National Highway Traffic Safety

Administration
The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA
National Highway Traffic
/ˈnɪtsə/ NITS-ə)[7] is an agency of the U.S. federal government,
part of the Department of Transportation. It describes its mission as Safety Administration
"Save lives, prevent injuries, reduce vehicle-related crashes"[8] (NHTSA)
related to transportation safety in the United States.

NHTSA is charged with writing and enforcing Federal Motor

Vehicle Safety Standards as well as regulations for motor vehicle Agency overview
theft resistance and fuel economy, as part of the Corporate
Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) system. FMVSS 209 was the first Formed December 31, 1970
standard to become effective on March 1, 1967. NHTSA also Preceding National Highway
licenses vehicle manufacturers and importers, allows or blocks the agency Safety Bureau[1]
import of vehicles and safety-regulated vehicle parts, administers
the vehicle identification number (VIN) system, develops the Jurisdiction U.S. motor
anthropomorphic dummies used in U.S. safety testing as well as vehicles[2]
the test protocols themselves, and provides vehicle insurance cost Headquarters Washington, D.C.,
information. The agency has asserted preemptive regulatory U.S.
authority over greenhouse gas emissions, but this has been
Motto "People saving
disputed by such state regulatory agencies as the California Air
Resources Board. people"[3]
Employees 626 (FY 2017)[4][5]
The Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards are contained in the
Annual $899 million (FY
United States 49 CFR 571 (https://ecfr.federalregister.gov/current/ti
tle-49/part-571). Additional federal vehicle standards are contained budget 2017)[4]
elsewhere in the CFR. Another of NHTSA's major activities is the Agency Steven Cliff[6],
creation and maintenance of the data files maintained by the executives Administrator
National Center for Statistics and Analysis. In particular, the
Jack Danielson,
Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS), has become a
Executive
resource for traffic safety research not only in the United States,
but throughout the world. Research contributions using FARS by director
researchers from many countries appear in many non-U.S. Ann E. Carlson,
technical publications,[9] and provide a significant database and Chief counsel
knowledge bank on the subject. Even with this database,
Parent Department of
conclusive analysis of crash causes often remains difficult and
controversial, with experts debating the veracity and statistical department Transportation
validity of results.[9] Website nhtsa.gov (https://n
htsa.gov)

Contents
History
International counterparts and the grey market
Regulatory performance
Development of Standardized Field Sobriety Testing
(SFST)
Data-Driven Approaches to Crime and Traffic Safety
(DDACTS)
Cost and cost-benefit
Fuel economy
CAFE Regulations
Performance
Aerodynamics brings change to NHTSA
NCAP
Administration
See also
References
Further reading
External links

History
In 1964 and 1966, public pressure grew in the United States to increase the safety of cars, culminating with
the publishing of Unsafe at Any Speed, by Ralph Nader, an activist lawyer, and the report prepared by the
National Academy of Sciences entitled Accidental Death and Disability: The Neglected Disease of Modern
Society.

In 1966, Congress held a series of publicized hearings regarding highway safety, passed legislation to make
the installation of seat belts mandatory, and created the U.S. Department of Transportation on October 15,
1966 (Pub.L.  89–670 (https://uslaw.link/citation/us-law/public/89/670)). Legislation signed by President
Lyndon Johnson earlier on September 9, 1966, included the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act
(Pub.L. 89–563 (https://uslaw.link/citation/us-law/public/89/563)) and Highway Safety Act (Pub.L. 89–564
(https://uslaw.link/citation/us-law/public/89/564)) that created the National Traffic Safety Agency, the
National Highway Safety Agency, and the National Highway Safety Bureau, predecessor agencies to what
would eventually become NHTSA. Once the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSS) came into
effect, vehicles not certified by the maker or importer as compliant with US safety standards were no longer
legal to import into the United States.

Congress established NHTSA in 1970 with the Highway Safety Act of 1970 (Title II of Pub.L. 91–605 (htt
ps://uslaw.link/citation/us-law/public/91/605), 84  Stat.  1713 (http://legislink.org/us/stat-84-1713), enacted
December 31, 1970, at 84  Stat.  1739 (http://legislink.org/us/stat-84-1739)). In 1972, the Motor Vehicle
Information and Cost Savings Act (Pub.L.  92–513 (https://uslaw.link/citation/us-law/public/92/513),
86 Stat. 947 (http://legislink.org/us/stat-86-947), enacted October 20, 1972) expanded NHTSA's scope to
include consumer information programs. Since then, automobiles have become far better at protecting their
occupants in vehicle impacts. The number of deaths on American highways hovers around 33,000
annually,[10] a lower death rate per vehicle-mile traveled than in the 1960s.

NHTSA has conducted numerous high-profile investigations of automotive safety issues, including the
Audi 5000/60 Minutes affair, the Ford Explorer rollover problem, and the Toyota sticky accelerator pedal
problem. The agency has introduced a proposal to mandate Electronic Stability Control on all passenger
vehicles by the 2012 model year. This technology was first brought to public attention in 1997, with the
Swedish moose test. Other than that, NHTSA has issued only a few regulations in the past 25 years. Most
of the reduction in vehicle fatality rates during the last third of the 20th century were gained from the initial
NHTSA safety standards during 1968–1984 and subsequent voluntary changes in vehicle crashworthiness
by vehicle manufacturers.[11]

International counterparts and the grey market

In 1958, under the auspices of the United Nations, a consortium called the Economic Commission for
Europe had been established to normalize vehicle regulations across Europe to standardize best practices in
vehicle design and equipment and minimize technical barriers to pan-European vehicle trade and traffic.
This eventually became the World Forum for Harmonization of Vehicle Regulations, which began to
promulgate what would eventually become the UN Regulations on the design, construction, and safety and
emissions performance of vehicles and their components. Many of the world's countries accept or require
vehicles and equipment built to the UN Regulations,[12] but the U.S does not recognize the UN
Regulations and blocks the importation of vehicles and components not manufacturer-certified as
complying with the U.S. regulations.[13]

Because of the unavailability in America of certain vehicle models, a grey market arose in the late 1970s.
This provided a method to acquire vehicles not officially offered in the United States, but enough vehicles
imported this way were faulty, shoddy, and unsafe[14][15][16] that Mercedes-Benz of North America helped
launch a successful congressional lobbying effort to close down the grey market in 1988.[17] As a result, it
was no longer possible to import foreign vehicles into the United States as a personal import, with few
exceptions—primarily vehicles meeting Canadian regulations substantially similar to those of the United
States, and vehicles imported temporarily for display or research purposes. In practice, the gray market
involved a few thousand cars annually, before its virtual elimination in 1988.[18]

In 1998, NHTSA exempted vehicles older than 25 years from the rules it administers, since these are
presumed to be collector vehicles.[13] In 1999, certain very low production volume specialist vehicles were
also exempt for "Show and Display" purposes.

In the mid-1960s, when the framework was established for US vehicle safety regulations, the US auto
market was an oligopoly, with three companies (GM, Ford, and Chrysler) controlling 85% of the
market.[19] The ongoing ban on newer vehicles considered safe in countries with lower vehicle-related
death rates has created a perception that an effect of NHTSA's regulatory activity is to protect the U.S.
market for a modified oligopoly consisting of the three U.S.-based automakers and the American operations
of foreign-brand producers. It has been suggested[20] that the impetus for NHTSA's seeming preoccupation
with market control rather than vehicular safety performance is a result of overt market protections such as
tariffs and local-content laws having become politically unpopular due to the increasing popularity of free
trade, thus driving the industry to adopt less visible forms of trade restrictions in the form of technical
regulations different from those outside the United States.[21]

An example of the market-control effects of NHTSA's regulatory protocol is found in the agency's 1974
banning of the Citroën SM automobile that contemporary journalists described as one of the safest vehicles
available at the time. NHTSA disapproved the SM's designs featuring steerable headlamps that were not of
the sealed beam design that was then mandatory in the U.S. as well as its height adjustable suspension,
which made compliance with the 1973 bumper requirements cost-prohibitive. The initial bumper
regulations were intended to prevent functional damage to a vehicle's safety-related components such as
lights and fuel system components when subjected to barrier crash tests at 5 miles per hour (8 km/h) at the
front and 2.5  mph (4  km/h) at the rear.[22] However, these regulations at low-speed collisions did not
enhance occupant safety.[23]
Vehicle manufacturers have acknowledged the functional equivalence of the UN and U.S. regulations,
encouraged developing countries to recognize and accept both,[12] and advocated for equal recognition of
both systems in developed countries.[24] However, some structural features of the U.S. legal system are
incompatible with some aspects of the UN regulatory system.[25]

Regulatory performance

Government data (from FARS for the U.S.) in a 2004

book by former General Motors safety researcher
Leonard Evans[26] shows other countries having
achieved greater safety improvements over time than
those achieved in the United States:

1979 2002 Percent

Country
Fatalities Fatalities Change
United
51,093 42,815 −16.2%
States
Annual US traffic fatalities per billion vehicle miles
Great traveled (red), miles traveled (blue), per one million
6,352 3,431 −46.0%
Britain people (orange), total annual deaths (light blue),
Canada 5,863 2,936 −49.9% VMT in 10s of billions (dark blue), and population
in millions (teal), from 1921 to 2017
Australia 3,508 1,715 −51.1%

Research suggests one reason the U.S. continues to lag in traffic safety is the relatively high prevalence in
the U.S. of pickup trucks and SUVs, which a 2003 study by the U.S. Transportation Research Board found
are significantly less safe than passenger cars.[27] Comparisons of past data with the present in the U.S. can
result in distortions, due to a significant population increase and since the level of large commercial truck
traffic has substantially increased from the 1960s, but highway capacity has not kept up.[28][29] However,
other factors exert significant influence; Canada has lower roadway death and injury rates despite a vehicle
mix comparable to that of the U.S.[26] Nevertheless, the widespread use of truck-based vehicles as
passenger carriers is correlated with roadway deaths and injuries not only directly by dint of vehicular
safety performance per se, but also indirectly through the relatively low fuel costs that facilitate the use of
such vehicles in North America. Motor vehicle fatalities decline as gasoline prices increase.[30]

Development of Standardized Field Sobriety Testing (SFST)

NHTSA created a Standardized Field Sobriety Testing (SFST) training curriculum to prepare police
officers and other qualified persons to conduct the SFST's for use in DWI investigations. This training was
developed in combination with the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) and has
experienced remarkable success since its inception in the early 1980s.

Data-Driven Approaches to Crime and Traffic Safety (DDACTS)

NHTSA, along with the Bureau of Justice Assistance and the National Institute of Justice (both part of the
Department of Justice) has a long history of actively promoting the use of traffic stops by local police to
combat crime and search for drugs.[31][32] This approach is controversial and has, in the past, been accused
of encouraging racial profiling of motorists.[33]

Cost and cost-benefit

It is expensive to certify a vehicle; on a particular 2013-model vehicle, certification costs one company US$
42 million for E.U. certification. Studies of the cost of complying with safety standards have concluded that
normalizing regulations between the EU and the US would significantly save development budgets for
manufacturers.[34]

NHTSA uses cost–benefit analysis for every safety device, system, or design feature mandated for
installation on vehicles.[35] No device, system, or design feature may not be mandated unless it will save
more money (in property damage, health care, etc.) than it costs, or must cost no more than a specified
amount of money per life saved. Requirements are balanced through estimated costs and estimated benefits
to justify or reject regulation. For example, FMVSS #208 effectively mandates the installation of frontal
airbags in all new vehicles in the United States, for it is written such that no other technology can meet the
stipulated requirements.[36] It has been argued that even using conservative cost figures and optimistic
benefit figures, airbags' cost–benefit ratio so extreme that it may fall outside of the cost–benefit
requirements for mandatory safety devices.[37][38] Cost–benefit requirements have been used as the basis
for lighting-related regulation in the U.S; for example, while many countries in the world since at least the
early 1970s have required rear turn signals to emit amber light so they might be distinguished from adjacent
red brake lamps, U.S. regulations permit rear turn signals to emit either amber or red light. This has
historically been justified on grounds of lower manufacturing cost[39] and greater automaker styling
freedom in the context of no demonstrated safety benefit to amber over red.[40][41][42] More recent
NHTSA-sponsored research has demonstrated that amber rear turn signals provide significantly better crash
avoidance than red ones,[43][44] and NHTSA has found there is no significant cost penalty to amber signals
versus red ones,[39] yet the agency has not moved to require amber—instead proposing in 2015 to award
extra NCAP points to passenger vehicles with amber rear turn signals.[39] As of July 2019, the agency has
not put this proposal into effect.

Fuel economy

CAFE Regulations

NHTSA also administers the Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE), which is intended to incentivize
the production of fuel-efficient vehicles by dint of fuel economy requirements measured against the sales-
weighted harmonic average of each manufacturer's range of vehicles. Many governments outside North
America promote fuel economy by heavily taxing motor fuel and/or by including a vehicle's weight, engine
size, or fuel economy in calculating vehicle registration taxes (road tax).

Performance

Information about manufacturers' CAFE performance and compliance beginning with the 2011 model year
can be found on the NHTSA website, their Public Information Center (https://one.nhtsa.gov/cafe_pic/hom
e), for both the light-duty and heavy-duty vehicle program. As of 2022, for model years 2005–2010
information can be found on the NHTSA website as Summary of Fuel Economy Performance, 15
December 2014 (https://www.nhtsa.gov/staticfiles/rulemaking/pdf/cafe/Performance-summary-report-1215
2014-v2.pdf).

Aerodynamics brings change to NHTSA

Automakers faced an inherent conflict between NHTSA's stringent headlight legislation, which mandated
unaerodynamic sealed-beam headlights, and the Corporate Average Fuel Economy standard, which
effectively mandated that automakers develop ways to improve the ability of the car to cleave the air. As a
result, in the early 1980s, automakers lobbied for a modification of the mandate for fixed shape sealed-
beam headlamps.

NHTSA adopted Ford's proposal for low-cost aerodynamic headlamps with polycarbonate lenses and
transverse-filament bulbs. The minimum allowed performance and materials durability requirements of this
new headlamp system are lower than those of the previous sealed beam system.

For the 1984 model year, Ford introduced the Lincoln Mark VII, the first car since 1939 to be sold in the
U.S. market with architectural headlamps as part of its aerodynamic design. These composite headlamps,
when new to the American market, were commonly but improperly referred to as "Euro" headlamps, since
aerodynamic headlamps were already common in Europe. Though conceptually similar to European
headlamps with nonstandardized shape and replaceable-bulb construction, these headlamps conform to the
SAE headlamp design standards contained in the U.S. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 108, and not
to the international safety standards used worldwide outside North America.

NCAP

0:00

NHTSA front and side-impact tests of the

2006 Honda Ridgeline at 35 mph (56 km/h)
and 38.5 mph (62 km/h), respectively
Consumer information label for a
vehicle with NCAP rating

United States has been the first country/region to have a NCAP

program before being copied by other regional, European, American, Asiatic, Oceanic or global NCAP
programs. This makes New Car Assessment Program can be colloquial and design either US NCAP or
generic NCAP.

In 1979, NHTSA created the/a New Car Assessment Program (NCAP) in response to Title II of the Motor
Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act of 1972, to encourage manufacturers to build safer vehicles and
consumers to buy them. Since that time, the agency has improved the program by adding rating programs,
facilitating access to test results, and revising the format of the information to make it easier for consumers
to understand.[45] NHTSA asserts the program has influenced manufacturers to build vehicles that
consistently achieve high ratings.[45]

The first standardized 35 mph front crash test was on May 21, 1979, and the first results were released on
October 15 that year.

The agency established a frontal impact test protocol based on Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 208
("Occupant Crash Protection"), except that the frontal 4 NCAP test is conducted at 35  mph (56  km/h),
rather than 30 mph (48 km/h) as required by FMVSS No. 208.
To improve the dissemination of NCAP ratings, and as a result of the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient
Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA–LU), the agency has issued a Final Rule
requiring manufacturers to place NCAP star ratings on the Monroney sticker (automobile price sticker).
The rule had a September 1, 2007 compliance date.[46]

Administration
The agency has an annual budget of $1.09  billion (FY2020). The agency classifies most of its spending
under the driver safety heading, with a minority spent on vehicle safety, and a smaller amount on energy
security matters of which it is in charge, i.e., vehicular fuel economy.

See also
Automobile safety rating
Crash test
FMVSS
Grey-market vehicle
Insurance Institute for Highway Safety
Intelligent Transportation Systems Institute
National Transportation Safety Board
Road-traffic safety
Title 23 of the Code of Federal Regulations
UNECE
Vehicle inspection
Work-related road safety in the United States

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"Validating Benefit and Cost Estimates: The Case of Airbag Regulation". Risk Analysis. 22
(4): 803–811. doi:10.1111/0272-4332.00070 (https://doi.org/10.1111%2F0272-4332.00070).
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39. New Car Assessment Program Request For Comment, US Government Docket NHTSA-
2015-0119, section D(2)(c) (https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=NHTSA-2015-0119-0
001)
40. Automotive Lighting in North America (http://www.drivingvisionnews.com/download.php?filei
d=20110830), Driving Vision News, 2011
41. Hitzemeyer, Erwin G.; Wilde, Helmut; Ellenberger, Donald (1977), "What Color Should Rear
Turn Signals Be?" (https://www.sae.org/publications/technical-papers/content/770812/),
SAE Technical Paper Series, vol. 1, Society of Automotive Engineers - Technical Papers,
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s/Crash%20Avoidance/2008/811050.pdf) (PDF). Archived from the original (http://www.nhts
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Further reading
Kevin M. McDonald, "Shifting Out of Park: Moving Auto Safety from Recalls to Reason"
(Lawyers & Judges Publishing, 2006). ISBN: 978-1933264165.
Evans, Leonard (2004). Traffic Safety. Science Serving Society. ISBN 978-0-9754871-0-5.
Code of Federal Regulations, Title 49, Transportation. Office of the Federal Register
National Archives and Records Administration. 2004. pp. 19–1263. ISBN 978-0-16-072891-
4.
The Century Council's Report on Alcohol-Related Traffic Fatalities in the United States
(2006) (https://web.archive.org/web/20110817033028/http://www.centurycouncil.org/files/TC
C-ARTF_2006_1.pdf)
 Peltzman, Sam. "The Effects of Automobile Safety Regulation." The Journal of Political
Economy 83, no. 4 (August 1975): 677–725. JSTOR link (https://www.jstor.org/stable/18303
96)
"U.S. Appeals Court Orders New Fuel Economy Standards" (https://www.reuters.com/article/
autos-fuel-court/update-2-us-appeals-court-orders-new-fuel-economy-standards-idUKN1532
769520071116?edition-redirect=in). Reuters. November 16, 2007.

External links
Official website (https://www.nhtsa.gov/)
49 CFR Chapter V (https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/49/chapter-V) (National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration)
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/nat
ional-highway-traffic-safety-administration) in the Federal Register
safercar.gov (https://www.safercar.gov/) for official ratings, tips, and recalls
Regulations regarding vehicle importation into the U.S. (http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/cars/rules/i
mport/FAQ%20Site/index.html)
UNECE vehicle safety regulations (https://unece.org/trans/main/wp29/wp29regs)
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (https://web.archive.org/web/200001161031
00/http://www.nhtsa.gov/) at the Wayback Machine (archived January 16, 2000)
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (https://web.archive.org/web/199611121036
47/http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/) at the Wayback Machine (archived November 12, 1996)
Traffic Safety (http://www.scienceservingsociety.com/traffic-safety.htm)
National Archives entry (https://www.archives.gov/research/guide-fed-records/groups/416.ht
ml)
Washington Post article (https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/business/includes/nhtsa_p
rimer.htm)
DOT's list of operating administrators of the NHTSA (https://web.archive.org/web/201010290
72838/http://dotlibrary.dot.gov/Historian/service.htm)

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Department of Transportation.

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