WHETHER SPELICA HAS FOLLOWED PROPER SAFETY PROTOCOLS AS

ESTABLISHED BY IAEA.
Seplica has not followed Proper Safety Protocols as established by IAEA for the following
reasons:
1. The act of Seplica of employing a flawed design of reactor is violative of Article 35
protocol 3 of Geneva Convention which says that

It is prohibited to employ methods or means of warfare which are intended, or may be

expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural
environment.

2. Article 55 Protocol 1
Care shall be taken in warfare to protect the natural environment against widespread,
long-term and severe damage. This protection includes a prohibition of the use of
methods or means of warfare which are intended or may be expected to cause such
damage to the natural environment and thereby to prejudice the health or survival of
the population.

3. Article 56 Protocol 1

Works or installations containing dangerous forces, namely dams, dykes and nuclear
electrical generating stations, shall not be made the object of attack, even where these
objects are military objectives, if such attack may cause the release of dangerous
forces and consequent severe losses among the civilian population.

4. IAEA General Conference Resolution 1987

Which take note of importance of ensuring the safe operation of nuclear power plant
and other nuclear facilities for the common interest of all states.

5. IAEA, Safeguards technical report, International target Values 2010 for measurement
uncertainties in Safeguarding nuclear materials, Safeguards technical report Str-368,
Iaea, Vienna (2010).
Requirement 12 states :

“The government shall ensure that, within the governmental and legal framework,
adequate infrastructural arrangements are established for interfaces of safety with
arrangements for nuclear security and with the State system of accounting for and
control of nuclear material.”

6. InternatIonal Safeguards in the design of nuclear reactors

The guidance is applicable to the design and construction of nuclear power reactors. It
complements the general considerations addressed in International Safeguards in
 nuclear facility design and construction and is written primarily for nuclear reactor
designers and operators.

Flawed design of the nuclear reactor may give rise to potential means through which
one can use to acquire unirradiated direct use nuclear material to subsequently
manufacture a nuclear explosive device.1 It takes the existing nuclear capabilities of
the State into account and how these capabilities can be complemented, misused or
diverted to enable the production of weapons useable material.

The design shall include due consideration of those natural and human induced
external events (i.e. events of origin external to the plant) that have been identified in
the site evaluation process. Causation and likelihood shall be considered in
postulating potential hazards.

7. IAEA Safety Standards

The nuclear installation of Seplica is located in an earthquake prone area in a coastal
city. It is provides that the installation will not be able to bear even the small
concussions. This goes against the IAEA safety standards on seismic designs.

a. Seismic design is the process of designing a nuclear installation to cope with the
effects of the hazards generated by a seismic event, in accordance with specified
performance criteria.
b. For seismic events, it is assumed that early warnings are not possible and that there is
a high probability of combinations with other seismic induced hazards (e.g. internal
fires, floods). Special consideration should be given to the need to provide an
adequate seismic margin for those SSCs ultimately required to prevent an early
radioactive release or a large radioactive release in the event of an earthquake
exceeding those considered for design purposes.
c. Steps are mentioned in 3.5 for seismic design of the nuclear installation which are not
met.
d. All procedures for seismic design should be based on a good understanding of the
consequences of past destructive earthquakes, and this knowledge should be adopted
and realistically applied as provided in 4.1.
e. The installation should met seismic qualification which is not met in this case.
Seismic qualification is the process of verification — through testing, analysis or
other method — of the ability of an SSC to perform its intended function during
and/or following the designated earthquake. 6.1.

1
Diversion , Misuse and Undeclared activities.