CIVIL LAW

Based on Atty. Elmer Rabuya’s Two-day Bar Lecture

October 8-9, 2018

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS

Accion in Rem verso vs Solution indebiti Principle of Territoriality

Accion in rem verso Solutio indebiti Art. 14. Penal laws and those of public security and
safety shall be obligatory upon all who live or
sojourn in the Philippine territory, subject to the
In both cases:
principles of public international law and to treaty
1. Both are unjustly enriched at the
stipulations.
expense of another,
2. There is payment Nationality Principle
3. An obligation to return what was
unduly delivered or paid arises Art. 15. Laws relating to ​family rights and duties, or
4. Purpose is to prevent unjust to the status, condition and legal capacity of
enrichment persons ​are binding upon citizens of the Philippines,
even though living abroad.

Lex Rei Sitae

1. Defendant has 1. Payment is
been enriched; made; Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is
2. Plaintiff 2. It was made by subject to the law of the country where it is
stipulated.
suffered a loss mistake
3. Enrichment is 3. The payor has
Exception​: However, ​intestate and
without just or no duty to pay;
testamentary successions, both with
legal ground; 4. There is no
respect to the order of succession and to
4. Plaintiff has no binding
the amount of successional rights and to
other action relationship
the intrinsic validity of testamentary
based on between the
provisions​, shall be regulated by the
contract, payor and the
national law of the person whose
quasi-contract, one who
succession is under consideration​, whatever
crime or received
may be the nature of the property and
quasi-delict payment
regardless of the country wherein said
property may be found.
There is no mistake in Essence is payment by
payment. mistake ● All matters concerning the title and
disposition of real property are determined
Note: Mistake refers to by what is known as the ​lex loci rei sitae​.
mistake of fact, except This general principle includes all rules
when it involves a
governing the descent, alienation and
doubtful or difficult
transfer of immovable property and the
interpretation of law validity, effect and construction of wills and
other conveyances.
Source of obligation is Source of obligation is a ● This principle even governs the capacity of
law quasi-contract the person making a deed relating to
 immovable property, no matter what its
nature may be. Thus, an instrument will be
ineffective to transfer title to land if the
person making it is incapacitated by the ​lex
loci rei sitae​, even though under the law of
his domicile and by the law of the place
where the instrument is actually made, his
capacity is undoubted. [Orion Savings Bank
vs. Suzuki, 740 SCRA 345 (2014)]
Lex Loci Celebrationis
Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts,
wills, and other public instruments shall be governed
by the laws of the country in which they are
executed.
When the acts referred to are executed before the
diplomatic or consular officials of the Republic of the
Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities
established by Philippine laws shall be observed in
their execution.
NOTE​: Prohibitive laws concerning persons,
their acts or property, and those which
have, for their object, public order, public
policy and good customs shall not be
rendered ineffective by laws or judgments
promulgated, or by determinations or
conventions agreed upon in a foreign
country.
● In ​Del Soccoro v. Van Wilsem [744 SCRA 516
(2014)], a Dutch national, after divorcing his
Filipino spouse, failed to support their child
for several years. When charged with
violation of R.A. No. 9262 for refusing
and/or failing to give support to the child,
he pleaded the law of the Netherlands to
advance his position that he is not obliged
to support his son.
The Court held that even if the laws of the
Netherlands neither enforce a parent’s
obligation to support his child nor penalize
the noncompliance therewith, said foreign
law cannot be applied in the Philippines
because it is contrary to a sound and
established policy of the forum and that,
additionally, prohibitive laws concerning
persons, their acts or property, and those
which have for their object public order,
public policy and good customs shall not be
rendered ineffective by laws or judgments
promulgated, or by determinations or
conventions agreed upon in a foreign
country. Thus notwithstanding his national
law, his obligation to support his child is still
duly enforceable in the Philippines because
it would be of great injustice to the child to
be denied of financial support when the
latter is entitled thereto.
Principle of Abuse of Right
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his
rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty
and good faith.
● Damnum Absque Injuria if there was a valid
or legitimate exercise of right.
● The proper exercise of a lawful right cannot
constitute a legal wrong for which an action
will lie, although the act may result in
damage to another, for no legal right has
been invaded.
Unfair Competition
Art. 28. Unfair competition in agricultural,
commercial or industrial enterprises or in labor
through the use of force, intimidation, deceit,
machination or any other unjust, oppressive or
highhanded method shall give rise to a right of
action by the person who thereby suffers ​damage​.
● The concept of "unfair competition" under
Article 28 of the NCC is very much broader
than that covered by intellectual property
laws. Under this article, which follows the
extended concept of "unfair competition" in
American jurisdictions, the term covers even
cases of discovery of trade secrets of a
competitor, bribery of his employees,
misrepresentation of all kinds, interference
 with the fulfillment of a competitor’s
contracts, or any malicious interference
with the latter’s business [Willaware
Products Corporation vs. Jesichris
Manufacturing Corp., 734 SCRA 238 (2014)].
In order to qualify the competition as
"unfair," it must have two characteristics:
(1) it must involve an injury to a competitor
or trade rival, and (2) it must involve acts
which are characterized as "contrary to
good conscience," or "shocking to judicial
sensibilities," or otherwise unlawful; in the
language of our law, these include force,
intimidation, deceit, machination or any
other unjust, oppressive or high-handed
method. The public injury or interest is a
minor factor; the essence of the matter
appears to be a private wrong perpetrated
by unconscionable means.
Simplified Elements of damage:
1. Injury sustained by a competitor
2. By reason of an unlawful act
Natural Persons
Art. 40. Birth determines personality; but the
conceived child shall be considered born for all
purposes that are favorable to it, provided it be born
later with the conditions specified in the following
article.
Art. 41. For civil purposes, the fetus is considered
born if it is alive at the time it is completely delivered
from the mother's womb. However, if the fetus had
an intra-uterine life of less than seven months, it is
not deemed born if it dies within twenty-four hours
after its complete delivery from the maternal
womb.
NOTE: ​A conceived child, although as yet
unborn, has a ​limited and provisional
personality for purposes favorable to it,
such as the following rights:
1. To be a donee of simple donations;
2. To receive support;
3. To be a testamentary heir, even if it be
born after the testator’s death
4. To be a beneficiary in an insurance
policy
5. It can be a recipient of a pure
obligation
Q: ​Can the provisional personality of
the child be asserted if the issue is the right
of the parents?
A: ​No​. In Continental Steel
Manufacturing vs Montano, the Supreme
Court said: ​“​We need not establish civil
personality of the unborn child herein since
his/her juridical capacity and capacity to act
as a person are not in issue. It is not a
question before us whether the unborn child
acquired any rights or incurred any
obligations prior to his/her death that were
passed on to or assumed by the childs
parents. The rights to bereavement leave
and other death benefits in the instant case
pertain directly to the parents of the unborn
child upon the latter’s death.”
Rules on Survivorship
Art. 43. If there is a doubt, as between two or more
persons who are called to succeed each other, as to
which of them died first, whoever alleges the death
of one prior to the other, shall prove the same; in
the absence of proof, it is presumed that they died
at the same time and there shall be no transmission
of rights from one to the other.
Survivorship under Art Survivorship under the
43 of the Civil Code Rules of Court
1. Successional
rights are
involved
2. The persons are
heirs of each
other
Marriage
Article 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent
union between a man and a woman entered into in
accordance with law for the establishment of
conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the
family and an inviolable social institution whose
nature, consequences, and incidents are governed
by law and not subject to stipulation, except that
marriage settlements may fix the property relations
during the marriage within the limits provided by
this Code.
Art. 2. No marriage shall be valid, unless these
essential requisites are present:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties
who must be a male and a female; and
(2) Consent freely given in the presence of
the solemnizing officer.
Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:
(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;
2) A valid marriage license except in the
cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title;
and
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place
with the appearance of the contracting
parties before the solemnizing officer and
their personal declaration that they take
each other as husband and wife in the
presence of not less than two witnesses of
legal age.
NOTE: ​In Republic vs. Albios ​[707 SCRA 584
(2013)], where a citizen of the Philippines
got married to an American citizen solely for
the purpose of acquiring American
citizenship in consideration of a sum of
money, it was alleged that the marriage
was void because it was one made in jest
and consent was therefore lacking. In
declaring the marriage to be valid, the Court
ruled that that there is no law that declares
a marriage void if it is entered into for
purposes other than what the Constitution
or law declares, such as the acquisition of
foreign citizenship. While the avowed
purpose of marriage under Article 1 of the
Family Code is for the couple to establish a
conjugal and family life, the possibility that
the parties in a marriage might have no real
intention to establish a life together is,
however, insufficient to nullify a marriage
freely entered into in accordance with law.
Thus, marriages entered into for other
purposes, limited or otherwise, such as
convenience, companionship, money,
status, and title, provided that they comply
with all the legal requisites, are equally
valid. Love, though the ideal consideration
in a marriage contract, is not the only valid
cause for marriage. Other considerations,
not precluded by law, may validly support a
marriage.
Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal
requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio,
except as stated in Article 35 (2).
A defect in any of the essential requisites shall not
affect the validity of the marriage but the party or
parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly,
criminally and administratively liable.
Essential Formal
Absence Void GR:​ Void
Exception: if
both/either parties
believed in good faith
that the solemnizing
officer had legal
authority to
solemnize
Defect Voidable
Irregularity Does not affect the marriage but
the party responsible shall be civilly,
criminally and administratively
liable.
Marriage License
Art. 20. The license shall be valid in any part of the
Philippines for a period of one hundred twenty days
from the date of issue, and shall be deemed
automatically canceled at the expiration of the said
period if the contracting parties have not made use
of it. The expiry date shall be stamped in bold
characters on the face of every license issued.
● No marriage license shall be issued by the
Local Civil Registrar unless the applicants
present a Certificate of Compliance issued
for free by the local Family Planning Office
certifying that they had duly received
adequate instructions and information on
responsible parenthood, family planning,
breastfeeding and infant nutrition [Sec. 15,
R.A. No. 10354, The Responsible
Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of
2012 (RH Law)].
Q: ​What if there is no marriage license at all
at the time of celebration of marriage?
A: ​Marriage is void.
Q: ​What if there is a marriage license, but it
is a spurious marriage license?
A: ​Valid marriage, but the party responsible
shall be civilly, criminally and
administratively liable
Note: ​The local civil registrar has no power
to extend the validity of marriage license.
Marriages solemnized outside the Philippines
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the
Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in
the country where they were solemnized, and valid
there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5)
and (6), 3637 and 38.
Recognition of Divorce decree in the Philippines
Three Important Legal Premises On Divorce
First,​ a divorce obtained abroad by an alien
married to a Philippine national may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided the
decree of divorce is valid according to the
national law of the foreigner. ​Second​, the
reckoning point is not the citizenship of the
divorcing parties at birth or at the time of
marriage, but their citizenship at the time a
valid divorce is obtained abroad. And ​third​,
an absolute divorce secured by a Filipino
married to another Filipino is contrary to
our concept of public policy and morality
and shall not be recognized in this
jurisdiction. [Bayot vs. CA, G.R. No. 155635,
Nov. 7, 2008, 570 SCRA 472]
Q: ​If a foreigner, married to another
foreigner obtains a decree of absolute
divorce abroad, can the decree be
recognized in the Philippines?
A:​ Yes.
Q: If a Filipino, married to another Filipino
obtains a decree of absolute divorce
abroad, can the decree be recognized in the
Philippines?
A: NO. It is contrary to public policy and
shall not be recognized in this jurisdiction.
Q: If a foreigner, married to a Filipino,
obtains a decree of absolute divorce
abroad, can the decree be recognized in the
Philippines?
A: Yes. ​Legal Basis: Article 26(2) of the
Family Code. Where a marriage between a
Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law.
Q: What if it was the Filipino spouse who
obtained the divorce decree?
A: Valid, and can be recognized in the
 Philippines.
In Republic v. Marelyn Tanedo Manalo (April
2018), the Court, in a landmark ruling,
declared the absolute divorce obtained by
the Filipino spouse married to a foreigner
valid even if it is the Filipino spouse who
obtained it. In this case, the RTC ruled that
Article 26 (2) of the Family Code does not
apply because it was the Filipino spouse
that initiated the divorce. But the Court of
Appeals overturned the decision, holding
that Article 26 of the Family Code applies
even if it was the Filipino spouse who filed
for divorce against the foreign spouse
because the decree obtained makes the
foreigner no longer married to the Filipino,
enabling the foreigner to remarry. The
appellate court held that it would be unjust
to consider the Filipino still married to the
foreigner who is no longer considered
married to the Filipino. The Supreme Court
sustained the appellate court's ruling.
Q: What if the absolute divorce decree was
applied for jointly by the spouses?
A: Valid, and can be recognized in the
Philippines
NOTE: ​Before the divorce decree can be
recognized by our courts, the party pleading
it must prove the divorce as a fact and
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign
law allowing it.
If the court finds that the decree
capacitated the alien spouse to remarry,
the courts can declare that the Filipino
spouse is likewise capacitated to contract
another marriage.
● The recognition of the foreign divorce
decree may be made in a Rule 108
proceeding itself, as the object of special
proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the
status or right of a party or a particular fact
[Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, G.R. No. 186571, 11
August 2010, 628 SCRA 266; Fujiki v.
Marinay, 700 SCRA 69 (2013)].
● The registration of a foreign divorce decree
in the civil registry without the requisite
judicial recognition is patently void and
cannot produce any legal effect. The Court
explained that while the law requires the
entry of the divorce decree in the civil
registry, the law and the submission of the
decree by themselves do not ipso facto
authorize the decrees registration. The law
should be read in relation with the
requirement of a judicial recognition of the
foreign judgment before it can be given ​res
judicata effect [Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, G.R.
No. 186571, 11 August 2010, 628 SCRA
266].
● Only the Filipino spouse can invoke the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code while the alien spouse can claim no
right under said provision. The Court
explained that the provision was included in
the law to avoid the absurd situation where
the Filipino spouse remains married to the
alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce,
is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.
The legislative intent is for the benefit of
the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her
marital status, settling the doubts created
by the divorce decree. Essentially, the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code provided the Filipino spouse a
substantive right to have his or her
marriage to the alien spouse considered as
dissolved, capacitating him or her to
remarry. Thus, if the Filipino spouse invokes
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code, the action is not limited to the
recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If
the court finds that the decree capacitated
the alien spouse to remarry, the courts can
declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise
capacitated to contract another marriage.
[Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, G.R. No. 186571, 11
 August 2010, 628 SCRA 266]
● The principle in Article 26 of the Family
Code is also applicable to a marriage
between a Filipino and a foreign citizen who
obtains a foreign judgment nullifying the
marriage on the ground of bigamy. The
Court explained that the principle in the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code applies because the foreign spouse,
after the foreign judgment nullifying the
marriage, is capacitated to remarry under
the laws of his or her country. If the foreign
judgment is not recognized in the
Philippines, the Filipino spouse will be
discriminated — the foreign spouse can
remarry while the Filipino spouse cannot
remarry. [Fujiki v. Marinay, 700 SCRA 69
(2013)]
● In the case of ​San Luis v. San Luis [​ 514 SCRA
294 (2007)], the Court held that there is no
need to retroactively apply the provisions of
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code because there is sufficient
jurisprudential basis to apply the rule
embodied in said law to absolute divorces
obtained by the foreign spouse prior to the
effecivity of the Family Code, as exemplified
by the cases of ​Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.,​
Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera ​and ​Quita v. Court of
Appeals​.
Marriages Exempt from Marriage License
Requirement
Remote The residence of either party is so
Places located that there is no means of
transportation to enable such party
to appear personally before the
LCR.
Among a. Among Muslims or members of
Muslims ethnic cultural
communities;
b. Solemnized in accordance with
their customs, rites or practices
5- Year a. Living together as husband and
Cohabitation wife for at least 5 years before the
marriage;
b. ​No legal impediment to marry
during the 5-year period
● In ​Republic v. Dayot ​[550 SCRA 435 (2008)],
the Supreme Court ruled that the falsity of
an affidavit of marital cohabitation, where
the parties have in truth fallen short of the
minimum five-year requirement, effectively
renders the marriage void ​ab initio for lack
of a marriage license.
● In ​De Castro v. Assidao-De Castro [​G.R. No.
160172 February 13, 2008, 545 SCRA 162],
the Court further clarified that the falsity of
the affidavit cannot be considered as a
mere irregularity in the formal requisites of
marriage. To permit a false affidavit to take
the place of a marriage license, the Court
explained in ​Dayot​, is to allow an abject
circumvention of the law.
● In ​Santiago v. People [​G.R. No. 200233, July
15, 2015], the Court held that the falsity of
an affidavit of cohabitation CANNOT be
used as a defense in the crime of bigamy,
for it will be the height of absurdity for the
Court to allow the accused to use her illegal
act to escape criminal conviction.
Marriage Ceremony
● In ​Ronulo v. People [728 SCRA 675 (2014)],
a solemnizing officer from the Aglipayan
Church was charged with violation of Article
352 of the RPC for allegedly performing an
illegal marriage ceremony because he
solemnized the marriage knowing fully well
that the parties did not have marriage
license. The accused contended that he
merely conducted a “blessing” and that in
order for a marriage ceremony to exist, the
law require the verbal declaration that the
couple take each other as husband and
wife, and a marriage certificate containing
the declaration in writing which is duly
 signed by the contracting parties and
attested to by the solemnizing officer. In
holding that the accused indeed performed
a marriage ceremony, the Court ruled that
the law sets the minimum requirements
constituting a marriage ceremony: first,
there should be the personal appearance of
the contracting parties before a solemnizing
officer; and second, their declaration in the
presence of not less than two witnesses
that they take each other as husband and
wife. Both requirements were present in
this case.
Void Marriages
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from
the beginning:
(1) Those contracted by any party below eighteen
years of age even with the consent of parents or
guardians;
(2) Those solemnized by any person not legally
authorized to perform marriages unless such
marriages were contracted with either or both
parties believing in good faith that the solemnizing
officer had the legal authority to do so;
(3) Those solemnized without license, except those
covered the preceding Chapter;
(4) Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not
failing under Article 41;
(5) Those contracted through mistake of one
contracting party as to the identity of the other; and
(6) Those subsequent marriages that are void under
Article 53.
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at
the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.
Art. 37. Marriages between the following are
incestuous and void from the beginning,whether
relationship between the parties be legitimate or
illegitimate:
(1) Between ascendants and descendants of any
degree; and
(2) Between brothers and sisters, whether of the full
or half blood.
Art. 38. The following marriages shall be void from
the beginning for reasons of public policy:
(1) Between collateral blood relatives whether
legitimate or illegitimate, up to the fourth civil
degree;
(2) Between step-parents and step-children;
(3) Between parents-in-law and children-in-law;
(4) Between the adopting parent and the adopted
child;
(5) Between the surviving spouse of the adopting
parent and the adopted child;
(6) Between the surviving spouse of the adopted
child and the adopter;
(7) Between an adopted child and a legitimate child
of the adopter;
(8) Between adopted children of the same adopter;
and
(9) Between parties where one, with the intention to
marry the other, killed that other person’s spouse, or
his or her own spouse.
Art. 38. The following marriages shall be void from
the beginning for reasons of public policy:
(1) Between collateral blood relatives whether
legitimate or illegitimate, up to the fourth civil
degree;
(2) Between step-parents and step-children;
(3) Between parents-in-law and children-in-law;
(4) Between the adopting parent and the adopted
child;
(5) Between the surviving spouse of the adopting
parent and the adopted child;
(6) Between the surviving spouse of the adopted
child and the adopter;
(7) Between an adopted child and a legitimate child
of the adopter;
(8) Between adopted children of the same adopter;
and
(9) Between parties where one, with the intention to
marry the other, killed that other person’s spouse, or
his or her own spouse.
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during
subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and
void, unless before the celebration of the
subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been
absent for four consecutive years and the spouse
present has a well-founded belief that the absent
spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance
where there is danger of death under the
circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article
391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years
shall be sufficient.
Art. 53. Either of the former spouses may marry
again after compliance with the requirements of the
immediately preceding Article; otherwise, the
subsequent marriage shall be null and void.
Art 35 (4) Art 40
Those bigamous or Art. 40. The absolute
polygamous marriages nullity of a previous
not failing under Article marriage may be
41 invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis
solely of a final judgment
declaring such previous
marriage void.
Valid/voidable prior Applies only if the prior
marriage marriage is void ab initio
Article 148 ACP
CPG or
Complete separation of
property
● The Court applied Article 40 retroactively to
cases where the second marriage took
place prior to the effectivity of the Family
Code and prior to the promulgation of the
Wiegel case. In ​Jarillo v. People [​ G.R. No.
164435, Sep. 29, 2009; and the Resolution
of the Motion for Reconsideration, G.R. No.
164435, June 29, 2010, 622 SCRA 24], the
second marriage was celebrated on
November 26, 1979; while in ​Montañez v.
Cipriano [​ 684 SCRA 315 (2012)], the second
marriage took place on January 24, 1983.
● In both cases, the Court applied Article 40
retroactively in a criminal action for bigamy
holding that said provision, being a rule of
procedure, may be applied retroactively.
● HOWEVER: In the 2016 case of Castillo v. De
Leon Castillo (789 SCRA 503), the Court
reiterated the ruling in Apiag v. Cantero
(1997) and Ty v. CA (2000) that ​the
requirement of a judicial decree of nullity
does not apply to marriages that were
celebrated ​before the effectivity of the
Family Code​, particularly if the children of
the parties were born while the Civil Code
was in force.
● In Ty, the Court clarified that those cases
continue to be governed by Odayat v.
Amante (1977), People v. Mendoza (1954),
 and People v. Aragon (1957), which
embodied the then-prevailing rule that no
judicial decree was necessary to establish
the invalidity of void marriages under
Article 80 of the Civil Code.
● Castillo reritrated the rule that Article 40
cannot be applied retroactively to a
marriage celebrated under the Civil Code
because it would impair vested rights.
● In Vitangcol v. People, Vitangcol contracted
a first marriage in 1987 and another
marriage in 1994. The second wife filed a
criminal complaint for bigamy. Vitangcol
presented as evidence a Certification from
the Office of the Civil Registrar of Imus,
Cavite, which states that the Office has no
record of the marriage license allegedly
● In Kho v. Republic, 791 SCRA 604 (2016),
issued in his favor and his first wife, Gina.
He argued that with no proof of existence
of an essential requisite of marriage—the
marriage license—the prosecution fails to
establish the legality of his first marriage.
The Court held that persons intending to
contract a second marriage must first
secure a judicial declaration of nullity of
their first marriage. If they proceed with the
second marriage without the judicial
declaration, they are guilty of bigamy
regardless of evidence of the nullity of the
first marriage. [Vitangcol v. People, 780
SCRA 598 (2016)]
● In Vitangcol, the accused presents a
Certification from the Office of the Civil
Registrar of Imus, Cavite, which states:
“After a diligent search on the files of
Registry Book on Application for Marriage
License and License Issuance available in
this office, no record could be found on the
alleged issuance of this office of Marriage
License No. 8683519 in favor of MR.
NORBERTO A. VITANGCOL and MS. GINA M.
GAERLAN dated July 17, 1987.” The Court
then ruled that “the appreciation of the
probative value of the certification cannot
be divorced from the purpose of its
presentation, the cause of action in the
case, and the context of the presentation of
the certification in relation to the other
evidence presented in the case.” The Court
adds, “We are not prepared to establish a
doctrine that a certification that a marriage
license cannot be found may substitute for
a definite statement that no such license
existed or was issued.
Definitely, the Office of the Civil Registrar of
Imus, Cavite should be fully aware of the
repercussions of those words. That the
license now cannot be found is not basis
per se to say that it could not have been
issued.”
however, among the pieces of evidence
presented by petitioner is a Certification
issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Arteche, Eastern Samar attesting that the
Office of the Local Civil Registrar "has no
record nor copy of any marriage license
ever issued in favor of Raquel G. Kho
[petitioner] and Veronica M. Borata
[respondent] whose marriage was
celebrated on June 1, 1972." The RTC
granted the petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of such marriage, which
decision, however, was reversed by the CA.
The CA held that since a marriage was, in
fact, solemnized between the contending
parties, there is a presumption that a
marriage license was issued for that
purpose and that petitioner failed to
overcome such presumption. The CA also
ruled that the absence of any indication in
the marriage certificate that a marriage
license was issued is a mere defect in the
formal requisites of the law which does not
invalidate the parties' marriage. On appeal
to the SC, it was held that based on the
Certification issued by the Municipal Civil
Registrar of Arteche, Eastern Samar,
coupled with respondent's failure to
 produce a copy of the alleged marriage
license or of any evidence to show that such
license was ever issued, the only conclusion
that can be reached is that no valid
marriage license was, in fact, issued. The
Court adds: “Contrary to the ruling of the
CA, it cannot be said that there was a
simple defect, not a total absence, in the
requirements of the law which would not
affect the validity of the marriage. The fact
remains that respondent failed to prove
that the subject marriage license was issued
and the law is clear that a marriage which is
performed without the corresponding
marriage license is null and void.”
Who May File a Petition to Declare Absolute Nullity
of Marriage
Marriages during ANY PARTY IN INTEREST (may
the Civil Code be filed even after the death
of the spouses)
Marriages during Apply AM 02-11-10
the Family Code Only the husband or wife may
fie during the lifetime of the
spouses
EXCEPTION: ​the rule in A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC that only the
husband or wife can file a
declaration of nullity or
annulment of marriage does
not apply if the reason behind
the petition is​ bigamy​.
The husband or the wife of
the prior subsisting marriage is
the one who has the
personality to file a petition
for declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriage under
Section 2(a) of A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC. [Fujiki v.
Marinay, 700 SCRA 69 (2013)]
(​PROBABLE BAR QUESTION)
● In ​Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of
Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental [​ G.R.
No. 181174, 4 December 2009, 607 SCRA
638]​, the Court ruled that the trial court has
no jurisdiction to nullify marriages in a
special proceeding for cancellation or
correction of entry under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court. Since the cause of action is
actually to seek the declaration of the
second marriage as void for being bigamous
and impugn the child’s legitimacy, which
causes of action are governed not by Rule
108 but by A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which
took effect on March 15, 2003, and Art.
171of the Family Code, respectively, it was
held that the petition should be filed in a
Family Court.
● The case of ​Braza must be distinguished
from the case of ​Republic vs. Olaybar [​ G.R.
No. 189538, Feb. 10, 2014, 715 SCRA 605],
involving a case of identity theft. In ​Olaybar​,
the respondent found out that someone
stole her identity in contracting marriage to
a Korean national. Upon such discovery, she
immediately filed a petition for cancellation
of entries in the marriage contract filed with
the NSO, specifically the entries in the wife
portion thereof. The Republic opposed the
petition which it claimed to be actually a
petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage in the guise of a Rule 108
proceeding. In allowing the correction of
the subject certificate of marriage by
cancelling the name of the respondent in
the wife portion thereof, the Court held
that the respondent did not seek the
nullification of marriage as there was no
marriage to speak of.
PROBABLE BAR QUESTION: ​[Juliano-Llave v.
Republic, 646 SCRA 753 (2011)]. Section 2(a)
of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a
spouse of a subsisting marriage to question
the validity of a subsequent marriage on the
ground of bigamy. On the contrary, when
Section 2(a) states that “ a petition for
 declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage may be filed solely by the husband
or the wife” ​— it refers to the husband or
the wife of the subsisting marriage. Under
Article 35(4) of the Family Code, bigamous
marriages are void from the beginning.
Thus, the parties in a A petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage may be filed solely by the husband
or the wife, if the marriage is covered by
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. However, the rule in
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the husband
or wife can file a declaration of nullity or
annulment of marriage does not apply if the
reason behind the petition is bigamy
bigamous marriage are neither the husband
nor the wife under the law. The husband or
the wife of the prior subsisting marriage is
the one who has the personality to file a
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
void marriage under Section 2(a) of A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC. [Fujiki v. Marinay, 700
SCRA 69 (2013)]
Psychological Incapacity
● In ​Ngo Te v. Yu-Te ​[G.R. No. 161793,
February 13, 2009, 579 SCRA 193], the
Court revisited the Molina guidelines and
put into question the applicability of said
time-tested guidelines. However, in the
subsequent cases of ​Ting v. Velez-Ting [​ G.R.
No. 166562, March 31, 2009, 582 SCRA
694.], ​Suazo v. Suazo [​ G.R. No. 164493,
March 10, 2010, 615 SCRA 514] and
Agraviador v. Agraviador ​[G.R. 170729, Dec.
8, 2010, 637 SCRA 519], the Court laid to
rest any question regarding the applicability
of ​Molina.​
● In these cases, it was clarified that ​Ngo Te
did not abandon ​Molina​; far from
abandoning ​Molina,​ it simply suggested the
relaxation of its stringent requirements. The
Court also explained in ​Suazo that ​Ngo Te
merely stands for a more flexible approach
in considering petitions for declaration of
nullity of marriages based on psychological
incapacity. In the more recent case of ​Kalaw
v. Fernandez [745 SCRA 512 (2015)],
however, the Court, in granting the petition
for declaration of nullity of a marriage
based on Article 36, relied heavily on the
teachings of ​Ngo Te.
Rule of thumb: ​Deny the petition. Why? It is
difficult to prove psychological incapacity.
In order to establish psychological
incapacity, it is necessary to determine
whether or not it is connected with a
certain psychological disorder.
● In Republic v. Romero II, 785 SCRA 164
(2016), it was held that the fact that the
husband married his wife not out of love,
but out of reverence for the latter’s
parents, does not mean that he is
psychologically incapacitated in the context
of Article 36 of the Family Code. Citing
Republic v. Albios [707 SCRA 584 (2013)],
the Court held that: “Motives for entering
into a marriage are varied and complex. The
State does not and cannot dictate on the
kind of life that a couple chooses to lead.
Any attempt to regulate their lifestyle
would go into the realm of their right to
privacy and would raise serious
constitutional questions. The right to
marital privacy allows married couples to
structure their marriages in almost any way
they see fit, to live together or live apart, to
have children or no children, to love one
another or not, and so on. Thus, marriages
entered into for other purposes, limited or
otherwise, such as convenience,
companionship, money, status, and title,
provided that they comply with all the legal
requisites, are equally valid.
● Love, though the ideal consideration in a
marriage contract, is not the only valid
cause for marriage. Other considerations,
not precluded by law, may validly support a
marriage.”
Decalaration of Presumptive Death
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during
subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and
void, unless before the celebration of the
subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been
absent for four consecutive years and the spouse
present has a well-founded belief that the absent
spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance
where there is danger of death under the
circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article
391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years
shall be sufficient.
Requisites:
1. The prior spouse has been absent for 4 or 2
years;
2. Well-founded belief that the absent spouse
is dead;
● PROBABLE BAR QUESTION ​In
Santos v. Santos [​ 737 SCRA 637
(2014)], the Court ruled that a
subsequent marriage contracted in
bad faith by the spouse present
(who knew that the alleged
absentee spouse is alive), even if it
was contracted after a court
declaration of presumptive death,
lacks the requirement of a
well-founded belief that the
spouse is already dead, and does
not validly terminate the first
marriage. Hence, the subsequent
marriage is void for being
bigamous under Article 35(4) of
the Family Code.
● Additionally, the Court ruled that if
the presumptively dead spouse has
not really been absent and the
judicial declaration of presumptive
death was obtained by reason of
extrinsic fraud, the proper remedy
available to the presumptively
dead spouse is not the filing of an
affidavit of reappearance but an
action to annul the judgment
declaring him/her presumptively
dead.
● The law did not define what is
meant by "well-founded belief." It
depends upon the circumstances
of each particular case. Its
determination, so to speak,
remains on a caseto- case basis. To
be able to comply with this
requirement, the present spouse
must prove that his/her belief was
the result of diligent and
reasonable efforts and inquiries to
locate the absent spouse and that
based on these efforts and
inquiries, he/she believes that
under the circumstances, the
absent spouse is already dead. It
requires exertion of active effort
(not a mere passive one).
3. The present spouse wishes to remarry;
4. Judicial declaration of presumptive death
● The proper remedy available to the
presumptively dead spouse who has not
really been absent is not the filing of an
affidavit of reappearance but an action to
annul the judgment declaring him/her
presumptively dead.
Effect of bad faith
Party in bad faith Status of subsequent marriage
Spouse present Void ab initio
● Bigamous even if the
other spouse is in
good faith
Second spouse Perfectly valid marriage
● Remedy of aggrieved
spouse is to file an
affidavit of
reappearance
Both spouses Void ab initio
Effect of Termination of Subsequent Marriage
(1) The children of the subsequent marriage Status of Illegitimate Legitimate if the
conceived prior to its termination shall be Children ground is:
considered legitimate; a. Psychological
incapacity
(2) The absolute community of property or the
b.
conjugal partnership, as the case may be, shall be Non-compliance
dissolved and liquidated, but if either spouse with
contracted said marriage in bad faith, his or her
Art. 52
share of the net profits of the community property
Property 147 or 148 Ground is Art.
or conjugal partnership property shall be forfeited in
Relations 40: ACP,
favor of the common children or, if there are none,
CPG or
the children of the guilty spouse by a previous
complete
marriage or in default of children, the innocent
separation
spouse;
Donation Revocable at Art. 40: Valid
(3) Donations by reason of marriage shall remain Propter the EXCEPT if the
valid, except that if the donee contracted the Nuptias instance of the donee
marriage in bad faith, such donations made to said donor spouse was in
donee are revoked by operation of law; bad faith –
revoked by
(4) The innocent spouse may revoke the designation operation of law
of the other spouse who acted in bad faith as Art. 44: Those
beneficiary in any insurance policy, even if such made by one
designation be stipulated as irrevocable; and in favor of the
other are
(5) The spouse who contracted the subsequent revoked by
marriage in bad faith shall be disqualified to inherit operation of law
from the innocent spouse by testate and intestate Designation If irrevocable, Art. 40:
succession.
as Beneficiary the Innocent spouse
● In Republic v. Sarenogon, Jr. [783 SCRA 615 insured cannot may revoke it if
(2016)], the Court reiterated the rule that a change it the
beneficiary
petition for ​certiorari ​pursuant to Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court is the proper remedy to spouse acted in
challenge a trial court’s declaration of bad faith
presumptive death under Article 41 of The Right to Valid Art. 40: Guilty
Family Code of the Philippines (Family Inherit spouse is
Code). disqualified to
inherit
Effect of Judicial Declaration of Nullity of Marriage Art. 44: Those
made by one
gr xpn in favor of the
retroactivity Retroacts to other are
the revoked by
date of operation of law
celebration

Voidable marriages
Art. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the
following causes, existing at the time of the
marriage:
(1) That the party in whose behalf it is sought to
have the marriage annulled was eighteen years of
age or over but below twenty-one, and the marriage
was solemnized without the consent of the parents,
guardian or person having substitute parental
authority over the party, in that order, unless after
attaining the age of twenty-one, such party freely
cohabited with the other and both lived together as
husband and wife;
2) That either party was of unsound mind, unless
such party after coming to reason, freely cohabited
with the other as husband and wife;
(3) That the consent of either party was obtained by
fraud, unless such party afterwards, with full
knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely
cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
(4) That the consent of either party was obtained by
force, intimidation or undue influence, unless the
same having disappeared or ceased, such party
thereafter freely cohabited with the other as
husband and wife;
(5) That either party was physically incapable of
consummating the marriage with the other, and
such incapacity continues and appears to be
incurable; or
(6) That either party was afflicted with a
sexually-transmissible disease found to be serious
and appears to be incurable. (85a)
Art. 46. Any of the following circumstances shall
constitute fraud referred to in Number 3 of the
preceding Article:
(1) Non-disclosure of a previous conviction by final
judgment of the other party of a crime involving
moral turpitude;
(2) Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the
time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man
other than her husband;
(3) Concealment of sexually transmissible disease,
regardless of its nature, existing at the time of the
marriage; or
(4) Concealment of drug addiction, habitual
alcoholism or homosexuality or lesbianism existing
at the time of the marriage. No other
misrepresentation or deceit as to character, health,
rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute such fraud
as will give grounds for action for the annulment of
marriage. (86a)
Art. 47. The action for annulment of marriage must
be filed by the following persons and within the
periods indicated herein:
(1) For causes mentioned in number 1 of Article 45
by the party whose parent or guardian did not give
his or her consent, within five years after attaining
the age of twenty-one, or by the parent or guardian
or person having legal charge of the minor, at any
time before such party has reached the age of
twenty-one;
(2) For causes mentioned in number 2 of Article 45,
by the same spouse, who had no knowledge of the
other’s insanity; or by any relative or guardian or
person having legal charge of the insane, at any time
before the death of either party, or by the insane
spouse during a lucid interval or after regainin
sanity;
(3) For causes mentioned in number 3 of Article 45,
by the injured party, within five years after the
discovery of the fraud;
(4) For causes mentioned in number 4 of Article 45,
by the injured party, within five years from the time
the force, intimidation or undue influence
disappeared or ceased;
(5) For causes mentioned in number 5 and 6 of
Article 45, by the injured party, within five years
after the marriage.
Doctrine of Triennial Cohabitation​: If the wife (3) Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the
remains a virgin after 3 years of cohabitation, the petitioner, a common child, or a child of the
husband will be presumed impotent. petitioner, to engage in prostitution, or connivance
in such corruption or inducement; (4) Final judgment
Effects of Annulment Decree sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of more
General Rule Effect of Bad than six years, even if pardoned;
Faith
(5) Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the
Status of Legitimate
respondent;
Children
Property Dissolution or Net profits shall (6) Lesbianism or homosexuality of the respondent;
Relations liquidation go to:
according a. Common (7) Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent
to ACP or CPG children; bigamous marriage, whether in the Philippines or
b. Children of abroad;
the guilty
spouse by a (8) Sexual infidelity or perversion;
prev marriage
(9) Attempt by the respondent against the life of the
c. Innocent
petitioner; or
spouse
Donation Valid Revoked by (10) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent
Propter operation of without justifiable cause for more than one year. For
Nuptias law purposes of this Article, the term “child” shall
Designation Insured cannot Innocent include a child by nature or by adoption.
as Beneficiary change if spouse may
irrevocable revoke it Defenses in Legal Separation
Right to Spouse in bad
Inherit faith will be (1) Where the aggrieved party has condoned the
offense or act complained of;
disqualified to
inherit by
(2) Where the aggrieved party has consented to the
testate and commission of the offense or act complained of;
intestate
succession (3) Where there is connivance between the parties
in the commission of the offense or act constituting
Legal Separation the ground for legal separation;
Art. 55. A petition for legal separation may be filed
on any of the following grounds: (4) Where both parties have given ground for legal
separation;
(1) Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive
conduct directed against the petitioner, a common (5) Where there is collusion between the parties to
child, or a child of the petitioner; obtain decree of legal separation; or

(2) Physical violence or moral pressure to compel
the petitioner to change religious or political
affiliation;
(6) Where the action is barred by prescription.
● Connivance ​Implies an agreement, express
or implied, by both spouses to the ground
for legal separation
 ● Collusion ​Implies an agreement between Testate A disposition Provisions
the parties: Succession may already made
a. For one of them commit, still be made will be revoked
appear to commit or to be after by
represented as having decree of LS operation of
committed a matrimonial law
offense; Support Obligation of The court may
b. To suppress evidence of a mutual order
valid defense support ceases him/her to
c. For the purpose of enabling support the
the other to obtain a legal innocent
separation spouse

Effects of Decree of Legal Separation Property Relations Between the Spouses

General: ​Right to live separately from each other but ACP CPG
the marriage Commencement 88 107
bonds shall not be severed Composition 91,95 106, 116-120,
Effect on Guilty 123
Spouse Exclusions 91,92 109,113
Property Dissolution or Net profits shall Charges 94 121,122
Relations liquidation go to: Administration 96 124
according a. Common
Dissolution 99 126
to ACP or CPG children;
Liquidation 102-104 129-131
b. Children of
Separation De 100 127
the guilty
Facto
spouse by a
Abandonment 101 128
previous
Remedies
marriage
c. Innocent
Sale of a portion of conjugal property
spouse
Art. 96. The administration and enjoyment of the
Donation May be Donations
community property shall belong to both spouses
Propter revoked by made by a third
jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband’s
Nuptias the innocent party to
decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the
spouse him/her may be
court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be
within 5 years revoked
availed of within five years from the date of the
Designation Insured cannot Innocent
contract implementing such decision.
as Beneficiary change if spouse may
irrevocable revoke it In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or
Intestate Innocent Disqualified to otherwise unable to participate in the administration
Succession spouse may inherit of the common properties, the other spouse may
inherit from from innocent assume sole powers of administration. These powers
guilty spouse do not include disposition or encumbrance without
spouse authority of the court or the written consent of the
other spouse. ​In the absence of such authority or
consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be
void. ​However, the transaction shall be construed as
a continuing offer on the part of the consenting
spouse and the third person, and may be perfected
as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the
other spouse or authorization by the court before
the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.
Q: ​Anastacio and Flora got married during
the effectivity of the Civil Code without any
marriage settlement. In 1968, Flora died. In
1978, Anastacio sold his interest in the land
which was acquired during the marriage to
the Spouses Molina, who registered the sale
several years after the death of Anastacio.
Is the sale valid?
A: ​The Court ruled that while Article 130 of
the Family Code provides that any
disposition involving the conjugal property
without prior liquidation of the partnership
shall be void, this rule does not apply since
the provisions of the Family Code shall be
"without prejudice to vested rights already
acquired in accordance with the Civil Code
or other laws."
The Court noted that upon the death of
Flora in 1968, an implied ordinary
co-ownership ensued among Flora’s
surviving heirs, including Anastacio, with
respect to Flora’s share of the conjugal
partnership until final liquidation and
partition; while Anastacio, on the other
hand, owned one-half of the original
conjugal partnership properties as his
share, but this is an undivided interest.
Anastacio, as a co-owner, had the right to
freely sell and dispose of his undivided
interest, but not the interest of his
co-owners.
Consequently, Anastactio’s sale to the
spouses Molina without the consent of the
other co-owners was not totally void, for
Anastacio’s rights or a portion thereof were
thereby effectively transferred, making the
spouses Molina a coowner of the subject
property to the extent of Anastacio’s
interest. This result conforms with the
well-established principle that the binding
force of a contract must be recognized as
far as it is legally possible to do so (quando
res non valet ut ago, valeat quantum valere
potest). The spouses Molina would be a
trustee for the benefit of the co-heirs of
Anastacio in respect of any portion that
might belong to the co-heirs after
liquidation and partition. [Domingo v.
Molina, 791 SCRA47 (2016)]
● In ​Hapitan vs. Sps. Lagradilla [​ G.R. No.
170004, January 13, 2016, 780 SCRA 288],
the RTC declared the sale of conjugal
property (house and lot) of the spouses null
and void, which decision was affirmed by
the Court of Appeals. Thereafter, the
husband entered into an amicable
settlement with the other parties
recognizing the validity of the sale
previously declared void in the court’s
decision. Since the husband made the
amicable settlement over the wife’s
objection, the latter questioned the validity
of said settlement. The Court declared the
amicable settlement void. The Court
explained that by agreeing to the validity of
the sale, the husband disposed of or waived
his and the wife's rights over the house and
lot and such disposal or waiver by the
husband is not allowed by law. Article 124
of the Family Code requires that any
disposition or encumbrance of conjugal
property must have the written consent of
the other spouse; otherwise, such
disposition is void. Further, under Article 89
of the Family Code, no waiver of rights,
interests, shares, and effects of the conjugal
partnership of gains during the marriage
can be made except in case of judicial
separation of property. Clearly, the wife did
not consent to the husband’s disposing or
 waiving their rights over the house and lot
through the Amicable Settlement.
● In ​Heirs of Patricio Go, Sr. and Marta Barola
vs. Servacio [​ 657 SCRA 10 (2011)], it was
held that the disposition by sale of a portion
of the conjugal property by the surviving
spouse without the prior liquidation
mandated by Article 130 of the Family Code
(which is the counterpart provision of
Article 103 in the regime of conjugal
partnership of gains) is not necessarily void
if said portion has not yet been allocated by
judicial or extrajudicial partition to another
heir of the deceased spouse. Instead, the
sale is valid insofar as the ideal share of the
selling co-owner/co-heir in the property is
concerned but without affecting the ideal
shares of the other co-owners. The ruling
was reiterated in the 2016 case of Domingo
v. Molina (791 SCRA 47). According to Heirs
of Go, Sr., Article 130 will only apply if the
death and the sale both occurred during the
effectivity of the Family Code; otherwise,
the ruling in said case and in Domingo will
be applicable.
● In conjugal partnership, when the property
is registered in the name of only one spouse
and there is no showing as to when the
property was acquired by same spouse, this
is an indication that the property belongs
exclusively to the said spouse [Valdez, Jr. vs.
CA, 439 SCRA 55 (2004); citing PNB vs. CA,
153 SCRA 435 (1987); see also Ruiz vs. CA,
449 Phil. 419, 431 (2003); Dela Pena vs.
Avila, 665 SCRA 553 (2012)].  ​When there is
no showing as to when the property was
acquired, the presumption in favor of
conjugal partnership cannot prevail when
the title is in the name of only one spouse
and the rights of innocent third parties are
involved [Lim vs. Equitable PCI Bank, 713
SCRA 555 (2014)]. Under Philippine law and
jurisprudence, if the property is registered
in the name of one of the spouses, with a
description that he or she “is married to”
the other spouse, the same is merely
descriptive of the civil status of the
registered owner [Orient Savings Bank vs.
Suzuki, 740 SCRA 345 (2014);
Calalang-Parulan vs. Calalang-Garcia, 725
SCRA 402 (2014) ; Dela Pena vs. Avila, 665
SCRA 553 (2012)]. Note that in numerous
cases where the Court held that registration
of the property in the name of only one
spouse does not negate the possibility of it
being conjugal or community property,
there was proof that the properties, though
registered in the name of only one spouse,
were indeed either conjugal or community
properties [Orient Savings Bank vs. Suzuki,
740 SCRA 345 (2014)].
● But even if the property was acquired
during the marriage, the presumption in
favor of conjugality cannot be applied with
respect to private lands if one of the
spouses is an alien for this will be in
violation of Section 7, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution which prohibits aliens from
acquiring private lands in the Philippines
[Matthews vs. Taylor, G.R. No. 164584 ,
June 22, 2009].
Q: ​Can the buyer invoke good faith?
​ es. ​In the cases of ​Bautista v. Silva [​ G.R.
A: Y
No. 157434, September 19, 2006, 502 SCRA
334], ​Ravina v. Villa Abrille [​ 604 SCRA 120
(2009)]​, and ​Aggabao v. Parulan​, ​[A ​ ggabao
vs. Parulan, G.R. No.165803, Sep. 1, 2010],
the Court erected a standard to determine
the good faith of the buyers dealing with a
seller who had title to and possession of the
land but whose capacity to sell was
restricted, in that the consent of the other
spouse was required before the
conveyance, declaring that in order to
prove good faith in such a situation, the
buyers must show that they inquired not
only into the title of the seller but also into
the sellers capacity to sell. Thus, the buyers
of conjugal property must observe two
 kinds of requisite diligence, namely: (a) the
diligence in verifying the validity of the title
covering the property; and (b) the diligence
in inquiring into the authority of the
transacting spouse to sell conjugal property
in behalf of the other spouse.
Property regimes of union without marriage
by both of the parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property, or industry shall be
owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions. In the absence of proof to
the contrary, their contributions and corresponding
shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and
presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money
and evidences of credit.

Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are If one of the parties is validly married to another, his
capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the
each other as husband and wife without the benefit absolute community or conjugal partnership existing
of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad
and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares faith is not validly married to another, his or her shall
and the property acquired by both of them through be forfeited in the manner provided in the last
their work or industry shall be governed by the rules paragraph of the preceding Article.
on co-ownership.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties even if both parties are in bad faith
acquired while they lived together shall be presumed
to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or
industry, and shall be owned by them in equal
shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did
not participate in the acquisition by the other party
of any property shall be deemed to have contributed 147 148
jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former’s Requisites There is a In cases of
efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the marriage, but void cohabitation
family and of the household. on the ground amounting to
other than adultery or
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter
absence of legal concubinage
vivos of his or her share in the property acquired
capacity and
during cohabitation and owned in common, without
article 40 Grounds
the consent of the other, until after the termination
1. Absence of
of their cohabitation.
or legal capacity
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in 2. art 38
good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the When a man and 3. art 35(1)
co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their woman who are 4. art 35(4)
common children. In case of default of or waiver by free to marry each
any or all of the common children or their other exclusively
descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the cohabitate
respective surviving descendants. In the absence of
descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent Salaries and EQUAL SHARES NO WORK,
party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place Wagies NO SHARE
upon termination of the cohabitation. (144a) Property Those acquired by Properties
Acquired both parties acquired by
Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under both
the preceding Article, only the properties acquired
 during through their parties
cohabitation work or industry through
ACTUAL joint
contributions
Proof ​ roperties
P There must be
required acquired are proof of actual
prima contribution
facie ​presumed to
have been
obtained through
joint efforts
Form of May consist of
Contribution efforts in the care
and maintenance
of the family
and household
● If the subsequent marriage is void by reason
of non-compliance with Article 40 (but the
prior marriage is indeed void ​ab initio)​ , the
property relations of the parties to the
subsequent marriage may either absolute
community or conjugal partnership of gains,
as the case may be, unless the parties agree
to a complete separation of property in a
marriage settlement entered into before
the marriage [Diño vs. Diño, 640 SCRA 178
(2011)]. As such, Sec. 19(1) of A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC, which requires the liquidation,
partition and distribution of properties prior
to the issuance of decree of nullity of the
marriage applies only to a void marriage
under Article 40 of the Family Code when
said rule mentions of “decree of absolute
nullity” and not to a marriage declared void
by reason of psychological incapacity under
Article 36 of the Family Code. In the latter
case, since the applicable property regime is
that provided in Article 147 of the Family
Code, the declaration of nullity can already
be made even without waiting for the
liquidation of the properties of the parties
because it is not necessary to liquidate the
properties of the spouses in the same
proceeding for declaration of nullity of
marriage.
● In Article 148, the fact that the
controverted property was titled in the
name of the parties to an adulterous
relationship is not sufficient proof of
co-ownership absent evidence of actual
contribution in the acquisition of the
property [Adriano v. Court of Appeals, 385
Phil. 474, cited in Saguid vs. CA, 403 SCRA
678 (2003)]. Registration under the Torrens
title system merely confirms, and does not
vest title [Ventura, Jr. vs. Abuda, 708 SCRA
640 (2013)]. The words “married to”
preceding the name of a spouse are merely
descriptive of the civil status of the
registered owner and such words do not
prove co-ownership under Article 148
[Go-Bangayan vs. Bangayan, Jr., 700 SCRA
702 (2013)].
Q: ​A Filipina is married to a foreigner, under a
bigamous marriage. Foreigner acquired a
property, but had it named under the name of
the Filipina because of the constitutional
prohibition. Who has a right over the property?
A: The foreigner spouse. ​However, there exists
a constitutional prohibition against alien
acquiring lands in the Philippines. Therefore, the
property will be escheated in favor of the State.
Family Home
Art. 152. The family home, constituted jointly by the
husband and the wife or by an unmarried head of a
family, is the dwelling house where they and their
family reside, and the land on which it is situated.
Art. 153. The family home is deemed constituted on
a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a
family residence. From the time of its constitution
and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides
therein, the family home continues to be such and is
exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment
except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of
the value allowed by law.
Effect GR: ​It shall be exempt from
execution
Except:
a. Non-payment of taxes;
b. Debts incurred PRIOR to
the constitution of the
FH;
c. Debts secured by
mortgages on the premises
before OR after such
constitution;
d. Debts due to laborers,
mechanics, architects,
builders and materialmen
and others who have
rendered service or
furnished material for the
construction of the building
When After FC​: Deemed
constituted on a house and
lot
from the time it is occupied
as a family residence
Before FC​: Considered as
family homes by
operation of law and are
prospectively entitled to
the benefits accorded to a
FH.
Where a. ACP;
b. CPG;
c. Exclusive property of
either spouse with the
consent of the other;
d. Property of the unmarried
head of the family
Who may a. Jointly by the husband and
Constitute wife;
b. Unmarried head of the
family
Effect of Beneficiaries FH will
Death survive continue
for 10
years
There is a FH will
minor continue
beneficiary until he
becomes
of age
Partition GR: ​The heirs cannot
partition the Family Home
Except: ​Compelling reasons
Art. 160. When a creditor whose claims is not among
those mentioned in Article 155 obtains a judgment
in his favor, and he has reasonable grounds to
believe that the family home is actually worth more
than the maximum amount fixed in Article 157, he
may apply to the court which rendered the judgment
for an order directing the sale of the property under
execution. The court shall so order if it finds that the
actual value of the family home exceeds the
maximum amount allowed by law as of the time of
its constitution. If the increased actual value exceeds
the maximum allowed in Article 157 and results from
subsequent voluntary improvements introduced by
the person or persons constituting the family home,
by the owner or owners of the property, or by any of
the beneficiaries, the same rule and procedure shall
apply.
At the execution sale, no bid below the value
allowed for a family home shall be considered. The
proceeds shall be applied first to the amount
mentioned in Article 157, and then to the liabilities
under the judgment and the costs. The excess, if any,
shall be delivered to the judgment debtor.
● PROBABLE BAR QUESTION ​If the increase in
value of a family home is by reason of an
involuntary improvement, like the
conversion into a residential area or the
establishment of roads and other facilities,
the one establishing the family home
should not be punished by making his home
liable to creditors [Eulegio v. Bell, Sr., 762
SCRA 103 (2015)].
● Hence, the family home still enjoys
protection from execution, force sale or
 attachment. If the value of the family home Generally, children of void marriages are
exceeded the maximum amount because of illegitimate children. By way of exception:
voluntary improvements by the one
establishing the family home, then Article 1. Conceived or born before judgment of
160 will apply. annulment or absolute nullity under art
● To warrant, therefore, the execution sale of 36 has become final and executor;
the family home under Article 160, the 2. Conceived or born of subsequent
following facts are required to be marriages under article 53
established: (1) there was an increase in its
Action to Claim Legitimate or Illegitimate Filiation
actual value; (2) the increase resulted from
voluntary improvements on the property Action to Claim Action to Claim
introduced by the persons constituting the Legitimate Filiation Illegitimate Filiation
family home, its owners or any of its
beneficiaries; and (3) the increased actual In both cases, ​ can be proved by the same means,
value exceeded the maximum allowed under Article 172 and Article 175 in relation to
under Article 157. Article 172
can only be claimed During the lifetime of
Paternity and Filiation during the lifetime of the child only
child, and even after the
● Filiation ​may either be natural or by death of the alleged What if the father dies?
adoption. parent If 172(1), the action may
still be filed because it is
Legitimate and Illegitimate Children a voluntary admission of
paternity,
Art. 164. Children conceived or born during the
marriage of the parents are legitimate. Children If 172(2), it must be filed
conceived as a result of artificial insemination of the during the lifetime of the
wife with the sperm of the husband or that of a putative father because
donor or both are likewise legitimate children of the it is a compulsory
husband and his wife, provided, that both of them recognition of paternity.
authorized or ratified such insemination in a written
instrument executed and signed by them before the
birth of the child. The instrument shall be recorded Proof of Legitimacy
in the civil registry together with the birth certificate
of the child. Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is
established by any of the following:
These are also legitimate children:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register
1. Children conceived as a result of
or a final judgment; or
artificial insemination (2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public
2. Born of voidable marriages before document or a private handwritten instrument and
decree of annulment signed by the parent concerned.
Art. 165. Children conceived and born outside a valid
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the
marriage are illegitimate, unless otherwise provided legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
in this Code.
(1) The open and continuous possession of the
status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of
Court and special laws. (265a, 266a, 267a)
Art. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be
brought by the child during his or her lifetime and
shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die
during minority or in a state of insanity. In these
cases, the heirs shall have a period of five years
within which to institute the action.
Art. 174. Legitimate children shall have the right:
(1) To bear the surnames of the father and the
mother, in conformity with the provisions of the Civil
Code on Surnames;
(2) To receive support from their parents, their
ascendants, and in proper cases, their brothers and
sisters, in conformity with the provisions of this Code
on Support; and
(3) To be entitled to the legitimate and other
successional rights granted to them by the Civil
Code.
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their
illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the
same evidence as legitimate children. The action
must be brought within the same period specified in
Article 173, except when the action is based on the
second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the
action may be brought during the lifetime of the
alleged parent.
● It is the rule that if the father did not sign in
the birth certificate, the placing of his name
by the mother, doctor, register, or other
person is incompetent evidence of paternity
and the Local Civil Registrar is devoid of
authority to record the paternity of an
illegitimate child upon the information of
such third person [Perla v. Baring, 685 SCRA
101 (2012); Salas v. Matusalem, 705 SCRA
560 (2013)]. The foregoing rule does not,
however, apply when there is a showing
that the putative father had a hand in the
preparation of the birth certificate, as when
he was the one who went to the Local Civil
Registry and gave all the data about his
child’s birth, or who caused the registration
the child’s birth certificate [Arado v.
Alcoran, 762 SCRA 37],or who supplied the
information himself about child’s birth,
including his paternity [Ilano v. CA, 230
SCRA 242 (1994)].
● If the birth certificate of the child was
registered after the death of the putative
father thru “delayed registration,” the same
is not a competent proof of paternity
against the putative father because he was
not involved nor had a hand in its
preparation [Ara v. Pizarro (2017)]
● For a public or private instrument to be
considered competent evidence of
paternity or filiation, the following
requisites must concur: (1) There must be a
statement of admission of paternity or
filiation; (2) It must be signed by the parent
concerned [Salas v. Matusalem, 705 SCRA
560 (2013); Nepomuceno v. Lopez, 616
SCRA 145 (2010)] and (3) The admission
must be made personally by the parent
himself or herself, not by any brother, sister
or relative [Cenido v. Apacionado, 318 SCRA
688 (1999)]; otherwise, such recognition is
ineffectual [Rivero v. CA,458 SCRA 714]. In
the 2016 case of Zoleta-San Agustin v. Sales,
801 SCRA 683, the Court ruled that the
signing thru thumbprint is considered
sufficient signature for purposes of
recognition of paternity.
● PROBABLE BAR QUESTION: ​In the case of
Dela Cruz v. Gracia [594 SCRA 648 (2009);
reiterated in Aguilar v. Siasat, 748 SCRA 555
(2015) J. DEL CASTILLO CASE], the Court
adopted the following rules respecting the
requirement of affixing the signature of the
acknowledging parent in any private
handwritten instrument wherein an
admission of filiation of a legitimate or
illegitimate child is made: a) Where the
 private handwritten instrument is the lone
piece of evidence submitted to prove
filiation, there should be strict compliance
with the requirement that the same must
be signed by the acknowledging parent; and
Where the private handwritten instrument
is accompanied by other relevant and
competent evidence, it suffices that the
claim of filiation therein be shown to have
been made and handwritten by the
acknowledging parent as it is merely
corroborative of such other evidence.
● In Perla v. Baring [685 SCRA 101 (2012)], the
child offered the following testimony to
prove his illegitimate filiation with the
putative father: (1) that during their first
encounter in 1994, the child called the
alleged father as “Papa” and kissed his hand
while the alleged father hugged him and
promised to support him; and (2) that his
alleged Aunt treated him as a relative and
was good to him during his one-week stay
in her place. The Court ruled that such acts
cannot be considered as indications of
Randy’s open and continuous possession of
the status of an illegitimate child under the
second paragraph of Article 172(1). The
Court held that except for that singular
occasion in which they met, there are no
other acts of the alleged father treating the
child as his son. Neither may paternity be
deduced from how the alleged father’s
sister treated the child because in the mind
of the Court, such actuations could have
been done due to charity or some other
reason.
● In Grande v. Antonio [G.R. No. 206248, Oct.
18, 2014, 716 SCRA 698], the Court clarified
that Article 176 of the Family Code, as
amended by R.A. No. 9255, gives
illegitimate children the right to decide if
they want to use the surname of their
father or not. It is not the father or the
mother who is granted by law the right to
dictate the surname of their illegitimate
children. The use of the word "may" in the
provision readily shows that an
acknowledged illegitimate child is under no
compulsion to use the surname of his
illegitimate father. Hence, a father cannot
compel the use of his surname by his
illegitimate children upon his recognition of
their filiation.
● While Article 176 of the Family Code, as
amended, does not explicitly state that the
private handwritten instrument
acknowledging the child’s paternity must be
signed by the putative father, said provision
must, however, be read in conjunction with
related provisions of the Family Code which
require that recognition by the father must
bear his signature, specifically Articles 172
and 175 of the Family Code. That a father
who acknowledges paternity of a child
through a written instrument must affix his
signature thereon is clearly implied in
Article 176 of the Family Code [Dela Cruz vs.
Gracia, G.R. No. 177728, July 31, 2009, 594
SCRA 648].
PROBABLE BAR QUESTION: ​If the admission of
paternity is made in a private handwritten
instrument which was not signed by the father,
may the illegitimate child be allowed to make
use of the father’s surname on the basis of such
instrument?
A​: In Dela Cruz v. Gracia [G.R. No. 177728, July
31, 2009, 594 SCRA 648], the Court allowed the
child to use the father’s surname on the basis of
such private handwritten instrument considering
that there are other evidence to prove paternity
and filiation. In the same case, the Court
adopted the following rules respecting the
requirement of affixing the signature of the
acknowledging parent in any private
handwritten instrument wherein an admission of
filiation of a legitimate or illegitimate child is
 made: (a) Where the private handwritten
instrument is the lone piece of evidence
submitted to prove filiation, there should be
strict compliance with the requirement that the
same must be signed by the acknowledging
parent; and (b) Where the private handwritten
instrument is accompanied by other relevant
and competent evidence, it suffices that the
claim of filiation therein be shown to have been
made and handwritten by the acknowledging
parent as it is merely corroborative of such other
evidence.
Impugning the Legitimacy of the Child
The child cannot choose his own filiation. If the
husband, presumed to be the father does not
impugn the legitimacy of the child, then the status of
the child is fixed and the latter cannot choose to be
the child of his mother’s alleged paramour.
The general rule is that impugning the legitimacy of
child is a personal right of the husband which must
be made in a direct proceeding.
● While the rule is that a person's legitimacy
can only be questioned in a direct action
seasonably filed by the proper party, it was
held that such issue may be resolved in an
action for annulment of deed of sale and
cancellation of title with damages since it
was necessary for the purpose of
determining the legal rights of the
respondents to the subject property and
the question of whether the respondents
have the legal capacity to sue as alleged
heirs was among the issues agreed upon by
the parties in the pre-trial. [Calimag v. Heirs
of Silvestra N. Macapaz, 791 SCRA 620
(2016)]
The presumption that a child conceived or born
during a valid marriage is legitimate applies only to a
situation where the wife denies the paternity of the
husband and not where a child is alleged not to be
the child of the couple.
Q: ​Can the mother declare against the
legitimacy of her own child?
A: No. article 167 of the family code states
that the child shall be considered legitimate
although the mother may have declared
against its legitimacy or may have been
sentenced as an adulteress.
Q: What if the mother declares that the
birth certificate of a child is void, will article
167 apply?
A: No If the allegation is that the child is not
a child of the parents at all, then article 167
will not apply.
Legitimation
a. The child is conceived and born outside
of wedlock;
b. At the time of conception, the parents
were not disqualified by any impediment to
marry each other, or were disqualified only
because any or both were below 18;
c. The parents got married after the child’s
birth;
d. The marriage is valid or at least voidable
Adoption
● In Grande v. Antonio [716 SCRA 698 (2014),
the Court clarified that Article 176 of the
Family Code, as amended by R.A. No. 9255,
gives illegitimate children the right to
decide if they want to use the surname of
their father or not. It is not the father or the
mother who is granted by law the right to
dictate the surname of their illegitimate
children. The use of the word "may" in the
provision readily shows that an
acknowledged illegitimate child is under no
compulsion to use the surname of his
 illegitimate father. Hence, a father cannot
compel the use of his surname by his
illegitimate children upon his recognition of
their filiation. In the same case, the Court
declared void the provision of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR)
of RA 9255, Office of Civil Registrar General
(OCRG) Administrative Order No. 1, Series
of 2004, issued by the National Statistics
Office-Office of the Civil Registrar General,
which makes it mandatory on the part of
illegitimate children to use the surname of
their father upon recognition
● The Certification Declaring a Child Legally
Available for Adoption applies only to
surrendered, abandoned, neglected, and
dependent children as mentioned in R.A.
No. 9523. Any of the following adoption
proceedings in court does not require a
Certification Declaring a Child Legally
Available for Adoption: (1) adoption of an
illegitimate child by any of his/her biological
parent; (2) adoption of a child by his/her
step-parent; or (3) adoption of a child by a
relative within the fourth degree of
consanguinity or affinity. [Sec. 4, IRR of R.A.
No. 9523]
● One of the exceptions to the rule of joint
adoption by the spouses is when one
spouse seeks to adopt his or her own
illegitimate son/daughter. However, the law
requires the spouse seeking to adopt
his/her illegitimate child to first obtain the
consent of his/her spouse. This requirement
is mandatory according to the case of
Castro v. Gregorio [738 SCRA 415 (2014)].
According to the Court, in all instances
where it appears that a spouse attempts to
adopt a child out of wedlock, the other
spouse and other legitimate children must
be personally notified through personal
service of summons and it is not enough
that they be deemed notified through
constructive service; otherwise, the court
does not validly acquire jurisdiction over
the proceedings and the decision of the
court is null and void.
● Under the Foster Care Act of 2012 (Sec. 17,
R.A. No. 10165), in case adoption of the
foster child by the designated foster
parents, the trial custody period may be
partially waived to the extent of the period
equivalent to the period in which the foster
child has been under the foster care of the
foster parents; provided, that a harmonious
relationship exists between the foster child,
the foster parents, and, where applicable,
the foster family.
● When the adopter dies during the time that
the adopted is still a minor or incapacitated,
the parental authority of the biological
parent is deemed to have been restored.
Considering that adoption is a personal
relationship and that there are no collateral
relatives by adoption, there shall be no one
left to care for minor adopted child if the
adopter passed away, hence, the parental
authority of the biological parent should be
deemed to have been restored, applying by
analogy the provisions of Section 20 of the
DAA. [Bartolome v. SSS, 740 SCRA 78
(2014)]
● Article 189(3) of the Family Code and
Section 18, Article V of RA 8552 (law on
adoption) provide that the adoptee remains
an intestate heir of his/her biological parent
[Obiter Dictum in In the Matter of Adoption
of Stephanie Naty Astorga Garcia, 454 SCRA
541 (2005)]. Also, the biological parents
retain their rights of succession to the
estate of the adopted child pursuant to
Article 190(2) of the Family Code [Obiter
Dictum in Bartolome v. SSS, 740 SCRA78
(2014)].
● The law says that the adoption decree “shall
be effective as of the date the original
 petition was filed” and that this rule “shall
also apply in case the petitioner(s) dies
before the issuance of the decree of
adoption to protect the interest of the
adoptee [Sec. 13, DAA].” Hence, for
purposes that are beneficial to the interest
of the adopted child, the latter acquires the
rights that are being enjoyed by legitimate
children as of the date of the filing of the
petition for adoption and not only at the
time of the issuance of the adoption decree.
However, no retroactive effect may be
given to the granting of the petition for
adoption for the purpose of imposing a
liability upon the adopting parents accruing
at a time when adopting parents had no
actual or physically custody over the
adopted child [Tamargo v. CA, 209 SCRA
518 (1992)].
● It must be emphasized that the basis of
parental liability for the torts of a minor
child is the relationship existing between
the parents and the minor child living with
them and over whom, the law presumes,
the parents exercise supervision and
control. Put a little differently, no
presumption of parental dereliction on the
part of the adopting parents may arise if the
adopted child is not in fact subject to their
control at the time the tort is committed.
● In the case of Castro v. Gregorio [738 SCRA
415 (2014)], the Court suggested that the
remedy of annulment of judgment could be
resorted to if the adoption was found to
have been obtained fraudulently, which
action must be brought within four years
from discovery of the fraud.
Tender-age presumption
● If the child is under the age of seven, the
law presumes that the mother is the best
custodian. Hence, the law provides that “no
child under seven years of age shall be
separated from the mother unless the court
finds compelling reasons to order
otherwise.” This is the so-called “tender-age
presumption [Pablo-Gualberto v. Gualberto,
461 SCRA 450, 476(2005); Gamboa-Hirsch v.
CA, G.R. No. 174485, July 11, 2007].” In the
case of Dacasin v. Dacasin [611 SCRA 657
(2010)], the Court held that this statutory
awarding of sole parental custody to the
mother under the second paragraph of
Article 213 of the Family Code is mandatory
and any agreement to the contrary is void.
In this case, the Court declared void a
compromise agreement providing for joint
custody of a child below seven years of age.
The Court in Dacasin recognized, however,
the validity of an agreement providing for
joint custody if the children are already over
seven years of age considering the fact that
the imposed custodial regime under the
second paragraph of Article 213 is limited in
duration, lasting only until the child’s
seventh year.
From the eighth year until the child’s
emancipation, the law gives the separated
parents freedom, subject to the usual
contractual limitations, to agree on custody
regimes they see fit to adopt.
Support
● In ​Lim v. Lim ​[604 SCRA 691 (2009)], the
grandparents theorized that their liability to
give support to their legitimate
grandchildren is activated only upon default
of parental authority, conceivably either by
its termination or suspension during the
children’s minority. The Court held that
neither the text of the law nor the teaching
of jurisprudence supports this severe
constriction of the scope of familial
obligation to give support. In the first place,
the governing text are the relevant
provisions in Title VIII of the Civil Code, as
amended, on Support, not the provisions in
 Title IX on Parental Authority. Under the
law, the obligation to provide legal support
passes on to ascendants not only upon
default of the parents but also for the
latter’s inability to provide sufficient
support
Foundlings
● Domestic laws on adoption also support the
principle that foundlings are Filipinos. These
laws do not provide that adoption confers
citizenship upon the adoptee. Rather, the
adoptee must be a Filipino in the first place
to be adopted. The most basic of such laws
is Article 15 of the Civil Code which provides
that "[l]aws relating to family rights, duties,
status, conditions, legal capacity of persons
are binding on citizens of the Philippines
even though living abroad."
● Adoption deals with status, and a Philippine
adoption court will have jurisdiction only if
the adoptee is a Filipino. [Poe-Llamanzares
v. Commission on Elections, 786 SCRA 1
(2016)]
● Recent legislation is more direct. R.A. No.
8043 entitled "An Act Establishing the Rules
to Govern the Inter-Country Adoption of
Filipino Children and For Other Purposes"
(otherwise known as the "Inter-Country
Adoption Act of 1995"), R.A. No. 8552,
entitled "An Act Establishing the Rules and
Policies on the Adoption of Filipino Children
and For Other Purposes" (otherwise known
as the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) and
this Court's A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC or the
"Rule on Adoption," all expressly refer to
"Filipino children" and include foundlings as
among Filipino children who may be
adopted.
● On the contention that Poe-Llamanzares
committed a falsehood when she put in the
spaces for "born to" in her application for
repatriation under R.A. No. 9225 the names
of her adoptive parents, the Court ruled
that the law allows Poe to state that her
adoptive parents were her birth parents as
that was what would be stated in her birth
certificate anyway. And given the policy of
strict confidentiality of adoption records,
Poe was not obligated to disclose that she
was an adoptee. The Court explained: “One
of the effects of adoption is to sever all legal
ties between the biological parents and the
adoptee, except when the biological parent
is the spouse of the adoptee. Under R.A.
No. 8552, petitioner was also entitled to an
amended birth certificate attesting to the
fact that the adoptee is the child of the
adopter(s) and which certificate shall not
bear any notation that it is an amended
issue. That law also requires that [a]ll
records, books, and papers relating to the
adoption cases in the files of the court, the
Department [of Social Welfare and
Development], or any other agency or
institution participating in the adoption
proceedings shall be kept strictly
confidential." Hence, she can state that her
adoptive parents were her birth parents.
[Poe-Llamanzares v. Commission on
Elections, 786 SCRA 1 (2016)]
Funerals
Art. 305. The duty and the right to make
arrangements for the funeral of a relative shall be in
accordance with the order established for support,
under Article 294. In case of descendants of the
same degree, or of brothers and sisters, the oldest
shall be preferred. In case of ascendants, the
paternal shall have a better right.
Art. 307. The funeral shall be in accordance with the
expressed wishes of the deceased. In the absence of
such expression, his religious beliefs or affiliation
shall determine the funeral rites. In case of doubt,
the form of the funeral shall be decided upon by the
person obliged to make arrangements for the same,
after consulting the other members of the family.

● In Valino vs Adriano (2014) SC ruled that it

is apparent that Article 307 simply seeks
to prescribe the "form of the funeral
rites" that should govern in the burial of
the deceased. As thoroughly explained
earlier, the right and duty to make funeral
arrangements reside in the persons
specified in Article 305 in relation to
Article 199 of the Family Code. As Article
307 itself provides, the wishes of the
deceased must be expressly provided. It
cannot be inferred lightly, such as from
the circumstance that Atty. Adriano spent
his last remaining days with Valino. It
bears stressing once more that other than
Valino’s claim that Atty. Adriano wished
to be buried at the Valino family plot, no
other evidence was presented to
corroborate it.

In this case, the wishes of the deceased

with respect to his funeral are limited by
Article 305 of the Civil Code in relation to
Article 199 of the Family Code, and
subject the same to those charged with
the right and duty to make the proper
arrangements to bury the remains of
their loved-one