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INTERNATION INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS

Page 16 , Topic 2.3 Diversion , Misuse and Undeclared Activities

the IAEA considers all potential means that a State can use to acquire unirradiated direct use
nuclear material to subsequently manufacture a nuclear explosive device. this analysis takes
the existing nuclear capabilities of the State into account and how these capabilities can be
complemented, misused or diverted to enable the production of weapons useable material. the
analysis will assume the possibility of undeclared nuclear material and activities. other
relevant information about a State is also analysed and safeguards measures are implemented
to detect the diversion of declared nuclear material and undeclared activities.

Page 17, Para 1, 7th Line from above


the IAEA can also verify the design and capacity of any processing equipment and systems in
the reactor facility. as part of this design and capacity assessment, it is important for the Iaea
to verify the maximum capacity of the plant, which includes verifying the limitations on the
possible misuse

Page 17, Last Para below Fig. 3 , 5th line from above
the IAEA makes use of several categories of measurements. three of general interest to
designers are measurements that detect gross, partial or bias defects in the declared quantity
of nuclear material [9].
— gross defect refers to an item or batch that has been falsified to the maximum extent
possible, so that all or most of the declared material is missing.
— Partial defect refers to an item or batch that has been falsified to such an extent that some
fraction of the declared amount of material is actually present.
— Bias defect refers to an item or batch that has been slightly falsified so that only a small
fraction of the declared material is missing.

Page 18, Para 2nd immediately below Fig 4

figure 5 shows measurements of irradiated fuel (irradiated direct use material) in the reactor
spent fuel storage pond. for an item facility such as a reactor, differences between the
physical inventory and the accounting records are generally investigated by means other than
statistical evaluation of measurement errors, e.g. by investigating the completeness and
correctness of facility records. Provision can be made in the design and in operations to
facilitate the controlling and verifying of the quantities, locations and movements of the
nuclear material.

Page 27 , Topic No. 4.1 Misuse/ Diversion Scenario


It is important head which established indirect link between nuclear weapon creation and
design of the reactor.

Table 1 Misuse, Diversion scenarios

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