Chapter - 1 - Module - 1 - Introduction To The Study of Globalization

Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study of Globalization
Module 1
Introduction to the Study of Globalization
Introduction
Globalization is the process by which the world, previously isolated through
physical and technological distance, becomes increasingly interconnected. It is
manifested by the increase in interaction between peoples around the world that
involves the sharing of ideas, cultures, goods, services and investment.
The last sixty years have witnessed a huge increase in globalization, but the
phenomenon has been going on for much longer. Thomas Friedman describes the
current trend as the third great wave of globalization in human history.
Globalization has brought fear of loss of jobs and loss of income, which are often
described as the “race to the bottom,” as industrialized countries are thought to have to
reduce wages to be competitive with those in the developing world. Globalization has
also spawned fears about loss of culture. Many countries worry about their cultures
being overwhelmed by that of the United States. France is a good example. Others fear
replacement of their cultures by that of Western nations (e.g., some Islamic states).
Countries also fear the loss of national sovereignty as they become part of
supranational entitles, like the European Union or the International Monetary Fund. And
yet, history shows that globalization has corresponded to higher national incomes and
increased opportunities. How can these conflicting views be reconciled? (ER Services,
2020)
The Contemporary World 1

Learning Outcomes
After successful completion of this module, you should be able to:
 Differentiate the competing conceptions of globalization

 Identify the underlying philosophies of the varying definitions of globalization
 Agree on a working definition of globalization for the course
Course Materials:
A. Competing Conceptions of Globalizations

1. The World-Systems Approach (Immanuel Wallerstein)
Marx’s legacy in social theory does not lie in his predictions of future
utopias but rather in his analyses of the workings and contradictions of
capitalism. Within contemporary sociology this tradition is very much
alive in world-systems analysis, a perspective developed by Immanuel
Wallerstein in the 1970s. According to Wallerstein, the modern nation
state exists within a broad economic, political, and legal framework
which he calls a “world-system.” Just as individual behavior cannot be
understood without reference the sociocultural system in which they
are members, individual societies or nation states cannot be
understood without reference to the world-system in which they are
embedded.
Modern nation states are all part of the world-system of capitalism,

and it is this world-system that Wallerstein seeks to understand.
Wallerstein believes that there are only three basic types of social
systems.
 Mini-systems
 World empires

 World-economies
The first he terms as “mini-systems,” these are the small, homogenous

societies studied by anthropologists. Hunting and gathering, pastoral,
and simple horticultural societies are relatively self-contained economic
units, producing all goods and services within the sociocultural system
itself. The second type of social system is a “world-empire.” This
system has an economy that is based on the extraction of surplus
goods and services from outlying districts. Much of this tribute goes to
pay for the administrators who extract it and for the military to ensure
continued domination, the rest goes to the political rulers at the head
of the empire. The third type of social system, according to
Wallerstein, is the world-economies. Unlike world-empires, the world-
economies have no unified political system; nor is its dominance based
on military power alone. However, like a world-empire, a world-
economy is based on the extraction of surplus from outlying districts to
those who rule at the center.
From the start, Wallerstein argues, capitalism has had a division of

labor that encompassed several nation states. The capitalist world-
system began in Europe in about 1500 and under the spur of the
accumulation of capital, expanded over the next few centuries to cover
the entire globe. In the process of this expansion the capitalist world
system has absorbed small mini-systems, world-empires, as well as
competing world-economies. The capitalist world-economy was
created by establishing long-distance trade in goods and linking
production processes worldwide, all of which allowed the significant
accumulation of capital in Europe. But these economic relationships
were not created in a vacuum. The modern nation state was created in
Europe along with capitalism to serve and to protect the interests of
the capitalists. What was in the interest of early European capitalists
was the establishment of a world-economy based on an extremely
unequal division of labor between European states and the rest of the
system. Also in the interest of early European capitalists was the
establishment of strong European states that had the political and
military power to enforce this inequality.

For Wallerstein, the capitalist world-economy is a mechanism of

surplus appropriation that is both subtle and efficient. It relies upon
the creation of surplus through constantly expanding productivity. It
extracts this surplus for the benefit of the elite through the creation of
profit. The capitalist world-system is based on a two-fold division of
labor in which different classes and status groups are given differential
access to resources within nation states; and the different nation
states are given differential access to goods and services on the world
market. Both types of markets, those within and those between nation
states, are very much distorted by power.
Wallerstein divides the capitalist

world-economy into three areas:
 Peripheral areas.
 Semi-peripheral
 Core states
The peripheral areas are the least

developed; they are exploited by
the core for their cheap labor, raw
materials, and agricultural
production. The semi-peripheral
areas are somewhat intermediate, being both exploited by the core
and take some role in the exploitation of the peripheral areas. In the
recent past they have been expanding their manufacturing activities
particularly in products that core nations no longer find very profitable.
The core states are in geographically advantaged areas of the world—
Europe and North America.
These core states promote capital accumulation internally through tax

policy, government purchasing, sponsorship of research and
development, financing infrastructural development (such as sewers,
roads, airports—all privately constructed but publically financed), and

maintaining social order to minimize class struggle. Core states also

promote capital accumulation in the world-economy itself. These states
have the political, economic, and military power to enforce unequal
rates of exchange between the core and the periphery. It is this power
that allows core states to dump unsafe goods in peripheral nations,
pay lower prices for raw materials than would be possible in a free
market, exploit the periphery for cheap labor, dump in their
environment, abuse their consumers and workforce, erect trade
barriers and quotas, and establish and enforce patents. It is the
economic, political, and military power of the core that allows
significant capital to be accumulated into the hands of the few, the
capitalist world-system that produces and maintains the gross
economic and political inequalities within and between nations.
As with capitalism within nation states, this unequal power between

nation states is not uncontested. It is the subject of struggle. There
are internal contradictions that with the passage of time cause political
and economic instability and social unrest. Eventually, according to
Wallerstein, a world-wide economic crisis will be reached and the
capitalist world-system will collapse, opening the way for revolutionary
change. The coming crisis of capitalism, as predicted by Wallerstein’s

world-systems theory, will be the topic of the next short-paper. (Elwell,

2013)
2. The Global Culture Model

For millions of years, human groups spanned over immense territories
without means of communications other than reliance on their physical
body parts such as their eyes, voices, hands and legs. With the advent
of the urbanized metropolitan cities dating back to more than 5,000
years ago and the beginning of commercial activities, cultural
exchanges have taken place between individuals living among various
societies. However, in the past, means of communication and
transportation were limited and cultural characteristics did not circulate
as rapidly and easily as in modern times.
With the industrial revolutions, societies began to have access to

machines which allowed them to create cultural products and export
them across borders. By the 18th century, thinkers had forecasted a
non-reversible trend of cultural standardization. However, the
predominance of the nation-state and national economic barriers had
protected and insulated cultures from external influence. Cultural
uniformization based on the European model at the end of 18th
century was prevalent, particularly due to the success of the rational
capitalism that characterized Europe and which was the symbol of
cultural modernity. Additionally, the enlightenment thinkers had
forecasted a uniformized and borderless world in the sphere of values.
In the 19th century, cultural industries depended on technical
innovations during the first and second industrial revolutions such as,
printing in 1860, and electricity and cinema in 1890. Further, cultural
miscegenation-related fear dates back to 1853 when Arthur de
Gobineau wrote an influential essay on the inequality of human races
in France. Marx and Engels noted an intellectual convergence in the
literature which was a kind of intellectual globalization of ideas that
preceded the materialistic globalization of goods and markets. As for
the German intellectual Goethe, he pleaded for a world culture through
world literature (Weltlitertur) where everybody would contribute. In
the 20th century, cultural industries appeared as communication
technology started to develop and flow seaminglessly across borders.

Interactions between globalization and culture do not seem to be a

recent phenomenon. In fact, they constitute, particularly with the
influence of globalization on culture, a contention point in the literature
as various theoretical standpoints have been developed to examine
these interactions. These standpoints will be grouped under three
different scenarios and presented in the subsequent sections.
Heterogenization scenario: While certain scholars (i.e. Appadurai,

1996; Featherstone, 1995) admit that globalization for the most part
originates from Western cultures, they however reject the idea that
this phenomenon constitutes a homogenization of world cultures
resulting from one way exchanges among the latter. In fact, this
“school of thought” argues that globalization generates rather a state
of heterogeneity which refers to a network structure in which nodes
tend to connect with each other in regard to certain cultural
dimensions. Two distinct variants of heterogenization can be
distinguished. The heterogenization at a local level refers to a situation
where the practices of a sphere of life in a specific milieu or locale
become more diverse over a period of time. The heterogenization at a
trans-local or global level refers to a situation where the practices of a
sphere of life in at least two locales become more distinct over a
period of time. In short, heterogenization, which has also been labeled
differentiation, relates fundamentally to barriers that prevent flows
that would contribute to making cultures look alike. In this perspective,
cultures remain different one from another.
Heterogenization represents a process which leads to a more inwardly

appearing world due to the intensification of flows across cultures.
Hence, local cultures experience continuous transformation and
reinvention due to the influence of global factors and forces. It is
important to keep sight of the fact that according to this perspective,
cultures do not remain unaffected by global flows and globalization in
general, but the actual crux of the culture remains intact and
unaffected, as has always been with only peripheral surfaces directly
impacted.
The convergence thesis advancing that globalization favors

homogenization of the world underestimates the global flows of goods,
ideas and individuals. In this regard, Robertson (2001), who is critical

of the focus on processes stemming from the United States and its
homogenizing impact on the world, advocates the notion of
heterogeneity with a focus on diversity, multi-directional global flows
and the existence of world processes that are independent and
sovereign of other nation-states. These flows do not eradicate local
cultures, they only change some of their traits and reinforce others.
Along the same line, Wiley (2004) contends that national cultures,
which are fluid constructs, have become part of a heterogeneous
transnational field of culture.
Different cultural groups develop into heterogonous entities due to

differences in demands necessitated by their environment in efforts to
adapt to the requirements of the latter. And consequently over a
period of time, these groups become diversified and very different due
to environmental circumstances and pressures. For instance, although
the spread of the colonization phenomena yielded a reduction of
cultural differentiation, when the colonization movement receded,
cultures sprung up and cultural differentiation was favored.
In sum, it has been documented in some instances that foreign

cultural practices remain in the margins of local and national cultures
resulting in a side-by-side coexistence of distinct and disparate global
and local cultures. It seems that cultural differentiation will most likely
remain strong despite globalization forces. What will probably change
are the criteria used by different cultural groups to define their identity
and differentiation vis-à-vis other cultures.
Homogenization scenario: Are international exchanges and flows of

goods, services, capitals, technology transfer and human movements
creating a more standardized and unique world culture? Would
acculturation, which yields from long and rich contacts between
societies of different cultures, result in a universal culture?
The homogenization perspective seems to positively answer these

questions as the increased interconnection between countries and
cultures contributes to forming a more homogenous world adopting
the Western Euro-American model of social organization and life style.
In the homogenization view, barriers that prevent flows that would
contribute to making cultures look alike are weak and global flows are

strong. In its extreme form, homogenization, which is also known as

convergence, advances the possibility that local cultures can be shaped
by other more powerful cultures or even a global culture. This
perspective is reflected in several concepts and models such as the
Global Culture, Americanization and more importantly the
McDonaldization theory.
Across different regions and countries in the world, more and more
people seem to watch the same entertainment programs, listen to the
same music, consume common global brand products and services,
and wear the same or similar clothes. These comparable developments
in cultural practices are suggestive of the emergence of a “global
culture” or “world culture” based on the assumption of the demise of
the nation-state as a major player on the global stage. In other terms,
globalization contributes in creating a new and identifiable class of
individuals who belong to an emergent global culture. According to this
concept, the selfsame dynamics of globalization are weakening the
connections between geographical places and cultural experiences,
and eroding the feeling of spatial distance which tends to reinforce a
sense of national separateness. Thus, globalization, which is a
replication of the American and/or Western cultural tradition, is
considered a destructive force, a recipe for cultural disaster and an
assault on local cultures which the latter are not able to withstand or
resist. This is presumably due to the fact that globalization contributes
in atrophying identities and destroying local cultural traditions and
practices, diluting, even eliminating the uniqueness of national
cultures, and establishing a homogenized world culture.
However, some proponents of the concept of global culture argue that

the latter is not cohesive in nature and refers to a set of cultural
practices that only bear surface resemblance. Moreover, Smith (2003)
completely rejects the existence of the notion of global culture whether
as a cohesive or discordant concept. Along the same lines, Tomlinson
(2003) maintains that globalization makes individuals aware of the
diverse national cultures in the world which are multiple in numbers
and distinct in nature. Hence, globalization strengthens national
cultures rather than undermine them.

On another note, Jaja (2010) stresses that the world is presently

experiencing Americanization, rather than globalization with the former
referring to the global spread of America’s influential dominance and
culture through drastic growth of mass communication and penetration
of American companies in other countries. As a matter of fact, there
seems to be an American hegemony reflected by a domination of the
Internet as 85% of web pages originate from the United States and
American companies control 75% of the world’s packaged software
market In addition to the latter, there is an American monopoly of the
media as seen with popular films, music, and satellite and television
stations around the globe. It should be highlighted that the American
conception of culture is open and far from the erudite notion of several
European countries, for instance. Further, the American way of life
does not appear to be elitist and aims at spreading cultural products to
the masses which increase economic opportunities. This model is
desired by other populations, developed and developing.
Nonetheless, it has been documented that only countries that share

values similar to those of the United States are more inclined to adopt
products which reflect the American culture and consider them as their
own; conversely, cultures with values different than those of the
United States are less likely to embrace products typical of the
American culture. Therefore, the Americanization phenomena seems to
be contingent with the predisposition of local cultures to embrace
artifacts reflective of the American culture, rather than with the simple
availability of these artifacts.
There is little doubt if any that the McDonaldization theory constitutes

an important symbol of the homogenization perspective. It is defined
as “the process whereby the principles of the fast-food restaurant are
coming to dominate more and more sectors of American society and
the world”. McDonaldization is the idea of a worldwide homogenization
of cultures through the effects of multinational corporations. The
process involves a formal consistency and logic transferred through
corporate rules and regulations. The McDonaldization model refers to
the principles that the McDonald’s franchise system has been able to
successfully spread across borders and into the global marketplace.
These principles embedded within the system are efficiency,
calculability, predictability, and control. In fact, the McDonald formula

is a success for the reason that it is efficient, quick and inexpensive,

predictable and effective in controlling both labor and its customers.
Most important to the origins of McDonalization is the interaction

between culture and economics. Although Ritzer (1993), like
Robertson (2001) recognize economic factor as forces of
McDonaldization, the authors emphasize the importance to consider
cultural factors. For instance, examining the fit between a culture that
values efficiency and accepts a McDonalized system is vital for
companies planning to take their businesses global.
From a theoretical standpoint, McDonaldization is based on Weber’s

(1927/1968) work on formal rationality. In this regard, Weber
maintained that the West has been characterized by an increasing
tendency towards the predominance of formally rational systems.
McDonaldization represents the bureaucracy in Weber’s model of the
modern development of rationalization. Further, McDonalization refers
to the far-reaching process of social change. It impacts social
structures and institutions in its country of origin, as well as, in other
developed and developing countries around the world. The
McDonaldization thesis’ relevance to issues of globalization asserts that
social systems in today’s society are becoming increasingly
McDonaldized, and more significantly that the fundamental tenets of
its principles have been successfully exported from the United States
to the rest of the world. Ritzer and Malone (2000) contend that
organizations in foreign markets that adopt the basic principles of the
model are to an extent undergoing the process of McDonaldization. In
other words, the latter is actively exporting the materialization and
embodiment of that process.
It seems that the McDonalization model has transformed the nature of

consumer consumption by encouraging and compelling individuals to
consume infinite amounts of goods and services. Due to the fact that
McDonaldized systems are robust entities imposing themselves on local
markets in other societies, these systems are drastically transforming
economies and cultures along the process. The model’s blueprint has
been put into operation in fields beyond the fast food eatery business
reaching out to the domain of higher education with the McUniversity,
theme parks as Disneyworld, politics and the health care sectors. The

phenomenon of being McDonaldized has transformed the many

aspects of the cultures within those societies, particularly, the way
people live in their environments.
Although cultural differences are unchangeable forces that breed

conflict and rivalry, growing global interdependence and
interconnectedness may lead toward cultural standardization and
uniformization as seen with the phenomenon of “McDonaldization”. It
should be noted that while businesses may slightly adapt to local
realities, the fact is that the basic items available for customers are
generally the same worldwide. Even more importantly is the fact that
the core operating procedures remain similar in every outlet around
the globe. Thus, the most important aspect of the McDonalized
systems is in how local and global businesses operate using their
standardized principles. What is actually being sold in not as relevant
as the activities related to how things are organized, delivered and
sold to customers; it is these steps that must abide to similar sets of
principles for the business to be successful in its new global context.
Despite the contribution of the McDonaldization theory in explaining

implications of globalization, Pieterse (1996) stresses that fast food
outlets like McDonalds and the sort are not at all culturally
homogenized but rather characterized by differences that reflect
culturally mixed social forms. In fact, McDonaldized systems have had
to adapt in order to succeed overseas. Organizations once imported,
serve different social, economic and cultural functions that all need to
be custom-tailored to local conditions.
In an ethnographic study of the McDonaldization theory, Talbott

(1995) examines the fast food technique at the McDonald’s fast food
restaurant in Moscow and discerns that the McDonaldization method is
not precise and accurate. In fact, every point substantiated by the
theory turned out to have different outcomes in Moscow. For instance,
the fast food outlet appeared to function inefficiently with customers
waiting for hours in extensive long line-ups to get their meals served.
The prices of a typical McDonald’s meal costs more than one thirds of
a Russian worker’s average daily income. Talbott (1995) observed
that, in opposition to what the McDonaldization theory holds about
predictability, the main attraction for the Russian customer is in the

diversified and unique lines of products that the chain offers not the
standard menu items that one thinks they may find in Russia. The
latter are not even available for the Russian customer. Further, control
of the labor force is not as standardized and unvarying as presented
by the theory. McDonald’s Moscow offers flexibility to their employees;
for instance, the chain encourages competitions among colleagues and
has special hours for workers and their families. This flexibility is also
extended to Russian customers that spend hours on end socializing
and chatting over teas and coffees. This would be unconceivable in a
North American fast food outlet as these sorts of customer practices
would be strongly discouraged by the business.
Similarly, American adaptations of the fast food principles have been

observed in China, south-east Asia and India. In these areas
McDonald’s responds to diverse tastes as well as different customer
wants and needs than their American counterparts. The Big Mac is
most probably not a standard menu item in Delhi. Another important
point to mention is the fact that these sorts of fast food outlets in
these countries are not considered as junk food eateries but in fact
cater to an upper middle class. The latter seek to explore new modern
tastes of the fusion of food variations whether it is the mixed tastes of
Chinese and American menu items or Japanese and American. These
customers are far from adhering to the principle of uniformity. In Yan’s
(1997) work on McDonald’s in Beijing, the author argues that the local
will prevail over McDonaldization, Americanization, and globalization
predicting that in the future, Chinese customers will not associate
typical standard menu items with America but may in fact get to the
point where they consider fries, nuggets and coke as local menu
options.
The cases of McDonald in Russia and Asia evidently fall short of being
considered as cultural homogenization but should rather be seen as
global localization, insiderization, or glocalization, the latter term
coined by Sony chairman Akio Morita to indicate the necessity for
companies to look in both local and global directions when working in
diverse business settings.
Lastly, Appadurai (1996) and Pieterse (2004) argue that cultural

homogenization is too simplistic as several local cultures have

demonstrated their ability to domesticate or resist foreign cultural

influences. Therefore, interactions between cultures favor cultural
hybridity rather than a monolithic cultural homogenization. In doing
so, globalization leads to the creative amalgamations of global and
local cultural traits.
Hybridization scenario: It is needless to mention that growing

awareness of cultural differences and globalization are interdependent
as awareness becomes a function of globalization (Pieterse, 1996). In
fact, with the advent of international workforce mobility, cross-cultural
communications, migration, international trade, tourism, and global
investments, awareness of cultural differences is inevitable and of vital
necessity in the current global context. In this regard, Featherstone
(1990) contends that globalization defines the space in which the
world’s cultures merge together while generating innovative and
valuable heterogeneous significance as well as culturally compelled
global insights.
The process of translocal fusion and cultural mixing or hybridization is

another model that touches on interactions between globalization and
culture. According to the hybridization view, external and internal flows
interact to create a unique cultural hybrid that encompasses
components of the two. Barriers to external flows exist; however,
although they are powerful enough to protect local cultures from being
overwhelmed by external exchanges, they are not powerful enough to
completely block external flows.
The main thesis of cultural hybridization is the continuous process of

mixing or blending cultures. The latter resulting from the globalization
of ends derived out of the integration of both the global and local and
of new, distinctive and hybrid cultures which are fundamentally neither
global nor local at their core. As for Robertson (2001), globalization is
a complex blend or mixture of homogenization and heterogenization as
opposed to a wide-ranging process of homogenization.
Pieterse (1996) argues that hybridization is in fact an offspring rooted

in the breadth of racism with inferences shedding light on the
existence of the métis, half-caste and mixed-breed. The latter
standpoint opposes the doctrines of racial purity and integration of the

19th century because, according to the father of racial demography,

de Gobineau, and other scholars, the idea of race-mixing with what
they considered lower elements of society would eventually elevate the
former in the dominant role. Based on the premise of de Gobineau’s
theory of the Arayn master race, it is believed that race created culture
and that mixing the white, black and yellow races broke established
barriers set in place to avoid states of chaos. Based on these premises,
the regions of central Asia, south and Eastern Europe, and the Middle
East and North African regions are mixed racial demographic areas.
Merging the races would inevitably cast doubt on pillars of the purity
creeds, as for instance with those that relate purity with strength and
sanctity. Hybridization takes the experiences that are marginalized and
considered taboo and merges them with principles of nationalism,
challenging the latter by taking matters beyond national borders.
Merging cultural and national elements would undermine ethnicity
because the very nature of the blending process would innately
originate from the experiences spurred and acquired across territorial
boundaries (Pieterse, 1996). In this respect, hybridization reflects a
postmodern view which curtails boundaries adhering to the merging of
diverse cultures. Proponents of the tenets of modernity stand for a
culture of order rooted within an unambiguous separation of national
boundaries. Modernists would not tolerate that hybridization vanguards
effects and experiences of what Foucault (1977) termed subjugated
knowledge.
On another note, humanity has not been inherently divided in cultural

bands as those formed in the past; hence the need for an equidistant
position which acknowledges the multifaceted and overwhelming
nature of modern technologies while recognizing the contribution that
distinctively diverse cultures bring to the new and inventive shared
common space.
Moreover, regarding the mixing and blending of immigrants within

their early settler societies, Pieterse (1996) alleges that the
intermingling of this process engages both peripheral and deeply
rooted cultural elements as observed with the case of North America.
The author maintains that the appeal of American popular culture is
defined by its mixed and nomadic characteristics, its light-hearted

resilience, and its disconnection from its unequal and hostile past. Both
marginal and peripheral cultural elements intermingled with deeply
rooted facets of diverse cultures blending and merging in newly varied
intercultural landscapes. This eclectic blending may be the source of
the subliminal and subconscious magnetism towards American pop
music, film, television, and fashion. It is an effect of the intimate
intermingling and collision of different ethnicities, cultures and
histories.
Along the same lines, intercultural mingling is a deeply embedded

process which is supported by Hamelink (1983:4) who remarks that:
“the richest cultural traditions emerged at the meeting point of
markedly different cultures, such as Sudan, Athens, the Indus Valley
and Mexico”. This sheds a different light on the surface/inherent
arguments for culture. It appears that some cultures have been fused
and united for centuries. And thus, the mixture of cultures should be
part of a world narrative.
Pieterse (1996) questions whether the distinction between what has

been referred to as cultural grammars as a metaphor for inherent and
deep-rooted cultural elements and cultural languages which are the
peripheral or marginal elements of a culture can be looked at as
divergences between surface and depth at all. The author infers that
to address the issues raised by the hybridization theory requires a
decolonization of the imagination and the need to reassess how we
examined culture in terms of territory and space in the past and how
we view culture in its varied global landscapes in the present and
future.
Hybridization in cultural studies has also been associated with the

notions of creolization and glocalization. The word “Creole” refers to
people of mixed race but it has been extended, among each other, to
the creolization of culture. Further, glocalization, which is at the heart
of hybridization, refers to the interpretation of the global and local
producing unique outcomes in different geographic regions.
Glocalization is reflected by the fact that the world is growing
pluralistic with individuals and communities becoming innovative
agents that have a tremendous power to adapt and innovate within
their newly glocalized world.

On another note, in tune with the hybridization view, Appadurai (1990)

argues that globalization represents a process of both differentiation
and interconnection. Therefore, the world should not be labeled as a
monolithic network spreading worldwide but, rather, as a collection of
partially overlapping socio-techno-cultural landscapes (Appadurai,
1990). The latter can be global and regional in nature, and marked by
a particular speed of growth and direction of movement. These
landscapes, which serve to examine disjunctures between economy,
culture and politics, constitute diverse layers of globalization or
dimensions of cultural flows. Mediascapes are about the flows of image
and communication. Ethnoscapes are concerned with the flows of
individuals around the world. Ideoscapes deal with exchanges of ideas
and ideologies. Technoscapes refer to flows of technology and skills to
create linkages between organizations around the world. Finances
capes relate to the interactions associated with money and capital.
These landscapes are independent of any given nation-state and
differently affect various territories.
The process of hybridization is distinguished from the McDonalization

theory in part due to the fact that it is not derived from pre-established
theorem but has ventured into a divergent unexplored and unmarked
path. While homogenization in general and McDonaldization in
particular evoke a victorious Americanism, hybridization is indefinite
and open-ended in reference to practical experience and from a
theoretical perspective. The theory does not correspond to an
established theoretical matrix or paradigm but it conjectures a shift by
virtue of its nature. The hybridization thesis stands for cultural
convergence and assimilation. The theory advances cultural mixing
and integration without the need to give up one’s identity with
cohabitation expected in the new cross-cultural prototype of
difference. The McDonaldization thesis may be interpreted as a policy
of closure and apartheid as outsiders are encouraged to engage in the
global arena but are kept at a peripheral distance by the most
dominant force in the game.
In terms of limitations, the hybridization thesis may conceal the

unevenness in the process of mixing and distinctions need to be made

between the different types and styles of mixing as the latter may
undergo different evaluation processes in diverse cultural settings.
As a final thought, it appears that only the superficial elements of a

culture are what are actually being mixed together. Conversely, the
deeply rooted and inherent aspects of a culture are not subject to the
blending and fusion. In fact, only the peripheral elements of culture
actually navigate and traverse beyond borders and across national
cultures via external and marginal rudiments such as cuisine, fashion
styles, shopping habits, crafts, arts and entertainment. Meanwhile
deeply rooted underlying assumptions, values and beliefs remain
adjacent to their original cultural context. (Hassi & Storti, 2012)
3. The Global Society Approach

The world as a single society: The issue of globalisation is a radical
one for sociology as well as for international relations - and indeed for
the social sciences as a whole. It challenges prevailing conceptions,
especially many which are implicitly assumed in social theory and
analysis, about the very nature of the social, as well as of the state
and civil society.
The concept of society is fundamental to sociology and its absence,

weakness or unacceptable mutation, we shall see later in this book, is
one of the definitive weaknesses of international relations. When
Margaret Thatcher proclaimed, 'There is no such thing as society', her
statement was received as a challenge by every sociologist. And yet
there can be no doubt that prevailing usages of 'society' are rendered
highly problematic by the processes of globalisation.
The term society is used in several senses. The most basic usage is a
generic term for social relations, which are the essential subject matter
of sociology. In this sense, society is the totality or complex of social
relations. Since social relations of all kinds are increasingly global, and
the all forms of social relations everywhere in the world are, at least in
some indirect sense bound into global networks, society in this sense is
now necessarily global.

The term is also used, however, and perhaps even more widely, in the
sense of a society. The assumptions behind such usage is that there
are relatively discrete complexes of social relations which can be
distinguished from other such complexes and analysed in a largely
self-sufficient manner. Note the qualifying adjectives, relatively and
largely, for it is a long time since any known area of social life,
probably not even the most recently 'discovered' peoples of New
Guinea, could be said to be absolutely or wholly separated from wider
frameworks of social relations.
There has always been a considerable paradox, and theoretical

question-mark, behind most senses in which sociologists have talked
of the existence of discrete societies. Such societies have always
existed in relation to other societies and have been defined largely by
such relationships. In modern times, moreover, societies have been
defined by their state institutions and the specific forms of
relationships between these. Hence, of course, the assumption by
international theorists that inter-state relations can be regarded as
largely autonomous from and analytically prior to social relations.
These considerations apply above all to national societies and the way
in which they are related to nation-states. National societies, in the
modern sense, depend on the existence of nation-states in a system of
relations between states. National societies have been state-bounded
segmentations of increasingly global social relations. Since there have
always been, in modern times, international, transnational and even
incipiently global relationships, such segmentations have always been,
however, quite arbitrary in some important respects. The ways in
which description and analysis have tried to represent them as real - in
a more or less absolute or fixed sense - has been patently false, and
has reflected the incapacity of much sociology to adequately criticise
national ideologies.
The same arguments apply, moreover, even to tribal societies. Such

societies have generally existed, over thousands of years, only in
relation to other similar societies. Societies, in the sense of discrete
human communities, have only been formed through migration,
differentiation and mutual contact. The circumstance of a wholly
isolated society must be viewed, historically, as a limited exception in

which a certain human group temporarily becomes isolated from

others. In modern times, moreover, such societies have become
increasingly defined by their contact with the Western nation-state
system. Even the early anthropological studies, which attempted to
define the pre-colonial forms of social relations were in fact, as later
critiques have established, manifestations of the colonial relationship
between tribal societies and Western state-bound societies.
There is a sense, then, in which the concept of discrete societies was

always questionable, when not clearly identified as a partial abstraction
from the global complex of social relations. A great deal of sociology
has failed to enter the necessary qualifications and has accepted the
national or state-bound divisions as much more fixed and complete
than they ever were. Such work has, of course, usually accepted the
identity of nation and state, or national society and state, even where
these ought to have been seen as problematic. (Thus most
sociologists, before the 1970s, referred to British society without
recognising distinct Scottish or Welsh dimensions, and without
recognising its atypicality in relation to the class of modern industrial
capitalist societies.) Such work has tended to discuss the relations
between national societies in terms of the comparative method, as
though comparisons between societies were an adequate substitute for
examining the common frameworks of relationships in which national
entities were involved.
The national (and corresponding tribal) demarcation of societies

worked, however, for a certain historical period. From the nineteenth-
century heyday of the nation-state, in which classical sociology was
largely developed, through the extreme national division of the world
in the era of total war, the idea of national society corresponded to
immediately comprehensible socio-political realities. The idea was still
strong in the mid-twentieth century 'post-war' condition, in which most
modern sociology grew. Although many developments after 1945 were
working to undermine this situation, the Cold War helped to freeze a
certain conception of national society beyond the point at which it
could really be sustained in its earlier form.
What is really new in the present situation, most clearly since the end
of the Cold War, is that although the idea of discrete national societies

retains much resonance, its absolute supremacy among the ideas of

society can no longer hold. This may seem a paradoxical assertion,
since the strongest tendency of the years since 1989 has been the re-
assertion of nationalism. On all sides, people are breaking up multi-
national states into nation-states, and nation-states into miniature
ethnically defined states. Socialism and communism seem to have
given way, not to liberalism but to nationalism. And yet the
desparation and violence of much of this return to the nation does not
speak of an idea whose time has come, but of one which has to be
upheld against all the odds.
The new nationalisms are not those of the classic, integrative nation-
state, bonding disparate cultures into a single entity, but of the
exclusive ethnic group, expelling all those who do not conform. The
new nationalisms arise from the disintegration of nation-states and
national societies. They reflect both historic pluralism and multi-
ethnicity and new patterns formed as a result of recent migration and
cultural change. Although ethnic identities seem the most powerful
foci, they in fact exist alongside a powerful range of diverse, part-
competing, part-overlapping forms of identity, centred on religion,
gender, race, class, profession and lifestyle. The virulence of ethnic
nationalism reflects its conflict not just with other nationalisms but with
ideas of a plural society with multiple identities.
The idea of a national society in the old sense has thus declined as the
idea of a global society and of various more local forms of social
identity have grown. The phenomenon of ethnic nationalism confirms
rather than contradicts this development. The decline of national
society brings to an end the idea of discrete segments in human
society, or of discrete societies. It leaves us with the idea of a single
global society, segmented in many different ways - not least by the
system of nation-states and by national and ethnic identities - but in
which no one form of differentiation is so dominant as to enable us to
adopt it as a general principle of analysis. All discussion of society
within particular regions, states, or local communities, or within
particular culturally defined limits, must be recognised as a relative
abstraction from the global complex of social relations, and one which
must ultimately be returned to an analysis of this whole.

Integration in global society: To describe global social relations in

terms of a society immediately raises critical issues about the meaning
of society. Different schools of sociology have fought in the past over
the concept, with clear lines of division, in a classic debate which is
highly relevant to the current discussion. For some theorists, a society
is characterised by normative consensus, reflected in commonly
accepted institutions. For others, society is formed simply by the
existence of networks of relationships, with mutual expectations, even
if the commonality of values and norms among the members is highly
limited. The mutual expectations may indeed be of sustained and
systematic conflict over values as well as resources.
These divided notions of the meaning of a society are also prevalent,

but as we shall see later in this book, largely unacknowledged and
untheorised, in the international relations debate. In this section,
however, we shall explore the sociological meaning of global society,
and try to illuminate the issues posed by the dual definitions of society
which are on offer.
In order to utilise the dilemma constructively, it is important not to

entrench ourselves in the polar positions of 'conflict' and 'consensus'
which characterise textbook discussions in sociology. It may indeed be
preferable, as a starting point, to examine the de facto patterns of
social relations, and it is unjustifiable to assume the existence of de
jure normative consensus as the foundation of society: to this extent
the present writer shares maintains the materialist foundations of the
conflict view. As David Lockwood argued, however, in a classic attempt
to overcome the polarity, it may be more relevant to see these two
approaches as indicating two distinctive dimensions of social cohesion,
which can be characterised respectively as 'system' and 'social'
integration. The former concerns the extent to which a society's
members are factually integrated in social relationships; the latter, the
extent to which they are normatively integrated. Lockwood's argument
suggests that these are not questions of definition, but empirical issues
in the assessment of any given society.
Two versions of 'system' integration may be identified as structuring

the sociological debate on globalisation. Immanuel Wallerstein's 'world
system' approach analyses the world in terms of the development of

global capitalism, in which the division between economic, political and

social relationships is seen as artificial. For Wallerstein, globalisation is
the development of a unified world system dominated - critics would
say excessively - by the socio-economic relationships of capitalism.
Wallerstein has recently extended his analysis into the cultural
dimension of the world-system, seeing this as dominated by a tension
between universalism and particularism (in the form of racism-sexism).
This remains, however, a highly simplified view of global society,
juxtaposing a one-dimensional view of culture and values with a similar
perspective on market relationships.
Anthony Giddens, on the other hand, has proposed a view of

globalisation which conceptualises systemic arrangements as multiple
and complex. In Giddens' view, modern society is dominated by
knowledge-based abstract systems which coordinate human activity,
and which enable as well as constrain individual action and choice. For
Giddens, the globalisation of abstract systems creates opportunities for
individuals, as well as crises in which they have constantly to remake
their own lives and identities. It is clear from Giddens' view that the
increasing integration of systems (plural) does not necessarily imply
greater social integration on a global scale. On the contrary, the crises
brought about by the failures of or contradictions between the various
abstract systems could lead to greater problems of social integration.
Applying the distinction between system and social integration to the

developing global society may, therefore, illuminate many of the issues
which concern current analysis. Global society clearly exhibits growing
system integration, above all at the level of socio-economic relations,
but also in the development of cultural and political institutions. What
is a great deal more problematic is the development of social
integration in the value sense. How far has the growing integration of
global systems been accompanied by a genuine emergence of
consensus and normative integration? In so far as such developments
are occuring, are they confined largely to state. corporate and
intellectual elites, or do they involve larger sections, or even all the
members of global society?
Merely to pose these questions is to underline how limited and

fragmentary is the process of globalisation. Clearly the emerging global

society is divided by fractures of many kinds - of income, wealth and

class; of knowledge and power; of gender, lifestyle and culture; and of
course, of nation, race and ethnicity. The obstacles to social
integration (of the kind classically understood by sociologists) are so
many that even a comprehensive description and analysis would
actually be very difficult.
Does this mean that the concept of global society should be employed
only in a factual and never in a normative sense? In reality such a
division cannot be made, because the two dimensions actually concern
aspects of the same relationships. Even global market relations and
the most limited global coordination of production involve the growth
of common expectations and ideas of social life. The global
coordination of communications, even more obviously, diffuses ideas
and values which become increasingly commonly held. The growth of
global politics is not just the bringing of very diffuse interests into
relations with each other, but also involves the development of a
common language and values (of democracy, rights, nation, etc.) in
which conflicts are articulated.
It is worth exploring further, therefore, what might be meant by

asserting that the social or normative integration of global society is
less developed than its systemic or factual integration. Essentially the
proposition would seem to revolve around two main absences: of a
developed and generally acknowledged central system of beliefs and
values (such as have been attributed, often somewhat dubiously, to
national societies); and of central institutions which clearly embody,
uphold and enforce these beliefs and values, and which are in turn
widely accepted in global society.
It is evidently correct to argue that global society, in its existing or

likely future form, does not and will not possess either common beliefs
and values, or common and accepted institutions, to even the
problematic extent to which these have been attributed to national or
tribal societies. Indeed it is difficult to argue that global society could
ever possess these forms of cohesion in the same ways, or to the
same degree, as these more limited societies. This is true because,
however fast global integration proceeds, world society seems likely in
the forseeable future (centuries as well as decades) to remain divided

between highly differentiated segments. The experience of society in

complex multi-national states has been that national, ethnic and other
divisions remain powerful; it seems inconceivable that these will be
less important on the much larger scale of global society, however
much global institutions develop. The reverse is more likely to be true,
as globalisation sharpens existing differences.
Global social integration seems likely, therefore, to remain extremely

problematic. Sociologists have, however, analysed cultural
developments as one of the main forms of globalisation, and such
developments pose the issue of integration particularly sharply. A
global culture which equates with national cultures may not exist,
Featherstone argues, and alleged homogenizing processes ('theories
which present cultural imperialism, Americanisation and mass
consumer culture as a proto-universal culture riding on the back of
Western economic and political domination') may have been
exaggerated. Nevertheless we can conceptualise global culture, 'in
terms of the diversity, variety and richness of popular and local
discourses', with an 'image of the globe as a single place, the
generative frame of unity within which diversity can take place.'
Anthony Smith, an authority on nationalism, reminds us that the

development of global means of communication does not necessarily
mean that a common content is shared in all societies. On the
contrary, national cultures may maintain or even increase their
vibrancy in response to globalising tendencies. However, a historical
perspective such as that proposed by Roland Robertson suggests that
the diffusion of nationalism can itself be seen as part of the process of
globalisation. In his account, the standardisation of the nation as the
basis for society and state was a facet of the early stages of
globalisation. By implication, its continuing importance, on which Smith
rightly insists, has nevertheless to be seen in the context of the current
phase of globalisation. Every nationalism is different, but all
nationalisms use a common language and symbols - which are global
currency. Nationalisms are, as Smith himself suggests, becoming
hybrids, exchanging ideas with each other and with other elements in
global political discourse. If nations are, in Anderson's term, imagined
communities, then one has to be aware of this worldwide intercourse
which feeds the way in which nations are imagined.

This discussion suggests that the problem of socio-cultural integration

in global society should not be conceptualised in one-dimensional
terms. The idea of a simple homogenisation is patently inadequate -
although homogenising processes certainly exist - but even diversity
can be seen to have integrating aspects. We can, indeed, go further,
and argue that the conflictual aspects of diversity, where cultural
differentiation is linked to political conflict, can be seen under the
rubric of global integration. Conflict sharpens awareness of mutual
dependence and promotes the development of common responses and
institutions for regulation, which in turn involve cultures of
cooperation.
Global culture, institutions and civil society: How then do we

conceptualise global society? Does its analysis require entirely new
concepts, or can we transfer the concepts with which sociologists have
analysed national societies to a global level? We have looked at some
of the issues which arise with the idea of society itself, but this is the
most general (and often vague and implicit) of the major concepts. It
is important to examine the more specific concepts which are widely
used, in their theoretical contexts, in relation to some of the manifest
dimensions of globalisation.
The conceptualisation of global society is not the novelty which it

might appear at first glance. A central paradox of sociology is that
while most analysis assumes national societies, the major theories are
centred on concepts which either implicitly or explicitly transcend
national frameworks. Sociological analysis has most commonly been
carried out at national or sub-national levels, and where it has
advanced beyond these has been based on the comparison of national
societies. Theory, on the other hand, has been based on paradigms
such as that of industrial society and modernisation, which has sat
uneasily within national frameworks, and of the capitalist mode of
production, which is explicitly transnational and incipiently global. The
contradiction has tended to be resolved in practice by the
domestication of concepts, as concepts like class have been treated as
appropriate to a national level and shorn of their potentially global
significance. In part, of course, sociology has here reflected the real

contradiction that despite developing globalisation, many levels of

society remain linked to the nation-state.
For the purposes of understanding globalisation, however, the

important fact is that many sociological categories, commonly
associated with national-level analysis, are already implicated in trans-
national or global theorisation. The ideas of a global economy, global
markets, and a global socio-economic system are commonplace, and
already recognised in social science areas such as international political
economy, which bridges economics and international relations. Within
sociology, the concepts of the capitalism as a mode of production and
a social formation have given a more specific formulation to these
same realities, even if the relations between national and global
contexts have not always been adequately theorised.
The concept of the state is one which is most ambiguously situated in

relation to the global problematic. On the one hand, much of the
sociological and political-science literature about the state, especially
but not exclusively from within the Marxist tradition, locates states far
too narrowly in relation to social relations within national contexts.
Much recent sociological writing, however - most notably the works of
Giddens, Mann and Skocpol - has placed the dimensions of external
state relations in general and military power in particular in a newly
central place in our understanding of modern society. A new paradigm
has become established in which the state is no longer the theoretical
object, but has been displaced by the state-system in which the
relations of states among each other are of critical importance.
Critics have pointed out the danger of simply shoring up the equally
one-sided view of the realist school of international relations, and this
is a real issue which is explored in later chapters of this book. From
the point of view of global sociology, however, the emphasis on the
state-system also has highly positive implications: it opens up the
possibility of theorising the relations between state-state and state-
society relationships.
Another central concept which is implicated in this ambiguity is that of

civil society. The idea of a complex of culture and institutions which
mediates the relations of social groups to the state, and in which

individual citizenship is grounded, would seem to be most clearly

located in the national or domestic context and linked to the nation-
state. With globalisation, however, it is clear that economic, cultural
and political relations develop rapidly independently of the relations
between states. National civil societies cease to be self-sufficient, even
in the partial sense in which they might previously have been said to
have been. Individuals and groups within society begin to develop
relationships with international (inter-state) institutions, mediated
through cultural forms and institutions of civil society which have
themselves developed beyond the national context. In this sense, even
the concept of civil society which appears to be firmly located in the
national setting now has to be, and can be, extended to the global
level - although what precisely is implied here needs considerable
explication.
Certain theoretical perspectives and debates have clearly played crucial

roles in opening up the understanding of globalisation. The concept of
modernity has been central, and with it the debate about post-
modernity, in clarifying the universalising tendencies of modern social
relations. The limited concept of the modern which is assumed by
much post-modernist writing implies a connection between modernity
and the nation-state, which is now being transcended. The more
general concept of modernity offered by critics of this view, such as
Giddens, offers the alternative of viewing the nation-state as one
partial, and historically limited, expression of modernity, but
nevertheless one which continues to form part of current tensions. In
either case, however, there is an agreement in seeing the
contradictions between national and global forms as central to current
trends in society.
This discussion leads to the conclusion that the theoretical

perspectives and central concepts of sociology can be utilised in
understanding global society, but that they cannot be uncritically
transposed to this very different level. What is necessary is a process
of theoretical transformation which takes account of the fundamental
differences between global and national contexts, and understands the
historical transformations of their relations which are taking place. To
some extent, the theoretical changes are precisely what have been
developing, in the debate about modernity, in the new thinking about

states, and the analysis of cultural change and communications, over

the last fifteen years. What has not yet been done, however, is to
systematically bring together the central concepts in a way which
enables us to conceptualise global society as a whole and the relations
between its various components.
One of the problems is that to formulate the task in this way could
lead to the dangers of the concepts of social system and social
formation which have been well criticised in their Parsonian and
Marxist versions. To emphasise the increasing reality of a society at
the global level could be said to impose a false unity on very complex
sets of relationships and to minimise the unevenness of unifying
processes. More fundamentally, it could be seen as shifting the focus
from processes and relationships to a more static concept of a social
system. The critique of functionalism, levelled at Marxist accounts of
the capitalist system as well as against post-war American theories,
could easily be revived against any attempt to define global society as
a closed and self-sufficient system.
Global society does not have to be defined, however, in this way.

Global society, to put it at its strongest, is no more or less than the
entire complex of social relations between human beings on a world
scale. As such it is more complete and self-sufficient than just about
any other society which has been or could be envisaged. It still
represents a partial abstraction relative to the history of human
societies, and relative to the natural and living world as a whole. It
does not have to be seen as having needs (as in the original
functionalist model), as being based on imperatives (such as capital
accumulation in the Marxist account of capitalism), or as necessarily
entailing a given set of functions and institutions. Its emergence and
the social relations, systems and institutions within it can be described
under the rubric of historical discontinuity and contingency rather than
of functional or historical necessity.
While global society in this sense contains all social relations, not all
relations are actually defined at a global level. Global society can also
be seen, therefore, as the largest existing, and also the largest
possible, framework or context of social relations, but not necessarily
the immediately defining context of all social relations. As in all large-

scale, complex societies there are many contexts in which relations can
be defined, and most are not located in the largest or most general
context. Crucial to understanding global society is to comprehend the
changing contextualisation of social relations, and one of the critical
issues is to grasp the extent, forms and processes of globalisation.
Globalisation, indeed, can be seen as the way in which social relations
become defined by specifically global contexts.
Global society can be said to exist, in the sense that global

relationships are sufficiently strong and established to be defined as
the largest context of social relationships as a whole. In an equally if
not more important sense, however, it can still be seen very much as
an emergent reality. Obviously, the historical origins and phases of
globalisation are a very important question: Robertson traces it back to
the mid-eighteenth century and, in its 'germinal phase', to the fifteenth
century; no doubt even earlier antecedents could be found. Even if
globalisation has been gathering momentum over recent centuries and
(especially) decades, there are clearly important senses in which global
society appears - by comparison with more restricted historical
societies - to be in its early stages. There is, for example, no concept
of deglobalisation, which suggests that the momentum is still very
much in one direction, even if the tensions in the process are of critical
importance.
If global society is still emergent, then this should increase our caution
over ascribing to it forms which have characterised previous societies,
and our attention to its historically specific features. A fundamental
feature of global society is the exceptional complexity of its
segmentation and differentiation, which subsumes and transforms the
complexity of the pre-existing civilisations, national and tribal societies
while producing many more from the processes of globalisation
themselves. The form of global society is, for this reason, a standing
reproach to any simple functionalism, since any attempt to identify
institutions with functional pre-requisites will immediately founder on
the institutional complexity and diversity of global social arrangements
and the unevenness of globalisation. Likewise, although the existence
of global production and markets may seem to indicate a plausible
case for a Marxist approach ('world-system' or otherwise), this
constitutes at best a partial case, since these forms have developed

within a complexity and diversity of institutions and cultures which

have many effects on them, and which cannot be explained by them.
Global society is best understood, therefore, as a diverse social

universe in which the unifying forces of modern production, markets,
communications and cultural and political modernisation interact with
many global, regional, national and local segmentations and
differentiations. Global society should be understood not as a social
system but as a field of social relations in which many specific systems
- some of them genuinely global, others incipiently so, and others still
restricted to national or local contexts - have formed.
Given the segmentation of global society, many of its institutions take

a qualitatively different form from those of other societies. The most
evident difference between global and national societies is the lack of
a centralised state. The contrast here is however a false one, since
national societies in modern times only exist by virtue of three
conditions: their dependence on particular states, these states'
relationships with other states, and the segmentation of wider social
relations in line with state divisions. These fundamental, structuring
facts are overlooked in any comparison which takes national societies
as a baseline for global society. We should consider national societies
not as a general model, but as characterised by a historically specific
relationship of state and society. This is not necessarily appropriate to
Western societies at all historical stages, may not apply to other
societies (for example, tribal societies - however much some
anthropologists have searched for comparable state institutions). This
model of state and society cannot, by definition, be applied to global
society since the latter constitutes the framework for the existence of
this relationship in the national cases.
Where national societies have states, therefore, global society has a

state system. We are so used to thinking of the society-state
relationship in a one-to-one sense, in a which a single state constitutes
the ultimate source of power and authority in a given society, that this
concept of state power in global society may seem confusing. The
familiar concept of one society, one state is however a historically
specific one, and to generalise it, and expect any newly identified

society to conform to it by definition, is to be guilty of illegitimate

generalisation.
Interestingly, international relations theorists have characterised the

state system as an anarchic one, and in a well-known work Hedley Bull
defined 'international society' as an 'anarchic society' comparable to
'primitive' stateless societies. There are problems, which are discussed
later in this book, with this concept of international as opposed to
global society. In particular, the definition of it as a 'society' of states
to be compared with societies composed of individual human beings
raised severe methodological problems. Nevertheless, the idea that a
society can be characterised by anarchic relations - i.e. characterised
by the absence of a clear central authority structure, and in particular
of a central state - is clearly valid.
Although we are used to the idea of a society in which economic

relations are anarchic (the essence of a market-based economy), the
idea of political anarchy is challenging. Yet global society is a society in
which anarchy prevails at both these crucial levels of social
organisation - and of others. The economic system of global society is
at root that of the global market, coordinating an enormously complex
division of labour in the production and exchange of commodities. The
political system of global society is basically that of the competitive
international system of states, coordinating an equally complex
diversity of national-state politics. The global cultural system is largely
one of diverse, part-competing, part-overlapping, part-distinctive, part-
integrated national and sub-national cultures, organised around a wide
range of principles.
The novel sense in which we talk of a global society at the end of the
twentieth century depends, however, on something more than an
awareness of these various forms of anarchy (which have
characterised the emerging global society for decades if not centuries).
Nor is it merely that, as a result of the development of
communications, we have a heightened awareness of the anarchic
nature of our world. This is important, but what is most significant is
that as a result of this heightened awareness we are beginning to
experience transformations of systems, institutions and culture.
Military, political, economic and cultural crises are increasingly defined

as global crises; even relatively limited regional conflicts are seen as

global issues. Global society is beginning to be more than the sum of
its parts; or to be more precise, more than a framework for the
competition of its parts.
It is in this sense that we should view the development of specifically

global institutions (as well as regional and other transnational
institutions). The global economic system consists not merely of a
global division of labour and global market exchanges, but increasingly
also of a variety of global economic (and regional) institutions aiming
to regulate these processes. Although such institutions - GATT, IMF,
Group of 7, EC, etc. - are dominated by the major Western states,
banks and other corporations, they are distinct from any specific state
or private interests and operate effectively as global regulators.
The global political system, similarly, consists not merely of an ever-

growing number of individual nation-states and alliances or groupings
of states. Global (and regional) institutions - above all, with all its
defects, the UN - play an increasingly critical role. No matter that such
institutions are manipulated by the major Western powers, and that
their actions - especially military intervention (as in the Gulf in 1990-
91) or non-intervention (as in Bosnia in 1992-93) - depend largely on
the interests and policies of these powers, and especially of the USA.
These are the developing global political institutions, and not
surprisingly they reflect the current realities of global politics.
The global cultural system likewise can be characterised by the growth

of global and regional elements. Although no one should doubt the
tenacity of particularistic ideas and identities, as of particular economic
and political interests, the growth of a common culture is still very
striking. It is not just, of course, that means of communication have
been transformed and that global communications systems have
developed, dominated like most other economic fields by Western
corporations with global reach. Nor is it merely that the standard
cultural commodities - images, ideas, information - of Hollywood and
CNN are globally diffused.
More important, although less easily summarised, are the ways that
through these processes, intermeshing with economic and political

globalisation, people are coming to see their lives in terms of common

expectations, values and goals. These cultural norms include ideas of
standard of life, lifestyle, entitlements to welfare, citizenship rights,
democracy, ethnic and linguistic rights, nationhood, gender equality,
environmental quality, etc. Many of them have originated in the West
but they are increasingly, despite huge differences in their meanings in
different social contexts, parts of the ways of life and of political
discourse across the world. In this sense, we can talk of the
emergence of a global culture, and specifically of global political
culture.
A vital issue here is whether we can posit the growth of a global civil
society. The concept of civil society forms of a pairing with that of
state. In a weak and inclusive sense, civil society denotes society as
distinct from the state; in this sense, clearly we can talk of a global
civil society, based on the emerging global economy and culture. In a
stronger sense, however, writers like Gramsci have seen civil society in
terms of the way in which society outside the state organises and
represents itself, forming both a source of pressure on the state and,
in a certain sense, an extension of the state. Civil society in this sense
is constituted by its institutions - classically churches, press, parties,
trade unions, etc., but in modern terms also including a variety of
communications media and new (no longer directly class-based) social
movements and campaigns. The institutions of civil society have
historically been national and constituted by the relationship to the
nation-state; indeed they may be said to be essential components of
the nation. Civil society has been, almost by definition, national.
It is clear that this situation, too, has begun to change in a

fundamental way. As an increasing number of issues are being posed
in global terms, the common threads weaving together civil societies in
many countries have grown ever stronger. Between Western societies,
the creation of a common military system, during the East-West
conflict, and with it of a common economic space, has encouraged the
linking of civil societies. Within Western Europe, especially, the
development of the EC at a state level has brought forward - however
contradictorily, since there is also societal resistance to European unity
- a greater convergence of civil society. Across the former Communist
world, the collapse of the system revealed the weakness of civil

society; while one result is a resurgence of nationalism, there is also

an unprecedented opening of civil society to the West. In the rest of
the world, there is also a collapse of ideas of a Third World, and with it
of the programme of national economic independence. There is a
greater worldwide recognition of global interdependence, which has
been strengthened since 1989.
Does the global linking of civil society amount to the development of

global civil society? Clearly such a development must be in its early
stages, and yet there are reasons for saying that it has well begun.
The growth of common expectations, values and goals - the
beginnings of a common world culture and especially a political culture
- is not simply reflected in parallel demands in individual nation-states.
It is reflected in the growth of common expectations of the state-
system, with demands throughout the world for action by the
'international community', and in particular new expectations of
international institutions like the UN. As suggested at the beginning of
this chapter, global crises play a crucial role in forging the global
consciousness which represents the awakening of a global civil society.
At an institutional level, the responses are still weak, although non-
governmental human rights, humanitarian, aid and environmental
agencies, developed from the West but with global reach, are
important forms in the embryonic global civil society.
Civil society, we have noted, has always been seen as symbiotically

linked with the state. Global civil society is coming into existence in an
interdependent relationship with the state-system, and especially with
the developing international state institutions. The development of
global civil society can best be understood in terms of a contradictory
relationship with the state system. Civil society represents social
interests and principles which may well conflict with the dominant
interests in the state system. Just as national civil societies may
express ideologies which are in contradiction to state interests, so
global civil society, in so far as it is constructed around ideas of human
rights, for example, may express ideologies which are formally upheld
within the state-system, but whose consistent application is in
contradiction with dominant state interests. Global civil society thus
constitutes a source of constant pressures on the state system,

although its development is in turn very much dependent on

developments in the state-system.
National civil societies have gone hand in hand with national identity as
a dominant principle in people's identity-formation. As we have noted,
the overarching importance of national identity has declined, although
it remains a - perhaps the most - powerful principle among many. The
development of global civil society raises the issue of how far global
principles of identity are now becoming important. Clearly important
groups in all parts of global society are beginning to see membership
of this society as a key identifier, alongside nationality and other
affiliations. In some parts of the world, other forms of transnational
identity are becoming more important - Europeanism, for example,
which fairly clearly has close links to globalism, and Islam, which
although universal in form is (like most other traditional religions and
political ideologies) potentially antithetical to globalism in practice. The
strength of globalism and related transnational identifiers is a key
sociological test of the emergence of global civil society. (Shaw, 2000)
4. The Global Capitalism Approach

Global capitalism is capitalism that transcends national borders. It is
known as the fourth epoch of capitalism in recognition of the three
periods or epochs that came before it. To give this some context,
here's a short history of how capitalism has developed into the global
system we have today:
Mercantile capitalism, the first epoch of capitalism, dates back to

the 14th century. It was popularized by European traders who sought
to increase their profits by looking outside of local markets. During this
time, merchants started traveling to distant places where they could
cheaply acquire resources and trade with other nations. Banks and
governments financed these ventures in return for shares in the
mercantile company and its profits. The early American colonies

practiced mercantile capitalism, but colonists were only permitted to

trade with their mother country, such as France or Great Britain.
Classical capitalism, the second epoch, more closely resembles the

system that we recognize today. For the first time, entire countries
began to organize on free market capitalist principles, including the
United States. Economists like Adam Smith debated the role of the
government in the capitalist economy and concluded that economic
value came when the marketplace regulated itself through self-
interest, competition, and supply and demand without interference
from the government. This is known as hands-off, or laissez-faire,
economics. The theory is that each person, by looking out for himself,
helps to ensure the best outcome for all.
A major component of classical capitalism was the launch of capital

markets that set prices for goods, currency, stocks and financial
instruments according to the laws of supply and demand. Capital
markets allowed corporations to raise funds to expand.
Keynesian capitalism, the third epoch, launched with the

dominance of laissez-faire ideologies and the belief that governments
should take a hands-off approach to capitalism. However, following the
stock market crash of 1929, questions were raised about free market
ideology and whether the market could, in fact, self-regulate. Several
nations, including the U.S., moved toward government intervention as
a way of regulating the excesses of monopolies and maintaining a level
playing field for smaller businesses. Policies were introduced to protect
national industries from overseas competition and to provide for those
who could not sell their labor and were disenfranchised by capitalism,
such as the elderly, sick and disabled.

Global capitalism is the fourth epoch of capitalism. It differs from the

other epochs in one key way: The system, once organized and
regulated within nations to protect them, now transcends national
borders. It's based on the same ideology as classical capitalism, only
now the holders of the means of production extend their reach to
everywhere around the globe, monetizing cheap labor and resources,
and profiting as best they can. Integrated globally, this fourth epoch is
backed by international policies that support the free movement and
trade of goods. This massively increases the flexibility that
corporations have to choose where and how they operate.
The Characteristics of Global Capitalism

Five core characteristics underpin global capitalism as it stands today:
Production takes place on the global stage. Corporations can

produce goods in a variety of places around the world. For example, a
car manufacturer might make windshields in China and engine parts in
India, then assemble the finished item in the United States. Companies
can choose locations that hold cheap resources and minimize the
impact of import and export tariffs. Thus, they acquire greater wealth.
Global corporations like Walmart are an extreme example of globalized
capitalism when they source and distribute products from suppliers all
over the world without producing a single item themselves.
Labor can be sourced around the world. As corporations expand
their production across borders, they are no longer limited to using
labor from their home country. They can draw from an entire globe's
worth of labor and locate production wherever workers are cheaper or
more highly skilled. This circumvents national government intervention

like labor laws and puts downward pressure on the wages of unskilled
workers.
The financial system operates globally. When corporations
generate and hold wealth around the world, taxing that wealth
becomes very difficult. It is possible for global corporations to develop
complex organizational structures and spread wealth across multiple
jurisdictions to minimize tax liabilities. Playing the system in this way
gives them great power to avoid corporate taxes on accumulated
wealth.
Power relations are transnational. There now exists a class of
transnational capitalists that have the power to shape the policies of
trade, finance and production at a global level – policies that trickle
down to national and state governments. Globalization has expanded
the influence that corporations hold in society and that gives them
great power to impact the everyday lives of people all over the world.
Global system of governance. Global capitalism requires a new
system of transnational governance. Core institutions such as the
World Trade Organization, the United Nations, the World Economic
Forum, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the G20
make the rules and adjudicate global trade. They set an agenda for
global capitalism that nations must comply with if they wish to
participate in the system. (Thompson, 2018)
Assignment:
 Look for a newspaper that tackles about globalization and provide your insight or
opinion about it.

Assessment Task
 What are the characteristics of Global Capitalism?

 Define the Global Society Approach in your own words.
References
Elwell, F. W. (2013). Wallerstein’s World-Systems Theory. Retrieved from
http://www.faculty.rsu.edu/users/f/felwell/www/Theorists/Essays/Wallerstein1.htm
ER Services. (2020). Reading: Introduction to Globalization. Retrieved from Microeconomics:

https://courses.lumenlearning.com/suny-microeconomics/chapter/introduction-to-
globalization/#:~:text=Globalization%20is%20the%20process%20by,%2C%20goods%2C
%20services%20and%20investment.
Hassi, A., & Storti, G. (2012, August 22). Globalization and Culture: The Three H Scenarios. Retrieved
from https://www.intechopen.com/books/globalization-approaches-to-diversity/globalization-
and-culture-the-three-h-scenarios
Shaw, M. (2000). The Theoretical Challenge of Global Society. Retrieved from Global Society:
http://users.sussex.ac.uk/~hafa3/global1.htm
Thompson, J. (2018, June 19). What Is Global Capitalism? Retrieved from bizfluent:
https://bizfluent.com/info-8147819-advantages-disadvantages-capitalist-system.html

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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study of Globalization

Introduction to the Study of Globalization

The Contemporary World 1

 Differentiate the competing conceptions of globalization

A. Competing Conceptions of Globalizations

Modern nation states are all part of the world-system of capitalism,

The Contemporary World 2

The first he terms as “mini-systems,” these are the small, homogenous

From the start, Wallerstein argues, capitalism has had a division of

The Contemporary World 3

For Wallerstein, the capitalist world-economy is a mechanism of

Wallerstein divides the capitalist

The peripheral areas are the least

These core states promote capital accumulation internally through tax

The Contemporary World 4

maintaining social order to minimize class struggle. Core states also

As with capitalism within nation states, this unequal power between

The Contemporary World 5

world-systems theory, will be the topic of the next short-paper. (Elwell,

2. The Global Culture Model

With the industrial revolutions, societies began to have access to

The Contemporary World 6

Interactions between globalization and culture do not seem to be a

Heterogenization scenario: While certain scholars (i.e. Appadurai,

Heterogenization represents a process which leads to a more inwardly

The convergence thesis advancing that globalization favors

The Contemporary World 7

Different cultural groups develop into heterogonous entities due to

In sum, it has been documented in some instances that foreign

Homogenization scenario: Are international exchanges and flows of

The homogenization perspective seems to positively answer these

The Contemporary World 8

strong. In its extreme form, homogenization, which is also known as

However, some proponents of the concept of global culture argue that

The Contemporary World 9

On another note, Jaja (2010) stresses that the world is presently

Nonetheless, it has been documented that only countries that share

There is little doubt if any that the McDonaldization theory constitutes

The Contemporary World 10

is a success for the reason that it is efficient, quick and inexpensive,

Most important to the origins of McDonalization is the interaction

From a theoretical standpoint, McDonaldization is based on Weber’s

It seems that the McDonalization model has transformed the nature of

The Contemporary World 11

phenomenon of being McDonaldized has transformed the many

Although cultural differences are unchangeable forces that breed

Despite the contribution of the McDonaldization theory in explaining

In an ethnographic study of the McDonaldization theory, Talbott

The Contemporary World 12

Similarly, American adaptations of the fast food principles have been

Lastly, Appadurai (1996) and Pieterse (2004) argue that cultural

The Contemporary World 13

demonstrated their ability to domesticate or resist foreign cultural

Hybridization scenario: It is needless to mention that growing

The process of translocal fusion and cultural mixing or hybridization is

The main thesis of cultural hybridization is the continuous process of

Pieterse (1996) argues that hybridization is in fact an offspring rooted

The Contemporary World 14

19th century because, according to the father of racial demography,

On another note, humanity has not been inherently divided in cultural

Moreover, regarding the mixing and blending of immigrants within

The Contemporary World 15

Along the same lines, intercultural mingling is a deeply embedded