Trustees of Princeton University

Three Dimensions of Ethnic Politics

Author(s): Donald L. Horowitz
Reviewed work(s):
Source: World Politics, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Jan., 1971), pp. 232-244
Published by: Cambridge University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2009677 .
Accessed: 20/02/2013 23:54

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Cambridge University Press and Trustees of Princeton University are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize,
preserve and extend access to World Politics.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded on Wed, 20 Feb 2013 23:54:31 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 THREE DIMENSIONS OF
ETHNIC POLITICS
By DONALD L. HOROWITZ*

THEgrowingrecognition
oftheimportance
of ethnic,
racial,and
religiousgroupsin thepolitics
ofthenewstateshas givenriseto
an urgentneedfortheory. Although thisneedextends to all aspectsof
grouprelations,
thefirstpriority
isforsystematic
classification
toreduce
thebewildering arrayof descent-groupsin the developing worldto
manageable proportions and comparablecases.Witha viewto facili-
tatingcomparative theaimofthispaperis to makea modest
analysis,
beginning in theformulation of meaningfulcategories.

I. THE STRUCTURE OF GROUP DIFFERENTIATION

Forpoliticalpurposes, a basicdistinction
needstobe drawnbetween
verticalandhorizontal ethnicdifferentiation.1
In vertical-that
is,hier-
archical-systems,stratification
is synonymous withethnicity.
Political
ascendency and socialmobility arerestricted
byascriptivecriterialike
colororphenotype. Therearesuperordinate and subordinateethnicor
racialgroups.Relations amongthegroupspartakeof casterelations
andaresuffused withdeference. The systemsofracerelationsfounded
on Negroslavery in theWestern Hemisphere werearchetypical cases
ofthissortofsystem.
In horizontalsystems, on theotherhand,parallelethnicstructures
eachwithitsowncriteria
exist, ofstratification.
Although thequestion
ofgroupsuperiority is farfrommoot,thegroupsarenot,in a general
socialsense,definitively
rankedin relationto eachother.Transactions
canoccuracrossgrouplineswithout necessarily
implyinganything about
ascriptively relations.The Ottomanmilletwas per-
based hierarchical
hapstheparadigm ofthiskindofparallelism.
Weberhas madea similardistinction betweena "castestructure"
(i.e.,a vertical
order)and "ethniccoexistence"
(i.e.,a horizontal
or-
* This articleis part of a longer study of multi-ethnic
politics in the new states.I am
gratefulto the Center for InternationalAffairsat Harvard Universityand the National
Science Foundation, which sponsored the research on which the study is based. I am
also indebted for advice and encouragement to Samuel P. Huntington. Portions of
this paper were presentedat a session of the Harvard-M.I.T. JointSeminar on Political
Development.
1 For the sake of terminologicalclarity,what we shall referto as vertical groups are
divided by what are usually called horizontal cleavages, while horizontal groups are
divided by verticalcleavages.

This content downloaded on Wed, 20 Feb 2013 23:54:31 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 ETHNIC POLITICS 233
der),andnotedsomeoftheconsequences: "The castestructuretrans-
forms thehorizontal andunconnected coexistences ofethnically
segre-
gatedgroupsintoa vertical socialsystem ofsuper-and subordination.
Correctly formulated: a comprehensive societalizationintegrates
the
ethnically dividedcommunities intospecific politicaland communal
action.In theirconsequences theydiffer precisely in thisway: ethnic
coexistences conditiona mutualrepulsion and disdainbutalloweach
ethniccommunity to consider itsownhonoras thehighestone; the
castestructure bringsabouta socialsubordination andan acknowledge-
mentof'morehonor'infavoroftheprivileged casteandstatusgroups."'
It is,ofcourse, readilyapparent thatthisdistinction betweenethnic
coexistence and ethnicsubordination is oftenblurredin practice.
Regularized interactionamonghorizonal groupscanproduceelements
ofstatus subordination. A trader fromethnicgroupA maydeferto an
aristocratfromethnicgroupB, whilea servant fromgroupB maybe
subordinate tothesametrader fromgroupA. Whatis more,ascriptive
patterns ofrecruitment to theserolesmaydevelop.Horizontal systems
rapidlyassumeaspectsof vertical systems. Conversely, a subordinate
ethnicgroupmay,byvirtueofeducation, producean elitethatdefies
therulesof ascriptive Neithertypeof differentiation
stratification. is
pure,andbothareusuallyin a process ofchange.'
Yet a greatmanysystems ofracerelations can be identified
as pre-
dominantly hierarchicalor parallel,and different can
characteristics
beattributed tothem.Vertical relations
frequently havesomeritualized
modeofexpressing thelowerstatus(sometimes "contamination") of
thebottom groups:intheUnitedStates, variousaspectsofsegregation;
in western Uganda,refusal to permitsubservient groupsto eat inside
thehouse;4in India,untouchability. Horizontally orderedgroupsob-
viously do notrequiremethods ofreinforcing and rationalizingethnic
subordination. Instead,a parallelgroupincontact andcompetition with
2H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds., From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology
(New York 1958), i89. For this referenceto Weber, I am indebted to the work of
Rene Lemarchand, cited below.
3 In addition to these variations in kind, there are variations in the degree to which

descent is an ordering principle of the society. A system of ethnic stratification,for

instance,may be more or less rigid, depending on the extent to which possession of
nonascriptivequalifications can compensate for the lack of ascriptivecharacteristicsin
facilitatingaccess to status opportunities.Brazil is most often cited as an example of a
mixed ascriptive-nonascriptive system (involving color and class), but in greater or
lesser measure exceptions to the ascriptive principle are made everywhere. And, of
course, there is nothing to prevent horizontal and vertical ethnic differentiationfrom
coexistingwithin the boundaries of a single state.
4Martin R. Doornbos, "Kumanyana and Rwenzururu: Two Responses to Ethnic
Inequality," in Robert I. Rotberg and Ali A. Mazrui, eds., Protest and Power in Black
Africa(New York I970), I090.

This content downloaded on Wed, 20 Feb 2013 23:54:31 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
234 WORLD POLITICS
othersdevelops elaborate waysofreaffirming thesuperiority
ofitsown
generalworld-view, evenwhileconceding limitedspheres of cultural
superiorityto othergroups.5
Despitetherigidity ofethnicstratification,vertical
relationsusually
embodyat leastsomeelements of socialcohesionand sharedexpecta-
tions,
in addition tocoercion andconflict.Theremaybe a moreorless
explicit"premiseof inequality." Benefits,suchas increased personal
security and even limitedleewayformaneuveramongcompeting
superiors,usuallyaccrueto thoseofsubordinate statuswho acceptthe
premise mostcompletely.6 Adaptive behaviorbythesubordinate group
to therequirements of itsstatusis thereforecommon.The relations
betweenhorizontally-ordered groups,however, characteristically
lack
theauthority necessary toestablisha highlevelofreciprocitypremised
oninequality.Theytendtobe characterized bymuchlesspredictability
and muchlessgeneralized collaborationthanare vertically ordered
groups.
Verticalsystems thusmaypossessmoresocialcementthando hori-
zontalat somestagesoftheirevolution.7 Butwhenthecementcracks,
theedificeusuallycollapses: whenverticalsystems areundermined, they
undergofundamental transformation. As Rene Lemarchand has co-
gentlyargued, conflictin a vertical
ethnicsystem hasa classcoloration.
Whenwarfare occursit takestheformof a socialrevolution.8 Hori-
zontalsystems are also susceptibleto periodicviolence,butwithdif-
ferentgoals.The interactions of horizontal groupsbearsomeresem-
blance to international relations.The "subnational communities,"
MichaelHudsonhas observed, "arecompelled bythesituation to act
5Malays, for example,admirethe businessskill of the Chinese,but oftenregard
Chinesebehavioras crudeand uncultured. See PeterJ. Wilson,A Malay Villageand
Malaysia(New Haven i967). WestIndian Negroesreadilygrantthegreatersolidarity,
and shrewdness
thrift, of East Indians; yet Indians are referredto by the pejorative
term"coolie"and are deniedpossessionof culturaltraitsthat would entitlethemto
prestigeaccordingto the normsof Creolesociety.See ElliottP. Skinner,"GroupDy-
namicsand Social Stratificationin BritishGuiana,"Annalsof theNew York Academy
of Sciences,LXXXIII (i960), 904-9I2. Indians, for their part, admire the physical
strength of Negroes,but do not acknowledgethe moral worthof presumedNegro
behavioralpatternsin general.See MortonKlass, East Indiansin Trinidad:A Study
of CulturalPersistence(New York i96i), 244.
6 Rene Lemarchand,"Powerand Stratification in Rwanda: A Reconsideration,"
Cahiers d'Etudes Africaines,vi (i966), 602-605; John Dollard, Caste and Class in a
Southern Town (3d ed., New York 1957), 179, 2I2, 262, 282; Kenneth M. Stampp,
The PeculiarInstitution: South (New York
Slaveryin Ante-Bellum 1956), I5I. See
also Michael Banton, Race Relations (New York i967), 87.
7This is especiallythe case afterthe firmestablishment of authorityand before
widespreaddislocationsare producedby the appearanceamong the subordinate group
of a largeelitethatcannotbe accommodated by the ascriptivesocial structure.
8 "Powerand Stratification,"
609-i0.

This content downloaded on Wed, 20 Feb 2013 23:54:31 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 ETHNIC POLITICS 235
as iftheywerestatesin an international
environment."9Eliterelations
partakeof diplomacy. "Politicalrelationsamongthese[communal]
leaders,
whichreflect
thislocalautonomy, areanalogoustotherelations
amongsmallstatesin a multipolar international
system. . . . They
thereforeformalliancesthatmightremindthe diplomatic historian
ofRenaissanceItaly,and theydeal withone anotheron thebasisof
sovereignequality."10
Whenethnicconflict occurs,horizontalgroups
usuallyaim,notat socialtransformation,butat theexclusion of other
parallelgroupsfrompowerand oftenat reversion to an idealized,
ethnically
homogeneousstatusquo ante."1
In general,vertical
systems havebeenproduced byconquestor cap-
ture,horizontal systemsbyinvasion in lessthanconquestor
resulting
bymoreorlessvoluntary migration.
The highly stratified
ethnicsystem
ofcentralRwandawastheresultofinvasion andconquest.12American
Negroslavery was madepossibleby theequivalent of conquest-the
forcedtransportation of Africansto theNew World.On the other
hand,invasionthatdid notresultin totalconquestproducedparallel
groupsin Nigeriaand Ceylon.Economically inducedmigration also
createdhorizontal systemsin Malaysia,
Guyana,andTrinidad.
Hierarchical groupsaregenerally fairly
wellintermixed geographi-
cally.Parallelgroupsmaybe eitherintermixed or regionally
discrete.
Typically,
migration generatesmoregeographic thandoes
intermixture
incompleteconquest.
Migration and incomplete kinds
conquestalso giveriseto different
of lingeringhistorical A groupwhoseconquesthas been
grievances.
thwarted maynourishunfulfilled territorial
ambitions, but a group
whoselandhasbeenpartly conquered maydevelopa domestic version
ofrevanche."3 An indigenous groupthatwas colonizedand forcedto
9 The Precarious Republic: Political Modernization in Lebanon (New York 1968), 9.
10Ibid.,135.
11For concreteillustrations, see Lemarchand,"Power and Stratification"; and
Lemarchand, "Revolutionary Phenomenain StratifiedSocieties:Rwandaand Zanzibar,"
Civilisations,
xviii (1i968), i6-49.
12 Lemarchand, "Powerand Stratification."
13 In Nigeria,the adventof Britishrule interrupted a Hausa-Fulaniinvasionsouth-
ward, and afterindependence"many Southerners fearedthat the departureof the
Britishhad opened the way for its continuance"-a fear reinforcedby occasional
Northernutterances.Walter Schwarz, Nigeria (New York i968), 76. In Ceylon, Tamil
invasionshad resultedin a de factopartitionof the island long beforecolonialrule.
But the teachingof Sinhalesehistoryhad kept the issue dimlyalive and given it
In 1957, when the Prime Ministeragreed to a decen-
periodicpoliticalsignificance.
thatwould have devolvedconsiderable
tralization local poweron Tamil authorities in
the Northand East, the oppositiontouredthe country, displayingmaps with a black
footprintovertheareasto be "ceded"to theTamils.RobertN. Kearney,Communalism
and Language in the Politics of Ceylon (Durham i967), 117-i8.

This content downloaded on Wed, 20 Feb 2013 23:54:31 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
236 WORLD POLITICS
abidetheentry ofethnicstrangers
forcolonialeconomic oradministra-
tivepurposes
maylaterregardtheirpresence as illegitimateab initio.14
Duringcolonialrule,however, thesefeelingstendto be subdued.
Virtually
all vertical
systems ofethnicrelations are in a stateeither
ofrapidtransitionorofincreasingcoerciondesigned bythedominant
grouptoavertchange.On a globalscale,vertical ethnicdifferentiation
seemsclearlyon thedecline,as is attested
by thedemiseof colonial
ruleand themovements of protestand revoltagainstvariousforms
ofethnicsubordination.Eroded"bythespreadofuniversalistic, egali-
tarian,achievement-oriented
values,"'15
by internationalcontactand
communication, by thediffusion of educationand othercarriers of
modern norms, stratification
basedon raceappearsto be ideologically
obsolete.16
Amongthesubordinate groups,economicand educational
changehaverepeatedly givenriseto "a newleadership skilledin the
waysofthesystem, andtheemergence ofintellectualswhodebunkthe
mythsof the racialorder,who advancenew definitions, and who
agitateon theirbehalf."17
Mechanisms ofassimilation,previouslyutil-
izedtocreate"exceptions"totheascriptive principle,aregenerally un-
ableto adaptfastenoughto assimilate thenew elites.Consequently,
subordinategroupsandthefrustrated, aspiringelitestheyproduceaim
todestroytheascriptive
principlethatimpedes theirmobilityandlimits
theirdignity.
Some verticalethnicsystems maybe transformed by revolution;
some,whoselowerstratahave producedrelatively largeelites,may
bereordered onhorizontallines;conceivably,somemaybecomelargely
nonascriptiveclasssystems.Butrarelywill it be possible,
withoutthe
applicationof considerablecoercion,to maintain a system of ethnic
stratification.
Horizontallyorderedethnicconfigurations,however, do notsuffer
fromthesameideological Parallelgroupstherefore
disabilities. have
muchmoreability to survive units.Sincethereis no ascrip-
as distinct
tivebarto socialmobility,
thestructure is nottaintedwiththesame
obvious thatpervades
illegitimacy a rigidvertical
system,characterized
-indeed,defined-by ofstatus
therestriction byrace.Therearewideop-
14 See, e.g., ElliottP. Skinner, in West AfricanSocieties,"Africa,XXXIII
"Strangers
(Octoberi963), 307-20.
15Lemarchand, "Powerand Stratification," 609.
16 See the interesting analysisand prognosisof HerbertG. Blumer,"Reflections on
Theoryof Race Relations," in AndrewW. Lind, ed., Race Relationsin WorldPerspec-
tive (Honolulu 1955), 13-17.
17 Ibid., i6. For the role of new elites in transforming some Indian castes from
subordinate in India,"
to parallelgroups,see F. G. Bailey,"Closed Social Stratification
Archives of European Sociology, iv (i963), 122.

This content downloaded on Wed, 20 Feb 2013 23:54:31 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 ETHNIC POLITICS 237
portunitiesformobility withintheethnicgroup;oneneednotchoose
between hisgroupmembership and personalambition. This doesnot
mean,of course,thateach grouphas proportionate numbersof its
members in all socialstrataor thatmobility opportunities arepropor-
tionedto the demand.Discrepancies in theseproportions typically
constitutean irritantin therelations of parallelgroups.Somesectors
of economicactivity may be all but closedto membersof some
groups.The pointis thateachgrouphas itsownelitestrata-perhaps
traditional,
perhaps modern, probably both.In thecaseofMalaysia, for
example,therearehigh-status Malayswhoaremembers oftheroyalty
or aristocracyas well as of themodernbureaucracy; thereare high-
statusChineseamongthedescendants oftheearlytraders and among
thenewerindustrialists, professionals,and intellectuals.Outsidetheir
groups,theelitesmaymeetas socialequals.Although in themodern
sectors
theremaybecertain common criteriaofstratification,
thegroups
do notstandin a generalized hierarchicalrelationto eachother.Each
ofthesesubsocietiescananddoes,as Webersuggested, consider itsown
"honor"to be thehighest.
II. THE Locus OF POLITICAL INTERACTION

The linesofgroupdifferentiation-whether horizontal or vertical-

constituteone planeon whichracialinteraction can be viewed.The
locus of thatinteraction constitutesanother.Here the questionis
whether theprimary focalpointofpolitical
activity amongthegroups
is parochialor national.
Of course,everyethnicgroupoperates at all levelsof thepolitical
system ofwhichitis a part.A groupmaysimultaneously strive
towin
localelections,seeka largershareof business licensesfroman inter-
mediategovernmental body(perhapsat thestatelevelin a federal
and
system), campaign vigorously forlinguistic
recognition nationally
andforprovincial autonomy in itsownarea.Nevertheless, on thebasis
oftheintensity and extensiveness at variouslevels,a rough
ofactivity
distinctionmaybe drawnbetweenthosestateswithgroupswhose
are mainlylocal in scopeand thosewithgroups
politicalactivities
whoseactivitiesareheavily national.Sucha distinctionfindssupportin
thegeneralpropensity of groupsto concentrate theirenergieson the
highest levelofactivity thatseemsto promisesomesuccess.
AmongthestatesofAfricaand Asia aremanythatpossessa large
number ofdispersed ethnicgroups.Indiais theoutstanding example
ofsucha state, buttherearemanyothers. In suchstates,theprolifera-
tionof dispersed groupspresents formidabledifficulties
of achieving

This content downloaded on Wed, 20 Feb 2013 23:54:31 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
238 WORLD POLITICS
unityandforward motion. Nationalistleaderships frus-
finditespecially
tratingtoconfront a societycomposed ofmultiple particularismssim-
ultaneously movingin different directions.The insularity of groups
rendersterritorial
integration precarious.18Separatist movements may
weakencentral authorityand threaten to severpartsofthestates.
Despiteall oftheseproblems, groupidentity in suchsystems is gen-
erallyso fragmented and loyaltiesso parochialthatnationalpolitics
doesnot centeron a fixedpatternof ethnicrivalry. Groupconflict
tendstobelocalized;it"couldputoneofa seriesofwatertight compart-
mentsoutoforder, butit couldnotmaketheshipsink...."19 In such
thecenterhas someflexibility20
situations, and can sometimes grant
thedemandsof one groupwithoutnecessarily injuringtheinterests
ofothers.Oftensuchdemandsaremadeat theexpenseofthecenter.
Evenwhentheyarenot,itmaybe possible to satisfyethnicaspirations
byconcessions fromthenationalpool,particularly iftheseconcessions
taketheformof opportunities forsocialmobility thatare in scarce
supplyin a givenregion.21 The plurality of groupsordinarily enables
thecenterto deal withone conflict at a time,thusproviding some
assurance thatthe entirestatewill not experience destabilizingup-
heavalssimultaneously. Finally,the profusion of dispersedgroups
usuallycreatessuchgreatheterogeneity at thenationallevelthatwhen
thecenter intervenes a
itmaydo so as neutral arbiter.22
A different pattern of demandsand tensions prevailsin statesin
whichpoliticsis so nationalin scopeand a fewgroupsare so large
thattheirinteractions are a constant themeof politicsat thecenter.
The demands ofonegrouptendtobe madeat theexpenseofanother;
"mutually demandscharacterize
exclusive The exi-
politicaldebate."23
genciesoforganization pullin opposite directions in thetwotypesof
systems.A nationalleaderin Indiacan hardlyafford to relyon the
supportof one or two ethnicgroups;a nationalleaderin Guyana,
Zambia,orMalaysiacanhardly do otherwise. The structureofdispersed
18 The term"territorial is employedherein the sensethatit has been
integration"
used by MyronWeiner,"PoliticalIntegrationand PoliticalDevelopment,"The An-
nals,CCCLVIII (March i965), 57-58.
19Doornbos,"Kumanyanaand Rwenzururu,"II36.
ofMyronWeiner,The Politicsof Scarcity:PublicPressure
20 See, e.g.,thesuggestions
and PoliticalResponsein India (Chicago i962), chap. 3, which reflectthisstructural
situation.
21 See Doornbos,"Kumanyana and Rwenzururu."
22 See ibid.; Doornbos,"ProtestMovementsin WesternUganda: Some Parallels
and Contrasts" (mimeo., i966), 5; Baldev Raj Nayar, Minority Politics in the Punjab
(Princeton i966), 283.
23W. HowardWriggins,Ceylon:Dilemmasof a New Nation (Princeton1960), 460.
See also K. J. Ratnam,Communalismand the PoliticalProcessin Maylaya (Kuala
Lumpuri965), 170.

This content downloaded on Wed, 20 Feb 2013 23:54:31 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 ETHNIC POLITICS 239
ethnicsystems abetsinterethnic coalition-building, butthestructure of
nationalethnicsystems impedesit.
A centrally focusedethno-political system maypossessfewercen-
trifugaltendencies thana dispersed system, but theyare of greater
magnitude. The center hasmuchlessability toworkon themoneat a
timeortopacify somegroupswithout antagonizing others. In dispersed
systems, the relationbetweengroupand groupis mediatedby the
relationbetween locality and center. In centralized polities,onegroup
confronts another directly.The inescapable presence ofethnicstrangers
commonly has a profoundly competitive effect. Membersof a group
measure theirsocialadvantages and politicalpoweragainsttheattain-
mentsand aspirations of a neighboring group.A frenzied contest to
catchup or keepaheadmayoccuron a nationalscale.If themajor
malaiseoftheethnically dispersed polity is inertia andlackofdirection,
thatof thecentralized polityis constant tensionand an overheated
politicalsystem. In general, theroomformaneuvering withoutjeop-
ardizingpoliticalstability is seriously limited.The neutrality of the
nationalregime, oftenan assetin ethnically dispersed systems at times
ofstress,is constantly underchallenge in centralized systems.
Whether ethnicpolitics is moreparochial or morecentralis mainly
a function ofgroupsizerelative to statesize.Groupidentity is byno
meansa staticphenomenon. Groupsizein mostcasesdependson the
ofsubgroups
ability toforgea commonidentity. This,in turn,depends
heavilyon perceived similarities amongthesubgroups takentogether
in
theothergroupstheyconfront thesociety.
vis-a-vis Although there
are,forexample, substantial tribalandreligious differences amongthe
southern Sudanese, whenthesegroupshaveinteracted withnortherners
therehasbeena fairly stableandcoherent southern loyalty. Giventhis
dependence ofgroupidentity on feltdistance fromothergroups, it is
notsurprising thatstateswithlargegroupsrelative to statesize have
oftenexperienced intensely hostilerelations amongthegroups.Exten-
of
siveamalgamation subgroups is itself often a signofa greatchasm
between themandothers. To focuson ethnically centralized politiesis
generally tobe concerned withconflict.
To be sure,notall statescan be easilyclassified as eitherethnically
dispersed or centralized. at
A numberof statesare variouspointsbe-
tweentheseextremes. Moreover, mostcountries witha nationalethnic
alsocontain
politics withintheirboundaries smaller groupswhoserela-
tionswith their are
neighbors mainly local. Before the Nigeriancoups
ofi966, eachregionexperienced constant tension between itsdominant
groupandtheregionalminorities. The BorneostatesofMalaysiacon-

This content downloaded on Wed, 20 Feb 2013 23:54:31 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
240 WORLD POLITICS
tainsimilarcompartmentalized relations,notreplicated in peninsular
Malaya.The CeylonTamilsare an important minority in national
Ceylonese butin theEastern
politics, Province theyarea majority and
theCeylonMoorsarean important provincialminority. Nevertheless,
in all of thesestatesthemajorfocusof ethnicactivity has beenthe
national levelofpolitics.
The extentto whichethno-political interactionis local or national
is alsorelatedtothedegreeofgovernmental penetration ofthehinter-
land and thedegreeto whichthecountry is unitedby interregional
communications. Moderntechnology, of course,facilitates a national
system of transactions and,as it bringsgroupsintocontact, supports
theamalgamation of somesubgroups intolargerunits.This is nota
unilinear or irreversibleprocess.It certainly
doesnotportend theend
ofethnicidentifications, becausetheextent ofamalgamation hassocial
as wellas technical Whatit doessuggest
limits. is that,in somestates
thatuntilnow havebeenpopulatedby numerous dispersed groups,
interaction is likelyto occurincreasingly amonglargeagglomerations
at thenationallevel.

III. THE QUESTION OF COLOR

Thus farwe haveusedtheterms"race"and "ethnicity" and their

derivative formsinterchangeably.It is fairlycommon,however,to
drawa clearcutdistinction betweenthesetwo categories, reserving
"race"fordifferencesofcolor.24
Thisdistinctiongenerallyassumesthat
colordifferences
arecapableofarousing uniquelyintenseemotions and
loyaltiesamongtheparticipants, or of servingas unusually reliable
signsofidentity.
Thefoundations oftheseassumptions areshaky. More-
over,to makethedistinction between and otherdescent-
color-groups
groupsattheoutset istolimitquitesignificantly
thefieldofcomparison
and to imposeon theanalysisunexamined hypotheses aboutthebe-
of
havior different kinds ofgroups.
The argument thatin someway color-group relationsnecessarily
differin kindfromothertypesofethnicrelations is usuallyethnocen-
tric.Notionsaboutthesupposedly uniqueeffectsof colordifferences
on groupantipathy andcohesion are,ofcourse, notconfined to North
America. Colorpreferences
canbe foundin manypartsoftheworld.25
24 See, e.g.,Harold R. Isaacs,"Color in World Affairs,"
ForeignAffairs,
XLVII (Jan-
uaryI969), 235-50; Isaacs, "GroupIdentityand PoliticalChange: The Role of Color
and Physical Characteristics,"Daedalus, xcvi (Spring i967), 353-75.
25 See the contributionsto the issue "Color and Race," Daedalus, xcvi (Spring i967).
On colorimagesin the WesternHemisphere,see H. Hoetink,The Two Variantsin
Caribbean Race Relations (London i967).

This content downloaded on Wed, 20 Feb 2013 23:54:31 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 ETHNIC POLITICS 241
Quite often,coloris used to explainthe specialqualityor intensity of
a given local group conflict.In the United States,however,the pre-
sumeduniquenessof colordifferences is employedin unsystematic at-
temptsto distinguishrigidlyhierarchicalethnicsystemslike slavery
and JimCrow fromotherformsof ethnicdifferentiation that seem
moreflexiblebecause the groupsdo not have assignedcaste or class
positions.In otherwords,theattemptis to explainthespecialharshness
of a rankedsystemby the presenceof somaticdifferences. Because it
occursin a local contextin which colorhas been closelylinkedwith
ethnicstratification, the explanationmistakesthe indicatorfor the
substanceof therelationship.
Slaveryand its successorinstitutions did come to be identifiedwith
color.But color did not initiallypossessthe stigmathatit later did.
Rather,it was becauseslaverywas so brutala verticalsystemthatcolor
came to have theintensely pejorativeconnotationsassociatedwithand
used to rationalizeslave status.
Color facilitatedthe brutality,not because it originallysignified
superiorityand inferiority,butbecauseit made it moredifficultforthe
slaveto escapehis singularlydisagreeablestatus.No identityis wholly
ascriptive.Marginality and assimilationare familiarphenomenaevery-
where.Originscan be concealedor "forgotten,"and evencolorcan be
changedin thecourseofgenerations by intermarriage.But somekinds
of assimilationare easierthanothersto accomplish.Language can be
changed,and religiousconversionis even less difficult to effect.That
is, someformsof identityare moreimmutablethan othersand hence
26 In the vertical
system of eastern Rwanda, for example, the Tutsis were the
superordinateand the Hutus the subordinate group. "Yet, the evidence shows that in
some cases the strengthof the local Hutu lineages was such that the Tutsi found it
expedient to absorb these meddlesome 'upstarts'into their own caste. In a fascinating
discussionof the power strugglewhich took place in Remera Gravel notes that 'the Hutu
lineages which have been in situ longest have acquired some sort of priorityof rights
on the hill. Their members are respected and the heads of the lineages have much in-
fluenceon their neighbors,and have an importantvoice in local administration....
The powerful lineages keep the power of the [Tutsi] chieftainin check. If, however,
they become powerful enough to threatenthe chieftainshipthey are absorbed into the
upper caste. Their Hutu origins are "forgotten."'" Lemarchand, "Power and Stratifi-
cation," 604-05, quoting Pierre Gravel, The Play for Power: Description of a Com-
munityin Eastern Rwanda (unpubl. Ph.D. diss. i962), 229.
There is a parallel in the completelydifferentcontextof Negro slaveryin the British
West Indies, where children of mulatto parentage, three steps removed from their
African ancestry,were by statute considered white. In exceptional cases, usually in-
volving wealthy or well-connectedmulattoes,the Jamaican Assembly sometimes passed
private bills to conferon individuals without the requisite generational removal all the
legal rightsof whites. See Bryan Edwards, The History, Civil and Commercial, of the
British Colonies in the West Indies (4th ed., London i807), II, 20-23. I have dealt with
these and other questions involving the color line in an unpublished paper, "Color Dif-
ferentiationin the American Systemsof Slavery" (mimeo., i969).

This content downloaded on Wed, 20 Feb 2013 23:54:31 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
242 WORLD POLITICS
bettersuitedto thelong-term maintenanceof large-scaleverticalethnic
systems. This pointwas apparently graspedby whitesin NorthAmer-
in
ica theseventeenth century, and was reflectedin shiftingterminology.
Early in the century,the English were usually called "Christians";
afterabouti68o,theterm"white"appeared.The initialdifferentiation
betweengroupsreliedheavilyon religion.27 But in timesomeNegroes
had becomeChristians. If reliancehad continuedto be placed mainly
on religion,baptismcould be employedto escape frombondage.28
Color,however,provided"a barrier"both "visibleand permanent,"29
and therefore apt formaintaininga degradingand hereditary system
of forcedlabor.The specialplace of color in Americanrace relations
seemsto have originatedin thespecialdesireof the slaveholders fora
permanently servilegroup.30In a systemofverticalethnicstratification,
thatpurposecould readilybe implemented forthedominantgroupby
redefining theindiciaof ethnicity.
The distinction betweencolorand otherformsofethnicidentification
thusderiveslargelyfromthefailureto distinguish betweenhorizontal
and verticalsystemsof ethnicity. The mostsignificant way in which
colordiffersfromothervarietiesofethnicity is itsrelativeimmutability.
But thischaracteristic
is farmoreimportant in systems of ethnicstrati-
fication,wherethereis likelyto be some attemptby membersof the
subordinate grouptoescapetheiridentity, thanitis in parallelsystems.3'
Wheresimilarconditionsof ethnichierarchy do not exist,it is hazard-
ous to generalizeabouttheroleofcolorfromtheAmericanexperience.
The peculiarpassionssupposedlyarousedby colordifferences can be
generatedon an ascriptive basiswithoutthem.The Chinesepenchant
27 See
Winthrop D. Jordan, White Over Black: American Attitudes Toward the
Negro, i550-i8i2 (Chapel Hill i968), 9i-98.
28 For evidence that this possibilitygenuinely disturbed the slaveholders,see Jeffrey
R. Brackett,The Negro in Maryland (Baltimore i889), 32, 38.
29 Jordan,96.

30 Cf. Dollard, 6i, for the apocryphal story of a Negro riding in a railroad car

reserved for whites on a Southern train. Asked to move to the Jim Crow car, he
announced he had "resigned" from the "colored race." Obviously, the reply sounds
absurd in the Southern context only because color was an immutable indicator of
subordinate identity.There is a double impossibility,physical and social: (i) Color-
group membershipis fixed. (2) Even if it were not, movement from one group to the
other cannot be at the choice of a member of the subordinate group in a system of
ethnic stratification.It would be less impossible on the first count to decide to
"resign" from a linguistic,ethnic, or religious group; and on the second count if the
group did not occupy an ascriptivelysubordinate position.
31 The distinctionmade by Laponce between "minoritiesby force" and "minorities
by will" is suggestive in this connection. J. A. Laponce, The Protection of Minorities
(Berkeley and Los Angeles i960). By the former,Laponce seems to refer mainly to
subordinate groups in hierarchical systems; by the latter, to parallel groups excluded
from political power.

This content downloaded on Wed, 20 Feb 2013 23:54:31 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 ETHNIC POLITICS 243

fortheconsumption of porkcan be seizeduponby theabstemious

Malaysas a signoftheuncleanliness andcrudeness associatedwiththe
in
Chinese32 somewhat the same way as blackness became a symbol
of pejorative withNegroes.Colormayconjureup a
traitsassociated
seriesofdisdainful Becauseit is easyto graftsuchgroup
stereotypes.
preconceptions ontoculturally definedconcepts of beauty,colorand
physiognomy are a convenient shorthand formoreextensive stereo-
typing. Butit maybe equallyeasyto associate withother
stereotypes
culturalqualitiesor practices,suchas eatinghabits,speech,or dress.33
Evenwheretheaesthetic conceptis similar, colormaynotconnote
undesirable traits.The mixof physicaland culturalattributes is not
necessarilythesame.SomeSinhalese, forinstance, viewCeylonTamils
as darkand unattractive, buttheprevailing is notblack,
association
ugly,indolent, and ignorant, but ratherblack,ugly,diligent,and
shrewd.34 In a societywherecolorisrelated buthasnot
toidentification
beenthecriterion forautomatic assignment to inferior
status,it need
notbe associated withonlynegative cultural Thiscomplexcon-
traits.
nectionofesteemed anddeprecated characteristicstendstogo unnoticed
in discussions of "colorprejudice" rootedin theAmericanracialex-
perience.It underlines theimportance ofmakingthebasicdistinction
between vertical and horizontalethnicsystems. Onlyin theformer is
sucha balanceofattributes precluded bythesocialstructure.
Dependingon thesocialandhistorical context, colormaybe a more
extensivedifferentiatorofidentity-in thesenseofbeinga moreaccu-
ratepredictor formoreindividuals-than
ofaffiliation otherindicators.
Butcolorand appearance can alsobe inaccurate and misleading indi-
cators.In manysocieties otherindicators, like language,can rivalit
forextensiveness andsalience.
Wherethereareambiguities ofgroupmembership, waysare found
ofmaking accurate as fastas necessary.
identifications Colorandpheno-
typearenottheonlyvisibleclues,and in anycaserelianceneedrarely
be placedon visiblecluesalone.35 In a NorthIndianvillagearea,for
example,shopkeepers, usingposture, bearing,gesticulation, clothing,
32 Wilson, 25.
33 For a similar view of race or ethnicityas stemming from presumed hereditary
differences, see Tamotsu
and pigmentationas only one of many potential differentiators,
Shibutani and Kian M. Kwan, Ethnic Stratification:A Comparative Approach (New
York i965), 44-45, 2i8-i9.
34 Cf. Wriggins, 232.
35Even the North American system of slavery, which placed a premium on the
visibilityand permanence of the identifyingcriteria,was obliged to resort to evidence
of ancestryin the case of mulattoes who claimed to be descended of a free mother.
Stampp, I95-96.

This content downloaded on Wed, 20 Feb 2013 23:54:31 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
244 WORLD POLITICS
and grammaticalusage in additionto physicalfeatures, were rapidly
and reliablyable to singleout low-castestrangersfor discriminatory
In theNigerianmassacresof Septemberand Octoberof i966,
service.36
Northernmobsin searchof Ibos sortedoutYorubasby theirdress.37 In
the heat of the Ceylonriotsof 1958,Sinhalesemobs were even more
methodical.They employeda varietyof indicatorsof Tamil identity:
theysystematically made preliminary investigations in the searchfor
men"who woretheirshirtsovertheirvertis,Tamil fashion,"who pos-
sessedearringholes in theirears (a Tamil sign of "early parental
affection"),or who could not on the spot "read and explain a piece
froma Sinhalesenewspaper."38 Calling intooperationas theydid the
wrathof the mob,thesealternative testsof identityconstitute a grim
cautionagainstacceptanceof the figmentof the pigment.
To summarize:therationalizing and symbolizing functions of color
in a verticalethnicsystemare notnecessarily replicatedin a horizontal
system, even thoughcolor may play a partin identifying the groups.
Wherecoloris a less salientdifferentiator,otherindicatorsmay serve
as alternative forgrouppreconceptions,
cluster-points and mayfurnish
moreaccurateclues to identity. The significance of the visibility
and
permanenceof colordifferences has been overemphasized forsocieties
in whichthe desireto escape identification is not a pervasivefeature
of ethnicity.
36 JamesM. Sebring,"CasteIndicators of Strangers,"
and CasteIdentification Human
Organization, xxciii (Fall i969), I99-207.
37This methodenabled a few fortunate or foresightedIbos to escape death by
takingrefugewith sympathetic Yoruba neighborswho providedthem with Yoruba
clothing.This accountis drawnfromtheofficialEasternversionof the riots,Nigerian
Pogrom: The Organized Massacre of Eastern Nigerians (Enugu i966), I5, I9.
38Tarzie Vittachi,Emergency '58: The Story of the Ceylon Race Riots (London
I958), 54-

This content downloaded on Wed, 20 Feb 2013 23:54:31 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions