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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – II (LAW 112)

INHERENT POWERS OF THE STATE

POLICE POWER
 Power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and
property.
 the most positive and active of all governmental processes, the most essential, insistent and
illimitable
 In police power, the owner does not recover from the government for injury sustained in
consequence thereof.
 Property taken is usually noxious or intended for a noxious purpose
 May be given retroactive effect and may reasonably impair vested rights or contracts.
 Power vested in the legislature but may be validly delegated to the President, administrative
bodies, and to lawmaking bodies of LGU.
 LGU exercise police power under the general welfare clause of RA 7160.
 If the liberty invoked were freedom of the mind or the person, the standard for the validity of
governmental acts is much more rigorous and exacting, but where the liberty curtailed affects at
the most rights of property, the permissible scope of regulatory measures is wider.

Limitations, Tests for validity:

a. Lawful subject
 The interest of the public in general as distinguished from those of a particular class,
require the exercise of the power. If distinction or classification has been made, there
must be a reasonable basis for said distinction.
 The property sought to be regulated affects the general welfare
 The police power legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare
b. Lawful means
 The means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose, and not duly oppressive on individuals.
 There must be an existence of a national emergency or imperious public necessity,
or that it is the only reasonable and calibrated response to such necessity.

When exercised by delegate (Additional limitations)

1. Express grant by law
2. Within territorial limits
3. Must not be contrary to law

Municipal ordinance to be valid

1. Must not contravene the Constitution or any statute
2. Must not be unfair or oppressive
3. Must not be partial or discriminatory
4. Must not prohibit, but may regulate trade
5. Must not be unreasonable
6. Must be general in application and consistent with public policy

Taxicab Operators v. Board of Transportation, 119 SCRA 597

 Reasonable standard in prescribing 6-year operational life of taxis
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Lutz v. Araneta, 98 Phil. 148

 increase taxes for sugar to support the government.

Miners Association v. Factoran, 240 SCRA 100

 Police power; upheld as against mining contract granted by the state.

EMINENT DOMAIN
 Power of expropriation
 Inherent power of the state to condemn private property for public use upon payment of
just compensation
 Normally results in the taking or appropriation of title to, and possession of, the
expropriated property but possible as well without taking the tile or the possession of the
property from the owner, as in easement of right of way ( Republic v. PLDT, 26 SCRA 620)
 Jurisdiction of complaint for eminent domain is with RTC
 Exercised by Congress and by delegation, the President, administrative bodies, LGU,
and even private enterprises performing public services.
 A derogation of private rights and thus must be construed strictly against the
expropriator.
 Expropriator must make a written, definite, and valid offer to acquire the property before
it files a complaint for expropriation.
 Limitations re public use and just compensation
 that only a few would actually benefit from the expropriation of property does not
necessarily diminish the essence and character of public use. main consideration is the
principal objective of the exercise of power and not the causal consequences that might
follow.
 Claim of just compensation is filed in COA
 LGU: by grant of express legislative authority by Congress, must not be a resolution but an
ordinance as required by RA 7160.

Requisites for exercise:

(Necessity, private property, taking in the constitutional sense, public use, just compensation)
a. necessity
 by legislature: a political question; by a delegate, the determination of genuine
necessity for the exercise is a justiciable question.
 genuine necessity and must be of public character
b. private property
 All private private property capable of ownership may be expropriated except
money. Services may be subjected to eminent domain.

c. Taking in the constitutional sense

 May include trespass without actual eviction of owner, material impairment of the
value of the property, or prevention of the ordinary uses for which the property
was intended.
 Napocor v. Gutierrez, 193 SCRA 1
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The power of eminent domain does not always result in the taking or
appropriation of title to the expropriated property; it may only result in the
imposition of a burden upon the owner of the condemned property without loss of
title or possession.

Requisites for valid taking: (Republic vs. Castelvi)

 the expropriator must enter a private property
 entry must be for more than a momentary period
 the entry must be under warrant or color of authority
 property must be devoted to public use or otherwise informally
appropriated or injuriously affected
 utilization of property is in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive
him of beneficial enjoyment of property
d. Public use
 Not only in the traditional sense of use by the public but synonymous with public
interest, public benefit, public welfare, and public convenience.
 Whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the
requirement of public use.
 Also, which while not directly available to the public, redound to their indirect
advantage or benefit.
e. Just compensation
 Full and fair equivalent of property taken; fair market value of property.
 Market value is the sum of money a person desirous, but not compelled to buy,
and the seller is willing, but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be
given and received therefore.
 owner is entitled to the market value of the portion taken, plus the value of
consequential damage, minus the value of consequential benefits. In any case
consequential benefits shall not exceed consequential damages.
 not just value paid but also within reasonable time from its taking
 EPZA v. Dulay, 148 SCRA 305
The ascertainment of what constitutes just compensation for property
taken in eminent domain cases is a judicial prerogative and PD67
which fixes payment on the basis of the assessment by the city
assessor or the declared valuation by the owner is unconstitutional.
 Trial for just compensation by commissioners is indispensable except for
agrarian reform cases. Commissioners may be appointed by the court to
determine just compensation but the latter is not bound of the findings by the
former and the court may substitute its own estimate of the value of the property
for valid reasons (illegal application of principles, amount is grossly inadequate,
disregard of preponderance of evidence)
 Compensation is to be paid in money and no other. Except in Assn. of Small
Landowners v. Sec. of Agrarian Reform, where payment by bond was allowed
due to the “revolutionary” nature of the expropriation.
 Other cases, cash or Land Bank Bonds
 After payment of just compensation or rejection or no response from the owner,
upon the deposit with an accessible bank designated by DAR of the
compensation in cash or in land bank bonds, DAR shall take immediate
possession of the land.
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 As a rule, the value for compensation is determined as of the date of the filing of
the complaint for eminent domain. If filed after the taking and owner would
receive undue incremental advantage, the value for just compensation shall be at
the time of the taking. But if value increased regardless of the expropriator, it will
be at the time of the filing.
 Date of the filing or taking whichever comes first.
 Just compensation is not limited only to the owner but also to those who have
lawful interest in the property to be condemned, including a mortgagee, a lessee
and a vendee in possession under an executory contract.
 As a rule, non-payment of just compensation in an expropriation proceeding does
not entitle the private landowners to recover possession of the expropriated lots
but only to demand payment of the fair market value of the property.
 Due process should be observed by giving the defendant an opportunity to be
heard and to question the propriety of the expropriation or the reasonableness of
the compensation.
 No compensation when there is no transfer of ownership, and if for temporary
use and due to exigencies of the times necessitating the government to take over
the operation of privately owned public utility or business affected with public
interest. This is an exercise of police power.
 Two conditions of expropriation:
1. it shall be resorted to only when the other modes of acquisition have been
exhausted
2. parcels owned by small property owners are exempt from acquisition (no
more than 300sqm for highly urbanized cities and not more than 800sqm for
other urban areas.

Republic v. CA, G.R. No. 146587, July 2, 2002

 The grant of the power of eminent domain to LGUs under RA7160 cannot be understood as
equal to the pervasive and all-encompassing power vested in the legislature but must, by
enabling law, be delegated to local government by the legislature and limited as intended by
them to be.

POWER OF TAXATION
 Limitations
a. Due process of law
Tax should not be confiscatory. Tax that are unconscionable and unjust as to amout
to confiscation of property.
b. Equal protection clause
Taxes should be uniform and equitable
c. Public purpose
 Double taxation are taxes laid on the same subject by the same taxing jurisdiction
during the same taxing period and for the same purpose.
 If regulation is the main purpose and revenue generation is merely incidental, the
imposition is of police power and if revenue generation is the main purpose and
regulation is merely incidental, imposition if of power of taxation.
 License fee is a police measure, tax is a revenue measure
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 Supremacy of the national govt over local govt in taxation: Instrumentalities of the
national govt are exempt from local taxation unless there is a clear imposition of tax in
the language of the law.

CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS

DUE PROCESS

Govt. of the United States v. Purganan, G.R. No. 148571, Sept. 24, 2002
- reversed by
In Government of Hongkong vs. Hon. Felixberto Olalia, Jr.,
 If bail can be granted in deportation cases, considering that the universal declaration of human
rights applies to deportation cases, there is no reason why it cannot be invoked in extradition
cases where both are administrative proceedings and the innocent or guilt of the person
detained is not in issue.
 the court adopted a standard to be used in granting bail in extradition cases, denominated as
clear and convincing evidence which is lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt but higher
than preponderance of evidence. In such standard, the potential extradite must prove by “clear
and convincing evidence” that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and
processes of the extradition court for entitlement to bail.

EQUAL PROTECTION
Meaning - All persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred
and responsibilities imposed.

Valid classification: persons or things ostensibly similarly situated may, nevertheless, be treated
differently if there is a basis for valid classification.
- Every classification made by law is presumed reasonable, and the party who challenges the law
must present proof of arbitrariness.
- The Constitution does not require absolute equality among residents; it is enough that all
persons under like circumstances or conditions are given the same privileges and required to
follow the same obligations. A classification based on valid and reasonable standards does
not violate the equal protection clause (Tiu v. Court of Appeals)

Requisites for valid classification: (SAGE)

1. Substantial distinctions which make for real differences
2. Germane to the purpose of the law – The distinctions which are the bases for the classification
should have a reasonable relation to the purpose of the law.
3. Not limited to existing conditions only
4. Must apply equally to all members of the same class

Ichong v Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155

- there exist real and actual, positive, and fundamental differences between an alien and a
national?

Ormoc Sugar Central v. Ormoc City, Feb. 17, 1968

- must not be limited to existing conditions only. Ordinance is invalid as it taxes only centrifugal
sugar produced and exported by Ormoc Sugar Company and none other. if a new sugar central
is established in Ormoc, it would not be subject to the ordinance.
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People v. Jalosjos, 324 SCRA 689, Feb. 3, 2000

- The position of Congressman is not a reasonable basis for valid classification in criminal law
enforcement.

SEARCH AND SEIZURE

- To be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose.
- No search warrant and warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by a judge, after examination under oath or affirmation of complaint
- Objections to the WOA must be made before the accuse enters his plea.
- Filing of charges and the issuance of the warrant of arrest against a person illegally detained will
cure the defect of that detention.

Requisites of a valid warrant:

a. Probable cause
- such facts and circumstances antecedent to the issuance of the warrant that in themselves are
sufficient to induce a cautious man to rely on them and act in pursuance thereof.
- for a search: such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in
connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.

b. Determination of probable cause personally by a judge.

- hearing not necessary to determine existence of probable cause. Judge determines only the
probability not the certainty of guilt of the accused.
c. After examination, under oath or affirmation, of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce.
- the evidence offered by the complainant and witnesses should be based on their own
personal knowledge and not on mere information or belief.
d. Particularity of description
- Description of person, place, and things
- General warrants are proscribed and unconstitutional
- John Doe warrants will satisfy constitutional requirement of particularity of description if
there is some description persona which will enable the officer to identify the accused.

A. Warrantless arrest
- a peace officer, or even a private person, may effect an arrest without a warrant
- an arrest made after an entrapment operation does not require warrant of arrest
- Buy-bust operation is a valid in flagrante arrest. The subsequent search of the person arrested
and of the premises within his immediate control is a valid as an INCIDENT TO A LAWFUL
ARREST.
- personal knowledge of facts in arrests without a warrant must be based on probable cause.

Requisites of a valid in flagrante arrest:

a. the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he had just committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime;
b. such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.

Offense just committed:

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1. an offense has JUST been committed

2. The person making the arrest has probable cause to believe, based on his PERSONAL
KNOWLEDGE of facts or of other circumstances, that the person to be arrested had committed
it.
A prisoner who escaped

Waiver of an unlawful arrest: It is necessary that the petitioner should question the validity of the
arrest before he enters his plea. Failure to do so would constitute a waiver of his right against unlawful
restraint of his liberty.
- waiver is limited to the illegal arrest. it does not extend to the search made as an incident thereto, or
to the subsequent seizure of evidence allegedly found during the search. any evidence obtained in
violation of the constitutional provision is legally inadmissible in evidence under the exclusionary
rule.
- posting a bail bond constitutes a waiver of any irregularity attending the arrest but the accused must
challenge the illegality of the arrest before entering his plea.

B. Warrantless Searches and Seizures

- WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND SEIZURES, WHEN PROPER. — A search may be

conducted by law enforcers only on the strength of a warrant validly issued by a judge as
provided in Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution. Articles which are the product of
unreasonable searches and seizures are inadmissible as evidence, pursuant to Article III,
Section 3 (2) of the Constitution. Warrantless searches and seizures may be made without a
warrant in the following instances: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest, (2) search of a moving
motor vehicle, (3) search in violation of custom laws, (4) seizure of the evidence in plain view,
(5) when the accused himself waives his right against unreasonable searches and seizures, (6)
stop and frisk and (7) exigent and emergency circumstances. These instances, however, do not
dispense with the requisite of probable cause before a warrantless search and seizure can be
lawfully conducted. In warrantless search cases, probable cause must only be based on
reasonable ground of suspicion or belief that a crime has been committed or is about to be
committed.

5 Generally well-established exceptions to the warrant requirement:

1. search incidental to an arrest
2. search of moving vehicles
3. seizure of evidence in plain view
4. customs searches
5. where there is waiver of the right

Rarer exceptions
1. exigent circumstance rule
2. stop and frisk rule

Valid waiver of a right: (De Garcia v. Locsin, 65 Phil 689)

1. it must appear first that the right exists
2. the person involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence of such right
3. that the said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right

- consent must be voluntary, i.e., unequivocal, specific, and intelligently given, uncontaminated by
any duress or coercion.
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- Consent to a search is not to be lightly inferred, but must be shown by clear and conving
evidence.
- waiver by implication cannot be presumed; there must be clear and convincing evidence of an
actual intention to relinquish the right in order that there may be a valid waiver.

“STOP-AND-FRISK” – vernacular designation of the right of a police officer to stop a citizen on the
street, interrogate him and pat him for weapons whenever he observers unusual conduct which leads
him to conclude that criminal activity may be afoot.

Requisite:
1. Police officer should introduce himself and make initial inquiries, approach and restrain a
person who manifests unusual and suspicious conduct, in order to check the latter’s outer
clothing for possibly concealed weapons.
2. The police officer must have a genuine reason based on his own experience and
surrounding conditions
3. Search and seizure should precede the arrest for the principle to apply.
Search and Seizure as an incident to a lawful arrest
- As a rule, the arrest must precede the search; the process cannot be reversed. nevertheless, a
search substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can precede the arrest if the police have
probable cause to make the arrest at the outset of the search.
- When the search is an incident to a lawful arrest, there is no necessity for a search warrant

Cases where search was declared valid without necessarily being preceded by an arrest.
- The Supreme Court held that a warrantless search, and seizure can be made without
necessarily being preceded by an arrest provided that the said search is effected on the basis of
probable cause.

Search of Moving Vehicles:

- a warrantless search of moving vehicles is justified on the ground that it is not practicable to
secure a warrant because the vehicle can be moved quickly out of the locality or jurisdiction in
which the warrant may be sought.
- Searches without warrant are also allowed for the purpose of preventing violations of smuggling
or immigration laws provided that such searches are made at borders or constructive borders,
like checkpoints near the boundary lines of the state.
- Checkpoint search is either:
1. mere routine inspection
- the search is normally permissible when it is limited to a mere visual search,
where the occupants are not subjected to a physical or body search.
2. extensive search
- the search is is constitutionally permissible only if the officers conducting the
search had reasonable or probable cause to believe, before the search, that
either the motorist is a law offender or they will find the instrumentality or
evidence pertaining a crime in the vehicle to be searched.

Where prohibited articles are in plain view: Plain View Doctrine

- Objects in the “plain view” of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view
are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence.
- Usually applied where the police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused but
nonetheless inadvertently comes upon an incriminating object.

An object is in plain view if:

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1. if the object itself is plainly exposed to sight

2. if the package proclaim its contents
3. if the package is such that an experienced observer could infer from its appearance that it
contains prohibited articles

- IMMEDIATELY APPARENT TEST does not require an unduly high degree of certainty as to the
incriminating character of evidence. It requires merely that the seizure be presumptively
reasonable assuming that there is probable cause to associate the property with criminal
activity; that a nexus exists between the viewed object and criminal activity.
Search and seizure under exigent and emergency circumstances

EXCLUSIONARY RULE: Evidence obtained in violation of Sec. 2, Art 3, shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding because it is the “fruit of the poisoned tree.”

David v. Macapagal-Arroyo (PP1017), GR 171396, May 3, 2006

Soliven v. Makasiar, 167 SCRA 394
- it is sufficient that the judge “personally determine” the existence of probable cause. it is not
necessary that he should personally examine the complainant and his witnesses.

Allado v. Diokno, May 5, 1994

- Preliminary inquiry distinguished from preliminary investigation. The former is made by a judge
and the latter bythe prosecutor.

Aniag v. Comelec, 237 SCRA 424

- Warrantless search: Consent given under intimidating or coercive circumstances is not consent
within the purview of the constitutional guarantee.

Valmonte v. De Villa, Sept. 29, 1989

- what constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search and seizure in any particular case is
purely a judicial question, determinable from a consideration of the circumstances involved.
- “stop and search” without a warrant at military or police checkpoints, which has been declared
not to be illegal per se so long as it is required by the exigencies of public order and conducted
in a way least intrusive to motorists.

People v. Marti, 193 SCRA 57

- The right applies as a distraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked
with the enforcement of law. It cannot extend to acts committed by private individuals so as to
bring them within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.

People v. Musa, 217 SCRA 597

Requisites for plain view doctrine to apply:
(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are
legally present in the pursuit of their official duties;
(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where they
are;
(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and
(d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search.

- the plain view doctrine may not be used to launch unbridled searches and indiscriminate
seizures, nor to extend to a general exploratory search made solely to find evidence of
defendant’s guilt.
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PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION

Exceptions:
1. lawful order of the court
2. when public safety or order requires otherwise, as may be provided by law

- Both as to tangible and intangible objects

Gaanan v. IAC, 145 SCRA 112

- telephone extension not among devices covered by this law
In re: Wenceslao Laureta, 148 SCRA 382
- lawyer of one parties to a case address letters to individual justices of the SC in the
performance of their judicial functions, become part of judicial record and are a matter of
concern for the entire court and thus are not covered by the constitutional guarantee.

Zulueta v. CA, Feb. 20, 1996

- right may be invoked against the wife went to the clinic of her husband and there talk documents
consisting of private communications by her husband and his alleged paramour
- The constitutional injunction declaring "the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be]
inviolable" is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her
husband's infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced.

Waterous Drug v. NLRC

- the SC said that the Bill of Rights does not protect citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures
made by private individuals.

RIGHT TO PRIVACY
- the right to be left alone

FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (SPEECH, PRESS, ASSEMBLY & PETITION)

a. Freedom from censorship or prior restraint

- the test is the clear, present, and imminent danger test (Brandenburg test)

Restrictions:
- Content-based restrictions – restricts the expression itself. Based on content of speech.
- Content-neutral – restricts based on time, place, and manner only.

O’Brien Test:
A government regulation of expression is valid if:
1. It is within the constitutional power of the government
2. it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest
3. the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression
4. the incidental restriction on the freedom is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.

Overbreadth Doctrine:
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- A statute is overbroad where it operates to inhibit the exercise of individual freedoms guaranteed by the
constitution, such as the freedom of religion or speech. When it includes within its coverage not only
unprotected activity but also activity protected by the constitution.
- In Adiong s. COMELEC ( 207 SCRA 712) the court declared as void that portion of the Election Code
prohibiting the posting of election propaganda in any place-including private vehicles- other than in the
designated common poster area.

Strict scrutiny:

- Strict scrutiny is a form of judicial review that courts use to determine the constitutionality of certain laws.
To pass strict scrutiny, the legislature must have passed the law to further a "compelling governmental
interest," and must have narrowly tailored the law to achieve that interest.

b. Freedom from subsequent punishment

- The state may validly impose penal and/or administrative sanctions, such as in the following:
a. libel (Unprotected speech)
b. obscenity (Unprotected speech)
- There is no perfect definition of “obscenity”, but the in Miller v. California, the following basic
guidelines were established:
1. Whether the average person, applying contemporary standards, would find that the work, taken
as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest
2. whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically
defined by the applicable state law
3. Whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value.

c. criticism of official conduct

d. right of students to free speech in school premises not absolute

Tests for determining the validity of curtailment of speech:

1. Clear and present danger test – the public order, safety, convenience, morals or health are in in clear,
present, grave, and imminent danger of an evil which the state has the right to prevent.
-
2. Balancing of interest tests
- Where the legislation under constitutional attack interferes with freedom of speech an assembly in a more
generalized way and where the effect of a specific danger is not susceptible even of impressionistic
calculation

Freedom from censorship or prior restraint

Diocese of Bacolod v. Comelec, G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015 Abrams v.
- Content-based restraint or censorship refers to restrictions “based on the subject matter of the
utterance or speech.” In contrast, content-neutral regulation includes controls merely on the
incidents of the speech such as time, place, or manner of the speech.
- The Court held that the regulation involved at bar is content-based. The tarpaulin content is not
easily divorced from the size of its medium.
- Content-based regulation bears a heavy presumption of invalidity, and this court has used the
clear and present danger rule as measure.
- Under this rule, “the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be substantive, ‘extremely
serious and the degree of imminence extremely high.’” “Only when the challenged act has
overcome the clear and present danger rule will it pass constitutional muster, with the
government having the burden of overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality.”
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- Even with the clear and present danger test, respondents failed to justify the regulation. There is
no compelling and substantial state interest endangered by the posting of the tarpaulin as to
justify curtailment of the right of freedom of expression. There is no reason for the state to
minimize the right of non-candidate petitioners to post the tarpaulin in their private property. The
size of the tarpaulin does not affect anyone else’s constitutional rights.

Exclusionary principle:
- Clear, present, and imminent danger test

Chavez vs. Sec. Gonzales 2008

- DOJ Sec and NTC issued warned radio and television stations against airing the hello garci
tapes under pain of suspension or revocation of their licenses.
-
Overview of Freedom of Expression, Prior Restraint and Subsequent Punishment

Freedom of expression is the foundation of a free, open and democratic society. Freedom of
expression is an indispensable condition8 to the exercise of almost all other civil and political rights. No
society can remain free, open and democratic without freedom of expression. Freedom of expression
guarantees full, spirited, and even contentious discussion of all social, economic and political issues. To
survive, a free and democratic society must zealously safeguard freedom of expression.

Freedom of expression allows citizens to expose and check abuses of public officials. Freedom of
expression allows citizens to make informed choices of candidates for public office. Freedom of
expression crystallizes important public policy issues, and allows citizens to participate in the
discussion and resolution of such issues. Freedom of expression allows the competition of ideas, the
clash of claims and counterclaims, from which the truth will likely emerge. Freedom of expression
allows the airing of social grievances, mitigating sudden eruptions of violence from marginalized groups
who otherwise would not be heard by government. Freedom of expression provides a civilized way of
engagement among political, ideological, religious or ethnic opponents for if one cannot use his tongue
to argue, he might use his fist instead.

Freedom of expression is the freedom to disseminate ideas and beliefs, whether competing,
conforming or otherwise. It is the freedom to express to others what one likes or dislikes, as it is the
freedom of others to express to one and all what they favor or disfavor. It is the free expression for the
ideas we love, as well as the free expression for the ideas we hate.9 Indeed, the function of freedom of
expression is to stir disputes:

[I]t may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction
with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger. Speech is often provocative and challenging.
It may strike at prejudices and preconceptions and have profound unsettling effects as it presses for
acceptance of an idea.10

Section 4, Article III of the Constitution prohibits the enactment of any law curtailing freedom of
expression:

No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or the press, or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances.

Thus, the rule is that expression is not subject to any prior restraint or censorship because the
Constitution commands that freedom of expression shall not be abridged. Over time, however, courts
have carved out narrow and well-defined exceptions to this rule out of necessity.
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The exceptions, when expression may be subject to prior restraint, apply in this jurisdiction to only four
categories of expression, namely: pornography,11 false or misleading advertisement,12 advocacy
of imminent lawless action,13 and danger to national security.14 All other expression is not subject
to prior restraint. As stated in Turner Broadcasting System v. Federal Communication Commission,
"[T]he First Amendment (Free Speech Clause), subject only to narrow and well understood exceptions,
does not countenance governmental control over the content of messages expressed by private
individuals."
Expression not subject to prior restraint is protected expression or high-value expression. Any
content-based prior restraint on protected expression is unconstitutional without exception. A
protected expression means what it says – it is absolutely protected from censorship. Thus, there can
be no prior restraint on public debates on the amendment or repeal of existing laws, on the ratification
of treaties, on the imposition of new tax measures, or on proposed amendments to the Constitution.

Prior restraint on expression is content-based if the restraint is aimed at the message or idea of the
expression. Courts will subject to strict scrutiny content-based restraint. If the content-based prior
restraint is directed at protected expression, courts will strike down the restraint as unconstitutional
because there can be no content-based prior restraint on protected expression. The analysis thus turns
on whether the prior restraint is content-based, and if so, whether such restraint is directed at protected
expression, that is, those not falling under any of the recognized categories of unprotected expression.

If the prior restraint is not aimed at the message or idea of the expression, it is content-neutral even if it
burdens expression. A content-neutral restraint is a restraint which regulates the time, place or manner
of the expression in public places16 without any restraint on the content of the expression. Courts will
subject content-neutral restraints to intermediate scrutiny.17

An example of a content-neutral restraint is a permit specifying the date, time and route of a rally
passing through busy public streets. A content-neutral prior restraint on protected expression which
does not touch on the content of the expression enjoys the presumption of validity and is thus
enforceable subject to appeal to the courts.18 Courts will uphold time, place or manner restraints if they
are content-neutral, narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leave open ample
alternative channels of expression.19

In content-neutral prior restraint on protected speech, there should be no prior restraint on the content
of the expression itself. Thus, submission of movies or pre-taped television programs to a government
review board is constitutional only if the review is for classification and not for censoring any part of the
content of the submitted materials. However, failure to submit such materials to the review board may
be penalized without regard to the content of the materials.21 The review board has no power to reject
the airing of the submitted materials. The review board’s power is only to classify the materials, whether
for general patronage, for adults only, or for some other classification. The power to classify
expressions applies only to movies and pre-taped television programs but not to live television
programs. Any classification of live television programs necessarily entails prior restraint on expression.

Expression that may be subject to prior restraint is unprotected expression or low-value expression. By
definition, prior restraint on unprotected expression is content-based since the restraint is imposed
because of the content itself. In this jurisdiction, there are currently only four categories of unprotected
expression that may be subject to prior restraint. This Court recognized false or misleading
advertisement as unprotected expression only in October 2007.

Only unprotected expression may be subject to prior restraint. However, any such prior restraint on
unprotected expression must hurdle a high barrier. First, such prior restraint is presumed
 14

unconstitutional. Second, the government bears a heavy burden of proving the constitutionality of the
prior restraint.25

Courts will subject to strict scrutiny any government action imposing prior restraint on unprotected
expression.26 The government action will be sustained if there is a compelling State interest, and prior
restraint is necessary to protect such State interest. In such a case, the prior restraint shall be narrowly
drawn - only to the extent necessary to protect or attain the compelling State interest.

Prior restraint is a more severe restriction on freedom of expression than subsequent punishment.
Although subsequent punishment also deters expression, still the ideas are disseminated to the public.
Prior restraint prevents even the dissemination of ideas to the public.

While there can be no prior restraint on protected expression, such expression may be subject to
subsequent punishment,27 either civilly or criminally. Thus, the publication of election surveys cannot
be subject to prior restraint,28 but an aggrieved person can sue for redress of injury if the survey turns
out to be fabricated. Also, while Article 201 (2)(b)(3) of the Revised Penal Code punishing "shows
which offend any race or religion" cannot be used to justify prior restraint on religious expression, this
provision can be invoked to justify subsequent punishment of the perpetrator of such offensive
shows.29

Similarly, if the unprotected expression does not warrant prior restraint, the same expression may still
be subject to subsequent punishment, civilly or criminally. Libel falls under this class of unprotected
expression. However, if the expression cannot be subject to the lesser restriction of subsequent
punishment, logically it cannot also be subject to the more severe restriction of prior restraint. Thus,
since profane language or "hate speech" against a religious minority is not subject to subsequent
punishment in this jurisdiction,30 such expression cannot be subject to prior restraint.

If the unprotected expression warrants prior restraint, necessarily the same expression is subject to
subsequent punishment. There must be a law punishing criminally the unprotected expression before
prior restraint on such expression can be justified. The legislature must punish the unprotected
expression because it creates a substantive evil that the State must prevent. Otherwise, there will be no
legal basis for imposing a prior restraint on such expression.

The prevailing test in this jurisdiction to determine the constitutionality of government action imposing
prior restraint on three categories of unprotected expression – pornography,31 advocacy of imminent
lawless action, and danger to national security - is the clear and present danger test.32 The expression
restrained must present a clear and present danger of bringing about a substantive evil that the State
has a right and duty to prevent, and such danger must be grave and imminent.33

Prior restraint on unprotected expression takes many forms - it may be a law, administrative regulation,
or impermissible pressures like threats of revoking licenses or withholding of benefits.34 The
impermissible pressures need not be embodied in a government agency regulation, but may emanate
from policies, advisories or conduct of officials of government agencies.

Bayan v. Ermita (CPR), G.R. No. 169838, April 20, 2006

- Not an absolute ban on public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates time, place, and
manner o the assemblies. In Osmena v. Comelec the SC referred to it as a content-based
regulation of the time, place and manner of holding public assemblies.

Near v. State of Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697

 15

- is a landmark United States Supreme Court decision that found that prior restraints on
publication violate freedom of the press as protected under the First Amendment, a principle
that was applied to free speech generally in subsequent jurisprudence. The Court ruled that a
Minnesota law that targeted publishers of "malicious" or "scandalous" newspapers violated the
First Amendment to the United States Constitution (as applied through the Fourteenth
Amendment)

Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444

- The Brandenburg test (also known as the imminent lawless action test)[edit]
The three distinct elements of this test (intent, imminence, and likelihood) have distinct precedential
lineages.
Judge Learned Hand was possibly the first judge to advocate the intent standard, in Masses Publishing Co.
v. Patten,[13] reasoning that "[i]f one stops short of urging upon others that it is their duty or their interest to
resist the law, it seems to me one should not be held to have attempted to cause its violation".
The Brandenburg intent standard is more speech-protective than Hand's formulation, which contained no
temporal element.
The imminence element was a departure from earlier rulings. Brandenburg did not explicitly overrule the bad
tendency test, but it appears that after Brandenburg, the test is de facto overruled. The Brandenburg test
effectively made the time element of the clear and present danger test more defined and more rigorous.
- In 1969, the court established stronger protections for speech in the landmark case Brandenburg v.
Ohio, which held that "the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State
to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is
directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action".[30][31] Brandenburg is now the standard
applied by the Court to free speech issues related to advocacy of violence.

- The Brandenburg test was established in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 US 444 (1969), to determine
when inflammatory speech intending to advocate illegal action can be restricted. In the case, a KKK
leader gave a speech at a rally to his fellow Klansmen, and after listing a number of derogatory racial
slurs, he then said that "it's possible that there might have to be some revengeance [sic] taken." The
test determined that the government may prohibit speech advocating the use of force or crime if the
speech satisfies both elements of the two-part test:

The speech is “directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action,” AND

The speech is “likely to incite or produce such action.”

Dennis v. United States, 341 U. S. 494

- Chief Justice Fred Vinson's opinion stated that the First Amendment does not require that the
government must wait "until the putsch is about to be executed, the plans have been laid and
the signal is awaited" before it interrupts seditious plots.[21] In his opinion, Vinson endorsed the
balancing approach used by Judge Hand

Gitlow v. State of New York, 268 U. S. 652

- Gitlow was decided based on the bad tendency test, but the majority decision acknowledged the
validity of the clear and present danger test, yet concluded that its use was limited to Schenck-
like situations where the speech was not specifically outlawed by the legislature.[5][12]

Assembly and Petition

 16

-The right to assemble is not subject to prior restraint, but the right must be exercised in such a way as not to
prejudice the public welfare. Permit is not required for the right to assemble but only for the use of the public
place.

JBL Reyes v. Bagatsing, 125 SCRA 553

- The power of local officials with the use of public place for assembly is merely of regulation and
not prohibition.

-(GSIS v. Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa GSIS) employees in the public service may not
engage in strikes or in concerted and unauthorized stoppage of work. the claim that the right to strike is
part of the freedom of expression and the right to peacefully assemble and petition the government for
redress of grievances was rejected by the SC.

-Freedom of education is at least equal to freedom of assembly and petition. Fredom of assembly and
petition is superior to economic rights.

OBSCENITY CASES

Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 5

- is a landmark decision by the United States Supreme Court wherein the court redefined its
definition of obscenity from that of "utterly without socially redeeming value" to that which lacks
"serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value".

FREEDOM OF RELIGION

Two Guarantees:
1. Non-establishment clause
2. freedom of religious profession and worship

Free Exercise clause

- right to believe, which is absolute. Right to act according to one’s beliefs, which is subject to regulation.

Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1

- that the non-establishment clause means that the state cannot set up a church, nor pass laws
which aid one religion, aid alt religion, or prefer one religion over another, nor force nor influence
a person to go to or remain away from church against his will or force him to profess a belief or
disbelief in.

Ebralinag v. Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu, March 1, 1993

- Reversed Gerona and Balbuna decisions and upheld the right of the petitioners to refuse to
salute the Philippine flag on account of their religious scruples.

Benevolent neutrality – Although the morality contemplated by laws is secular, benevolent neutrality
could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion provided it does not offend compelling
state interest. The benevolent neutrality theory believes that with respect to these governmental
actions, accommodation of religion may be allowed, not to promote the government's favored form of
religion, but to allow individuals and groups to exercise their religion without hindrance||| (Estrada v.
Escritor, A.M. No. P-02-1651, [June 22, 2006], 525 PHIL 110-226)
 17

Compelling state interest test

1. Whether respondent’s right to religious freedom has been burdened.

2. ascertain respondent’s sincerity in her religious belief.

Fonacier v. CA, 96 Phil. 417

- Where the dispute involves the property righs of the religious groups, or the relations of the
members where property rights are involved, the civil court may assume jurisdiction.
People v. Cayat, 68 Phil. 12
- Non-christian tribes was given an interpretation by the SC as not referring to religious belief, but
to degree of civilization.

LIBERTY OF ABODE

Limitations: lawful order of the court.

RIGHT TO TRAVEL

Limitations: interest of national security, public safety or public health, lawful order of the court, as may
be provided by law.

Caunca v. Salazar, 82 Phil. 851

- Whether a maid had the right to transfer to another residence even if she had not paid yet the
amount advances by an employment agency:
- Yes. The fortunes of business cannot be controlled by controlling a fundamental human
freedom.
Manotoc v. CA, 142 SCRA 149
- The court my validly refuse to grant the accused the permission to travel abroad, even if the
accused is out on bail.

Marcos v. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668

- Refused by SC to return to Philippines as it would endanger national security.
- The liberty of abode and the right to travel includes the right to leave, reside and travel within
one’s country but it does not include the right to return to one’s country.
- NOTE: Court warned that this case should not create a precedent because Marcos was a class
in himself.

Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil. 660

- Held valid the requiring of certain members of a tribe to reside only within a reservation to
promote their better education, advancement, and protection.

Silverio v. CA, April 8, 1991

- Art 3 Sec 6 should be interpreted to mean that while the liberty of travel may be impaired even
without court order, the appropriate executive officers or administrative authorities are not
armed with arbitrary discretion to impose limitations.

Villavicencio v. Lukban, 39 Phil. 778

- prostitutes deported to davao have constitutional rights like any other Philippine citizen.
 18

ACCESS TO PUBLIC INFORMATION

- The right only affords access to records, documents and papers, which means the opportunity to inspect
and copy them at his expense.
Exceptions:
1. Privileged information rooted in separation of powers
2. military and diplomatic secrets
3. information affecting national security
4. information on investigation of crimes by law enforcement agencies before the prosecution of the
accused.
5. trade and industrial secrets.

- the performance may be compelled by a writ of mandamus.

Baldoza v. Dimaano, 71 SCRA 14

- except when the purpose of examination is unlawful or sheer, idle curiosity, it is not the duty
under the law of registration officers to concern themselves with the motives, reasons and
objects of the person seeking access to the records.
- Judges cannot prohibit access to judicial records. However, a judge may regulate the manner in
which persons desiring to inspect, examine or copy records in his office, may exercise their
rights.

Valmonte v. Belmonte, Feb. 13, 1989

- the right to confidentiality of the borrower to the records is personal to the same and may not be
invoked by GSIS.
- Funds in GSIS assume a public character.
- The people have a right to access official records but they cannot compel custodians of official
records to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like, such not being based on a
demandable legal right.

Echegaray v. Secretary of justice – the procedure for administering the lethal injection written in a
manual are matters of public concern.

In Re: Request for live radio-tv coverage of the trial of plunder case against Estrada:
- freedom of the press and the right to public information vs. Fundamental rights of the accuse, the latter
wins.
- audio-visual recording of the trial for documentary purposes and only later will they be made publicly
available for viewing.
- The people’s right to know is limited to “matters of public concern” and is further subject to such
limitation as may be provided by law.

- court orders and decisions are matter of public concern; pleadings and other documents filed by parties to
a case need not be.

RIGHT TO FORM UNIONS, ASSOCIATIONS OR SOCIETIES

- The right to form, or join, unions or associations, includes the right not to join or, disaffiliate from an
association.

In Re: Edillon, 84 SCRA 553

- It was held that compulsory membership of a lawyer in the IBP does not violate the constitutional
mandate.
 19

CONTRACT CLAUSE

Requisites to fall within the prohibition:

1. There is an impairment in the obligation of contract
2. The impairment must be substantial.
- A mere change in PROCEDURAL REMEDIES which does not change the substance of the contract, and
which still leaves an efficacious remedy for enforcement does NOT impair the obligation of contracts.

There is substantial impairment when:

1. the law changes the terms of a legal contract between parties, either in the time or mode of performance;
or
2. imposes new conditions; or
3. dispenses with those expressed or authorizes for its satisfaction something different from that provided in
its terms.

Limitations:
1. Police power (Lozano v. Martinez, 146 SCRA 323: The law was a police measure and therefore
superior to contracts)
2. Eminent Domain
3. Taxation

MIRANDA RIGHTS
- guarantee does not apply to spontaneous made before custodial investigation
- the practice of issuing invitation is included as to be custodial investigation
- The burden of proof that there was a valid waiver rests on the prosecution. The presumption of regularity
in the conduct of official duty cannot prevail over the presumption of innocence.
- the right to remain silent and to counsel may be waived except the right to be informed of these rights.
- no custodial investigation shall be conducted except in the presence of his counsel or after a valid waiver
has been made

Exlusionary Rule
Fruit of the poisonous tree
- a phrase minted by Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter in Nardone v. US
- According to this rule, once the primary source is shown to have been unlawfully obtained, any secondary
or derivative evidence derived from it is also inadmissible.

People v. Samus
- for failure of the accused to object to the offer in evidence, the uncounseled confession was admitted in
evidence.

Rights available:
1. to remain silent
 20

2. to competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice at all stages of investigation
3. to be informed of such rights
- informing him his rights is not enough, the prosecution must show that the accused understood
what he has been informed.
4. Rights cannot be waived except in writing and signed by the person in the presence of his
counsel.
5. No torture, force, etc. which vitiates the free will shall be used.
6. Secret detention places are prohibited
7. Confessions/admissions obtained in violation of rights are inadmissible in evidence

Rights are not available when:

1. paraffin testing
2. merely being photographed

Not independent counsel

- Mayor, prosecutor, counsel of police, municipal attorney, whose interest is admittedly adverse to
the accused.

Counsel preferably of his own choice

- it is enough and can satisfy the constitutional requirement when a counsel is engaged by anyone acting
on behalf of the person, or appointed by the court upon petition, or by someone on his behalf.

People v. Guillermo
- Spontaneous statements or those not elicited through questioning by law enforcement officers but given
in an ordinary manner where the appellant verbally admits to having committed the offense are
admissible.

People v. Bravo
Police line-up is not considered a part of any custodial inquest because it is conducted before that stage of
investigation is reached.
People v. Judge Ayson
- Rights are available only during custodial investigation or in custody interrogation of accused persons
People v. Piedad
- The rule begins to operate at once as soon as the investigation ceases to be, a general inquiry into an
unsolved crime, and direction is then aimed upon a particular suspect who has been taken into custody
and to whom the police would then direct interrogatory questions which tend to elicit incriminating
statements.

RIGHT TO BAIL

- bail as the security given for the release of a person in custody of the law, furnished by him or a
bondsman, conditioned upon his appearing before any court as required under the conditions specified in
said Rule||| (Paderanga v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 115407, [August 28, 1995], 317 PHIL 862-
882)when accused is charged with an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or higher, a hearing on
the motion for bail must be conducted by the judge to determine whether the evidence of guilt is strong.
- even if the prosecution refuses to adduce evidence, it is still mandatory for the court to conduct a hearing
or ask searching and clarificatory questions from which it may infer the strength of the evidence of guilt.
-
Bail as a matter of right
1. before or after conviction by the MTC, MCTC, MeTC, MTCC of an offense not punishable by reclusion
perpetua or higher
2. before conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable by reclusion perpetua or higher
 21

Bail when discretionary

1. Upon or after conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable by reclusion perpetua or higher

Bail is denied for offenses where penalty is between 6-20 yrs and the accused is a:
1. recidivist, quasi-recidivist, habitual delinquent, or has committed a crime aggravated by the
circumstance of retieracion
2. that the accused has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence or has
violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification
3. the accused committed the offense while on probation, parole, or under conditional pardon
4. that the circumstances
5. the accuse is a flight risk

Dela Camara v. Enage, 41 SCRA 3

- Standards for fixing bail:

1. The financial ability of th eaccused
2. the nature and circumstances of the offense
3. the pealty for the offense charged,
4. the character and reputation of the accused
5. age and health
6. the weight of evidence against him
7. the probability of his appearing at the trial
8. the forfeiture of other bonds by him
9. the fact that he was a fugitive from justice when arrested
10. pendency of other cases in which he is under bond

Standard for extradition cases:

Clear and convincing evidence standard. The potential extradite must prove by clear and convincing
evidence that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition
court.

Comendador v. De Villa, 200 SCRA 80

- right to bail is not available to the military. no violation of equal protection clause as there is
substantial difference between military and civilians
Enrile v. Salazar, 186 SCRA 217
- petitioners were charged with rebellion complexed with murder and multiple frustrated murder,
the court ruled that they be charged with simple rebellion only as enunciated in People v.
Hernandez and therefore entitled to bail as rebellion is a bailable offense.

People v. Donato, June 5, 1991

- The right to bail is another of the constitutional rights which can be waived. it is a right which is
personal to the accused and whose waiver would not be contrary to law, public order, public
policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.

RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED

1. cannot be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law
2. shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved
3. right to be heard by himself and counsel
4. to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him
5. to have a speedy and impartial and public trial
 22

6. to meet the witness face to face

7. to have a compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of
evidence in his behalf

Mejia v. Pamaran
- the SC enumerated the ingredients of due process to criminal proceedings:
1. the accused has been heard in a court of competent jurisdiction
2. the accused is proceeded against under the orderly processes of law
3. the accused has been given notice and the opportunity to be heard
Presumption of regularity in conduct of official duty
- cannot by itself prevail over constitutional presumption of innocence
Presumption of Innocence
- Will not apply as long as there is some logical connection between the fact proved and the
ultimate fact presumed
- If the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of 2 explanations, one for the innocence
and the other for the guilt of the accused, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral
certainty and therefore presumption of innocence must prevail.
- Under the principle of presumption of innocence, it is merely required that the state establish a
prima facie case, after which the burden of proof is shifted to the accused.

Circumstantial evidence may warrant conviction if:

1. there is more than 1 circumstance
2. the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven,
3. the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt.

- PAO lawyer is considered an independent counsel

Requisites of right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him, the information must contain,
1. the name of the accused
2. the designation given to the offense by statute
3. a statement of acts or omission complained constituting the offense
4. the name of the offended party
5. the approximate date and time of the commission of the offense
6. the place where the offense was committed

Void for Vagueness Rule

- the accused is also denied the right to be informed of the charge against him, and to due
process as well, where the stateu itself is couched in such indefinite language that it is not
possible for men of ordinary intelligence to determine therefrom what acts or omissions are
punished. Such law is deemed void.

Right to speedy trial

- A trial free from vexatious, capricious, and offensive delays. Justice and fairness, not speed, are
the objectives,
- Accused is entitled to dismissal, equivalent to acquittal if trial is unreasonably delayed
- the right to speedy trial is relative, subject to reasonable delays and postponements.

Impartial trial
- the accused is entitled to the “cold neutrality of an impartial judge”.
 23

Public trial
- a public trial only implies that the court doors must be open to those who wish to come, sit in the
available seats, conduct themselves with decorum and observe the trial process

Right to meet witness face to face

- right to cross-examine complainant and witnesses. testimony of witness inadmissible if not
subjected to cross-examination.

Right to compusolry process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of
evidence
- subpoena ad testificandum (persons) and subpoena duces tecum (books, records, things)

Trial in absentia
- Gimenez v. Nazareno
- is mandatory upon the court whenever the accused has been arraigned, notified of date’s of
hearing, and his absence is unjustified.
- The presence of the accused is mandatory during arraignment and please, during trial, for
identification, during promulgation except for light offenses wherein counsel or representative is
sufficient

Corpuz V. People, 194 Scra 73

The equipoise rule invoked by the petitioner is applicable only where the evidence of the parties
is evenly balanced, in which case the constitutional presumption of innocence should tilt the scales in
favor of the accused.

Estrada V. Desierto, March 2, 2001

Issue: Whether or not the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial
publicity.
Be that as it may, we recognize that pervasive and prejudicial publicity under certain circumstances can
deprive an accused of his due process right to fair trial. To warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity there
must be ALLEGATION AND PROOF that the judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that they
might be, by the barrage of publicity. Then and now, we rule that the right of an accused to a fair trial is
not incompatible to a free press. Responsible reporting enhances an accused's right to a fair trial for a
responsible press has always been regarded as the handmaiden of effective judicial
administration,especially in the criminal field.

HELD: Applying the above ruling, we hold that there is not enough evidence to warrant this
Court to enjoin the preliminary investigation of the petitioner by the respondent
Ombudsman. Petitioner needs to offer more than hostile headlines to discharge his
burden of proof. He needs to show more weighty social science evidence to
successfully prove the impaired capacity of a judge to render a bias free decision.)

Abadia V. Ca, Sept. 23, 1994

ID.; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED; RIGHTS AVAILABLE TO ALL,
MILITARY INCLUDED. — The rights under Sec. 14, Article III of the Constitution are clearly
available to all citizens even in the absence of statutory enactment They cannot be denied
to certain individuals because of gaps in the law for which they are not responsible. They
cannot be taken away from certain individuals because of the nature of their vocation.
Members of the military establishment do not waive individual rights on taking up military
uniform. That they become subject to uniquely military rules and procedures does not
 24

imply that they agree to exclusively fall under the jurisdiction of only those rules and
regulations, and opt to stand apart from those rules which govern all of the country's
citizens.

Cosep V. People, May 21, 1998

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; DUE PROCESS; QUESTIONS ASKED BY A
JUDGE DURING PROCEEDINGS TO ELICIT FACTS, NOT A VIOLATION THEREOF. — Petitioner,
like any other accused individual, is entitled to a fair trial before an "impartial and neutral judge" as an
indispensable imperative of due process. Judges must not only be impartial, but must also appear to
be impartial as an added assurance to the parties that the decision will be just. However, this is not to
say that judges must remain passive or silent during the proceedings. Since they are in a better
position to observe the demeanor of the witness as he testifies on the witness stand, it is only natural
for judges to ask questions to elicit facts with a view to attaining justice for the parties. Questions
designed to clarify points and to elicit additional relevant evidence are not improper. Also, the judge,
being the arbiter, may properly intervene in the presentation of evidence to expedite and prevent
unnecessary waste of time.
ID.; ID.; ID.; PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE; MUST BE OVERCOME BY PROOF BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT; BURDEN OF PROOF. — It must be borne in mind that criminal cases
elevated by convicted public officials from the Sandiganbayan deserve the same thorough review by
this Court as criminal cases involving ordinary citizens, simply because the constitutional presumption
of innocence must be overcome by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Where the state fails to meet the
quantum of proof required to overcome the constitutional presumption, the accused is entitled to
acquittal, regardless of the weakness or even the absence of his defense for any conviction must rest
on the strength of the prosecution's case and not on the weakness of the defense.

Dumlao V. Comelec, 95 Scra 392

Explicit is the constitutional provision that, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and
counsel (Article IV, section 19, 1973 Constitution). An accusation, according to the fundamental law, is
not synonymous with guilt. The challenged proviso contravenes the constitutional presumption of
innocence, as a candidate is disqualified from running from public office on the ground alone that
charges have been filed against him before a civil or military tribunal. It condemns before one is fully
heard. In ultimate effect, except as to the degree of proof, no distinction is made between a person
convicted of acts of disloyalty and one against whom charges have been filed for such acts, as both of
them would be ineligible to run for public office.

Gideon V. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335

The right of an indigent defendant in a criminal trial to have the assistance of counsel is a
fundamental right essential to a fair trial, and petitioner's trial and conviction without the assistance of
counsel violated the Fourteenth Amendment

Guerrero V. Ca, June 28, 1996

2. ID.; ID.; WHEN THE RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL IS DEEMED VIOLATED. — The right to speedy
trial is violated only where there is an unreasonable, vexatious and oppressive delay without the
participation or fault of the accused, or when unjustified postponements are sought which prolong the
trial for unreasonable lengths of time.

3. ID.; ID.; SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASES; CONSTRUED. — The case of Caballero vs. Alfonso,
Jr., 153, SCRA 153, 162-163 (August 21, 1987), laid down the guidelines in determining the
 25

applicability of the "speedy disposition" formula: ". . . '[S]peedy disposition of cases' is a relative term.
Just like the constitutional guarantee of 'speedy trial' accorded an accused in all criminal proceedings,
'speedy disposition of cases' is a flexible concept. It is consistent with delays and depends upon the
circumstances. What the Constitution prohibits are unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive delays
which render rights nugatory. In the determination of whether or not the right to a 'speedy trial' has
been violated, certain factors may be considered and balanced against each other. These are length
of delay, reason for the delay, assertion of the right or failure to assert it, and prejudice caused by the
delay. The same factors may also be considered in answering judicial inquiry whether or not a person
officially charged with the administration of justice has violated the 'speedy disposition of cases'
guarantee."

Miranda V. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436

In each of these cases, the defendant, while in police custody, was questioned by police
officers, detectives, or a prosecuting attorney in a room in which he was cut off from the outside world.
None of the defendants was given a full and effective warning of his rights at the outset of the
interrogation process. In all four cases, the questioning elicited oral admissions, and, in three of them,
signed statements as well, which were admitted at their trials. All defendants were convicted, and all
convictions, except in No. 584, were affirmed on appeal.
The privilege against self-incrimination, which has had a long and expansive historical
development, is the essential mainstay of our adversary system, and guarantees to the individual the
"right to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will," during a
period of custodial interrogation
In the absence of other effective measures, the following procedures to safeguard the Fifth
Amendment privilege must be observed: the person in custody must, prior to interrogation, be clearly
informed that he has the right to remain silent, and that anything he says will be used against him in
court; he must be clearly informed that he has the right to consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer
with him during interrogation, and that, if he is indigent, a lawyer will be appointed to represent him.

People V. Teehankee, Oct. 6, 1995

ID.; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED; RIGHT OF AN ACCUSED TO A
FAIR TRIAL NOT INCOMPATIBLE TO A FREE PRESS. — We cannot sustain appellant's claim that
he was denied the right to impartial trial due to prejudicial publicity. It is true that the print and
broadcast media gave the case at bar pervasive publicity, just like all high profile and high stake
criminal trials. Then and now, we rule that the right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a
free press. To be sure, responsible reporting enhances an accused's right to a fair trial for, as well
pointed out, "a responsible press has always been regarded as the handmaiden of effective judicial
administration, especially in the criminal field.

Mapa V. Sandiganbayan, April 26, 1994

The denial of the right to be free from further prosecution of a cooperative witness who has
been granted immunity is the core issue posed in this petition. On balance are important rights in
conflict: the right of an individual who has surrendered his constitutional prerogative to be silent to the
State to be exempt from further prosecution; the right of the State to prosecute all persons who
appears to have committed a crime and its prerogative to revoke the immunity it has granted to an
accused for breach of agreement; and the extent of the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as an
impartial tribunal to review the grant of immunity extended by the PCGG to an accused.

HABEAS CORPUS

- lies only where the restraint of a person’s liberty has been judicially adjudged to be illegal or
unlawful.
 26

- suspension is in case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, may for the
period not exceeding 60days suspend the privilege of the write of habeas corpus.
- within 48hours the President shall submit a report to Congress, congress voting jointly aby a
vote atleast a majority in regular or special session.
- suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion
or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion.
- during suspension, any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within 3
days, otherwise he shall be relased.

Caunca v. Salazar, 82 Phil. 851

"An employment agency, regardless of the amount it may advance to a prospective employee
or maid, has absolutely no power to curtail her freedom of movement. The fact that no physical force
has been exerted to keep her in the house of the respondent does not make less real the deprivation
of her personal freedom of movement, freedom to transfer from one place to another, freedom to
choose one's residence. Freedom may be lost due to external moral compulsion to founded or
groundless fear, to erroneous belief in the existence of the will. If the actual effect of such
psychological spell is to place a person at the mercy of another, the victim is entitled to the protection
of courts of justice as much as the individual who is illegally deprived of liberty by duress or physical
coercion.
ID.; SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS; HABEAS CORPUS; WHEN WRIT NOT ISSUED; EXCEPTION.
— As a general rule, the writ of habeas corpus will not issue where the person alleged to be restrained
of his liberty in custody of an officer under a process issued by the court which jurisdiction to do so. In
exceptional circumstances, habeas corpus may be granted by the courts even when the person
concerned is detained pursuant to a valid arrest or his voluntary surrender, for this writ of liberty is
recognized as "the fundamental instrument for safeguarding individual freedom against arbitrary and
lawless state action" due to "its ability to cut through barriers of form and procedural mazes." Thus, in
previous cases, we issued the writ where the deprivation of liberty, while initially valid under the law,
had later become invalid, and even though the persons praying for its issuance were not completely
deprived of their liberty.
ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT THE APPROPRIATE REMEDY FOR ASSERTING ONE'S RIGHT TO BAIL.
— [A] petition for habeas corpus is not the appropriate remedy for asserting one's right to bail. It
cannot be availed of where accused is entitled to bail not as a matter of right but on the discretion of
the court and the latter has not abused such discretion in refusing to grant bail, or has not even
exercised said discretion. The proper recourse is to file an application for bail with the court where the
criminal case is pending and to allow hearings thereon to proceed.

Ex Parte Merryman, 17 Fed. Cas. No. 9487

The Constitution does not give the president the authority to suspend, or authorize the
suspension of, the writ of habeas corpus. The writ of habeas corpus may only be suspended by
Congress. The constitutional clause allowing such suspension is found in Article I, which details
legislative powers. If the authority to suspend the writ of habeas corpus were meant to be given to the
executive, it would be found in the second article. The president may not take it upon himself to
exercise a power reserved to Congress, even in times of emergency, tumult, or danger.

Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2

A petition for a writ of habeas corpus, duly presented, is the institution of a cause on behalf of
the petitioner, and the allowance or refusal of the process, as well as the subsequent disposition of the
prisoner is matter of law, and not of discretion.
Neither the President nor Congress nor the Judiciary can disturb any one of the safeguards of
civil liberty incorporated into the Constitution except so far as the right is given to suspend in certain
cases the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
 27

In re Yamashita, 327 U. S. 1
On an application for habeas corpus, the Court is not concerned with the guilt or innocence of
the petitioner.

In re: Sumulong, Dec. 25, 1995

REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS; HABEAS CORPUS; PROPER ONLY WHERE
RESTRAINT IS ILLEGAL OR UNLAWFUL. — Habeas corpus lies only where the restraint of a
person's liberty has been judicially adjudged as illegal or unlawful. In the instant petition, the
incarceration of Torres remains legal considering that, were it not for the grant of conditional pardon
which had been revoked because of a breach thereof, the determination of which is beyond judicial
scrutiny, he would have served his final sentence for his first conviction until November 2, 2000.||| (In
re: Torres v. Director, Bureau of Corrections, G.R. No. 122338, [December 29, 1995], 321 PHIL 1105-
1111)
Magno v. CA, 212 SCRA 229
1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS; HABEAS CORPUS; PETITION
THEREOF BECOMES MOOT AND ACADEMIC WHEN A PERSON IS ALREADY RELEASED FROM
DETENTION. — Petitioner’s release from detention has rendered this petition moot and academic
insofar as it questions the legality of her arrest and detention. A habeas corpus proceeding." . . shall
extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty . . .
." (Rule 102, Sec. 1, Revised Rules of Court).

Ordonez v. Director of Prisons, 235 SCRA 152

"those civilians who were convicted by military courts and who have been serving (but not yet completed)
their sentences of imprisonment for the past many years" . . . "may be given the option either to complete the
service of their sentence, or be tried anew by the civil courts. Upon conviction, they should be credited in the
service of their sentence for the full period of their previous imprisonment. Upon acquittal, they should be set free.

SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASES

- applies not only during trial but even after the submission for decision.

Abadia v. CA, 236 SCRA 676

- the right extends to all citizens and covers the period before , during, and after the trial.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL; CANNOT BE
DENIED BY FACT THAT THERE IS NO TIME LIMIT WITHIN WHICH RECORDS OF COURT
MARTIAL SHOULD BE FORWARDED TO THE APPROPRIATE REVIEWING AUTHORITY; CASE AT
BENCH. — In the context of the constitutional protection guaranteeing fair trial rights to accused
individuals particularly the Right to a Speedy Trial, we cannot accept petitioners' submission that the
absence of any specific provision limiting the time within which records of general courts martial should
be forwarded to the appropriate reviewing authority and for the reviewing authority to decide on the
case would deny private respondent — or any military personnel facing charges before the General
Courts Martial, for that matter — a judicial recourse to protect his constitutional right to speedy trial.
What petitioners suggest is untenable. In the case at bench, the records of the case may indefinitely
remain with the General Court Martial, and our courts, because of a procedural gap in the rules, cannot
be called upon to ascertain whether certain substantive rights have been or are being denied in the
meantime. That is not the spirit ordained by inclusion of the second paragraph of Article VIII, Section 1
of the Constitution which mandates the "duty of the Courts of Justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of an
 28

branch or instrumentality of the government." Moreover, the absence of rules and regulations
mandating a reasonable period within which the appropriate appellate military authority should act in a
case subject to mandatory review is no excuse for denial of a substantive right. The Bill of Rights
provisions of the 1987 Constitution were precisely crafted to expand substantive fair trial rights and to
protect citizens from procedural machinations which tend to nullify those rights. Moreover, Section 16,
Article III of the Constitution extends the right to a speedy disposition of cases to cases "before all
judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative bodies." This protection extends to all citizens, including those
in the military and covers the periods before, during and after the trial, affording broader protection than
Section 14(2) which guarantees merely the right to a speedy trial.
RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION

- testimonial compulsion only.

- simply against the legal process of extracting from the lips of the accused an admission of his guilt.
- includes specimen of handwriting or documents, papers, and chattels except when the state has the right
to inspect the same such as the books of accounts of corporations, under the police or taxing power.

Immunity

1. transactional immunity- such that may be granted by the CHR to any person whose testimony is
necessary, which make the witness immune from criminal prosecution for an offense to which is
compelled testimony relates.
2. use and fruit immunity – prohibits the use of the witness compelled testimony and its fruits in any manner
in connection with the criminal prosection of the witness
Pascual v. Board of Medical Examiners, May 26, 1969
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; RIGHTS OF AN ACCUSED; RIGHT AGAINST SELF-
INCRIMINATION; APPLICABILITY THEREOF IN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS. — Where
petitioner was the respondent in the malpractice charge filed against him with the Board of Medical
Examiners, the said Board cannot compel him to take the witness stand as a witness for the
complainants. The principle against self-incrimination is equally applicable to a proceeding that could
possibly result in the loss of the privilege to practice the medical profession.

2.ID.; ID.; ID.; RIGHT INCLUDES RIGHT TO SILENCE. — The constitutional guarantee against self-
incrimination is not limited to that of allowing a witness to object to questions the answers to which
could lead to a penal liability being subsequently incurred. The constitutional guarantee protects as well
the right to silence.

3.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REASON. — Why the constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination protects as
well the right to silence should be thus is not difficult to discern. The constitutional guarantee, along with
other rights granted an accused, stands for a belief that while crime should not go unpunished and that
the truth must be revealed, such desirable objectives should not be accomplished according to means
or methods offensive to the high sense of respect accorded the human personality. More and more in
line with the democratic creed, the deference accorded an individual even those suspected of the most
heinous crimes is given due weight.

4.ID.; ID.; ID.; SAID RIGHT IS IDENTIFIED WITH RIGHT TO PRIVACY. — It is of interest to note that
while earlier decisions stressed the principle of humanity on which the right against self-incrimination is
predicated, precluding as it does all resort to force or compulsion, whether physical or mental, current
judicial opinion places equal emphasis on its identification with the right to privacy.

People v. Tranca, Aug. 17, 1994

 29

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION; NOT

VIOLATED WHERE ACCUSED WAS MADE TO UNDERGO AN ULTRA VIOLET RAY EXAMINATION.
— The defense contends that the right of the accused against self-incrimination was violated when he
was made to undergo an ultraviolet ray examination. The defense also argues that Chief Chemist
Teresita Alberto failed to inform the accused of his right to counsel before subjecting him to the
examination. These contentions are without merit. What is prohibited by the constitutional guarantee
against self-incrimination is the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communication from the
witness, not an inclusion of his body in evidence, when it may be material. Stated otherwise, it is simply
a prohibition against legal process to extract from the defendant's own lips, against his will, an
admission of guilt. Nor can the subjection of the accused's body to ultraviolet radiation, in order to
determine the presence of ultraviolet powder, be considered a custodial investigation so as to warrant
the presence of counsel.||| (People v. Tranca y Arellano, G.R. No. 110357, [August 17, 1994])

Villaflor v. Summers, 41 Phil. 62

The constitutional guaranty, that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself, is limited to a prohibition against compulsory testimonial self-incrimination. On a proper showing
and under an order of the trial court, an ocular inspection of the body of the accused is permissible.

RIGHT AGAINST INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE

Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U. S. 219; 55 L. Ed. 191

Although a state statute in terms be to punish fraud, if its natural and inevitable purpose is to
punish for crime for failing to perform contracts of labor, thus compelling such performance, it violates
the Thirteenth Amendment, and is unconstitutional.

A constitutional prohibition cannot be transgressed indirectly by creating a statutory presumption any

more than by direct enactment, and a state cannot compel involuntary servitude in carrying out
contracts of personal service by creating a presumption that the person committing the breach is guilty
of intent to defraud merely because he fails to perform the contract.

US v. Pompeya, 31 Phil. 245

PHILIPPINE LEGISLATURE; LEGISLATIVE POWER; MUNICIPAL PATROLS. — The Philippine
Legislature has power to legislate upon all subjects; affecting the people of the Philippine Islands, which has not
been delegated to Congress or expressly prohibited by the Philippine Bill (Act of Congress of July 1,1902).
(Gaspar vs. Molina, 6 Phil. Rep., 197; U. S. vs. Bull, 16 Phil. Rep., 7.) Under said general power the Philippine
Legislature has a right to require able-bodied male residents of the different municipalities, between the ages of
18 and 60, to assist, for a period not exceeding five days in any one month, in apprehending ladrones, robbers,
and other lawbreakers, and suspicious characters, and to act as patrols for the protection of the municipality, not
exceeding one day of each week. And also to require each householder to report certain facts enumerated in the
law.||| (U.S. v. Pompeya, G.R. No. 10255, [August 6, 1915], 31 PHIL 245-257)

CRUEL AND INHUMAN PUNISHMENT

People v. Dacuycuy, 173 SCRA 90

"The rule is established beyond question that a punishment authorized by statute is not cruel or
unusual or disproportionate to the nature of the offense unless it is a barbarous one unknown to the law
or so wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the moral sense of the
community.
The Constitution directs that 'Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishment inflicted.' The prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments is generally aimed at the form
or character of the punishment rather than its severity in respect of duration or amount, and apply to
 30

punishments which never existed in America, or which public sentiment has regarded as cruel or
obsolete (15 Am. Jur., p. 172), for instance there (sic) inflicted at the whipping post, or in the pillory,
burning at the stake, breaking on the wheel, disemboweling, and the like (15 Am. Jur. Supra, Note 35
L.R.A. p. 561). Fine and imprisonment would not thus be within the prohibition.' (People vs. de la Cruz,
92 Phil. 906)."

People v. Echegaray, G.R. 117472, Feb. 7, 1997

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; PROSCRIPTION AGAINST CRUEL,
DEGRADING OR INHUMAN PUNISHMENT; DEATH PER SE, NOT CRUEL, DEGRADING OR
INHUMAN. — The death penalty per se is not a cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment. In the oft-
cited case of Harden vs. Director of Prisons, this Court held that "[p]unishments are cruel when they
involve torture or a lingering death; but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that
word as used in the constitution .It implies there something inhuman and barbarous, something more
than the mere extinguishment of life."||| (Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 132601, [October
12, 1998], 358 PHIL 410-476)
ID; ID; ID; DEATH BY LETHAL INJECTION, CONSTITUTIONAL; INFLICTION OF PAIN,
MERELY INCIDENTAL. — Any infliction of pain in lethal injection is merely in carrying out the execution
of the death penalty and does not fall within the constitutional prescription against cruel, degrading or
inhuman punishment. "In a limited sense, anything is cruel which is calculated to give pain or distress,
and since punishment imports pain of suffering to the convict, it may be said that all punishment are
cruel. But of course the Constitution does not mean that crime, for this reason, is to go unpunished."
The cruelty against which the Constitution protects a convicted man is cruelty inherent in the method of
punishment, not the necessary suffering involved in any method employed to extinguish life
humanely.||| (Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 132601, [October 12, 1998], 358 PHIL 410-
476)

Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, GR 132601, Jan. 19, 1999

The Constitution Abolished Death Penalty

Section 19, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:

"Sec. 19.(1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment
inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless for compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to
reclusion perpetua." (Underscoring supplied)

The second and third sentences of the above provision are new and had not been written in the 1935,
1973 or even in the 1986 "Freedom Constitution." They proscribe the imposition 5 of the death penalty
"unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, Congress provides for it," and reduced "any
death penalty already imposed" to reclusion perpetua.The provision has both a prospective aspect (it
bars the future imposition of the penalty) and a retroactive one (it reduces imposed capital sentences to
the lesser penalty of imprisonment).

Congressional Prerogative to Prescribe Death

To me, it is very clear that the Constitution (1) effectively removed the death penalty from the then
existing statutes but (2) authorized Congress to restore it at some future time to enable or empower
courts to re-impose it on condition that it (Congress) 9 finds "compelling reasons, involving heinous
crimes." The language of the Constitution is emphatic (even if "awkward" 10 ):the authority of Congress
to "provide for it" is not absolute. Rather, it is strictly limited:

(1)by "compelling reasons" that may arise after the Constitution became effective; and
 31

(2)to crimes which Congress should identify or define or characterize as "heinous."

People v. Esparas, July 10, 1998

Four members of the Court — although maintaining their adherence to the separate opinions expressed
in People vs. Echegaray (G.R. No. 127472, February 12, 1997) that R.A. No. 7659, insofar as it prescribes the
death penalty, is unconstitutional — nevertheless submit to the ruling of the Court, by a majority vote, that the law
is constitutional and that the death penalty should accordingly be imposed.

NON IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT

Lozano v. Martinez, 146 SCRA 323

9. ID.; ID.; POLICE POWER; BATASANG PAMBANSA 22; VALID EXERCISE THEREOF; NOT
REPUGNANT TO CONSTITUTIONAL INHIBITION AGAINST IMPRISONMENT FORDEBT. —
The police power of the state has been described as "the most essential, insistent
and illimitable of powers" which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort,
safety and welfare of society. It is power not emanating from or conferred by the
constitution, but inherent in the state, plenary, "suitably vague and far from precisely
defined, rooted in the conception that man in organizing the state and imposing upon the
government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable
individual citizens or group of citizens to obstruct unreason able the enactment of such
salutary measures to ensure communal peace, safety, good order and welfare." The
enactment of B.P. 22 is a declaration by the legislature that, as a matter of public policy,
the making and issuance of a worthless check is deemed a public nuisance to be abated
by the imposition of penal sanctions. The effect of the issuance of a worthless checks
transcends the private interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and
touches the interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong
to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public. In sum, we find the enactment of
B.P. 22 a valid exercise of the police power and is not repugnant to the constitutional
inhibition against imprisonment for debt.

People v. Nitafan, 207 SCRA 726

D.; BILL OF RIGHTS; DOUBLE JEOPARDY; REQUISITES; CASE AT BAR. — Double
jeopardy connotes the concurrence of three requisites, which are: (a) the first jeopardy must have
attached prior to the second, (b) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated, and (c) the
second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the first or the second offense includes or is
necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information, or is an attempt to commit the same
or is a frustration thereof. In this case, it is manifestly clear that no first jeopardy has yet attached nor
any such jeopardy terminated.
ID.; ID.; ID.; ATTACHMENT OF FIRST JEOPARDY; CASE AT BAR. — The first jeopardy
attaches only (1) upon a valid indictment, (2) before a competent court, (3) after arraignment, (4) when
a valid plea has been entered, and (5) when the defendant was convicted or acquitted, or the case was
dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused. Other than the Solicitor-
General's allegation of pending suits in Branch 26-Manila, respondent judge has no other basis on
whether private respondent had already been arraigned, much less entered a plea in those cases
pending before the said Branch. Even assuming that there was already arraignment and plea with
respect to those cases in Branch 26-Manila which respondent judge used as basis to quash the three
informations pending in his sala, still the first jeopardy has not yet attached. Precisely, those Branch 26-
Manila cases are still pending and there was as yet no judgment on the merits at the time respondent
judge quashed the three informations in his sala. Private respondent was not convicted, acquitted nor
 32

the cases against her in Branch 26-Manila dismissed or otherwise terminated which definitely shows
the absence of the fifth requisite for the first jeopardy to attach. Accordingly, it was wrong to say that the
further prosecution of private respondent under the three informations pending in Branch 56-Manila
would violate the former's right against double jeopardy. cH||| (People v. Nitafan, G.R. Nos. 107964-66,
[February 1, 1999], 362 PHIL 58-75)

DOUBLE JEOPARDY
Requisites:
1. Valid complaint or information
2. Filed before a competent court
3. to which defendant had pleaded
4. defendant was previously acquitted or convicted, or the case dismissed or otherwise terminated
without his express consent

Dismissal of action may either be:

1. permanent dismissal
2. provisional dismissal
- the dismissal of an action on procedural grounds, not being an acquittal, does not give rise to
double jeopardy

Requisites for a valid defense of double jeopardy: [ATS]

1) [A] First jeopardy must have attached prior to the second.
2) [T] The first jeopardy must have terminated.
3) [S] The second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the first.

When does jeopardy ATTACH: (1st requisite) [CICAV]

1) [C] A person is charged
2) [I] Under a complaint or information sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction
3) [C] Before a court of competent jurisdiction
4) [A] After the person is arraigned
5) [V] Such person enters a valid plea.

When does jeopardy NOT attach:

1) If information does not charge any offense
2) If, upon pleading guilty, the accused presents evidence of complete self-defense, and the court
thereafter acquits him without entering a new plea of not guilty for accused.
3) If the information for an offense cognizable by the RTC is filed with the MTC.
4) If a complaint filed for preliminary investigation is dismissed.

When does first jeopardy TERMINATE: (2ND REQUISITE)

1) Acquittal
2) Conviction
3) Dismissal W/O the EXPRESS consent of the accused
4) Dismissal on the merits.

Examples of termination of jeopardy:

1) Dismissal based on violation of the right to a speedy trial. This amounts to an acquittal.
2) Dismissal based on a demurrer to evidence. This is a dismissal on the merits.
 33

3) Dismissal on motion of the prosecution, subsequent to a motion for reinvestigation filed by the
accused.
4) Discharge of an accused to be a state witness. This amounts to an acquittal.

When can the PROSECUTION appeal from an order of dismissal:

 If dismissal is on motion of the accused. Exception: If motion is based on violation of the right
to a speedy trial or on a demurrer to evidence.
 If dismissal does NOT amount to an acquittal or dismissal on the merits
 If the question to be passed upon is purely legal.
 If the dismissal violates the right of due process of the prosecution.
 If the dismissal was made with grave abuse of discretion. (Certiorari is applicable only when
correcting errors of jurisdiction, but not in order to correct findings or conclusions of the court)

What are considered to be the “SAME OFFENSE”:

1) Exact identity between the offenses charged in the first and second cases.
2) One offense is an attempt to commit or a frustration of the other offense.
3) One offense is necessarily included or necessary includes the other.

Note: where a single act results in the violation of different laws or different provisions of the same law,
the prosecution for one will not bar the other so long as none of the exceptions apply.

II. SAME ACT

Double jeopardy will result if the act punishable under the law and the ordinance are the same. For
there to be double jeopardy, it is not necessary that the offense be the same.

SUPERVENING FACTS
1) Under the Rules of Court, a conviction for an offense will not bar a prosecution for an offense
which necessarily includes the offense charged in the former information where:

a) The graver offense developed due to a supervening fact arising from the same act or omission
constituting the former charge.
b) The facts constituting the graver offense became known or were discovered only after the filing
of the former information.
c) The plea of guilty to the lesser offense was made without the consent of the fiscal and the
offended party.

2) Under (1)(b), if the facts could have been discovered by the prosecution but were not
discovered because of the prosecution’s incompetence, it would not be considered a supervening
event.

Effect of appeal by the accused:

If the accused appeals his conviction, he WAIVES his right to plead double jeopardy. The whole case
will be open to review by the appellate court. Such court may even increase the penalties imposed on
the accused by the trial court.

EX POST FACTO LAWS AND BILL OF ATTAINDER

 34

Ex post facto law characteristics:

1. refers to criminal matters
2. retroactive in application
3. it works to the prejudice of the accused

Bayot v. Sandiganbayan, 128 SCRA 383

- law not held to be ex post facto law as the suspension was not punitive, but merely preventive

People v. Ferrer, 48 SCRA 382

- The anti-subversion act was held not to be an ex post facto law, because it is not applied
retroactively

Wright v. CA, Aug. 15, 1994

- retroactive application of the treaty of extradition does not violate the prohibition on ex post facto laws
because the treaty is neither a piece of criminal legislation nor a criminal procedural statute.

Bill of Attainder – it is a legislative act that inflicts punishment without trial

ACADEMIC FREEDOM

In Non v. Dames, 185 SCRA 523, the Supreme Court reversed its ruling
in Alcuaz v. PSBA, 161 SCRA 7, declaring that the “termination of contract” theory
in Alcuaz can no longer be used as a valid ground to deny readmission or reenrolment
to students who had led or participated in student mass actions against
the school. The Court held that the students do not shed their constitutionallyprotected
rights of free expression at the school gates

University of San Agustin v. CA, March 7, 1994

- school may refuse to enroll a student for academic delinquencies. It cannot be compelled by
mandamus to enroll a student. In the same case it was held that a school has the right to refuse
to enroll a student and such refusal falls within the academic freedom clause of the Constitution.