of the respondents and awarded
actual and moral damages plus attorney’s fees and cost. The Court of
Appeals affirmed in toto the RTC’s decision and considered the
petitioning doctor’s testimonies as self-serving and noted that they did
not present other evidence to prove that they exercised due diligence in
diagnosing Edmer’s illness. The RTC and the CA relied heavily on Dr.
Jaudian’s expert testimony on dengue diagnosis and management to
support their decisions. The petitioners on the other hand, tried to
discredit the witness on the ground that he lacked proper training and
fellowship status in pediatrics.
ISSUE: Whether or not Dr. Rodolfo Jaudian is qualified as an expert
witness.
RULING: Yes. The competence of an expert witness is a matter for the
trial court to decide upon the exercise of its discretion. The test of
qualification is necessarily a relative one, depending upon the subject
matter of the investigation and the fitness of the expert witness. In our
jurisdiction, the criterion remains to be the expert witness’ special
knowledge experience and practical training that qualify him/her to
explain highly technical medical matters to the Court. It is the
specialist’s knowledge of the requisite subject matter, rather than
his/her specialty that determines his/her qualification to testify.
In the case of Evans vs. Ohanesian, the court set guidelines in
qualifying an expert witness. It must be shown that the witness (1) has
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the required professional knowledge, learning and skill of the subject
under inquiry sufficient to qualify him to speak with authority on the
subject; and (2) is familiar with the standard required of a physician
under similar circumstances. It is not critical whether a medical expert
is a general practitioner or a specialist so long as he exhibits knowledge
of the subject. Where a duly licensed and practicing physician has
gained knowledge of the standard of care applicable to a specialty in
which he is not directly engaged but as to which he has an opinion
based on education, experience, observation, or association with that
specialty, his opinion is competent.
Dr. Jaudian was admittedly not a pediatrician but a practicing physician
who specializes in pathology. He does not possess any formal
residency training in pediatrics. Nonetheless, the lower courts found his
knowledge acquired through study and practical experience sufficient
to advance an expert opinion on dengue-related cases. The expert
witnesses’ specialties do not match the physician’s practice area only
constituted, at the most, one of the considerations that should not be
taken out of context. After all, the sole function of a medical expert
witness, regardless of his/her specialty, is to afford assistance to the
court on medical matters, and to explain the medical facts in issue.
Although he specializes in pathology, he had attended not less than 30
seminars held by Pediatric Society, had exposure in pediatrics, had
been practicing medicine for 16 years and had handled no less than 50
dengue-related cases. Therefore, the Court is convinced that Dr.
Jaudian possesses knowledge and experience sufficient to qualify him
to speak with authority on the subject.
SECTION 50. Residual Exception. — A statement not specifically
covered by any of the foregoing exceptions, having equivalent
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, is admissible if the court
determines that (a) the statement is offered as evidence of a material
fact; (b) the statement is more probative on the point for which it is
offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure
AQUINO, ALYSSA M.
through reasonable efforts; and (c) the general purposes of these
[R]ules and the interests of justice will be best served by admission of
the statement into evidence. However, a statement may not be
admitted under this exception unless the proponent makes known to
the adverse party, sufficiently in advance of the hearing, or by the pre-
trial stage in the case of a trial of the main case, to provide the adverse
party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, the proponent's
intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it, including the
name and address of the declarant.
C7. OPINION RULE
SECTION 51. General Rule. — The opinion of a witness is not
admissible, except as indicated in the following sections. (48)
SECTION 52. Opinion of Expert Witness. — The opinion of a witness
on a matter requiring special knowledge, skill, experience, training or
education, which he or she is shown to possess, may be received in
evidence. (49a)
Note: the use of expert opinion by the courts is merely permissive an
NOT mandatory. [check hottubing: concurrent evidence]
When may an opinion be made admissible?
1. When it has proper factual basis: supported by facts or
circumstances which they draw logical inferences.
2. It must be credible
Is a medical certificate indispensable in the crime of rape?
NO. At best, it is merely corroborative and NOT indispensable.
The crime of rape may be proven based on the victim’s credible,
natural, and convincing testimony.
SECTION 53. Opinion of Ordinary Witnesses. — The opinion of a
witness, for which proper basis is given, may be received in evidence
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regarding —
a. [T]he identity of a person about whom he or she has
adequate knowledge;
b. A handwriting with which he or she has sufficient familiarity;
and
c. The mental sanity of a person with whom he or she is
sufficiently acquainted.
The witness may also testify on his or her impressions of the emotion,
behavior, condition or appearance of a person
Can the testimony of a person who denies the genuineness of his
signature be given probative value?
YES. While it may initially seem as self-serving, it cannot be
denied the fact that he is at best position to determine whether or not
the signature was his.
Can mental retardation be proven by evidence other than medical
or clinical evidence?
Yes. Based on the court’s impressions on his actions, emotion,
behavior, and condition.
→ How does it become competent: witness had the sufficient
opportunity to assess the speech ,manner, habits, and conduct of the
witness or person in question.
Can the mother of a rape victim, although not a psychiatrist testify on
the mental and physical condition of her daughter?
Yes, if she is aware of the mental condition of her child from
the day she was born, what she is suffering from, and what her
attainments are.
PEOPLE V. CCC
G.R. NO. 228822, [JUNE 19, 2019]
AQUINO, ALYSSA M.
DOCTRINE: The opinion of a witness for which proper basis is given,
may be received in evidence regarding: (a) the identity of a person
about whom he has adequate knowledge; (b) a handwriting with which
he has sufficient familiarity; and (c) the mental sanity of a person
whom he is sufficiently acquainted.
FACTS: CCC was charged with four counts of rape by AAA. The
prosecution presented Dr. Dianco, the Municipal Health Officer of the
Rural Health Unit of Romblon as its first witness. Dr. Dianco testified
that she conducted a physical and genital examination of AAA and
observed that the latter’s hymen was no longer intact and that it had
been ruptured but healed. She opined that possible penetration had
happened about a month prior. She also identified the Medico-Legal
Certification dated March 19, 2004.
The prosecution presented BBB, AAA’s mother. BBB claimed that CCC
was the father of AAA. She also identified AAA’s birth certificate in
open court which stated that AAA was born on May 13, 1991. The latter
was only 12 years old when the alleged rape incidents happened.
BBB testified that sometime after the alleged rape happened, she
noticed that AAA had a sudden change in attitude. AAA became quiet,
aloof and in a periodic state of shock. BBB also noticed a change in the
behavior of CCC who could no longer stay home.
BBB also testified that AAA ran away from home, leaving behind a
handwritten letter. BBB identified that the handwriting in the said letter
was that of AAA. In the letter, AAA called his father “Manyak” and
wrote that “7 Bises NIYA iYON GINAWA SA AKIN SIMULA NG
NAMATAY SI LOLA.”
When BBB confronted AAA, and she revealed that she had been raped
by her father, CCC 7 times. During these incidents, AAA cannot ask for
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help because CCC would tie a piece of cloth around her mouth and
threatened her.
AAA was the last witness to be presented. However, she was not able
to testify for lack of material time. The following hearing was cancelled.
But on the next hearing, AAA was able to testify under oath. However,
her testimony was again suspended for lack of material time. Her
testimony was later on expunged from the records due to the lack of
cross-examination. The succeeding hearings were cancelled due to
different reasons, one of which is the refusal of BBB to sign the
subpoena.
When the case was reset, the prosecution offered the following exhibits
through a verbal formal offer of evidence: (1) certified “xerox” copy of
the Medico-Legal Certification issued by Dr. Dianco; (2) Birth
Certificate of AAA; and (3) The handwritten letter of AAA.
The RTC ruled in favor of AAA and found BBB’s testimony as reliable
and credible. It found that such testimony was within her knowledge as
to what was confided to her by AAA. The RTC found that the testimony
of Dr. Dianco and the undated letter of AAA which was positively
identified by BBB in open court adequate and convincing evidence for
the conviction of CCC.
Aggrieved, CCC filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was denied. On
appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC’s decision with modification as to the
penalty. It ruled that the details divulged by AAA to BBB were mere
hearsay, but it still found CCC guilty based on personal knowledge on
the handwritten letter of AAA. The CA held that the letter of AAA clearly
indicates that she was raped even the word “rape” was not used by
AAA.
ISSUE: Whether or not the handwritten letter of AAA is admissible as
evidence in order to convict CCC.
AQUINO, ALYSSA M.
RULING: No. Under Rule 130, Sec. 50, the opinion of a witness for
which proper basis is given, may be received in evidence regarding: (a)
the identity of a person about whom he has adequate knowledge; (b) a
handwriting with which he has sufficient familiarity; and (c) the mental
sanity of a person whom he is sufficiently acquainted.
In this case, the Supreme Court held that the handwritten letter of AAA
does not prove that CCC indeed raped his daughter. In the said letter,
AAA accused her own father of being a “manyak” and that “Bises NIYA
iYON GINAWA SA AKIN SIMULA NG NAMATAY SI LOLA.” However,
AAA never explained what her father did to her. Characterizing her
father as “manyak” does not automatically mean that he raped her, as
it may pertain to other acts which are lascivious that does not
necessarily constitute rape. Without proving the very acts of CCC, the
latter cannot be convicted of the crime charged.
BELEN V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. NO. 211120, [FEBRUARY 13, 2017], 805 PHIL 628-673.
DOCTRINE: As a rule, the opinion of a witness is inadmissible because
a witness can testify only to those facts which he knows, of his own
personal knowledge and it is for the court to draw conclusions from the
facts testified to.
FACTS: On March 12, 2004, Medel Belen, then a practicing lawyer and
now a former Judge, filed a criminal complaint for estafa against his
uncle, Nezer D. Belen, Sr. and assigned to then Assistant City
Prosecutor Suñega-Lagman for preliminary investigation.
In order to afford himself the opportunity to fully present his cause,
Belen requested for a clarificatory hearing. Without acting on the
request, ACP Suñega-Lagman dismissed Belen’s complaint in a
Resolution. Aggrieved by the dismissal of his complaint, Belen filed an
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Omnibus Motion (for Reconsideration & Disqualify), the contents of
which later became the subject of this libel case.
Petitioner Belen furnished copies of the Omnibus Motion to Nezer and
the Office of the Secretary of Justice, Manila. The copy of the Omnibus
Motion contained in a sealed envelope and addressed to the Office of
the City Prosecutor of San Pablo City was received by its Receiving
Section. As a matter of procedure, motions filed with the said office are
first received and recorded at the receiving section, then forwarded to
the records section before referral to the City Prosecutor for
assignment to the handling Investigating Prosecutor.
ACP Suñega-Lagman filed a criminal complaint for libel against Belen
on the basis of the allegations in the Omnibus Motion. The Regional
State Prosecutor issued an Order in the investigation of the libel
complaint. State Prosecutor Baculi rendered a Resolution finding
probable cause to file a libel case against Belen. Upon arraignment,
Belen refused to make a plea; hence the trial court entered a plea of
“NOT GUILTY”.
The prosecution presented 4 witnesses, namely; (1) complainant ACP
Suñega-Lagman, (2) Michael Belen, the son and representative of
Nezer, (3) Joey R. Flores and Gayne Enseo, who are part of the
administrative staff of the OCP of San Pablo.
The trial court found Belen guilty of libel and stressed that the
allegations and utterances against ACP Suñega-Lagman in Belen’s
Omnibus Motion are far detached from the controversy in the estafa
case, thereby losing its character as absolutely privileged
communication.
On the element of publication, the trial court noted that the Omnibus
Motion was not sent straight to ACP Suñega-Lagman, but passed
AQUINO, ALYSSA M.
through and exposed to be read by third persons, namely: prosecution
witnesses Flores, Enseo, and Michael Belen.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the trial court's decision. On the claims of
publication, the CA pointed out that the defamatory matter was made
known to third persons because the witnesses of the prosecution were
able to read the Omnibus Motion.
ISSUE: Whether or not the opinion of an ordinary witness is admissible
to show the presence of malicious imputations.
RULING: YES. Belen argued that the reliance of the CA to the
statements of ordinary witnesses like Michael, Flores and Enseo is
contrary to Sections 48 and 50 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court,
because they were incompetent to testify on whether the statements
against ACP Suñega-Lagman in the Omnibus Motion constituted
malicious imputations against the latter.
As a rule, the opinion of a witness is inadmissible because a witness
can testify only to those facts which he knows, of his own personal
knowledge and it is for the court to draw conclusions from the facts
testified to. Opinion evidence or testimony refers to evidence of what
the witness thinks, believes or infers in regard to facts in dispute, as
distinguished from his personal knowledge of the facts themselves.
In this case, the prosecution’s witnesses barely made a conclusion on
the defamatory nature of the statements in Belen’s Omnibus Motion,
but merely testified on their own understanding of what they had read.
In Buatis, Jr. v. People, the Court stated the twin rule for the purpose of
determining the meaning of any publication alleged to be libelous; (1)
that construction must be adopted which will give to the matter such a
meaning as is natural and obvious in the plain and ordinary sense in
which the public would naturally understand what was uttered; and (2)
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the published matter alleged would be libelous must be construed as a
whole.
In applying the above-mentioned rules, the witnesses are competent to
testify on their own understanding of the questioned statements, and
their testimonies are relevant to the trial’s court determination of the
defamatory character or the statements, as the persons, who aside
from ACP Suñega-Lagman, had also read the Omnibus Motion.
Even if Belen’s objections to the testimonies of the witnesses were to
be sustained, the trial court still correctly determined the statements to
be defamatory based on its own reading of the plain and ordinary
meanings of the words and phrases used in the Omnibus Motion.
C8. CHARACTER EVIDENCE
SECTION 54. Character Evidence Not Generally Admissible;
Exceptions. — Evidence of a person's character or a trait of character
is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity
therewith on a particular occasion, except:
(a.) In Criminal Cases:
1. The character of the offended party may be proved if
it tends to establish in any reasonable degree the probability or
improbability of the offense charged.
2. The accused may prove his or her good moral
character[,] pertinent to the moral trait involved in the offense charged.
However, the prosecution may not prove his or her bad moral character
unless on rebuttal.
(b.) In Civil Cases:
Evidence of the moral character of a party in a civil case
is admissible only when pertinent to the issue of character involved in
the case.
(c.) In Criminal and Civil Cases:
-Evidence of the good character of a witness is not admissible
AQUINO, ALYSSA M.
until such character has been impeached.
-In all cases in which evidence of character or a trait of
character of a person is admissible, proof may be made by testimony as
to reputation or by testimony in the form of an opinion. On cross-
examination, inquiry is allowable into relevant specific instances of
conduct.
In cases in which character or a trait of character of a person is
an essential element of a charge, claim or defense, proof may also be
made of specific instances of that person's conduct. (51a; 14, Rule 132)
CHARACTER GOOD MORAL CHARACTER
-the possession by a person of All elements to make up for good
certain qualities of mind and moral character:
morals WHICH distinguishes him 1. Common honesty
from others. 2. Veracity
[closely related to reputation:
opinion generally entertained of
a person derived from the people
around him.]
Can the accused in a criminal case prove his good moral character?
Yes. (under Sec 51) the accused may prove his good moral
character which is pertinent to the moral trait involved in the offense
charged. [must be related or germane to the kind of act charged;
example: on a charge for rape- a character for chastity; on a charge of
assault- character for peacefulness or violence; on a charge for
embezzlement- character for honesty and integrity]
→When it is proved, it strengthens the presumption of
innocence and if good character and reputation is proved, it raises an
inference that the accused DID NOT commit the crime charged.
What does Sec. 54 Par. A subsection 2 (last part) mean?
It is intended to avoid unfair prejudice to the accused who
might be convicted not because he is guilty but because he is a person
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of bad character. It protects the accused from the prosecution by only
allowing them to prove his/her bad faith on a rebuttal.
Examples:
Sex offenses
→ Rape: willingness of the woman is material (the woman’s character
as to her chastity may be determinative if she consented to the act or
not.
(not material if statutory rape; consent is IMMATERIAL)
→ qualified seduction/ consented abduction: virgin (presumed if
unmarried and of good reputation)
→ Simple seduction: involves a virgin or a widow with good reputation
Homicide cases (for self defense)
-as evidenced by the deceased’s aggression
-as evidence by the state of mind of the accused
(Murder: NO → killing is through premeditation or treachery)
RULE 131: BURDEN OF PROOF AND PRESUMPTIONS
What is burden of proof?
-It is the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in
issue necessary to establish his or her claim or defense by the amount
of evidence required by law (burden of proof NEVER shifts)
The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but
may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
e. That the evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if
produced;
m. That official duty has been regularly performed has been
regularly performed
p. private transactions have been fair and regular
v. That a letter duly directed and mailed was received in the
regular course of the mail
AQUINO, ALYSSA M.
RULE 132: PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE
A. EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES
SECTION 1. Examination to be Done in Open Court. — The
examination of witnesses presented in a trial or hearing shall be done
in open court, and under oath or affirmation. Unless the witness is
incapacitated to speak, or the question calls for a different mode of
answer, the answers of the witness shall be given orally. (1)
How is the examination of a witness done?
-It shall be done in open court UNDER oath or affirmation
(UNLESS incapacitated to speak, answers shall be given orally)
When is a court considered open?
-A court formally opened and engaged in the transaction of
judicial affairs to which all persons who conduct themselves in an
orderly manner are admitted.
Is arraignment deemed part of pre-trial?
-Generally, NO because trial presupposes the presentation of
evidence HOWEVER, for purpose of evidence: arraignment is part of
trial
[Arraignment: ]
Who is considered to be a witness?
-A witness is one who testifies before a judicial, tribunal, quasi-
judicial, administrative proceeding and can perceive, and by perceiving,
be make known his perception to others.
What is an oath?
- An appeal to God to witness the truth of what he declares,
and an impreciation of Divine punishment or vengeance upon him if
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what he says is false.
Oath V. Affirmation
- An oath is when the witness places his hands before a Bible
and an Affirmation is when there is no Bible used.
Is the CA allowed to accept evidence and hear the testimonies of
witnesses?
-upon its discretion
What does “discretion mean”
- The power given to the courts or Judges to decide questions
during trial where no particular law is applicable and controlled by
personal judgment.
Is the CTA allowed to accept evidence and hear the testimonies of
the witnesses?
-Yes. Any case involving the question of taxes levied upon by
the BIR and BOC and the amount is 1M and above cannot be taken by
other courts→ under jurisdiction of the CTA
How should the answers/testimonies be given?
GR: Given in open court
XPN:
a. if the question calls for a different mode of answer
[demonstration]
b. when the testimonies of witnesses may be given in
affidavits under the Rules on Summary Procedure
c. Depositions
Why should it be made in open court?
-In order to enable the court to judge the credibility of the
witness by his manner of testifying, demeanor, their intelligence, and
appearance.
AQUINO, ALYSSA M.
Why should it be made under oath or affirmation?
-It shall be made under oath or affirmation because once a
witness tells a lie, he/she may be charged with perjury or false
testimony under civil or criminal cases.
The rule says testimonies should be given orally; Can the answers
of testimonies of witnesses be in the form found in a question and
answer? Like those made before police officers or affidavits?
GR: Affidavits cannot take place the testimonies of witness
XPN:
a. In cases governed by the Rules of Summary
Procedure
b. Where the fact obtaining the affidavit is in issue
c. As an admission by the adverse party
d. To impeach a witness on stand
e. When they allow judicial affidavits
f. As part of the testimony of the witness
g. When the adverse party waives its objection on its
admissibility
h. As part of res gestae
i. As an admission or declaration against interest
j. When the court takes judicial notice thereof
If the answer of the witness is not responsive t not responsive to
the question, what are you going to question, what are you going to
do?
-Ask the court to Strike Out the answer on the ground that you
are not given time to object because the witness’ answer it not
responsive
What if the answer is given so quick that you are not able to
immediately object, what are you going to do?
-Ask the court to Strike Out the answer on the ground that you
are not given time to object because the witness answered so quick
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SECTION 2. Proceedings to be Recorded. — The entire proceedings
of a trial or hearing, including the questions propounded to a witness
and his or her answers thereto, and the statements made by the judge
or any of the parties, counsel, or witnesses with reference to the case,
shall be recorded by means of shorthand or stenotype or by other
means of recording found suitable by the court.
A transcript of the record of the proceedings made by the official
stenographer, stenotypist or recorder and certified as correct by him or
her, shall be deemed prima facie a correct statement of such
proceedings. (2a)
Note: The lawyer cannot say off the record because under Sec. 2 it
stated that a record of the proceeding shall be made which should be
the correct statement of the proceedings.
SECTION 3. Rights and Obligations of a Witness. — A witness must
answer questions, although his or her answer may tend to establish a
claim against him or her. However, it is the right of a witness:
1. To be protected from irrelevant, improper, or insulting questions, and
from harsh or insulting demeanor;
2. Not to be detained longer than the interests of justice require; 3. Not
to be examined except only as to matters pertinent to the issue;
4. Not to give an answer which will tend to subject himor her to a
penalty for an offense unless otherwise provided by law; or
5. Not to give an answer which will tend to degrade hisor her
reputation, unless it be to the very fact at issue or to a fact from which
the fact in issue would be presumed. But a witness must answer to the
fact of his or her previous final conviction for an offense. (3a)
What are the rights and obligations of a witness?
a. Rights
1. To be protected from irrelevant, improper, or insulting questions, and
from harsh or insulting demeanor;
AQUINO, ALYSSA M.
2. Not to be detained longer than the interests of justice require; 3. Not
to be examined except only as to matters pertinent to the issue;
4. Not to give an answer which will tend to subject him to a penalty for
him to a penalty for an offense unless otherwise an offense unless
otherwise provided by law; or
5. Not to give an answer which will tend to degrade his reputation,
unless it to be the very fact at issue or to a fact from which the fact in
issue would be presumed.
b. Obligations
1. A witness must answer questions, although his answer may tend to
establish a claim against him, provided that it is not violative of his right
against self-incrimination.
2. A witness must answer to the fact of his previous final conviction for
an offense.
What is this right against self-incrimination? against self-
incrimination?
No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself
(Section 17, Article 3, 1987 himself (Section 17, Article 3, 1987
Constitution) Constitution)
Is the right against self-incrimination self-executing?
No, it should be invoked.
Is the right against self-incrimination applicable to a corporation?
No, it cannot be invoked be a corporation but only by an
individual person.
Must a witness answer any question asked?
Yes, a witness must answer questions, although his answer
may tend to establish a claim against him.
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Who determines the witnesses to be presented in the prosecution
of a crime?
Prosecution has the EXCLUSIVE PREROGATIVE to determine
whom to present as a witness.
Is the right against self-incrimination applicable in civil, criminal
and administrative cases?
Yes.
Does the right against self-incrimination involve only testimonial
only testimonial compulsion compulsion?
No. It involves production of incriminating documentary
evidence
What is the difference between the right against self-incrimination
of an ordinary witness and the right against self-incrimination of a
witness who is at the same time an accused?
a. Ordinary Witness – you can invoke the right only when the
incriminating question is asked, it’s when the incriminating question is
asked, it is akin to a partial to a partial disqualification
b. Accused Witness – you can invoke the right at the first
instance, you can automatically refuse to obey the subpoena to testify,
it is akin to absolute disqualification
X is charged with falsification, he was called to the witness stand
by his counsel. On cross-examination, the counsel of the the
counsel of the adverse party asked him, “Mr. X, are you the author
of this falsification?” The accused said no. The Counsel of the
Adverse Party then asked X to write in a piece of paper. X’s counsel
objected, right against self-incrimination. Rule on the Objection.
Overruled. Although the act of asking the witness to give
samples of his signature is violative of his right against self-
incrimination, when he denied authorship of the falsified document, he
in effect waived his right against self-incrimination.
AQUINO, ALYSSA M.
In the above question, what if the fiscal did not ask him to produce
sample signatures but on rebuttal, the fiscal is now asking X, as an
adverse witness to produce sample signature. Can X now invoke his
right against self-incrimination, although in cross-examination, he
already denied authorship of the falsified document?
Yes. Waiver of the right against self-incrimination invoked
during the cross-examination does not mean its waiver during rebuttal
stage.
SECTION 4. Order in the Examination of an Individual Witness. —
The order in which an individual witness may be examined is as
follows:
(a) Direct examination by the proponent;
(b) Cross-examination by the opponent;
(c) Re-direct examination by the proponent;
(d) Re-cross[-]examination by the opponent.
At what stage does the order of examination take place?
At the trial stage, during the presentation of evidence.
The prosecution has three witnesses – 1, 2, and 3. Can the fiscal
ask the judge that the direct examination of ALL three witnesses be
done first before the cross, re-direct and re-cross of each?
As a rule, technically speaking, that is not allowed. But the
court, on the principle that it has the power to control its proceedings,
may allow such. That is purely discretionary.
SECTION 5. Direct Examination. — Direct examination is the
examination-in-chief of a witness by the party presenting him or her on
the facts relevant to the issue. (5a)
What is direct examination?
Direct examination is the examination-in-chief of a witness by
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the party presenting him on the facts relevant to the issue.
When is a fact relevant to the issue?
When it is material and probative
What is the purpose?
To prove the elements of the crime
Can the courts delegate the reception of evidence to its Clerk of
Court?
Yes, provided that:
a. The Clerk of Court is a lawyer AND
b. The case is a Special Proceeding Case
SECTION 6. Cross-examination; Its Purpose and Extent. — Upon the
termination of the direct examination, the witness may be cross-
examined by the adverse party on any relevant matter, with sufficient
fullness and freedom to test his or her accuracy and truthfulness and
freedom from interest or bias, or the reverse, and to elicit all important
facts bearing upon the issue.
What is the purpose of the cross-examination?
To test the witness’ accuracy and truthfulness and freedom
from interest or bias, or the reverse, and to elicit all important facts
bearing upon the issue; to break the credibility of the witness.
What is the scope of the cross-examination?
Matters stated in the direct examination, or those connected
therewith
Can the cross-examiner ask the witness on a fact not stated during
the direct not stated during the direct nor connected therewith
Yes, under the ROC, the cross-examination is to elicit facts
bearing upon the issue – the fact must be material and relevant,
AQUINO, ALYSSA M.
although it was not asked during the direct examination nor connected
therewith.
What is the basis of the right to cross-examine the witness?
(Sec. 14(2), Art. 3, 1987 Constitution) The right to meet the
witness face to face involves the right to cross-examine the witness.
Pp vs. X. X was charged with murder. His defense was that in July
31, 2012, he is in the US. X is now on the witness stand. X’s lawyer
now asks him, “Where were you on July 31, 2012?” Is that question
objectionable?
No. It is a correct No. It is a correct direct examination question.
In the above problem, what if my question was, “What happened
during July 31, 2012,” is the question objectionable?
Yes. The question calls for a narration.
Is the actual cross-examination necessary, or a mere opportunity?
Mere opportunity
Can a lawyer of the accused cross-examine the witness of his co-
accused?
Yes. As long as there is already a showing of adverse interest
upon the testimony of the witness – they are now opponents.
Are leading questions allowed in cross examinations?
Yes, they are allowed in cross and re-cross BUT not in direct
and re-direct.
Note: Misleading questions are not allowed in direct, cross, re-direct
and re-cross e cross, re-direct and re-cross examination
May a judge asks clarificatory questions to a witness?
Yes, but not searching questions (as if you are already the
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fiscal)
What if the judge asks searching questions, what should the lawyer
of the acc should the lawyer of the accused do?
Invoke the case that provides that Judges are not allowed to
conduct searching questions
What if the judge is not asking searching questions but is asking
objectionable questions (leading, misleading)?
Invoke the case of Lopez vs. Standard Oil (5 Phil 549)
SECTION 7. Re-direct Examination; Its Purpose and Extent. — After
the cross-examination of the witness has been concluded, he or she
may be re-examined by the party calling him or her to explain or
supplement his or her answers given during the cross-examination. On
re-direct examination, questions on matters not dealt with during the
cross-examination may be allowed by the court in its discretion.
What is re-direct examination?
It is the examination after the cross examination
What is the purpose?
To complete the testimony in the direct examination
What is the scope of re-direct examination?
Only matters asked during the cross-examination
[discretionary: questions on matters not dealt with during the
cross]
If the matter is not asked during the cross-examination, can you
still ask such questions?
Yes, upon the judges’ discretion
AQUINO, ALYSSA M.
SECTION 8. Re-cross[-]examination. — Upon the conclusion of the
re-direct examination, the adverse party may re-cross-examine the
witness on matters stated in his or her re-direct examination, and also
on such other matters as may be allowed by the court in its discretion.
What is re-cross examination?
It is the examination after the re-direct examination
What is the purpose?
To break down the elements and credibility of the witness
What is the scope of re-direct examination?
Only matters asked during the re-cross examination
If the matter is not asked during the cross-examination, can you
still ask such questions?
Yes, upon the judges’ discretion
After the prosecution presented its evidence, can they present
rebuttal and sur-rebuttal evidences?
Yes.
SECTION 9. Recalling Witness. — After the examination of a witness
by both sides has been concluded, the witness cannot be recalled
without leave of the court. The court will grant or withhold leave in its
discretion, as the interests of justice may require.
What is the rule in recalling a witness? What to do?
You should file a motion for leave of court
What do you mean by leave of court?
Permission of the court
What is the parameter that the judge will grant leave of court?
It is upon the interest of justice
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SECTION 10. Leading and Misleading Questions. — A question which
suggests to the witness the answer which the examining party desires
is a leading question. It is not allowed, except:
a. On cross-examination;
b. On preliminary matters;
c. When there is difficulty in getting direct and intelligible
answers from a witness who is ignorant, a child of tender years, is of
feeble mind, or a deaf-mute;
d. Of an unwilling or hostile witness; or
e. Of a witness who is an adverse party or an officer, director, or
managing agent of a public or private corporation[,] or of a partnership
or association which is an adverse party.
A misleading question is one which assumes as true a fact not yet
testified to by the witness, or contrary to that which he or she has
previously stated. It is not allowed.
What is a leading question?
A question which suggests to the witness the answer which the
examining party desires
What is a misleading question?
A question which assumes as true a fact not yet testified to by
the witness, or contrary to that which he has previously stated.
When should objections to objectionable questions be raised?
When the objectionable grounds becomes apparent
Instances when a leading question is allowed:
GR: Not allowed
XPNs: 1. Cross examination
2. Preliminary matters
AQUINO, ALYSSA M.
3. When there is difficulty in getting DIRECT and
intelligible answers from a witness who is ignorant or a child of tender
years; or is of feeble mind; or ignorant
4. Unwilling or hostile witness
5. Witness is an adverse party or officer, director, or
managing agent of a public or private corporation or of a partnership or
association which is an adverse party.
What are the buzz words in leading questions?
Was the, Did you, You did not, Have you not, Isn’t a fact, As a
matter of fact, The facts are, That is true, Isn’t, Don’t you know, Do you
mean Don’t you know, Do you mean to say, You don’t know to say, You
don’t know of course, By that answer of yours, Whether
How will you counter argue that the objection of leading should be
overruled?
“Your honor that is not a leading question. The question is
merely suggestive of the subject matter and not the answer.”
What is a preliminary matter?
These are preliminary facts that are not relevant to the issue
When is a witness an unwilling or a hostile witness an unwilling or a
hostile witness?
A witness may be considered as unwilling or hostile only if so
declared by the court upon adequate showing of his adverse interest,
unjustified reluctance to testify, or his having misled the party into
calling him to the witness stand. (Sec 12 (2))
What is an Adverse Witness?
The opposing party who becomes your witness
Direct Examination on an ordinary witness. The question is, “even
though you knew you were at fault, you still did not stop your
vehicle.” Is this objectionable?
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Yes:
(a) leading and
(b) question calls for a conclusion.
Direct examination question on a hostile witness. The question is,
“even though you knew you were at fault, you still did not stop your
vehicle.” Objection: leading and question calls for a leading and
question calls for a conclusion.
As to leading – it should be overruled since a hostile witness
may be asked leading questions.
As to the ground that the question calls for a conclusion – it
should be sustained.
Direct examination question on a hostile witness. The question is,
“even though you knew you were driving at the right side of the
road, you still stopped your vehicle.” Objection: leading and
question calls for a conclusion. Rule.
The question is no longer objectionable since:
(a) a hostile witness can be asked leading questions and
(b) the question no longer calls for a conclusion; you are merely
stating a fact.
“State whether the defendant passed through a red light in the
intersection” – is the question objectionable?
Yes, on the ground of leading. – The question may be rephrased
as follows: “What was the color of the traffic light when you passed
through the intersection?”
SECTION 11. Impeachment of Adverse Party's Witness. — A witness
may be impeached by the party against whom he or she was called, by
contradictory evidence, by evidence that his or her general reputation
for truth, honesty, or integrity is bad, or by evidence that he or she has
made at other times statements inconsistent with his or her present
testimony, but not by evidence of particular wrongful acts, except that
AQUINO, ALYSSA M.
it may be shown by the examination of the witness, or record of the
judgment, that he or she has been convicted of an offense.
What is impeachment?
It is the destruction of the testimony of a witness
What is the purpose of impeachment?
To prove to the court that the witness’ testimony is unworthy of
belief
What are the 4 modes of impeachment?
1. Contradictory Evidence
2. Evidence that his general reputation for truth, honesty, or
integrity is bad
3. Prior Inconsistent Statement
4. Record of Prior Conviction
How are you going to impeach by contradictory evidence?
To present evidence that will contradict prior evidence
presented by your adversary (indirect impeachment – if A is telling the
truth, B is telling a lie; and vice versa); it requires the calling of another
witness to contradict what the other witness to contradict what the
other witness say
What do you mean by “general reputation for truth, honesty, or
integrity is bad?”
It means that this witness has a bad reputation for lack of
veracity/ accuracy
Note: Evidence of General Immorality, Bad Character, Particular
Wrongful Act, and Particular Crime is not allowed
Can you impeach a witness under the second mode on the ground
of lack of morality (evidence of bad character)?
GR: No, this is not allowed
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XPN: 1. If the person on the witness stand is the accused
himself and you ask him about his record of prior conviction
2. If what you’re going to ask the COC of the Judge who
convicted him is about the person’s record of prior conviction (the
competent person)
What is not allowed evidence of Bad Reputation vs. Bad Character?
Bad Character
Bad Reputation IF: [perjury, false testimony; those cases with
needs to question the reputation of the witness or accused]
Impeachment of the reputation of an ordinary witness vs.
Impeachment of the reputation of an Accused Witness
For an Ordinary Witness, what is important is his reputation at
the time that he is called to testify. For an Accused Witness, it is as to
his reputation when he committed the crime
Two kinds of prior inconsistent statement?
a. Oral
b. Written
How do you impeach a witness on the ground of prior inconsistent
statement?
a. Written Inconsistent Statement (S-R-A)
i. Show the sworn statement
ii. Read the statement
iii. Ask the witness of the contents of the document – make
him admit the contents of the document (if he denies, charge him with
perjury; if he admits, there is now an inconsistent statement)
Note: If the witness refuses to answer, make a manifestation of his
refusal to answer
b. Oral Inconsistent Statement (M-C-U)
AQUINO, ALYSSA M.
i. Ask the witness if he Made such statement
ii. Ask him about the Contents
iii. Understand – did the witness understand about the
inconsistency
Note: You cannot contradict by a prior inconsistent statement if the
issue is a collateral matter – you can only contradict on issues that are
material or germane to the main case. You now object on the ground of
improper impeachment. But if the case is perjury, any PIS showing
dishonesty may be used since in perjury, you are to prove the
dishonesty of the witness.
When can a witness be impeached by evidence of his wrongful
particular acts?
1. The crime was punishable by a penalty in excess of one year
OR
2. The crime involved moral turpitude REGARDLESS of the
penalty
Is final judgement necessary?
YES. There must be a finality with the decision before a
witness’ ability to testify may be impaired.
Plaintiff vs. Defendant (Recovery of Parcel of Land). Plaintiff
presented W who said that the real owner of the land is the
plaintiff. Can the defendant, through Y, present evidence that the
reputation of W is bad?
Yes.
Plaintiff vs. Defendant (Recovery of Parcel of Land). Plaintiff
presented W who said that the real owner of the land is the
plaintiff. Can the defendant, through Y, present evidence that the
bad character of W?
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A: No.
Plaintiff vs. Defendant (Recovery of Parcel of Land). Plaintiff
presented W who said that the real owner of the land is the
defendant (hostile witness). The court declared W a hostile
witness. Can Y present evidence of the bad reputation of W? Can Y
present evidence of the bad character of W?
As to bad reputation, Yes; as to bad character, No
SECTION 12. Impeachment by Evidence of Conviction of Crime. —
For the purpose of impeaching a witness evidence that he or she has
been convicted by final judgment of a crime shall be admitted if (a) the
crime was punishable by a penalty in excess of one [(1)] year; or (b)
the crime involved moral turpitude, regardless of the penalty.
However, evidence of a conviction is not admissible if the conviction
has been the subject of an amnesty or annulment of the conviction. (n)
Sec. 11 talks of Bad Reputation – Sec. 12 talks of Bad Character. Is
there a difference between their applications?
None.
Can a party impeach his own witness?
No.
What is the effect on the party of the testimony of a witness who
was not declared hostile but testified adversely on your claim?
It is binding on the party who presented that witness.
When can one be considered an unwilling or a hostile witness?
A witness may be considered as unwilling or hostile only if so
declared by the court upon adequate showing of his adverse interest,
unjustified reluctance to testify, or his having misled the party into
calling him to the witness stand.
AQUINO, ALYSSA M.
Can a party call his opponent as his own witness?
Yes (because you can now ask leading questions)
Plaintiff vs. Defendant (Damages arising on Vehicular Accident). P
presented W who is supposed to testify that the P is not negligent
on the accident BUT W went against the P and said that D is not the
one driving the car; the lawyer of P did not declare W a hostile
witness. P presented another witness, Y, who testified that (1) the
real one driving the car is D, contrary to what W said that D is
contrary to what W said that D is not the one drivi not the one
driving. Y said that (2) W has a bad reputation, that he is a liar. Y
went further and told the judge that (3) prior to testifying, W
whispered to him that D is the one driving driving the car the car.
All of Y’s testimony is objected to, rule on the objection.
Sustained. A Party may not impeach his own witness.
On the above problem, W was declared a hostile witness; Rule on
the objections.
Overruled. As an exception to Sec. 12, a party may impeach his
witness if such has become a hostile witness.
In the above problems, what if Y is the witness of the defendant;
can he testify against the defendant; can he testify against the
statement statements of W?
Yes (Sec. 11 – Impeachment of Adverse Party’s Statement)
SECTION 13. Party May Not Impeach His or Her Own Witness. —
Except with respect to witnesses referred to in paragraphs (d) and (e)
of Section 10 of this Rule, the party presenting the witness is not
allowed to impeach his or her credibility.
A witness may be considered as unwilling or hostile only if so declared
by the court upon adequate showing of his or her adverse interest,
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unjustified reluctance to testify, or his or her having misled the party
into calling him or her to the witness stand.
The unwilling or hostile witness so declared, or the witness who is an
adverse party, may be impeached by the party presenting him or her in
all respects as if he or she had been called by the adverse party, except
by evidence of his or her bad character. He or she may also be
impeached and cross-examined by the adverse party, but such cross-
examination must only be on the subject matter of his or her
examination-in-chief. (12a)
SECTION 14. How Witness Impeached by Evidence of Inconsistent
Statements. — Before a witness can be impeached by evidence that
he or she has made at other times statements inconsistent with his or
her present testimony, the statements must be related to him or her,
with the circumstances of the times and places and the persons
present, and he or she must be asked whether he or she made such
statements, and if so, allowed to explain them. If the statements be in
writing[,] they must be shown to the witness before any question is put
to him or her concerning them. (13a)
What is the reason for the rule?
The law presumes every person to be reputedly truthful until
the evidence shall be produced to the contrary
Sec. 14, Rule 132 vs. Sec. 51, Rule 130
a. Sec. 14, Rule 132 – the witness whose character is involved is
not a party to the case.
b. Sec. 51, Rule 130 – the witness whose character is involved
is a party to the case
P is claiming insurance proceeds for his burned house. D does not
want to pay on the ground that P’s son deliberately burned the
AQUINO, ALYSSA M.
house. The Son testified that he did not do such. P testified to
prove the good character of his son; D objected on the ground that
P can’t do such, Rule.
Sustained. There is yet an impeachment of P’s Sons Character
In the above problem, what if D testified that P’s Son has a bad
reputation? Can P now prove to the Judge his son’s good character?
Yes. The Sons reputation is now being impeached.
SECTION 15. Exclusion and Separation of Witnesses. — The court,
motu proprio or upon motion, shall order witnesses excluded so that
they cannot hear the testimony of other witnesses. This rule does not
authorize exclusion of (a) a party who is a natural person, (b) a duly
designated representative of a juridical entity which is a party to the
case, (c) a person whose presence is essential to the presentation of
the party's cause, or (d) a person authorized by a statute to be present.
The court may also cause witnesses to be kept separate and to be
prevented from conversing with one another, directly or through
intermediaries, until all shall have been examined.
What is the reason for the rule?
To avoid influencing the testimony of the witness
Is there a difference between exclusion from other witness from
exclusion from the public?
If there is somebody testifying in the witness stand, the next
possible witness can be excluded and separated from the public.
P vs. D. The plaintiff’s witness are X, Y and P (plaintiff himself). X is
now testifying, the counsel for the defendant moved to exclude Y
and P on the ground that they are the next witnesses, can they be
both sent out of the court?
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Only Y may be excluded and not P (the plaintiff) due to his
Constitutional right to be present at every stages of the proceeding and
the right to hear the accusations against him because the Constitution
is supreme over the Rules of Court.
SECTION 16. When Witness May Refer to Memorandum. — A
witness may be allowed to refresh his or her memory respecting a fact
by anything written or recorded by himself or herself, or under his or
her direction[,] at the time when the fact occurred, or immediately
thereafter, or at any other time when the fact was fresh in his or her
memory and he or she knew that the same was correctly written or
recorded; but in such case[,] the writing or record must be produced
and may be inspected by the adverse party, who may, if he or she
chooses, cross-examine the witness upon it and may read it in
evidence. A witness may also testify from such a writing or record,
though he or she retains no recollection of the particular facts, if he or
she is able to swear that the writing or record correctly stated the
transaction when made; but such evidence must be received with
caution. (16a)
What are the 2 parts of Section 16?
1. Present Recollection Revived – A witness may be allowed to
refresh his memory respecting a fact, by anything written or recorded
by himself or under his direction at the time when the fact occurred, or
immediately thereafter, or at any other time when the fact was fresh in
his memory and knew that the same memory and knew that the same
was correctly was correctly written or recorded ; in here, the evidence
is the testimony – the writing being a mere memory aid
Note: The evidence is still testimonial in character. The memorandum
will not be considered as documentary evidence [assists him in
recollecting the scenario]
AQUINO, ALYSSA M.
2. Past Recollection Recorded – A witness may testify from
such writing or record, though he retain no recollection of the particular
facts, if he is able to swear that the writing or record correctly stated
the transaction when made; in here, the evidence is the writing itself,
having been attested to as correct by the witness
Note: Since there is a complete loss of recollection or memory on the
part of the witness, then it is the memorandum itself that will serve as
evidence. It will now be considered as documentary evidence.
What is admissible between the two parts?
Only the Past Recollection Recorded
Why is it that Present Recollection inadmissible and the past
recollection the past recollection recorded admissible?
In the Present Recollection Recorded, the character of the
evidence is still testimonial – the memorandum or notes is inadmissible
because that memorandum cannot corroborate the testimony of the
witness who prepared that memorandum.
In the Past Recollection Revived, it is admissible since in here,
it is the memorandum itself which serves as evidence – it is now
considered as documentary evidence.
With respect to the time frame when the memorandum was made,
what is the difference?
In Present Recollection Revived, the note is made at the time
when the fact occurred, or immediately thereafter, or at any other time.
On the other hand, the Past Recollection Recorded, the time frame is
immaterial.
SECTION 17. When Part of Transaction, Writing or Record Given in
Evidence, the Remainder Admissible. — When part of an act,
declaration, conversation, writing or record is given in evidence by one
party, the whole of the same subject may be inquired into by the other,
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and when a detached act, declaration, conversation, writing or record is
given in evidence, any other act, declaration, conversation, writing or
record necessary to its understanding may also be given in evidence.
Does the word “part” include 2 separate but forming one document,
but not in a series of pagination?
Yes, it is a part of the whole or totality of the pages,
transaction, declaration, etc
SECTION 18. Right to Inspect Writing Shown to Witness. —
Whenever a writing is shown to a witness, it may be inspected by the
adverse party.
Relate Sec. 8, Rule 130 (Party who calls for Document not bound to
offer it) to Sec. 18, to Sec. 18, Rule 132 Rule 132 (Right to inspect
writing shown to witness)
Whenever a writing is shown before the court, the adverse party
may examine that writing. But the person who called for the production
of that document is not obliged to present it in evidence.
What is the purpose?
To be able to inspect if it is genuine.
B. AUTHENTICATION AND PROOF OF DOCUMENTS:
SECTION 19. Classes of Documents. — For the purpose of their
presentation in evidence, documents are either public or private.
Public documents are:
a. The written official acts, or records of the sovereign
authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of
the Philippines, or of a foreign country;
b. Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last
wills and testaments;
c. Documents that are considered public documents under
treaties and conventions which are in force between the Philippines
and the country of source; and
d. Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents
required by law to be entered therein.
e. All other writings are private.
What is a document?
A document is any deed, instrument, or any duly authorized
paper by which something is proved, evidenced or set forth.
What do you mean by documentary evidence?
It consists of writings or any material containing letters, words,
numbers, figures, symbols or other modes of written expressions
offered as proof of their contents.
What are the classes of documents?
Public and Private Documents
Under the RPC, how many classes of documents are asses of
documents are there? What are they?
1. Official
2. Public
3. Commercial
4. Private
What is the importance of distinguishing public from private from
private documents?
For the purpose of their presentation in evidence
What are Public Documents?
Any document issued by an officer made in accordance with
law; Documents issued with the solemnities required by law

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What are the classes of Public documents?
(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the
sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers,
whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;
(b) Documents acknowledge before a notary public except last
wills and testaments; and
(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents
required by law to the entered therein.
Is a last will and testament a public document?
No, because under the law on Succession, wills, even though
notarized, their due execution and authenticity should still be proved by
the 3 witnesses
What do you mean by due execution?
Nothing more than that the instrument is not spurious,
counterfeit or of a different import on its face from the one executed
DOCUMENT WAS REGULARLY MADE IN ACCORANCE WITH LAW
AUTHENTICATE
CHECK THE VERACITY OF THE DOCUMENT
What are private documents?
Any deed or instrument, by which something is proved, evidenced or set
forth.
How would you compare a public document from a private
document?
1. As to authenticity
a. Public – no need to present proof of its due execution and
authenticity, before it may be received in evidence
b. Private – you need to prove its due execution and
authenticity, before it may be received in evidence
AQUINO, ALYSSA M.
2. As to persons bound
a. Public – evidence even against 3rd persons, of the fact which
gave rise to its due execution and to the date of execution and to the
date of the document the document
b. Private – binds only the parties who executed it or their
Is an SPA executed abroad acknowledged before a notary public
abroad admissible in evidence as public documents in our courts?
Yes (Sec. 19 (a)) Note: Any foreign document to be admissible
in our courts must have a “red ribbon”
What is the evidentiary value of public document evidentiary value
of public documents?
It must be sustained in the absence of strong, complete proof
of its nullity or falsity. It means that mere presentation thereof is prima
facie evidence of the facts therein stated.
SECTION 20. Proof of Private Document[s]. — Before any private
document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due
execution and authenticity must be proved by any of the following
means:
(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or
handwriting of the maker[;] or
(c) By other evidence showing its due execution and
authenticity.
Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is
claimed to be.
How do you prove the due execution and authenticity of a private
document?
(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; (b)
By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting
of the maker.
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How are you going to prove or establish the genuineness of the
signature of the maker? (Sec. 22)
a. By anyone who saw
b. Testimony of a witness purporting to show that the signature
is the signature of the the signature is the signature of the maker
c. By the comparison of the handwriting of the witness by the
court
d. By Expert Witness
What are the self-authenticating documents?
1. Public Documents
2. Ancient Documents (Sec. 21, Rule 132)
3. Notarized Documents
4. Documents whose authenticity has been admitted under the
Rules on Actionable Documents (Rule 8, Section 8) – if you fail to
verify your answer, anything attached to the document is deemed
admitted
5. Reply to the Letter Rule – confirmation made the counsel
that demand letter has been rec counsel that demand letter has been
received
How will you temporarily have a photocopied document temporarily
marked?
You say, “Your Honor, may I move that this document be
temporarily marked.” Then the next hearing, you now ask the court to
transfer the mark to the original document.
SECTION 21. When Evidence of Authenticity of Private Document
Not Necessary. — Where a private document is more than thirty (30)
years old, is produced from a custody in which it would naturally be
found if genuine, and is unblemished by any alterations or
AQUINO, ALYSSA M.
circumstances of suspicion, no other evidence of its authenticity need
be given.
SECTION 22. How Genuineness of Handwriting Proved. — The
handwriting of a person may be proved by any witness who believes it
to be the handwriting of such person because he or she has seen the
person write, or has seen writing purporting to be his or hers upon
which the witness has acted or been charged, and has thus acquired
knowledge of the handwriting of such person. Evidence respecting the
handwriting may also be given by a comparison, made by the witness or
the court, with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party
against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to the
satisfaction of the judge. (22)
SECTION 23. Public Documents as Evidence. — Documents
consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a
duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein
stated. All other public documents are evidence, even against a third
person, of the fact which gave rise to their execution and of the date of
the latter.
Between a public document and a bare allegation, which shall
prevail?
Public Document
SECTION 24. Proof of Official Record. — The record of public
documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible
for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or
by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record,
or by his or her deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in
the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody.
If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, which is
a contracting party to a treaty or convention to which the Philippines is
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also a party, or considered a public document under such treaty or
convention pursuant to paragraph (c) of Section 19 hereof, the How do you prove Certified True Copies; requirements?
certificate or its equivalent shall be in the form prescribed by such a. Local Official Records
treaty or convention subject to reciprocity granted to public documents 1. Attestation
originating from the Philippines. 2. Authentication
3. Documentary Stamp (w/o such, it is inadmissible in
For documents originating from a foreign country which is not a evidence); provided under the NIRC
contracting party to a treaty or convention referred to in the next b. Foreign Official Records
preceding sentence, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the 1. Attestation – a statement that this is a certified true
embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul, or consular copy
agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines 2. Certification – a statement that the original copy is in
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and the custody of a public officer
authenticated by the seal of his [or her] office. 3. Authentication – proof of due execution

A document that is accompanied by a certificate or its equivalent may Note: Certification is used only for certified true copies while
be presented in evidence without further proof, the certificate or its Acknowledgment is for an Original; although they are used
equivalent being prima facie evidence of the due execution and interchangeably
genuineness of the document involved. The certificate shall not be
required when a treaty or convention between a foreign country and the How do you prove an Original Document?
Philippines has abolished the requirement, or has exempted the a. Local Official Records - No more need for any attestation,
document itself from this formality. acknowledgement, and authentication
b. Foreign Official Records
Does Section 24 cover both local and foreign official records? 1. By an Acknowledgement – that the document is duly
Yes. executed before a public officer
2. By an Authentication – that the document is sealed
How can you prove official records?
a. Local Official Records Are the following public or private documents?
1. By Official Copy 1. Application for registration of a TIN in BIR – public (Sec. 19a)
2. By Official Publication 2. Sealed Original Stock Certificate – private (a private individual
3. By Certified True Copy caused the seal)
b. Foreign Official Records 3. Certification of the Clerk of Court – public
1. By Official Copy 4. Receipt of the Treasurer’s Office – public
2. By Official Publication 5. Un-Notarized Sealed Title of a Land – public
3. By Certified True Copy 6. Certification from Biñan, Laguna – public

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7. Articles of Incorporation – public (issued by the SEC)
SECTION 25. What Attestation of Copy Must State. — Whenever a
copy of a document or record is attested for the purpose of evidence,
the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy
of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The
attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if
there be any, or if he or she be the clerk of a court having a seal, under
the seal of such court. (25a)
SECTION 26. Irremovability of Public Record. — Any public record, an
official copy of which is admissible in evidence, must not be removed
from the office in which it is kept, except upon order of a court where
the inspection of the record is essential to the just determination of a
pending case.
What is the reason behind the rule?
To enable others to use the record
Are there exceptions to the rule?
1. Order of the Court (Rule 136, Section 26)
2. Rule 136, Section 14 (Taking of record from the clerk’s office
What if a public officer violates Section 26, is he criminally liable?
Yes. Under Section 2, Chapter 5, RPC (Infidelity in the custody
of documents) – Articles 226, 227, 228
SECTION 27. Public Record of a Private Document. — An authorized
public record of a private document may be proved by the original
record, or by a copy thereof, attested by the legal custodian of the
record, with an appropriate certificate that such officer has the custody.
AQUINO, ALYSSA M.
Is a public record of a private document proof of its contents, due
execution, and authenticity; does the private document acquire the
status of a public document under Sec. 27?
No, the writings remain private – it will only acquire the
character of a public document BUT it remains to be private documents
which due execution, contents and authenticity must be prove.
SECTION 28. Proof of Lack of Record. — A written statement signed
by an officer having the custody of an official record or by his or her
deputy that[,] after diligent search[,] no record or entry of a specified
tenor is found to exist in the records of his or her office, accompanied
by a certificate as above provided, is admissible as evidence that the
records of his or her office contain no such record or entry.
SECTION 29. How Judicial Record Impeached. — Any judicial record
may be impeached by evidence of:
a. want of jurisdiction in the court or judicial officer[;] collusion
between the parties[;] or
b. fraud in the party offering the record, in respect to the
proceedings.
SECTION 30. Proof of Notarial Documents. — Every instrument duly
acknowledged or proved and certified as provided by law, may be
presented in evidence without further proof, the certificate of
acknowledgment being prima facie evidence of the execution of the
instrument or document involved.
Why are documents notarized by the Notary Public given the
statues of a given the statues of a public document?
Because Notary Publics, as officers of the law, are given a
certain degree of respect and a certain degree of confidence
SECTION 31. Alteration in Document, How to Explain. — The party
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producing a document as genuine which has been altered and appears
to have been altered after its execution, in a part material to the
question in dispute, must account for the alteration. He or she may
show that the alteration was made by another, without his or her
concurrence, or was made with the consent of the parties affected by
it, or was otherwise properly or innocently made, or that the alteration
did not change the meaning or language of the instrument. If he or she
fails to do that, the document shall not be admissible in evidence.
What to do when your adversary presented an altered document?
Make a manifestation to the Judge saying that the document is
altered so that when you object, the court will remember that the
document is an will remember that the document is an altered one
altered one
Note: An altered document cannot be cured
If you are the presenter of the altered document, what are you
supposed to do in order for it to be admissible in evidence?
He may show that:
1. The alteration was made by another, without his
concurrence, or
2. The alteration was made with the consent of the
parties affected by it, or
3. The alteration was properly or innocently made,
4. The alteration did not change the meaning or
language of the instrument
SECTION 32. Seal. — There shall be no difference between sealed and
unsealed private documents insofar as their admissibility as evidence is
concerned.
Do you still need to prove the due execution and o prove the due
execution and authenticity of a Sealed Private authenticity of a
AQUINO, ALYSSA M.
Sealed Private Document?
Yes, for it still remains a Private Document
How do you prove the due execution and authenticity of a Private
Document?
By asking these two questions:
1. What is your evidence? ( a general question to prove due
execution and authenticity of a Private Document)
2. Whose signature is this? (Proving due execution) How did you know
whose signature this is? (Proving Authenticity)
SECTION 33. Documentary Evidence in an Unofficial Language. —
Documents written in an unofficial language shall not be admitted as
evidence, unless accompanied with a translation into English or
Filipino. To avoid interruption of proceedings, parties or their attorneys
are directed to have such translation prepared before trial.
What if X killed Y. X admitted guilt in a Cebuano dialect, is his
admission admissible in evidence?
Yes, since these local dialects are considered as auxiliary
official languages – they are no longer needed to be translated. (Pp v.
Tomaquin; 435 SCRA 23)
What if X killed Y. X admitted guilt in a Russian language, is his
admission admissible in evidence?
NO. Foreign language has to be translated first before being
offered in evidence.
C. OFFER AND OBJECTION
SECTION 34. Offer of Evidence. — The court shall consider no
evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose for which
the evidence is offered must be specified. (34)
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SECTION 35. When to Make Offer. — All evidence must be offered
orally.
The offer of the testimony of a witness in evidence must be made at
the time the witness is called to testify.
The offer of documentary and object evidence shall be made after the
presentation of a party's testimonial evidence. (35a)
When should you make an offer?
A. Documentary and Object evidence – the offer must be made
after the party’s presentation of the testimonial evidence
B. Testimonial Evidence – the offer shall be made at the time
the witness is called to testify
Why should evidence be formally offered; purpose?
No evidence shall be considered unless formally offered in
court.
What are the types of Evidence?
1. Testimonial
2. Object/Real
3. Documentary
Before asking the witness on stand, what should the lawyer state
first?
The purpose of the testimony – after this, you can now ask the
witness
Note:
-You cannot ask questions, if you did not state the purpose of the
testimony – thus, if you are an adversary, you can object
-After the last witness underwent the q&a, the lawyer now shall make a
formal offer of evidence within 3 days from the statement of the last
witness – which shall consist of the different documentary exhibits
(from this time, the other party may now object)
AQUINO, ALYSSA M.
If the document, which was attached to the complaint but not
identified nor marked but formally offered; is it admissible or
inadmissible?
Admissible
If the document is not attached to the complaint but was identified
and marked but not formally offered; admissible or inadmissible?
Inadmissible
If the document is attached to the complaint, identified, marked
and lost but formally offered; admissible or inadmissible?
Inadmissible, since a lost document cannot be offered
REGALADO: (sir does not agree)
GR: Evidence not formally offered is inadmissible
XPN: Though not formally offered, as long as it is marked and identified
as borne by the stenographic notes, it is admissible
Should the offer be specific?
Yes because of the doctrine of the Multiple Admissibility of
Evidence
Can a party withdraw his evidence?
No.
Identification of Evidence vs. Formal Offer of Evidence
Identification of Evidence is made during the course of the trial
while formal offer of evidence is made after the party’s presentation of
testimonial evidence
SECTION 36. Objection. — Objection to offer of evidence must be
made orally immediately after the offer is made.
Objection to the testimony of a witness for lack of a formal offer must
be made as soon as the witness begins to testify. Objection to a
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question propounded in the course of the oral examination of a witness c. Question Propounded in the course of the oral
must be made as soon as the grounds therefor become reasonably examination – when the objectionable portion becomes apparent
apparent. (during the trial stage)
The grounds for the objections must be specified. (36a)
SECTION 37. When Repetition of Objection Unnecessary. — When it
What should the party do if he wants the evidence of the adverse becomes reasonably apparent in the course of the examination of a
party not be accepted by the court witness that the questions being propounded are of the same class as
IMMEDIATELY Object those to which objection has been made, whether such objection was
sustained or overruled, it shall not be necessary to repeat the objection,
Give me 10 kinds of Objection it being sufficient for the adverse party to record his or her continuing
1. Question is Ambiguous objection to such class of questions. [CONTINUING OBJECTION]
2. Question is Argumentative
3. Question is violative of the BER What is your remedy for same kinds of question propounded to your
4. Question is Compound witness?
5. Question calls for Conclusion Objection, the question is repetitive; and if such was still done,
6. Question is too General now ask the court to make a record of your continuing objection
7. Question is Hypothetical
8. Question is Leading What if, when you objected first, the objection was overruled. And
9. Question is Misleading then on the second time, your objection was sustained. Can you
10. Question Misquotes a witness move for a record of your continuing objection?
Yes, Sec. 37 said “whether such objection was sustained or
What happened on July 13, 2001? – is it this objectionable? overruled”

Yes. 1. Leading
2. Misleading SECTION 38. Ruling. — The ruling of the court must be given
3. Narrative immediately after the objection is made, unless the court desires to
take a reasonable time to inform itself on the question presented; but
NOTE: In order to obviate the objection, add “if any” after the question, the ruling shall always be made during the trial and at such time as will
the objection can no longer be sustained give the party against whom it is made an opportunity to meet the
situation presented by the ruling.
When to make an objection?
a. Oral Testimony – after the offer of the evidence is made The reason for sustaining or overruling an objection need not be stated.
(also after the purpose was stated) However, if the objection is based on two [(2)] or more grounds, a
ruling sustaining the objection on one [(1)] or some of them must
b. In Writing (Documentary Evidence) – within 3 days after specify the ground or grounds relied upon.
the formal offer

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If the objection was based on 2 or more grounds, must the judge
state his basis of his ruling, if he will overrule all the objections?
No.
If the objection was based on 2 or more grounds, must the judge
state his basis of his ruling, if he will sustain one of the 2 or more
objections?
YES.
SECTION 39. Striking out [of] Answer. — Should a witness answer
the question before the adverse party had the opportunity to voice fully
its objection to the same, or where a question is not objectionable, but
the answer is not responsive, or where a witness testifies without a
question being posed or testifies beyond limits set by the court, or
when the witness does a narration instead of answering the question,
and such objection is found to be meritorious, the court shall sustain
the objection and order such answer, testimony or narration to be
stricken off the record.
On proper motion, the court may also order the striking out of answers
which are incompetent, irrelevant, or otherwise improper. (39a)
What to do when the answer was made so quickly?
Should a witness answer the question before the adverse party
had the opportunity to voice fully its objection to the same, and such
objection is found to be meritorious, the court shall sustain the
objection and order the answer given to be stricken off the record.
What are the other grounds for you to move for a motion to strike
out?
If the answer is otherwise improper, irrelevant, or immaterial.
SECTION 40. Tender of Excluded Evidence. — If documents or things
offered in evidence are excluded by the court, the offeror may have the
same attached to or made part of the record. If the evidence excluded
AQUINO, ALYSSA M.
is oral, the offeror may state for the record the name and other
personal circumstances of the witness and the substance of the
proposed testimony.
What is offer of proof, tender of excluded evidence, or proffer of
evidence?
This is the offer of evidence excluded by the trial court for the
consideration by the appellate court (Sec. 40)
What is offer of evidence?
Offer of evidence for the consideration of the trial court – this is
the one that may be objected to within 3 days (Sec. 34)
What are the kinds of evidence?
1. Object/Real – you object during the Formal Offer (3 days
after the offer)
2. Testimonial/Oral – you object during the course of the
examination
What are the 3 ways to object?
1. Object on the Purpose
2. Objection during the Formal Offer
3. Objection during the course of the examination
What if the objection against you was sustained by the Judge so
that you were not able to present your witness’ oral or testimonial
evidence; what is your remedy?
Say, “Your honor, may I be allowed to make a proffer of
evidence” (or tender of excluded evidence or offer of proof). Then
present such:
a. The name of my witness is Ms. X
b. Her personal circumstances are the following:
c. And that if I were to be allowed to continue with my
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questioning, I will be able to prove the following x x x and that will be
the supposed testimony of my witness.
What is the purpose of the above?
It will be recorded already – then the Judge will be able to read
it when making hi decision
What if the objection against you was sustained by the Judge so
that you were not able to present your witness’ written or object or
real evidence; what is your remedy?
The offeror may have the same attached to or made part of the
record; how: Make a manifestation in writing that you will be making a
proffer of evidence to have the document for part of the whole record of
the case
What if the value of the proffer of evidence?
So that the appellate court may be able to read the records of
excluded evidence
RULE 133
Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence
SECTION 1. Preponderance of Evidence, How Determined. — In civil
cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his or her
case by a preponderance of evidence. In determining where the
preponderance or superior weight of evidence on the issues involved
lies, the court may consider all the facts and circumstances of the case,
the witnesses' manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and
opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature
of the facts to which they testify, the probability or improbability of their
testimony, their interest or want of interest, and also their personal
credibility so far as the same may legitimately appear upon the trial.
AQUINO, ALYSSA M.
The court may also consider the number of witnesses, though the
preponderance is not necessarily with the greater number. (1a)
SECTION 2. Proof beyond Reasonable Doubt. — In a criminal case,
the accused is entitled to an acquittal, unless his or her guilt is shown
beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not
mean such a degree of proof as, excluding possibility of error, produces
absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or that degree of
proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. (2a)
SECTION 3. Extrajudicial Confession, Not Sufficient Ground for
Conviction. — An extrajudicial confession made by an accused shall
not be sufficient ground for conviction, unless corroborated by evidence
of corpus delicti. (3)
SECTION 4. Circumstantial Evidence, When Sufficient. —
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
a. There is more than one [(1)] circumstance;
b. The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven;
and
c. The combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
Inferences cannot be based on other inferences.
SECTION 5. Weight to be Given Opinion of Expert Witness, How
Determined. — In any case where the opinion of an expert witness is
received in evidence, the court has a wide latitude of discretion in
determining the weight to be given to such opinion, and for that
purpose may consider the following:
(a) Whether the opinion is based upon sufficient facts or data;
(b) Whether it is the product of reliable principles and methods;
(c) Whether the witness has applied the principles and methods
reliably to the facts of the case; and
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(d) Such other factors as the court may deem helpful to make such
determination. (n)

SECTION 6. Substantial Evidence. — In cases filed before

administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed
established if it is supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of
relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to justify a conclusion.

SECTION 7. Power of the Court to Stop Further Evidence. — The

court may stop the introduction of further testimony upon any particular
point when the evidence upon it is already so full that more witnesses
to the same point cannot be reasonably expected to be additionally
persuasive. This power shall be exercised with caution.

SECTION 8. Evidence on Motion. — When a motion is based on facts

not appearing of record, the court may hear the matter on affidavits or
depositions presented by the respective parties, but the court may
direct that the matter be heard wholly or partly on oral testimony or
depositions.

Preponderance of evidence
-greater weight of credible evidence
- certain facts or evidence presented at trial are more likely
than not to be true

Proof beyond reasonable doubt (criminal case)

-degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced
mind—not absolute certainty

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