A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U. S.

Anny
amMnd ard Generdl Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requir-ts for the
dw=

JAMES J. mEPsui, m, rn

B.A., GLASS€RD SECE3 m,NEW JEFSEY, 1980

R x t Lea-, Kansas
1995

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2 June 1995 Master's The is, 2 Aug 94 - 2 Jun 95
TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5. FUNDING NUMBERS
Military Police Operations in the

Okinawa Campaign

Major James J. Emerson, USMC

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REPORT NUMBER

U.S. Army Command and General Staff College

ATTN: ATZL-SWD-GD

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I
. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 w o r m
During the World War I1 campaign to seize the island of Okinawa, Operation Iceberg,

U.S. Tenth Army employed a significant U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps military

police structure. However, the challenges posed to these units by military

traffic, nearly 300,000 enemy civilians, and over 10,000 prisoners of war are

issues largely neglected by historians. This study analyzes the overall

effectiveness and value of the largest joint military police operation in the

Pacific theater. It evaluates military police force structure and operations by

assessing pre-campaign planning and results of operations with extant historical

doctrine, operational setting, and historical information. Historical military

police doctrine is discussed to identify standards which existed in 1945.

Intelligence or other information about the operational environment is examined for

relevance to doctrine. Finally, historical accounts or information about military

police operations are contrasted with doctrine and operational setting. Historical

information is assessed within five mission areas; traffic control operations,

prisoner of war operations, civilian handling operations, security operations, and

law and order operations. within these mission areas information is further

organized by unit. time, and relation to the tactical situation. Detailed

assessment and evaluation reveal Tenth Army military police overall effectiveness

and value in Operation Iceberg.

. SUBIECT TERMS 15. NUMBER OF PAGES

World War 11, Joint Operations, Military Police Operations 124

Amphibious Operations, Traffic Control, Prisoners of War,

16. PRICE CODE
Civilian Handling, Security, Law and Order, Pacific Theater

I
: SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRAC1
OF REPORT OF T ~ I SPAGE OF ABSTRACT
Unclassified
1 754001-280-5500
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Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)

P ~ C X I I W 4 ANSI Std 239.18
298.102
 MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of Candidate: Major James J. Emerson

Thesis Title: Military Police Operations in the Okinawa Campaign

, Thesis Cannittee Chairman

, Member

, Member, Consulting Faculty

LTC Robert G. Mang&, Ph.D.

Accepted this 2nd day of June 1995 by:

, Director, Graduate Degree

Philip J. '~rookes, Ph.D. Programs

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the

student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the

U. S. Army Camnand and General Staff College or any other

governmental agency. (References to this study should include the

foregoing statement.)

MIIXrAw KILICE O S ?HE oxcmAnA C

~ C N IN aMP AI by

m
mjor J-s J. ~wscll,USM3, 117 pages.

m i n g the World War I1 capaiw to seize the island of Okinawa, Operaticn

Icekeg, U.S. ~ e n t hArmy
' arplayed a significant U.S. Army and U.S. m i n e
Ccaps military police structure. However, the &all- posed to these
units by military traffic, nearly 300,000 eraeny civilians, and over 10,000
prisoners of war are issues laqely neglected by historians.

This st* andlyzes the overall effectiveness and value of the largest
joint military police operation in the Pacific theater. It evaluates
military police force structure and operations by assessing pre-capaign
planning and results of operations with extant historical doctrine,
operatid setting, and historical infomation.

Historical military police .&=trim is discussed to identify standards

which existed in 1945. Intelligence or other informtion about the
operatid euvirctment is Bgmined for relevance to doctrine. Fi~lly,
historical acaxmts or inf-tion about military police operations are
cantrasted with doctrine and operati-1 setting.

Historical inf-tion is assessed within five mission areas; traffic

c a l t r d operations, priscner of w a r operations, civilian handling
operations, security operations, and law and order operations. Within
these mission areas information is further organized by unit, time, and
relation to the tactical situation. Detailed asses- and evaluaticn
reveal Tenth Army military police overall effectiveness and Value in
@ention Iceberg.
 To my wife, Sharyn, I cuuld riot have succeeded without

enaauaganent, patience, support, and sacrifice. This thesis is yours

also.

'I\3 my son, J
-
, and daughters, Stefany and Sammtha, thanks for

your mture sense of understanding and auxxlraganent.

To my amnittee; C o l Wood, Ln: Wyes, and Dr. Maqmm, y&

,¶per% advice and support were invaluable.

Finally, to those veterans of Okinawa ackmmledged in the

bibli-, you have my resped and gratitude for both your

accarplishnents in "Cperaticm Icebergn and your enthusiastic support for

this thesis. This is your story; Setper Fi!

iii

 TABLE OF C O ~ S

APPROVAL .......................... i
ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii
ACKNOWLEDQmNTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi
Chapter
ONE. INTRODUCTION
Background .. .
................. 1
rnrpose . . . . . . ............... 6
Assumptions . .
................. 6
Definition of Terns ............... 7
Limitations . .
................. 9
eli imitation . .
.................. 9
Review of Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Significance of the Study . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Endnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

TWO. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

..............
General Logic

...........
Evaluation Framework

..........
Assessment of Planning

.........
Assessment of Operations

Doctrine .................

..........
Structural Evaluation
....
Structural Planning Assessment
Structural Operations-based Assessment
.....
Operational Evaluation Criteria
....
Operational Planning Assessment
....
Operational Results Assessment
Summary .................

Endnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

THREE. MILITARY POLICE FORCE STRUCTURE EWLUATION

General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... 28

Structural Planning Assessment . . . . . . .... 28

 Doctrinal Support Relationships ........ 28

U.S. Axmy Ground Combat Forces ........ 29

U.S. Marine Corps Ground Combat Forces .... 31

Landing Operations . . . . . . . . . . .... 33

........
Garrison Forces/Island Command 33

..............
Tactical Air Forces 35

Functional Doctrine and Setting . . . .

....
..........
Traffic Control Operations
36
37

..........
Prisoner of War Operations 39

.........
Civilian Handling Operations 41

..............
Security Operations 44

...........
Law and Order Operations 45

"

Operations-based Assessment of Structure .

.... 47

..........
Traffic Control Operations 47

Prisoner of War Operations . . . . . .

.... 50

Civilian Handling Operations . . . . .

.... 51

..............
Security Operations 53

Law and Order Operations . . . . . . .

.... 55

Summary ..................... 56

Endnotes ..................... 57

FOUR. MILITARY POLICE OPERATIONS E7JALUATION

General ..................... 61

Operational Planning Assessment . . . . . . . . . 61

Traffic Control Operations Planning . . . . . . 61

Prisoner of War Operations Planning . . . . . . 63

.....
Civilian Handling Operations Planning 65

Security Operations Planning ......... 66

.......
Law and Order Operations Planning 67

Operational Results Assessment .......... 68

Traffic Control Operations . . . . . . . . . . 68

Prisoner of War Operations .......... 76

Civilian Handling Operations . . . . . . . . . 80

Security Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87

Law and Order Operations . . . . . . . . . . . 89

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92

Endnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93

FIVE. CONCLUSIONS

Structural Appropriateness . .... . ...... 98

,

Operational Effectiveness . .... . ...... 103

BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . .... . ...... 109

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST . . . . . .... . ...... 116

 LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Figure Page

1 . Tenth Army Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

2. Tenth Army Military Police Force Structure . . . . 5

3. WaluationFramework ................. 16

4. South and Central Okinawa Road Network . . . . . . . . 40

 Ba-
The last major World War I1 operation in the Pacific theater, the

Ryukyus Oonpaign, focused on the island of Okinawa at the southern end of

the qrukyu chain between Fonmsa and Japan. The invasion of Okinawa,
Operation Iceberg, was one of the largest mphibious assaults of the w a r
bringing the gnnmd forces of A&iral Chester A. N M t z and General Douglas

Maarthur tcgether for the first time. U.S. ambat and logistical forces
mmkered 172,000 and 115,000 respectively, slightly less than at Luzon.

This force faced 100,000 Japanese defenders and a dense civilian population

of 500.000.'
The joint and d i n e d expeditionary force under the operational

direction of the aarmander-in-Chief,Pacific Ocean Areas, was assigned the

mission to capture, o c q , defend, and develop Okinawa island and
establish ccoltrol of sea and air in the Nansei Shoto area. The mission
sought to establish bases £ran which U.S. forces a u l d attack the Japanese
main islands, support operatias contiguous to the East China Sea, and

sever Japanese lines of cammication with Asia, Fonmsa, Malaya, and the

East Indies. U.S. Anny and K x h e Corps ground and tactical air forces
were task organized uuder U.S. Tenth Anny headquarters. The resulting
Tenth Anny canpign concept was to seize the island of Okinawa, rapidly
inprove and develop airfields and port facilities, and exploit this

pitian in the region. In addition to the necessary naval and air forces,

planners designed a large joint ground force canprised of U.S. Anny XXIV

Corps, I11 W i n e llvrplhibious Corps, Tenth Anny reserve mads up o b

W i n e and two Psny divisions, and a large army garrison force or island
carmand.'

The qrukyus C a p i g n provides a unique and m t c h e d vie of

joint and ccmbined integratian of senrices and forces at both the
operational and tactical levels? The Carmander, Fifth Fleet was the
werall carmander of the opemtim, the amrander, llvrplhibious Forces

Pacific was the oarmander of the e t i o n a r y force, and the Carroanding

General, Tenth ?my was the cormander of expditicmary troops. The

Cmmder-in-Chief,Pacific Ocean Areas issued the initial pl-

directive an 10 Cctober 1944 to initiate preparatias for Operatian

.
-
I Tenth ?my had developed basic amnmd and organizatian mcepts
for an operation of this size and scq?e previously on 16 August 1944. Tkis
structure was ncdified by replac- the Anny service area structure with
the f m t i m of an Island Carmand to better facilitate base developoent,
island defense, and military gomxment operatias. Canbat forces

canprised the remhder of the Tenth W a s in figure 1:

The regirerent for base developnent and military govermnent
operatias in the Pacific theater had highlighted the inadequate mmker of

military police orgamic to the divisions and carps. The P m t mrshal,

Far East Carmand, realized that as operatians pushed further into the

theater, it would not bepractical to evacuate prisoners of war to

Australia. As a result, this would require a dramatic increase in the
mmker of military police units. Additicmally, as the U.S. presence
continued to "strkg out" dl- haeasing exterior lines of operation

behind advancing ompaign fmts, the need for additimal military police
units to protect installatias in theater would also grow. Widering

Command

Fi- 1. Tentki Anny Structure

this, the hravost -1, Far East Carmand, requested an additicmal 17,000

military police be prodded in theater. The War Department could not fully
accamodate this request and f o m t i m of provisiaal military police units

hcam necessary.'
?@rims were encountering increasing ~nmnbersof civiliansin their

-ti- as they pushed closer to Japan. Increasiq population density

and the extra reactions displayed by Japanese civilians to U.S. forces

qlicated tactical prablens, exposed canbat forces to increased risk, and

created psychological dil-.' W, the Ryukyus campaign challeqed

military police planners to provide classic suppoa to a joint field q ,

handle an estimated 500,000 eneny civilians, support base developlaent for

at least eight airfields, and support dwelopnent of a Navy operating base

at White Beach on Nakagusuku Bay. '

Acardhqly, w i t k i n the Tenth Army task organization existed an

Army and I%&ne Corps military police farce structure canprised of

appruxjnntely 3,500 soldiers and m s . The Army aap1Oyea three

battali-, three separate anpnies, and six separate platccas of military
police, while the Marine Corps enp1Oyea one battalion and five separate

canpanies of military police. The foregoing force structure is depicted in

figure 2. Finally, the Tenth Amy PrOwst mrshal also aaployed a joint
staff canprised of both Anrry and Marine Corps representatives.'

U.S. Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas, military police planners

detennhsd the troop reqdreuents for the ompaign. They

cansidered experience gained in past and q i n g operations, studied
Okinawa prabable needs, and canpared then to military police unit
availability.' The Prcnrost Marshal, Tenth Amy, kegan p h m h q for the
ompaign in Novanber 1944. Planners originally a military

police structure that nas larger than that described above. The creation
of provisimal military police units was utilized to aqwwate for

military police deficiencies identified by planners. Additicmally, there

are mmerms -1es of joint military police task organization in the

amalgamated phases I and I1 of the ompaign.'O

Lieutenant Generdl Victor H. Krulak, U.S. I%&ne Corps, Retired,
was the G-3 for 6th I%&ne Division &riq Operation Iceberg. General
Krulak made the fol1avj.q camrents -r military police support d ~ k g

the Okinawa czqxiign:

You must realize that this was our first real exprience w i t h
civilians. Military police wereused in the classic sense as part of
the shore party to help organize the beach area, and as sam as we
began to encxnmter civilians they were givencharge of the civilian

Figure 2. Tenth Army military police force structure

In spite of the rnrmeroussignificant characteristics of military police

support in Operatia Iceberg, there is no collective written history,

 5. Infonmtion provided in after action reports by units

regarding the results of operatiens is factual and accurate.

6. Military policelogistical support was adequate.

Definition of Terms

There are ~.nnwaust

- and phrases in this doclnnent that require
a clear definition. W y terms camrm in 1945 or those diffdng f m
current dcctrinal mankg are included:

Adininistrative Order. An order cover* administrative details,

such as traffic, supply, and evacuation, when instructions are tco
v01- to be included in paragraph 4 of the field order, and at other
times when necessary ti publish administrative instructions to the carmand;
usually issued by divisiens and higher units.
Beach W t e ~ a n c ered The beach maintenance area is that
poaion of the beachhead which cxmtains all the canbat senrice support
units and activities necessary to sustain the

- 1 f0rC€?.13

Dmp. A dmq is the locaticm within the beachhead where an

individual unit's short tenn supply sustairnnent which t r a m s in its

organic trains is located. "
Civilians. Civilians found or encamtered in a theater of
war or in areas affected by operations other than war. They may include
civilian internees, refugees, displaced civilians or detained civilians."
Garrisan/&%md CCormudder. l%e garrisan or island carmander is

the officer ordered to canrand the units of all services assigned as the
garrison of an atoll, island, or other
 M i l i t a r y Gave-t. That form of governnent which is established
and mintdined by a Mligerent by force of arms over occupied territory of
the eneny and over the inhabitants thereof. "
Prisoner of War. A persan captured or interned by a belligerent *

p e r because of war."
Friscoler of War C o l l e c t i r g mint A locality designated in the
-
a r e of a frat-line divisian during ocmbat for the assenblage of priscmers
of war, pendhy ewminaticm and arrangenent for fuahez e~cuatian.~'
m i s a n e r of War IncZosure An installatian in the ccmbat or
axmumications zane with facilities for the processhg and tenpolary
detentian of p r i m of w a r .
Straggler. A soldier who has becane separatedfran his
organization without authority. A mtor vehicle that has fallen behind for
any reason i
n an advance. >I
Straggler C o l l e c t i r g Paint: A straggler post designated as a
collecting point in administrative orders at which stragglers are assenbled
pmdhq return to their proper organizations. Straggler collecting points

are located in straggler lines. "

Straggler Line. A line designated as such in adninistrative

orders and usually following well-defined terrain features such as roads,

railroads, or streams a l q or in rear of which military police patrol for
the purpose of app- soldiers absent f m front-lineunits without
authority."
Straggler W t . A post established by military police fron which
patrols operate for the purpose of appr- stragglers."
.
 Limitations

The prablen ocolducthg this research results f m n limited sources

of inf-tion. Semndaq sources which cover this caqaign spend very few

words address- military police support directly. These sources do cwver

the topic indirectly wfien speakhg of emirta~nentalfactors: enmy

p r i m , enmy civilians, or trafficability of main supply routes. This

type of infmtion is scattered through these texts rquirhg detailed and

time conslanirag examination. Fortunately, the available primary source

dacumentation p d d e s much better detail n q a d i q task organization,

p l d enployment and results of operations. This infonmtion c a n b i d

w i t h the fonner may not provide a caplete picture of the results of

enployment, pmblans, and lessans learned. Military p~licebattalion after

action reports &st for the units involved; however, infop~tionabout

separate units below the battalion level is cxmtained within higher

headquarters reports. Professicmal associatias have rendered access to

veterans of the 1st Military Police Battalion, Fleet mine Force, Pacific
Mnnerous mrine Corps eyewitnesses were located and intenriared. No Army

participants were located in spite of strenuous efforts. Even thotgh

difficulty &st4 in collecting desired evidence, this research design

renders an accurate px&ct with sufficient evidence to wt this
r

thesis.

Delimitation

This thesis will address the operations of other oanbat forces,

canbat support forces, and canbat service support forces as required to
N l y answer the primary and secondary questions regardirag rkLlitary police

rmpport.

Review of Literature

There are a rnnnber of excellent extant works which address the

Okinawa Canpign. Key works on this topic are mjor Charles S. Nichols,
Jr., W, and Henry I. Shaw, Jr.' s Okinawa: V i c t o z y in the P a c i f i c ;

J a m H. and William M. Belote's af S t e e l : lk B a t t l e f o r Okinawa;

Burtcn Beecher Brigys' Logistic Stqoport o f the Okinawa C a p a i g n ; George C .

Dyer's %2
Anphibidus Cam2 to CanqUer War: lk S t o r y o f W r d R i W

Kelly mmer; Benis M. FranktsOkinawa: C q ~ s t o n eto V i c t o r y ; I . T . M.

h ' s Okinawa, 345: ZFE Gateway to Japan; Frank 0. Rngh's ZXx? I s l a n d

War; Thaws M. Iluber's Japan's B a t t l e f o r Okinawa; and irvirag Werstein's

Okinawa: xke Last Ordeal.

These accounts provide excellent historical infonmtion regardiq

the tactical and operatid chronology of the Canpaign. They spend
little, if any, time addressing the military police support imralved in the
operation. There is saxe indirect reference through discussion of the

envirornnent. The attention devoted to enerry prisaners, circumstances on

the beach, eneny civilians, military govermnent, weather, and
trafficability on Okinawa provides indirect reference to the operatid

ernrircamwt of the military police.

Several other works serve to illustrate the persanal attributes of

this Canpign experienced by the individual mvine and Soldier. These
books are George Wt4illan; C. Peter Zurlinden, Jr.; Alvin M. Josephy, Jr. ;
navid Daqsey; Keyes Beech; and Heman Kogan's Mc~mnanVdor: mcine
Divisians in Action; William Manchester's GWdbye, WDarlolesS: A Enwir o f
the P a c i f i c War; and Emie Pyle's Last C h a p t e r . !Chese texts make

occasicmal reference to the military police directly and are also laced

with of the indirect notes described in the first category of

literature.

N e , Mere are works deal* with specific unit history.

These are found primarily at the Service and division level. These works
include Benis M. Fmuk and Henry I. Shaw, Jr.'s V i c t o r y and O c c u p a t i a n :

History o f U. S. &dne C o r p s qperatians in W o r l d War II; Ray E.

Zqplanan, James M. Burns, Russell A. Gugeler, and John Stevens' Ufrited

States Amy in W o r l d War 11, The War in the P a c i f i c , Okinaha: The Last

Battle; Geo2ge W l l a n t sThe O l d Breed: A H i s t o y o f the First mine

Division in W o r l d War II; Richard W. Johnston's E D l l c w M2: The Story o f

the Secand mine D i v i s i o n o f W o r l d War II; James R. StC&Muts 'Be Sixth

Mw5ne D i v i s i o n ; The Sixth &Brine Division Association's S i x t h mi
n e
Division: The Strikirtg Sixth; Edmud G. Love's The H o u r g l a s s : A History
o f the 7th Infantzy D i v i s i o n in W o r l d War II; Edrrornd G. Love's The 27th
Infantry D i v i s i o n in W o r l d War II; 77th Mantry Divisicol, mited States

Amy's Ows to hbld it High: The History o f the 77th I n f a n t r y D i v i s i o n in

W o r l d War II; and Orlando R. Davidscmts 2 3 Deadeyes:
~ The St- o f the

96th Infantry D i v i s i o n . These viurks collectively provide very good d t

histories cansidering the canbat invwlvenent at the divisicm and reghatal

levels. These authors spend very little the and text addressing their
organic military police support or attached military police support in a

given operation. There is m e direct reference available in these texts

than found in other viurks about the Canpig-. There is also additicolal
indirect reference made in these texts similar to that mentimed above.

The history of the Seccmd Marine Division prwides aparagraph of

amwntary of its organic Military Police s
- handling of eneny

prisaners d m i q the Okinawa Canpaign. The history of the 96th Infantry .

Division provides a tm-page history of its organic Military Police

Platoon's imrolvemnt in the Pacific, There are no references made about

.
the canpanies of the 519th Military Police Battalion which were attached to
the 7th, 77th, and 96th Infantry Divisias &ring the early phases of the

Okinawa Gqaign. Similarly, there are no references made to the canpanies

of the 51st Military Police Battalion (Provisional) ~ c were
h attached to
the I11 2nphibious Corps, First l4dzi.m Division, and Sixth l4dzine Divisim

during the early phases of the Okinawa Canpaign.'* Detailed exmination

of both of the foregoing categories-oflitezatme ensured discovery of

-11 references to military police support spread thraughout larger

the ,
I&& m3st anplete source of infomtion &sts in the
pr- source doclnnentation: operation plans, administrative orders,
field orders, daily staff reports, actim reports, and special action

repoas f m n theater level down to battalias. Reports frcm units, wen

separate units belm the battalion level were incorporated in the reports

of the next higher level amnands, if at all. This creates an obstacle in

deal- with military police units due to the tendency to attach carpMnies

and plat- to divisims and regiments certain phases of an

operation. In these cases infmtion availability depends the

reporting priorities of the supported unit, since separate capany and %

platoon reports thraugh parent mrmands appear to have been rare.

Nevertheless, there is a amsiderable antnmt of infmtion available in

these documents for detailed review.

Finally, mmenms relevant articles fran periodicals such as the
muine Ca2ps G3zette and Military Review, are available. These -ces

provide a range of infomation which is both directly and indirectly

relevant. 'I%y ccmtain historical discussions r q a r d h g military police

support in several areas. Only cme of these articles deals directly with

the Okinawa Cmnpaign; however, they serve to support dcctrinal discussion

and canpariscm. There is a great deal written about military w t

qerations, civil affairs, and military police handlw of enmy civilians.
These articles serve to support discussion of military police handling of

civilians.
Collation of the many mall shreds of evidence available increased

the ultirrate d u e of this literature. No cme source makes significant

effort to address this topic; however, exWaction of infomation fran the

many sources provided a more caplete historical picture.

Significance of the'study

The significance of this study is twofold. First, this thesis

fills a historical void in a military era which is otherwise well

documented. while this thesis does not provide a mnprehensive historical

accounting of military police involvement in the Ryulryus campaign, it does

represent the only collective work on this topic. Seccoad, this thesis
provides the cmly analysis of military police operations in World War 11,
and specifically the Pacific theater.
 'Dan, Van der Vat, !RE P a c i f i c CiolpMign: !l%e U.S. -J-se Naval

War 1941-1945 (New York, NY: S i m and S b t e r , 1992) , 382.

9enth pnml, Action Report Rydqus, 26 mh to 30 June 1945

c
(Okinawa: n.p., 3 sep 4 5 ) , 1-0-1.

G. Fix, Tenth A m y in the Okinawa CanpMign: An AnaZysis

f a n the O p e r a t i d Pa-spective W A S Thesis, U. S. Army Caumnd and
General Staff College, 1992), 1-2.

%nth Army, Action Report Ry&us, 1-0-2, 3-0-1, 3-0-2.

' ~ r m yForces, ~ a East

r Cormand, ~enealHeadquarters,!l%e havost
J&mhal'sHistozy, Cznpaigns of the Pacific, 1941-1947 (Australia: n.p., 23
Dec 47), 8, 30-33.

61stLt Lewis Meyers, m, ftJapanese Civilians in Canbat Zanes"

mine coqs ~ e t t e(February 1.945), 1-3.

'James H. and William M. Mote, 7&2mm of Steel: !The B a t t l e for

Okinawa (New Yak: IEarper and Raw, 1970). 196-197.

"Tenth Army, Action Report Rydqus, 1 1 - M I - 1 , 11-=I-2.

'Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas, Participation in the Okinawa

Operation, ([?I : n.p., 15 m r 46). 99.

''?renth Amy, Action Re- Rydqus, 11-MI-I, 11-MI-2.

"LtGen Victor H. Krulak, m, (Ret), interview by author, 19 C c t

1994, tape reandhg and transcript, telephmic interview at LtGen Krulak's
hane in San Diego.

"FM 19-5, M l i t a z y Folice [Obsolete1 (War Department: Govenmrent

Printing Mfice, 14 Jun 441, 221.

'%nth Amy, 1st Qlgineer special Brigade,Operations Plan

"Ice&zyn (Okinawa: n.p., 4 Feb 45). Armex No 1.

"Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, Staff O f f i c e r s ' Field mnual for

dqkibious Operations [Obsolete] (Hawaii: n.p., 10 Sep 44) , 55.
 "EM 19-5, 223.

"Bid., 223.

''Bid., 223.

"Bid., 223, 224.

"Bid., 225.

i d . , 225.

i d . , 225.

" k y E. m l e m n , James M. Burns, Russell A. Weler, and John

Stevens, Okinawa: Ihe Last Battle, Ihe War in the P a c i f i c , Lhlited States
Army in World War II (Center of Military History, United States Army,
Washiragtan, DC), 1993, 473-482.

 General Lqic

The challerge in studying military police support in Opeation

Iceberg is meamrhg its effectiveness. In order to gaugenilitary police
effectiveness in this campaign, structural and operaticma1 evaluations are
presented us- a symnetrical framework (fig. 3 ) .

Figure 3. Ebaluation Framwork

Within both major parts of this framework, two processes facilitate

evaluaticm: asses-t of pl- and assesswnt of operatias. Thus,

this chapter describes the framework for both evaluations and the mechanics
of both processes within that framework. Finally, the military police
doctrine and plaxmirq infonmtion available in 1945 is presented. While
this chapter provides an overview of doctrine and infomation, detailed
discussion by topic is found in chapters three and four.

Evaluation Frammrk

Structural and operatianal evaluatims are d i n e d to create me

logical framework. This architecture fonns the basis for chapters three
and four: Military Police Structural Evaluation and Military Police
Operatid Evaluation. Within each chapter assesstents of both plarrning
and operations are used to facilitate evaluation. Additicmally, efficiency
is emsidered by graupirq evidence according to major subordinate units,
mission areas, and critical canpaign junctures. Task organization and
opeatimal tenpois considered across this series of junctuces. Relative
eccmnty of force and mtual support are highlighted in both evaluatiow.
In chapter three, force structure is evaluated to determine if it
was appropriate. This evaluation of military police force structure seeks
to answer the follcuixig question: Were sufficient personnel planned for,
employed, and properly task organized to achieve operatianal success? In
chapter four, military police operations are assessed to determine if
n actual execution. Amlysis of military police operations
effective i
seeks to answer the follcuixig question: Given the available force
structure, were military police operatims effective and of value to the

W g n ?

 This research design does not attenpt to masure other areas, such
as logistics, due to a lack of pertinent military police infonmtion.
logistical cansiderations h a m a significant inpact on strudure or
operations are discussed under each topic.

Assessment of Plarrning

Each evaluation enplays World War I1 contemporary doctrine and

information regarding the operatid settiriy available to planners as a

gauge for asses- of preoperation military police planning. The goal of

this asses-t is to determine phmirq adequacy. Dxtrinal standards and

operaticma1 settirag are canpared to operation and *strative plans to

provide -1usions about the appropriateness, ccmpleteness, and accuracy
of military police force strudure and operations plarrning.

Assessment of Operations

A s e a assesmat process examims the appropriateness of the

force structure enployed and the effectiveness of the operations cmducted

based q c m the results of military police operations. This

operations-based assessnent process differs fran the operatid
evaluation. whereas, the operatid evaluation measures effectiveness,
the operations-basedasses- is merely cme-of-twopmesses utilized to

judge structural appropriateness as well as operatid effectiveness. It

canbines infomation provided in special action reprts, after action
reports, literature, and interviews of participants to provide a historical
picture of military police operations. Canparisan of results with

doctrinal Qliteria and pr-gn plarrning creates a second gauge for

assess- k o t h military police structure and operations.
 Dodrine

our principdl pieces of historical doctrine pruvide a basis for

asses-t of the accuracy of the military police force structure planning

prccess. First, Field Mmual 19-5,Military Aolice,' provided the primary
source of &my military police doctrine tho.@ 1945. This field d

primarily addressed operatid tapics. There were, howwer, several

sections dedicated to standard military police organizatias and doctrinal
support relationships with a field anny, a a q s , and a division.
O p e a t i d infomticm pruvided a basis for p1ami.q the capabilities and
structure required to perform specific missions. Field -
1 19 -5

included a separate section cm military police support for anphibious

operations.
Second, Fleet M&ne Force, Pacific Staff Officersr Field Mmm.2
far Anplhibia~sqperaticms; pruvided detailed m i n e Corps pl-
guidance for anprhibious operatias in the Pacific Ocean Area. This field

manual mmtained a structural cmprisun of a Marine Divisicm and an Anny

Wantry Division. Other infomtion regardirrg military police support*
relationships w i t h canbat, and canbat support, and canbat service

support units was included. There was no specific military police

operatianal infoxxmticm in this source, however, infrequent references are

m d e z q a d i q military police roles in anphibious operatias.
Third, a series of trainkg docments, published by m i n e Corps
Schools titled, Arpbibicus Gpratiom, included Mphibious (Phib) 19,
-1-t of Militazy Aolice: This doclrment pruvided the same level of
dactrinal detail for operatianal tapics as Field -
1 19-5, but

enphasized M&ne Corps anprhibious operatias. Whereas, Phib 19 was

published in 1945 and m y not have beenavailable to -tion Iceberg
planners, it does represent the collective Marine Corps military police
eqerieuce available to planners fran after action reports of previous
operations. It can masaably be assured to represent m i n e Corps
military police operatid standards in ~anuary1945.
Fourth, Field mnual 27-10, W e s of Larad Warfare , provided very

detailed and directive policy -r the of occupatianal forces,

administration of military w t s , and the treatment and handlhg of
prisoners of war. This docranent represented very definitive policy for all
perscolnel ~ r m c e m i r qthese topics.'
Several periodicals exist which addressed military police lessans

of &s era. These articles focused primarily on three areas; -ious

operations, handling of civilians, and traffic qerations. When canbined
with the four principal sources cited, the mterial provides a
canprehensive base fran which to derive historical standards. These
standards provide a general gauge for assessnent of military police
strurrure and operations pl- for this qeratj.cn. Finally, the

doctrine addresshg force structure nonmlly discussed types of units, but

not their specific -tents. Where necessary, U.S. ?umy and M&ne Corps
tables of organization will be referred to for details of unit structure

and organization.

Structural Evaluation Criteria

The first mjor measure of military police effectiveness is the
appropriateness of the military police force structure splayed in this

d g n .
The follcwing questians arise:

1. Was the planned military police structure amsistent with

extant doctrinal standards and contgilporary eqerience in the Pacific

theater?

2. Was the military police structure wfiich was anployed adequate

to handle the actual mission requirements?
The l@c utilized to evaluate appropriateness of military police
force structure anplays the two asses-ts of planning and operaticas
already discussed. M-tion is presented by major subordinate unit and
is amsidered relative to the tactical and operatid setting. Asses-t
of military police planning and operations as they relate to force
structure provides a gmd ruler for me%mxkg overall military police
structural appropriateness for this v i g n . Detailed discussion and
evaluation is contained in chapter three.

Structural Planning Assesauent

Ewmination of Tenth Anny and U.S. Anny Forces, Pacific Ocean

nrea, military police structd planning provides a basis for assessnent.
This inf-tion is assessed for planner adherence to minirmnn standards
established in dodrine. Did Tenth Anny anploy the dnhnn military police
structure prescribed by doctrine ?
Military police dodrine traditional relati&ps
between supporting and supported units based upm exprience at the service
level. While these traditional relationships fail to account for specific
mission-based requirements, they do infer minirmnn generic levels of support
at various canmnd levels. Dob2:ine also provides a basis for deducing
dnhnn requirewrits for the successful acaqlishwnt of traditional

21

military police missions and £unctions. These requirerents serve as a

basis for calculating m i d n u n force structure required for specific types

of missi-. Whilemission-based requiranents f a i l t o account for the

, two methods used in taudeiu provide a

general needs of supported ~ t s the
canplete means to assess the planned military police force structure.

Intelligence available t o military police planners forecastedthe

probable o p e r a t i d setting. Mnnerous factors reg- the en-,

indigenous civilians, the euvircwnent, and the situation are cansidered due

t o their significant iqdct q m n doctrinal cansideratims. Exh factor is

discussed in chapter three as it affects a particular facet of missim

planning. Doctrinal criteria teqered w i t h infomatian pruvided the most

accurate basis for pl- military police support in 1945. Today this
same process serves as a basis for assesanent of the military police

p1- conducted.

Historical military police planning is reviewed and evaluated

against the doctrinal criteria and o p e r a t i d setting t o determine

s t r u c t d planning a-cy. U.S. Amy Forces, Pacific Ocean Arsas, Tenth

Amy, and major subordinate carmand pl- is assessed using this

criteria.

S t r u c t d Operati--based Assesanent

Operations-based assesanent of the Tenth Amy military police

force structure m i d e r s specific m i t s , specific o p e r a t i d results, and

the relative tacticdl and o p e r a t i d setting i n w h i c h military police

operations occurred. This process seeks t o assess the adequacy of military

police structure based q c m o p e r a t i d results. Did the Tenth Amy have

sufficient military police assets to handle thecirclnustances they
encountered? This question is anmered by analysis of military police
operati- as they relate to structure. Assessnent depends upcgl results
frun after action reports, special action reprts, recollecticms of
participants, or well-ckumnted seandaq saurcematerials.
Major abjectives expressed in plannirig are canpared to the
results of operatims. Operation plans define the required structure that
planners identified for this caugnign. Operatid results damstrate
whether planned structure was adequate withtangible evidence.
Evidence is oqadzed by mission type or function, per£onni!=g
unit, and chronolcgically. Missicms, £uucticms, and per£omhg units are
self-explanatory. Chrcau,lcgicdl placenent draws a relaticmsbip between the
historical operation and cme or rr~remilitary police critical junctures in

the canpign. There are five critical junctures for military police
suppoa in Operation Iceberg w h i c h are considered. First, there is the
support to operaticms in the beach maintenance area.' Seccmd, there is
the rapid sweep of northern Okinawa by 6th M x c h Divisica6 Third, there
is the shifting of I11 Marine ~ i o u Oorps
s to southem Okinawa.'
Faurth, there is the perid of omstant msnsoons and diminished

trafficability in May and June, 1945.8 Finally, there is the mssive

-ion of p r i m and civilian internee pcqxrlaticms as the southemmxt
part of Okinawa is s-ed? Tkse five junctures are not -istent with
canpign phases; haever, they constitute periods of criticdl effort by

military police units. Inefficiency is captured and separated £run

inadequate structure.
 Operational Evaluation criteria

The second major masme of military police overall effectiveness

is operational effectiveness The folludg questions lcgically arise:

1. W a s operational pl- masistent w i t h extant doctrinal

standards arad v i e n c e i
n the Pacific theater?
2. Were planned military police missions successfully
aconplished?
The lcgic and methadology used to determine effectiveness of
military police operations enploy the same assessnents of pl- and
operations. The framewcok for evaluation is near-identical to that used
for structure. Evidence is again organized by unit, function, and
chnxmlcgical sequence. As in the structural evaluation, the factors of
ecanany of force and mtual support are discuss& where applicable. A
detailed discussion is cantained in chapter four.

The doctrindl aiteria used in the structural evaluation is

eqnndd qxm in the operational evaluation Was military police

operatiaal plambq effective? This question is answered again by

canparirag dcctrinal criteria and operational settirag with the historical
plamliq conducted.
Even t b g h issessnent of operations planuixg relies qxm the same
dcctrjnal sources, chapter four examhes cmly operational catent. It is
specific enough to facilitatediscussion of the key mission areas. The
same five mission areas described in the structural evaluation are
cansidered here again. Each area is defined in sufficient detail to

evaluate the effectiveness of both planning andoperations ccoldubed.

External factors and circ~anstancesabviously affected each unit's

ability to adhere to doctrinal standards Thus, the setting is £urther

defined f m n that base provided in chapter three. The expanded doctrinal
criteria canbined with a redefined setting together provide a yardstick to
measure operational plans.
Planning is assessed for every unit possible; however, lack of
infonmticm for scme units precludes q l e t e assessrent. Thus, the
assesanent of planning in this operation focuses at the Tenth Amy, X C J

Corps, and 111 Aqhibious Corps levels due to availability of historical

infonmtian. Unit plannhq at lmer levels is inwrporated into the Amy
and Corps discussions. The planning assessrent d e w s the planning
prcduct not the process.

Operational Results Assesanent

Assessrent of operational results represents the realsubstance of

the historical discussicm in this thesis. Wereoperaticms successful or
unsuccessful? This question is answered by the historical facts
wrmmdhq the various military police operations. Operations discussed

in chapter three cansidered structd inferences cmly, but chapter four

analyzes all aspeds of both successful and unsuccessful results achieved.

Plans identify operational objectives. These objectives indicate
what capabilities were desired by planners Military police plans,
analyzed in the operational planning assessrent, provide a basis for
analysis of operations actually executed. Discussion of doctrinal
criteria canbined with the operational setting and planned operations
provides an overall operaticmal criteria for each mission area. Ccmparisan

of historical operations with this criteria pennits assessnent of the

quality of military police perf011~llce.Asses-t of operations plarmiq

d i n e d with asses- of actual o p e a t i d results provides an accurate

mans to assess the overall effectiveness of military police operatias.

The owmr&fq logic and methodology of this thesis seeks to

capletely answer the prifiary and seccndary questions spelled out i
n
chapter one. This is accaplished tlmn.gh separate yet syrmretrical
evaluaticm of military police structure and military police operations.

These t w areas caprise the substance of the two follawirag chapters.

Within each chapter, plarmirg and operatias are discussed to achieve

logical and factual answers to the research questions of this thesis.

 'EM 19-5, M l i t a z y mlice [Obsolete] (War Department, Washington,
DC: Govenrment Print* Office, 14 Jun 44),1-250.

'Fleet m i n e Force, Pacific, S t a f f O f f i c e m f Field Nmud f o r

Aphibicxzs Operations [Obsolete] (Hawaii: n.p., 10 Sep 44), 1-74.

' p m 19, Ehplopsnt o f M l i t a z y &lice [Obsolete] ( m i n e Corps

Schools, NC: n.p., 1945), Series on Arrpjlibious Operations, 33vols, 1-48.

'EM 27-10, Rules o f Land W a z f m [Obsolete] (War Department,

Washjlagton, DC: C m e m w n t Frint* Office, 19401, 18-21, 74-77, 82-85.

=TenthA q r , Action Repart Ryukyus, 26 Mrch t o 30 June 1945, 3

w l s . (Okinawa: n.p., 3 Sep 4 5 ) . P7-111-2, PII-IV-8/29, PII-=1-1/5;
PTOVOGt B k x s b l , 1st Rgineer Special Brigade, M i l i t a z y mlice Activities
Okinawa Beach *Nice m a (Okinawa: n.p., 17 ~ u l y1945). 1-3

'6th BBrhe Divisicm, Special Action Report, Okinawa Gperation, 2

wls., Phases I & 11, 30 Apr 45, Phase III (Okinawa: n.p., 30 Jun 45),
VII-11/48.

'111 BBrine Zqhibious Corps, Action Repart Ryukyus -ration,

Phases I and I1 (Okinawa: n.p., 1 Jul 451, 44.

%XIV Corps, Action Report Ryukyus, 1 Apr-30 Jun 45(0kinawa: n.p.,

n.d.), 67-69, 87-90; I11 K&ne Zqhibious Corps, Action Report, 110-128.

%nth U m y , Action Report, P7-111-33/35.

 Generdl

World War I1 era military police operations depended heavily on

manpower and hmm interacticm to achieve success. %emfore, adequate

farce structure, effective task organizaticm, and econany of force were

crucial principles gui- the military police planning pmess. As
described in chapter two, asses-ts of planning and opeations are
cmbined to evaluate structure, but dcctrinal criteria m t first be
identified.

S t r u c t d -P Asses-t
Doctrinal Support Relatiaships
Doctrine affected force structure in two ways. First, dcctrine
established traditimal support relatiaships for military police units and
supported carmands. S d , dactrine created specificamditians for
mission per£ommce based qxm service level-ence and lessons
l e a d . These ccmditians served to expand or diminish traditimal levels
of prescribed support tail- it for a given situaticm. Raditional
support relatiaships therefore required first amsideraticm. Cme questicm
arises here. Does the p
l
& military police force struchve provide
minirman dcctrinal support prescribed in traditimal support relatiaships?
 Field Mmml (EM) 19-5,Military Police, provided planners with a
general description of the doctrinal levels of military police support for
a U.S. Army division, corps, field army, and theater headquarters.

Specific organization of these units was found in their respective tables

of organization or tables of organization and equipnent. Additicmally,
this reference provided description of military police prisoner of w a r

processirag canpanies, military police escort guard canpanies, and specially

fonned criminal investigation units for use at critical points within a
theater. Finally, FM 19-5 describes a military police canpany, aviatim
for use in support of air forces and associated installations.'

U.S. Amy Gxxm3 aanbat Porces

The division military police platoan, organic to all types of

divisions, was named in accordance with Tables of Organization

19-87 and 19-97, or Tables of Organization and Equipnent 19-7, 19-117, and

19-177T. It is inportant to note that the tenn platcon here must be

properly defined. A division military police platcon organized under Table

of Organization 19-7 was authorized apprcodrrately 90 soldiers in the unit.

By caqprisan, Amy military police canpanies were authorized between 130

and 150 soldiers dependirag upon the table of organization that the unit was
organized under. Fomd w i t h i n the division headquarters anpry, division
military police plat- were carmanded by thedivision p m t rcarshal?
The Amy corps was doctrinally assigned a military police platcon
organized under Table of Organization and Equipnent 19-77. The corps

p m t1
-
supervised this platcon. When the Cmqs operated as part
of a field army, doctrine considexed one platcon adequate. In situations
wfiere the corps was operatirag independently or required additid support,

29

doctrine provided for the assignment of a military police canpany,

organized under Table of Organization and Equipnent 19-37. This elastic

ccmpany expand& with additional platccms to provide a m . of cme

platoon per division. The 19-37 canpany had the same support relationship

with a corps as a military police battalion had with a field anny.

The field anny military police battalion doctrinally provided a

.
w i d e m t q e of support within the anny area of operation. It operated within

both the canbat zme and the annumication z m . This battalion was
organized under Table of Organization and Fquipnent 19-35. This battalion
ccmsisted of a headquarters and headquaaers detachvat, four military
police ccmpanies, and a medicdl detaclm~~LEach ccmpany within the

battalion m i s t e d of ccmpany headquarters, scout car section, and three

military police platcons. Ebr an anny of mxe than three corps, a military

police ccmpany, Table of Organization and Equipent 19-37, attached to the

battalion for each additicaal corps.'

The task organizaticm for Tenth Amy reflects that each Amy
division had an assigned military police platm, the XXnr Ccaps hacan
assigned military police plat-, and the 519th Military Police Battalim.
Assignirag the 519th Military Police Battalion to the XXnr Corps vice Tenth

Amy, deviated £ran doctrinal support relationshipsi

n EM 19-5 to push
military police support forward to XXnr Corps. The Tenth Amy Headquarters
had a platoon fran the 519th Military Police Battalion providirig security

and military police support at the canmnd post. Additionally, the Corps
attached ccmpanies fran the 519th to their two assault divisicms, 7th
Infantry Division and 96th Infantry Division. Ccmpany B, 724th Military
Police Battalion attached to the 77th Mantry Division in Tenth Amy
reserve.' The Tenth Amiy M a t e d fran basic Amiy dadrinal support

relatimships, however, the total quantity of Anny military police units

canpared to the total nmhr of Anny supported carmands clearly satisfies
the basic quantitative support requirement for a field any established in
doctrine. Tenth Amiy did not lMintain centralized ccmtrol of the 519th
Military Police Battalian in order to provide additiaal support to X X N
Corps for shore party operations. M d n u n military police support was task
organized at the lowest possible levels.

U.S. &Brine Corps G d Canbat Forces

The &@d.ne Corps Schools prduced a series of training documents

titled ryphibicus Operations (Phib). Doclanent nmhr 19 in this series,

Phib 19, was t i t l e d ~ l q m n tof Mlitary Rdice Phib 19 provided

planners with the sane service level experience and traditicmal support
relatimships as FM19-5. Phib 19 provided a descriptian of two basic
m i n e Corps military police organizations; the fleet Marine Force military
police battalion and the m i n e division military police canpany.'
The military police canpany organic to the mrine division
possessed three platocnts and a canpany headquarters. Table of Organizatian
F-90 provided the structure and organizatian of this canpany. An F Series

canpany rated apprcDdmately 100 mines. The military police canpany

pmvided a full range of support to the Xwine division. The canpany

carmander also acted as the division provost mrshal. Doctrinal provision

existed for a divisian to request additional military police support fran
the next higher echelcm of wmrand when necessary.'
Fleet m i n e Force military police battalions, new organizatims

at the end of 1944, possessed four military police cmpmies and a

headquaam and service canpany. The first of these military police

battalions was activated 27 October 1944. These new battalions saw varying
mmirq levels between 350 to 500 t4xi.m~. Doctrinally, cme or more of

these battalicms was task organized into a force abnre the division lever.
The Marine ground mnbat forces of Tenth Army helm to
the I11 Marine IImphibious Corps. The Corps' task organization included a
corps military police and a canpany in each of its two principal

.
assault divisions: 1st and 6th Marine Divisions. The 1st Military Police

Battalion, Fleet l4I?5IE Force, Pacific also attached to and supported the

111 Marine Anqhibious Gzwqs. Additionally, the Tenth Army attached three

military police cmpanies £run the 1st Pravisid Military Police

Battalion, Island amMnd to this corps. The I11 Marine Anqhibious Corps
kept one of these mnpanies attached to the Corps Military
Secticm, and attached the other two cmpanies to the 1st and 6th W i n e
Divisicms. Tenth Army planned this joint atta-t of military police to
assist I11 Marine Aqhibious Corps with cantrol of civilians and allow more
military police mits to flow into the target in assault shipping. The
7th Field Depot possessed a guard ccmparry. Altlmgh not organized under a

military police table of organization, this canpany perfonaed nummus

military police support functions. Finally, the 2d Marine Division also in
~enth~ r m yreserve had a canpany of military police organized under Table

It is abvious that Marine Corps doctrine in PHIB 19 failed to

address two of the military police organizations enploy&d to support an

AqXbious Corps: the m~psmilitary police canpany and the field depot
guard mnpany. In spite of this, the plamed l4I?5IE military police force
strudure exceeded doctrinal standards. The three attached Army military

police canpanies gave the corps an apprcadmate 30% increase t o its military

police structure. Ultimately, I11 Marine Anphibious Corps possessed over

60% m e military police support than prescribed by doctrine.

Landing Operatiom

Prior t o leavkg the discussion of aqprt t o ground an'ht units,

it is important t o mention the specific nuances involved w i t h anphibious

operatiom of this time f-. In the 1

- phase of this anphibious

operation, organic military police aqprt fran the divisiom decentralized

and attached t o the reghatal ambat team. In sane cases this support
further Suwivided attachjlag t o the battalicm landing t-. This process

provided e x l y presence of military police aqprt t o the shore party. As

the next higher headquarters flowed ashore and established ccmtrol; these
units ~ m ~ l consolidated
l y again either re~iningcm the beach or pushiq

forward w i t h the divisicm. These units required no a d d i t i d structure t o

provide this shore party aqprt. Division military police w e s

s+ly detached plat- and plat- detached squads t o shift structure.

Capst and Army l w e l shore parties drew military police support £ran

organic and attached assets:'

~ a r r i s c ~~1o r ~ e s / ~ s l aarma
nd and

FM 19-5 prescribed a s d type of military police battalicm to

assist in maintaining security a t the service carmand, defense carmand,

ports of embarkation, overseas department, or within a theater of

operatiom. This type of unit, organized under Table of Organization and

Equipnent 19-55 or 19-56, possessed four military police canpanies, a

headquarters and heackparters deta-t, and a medical detachent.

W l e of perfomirg a full range of military police functias, it

represented a versatile organization well suitedfor support to garrison

forces and island canrands. Emever, available doctrinal publications

failed to specifically address a m p p r t relatimship for this type of
battalion w i t h a specific size U.S. Anny garriscm force or island carmand.
For that reascm, garriscm force plarnring relied alrrPst exclusively on

estimated mission requi-ts. It is noted here that two provisimal

military police battalions were formed £ran the 102d Mantry Regiment
under Table of Organization 19-55. The 1st Provisid Military Police

battalion attached to the Island Trcops, Island Carmand, and the 2d

Provisid Military Police battalion attached to the Military Govenmrent,

Island Carmand. The Army redesignated these two battalions prior to

canpaign closure as the51st and 52d Military Police battali-

respectively.'l
In addition to military police battalions, FM 19-5 lccsely
desaibed crhinal investigation units. These were special organizations
formed w i t h i n a theater of operations to amduct Q^iminalinvestigations
for a field a m y , w i t h i n a cammications zone, or other carmands wfiich
required this type support. Here again, doctrine failed to establish a
quantitative s u p p r t relaticmship. It also fails to establish the general
size of these units. U.S. Anny Forces, Pacific &em ALW and ~enth~ n n y
Provost s
- identified a requi-t for tvm criminal investigation
sections, organized under Table of Organization 19-5005J. Subsequently,

cmly one kcam? available: the 36th Criminal Investigation Detachent

with apprcodmately eleven members.=
 A third area of support to a garrison force where no exact support

relationship existed concerned prisoner of w a r processkg canpanies. These

mall special units operated at the platm level in the Pacific. They

pravided a&.ninistration and record keepkg functions for the Prisoner of

War M m t i o n Bureau. Table of Organization and ?Zquipnent 19-237

outlined structure for these canpanies; howewc, their independent plat-
had an organic aWstrative capability and operated inaepenaent of the

canpany. The 1st Platm, 162d Military Police Prisoner of War Processkg
Ccmpany attached to the 1st Military Police Battalion, Island Troops,
Island amnand. The successhl eqerience of these unitsin the Pacific,

forecasted the adequacy of this p l d ~tructure.~

FM 19-5 identified cme organizatian that had a prescribed support

relationship with garriscm forces; the military police escort guard

cupany. Organized under Table of Organization 19-47, this canpany
attached to the higher headquarters for a theater ofoperatiom, a service

carmand, a defense carmand, a field amy, or a separate corps. This

canpany operated a prisoner of w a r inclamre, or a canp, and ccmducted
evacuation of prismem. The Tenth Army did not request any of these
canpanies for operation of the Island Connmd central priscmer of w a r
incl-e. Historical records provide no evidence of why this type
organization failed to participate in the campaign."

Tactical Air Forces

P1annh-g for support of tactical air forces and installations

presented issues similar to those faced in p1anrh-g for military
police support for garrison forces. Develcpent of airfields an Okinawa
projected a cannensurate increase in the military police m q p r t for these
installations. The base developnent plan depicted a total of eighteen

airfields. EM 19-5presmibed use of a military police canparry, aviation

for airfield support. It provided traffic amtrul and security with five

operatirag sections and a canpany headqw.rters according to Table of

Organization 19-217. This oqanization eqanded as necessary to meet the
*
needs of a particular air base. The tmditicmal support relatiaship
assigned cme cxnpany per base. The Tenth Amy Tacticdl Air Force possessed
the 1243d Military Police -, Aviation and the 1388th Military Police
Capaq, Aviation within the Headquarters and Headquarters Squadrcm, 92d
Air Depot Group. The plan to utilize cmly tvJo military police canpanies,
aviation failed to recognize m h h n n doctrinal support relatiashipsfor
the support of eighteen airfields. Additionally, the two principal
airfields of Yontan and Kadena amtinually drew on the 1st Provisicmal

Military Police Battalion and the 1st Military Police Battalim, Fleet
Force, Pacific for additional support. Military police records fail
to explain this pl- deficiency. Due to exhausted theater smrces of
replacmts and service units, the hwost Marshal, U.S. Amy Forces,
Pacific Ocean Area received disappmval of a request for a fifth military
police battalion This m y account indirectly for this and other
structural shortfall^.'^

Functional Dxtrine and Settirag

*
Functicmal doctrine merely prescribed the characteristics of

p2oper perfonnmce of a prticular mission or function. This cnnbined with

relevant intelligence all& planners to predict the e n v i m t and its

h p c t on structure. The same military police doctrine used todetermine
support relationships applied here also. Fmctional areas included traffic
control operations, p r i m of viar apeations, enarry civilian ccmtml
apeatians, security apeations, and law and order operations. These
fmctional areas are andlyzed and anpared to the structure and
capabilities of the various military police units.

haffic Cmtrol Operations

*doctrine in E
'M 19-5 andmrine Corps Doctrine in pHIB 19

placed a large prenim on the kpxtmce of traffic contm1,avoidance of

anqestion, and nobility for canbat effectiveness andoperatid success.
Doctrinal respcasibility for traffic plaxming resided with the G-4.
Doctrinal reqcasibility for road reamnaissance, input to the G-4, and
route signkg fell q c m the -. Doctrinal respcasibility for
execution of traffic plans resided with the military police under the
supenrision of the p m t marshdl.'6 Specific prescribed duties fall into
two areas which h p c t qm required structure.
1. qwate control points at bottlenecks, intersections, and
cme-way defiles; and operate infonmtion booths, furnish infonmtion,
report rmvenents, report required mintenance, and recannend iuprovanents.
(Required fixed posts)

2. Esoort colunms, patrol routes, handle accidents, and clear

jams. (Required foot and vehicle patrols) '"

Intelligence available for the target emrirorrment provided fairly
detailed infonmtion on beaches, inland terrain, and road networks The
Hagushi beaches backed up to a seawall and other obstacles, but, each
assault beach had rmerow exits leadkg tavard a mastal road nmnirq

37

between the beach and Kadena and Yontan airfields. The c e n M part of the
island psessed a ccmplex inland mad network. Okinawan mads omtinued
south via three principle routes. Substantial lateral routes existed

around mjor towns and villages, however, decreased in the open expnses in .
between. TO the north, only o m principle routeran north and south.

Occasionally, lateral access rcads ranbetween the primary route and local
towns or villages. Undweloped and restrictive routes characterized the
road network in the north Apprmcimately 225 and 450 miles of primary and
seccwdary roads respectively would require a canplex systen of traffic

omtrol posts and patrols. This is depicted in Figure 4. The m t

significant deficiency of the Qkinana road network centered on the poor
qyality of surface and subsurface road mterials. Ctmsideriq the
anticipated volume of military traffic and pcDr weather, roads pranised to
deteriorate quickly requiriq traffic omtrol in areas requiring
mhtenance. Tqether, these factors indicated that traffic omtrol would
require a rrmch greater than -
1 f- of mqzmsr.''
The Provost Marshal, U.S. Anny Forces Pacific Ocean Area analyzed
traffic operations of previous theater aqaigns in detail to prcduce force
requiranents. Subsequently, the Tenth Anny Prmst mshaltsplans called
for and requested an additiaal military police battalion which was
disapproved. There is no evidence that corps or divisicm provost lrrarshals
anticipated difficulty acanplisking this mission with the available
support. Military police pl- at the anny and theater levels reflected
thoxniyh analysis; however, subordinate military policeunits relied q m

G-4 sections for production of traffic plans necessary to calculate

traffic p t and patrol requirements. l'be timeliness of traffic pl-

38
varied amrmg the nmtamw G-4 sections. Not all major subordinate carmands
prduced traffic circulation plans prior to landirg. mis deprived
military police units of theability to plan traffic related force
reqwiranents in detail.'9

Priscmer of Xar Cpemticms

Doctrine in both FM 19-5 and Phib 19 maintained -istent policy
for military police handling of prisaners of w a r . Clear reference also

existed to Field Mmual (FM) 27-10,Rules of Land Warfare? The primary

godl of doctrine soqht ccmpliance with the provisions of FM 27-10 in

handling prisoners at all levels. There existed three sub-fundions of

these operations w h i c h directly affected military police force structure
requirements:
1. Operation of division collecting pints. (Division level

military police operated)

2. Evacuation of priscolers frun division collecting points

to prisoner of w a r inclosures in rear areas. (Corps/anny level military
police evacuated)
3. Operation of p r i s m of war inclosu~es.(Operated by
corps/anny level military police/military police escort guard carpwly)21

Each of the functions listed a b e have a varying i n p c t on

structure d q e m l i q upm the ~nanberof enany prisaners iwolved and the
duration of the operation. In order to be useful, this dcctrinal
infonmtion required an estimate of enany prisoners of vmr that would be
captured. The Tenth Amy intelligence estimate in the ~entati-ticms
Plan, Iceberg provided M, in€-tion or estimate of enany prisoners that
Figure 4. South and C e n t r a l Okinawa Road Network

40
would probably be captured during the campaign. Both Tenth Army and U.S.

Anuy Forces, Pacific Ocean ?+reas action reports anitthis issue in

discussians of pl- and intelligence. However, the Prwvst -1,

U.S. Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas states that the enemy prisoner of war

operations in the Philippines and other -11 island can&- were studied

in plarming for Operation Iceberg. These records further indicate that

large mxnb=rs of prisaners were anticipated in planning. Plans placed
respansibility for prisoner of war operations with military police units
o m c to canbat units and considered this structure adequate. Corps
military police units were initially tasked with establishent and

operation of incl-es. Operation plans provided detailed and consistent

guidance for handlirg of prisoners of war. In short, the traditicmal
support relatiowhips were viewed as adequate. Findlly, the military
police battalion assigned to garrison forces was tasked to run a central
priscmer of w a r inclosure later in the campaign. The priscmer of war plans
were consistent with doctrine, exploited the additid military police
suppoa at the corps level, and ultimately shifted the burden to garrison
forces.''

Civilian &mcXLingOperatians

Both Army and Marine Corps doctrine pointed out the relatiaship

between military police in occupied territory and the aWstration of

military gwenment. EM 27-10,Rules of Lmd Warfare, was at the heart of
military police operatias in support of military w t . The basic
goals for this missicn area included enforcerent of military govenmtent
ordinances, protection of lives and property, and restoration of law and
order. Specific duties prescribed fell into two areas affecting structure:
 1. Security functions; escort and guard internees, defend

civilian inclosures and rear areas f m n isolated resistance, guerrillas,

and hostile attacks, and seize and secure civil records, property, and

facilities.

2. I a w and order functions; prevent pillage and pilferage,

ccmduct energetic preventive polichg, and a M s t e r jails or priscm~.~'
Doctrinal inf-tion considered military occupation in general
tenus, and presented canplex prablems to military police planners.
Colrnterintelligence planws assessed the pmbable reaction of these
civilians to Tenth Amy forces. Japanese propaganda would prabably result

in fear and possible hostility until U.S. intentions were deronstrated.

Thus, the Tenth Army ccmcept initially treated each enany civilian on
Okinawa as a p r i m of war until properly classified. A l t h q h

segregated f m n actual priscmers of war, each civilian would require all of

the same handling cansideratians. This added a seccmd requirement to
perfom all the same &ties necessary for prisaners of w a r . Civilian
functions a u l d not be consolidated with prisoner of war handling since the
t m groups had to be segregated: separate collecting points, separate
inclosures, and separate evacuation processes. At a mininnrm, this would
require duplication of the military police support to ccmbat units
cansidered adequate for handling priscmers of war.
This mission area also required an estimate of the m m h r of
civilians that would be interned in order to judge the inp.ct on structure.
In this case, military govennnent planners prepared a detailed estimate of
civilians to be interned, respective geogaphic lccatias, and relative
time in the c~npaign. The plan envisioned a symnetricaluncwerirag of the
civilian population in the north and south. The total population
anticipated counted appKodmately three hundred thousand Okinaumn~.~~
Military gwensnent teams were attached to cantat units at the
lowest levels; however, the 2d Provisicnal Military Police Battalion
attached to the Military Governnent Secticn, Island OcmMnd was not
scheduled to arrive at the target until seventeen days after the initial
landing. Three anpanies f m the 1st Provisicnal Military Police

Battalion were attached to the I11 l&rbe Zqhibious Carps: Ccmpany A

attached to the Military Goverrnnent Section, I11 Mw5.m Zqhibious Corps,
and aanpanies B and C attached to the, 1st and 6th l&rbe Divisi&o work
with military goverrnnent teams. lhis joint task organization planned to
cover the shortfall created by the shippiq flow of the garrison forces,
and mved m e military police support forward to handle civilian^.'^
This mission area deMnded a m t a t i o n of military police
structure based p the density of the civilian population on Okinawa.
Planners acmrmodated this need thraEgh shifts in task Organization. Each
corps had a military police battalion attached, and the I11 Marine
Zqhibious Corps had garrison force military police anpanies attached.
Additicnally, the reminder of the 1st Provisial Military Police
Battalion planned to land and attach to the 1st hgineer Special
Brigade/Tenth Amy Shore Earty Group. Tenth Amy planners shifted three
battalias of army level and garrison force military police support to
canbat units early in the campaign. The plan later shifted garrim force

units back under Island Carmand. Ttxxwgh plamiq by military govenment

sectias allowed military police planners to be flexible in the gnplayment
of a limited structure."
Security Operations
Security operations doctrindlly overlapped the four other mission
areas. In traffic operations, military police s-ed min supply routes,

key rcad junctions, and brim-. In p r i m of w a r operations, military

police s-ed collecting points, incl-es, and prisoners in transit. In
civilian ccmtx-01 operations, military police secured civil records,

security operations in -
populations, and facilities. Military police also cxmducted tactical

areas against enslry 4 1 units or guerrillas.

As will be shown in law and order operations, security is inherent in the
act of policing. These functionsgenerally do not affect structural

plambq, as mst are a b e t activities of another missicm area. As such,

they require no additional prsmnel. Eavever, security of critical

facilities such as supply W s , airfields, carmarad posts, or amstruction

units generally required dedicated forces with this as their primary focus.
In these cases, military police forces required stmctuciq to accamodate
these planned missions?'
FM 19-5 and Phib 19 described all the duties listed above.

Additionally, these references provided guidance cmemkg shore party

security cancerns. Security of supply 6uqs cca~stituteda major

amsideration in the n o d &usion that characterized the ha& service

area durirag an Emplhibious .

-
1 Security of supplies precluded
pilferage and protected them against eneny units and civilians.

Intelligence estkmtes described c~unterlandingsand erployment of

paratrccps within the hchhead as likely eneny cwurses of actian. This
potential threat required that structurdl plans acmmt for it. Military
police detadxm~tsfran division assets attached to the first subordinate
shore parties to land, and canpany size detachents £ran corps' military

police units ultimately supported the Anny Shore Party Group."

Next, cansideration of airfield security requirements was a

critical plamiq factor. The size of Kadena and Yontan airfields and the
prosped of developing sixteen additional airfields created a major

structurdl consideration. Doctrine asserted that military police

canpanies, aviation provided a proper suppcart relationship for a single

tactical air forces installation. However, no infomtion on security
requir-ts for either of these airfields or any of the planned airfields

was present in the historical records available. Additionally, this

caganization provided eqandable structure, kut no inf-tion on actual

size or structure was addressed in the doclaeents ewmined. The 1243d

Military Police Capny,Aviation and the 1388th Military Police Capny,
Aviation both existed under H e a w e r s and Headquarters S q a c k m , 92d Air

Depot Group. These two units are menticoled in the action report of the
P ~ O ~-
O, G ~ Tenth A m y , but only briefly. It is unclear why

additional aviation canpanies were not plarmd to suppcart the two other
existing airfields or the fourteen planned airfields. Plans fail address
any of these additional requir-t~?~

Law and Order Operatias

Doctrine £ran FM 19-5 and Phib 19 specified law and order
operati- enccnpssed within the scope of traffic ccmtrol operati-,
prisoner of w a r operati-, and civilian ccmtrol operati-. These

£uuctio.s, such as traffic enfox-t or enfox-t of civil Kqxllatians,

were canpanents of the larger mission areas. These redundant functim
required no additional structure beycaul that required for the principal
mission area."
Ttm other independent functians of law and order operations

prescribed by doctrine existed in plans. The m3st significant function

involved control of stragglers. Stragglers cansisted of unauthorized
perscumel in a given zone of action. These stragglers routinely included

sanrenir hunters or curiosity seekers. Their mwenent fran rear areas and
presmce in forward areas clogged main m p ~ ~ lroutes
y and interfered with
canbat forces. Doctrine prescribed establi-t of straggler lines,
points, and patrols as control measures. These requirements sanetimes
coincided with other traffic, prisoner of war, civilian ccmtrol, or
security posts; however, this was mt a l w a y ~the case. Given its relative
priority by Tenth Anny, this function required cansideration in fo-
structure. Stragyler -1s were k p ~ l instituted
l ~ imnediately to the
rear of division hdaries plackg principal respmsibility with the corps
military police. The scope of this problem typically grew as service and
garriscm forces flowed ashore later in the canpaign. However, as shown
earlier, the corps military police assets kcam less eqaged with
prisoners and civilians as garrisan forces became operatianal. The result
was that corps military police battalions planned to shift enphasis fmn

other mission areas to this one."

Another t- function of law and order operatians amern&
general enf0.t-c-t. First, military police attenpted to prevent
pilferage, praniscuous fir* of weapans, unauthorized possession of
sowenirs or ccmtraband, and desecration of tanbs. Violations were
investigated, incidents reported, and restraint applied w i m ~necessary.
?he Island ClcmMnd operated a U.S. priscmer central stockade. At lower

levels, tfmporary stockades were operated as necessary. Plans placed the

reqcmsibility for law and order operatians with military police units at
each level due to anticipated infrequency of violations?

Operations-basedAssessment of Structure

Traffic Cmtrol Operations

Traffic operations planned in the beachhead anployed doctrinal

relatiaships of military police units attached to shore party elenents as

described in the planning assessment. At division and lower levels

operations were executed in accordance with plans. As the corps' shore

parties landed, corps military police units were planned for support of
these organizations. XxIV Corps asslaned ccmtrol of the southern half of
the Hagushi beaches cm Lt2 and I11 Marine Amphibious Corps as& control
of the mrthem half cm Lt6. 1st Platoon, &q?ay A and 1st Platoon

Canpany B, 519th Military Police Battalion detached £ran their parent

mnpanies supporting the 7th and 96th Mantry Divisions. They remained on
the beach as planned to support the XxIV Qxps Shore Party. Ccmpanies C
and D of the 1st Military Police Battalion, Fleet m i n e Force, Pacific
were planned to support the I11 Marine Amphibious Corps Shore Farty. These
units, originally, scheduled to land cm -3, did not cane ashore until Lt11
leavirq the corps shore party without support for five days." During
this period the 1st and 6th Marine Divisions left guides behind in critical
intersections to protect their lines of annumicatian to the beach.
The Tenth Anny Shore Party Group as& control of the beachhead
cm 9 April 1945?5 Tenth Anny Shore Party Group or 1st Bigheer Special
Brigade relied upcm military police elenents of both corps' shore parties.
oanpany D of 1st Prwisicml Military Police Battalion was planned to
attach to the brigade for additional support. Sch-ed to land on -5.
this unit did not arrive until -16. Corpss'
military police
respcmsibilities were divided north and south at yellow beach 3 at the

mth of the Bisha Gavia. The mrthem beaches were largely abafbmd after

Tfie Tenth Anny Prowst khrshal reported division military police

on duty on the beaches and lMin roads on I+1 in accordance with plans. The

6th Mxine Division assessed their military police organization for shore
party support as adequate and efficient. Both corps reported no ccolgestion
on their beaches; hawever, I11 Sm@i.bious Corps noted that the shore

party military police landed too late to perfom efficiently, and sane
beaches used to 1and'TenthAnny service units had hadequate traffic
control."
As initial inland traffic control operations in central Okinawa
progressed, military police assisted eqimers post* signs. This
additid duty diverted p?mamel planned for use at traffic posts. The
ergheem reccmnended greater rnmJws of military police to keep min
supply routes open. As operations in the north progressed rapidly and mre
roads uncowed, traffic control was hirmpered. Due to the rnanber of

military police required to handle civilians, guard supply dmps, and still
afloat, insufficient military police were available for traffic amtrol
posts. The initial traffic problems were axrected as mre units such as
the 1st Military Police Battalion flowed ashore and established traffic
posts as planned. The 6th Mxine Division Bqheer reported that engineers
-
handled traffic control at canstruction sites until military police became
available."
At the end of April 1945 the 111 m i n e Zqhibiaus Corps executed
two separate division nwes south into the Tenth Amy lines. Additionally,
the 27th Mantry Division nwved to the north to as- tactical
mspmsibility for that areal9 All of these division rrwes succeeded
without any difficulty. This provided evidence of adequate military police

structure when division and corps mits supported each other."

Traffic control became critical dur5.q the mmscxms between late
May and early June. U.S. Amy Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas, Observer
reports indicated that there was a need for m e properly trained military
police, especially in these later phases. It further inferred that
inadequate military police structure ampmded the problems in the xxnr
Corps zone created by weather. Subsequent to the loss of supply mutes 13
and 5, the structure slpsported twenty-four-hour-a-day
operations between
-51 and Lt65. IIowever, XXrV Corps military police assisted I11 Wtrine
Zqhibious Corps military police with ccmtrol of Xxrv Corps traffic on
route 1 while route 13 was closed."
haffic control operatiam supportkg Tenth Amy, as it uncovered
the southern end of Okinawa and encountered dense pockets of miniq
civilians, were characterized at all echelons as excellent. Many traffic
posts south of the Island OcmMnd forward bmdary were jointly mnned.
The I11 mine 2nphibious Corps characterized these operations as requiring
strenuous effort £ran available mits."
Traffic control in the outlyiq island operations is evidenced by
operatiam of 3d Platoan, 2d m i n e Divisicm Military Police aanpany on
rneya Shim and Agud Shkm. This platcon's support for shore party
required augmentation by l&rines of a thirty five nun replacerent draft.
The S-4 M c a t e d that the doctrinal ccnpliment of military police was
insufficient for handling both traffic operations and civilian handling

operations ~imultaneously.'~

In sumnwy, the results of traffic antrol operations prwided *

mixed reviews on the supppting strudure. First, it is difficult to draw
exact discriminating lines between prablms created by late arriviq units
and insufficient structure. Division level support was generally viewed as
adequate except within the separate regimental 1adi.x~ force enplayed on

Iheya Shim. Hcwever, division operations received supplenentary support

£ran corps military police units. Operations at corps or army levels

sametimes indicated a need for additid structure. This resulted

primarily f m the late arrival of corps, antry, and garrison military
police units, and was corrected as these units became available. Garrison
f
- prwided minimdl augmentation to canbat units in this mission area;

harever, the two corps ulthtely supported each other late in the
-9. Finally, the simultaneous requirenent to acccnplish other
missica~swas a significant distraction frun traffic operations throughout

the =w=&m.

Friscmer of W a r Operations
Planned priscmer of w a r operations sinply included collection,
4

escorting, h o l m , and p~ocessingof Japanese military primers and other

labor t q s . Canplexity entered into this mission area only as
respansibility for various tasks was assigned to a particular level of
.
military police support. A s noted earlier in this chapter, planners

assmed that military police structure assigned t o canbat units would be

adequate t o accanplish this functicm. Additimally, garrism forces were

tasked t o take over operation of corps inclosures and conduct pemanat

processing of prisoners. They were unable t o accanplish this and had to

opt for a single central incl-ef'

Historical records reflect that the intenment and processing of

over 10,000 priscmers was accanplished without significant difficulty.

P l d tenporary inclosures were operated by both corps until the Island

Cmmmd tenporary central inclosure was opened cm 17 April 1945. Garrison

forces also proved inadequate t o run the central inclosure a t several

points during the cmpaign. The 1st Platcan, 162d Military Police capany,

P r i m of War Processing, had t o pmvi& or a m t security d u r k g these

periods. In spite of this, the unit proved adequate for the task of

processirag 10,000 prisaners over the allotted period. The clear inference

fran review of these operatias points t o the adequacy of the military

police structure within oanbat forces as well as the inadequacy of military

police structure within garrism forces!'

Civilian Hadling qperatias

Civilian handlkg operations ran parallel to p r i m of war

operations, but were thirty times the size and scope of the latter. This
missicm area repssented the mt significant challeqe of the cmpign for
military police. Planners, as already noted i n this chapter, provided a

dedicated military police structure intended t o integrate into the Military

&xenment Secticm of the Island Carmand. The 2d hwisicmal Military

Police Battalicm ultimately provided this support; hawever, the unit landed

51

in three principal echelcms on Lt17, Lt25, and -37. This scheduled flow
into the target rendered this battalion unavailable until phase three of
the &gn causirig other units to canpensate i
n the interim period.

whereas, military police units assigned to ambat forces plarmed to collect -

and escort civilians, garriscm forces were w e d to hold civilians,
achhister to twenty three plarmed caps, and provide a N 1 m e of A

suppoa to the military govenrment teams?

m order to reinforce available military police units early in the
operation, Canpanies A, B, and C of the 1st hrovisid Military Police
Battalion attached to the I11 Marine Amphibious Corps and landed on L day
throqh -2. These units dedicated their efforts exclusively to this
mission area. The 1st Military Police Battalion, Fleet m i n e Force,
Pacific as already mentimed landed eight days late. This factor also
deprived the I11 m i n e ?mpXbious Corps of pl- support for this
function during this initial phase.
Civilian incl-es established by military teams in
the beach service axea were initially mguax&d due to insufficient
military police once divisians rroved forward. Lack of interpreters again
hffnpered military police m p p n t . Selected &server repcats recarmended
that military police tables of organization be expmdd to include
interpreters in each canpany and battalion headquarters!'
Ctnbt forces were required to ann%x=t civilian handlirig
operatians beymd mere collection at least twice during the campaign. A .
shortage of military police bwdemd the ambat forces of 6th Mxbe
Division w i t h civilians in northem Okinawa between W 2 0 and -30. This
issue W c t e d 6th m i n e Division tactical operatians significantly. As a
result, the decision was made to decline civilian operations where a
potential adverse result to tactical operati- might occur. This pmblen

occurred again for 6th m i n e Divisian late in the &gn in southern

Okinawa. However, this time the 15th Marines formed a provisional military

police unit of two officers and seventy five enlisted Marines to handle
civilians. In cases, the available military police structure prwed
irsdequte to acccmplish plarmed missicms?
The pmblans handling civilians resulted £ran three basic
factors. First, the late arrival of canbat support and garrison forces
limited ability to cope with initial rnanbers of civilians. S d , the
return of all three &es of the 1st Pravisicmal Military Police
Battalian to Island OcmMnd cantrol while 6th Marine Divisian was quickly

m c m e r i q large rnanbers of civilians, put this division at M a t e

disadvantage. Third, the density of civilians uncovered in final stages of

the d g n cxxnbined with -
1 evacuation m t e s to caqs in the rear,

stressed the military police structure. This o c m e d at a time whm

military police were providirg a full range of services a-s the entire

island. No other operational exanples indicating insufficient military

police structure existed. All other planned civilian operations were
accanplished, and a total of 284,669 civilians were successfully
interned.'9

Security Operations

Security of supply W s , airfields, carmand p t s , or other

critical sites represented four areas which required independent military

police structure. Little evidence of advance detailed plarnrirag or

enumeration of sites left only general guidance addressirg the types of

service or rear area activities requiriq protection. W l y duq security
was the respmsibility of the respective shore party ammnder; howwer,

airfields, canmnd posts, or other sites received no attention in plans.

Plans included supply dunp security pruvisicols and strict
prohibition of pilfer-. The absence of sufficient military police
*
initially in the beach s d c e area resulted in amsiderable looting and
pilferage of equipnent and supplies. As additional units landed this
prublen came under amtrol. The equipnent of the 1st Military Police
Battalion, fleet K d n e Force, Pacific landed on yellow beach three ahead
of the Battalion. When the unit came ashore on -11, virtually all of it

was gcme. It took apprcodmately five days for the battalion to recwer the
majority of its vehicles, and by six days for the quarteamster to replace
essential ~upplies.'~
Plans failed to address security for airfields. Very little
infopnation exists regardirag the actual security of KadeM or Y a t a n
airfields. The 1st Prwisional Military Police Battali=, the 1st Military
Police Battalion, Fleet M 3 r i . w Force, Pacific, and the 519th Military
Police Battalion all aupented security at one or koth of these airfields
on rumexus cccasiom during the canpign. In the absence of specific

plans, these additicnal missions pulled planned structure £run other

mission area^.^'
Plans also failed to address security of canmnd posts. Dxtrine <

prescribed military police for the field amty canmnd post;

b e e r , this support was oriented around perscumel protection of the

a m m d h g general. This fundion was not prescribed for corps and

division units. The 519th Military Police Battalion provided a plat- to

the Tenth &.my C!anmnd post. This platcan provided security for the
headquarters and assisted the provost rrarshal operatirag a special G-2
interrogation area. The General, Island CcmMnd also aloyed a
larye twenty ~ m np rscmal security detail. Canpany D, 1st Provisicmal

Military Police Battalian provided this detail. Finally, sane division

d t s also used military police for security of the divisicm carmand p t .

Here again, unplanned missions pulled structure away f m n other potential

a1oP-t.

Finally, miscellaneous security requirements such as protection of

navy canstruction battalion sites and @pnent drew q x m military police
structure. These miscellaneous security tasks were not planned. The 1st
Military Police Battalion, Fleet Wine Force, Pacific, provided this type
of support dw5.q phase three of the cmpign. This security was not

incident to another principal mission area such as traffic operations.

Military police focused on security of assets at night when hqemhle.

Plarmed and unplanned security operations canstituted the largest

iqdhent to structural adequacy for other mission areas. Jnproperly

cansidered, these requimwnts lacked sufficient dedicated structure to

ensure successful mission accanplishment and mn-interference with other
mission areas.

Law and Order Operations

Stragyler cant101 topped the list of duties in this mission area.

This responsibility rested primarily with the corps military police units,
however, all levels of carmand bore a respmibility for enforcenent. The
Tenth ?4my Provost Mzrshal reported this as the greatest enfor~etlent
problem, but apprmdmately seven hundred and ninety stragglers were
apprehended in the beach maintenance area alcme between -8 and -60.

Conversely, the 519th Military Police Battalion apprehended cnly Fifty four
stragglers in the mlv Corps zcme of action between L day and -84. These
operaticas achieve3 planned results without significant difficulties

idcat- adequate support- ~tructure.~'

General enforc-t and prevention of pilferage r+red the
seamd greatest amo~lntof military police effort. Few arrests were made,
but mch of the miss- material was recwered by military police. Here,
military police structure provided adequate support for a planned and
duable service. EufoIcement of weapns discipline in rear areas and
prevention of desecration of tanbs were the subject of limited historical
discussion in unit reports. It is clear that these missions were planned
for and amkcted indicat- that the minimum necessary support-

structure was a~ailable.~These law and order operaticas pointed to the

adequacy of military police structure for this function.

limerow prablans existed with both the plarnred and actual

military police structure. While generally adequate to provide required.
support for this caqaign, plarmkg gaps, nunaganent of force arrival, and
amtml of task organization at the target were sanetimes deficient.
Chapter four discusses operations in detail.
 Endnotes

'EM 19-5, M i l i t a z y Evlice [Obsoletel (War Department, Washiragton,

DC: Gavenrment P r i n t i n g Office, 14 Jun 44) ,204-220.

"Fleet Marine Force, P a c i f i c , S t a f f O f f i c e r s ' Field Mmual for

duphibicus Operatiom [Obsoletel (Hawaii: n.p., 10 Sep 441, Chap. 1, 16;
6 t h Ma?5ne D i v i s i a n , Operation Plan hB 1-45 (Okinawa: n.p., 10 Feb 45),
3zmex Mike, 1-7; U. S. Imny Forces, P a c i f i c Ocean m s , P a r t i c i p a t i o n i n
the OkinarYa @eration, 2 vols. (n.p.: n.p., 15 46), 99-100.

'EM 19-5, M i l i t a r y Evlice, 216-217.

'renth ~ n n y , '2Bntative
Operation Plan 1-45 (Okinawa: n.p., 6 Jan
4 9 , 1-10; Iwv Corps, Action Reprt Qukyus, 1 Fpr-30 Jun 45 (Okinawa:
n.p., n.d.1, 2-6.

EM 27-10, M e s of Larad Warfare Dbsoletel ( W a r Department, washiragtan, DC:

Goverrnnent Printing Office, 19401, 18-21, 74-77, 82-85.

'PHIB 19, ~ l of Military

~ E w l i at [Obsolete] (Marine Corps
Schcols, NC: n.p., 1945) , Series m rrmphibiaus Operations, 33vols. 1-48.

"w. Victor Bdej, U. S. Atmy and Muirae Corps h e r of B a t t l e ,

P a c i f i c TBeater of G p r a t i o m , 1941-45 (Allentown, PA: Game Publishing Co,
1984). 170.

'phib 19, Part 1, S e c t i a n 1, 2-3.

'1st Military P o l i c e B a t t a l i a n , fleet Marine Force, P a c i f i c ,

Action R e p r t of F i r s t M i l i t a r y Evlice Battalion, Fleet W 3 n e Farce,
P a c i f i c f a r Phases 1 and 2 of Okinawa Gperation (Okinawa: n.p., n.d. ) , 2;
m d e j , 161-165; Phib 19, Part 1, Section 1, 2.

'III Auphibiaus Corps, Action Reprt Qukyus Gperation, Phase I &

11 ( O k h a w a : n.p, 1 Jul 45). 3.8; Island Oarmand, U. S. Anny Forces,
P a c i f i c Ocean Area, Gperation Plan m. 1, Legdims (n-p.: n.p., 1 5 Feb
1945), 13; Ora N t z , Former manber Guard aanpany, 7 t h F i e l d Depot, during
Operation Iceberg, interview by author, 13 IXmnker 1994, tape recording
and t r a n s c r i p t , telephonic intenriew at Ora N t z ' hate i n W e s t Lafayette,
; 2d Ma?5ne Divisim, Operation Plan AD 10 (Saipan: n.p., 15 Feb 45) ,
1-2.

lo Tenth Anny,Share P a r t y I n s t r u c t i o m ( d r a f t l (Okinawa: n.p., 10

Feb 45), 1-7; 1st Ergbeer Special Brigade, G p e r a t i Plan "Ia&erg*
(Okinawa: n.p., 4 Feb 45). ~ n n e v~ 0 . 7 , I.
 19-5, 179-191; USAETOA, 77;80,99-100; Tenth Army, Tentative
Operations Plan 1-45, 1-10.

"FM 19-5, 204-212; USAFEOA, 689-700; LTC J. K. Daly, USA,

*Thirty Zhasaud Prisoners of W a r Over the Beachn M l i t a r y Review (April

1945).

"FM 19-5, 202-203; Tenth Army, Action Report 2m, 6 6 to

30 June 1945 3 vols., (Okinawa: n.p., 3 S q 451, PII-XXI-1.

'5USAFEOA. 77-80, 99-100; FM 19-5, 219-220; 51st Military Police

Battalian, Action Report, 10 Jan 1945-30 June 1945 (Okhawa: n.p., 30 June
1945), 1-8; 1st MPBn, EMFPac, Action Repmt, Phases I & II, l-8.

%SMTOA, 77-80; Tenth Army, m t a t i v e O m a t i o n s Plan 1-45,

Annex 3, 1-10.

,-I 99-100, 708; Tenth Army, Action Reprt, PII-XI-1.

"%M 19-5, 161-162; Basic Field Manual 27-10, (FM 27-10), Rules of
Land wazfare, (war ,
t
- washiragtcm, DC: m t e d States Govemmnt
Printing Office, 1940), 18-21.

"-. 13-23, 99-100, 218-220, 547,548; Tenth Army, Tentative

Operations Plan 1-45, Annex 3.

"FM 19-5, 66-68, 155-160; Phib 19, Part 2, Sectian 4, 34-38;

FM 27-10, 74-85.

" ~ .
13-23, 99-100; Tenth Army, Tentative Operations Plan
1-45, Annex 4, 8-9; 6th ES?5ne Divisian, Special Action Report, Okinawa
@ration, 2 vols., Phases I & 11, 30 Apr 45, Phase I11 (Okinawa: n.p., 30
Jrn 45), VII44-VII47. *

'%nth Army, Tentative @rations Plan 1-45,Annex 15, 4.

-,
' 220; 51st MPBn, 1-7; 52d Military Police Battalian,
Action Re+ (Okhawa: n.p., 18 Oct 1945). 1-2.
 "1st - Special Brigade, 2; 51st MPBn, 1-7; 52d MPBn, 1-2;
1st MPBn, FMFPac, Action Report, Phases I & 11, 1-8.

"'EM 19-5, 146-155, 157, 189, 216, 219-220; Phib 19, Part 2, 13-26,
figure 1 & 2.

"'Tenth my, Tentative G p e r a t i m plan, ~ n n e x3, 11; EM 19-5,

188-191.

% 19-5. 219-220; Tenth ?Amy, Tentative Gperatians Plan 1-45,

AQnex 13.

"FM 19-5, 32-41, 128-133, 155-159, 168-178; Phib 19, Fart 2,

13-26, 31-38.

=FM 19-5, 33-38, 157; Phib 19, 27-30; Tenth ?Amy, Tentative
operations Plan 1-45, 17-19, Annex 13, Pgpendix I, 3; 51st MPBn, 1-7.
FM 19-5, 11-19, 20-28, 31, 139-141; Tenth Amy, Tentative
31

G p e r a t i w Plan 1-45, 15-19; Annex 13, Appendix H, 1 & Annex 13, Pgpendix
I, 1-3.

'Tenth Amy, Action Report, P11-IV-8.

Amy, Action Report, Pll-XI-3,8; 6th m i n e Divisicm,

Specid Action Report, VII-11.12; X X I V Corps, Action Report, 34; I11
Mzine m i o w Corps, Action Report, Phases I & 11, 125, 216.

'%nth Army, Action Report, Pll-XI-3,4; 1st Karine Divisicm,

Special Action Report, E Z g h e e r Engineerex, 6; 6th Mzine Divisicm, Special
Action Report, VII-33.

'%enis M. Frank and Henry I. Shaw, Jr., Victory and Occupation:

Xistory o f U. S. Corps Gperatians in Warld War 11 (Washingtan, DC:
Historical Branch, G-3 Division, H e a u e r s , U. S. m i n e Corps, 1968),
197-222.

'?Yenth Amy, Action Report, P11-XXII-4.

'~IJSAF~A,708-709; Tenth Amy, Action Report, P11-XI-9; X X N

Corps, Action Report, 67-69.
 Urenth Army, Action Repart, Pll-IV-29; I11 Wine Z4tphibious
Oorps, Action w r t , 197.
''Iheya-Ag~mi Landirag Force, Action &port (okinawa: 25 ~ u n e1945),
V I I 2, 1-7, X 1.

'yenth Army, Action Report, P l l - X I - 6 , 7 .

"Ibid., Pll-XI-6,7.

-
'; 218-220.

"Provost -1, 1st mgheer Special Brigade, Military Fwlict?

Activities Okinawa Beach Service Area (okinawa: n-p., 17 J u l y 1945) , 1-3;
USAFEOA, 708.

"6th Marine Division, S p e c i a l Action Report, Phases IaI, VII 47

and Phase 111, I11 51.

"6th &Brine D i v i s i o n , S p e c i a l Action Report, Phase 111, VII 47-48,

50-51; Tenth Army, Action Repart, P11-XXVII-4.

t"" -, 1st Special Brigade, 2-3; 1st MPW,

FMFPac, Action Repart, Phases I & 11, 5.

5151st MPW, 1-7; 1st MPBn, FMFPac, Action Repart, Phases I & II,
1-8; 519th M i l i t a r y P o l i c e B a t t a l i a , Action Report (Okinawa: n.p., 1
J u l y 1945). 1-11.

=EM 19-5, 216; Tenth Army, Action Report, P l l - X I - 2 - 7 ; 51st

MPW, 1-7; a p t Edma7d G. ~ove, T h e 27th Infantzy D i v i s i o n in World War
11 (Washhgton, LC: Washington Infantry Journal Press: 19491, 551; 1st
M i l i t a r y Police Battalion, F l e e t l&rhe Force, Pacific, S Q p p l e r w 2 t d
Action Report of F i r s t Military Fwlict? B a t t a l i o n , F l e e t l&dne Force,
P a c i f i c f a r A3ricxi 22 April 1945 to 30 June 1945, Okinana @eration
(Okinawa: n.p., 1 J u l y 1945), 2.

"hwost Mwx&al, 1st Special Brigade, 2; 519th MPW,

1-11.

"Crenth Army, Action Report, P 1 1 - X I - 5 ; 1st MPBn, FMFPac, Action

Report, m e s I & 11, 1-8; SQpplanental Action Report, 1-4; Provost
Marshal, 1st Ecgineer Special Brigade, 1-3.
 General

The military police operations amducted during the Okinawa

capaign proved ~llrmerous and diverse. As in chapter three, this chapter

considem five functional or mission areas: Traffic control operations,
prisoner of w a r operations, civilian handling operations, security
operations, and law and order operations. Doctrinal criteria for these

five mission areas which was presented in chapter three and will not be
reiterated. However, additional functional criteria is discussed.
Planing amducted and operational results are assessed within the

frammrk of these five mission areas.

Operatid Planning Assessment

Traffic C!cmtrol Operations Planning
Field B&nual (EM) 19-5, Military Police, and IImphibious Operations

(Phib) Volume 19, Brploymnt of Military Police, both provided military

police planners with detailed guidance for the planning of traffic control
operations. These sources both pint out the dependent relatiaship of the
military police traffic control plan upcm the approved traffic circulation
plan prepared by the G-4. The i M ccoltrol plan resulted in proper
placenent and ccadhation of traffic emt.rols to canpliment the
circulation plan and consider contiqencies.'
 Review of available operation plans and adninistrative plans

revealed significant dwelopnent of traffic policy. System for mmkerhg

and letterkg routes, posting of signs, area respmsibilities, and
functid respmsibilities were presented in these docrmients. At each
level a traffic circulation plan was discussed, however, only the 2d Marine
Division Order included a traffic circulation diagram. U.S. Anny Forces,
Pacific Ocean Azea Selected Wervers noted that numeraus traffic
circulation plans were not prepared prior to landing nor were they
available for M a t e i.nplenentation.2
The inference exists that detailed amtrol planning was delayed by
the absence of tircsely circulation plans. Hcmever, the Tenth Anny G-4

reported that the Anny traffic circulation map required very few changes,
indicating a plan existed at the start of the carrp3aign. The Tenth ~ n n y
Prmrost Nwshal spoke further to this issue not- that original plans
proved satisfactcay. Finally, the ProMst BBmhal reported that military
police ashore on Lcl had strip maps in their possession which had been
prepared akcmd ship frcm aerial photcgraphs. In ccmtrast, the 1st
Military Police Battalion, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific put together their
traffic amtrol plans subsequent to arriv4.q at the I11 Mphibious Corps
carmand post at G m a Point. This oc-ed for two reasaus. First, the
battalim, as discussed in chapter three, landed late on Lcll. ,
-
S the
6th Marine Division had made quick and sizable gains e x p a d k g the Corps

zone of action to the north. The planning amducted at Orrna actually

involved the battalion's follow-onplanning subsequent to the assault.'
Traffic circulatian planning at various levels was criticized as

untimely; howwer, timely military police traffic amtrol planning did

occur. Such initial traffic amtxol plannirg attenpted to meet basic

doctrinal standards. The Provost Marshal, U.S. Amy Forces, Pacific Ocean

Areas, and the Provost Mm&al, Tenth Amy studied potential differences in
traffic control requirements frun previous Pacific Ocean Areas operations.

Finally, untimely traffic circulation planning by sane units failed to

achieve doctrinal objectives: caplimentary traffic ccmtxol and
circulation platming. Ultimately, these two processes occurred independent

of each other or in reverse order at sane levels w i t h i n the Tenth Army?

Prisaner of War Operatiom Plannirg

noctrinal prisoner of w a r operations plannirg required

amsideration of several basic clanponents: handling, collecting points,

evacuation, and inclosures. EM 19-5 and Phib 19 both addressed each of

these areas. DependinEI q c m the given stage of an anphibious operation,

respansibilities for each of these areas varied. Within the beachhead the

shore party carmander was respansible; hawever, this was generally a

military police £unction in the traditional rear area.'

Basic handling guidance was aimed at protection of the prisoners

rights under Field khnual (FM) 27-10,M e s of Land Warfare. Collection

points provided a co3lrdinated location for tactical units to deliver

priscmers. These were nomKily operated by the division military police
platccm or a n p n y , the unit also respnsible for evacuation of priscolers
to inclosures.6
Incl-es were doctrinally established by a corps or army in a
canbat or cammications zane. Laxye incl-es, temed central
inclosures, were established by theater or field army ccnmanders.
Priscmera were p-ssed by a priscmer of war processing ccmpany at the
inclosure in accordance with War &parimat requirenents. The tenu,
priscmer of w a r stockade, finds its way into the action reports of this

m g n . This is not a dcctrinal tenn for describing a prisoner of war

facility. It generally refers to sanething between the collecting pint

and the inclosure described here. This facility is used at the divisicm

and corps level in addition to colleding pints. It does not provide the

perm~entprocessing described above."

As discussed in chapter three,the Tenth Anny plan did not provide

an estimate of prisoners to be captured. Hcnvever, military police study of

prismem captured in the Philippinesand other small island m g n s
resulted in anticipation of larger n*anbers of prisoners. Corps military
police units were initially tasked to establish and operate three primer
of war incl-es or stockades: cme by IMIV Corps arid two by I11 Phib

Corps. Subsequently, the 51st Military Police Battalion, Island amrand,

planned to as- ccmtrol of the three corps incl-es.'
'Ihese plans provided detailed guidance for handling of priscmera,
aperation of collecting pints, arhhistration of id-es, and
evacuation of priscmers within both the beachhead and the various zcmes of
action. The 1st Military Police Battalion used the Tenth Anny txacept for
handling priscmera in both training and plamiq. The former &mradhg
officer of Clnpany A, Colonel Kenneth J. Becker, indicated that both the

aawpt and the tminiq were proper for what they m t a e d . These
priscmer of war plans were all consistent with basic doctrine.'
Civilian Handling Operations Pl-

The fonner G-3 of 6th W i n e Division, Lieutenant General Victor

H. Krulak, U. S. W u h e Corps, Retired, noted that Okinawa was the

divisicm's first real experience with civilians. They realized that the
Okinavians were not treated well by the Japanese. Even though they obeyed

the Japanese, under American amtml they would be canpliant, helpless, and
require care. The Tenth Anny planned to be ccmpassiomte, provide fccd,
and medical attention in the amtext of the tactical situaticm.1°
FM 19-5 discussed the suprene authority of a military gwenmnent

over lands, property, and inhabitants of an ensrry territory. Phib 19

provided practical guidance c
m the iqatace and tedmiques for handling
and controlling civilians. Military police missions again included both
security and law and order fuuctions previously depicted in chapter
three."
Mnneraus articles on civil affairs, military gwenmnent, emmy

civilians, and related p

l
& provided additicmal les- leamed in

prior c a q a i g n s . The cansiderations of intematimal law, the impact on

t
& and supporting operations in the Marianas, the extr6ne behavior of
Japanese civilians on Saipan, and pl- cansiderations for the mianas
were amcolg the topics inc1uded.12 This operation planued to integrate
military police with military government relieving military police of all
but security considerations. As such, military police planners primarily
cansidered nmkers of civilians and their attitudes.l3
Finally, military police anticipation of requir-ts for

amtrolling civilians is evidenced in pre-opeation trahiq. Both mines

and soldiers csmducted 1-ge trainhg designed to facilitate basic

annnmicaticm between military police and the Okinawans. Classes and

lectures were designed to develop appropriate attitudes focusing cm relief
. . recognized that these units

and protection of these civilians. Trarnrng

cmtabed ccmbat veterans with potentially hostile attitudes toward amy

civilians.

'l

The three battalions of military police support pushed forward

into the assault echelcm clearly reflected an appreciaticm for the scope of

civilian handling operations anticipated. Policies cansidered security

first by initially treating all civilians as prisoners. Semnd, policy

addressed relief operatians and protecticm of civilians. Last,
prohibitions of American ccmtact with Okinawau civilians enhanced both
security for Tenth &my forces and the civilians residirig in military

gavenrment inclosures. Civilian handling operatians are not renenbered

b s i q of primry hprtance by all veterans; hawarer, pl- inferred
that they were the largest anticipated challenge.
Plamiq satisfied most dactrinal standards incorporating

significant detail. Hawever, there was m specific policy for the use of
force w i t h civilians. Neither doclanentaticm or the recollection of
veterans revealed any explanation. While not addressed in Phib 19, FM 19-5
provided specific guidance in this area. This was a significant p1amh-q
failure. E ~ ~ e p t ithis
q problem, civilian handling operatians pl-
was

doctrinal, W h , and adequate for the operational settiriy."

Security C)perationsPl-
Security planning failed to adequately cansider three specific
areas; airfield security, cam?aud p t security, and engheer and naval
construction battalion site security. There is no indication of plannkg

in any of these areas. First, airfield consideratians are entirely absent

in plans, yet military police action reports refer to significant -rt
provided at both Kadena and Yontan airfields thmghout the canpign.
Second, the cmly discussion of canmud post security found in plans

addresses a pmhibition on n w v i q or holdkg priscolers or civilians w i t h i n

sight or hearing of any carmand post. Here also, military police action

-
reports and recollectims of veterans indicate security operatians to
protect carmand posts £ran the Army level da;vn occurred. Specific

detacinnents were f d in accordance with EM 19-5 for protection of the

General, Tenth Army and the Cmnm3.q General, Island CamwCi.

There is M evidence of this in pre-operationplannkg. Third, xwmnxs

military police units were attached to engineer and naval construction
battalion units for security of equipnent, perscumel, and key sites such as
briaes. This is also neglected in available plans. ''
Finally, neither the Provost -, U.S. Army Forces, Pacific

Ocean Areas or the Provost -1, Tenth Army cansidered these issues in
plannkg as evidenced by respedive action reports. There is no evidence
that the doctrinal standards identified in chapter three were met.''

Law and Order Operaticms Plannkg

?tvo principal areas of law and order doctrine were addressed in

chapter three; straggler ccmtrol and general enforcement. Plans addressed
each of these areas r q a d k q policy and pmhibiticms. Military police
rxmtrols and schenes for enforc-t were also generally addressed. There
is no indication of specific plans for straggler amtrol points, lines, or
patrols prior to landing. Nor is there any indication of specific plans
for law enf02c-t patrols or posts. Neither of these functions were
expected to require significant attention until later in the canpaign.

This m y account for the absence of this specific p1amiq.l'

Operatid Results Assessment

Traffic Ccmtrol Operations

The first point of focus for traffic operatias was the beachhead.
FM 19-5 clearly listed the first duty of military police i
n the beachhead
as traffic ccmtrol. There are mixed reviews on military police
effectiveness in this area. The Tenth Army G-1 -lain& of inadequate

traffic control on the beaches to guide debarking units to assably areas.

It is noted that the Tenth Army Headquarters cam ashore on Lc17. IMIV
Corps reported no caqesticm on their beaches early in the operation. The
111 m i o u s Corps action report indicated no caqestian on their
beaches on -2; however, it was noted that the shore party military police
landed too late to perfom efficiently. These military police were
pruvided by the 1st Military Police Battalion, fleet mine Farce, Pacific

which landed eight days late on -11. The former aanpany A carmanding
officer of this unit, Colcmel Becker, stated, "We were p1ayi.q catch-up
ball on the beach since we landed late. If we were to prcnride any real
ccmtrol, we shaild have landed mch earlier.""
ampanies A and B of the 1st Military Police Battalion
established traffic posts, infomntion booths, and radio jeep patrols of
the roads. Jeeps amducted camroy escort, cleared roads, reported road
conditions, reported on civilian cancentraticms, and enforced traffic -
regulations. Colanel Becker stated, "My Ccmpany handled traffic control up

68
to mtobu, but not any further." Apprmdmately sixty percent of this

battalion was iwolved primarily in traffic m t r o l . Becker noted, These

operations w e r e very effective. W

e kept civilians off of supply lines. W
e

kept supply lines open." ''

Canpanies C and D r a i n e d w i t h the Corps Service Group a t the

North Shore Farty Area. Canparrl C established traffic posts, infomation

booths, and stragyler collection points £ r a n Bishagawa north t o Bolo point

inc1di.q Route 3 and all of the territory east t o the Ocean. Oanpany D
performed the same funbions in a zone parallel t o C Conpany a l q the west

coast mmiq north t o the road junction of Routes 1 and 6. The Provost

-1, Service Group exercised operational mtrol of these canpanies.

The fonner Executive Officer of Conpany C, C o l d Jams H. l&Crddin

U.S. Kxim Corps, Retired, recalled, " m f f i c was the mt i n p r t a n t

function we M. It was a function of xmbility. Other than 1

- late

the operations went well." "

?AS previously noted, 111 Aqhibious Corps divisions l e f t military

@ice behind a t key intersections as a result of the absence of the Qrps

Shore Party military police. 6th Kxim Division noted that their military

police organization for shore party was adequate and efficient. This was

damstrated by their ability t o expand their military police support £ran

the beachhead as they turned north?

The 519th Military Police Battalion was largely split up anrmg

their divisions. aanpany A provided the 7 t h Infantry Division w i t h traffic

control in the Division zone of action. 1st Plat- was attached t o the

Corps Shore Party u n t i l relieved on -18. Canparrl B provided traffic

ccoltrol in nmemw areas; 1st Platcxm a t the Tenth Atmy Carmand Post, 2d
Platam in the vicinity of Kue and Chatan, and 3d Platam in the XXIV Corps

area east of mgushi beaches. ampany C also had 1st Plat- attached to
the corps Shore Party until relieved on -18. Additionally, on W14, 2d
Platcon, ampany A and the 3d Platam, Canpany C were attached to the
Island Oamrand Slmre Farty for traffic control.
The 519th Military Police Battalion was fully engaged in traffic
control frun the nnnent it cam ashore. As noted above, the XXIV Corps
reported no traffic problems on its beaches. Distinctive G~eenand yellow
infmtion bcoths were established by the 519th Military Police Battalion
early in the operation. These were inneased to cover inprtant traffic
centers as the tactical situation developed. These posts provided
immluable assistance to drivers, maintained current situation maps, and
remuted traffic as required
indicated by the PrOvOGt -, 1st Engineer Special Brigade,
military police were initially sufficient in the beach maintenance area.
All who were available were assigned to traffic ccmtrol and e~cuatimof
civilians f m the rcads in this -. Due to road d t i o n s , traffic

bwme q e s t e d but never stopped w. Extensive civilian handliq

r e q u i r e s ma& it necessary to relieve military police £run traffic
posts and patrols to collect these civilians. &kinsugply roads were still
behg developed throughout this period. Ccnstruction of the Kadena traffic
circle aided greatly with the speed, flow, and handling of traffic. After
construction of the circle, bottlenecks d y occurred on Route 1 crossiq
the Bishagawa and at other briaes along Route 1. In spite of the late
arrival of the 1st Military Police Battalion and the 51st Military Police
Battalions traffic operations within the beachhead were generally
successful.2S

The systan for mkiq routes proved very satisfactoq, however,

signs prepared in Oahu received unsatisfactory distribution delaykg the
pmper mkiq of routes. Military police assisted posting signs; thus
perscaznel were diverted who had been plarmed for traffic posts. In spite
of this, traffic ccmtml at all levels was excellent. &Bst difficulties
were due to rmd ccmditias. The origindl Tenth Anny plans pmved
satisfactory, as evidenced by the Prwost -1's tour of the Island cm
Lcl. Well informed Military Police armed with maps were on duty on the
heaches andaloqthemainroads."

Next it is apprcpriate to emmine traffic control as the

operations eqanded ashore. The 6th Marine Division made quick and
sweeping progress in the north. M x h of this expausion occurred
sinailtaneausly with developoent of the beachhead. Military police support
for the 6th Marine Division drive came £ran Oanpanies A and B, 1st Military
Police Battalion as discussed above. As the operation progressed rapidly,
mre of the island was u~lcoveredand traffic ccmtml was b e d . The
lack of military police, the m m b r of civilians, the requiranent for dmp
guards, and significant elements of the military police force were still
afloat, precluded establishing all of the desired traffic posts. This
prablen was corrected as m e military police becaw available.'"
The entire I11 &phibious Corps displaced f m n the north and
central areas of Okinawa to Tenth Axmy lines in the south cluring the first
week of Nay. Emments of divisions in and out of Tenth Anny lines were

amtrolled by the Tenth Wmy Prwost Marshal Secticm in close coordination

with the 111 &phik&ousCorps and Corps ProMst Marshal Secticms.
The Tenth Army, hwost IBzxhal's report indicates the m s were a l l

canpleted without any difficulty. The 6 t h m i n e Division used their

military police effectively for their divisicmal m t o southem Okinawa -

between L+31 and L+35. A -
t plan w i t h overlay, routes of rrarch,

and specific instructions to military police was

rates of d,

inoJrporated in Opeation Order m d x r 49-45 on L+29."

On -35, the 1st Military Police Battalion began Supenrishg the

rmves south of 1st m i n e Division, 6 t h m i n e Division, and the I11

Aqhibious Corps Carmand F a t . The Battalion displaced t o the new Corps

Carmand Pofit in the vicinity of Fut- on W39. A s noted by the Tenth

Army hwost I v B r s b l , these major m s went withaut difficulty."

Dust and rain caused delays throughout the operation. The roads

had pcor bttans, and heavy traffic grwnd rcads into clouds of dust and

then seas of d.Qleck points were established w i t h i n corps' boundaries

t o screen out unessential vehicle traffic. Qn L+59 I11 &phibious Corps

began ccntml of traffic by camray cmly. Screenirag fomd several hundred

vehicles per day in forward areas ha* no wnnection w i t h &t

operati-. In m y traffic posts south of the Island Carmand h m d a q were

covered jointly by m i n e and Army military Police. In€-tion booths

were established a t key intersectians. These booths provided valuable

assistance which kept traffic moving m t h l y . ROadS did not inprove u n t i l

mid-June.30

In the south, the 111 Aqhibious CBqs rear area was divided

between two mnpanies of the 1st Military Police Battalion. mere vvas cme
.
way traffic on the main supply rautes. The rcads would not sustain two way
traffic except around Naha. This system was not trouble free. Becker
stated, "Scme perxnmel were insistent that they cane back the same way
they went. Nothirig would have gotten down that road. So, we insisted that

they follow the cme-way circuit. It worked well.""

Tra£fic control became critical during the mnsams between
mid-my and early June. By L A 0 rain and traffic rendered routes five and
thirteen in the XXtV Corps zcme inpassable. All overland mxrenent of

troops and -lies for five divisicms had to be routed over Route 1
through I11 Anp3hibious Corps zone of action. An average of twelve hundred

vehicles traveled in each direction daily. Close liaison, constant traffic

control, and rigid traffic screening maintained the flow of annumition and
e q u i m t to the f m t line troops. mjor General Ray S. Geiger,

Carmandirag General, of the I11 Anp3hibious Corps fomlly recognized 1st

Military Police Battalion's successful effort'

The 519th Military Police Battalion shared traffic posts
with Marines of the I11 Anp3hibious Corps durhg this period as efforts
intensified to limit traffic an deteriorating main supply routes. The
519th Military mlice Battalion and the XXtV Corps Staff J m e Prhrocate
established mbile traffic courts operated with military police patrols.
One c m p n y was focused on traffic control for the Corps at any time.
Qnpny A was relieved on L A 5 by Canpany B. These units m m m d posts, ran
patrols, and comkcted road blocks a l q the Corps bolmdary. Qnpny B

shared a post at Chatan with military police £ran the 1st m i n e

Division."

C m t W deterioration and closure of roads in the XXrV corps

area intensified traffic control throughaut the oanbat zone in early
June. XXIV Corps military police assisted I11 Marine Anphibious Corps
military police with control of XXIV Corps traffic on Route 1 while Routes
13 and 5 were closed:'
U.S. Army Forces Pacific Ocean &?=as Observer reports indicated
A

there was a need for more properly trained military police. It suggested
that if traffic amtml had been prcnptly established, saw roads in the
XXIV Q r p s zcme of adion would not have been lost.n3s The Tenth A .

reprted that subsequent to the loss of sqply Routes 13 and 5,

Route 1 was only kept open between -51 and -65 t b m g h rigid traffic
control and twenty four hour a day eqineer ~perations.'~
Traffic control d w 5 . q the final part of the ca&?aign was hmpered
by dense pockets of civilians. The effects of lost w l y routes
in the east were still evident. m l y operations anployed air and water
lines of CamMlication to relieve the stress on roads. The I11 Marine
Wphibious Corps evaluated traffic ccoltrol as satisfactory, but mcrvetwt of
t-s and sqplies required strenuous effort. It was noted that cxmtrol
could have been better?'
The 51st Military Police Battalion also provided traffic cxmtrol
at mmemus times in the campaign. When Canpany A reverted to battalion
mtro1, it provided traffic posts and patrols annmd Hiza in the vicinity
of the Island Ccmmnd. Canpany C C to the Island Carmand prisoner of

w a r stockade near Kadeua also providing traffic control in that area.

aanpany D provided traffic control alcmg the Bishagam. On Lt60, Catlpany D
reverted back to Battalion mtrol. Traffic mtrol shifted £ran south of
the Bishagawa river to northsi.de and expnded northward. Canpany A

antirrued to patrol the Island amMnd Area in early my. aanpany B also
provided traffic ccoltrol at Kadena Airfield and a 16 square mile area at

S h i m h d a with traffic posts and patrols in May. Canpany C continued to

provide control of traffic in the area aruund Kadena. The 51st Military
Police Battalion provided traffic control throughout the Island CcmMnd

area. These operations were all cmpleted effectively without

difficulty.''

Traffic amtrol in autlyhig island operations is characterized by

operations on Iheya Shims by the 3d Platom, 2d Marine Division Military

Police Canpany. This platom's support for shore party was a m t e d by

Marines of a 35 man replac-t draft. Heavy rain and deep md forced
tanks and artillery vehicles to ramin in dmps d m i q unloading.
Avoidance of serious traffic cagestion was attributed to g a d traffic
amtrol. The S-4 indicated that the doctrinal cmpliment of military
police was insufficient for h i n d l i q both traffic opeations and civilians
sMtaneOuSly.'9
Traffic amtrol operations were effective except in two areas.
First, the late arrival of the 1st Military Police Battalian and el-ts
of the 51st Military Police Battalion significantly hapxed Corps-level
shore party operations in the mgushi beachhead. This settack was
ampensated for by flexible military police £run the Marine Divisions, and
the 1st Military Police Battalion's ability to quickly gain control once
ashore. Seccold, U.S. Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas, Selected Qbsenrers

reported that better preventative traffic amtrols could have precluded the
loss of m t e s 13 and 5 in the X X I V Corps zone. In contrast the I11

?4qEbious Corps inwrporated a rigid one-way traffic circuit prior to the

rains, and dedicated two ccmpanies to traffic control in the Corps area.
A s a result, Route 1 was not 1-t. This effort resulted i n cxmtinued

sustainnent of the Tenth Army f m t . In spite of these problems, tra£f i c

cantrol operations were ultimately effective.

Friscmer of War Operations

The two corps and their division military police units were

reqmsible for priscmer of w a r operations. According t o plan, three

stockades were established initially: one by XMV Corps and tviu by I11

Aqhibious Corps. Qn order Island amrand planned t o assme control of the

three corps or division stockades. The G-1, Tenth Plmy noted that

ackhistrative considerations made it necessary t o vary frcm the basic

plan. There is no other specific reascm given for this change. The Island

Canrend established a central Island amrand inclosure instead on -16. A

s i q l e inclosure was sufficient for the m m h m of prisoners captured."

Once established, a l l prisoners were evacuated t o the central

inclosure directly frcm the divisions. The f i r s t prisoners of war received

by Island Canrand arrived on Lc20. Initially, they were guarded by the 1st

Platcm, 162d Military Police acmpany a t the central inclosure in the

vicinity of Kadena airfield. Later, these prismers were handled by

el-ts of the 51st Military Police Battalion."

The tenporary central inclosure was s u n m d e d by a six £cot four

strand barbed wire fence. Salvaged shelter halves over slit trenches

provided the cmly shelter for prisoners. Food included K and C rations

suppl-ted with native food when possible. Water had t o be hauled and

transportation was scarce. Sanitation had t o be t a m t t o the prisoners,

the mst difficult problem to address."

 Ccoltrol of prisoners was easy since -1ish speaking prisoners

tansmitted orders to the others, but pmblans did occur. In one instance,
a p r i m on a w m k i q party cut American phone lines. In another
instance, six prisoners escaped f m the central inclosure. All of them
were recaptured or accounted for in several days. These type instances
were the exception. The greatest percentage of the prisonera initially
were Korean or Okinawau labor troops. The first Japanese were mostly

vmded, a factor limiting resistance. Segregation in the temporary ~sland

OcmMnd central inclosure was limited to ~fficers.'~

Counterintelligence Corps teams screened prisoners daily. Sane

banefide civilians were found a n w q priscmers and turned over to military

grrvernment. Those prisoners with established prisoner of war status were

pennmently processed by the 1st Platoon of the 162d Military Police
Ccmpany. This platoon processed prisoners -thly and efficiently. on
-90, 10,740 priscners had been interned. This included 120 p r i s m of
war f m outlying islands, 1,093 d e d prisoners, and labor troops. Mmy

soldiers were found in civilian incl-es, others ccoltinued to be captured

after the island was secured, many were found hidirg in caves, and there
was a sizable guerrilla force in north Okinawa."

Castructicm of a new and larger ampolrnd at Yaka began in

June. Ccmpany A and Canparry B (less the 1st Platccm) of the 51st Military
Police Battalim operated the Yaka ampolrnd. By -81, eight thousand
prisoners of w a r had been processed. The p m a n m t Island Cnrmand
inclosure was opened on -83 at Yaka with a capacity to hold 15,000
prisoners. The temporary inclosure at Kadena transferred to the military
govenrment for use as a civilian incl-e.'5
 % hwost 1
- Section, Tenth ~ n n yoperated a special

intenqation center for the G-2 where reliable sources were inte?zqated.

The FYOICS~ Wshal utilized military police assigned to the Anny aarmand

post fzun the 519th Military police att tali on." .

Whereas XXlV Corps initially operated a prisoner of war stockade

for its divisions, the I11 w i o u s Corps did not maintain a regular
pri- of w a r stockade. The 2 initial stockades referred to were
established and operated by both of the Ku-ine Divisions. These 3

stockades were necessary prior to establishment of the Island aarmand

central inclosure. 1st Marine Division noted that the prisoner evacuation
process was satisfactory. Cm b43, the 1st Military Police Battalion
opened a Corps primer of w a r stcckade adjacent to a W i n e Brig. ?his
Corps inclosure handled an average of 11 prisoners each day. % Battalian
also pruvided guards for m x d e d priwmrs at Corps hospitals."
Early in the operation while supporting the I11 2qWbious Corps,

the ccmpanies of the 51st ~ilitarymlice Battalion operatedprimer of

incl-es
collected were actually p r i m of w a r .
Island Carmand p r i m of war inclosure at Kadena.
-
war inclosures and collecting pints in close prcPdmity to civilian

and collecting points. An estimated 2% of the civilians

Cm -60, A operated the

Between -80 and -83,

capmy A operated the new Island aarmand central inclosure at Yaka
containing 12,000 priwmrs. This m m b r included M i d e civilians
subsequently transferred to civilian inclcsures.
Initially, the 1st Platcxm, 162d Military Police Canpany

furnished interpreters, assisted in nmniq the incl-e, and processed

primers. On -21. C m p q C reverted back to battalion control and took

78
over operation of the Island Cnrmand inclosure at Kadena. By Lt30, the 1st
Platoon, 162d Military Police C ! c n p n y had processed 250 prisoners in
addition to initially qerating the inclosure. 141ey mtinued until late
in June when mmbrs dramatically increased. During the nrmth of B y , this
Platoon was required to a m t the inclosure guard fran -70 to U76 and
-79 to Lt86. During these two periods processing tenporarily ceased.
Interrupticms limited precessing for this single plat-. The plat- urns
forced to stop processing at least f a u times during the v i g n in order

to a m t security."
Within the lMnr Corps zcme of action, the problen of handlizg

civilians urns also larger than prisoner of war considerations. As a

result, sane prisoner of w a r functicms were cmsolidated with civilian
handling functicms. The Provisional Canpany, 519th Military Police
Battalion established collecting points for the 27th Mantry Division.
Ute in the operation, C h p n y A intensified prisoner of war operations
d Koza, Ycolabaru, and mgusuku. The 519th Military Police Battalion
was cxmtinuously imrolved handling prisoners of w a r throughout the

operation.
These opeations provided viable evacuation of prisaners, positive
amtml of prisoners, support for intelligence and ~terintelligence
operaticms, protection of prisoners, care of prisoners, and p e m m a t

processizg of priscmers. Evidence that insufficient military police were

available to cope with p r i s m of w a r operations simultaneously with other
missicms clearly exists. In spite of that deduction, these operations
achieved their desired results without any negative h p c t on the mnpaign
or the forces imrolved.
Civilian Handlhg Operations

These operations canstituted the largest and mxt canplex mission

area d r o n t h g military police. Dodrine proposed mtrol of the

populaticm, s
a
f
- of the population, and protecticm of civil 7

records, currency, and prqerty to the greatest extent possible. P l a m

clearly recognized this challerge, as three battalions of military police

plus corps and division organic assets were landed in the assault echelon
to handle civilians. This mission area, like traffic mtrol, pranised to
inpact the tacticdl situation directly if inproperly handled."
The principal military police unit planned to m & p x t military
govenrment operations was the 52d Military Police Battalicm. This

Battalion guarded civilians in 23 military governnent Caps. However,

it was necessary to use military police assets organic to canbat units to

handle civilians at mmerous times during the cmpdign. Military police

kept natives inside inclosures at night and guarded guarded in fields

gathering fccd durhg the day. The Okina- mthmally attempted to

evade their guards to return to their fonner hanes for clotbiq or other
1
- affects. Gthers sinply wanted to be free of the restraint

imposed. Wscorted civilians were not permitted to travel anywhere cm the

island. This prevented Japanese soldiers fran n-aving and poshg as
civilians, it prevented civilians £run -
f ensny soldiers, and it
prevented civilians £ran being mistakenly killed. Military police

attempted to keep guerrillas away frun civilians. Sane instances existed .

where raidiq Japanese killed civilians w e d of cooperating with the

Americans. Military police also kept unautbrized Americans away frun

.
civilian inclcsures ."
 Due to lqistical design, the 52d Military Police Battalian did

not land early enotigh to handle civilians in the initial stages of the
operatian. Military Folice assigned to the military government should have
landed w i t h than. As a result, the 3 ccnpnies fmn the 51st Military
Police Battalian which landed in the assault echelan w i t h the I11
Zqhibious Corps played a critical role as 6 t h M&ne Divisicm began to
Wckly push north. Additionally, divisicm military police were actively
engaged w i t h significant lnanbers of civilians wen before military
govennnent teams came ashore. This requirement imposed the ability of
these units to perionn other planned missions.u
Mrmeraus civilians were encountered m v i q in the beach

maintenance area. A civilian inclosure was amstructed but went mmmmed

initially. Civilians would leave the inclosure and return to their
villages. Military police were ultimately w i t h d r a w n £ran traffic posts to
collect and control civilians. The Tenth Azmy Military Govenrment actian
report noted that difficulty was en-tered controlling the circulation of
1-e gxnqs of civilians with limited lnanbers of military police.
Civilian collect* points were operated as far forward as possible by
military police, military gov-t, and mmterintelligence. 5'
The Okinawans were generally cooperative and docile. A large
percentage were ufimen, children, and the elderly. No Japanese fanaticism
was m e n c e d a m q those civilians successfully taken into American
custcdy. No concrete cases of civilian espicnage or sahtage occurred.
The Okinawans did not fear the Americans as nu& as they feared the ravages
of w a r . Hawever, tco few interpreters and military police hindered
military gavenmnent operatias. Furthenmre, too few interpreters
h a q e r d military police operaticol~.~
In addition to security of inclosures, military police
&tails £ran the Xxnr Corps collected livestock until the Island Cnrmand

units toak over. Qn L+77, 2 &

e
s were attached to Island Carmand to

handle large rnanbers of civilians and p r i m collected in the final days

of Daily ccanrays £run the I11 2nphibious Corps of

apprcacirrately 50 trucks peddled civilians to whatever Island Carmand caps

would accept them. These cawoys had to travel lcolg distances £run the

south requiring precious transportation and limited military police

escorts. Late in June, the Corps evacuated 21,967 civilians frun the
~slandCarmand area because Island Carmand did not have sufficient
resources available. This was a 75 hour operation tyirq up trucks and
troops." In each case above, assets organic to a n h t LIX~ZSassisted an
overburdened garrison force ensuring mission accanplishmnt.
The 1st Military Police Battalion worked closely with the I11
Aphibious Corps C-1, C-4, the Corps Military Police Cmpny, and the
Military Gavennnent Section. The battalion evacuated 1602 civilians in the
first 8 days. They also provided guards at inclosures and chasers for
civilian working parties.
7 3 ~ 0 plat- attached to 6th mrine Division, a reinforced platoool
attached to 1st Division, and 2 officers a-ted the Corps
Military Garemmnt Section. These &tadmats operated at Sobe, Jima,
.
China, Nakadamara, and the Ishigawa-Cbimarea. They relieved much larger
Anny military police canpanies of the 51st Military Police Battalion, but

perfolmed the same scope missions satisfactorily. Dwing Phase I11 of the
ompaign, one platm was attached to 1st m e Division, and a reinforced
platam was attached to 6th m i n e Division to handle civilians. The 1st
Military Police Battalion pruvided substantial support to the m i n e
Divisims, I11 m i o u s Corps, and Island aarmand."' Becker mrmnarized
the battalion's experience with civilians:
Srrall grarps of military police £run the ccmparry not invulved in
traffic control would be sent out to pichq civilians £ran collection
points or find than. A dozen or so would ame aut of a cave, get on
the narrow roads, interfere with traffic, and slow the advance of
sup~1ie~.=~
Becker further recalled:
The use of force was applied at face value. There was no policy per
se. W a n e n and children were no tmuble, and the mles were largely
coaperative in the presence of w a n m and children. You just pointed
which way that you wanted than to go and they waild go. The irales by
themselves were always treated with sane caution.59
Periodically, these mines would experience significant
quantities of civilians, but they were all extremely coopeative. Howwer,
the first task of collectkg civilians was sanetimes difficult. Military
Police would look into a cave and observe mwenent, but due to the language
barrier receive no response to caoPands. B S r i n e s would m t i m e s open fire
into the cave. Becker recalled, "Gne Sergeant to me once sa* that
he had killed two Okina-; he was really bothered by this.'@
The 519th Military Police Battalion provided this same type of
civilian handlkg support to the XXIV Corps and its divisims. Canpany A
operated the 7th Infantry Division civilian stockade and controlled
civilians at S h h ? h h . In June, the Canparry handled civilians at
Y w . M y a , m e , Koza, and Tamgusuku. Canparry B handled
civilians in the XXIV Corps area at Chatan and l%amkoru between early in
the operation. Canparry C handled civilians at Ginowan and Shimabuku in
2pril. In June, Ctnpny C controlled civilians at Shinzato, Hyakona,
Yabiku, F u m h s h i , and Ycmabaru. Gn b18, the Battalion folmed a

provisional acmpanY to attach to and support the 27th Infantry Division.

This Ctnpny ran the civilian inclosure at l&nnbru, forward collectirq
points, an intermediate inclosure, and a rear inclosure. This support

ccmtinued until b 3 3 when the canpany was disbaraded.61

?he 51st Military police Battalion engaged in extensive civilian

control aperaticols dux- the initial stages of this operation. Ctnpny A

established multiple tenporary anpmds at Saba, usa, J*, ~agahama,and

w. The acmpanY also established capmnds at Toy,~agdam,N a k a m i

and Ishikawa.
Ctnpny B worked with civilians at Sabe, Chibna, Gushikawa, and
Ishimine-Kutoku. This Chpmy mJved 10,000 civilians and priscmers to
Olibana. Their coways were strafed and attacked by snipers. Extensive
raanbers of civilians were pushed out on the Katchin Peninsula and fenced
off f m friendly forces as an imnediate tenporary control. This c a p n y

established outposts to pickup civilians and amducted foot patrols w i t h

military governnent teams forward of friendly lines to locate, capture, and

protect civilians, records, and property. B Chpmy guarded Island CcmMnd
civilian inclormres at -
, Koza, Takabaru, and M d i h r u . They were
relieved of duty in early May at these anpmds by military police f m
the 52d Military police Battalion.
Chpmy C followed the 6th M d n e Division north mkbg with the
military government team. This canpany established civilian collectirq
points at W, Tbya, QI~M, Takeshi, Usa, Nsgahama, Ishikawa, Futsuki,
-, Nakadarrari, Yaka, Nago, G m a , and Taira. It also patrolled ahead
of a n h t units with military gaverrrment teams to locate and protect civil

records and property. C Canpany attached two plat- to the Island

Camand Military Govwment Section to assist with large rnanbers of

civilians at the end of the campaign.62

Even though the 52d Military Police Battalion functioned
near exclusively handling civilians with the Military Gmernwnt Section,
there is negligible infonmtion about their operatias. The bulk of their
responsibilities enccmpassed support to the various military w t
teams focused primarily on the operation of omps and inclosures.63
Late in the campaign in the south, the Tenth Anny found large
g m q s of civilians. In one particular case the 6th Marine Division found
a p p d t e l y five hmdzd in a quarry. division military police took
control of this 1- and cared for then. The f0- G-3 of 6th
m i n e Division, Lieutenant General Victor H. Krulak, U. S. m i n e Corps,
Retired, cannented:
These operaticms took the load of handling civilians away £run canbat
units. The principal problems were those of magnitude. Our military
police had never done this before. I believe they were quite well
trained. We benefited early £ran the Okinawan willingness to
cooperate."
As noted by Krulak, the first significant problem was based upm
the periodic magnitude or y o l m of civilians requiring ccmtrol. In the

north, the 6th m i n e Division uncovered civilians much mre quickly than
anticipated. The late arrival of the 1st Military Police Battalion, the
52d Military Police Battalion, and el-ts of the 51st Military Police
Battalion canplicated this. In addition, the three canpanies of the 51st
Military Police Battalion attached to I11 Aqhibious Corps returned to
 Island Carmand cantrol while the 6th W i n e Divisicm was still wrestling

with sizable groups of civilians in the north."

Again, in the south, the volume of civilians encountered

overwhelmed military police units. The 15th Wines formed a provisional

military police unit for this reascol. In spite of these prablens, civilian

handling operations were effective overall. Three thousand military police

amtrolled three hund~edthousand civiliansP6

Secmd, it appeared that the use of force in these operatias was

not properly regulated. As noted in the pl- assesanat, there was no

policy reflectirag doctrinal prescription, there were no =-lethal force

options available, and mitigaticm of lethal force appeared to rely qxm

Okinawan cwperation and circmmtance. BeckerTsreoollectias cm this

mtter are t v e d by the recollections of former Private First Class

Salvatore Cavallaro, of the 1st Military Folice Battalian. He stated,

Force in handling civilians was discussed, because we were going to

take care of than. We had to clear caves and tunnels of the Japanese
without killing the civilians that they tcok for cover. Accidents
happened sanetimes when Japanese soldiers hid in a crcwd of civilians
and used a weapm or grenade on the troops. Sanetimes, t q s d d
get trigger happy and open fire on the crowd. We would have to stop
this if we d d P 7
In spite of the lack of plamed policy, use of force was covered in

.-t Military police understccd that their job was to protect the
Okina-. This served to regulate the use of force.6s Regardless of
deficiencies, these operations achieved overall success in the face of a
large and canplex challage.
?
Security Operations

Security operations, though largely u n p l d , required a great

deal of military police time and effort. Airfields, carmand posts, and
other critical sites were secured by military police. The XXIV Corps G-2
credited military police security with denial of eneny tactical success in
rear areas.-
The 1st Military Police Battalion provided a wide q e of
security support. Daily r o v i q patrols covering the Corps area encountered
and neutralized d l eneny cancentrations. lt&s in the Corps zcme were
inspected and closed. During the last eight days of phases 11, 1,290 tanbs

were inspected. heny en-ters were custa~lry:snipers, infiltrators in

bivouac areas, and attacks on vehicles passing at night. During phases I

and 11 menbers of this battalion killed 5 and wounded 4 Japanese soldiers.
During Phase 111, one platcan provided security for the I11

m i o u s Corps rest cap at m. One platm, attached to the 1st

Separate %beer Battalion, secured bri-s, equipnent, and mtrolled
traffic a?mmd canstruction sites. Amther plat-, attached to the 1st

Naval Ccastruction Battalion, provided night security of equipnent and

installations. Finally, a squad of 16 mines was attached to various
elements of the Joint Intelligence Center, Pacific Ocean Wea. Lhily
security patrols ccoltinued in the Corps area and 1981 tanbs were inspected.

During the entire operation, menbers of this ~t killed a total of 24 and

captured 13 Japanese soldiers."
The 51st Military Police Battalion was also engaged in a wide
range of security functions. Canpany D, while attached to the 1st mgineer
Special Brigade, provided 20 men as a special guard for the protection of
the Q m m d i q General, Island Carmand. Cb Lt22, this anpny dispatched

military police to intercept two coral trucks reported as driven by

Japanese soldiers. Canpany D provided scout cars to Y m t a airfield and
the South Beach Provost Marshal as a precauticm against enemy paratrcqs.
In m y this anpny operated guard posts at Kadena airfield, yellow beach,
the 43d W i l e Cammmicaticm ~ , the Island Carmand Tank Farm.
t and
Canpany A respcolded to Y m t a airfield after enemy planes crash landed.
The anpny guarded sites at Kadem and provided security patrols in the
Island Carmand area. acmparry B encwntered a d l Japanese unit of
infiltrators at -, and killed 3 Japanese soldiers that night. Early
in m y , the anpny guarded supply duqs at Kadena airfield and respzmded
to Ycmtan airfield when eneny aircraft aash landed. Canpany C while

attached to 6th Marine Division, helped suppress a Banzai attack at Tancha.

They supported the 521st Quartemaster Group by g u a z d i q supplies and ran a
patrol at Kadena airfield to protect persannel against sniper fire.
Finally, this anpny provided security for the 693d Ordnance Battalion
duqs.
The 519th Military Police Battalicm was no excepticm in this
missicm area. It also provided the saw range of security operations as
the other battalions. Canpany A, attached to 7th Mantry Divisicm, had
its 1st Platcon providirig security for the shore party in the South Shore
Paay Area. !Chis security included area and duq guards. In m y the
anpny provided a guard &tail at the 74th Hospital. The detail eqxmded
to include guards for the -es quarters in June. Finally, A Canpany also
provided a platcon to guard the Corps duq. Canpany B provided guards to
the 394 Haldirig Canpany, and the 7lst Me3ical Battalion. The capany
provided guards to the aorps drrmp. Canpany C, attached to 9 6 t h Mantry
Division, had its 1st Platm provide security to the shore party in the
S x t h Shore Party Area. This security included area and drrmp guards.n

Finally, the Fruvost Mw.-&al, 1st JBigineer Special Brigade

reported that the physical presence of sufficient Military Police hraught a

significant looting and pilferage prablan on the beach under control
through the use of walking patrols throughout the area."

Military Police units of the Tenth Anny appear to have achieved

pitive results w i t h these security operations. As the G-2 for xxlv Corps
pointed out, military police security operations denied the Japanese
tactical opportunity or advantage in the Tenth Anny rear area. Despite the
lack of plannkg for these operations, effective and measured application
of this mission area helped provide force protection for the Tenth Antry.
In amtrast to the value of these operatias, there exists the canpetitive
role w i t h other mission areas for limited military police res-es. The
relative value or importance of gmrdhq nurses quarters or a rest canp
could not be canpared to the need for additicmal traffic control or
civilian handling capability. This is neither cansidered in relation to
other mission areas or the criticd military police junctures in the

vign. In retrosped, sane of the assets dedicated to specific security

operations at specific times could have possibly been used to better
overall advantage.

Iaw and Order qWations

Neither of the t
w basic £unctions of this mission area presented
prablens w h a canpared to other missims. Stragglers and pilfering, while
clearly pmblms, were not serious. Rgnedial and a&inistrative measures

help& wntrol these problms." M these pmblgns, the mst significant

was that of stragglers mnrirag fnm rear to f m t for the purpose of

souvenir hunting and looting. Military police recwered civilian property ,

and turned it over to military govwmnat. Military police check pints
had great effect; stragglers were sent forward to bury enemy dead. At the

end of the day they were returned to their units with a message for their
ammdbg officer. Passes were issued to aid in the wntrol of
stragglers. Passes did not authorize travel forward of the corps rear

hnmdary. These measures reduced the rnrmber of stragglers cansiderably.

There were also very few stragglers dmkg incl-t weather.

Pilfering in supply chnrpJs, cm beaches, vehicle theft, and

unauthorized access to civilian canpolnads represented the next msat

frequent offenses. Very few arrests were made for pilfering, but mch

stolen property was recovered. Unattended vehicles were frequently taken

by stragglers or others and afterward abr&med. Wmy vehicles were

inproperly marked, repainted, or the losing uuit was unable to identify the
vehicle in detail. These factors greatly canplicated the recovery process.
Despite this obstacle, a cansiderable rnrmber of vehicles were recovered

thrmgh the effective use of check pints.

Another area of general law and order was p m t i c m and response

to crimes against the civilian population. There were a large rnrmber of
native -, and specific efforts were mxle to keep troops away f m n
civilian inclosures. In spite of this there were a few cases of rape that
were ultimately investigated. Additidly, military police investigated
the b m i q of native houses. These incidents were largely attributed to
stragglers. Violators were cmfined in the Island Carmand stockade, and on
Lt90 there were 95 soldiers, 2 sailors, and 3 m i n e s in the Island Carmand
stockade.75

The 1st Military Police Battalion investigated fires, accidents,

and missing persormel. mnbrs of this unit apprehended a deserter £ran a
Navy Construction Battalion declared a deserter an the island of
Guadald. He was apprehended in the 6th m i n e Division area.
Additionally, spot check teams were established to locate stolen vehicles.
The battalion recovered 50 stolen vehicles and retumed thgn to their
rightful awners. Also, 14 a h m k m e d vehicles w e r e turned over to the
Provost mrshal, Tenth A m y , and 62 Japanese vehicles were imporrnded
between 25-30 June for delivery to the Island Carmand Provost mmhal.
Stragglers were detained at the Battalion Wig until an officer £ran the
individuals unit called for him. This was quite effective in cutting dawn

the rnrmber of sowenir hunters each day."

The 51st Military Police Battalion had ane canparry primarily
ccmducting these operatiam. Canparry D provided detailed straggler amtrol
in the South Shore Party Area of the Hagushi beaches, and ran patrols alcolg
the south side of the Bishagawa. Additicmally, these military police
enforced Tenth ?mny regulations rqardhg the praniscuaus firing of

weapans. The canparry issued reports of delinquency for each violation

identified. By mid-Kay the canparry had issued a totdl of four hundred and
sixty two reports."

The Provost -1, 1st Engineer Special Brigade reported that no

serious crimes were camLitted against civilians. Looting and pilferage
were most significant initially, but ultimately reduced and b q h t under
control. The aimindl Iwestigaticm section of the 519th Military Police
Battdlicm was left cm the beach to imrestigate these problens. Five
reposed cases of robbery and thirty six reported cases of larceny occurred
in the beach maintenance area. The largest problem was vehicle theft.
Pspreheusicm of stragglers rivaled the scope of the vehicle theft
problem. mrcodrrately seven hundred and ninety stragglers were
appmhadd in the beach maintenance area between L+8 and b60. This was
primarily ammplished by the use of motor and fat patrols. Miscellaneous
violations included resist- arrest, insubordinaticm, or uniform
violations; these made up the rerainder of 1,133 reports of delinquenq
l3udng this period.

Law and order operations achieved notable results amsider- the

part time focus and priority that they received. Tenth ?mny military

police units were generally successful accanplishirag p l d abjectives in

this area. These operations were also consistent w i t h doctrinal criteria.

Military Police operations achieved p l d abjectives and were

generally effective. Operaticma1 deficiencies resulted pr-ily £ran
structurdl inadequacy and late force arrival, however, rnrmerous operational
pl- oversights occurred. Detailed conclusions are provided in chapter
five.
 %M 19-5, M i l i t a r y Fulice [Obsoletel (War Department, Washington,
DC: Govermnent Print* Office, 14 J m 44),48-65; PHIB 19, h l p l o y n w t of
M l i t a r y Police [Obsolete] (Marine Corps Schools, NC: n.p., 1945), Series
on zmpbibious Opeaticas, 33~01s.13-20.

?&nth Amy, W t a t i v e G p r a t i o n Plan 1-45 (Okinawa: n.p., 6 Jan

45), Annex 13, AppendixH, l,ff, Pppendix I, 1; XXnrCcorps,
AchMstrative Order 10 ( m e : n.p., 10 Feb 45), Annex K, 1-4; lMIV
Corps, Action Repart RyukyUs, 1 Apr-30 Jun 45 (Okinawa: n.p., n.d.1,
67-69, 87-90; 111 &@ibious Corps, Operation Plan No 1-45 (Okinawa:
n.p., 23 Feb 45), Annex IbJw, 1,ff; U. S. Amy Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas,
participation in the Okinawa Gpration, 2 vols. (n.p.: n.p., 15 Mar 46).
708-709.

*th Plmy, Action Repart Ryukyus, 26 6 to 30 June 1945, 3

wls. (Okinawa: n.p., 3 Sep 451, PII-IV-27-29,PII-XXII-1-5.

'FM 19-5, 161-178; Phib 19, Section 3, 31-33.

%S?GPX, 13-23, 99-100, 218-220, 547,548; Tenth Amy, W t a t i v e

Operations Plan 1-45, Amex 3, 1,ff; Tenth Amy,Actbn R e p r t ,
PII-1-40-41; 519th Military Police Battalion, Action Report (Okinawa:
n.p., 1 July 1945). 1-11.

%AEFWi, 13-23, 99-100, 218-220, 547,548; Tenth Amy, m t a t i v e

qperatians Plan 1-45, Amex 3, 1,ff; Colonel Keflleth J. Becker,
(Ret), Interview by author, 28 Oct 1994, tape recording, telephonic
interview at Colonel Becker's hane in L a Altos, Qlifomia; Provost
Marshal, 1st Engineer Special Brigade, M i l i t a r y Police Activities Okinawa
Bead Service Area (Okinawa: n.p., 17 July 1945). 1-3.

lo Lieutenant General Victor H. Krulak, n3C (Ret), Interview by

author, 19 Oct 1994, tape recordkg and transcript, telephonic interview at
Lieutenant General Krulaktshane in San Diego.

"FM 19-5, 66-68, 155-160; Phib 19, Part 2, Section 4, 34-38;

Basic Field Mama1 (FM 27-10),Rules of Lurd W a r f m (War Department,
Washington, DC.: &ted States Rwemmnt hrintirq Mfice, 1940), 74-85.
 -EM 19-5, 154-160; ~ h i b19, 33-37;
Lieutenant Colonel Lewis N.
samelsen, m, ~wandZirx~
Enarry Civilians" M3rine Coqs Gazette (April
1945) ; Captain H. C. Prudthamre,U5.Z?lZ, "Civil Affairs" mine Corps
Gazette (my 1944) ; S t a f f Sergeant B i l l Miller, USMC, ffBeachhead
Gavezinmztm mvine CoIps Gazette (Nwauber 1944); First Lieutenant Lewis
m,m, 57apanese Civilians in C&t Zanes" mine Coqs Gazette
(February 1945). 1, f f .

"Sarrmelsen, 1-4; Tenth Amy, Action Report, PII-XXII-8/9,

1 - 1 - 5 ; USAFPQA, 99-100.

"1st M i l i t a r y P o l i c e Battalion, F l e e t Marine Force, P a c i f i c ,

Action Repart of First Military FDliae Battdim, Fleet Xzine Force,
Pacific far Phases 1 and 2 of Okinawa Gpxatim ( O k b a w a : n.p., n.d.1,
1-8 and Stpplemental Actim Report of First Military FDlice Battalion,
Fleet xwine Force, Pacific far Period 22 qpril 1945 to 30 June 1945,
Okinawa Operation ( O h m : n.p., 1 July 1945). 1-6; 5 1 s t M i l i t a r y P o l i c e
B a t t a l i a n , Acticm Report, 10 Jan 1945-30 June 1945 (Okinawa: n.p., 30 June
19451, 1-8; 52d M i l i t a r y P o l i c e Battalion, Actim Report (Okinawa: n-p.,
18 Oct 19451, 1-2; 519th MPBn, Action Report, 1-11; Becker, Interview;
Colonel James H. McCrocklin, USXR (Ret), Interview by author, 23 Oct 1994,
tape reaxdbq, telephonic interview at C o l d MXxccklin1s hane in
Wimberly, Texas; Fonner PriMte First Class Hans H. Wer, U S E ,
Interview by author, 12 Nwauber 1994, t r a n s c r i p t , telephconic interview at
Mr. W e r ' s hane i n Philadelphia, PA; Fo- F i r s t Lieutenant John P.
Sawyer 11, USICR, Interview by author, 22 October 1994, telephcmic
interview a t Mr. Sawyer's hane i n Vero Beach, FL; Fozmx Private F i r s t
Class Salvatore Cavallam, uSW2, Interview by author, tape recording,
telephconic interview at Mr. Cavallaro' s hdme i n -stead NY.

"EM, 1st Dqineer Special Brigade, 2; 5 1 s t MPBn, 1-7; 52d MPBn,

1-2; 1st MPBn, FMFPac,Action Repart, Phases I & 11, 1-8; Tenth Army,
mtative qperaticm Plan 1-45, 15-19; Becker, Interview.

EM 19-5, 158-160; phib 19, S e c t i o n 4, 33-37; Becker, Interview;

MXxccklin, Interview.

l?USnrrOn, 99-100;
Tenth Amy, Tentative Operation Plan 1-45,
Annex 13, Pppendix I, 1-3; Tenth Amy,Action Repart, PII-XXII-1/9; 51st
MPBn, 1-7; 52d MPBn, 1-2; 1st MPBn, FMFPac,Action Report, Phases I & 11,
1-8; 519th MPBn, 1-11; Becker, Interview; McCrocklin, Interview.

%SAFFG4, 99-100; Tenth Amy, Actim Report, PII-XXII-1/9.

'*EM 19-5, 11-19, 20-28, 31, 139-141; Tenth Amy, 'Bntative

qperatians Plan 1-45, 5-19 andAnnex 13, Pppendix H, 1 and~nnex13,
Apped-k I, 1-3.

94
 '?EM19 -5, 150; Tenth Army, Action Report, El-IV-8; Tenth ~ r m y ,
ActimReport, P6-0-2; XXnr Corps,ActionRepart, 34; I11 mine
e i a u s Corps, Action ~epart, 125, 216; m e ,mterview.

"1st MPBn, FMFPac, Action Report, Phases I and 11, 1-8; Becker,
Interview.

=lst IGBn, EMFPac, Action -, Phases I and 11, 1-8;

l%Ckddin, Interview.

"'6th b5dne Divisian, *cid Action Report, Okinawa Operation, 2

wls., Phases I & 11, 30 Apr 45, Phase I11 (Okinawa: n.p., 30 Jim 4 9 ,
WI-11.12; EM. 1st Ekgineer ~ p e c i a iBrigade, 1-3.

"519th MPBn, 1-11; XXIV Corps, Action Report, 89-90.

a5m,1st Engineer Special Brigade, 1-3

'"Tenth Army, Action Report, PII-XXII-4, PII-XXII-1/9,

PII-IV-27/29.

'"Tenth ~ r m y ,m i a n Report, P11-XXII-4; 6th b5dne ~ i v i s i a n ,

specid m i o n Report, OPnO No 49-45. 3-4.

% 3 t MPBn, Supple2pntd Action Report, Phase 111, 1-6.

'Venth Army, Action Report, PII-XXII-1/9.

"er, Interview.

"1st MPBn, Supple2pntal Actian Report, Phase 111, 1-6; I11

Anphihiom Corps, Actian Report, 128.

"519th MPBn, Action Report, 1-11.

"XXIV Corps, Action Report, 67-69.

'vent& Army, Action Repart, P11-XI-9.

"Tenth Anny, Action Report, P11-XXII-4; I11 Anphihiow Corps,

Action Report, 197. ,

'%lst MPBn, Action Report, 1-11.

95
 " a p - d m m i Action &part, VII 2, 1-7, x 1.

' W t h Anny, Action Report, PII-1-40.

"Tenth Anny, Action Repart, PII-1-40; USAFPOA, 218-220, 530-532.

Yenth Army, Actian Repart, PII-XXII-I/~;USAFpoA, 218-220,

530-532.

"Ibid.

"Ibid.

"111 m i - Corps, Action Report, 141-143; 1st Marine

Divisian, Specid Action Report,Okinawa, Namei-Shot0 (Okinawa: 10 Jul
4 9 , 2; lst m, FMFP~C,mppl-td Action ~eport,-P III, 1-15.

''Tenth Anny, Action Report, PII-XXII-8/9, PII-XXVII-3/5.

"Ibid., PII-XXII-8/9, PII-XXVII-3/5.

-, 235-236; Tenth &my, Actian ~epart, PII-XXVII-~/~;

USAFPOA, 708,ff.

'5XXN Corps, Action Report, 89-96.

"111 m i o u s Corps, Actian &port, 133-138.

"1st MPBn, FMFPac, Action Repart, Phases I & II, 1-8; and
Suppl-td Action Repart, Phase III, 1-6.

'BBecker, Interview.
 6'519th m, Action Report, 1-11.

"51st MPB~, Action Report, 1-8.

"52d MPBn, Action Repart, 1-2; Island C d , U. S. Wmy Forces,

Pacific Ocean Areas, Gpration Plan No. 1, h . p . : n.p., 15 Feb
1945). 3, Annex I, Pppendiv A, 10.

W a k , Interview.

'%thMarine Divisicm, S;oecial Action Report, 111 49-52.

"Cavallaro, Interview.

"xxIV Corps, Action ~eport,114-115.

"1st MPBn FMFPac, Action Reports, Phases I & II and Phase III,

1-8, and 1-6.

"FM, 1st mgheer Special Brigade, 1-3.

'?kTlth Anoy, Action Report, PII-=I-5/6.

"1st MPBn, FMFPac, Action Repart, Phases I & 11 and Phase 111,

1-8 and 1-6.

Si%ucturdl ?qprapriateness

Military police structure p l d to support the U. S. Tenth Imny

quantitatively met or exceeded dcctrinal support relatiaships in all but

two areas: support for Tactical Air Forces and support for Garrison Forces.
Although structure provided military police assets for Kadena and Yontan

airfields, it made no provision for develqwnt and rehabilitation of

additional airfields cm Okinawa. Additionally, doctrinal aplayment of a
military police escort guard canparrywithin the Garriscm Force or Island
amMnd was not included or discussed in available plans.
Gther doctrinal support relatimships, while quantitatively

adequate, deviated significantly £run traditional task oqanization to meet

£uncticoldl requir-ts. Planners clearly denonstrated fldility and
insight as they shifted oryanizatimal caphasis forward in support of
ccmbat forces. Tenth Imny shifted the 519th Military Police Battalion dawn
to the XXIV Corps. The Fleet Marine Force, Pacific created the 1st
Military Police Battalion and attached it to the I11 Nazhe Anphibious

aorps. Finally, the Tenth ?umy jointly attached three canpanies of the
51st Military mlice Battalion, Island amMnd to the I11 Anphibious Corps.
Planners abvicusly appreciated the challaqe facing the assault echelon by
the scope of traditional military police functicms in cc~lcertwith civilian 4

handling operations.

98
 Curiously, the I11 2nphibious Corps received a large and

disproportimate share of the military police support. This was due to the
Tenth Amy's need to m e mxhnn nunkers of military police ashore in the
assault echelon d i n e d with I11 2nphibious Corps' ability to embark these
forces. Coincidentally, these forces prarided an mintentional depth for
111 2nphibious Corps when the 1st Military Police Battalion c a m ashore

eight days late. Further, these units were able to perfom civilian
handling functions tasked to the 52d Military Police Battalion which was
not schechrled to arrive at Okinawa mtil phase I11 of the aapaign.
Civilian handling operations posed the m t significant
requirement for military police in this campaign. The majority of the
military police structure was plam-ed to handle civilians at sane point in

the U g n . The inability of these forces to support volminous

operatias at least twice during the &gn amstituted a weakness in
this mission area. hragile plans to shift task organization ciuriq initial
stages of the campaign sought to provide adequate support until garrison

forces were established ashore. Houwer, -ed rapid gains in the

north rendered plans inadequate in the face of increased poExilation density
prior to arrival of two military police battalias in the assault echelon:
the 1st Military Police Battalion and the 51st Military Police Battalion.
Also, a task olganization shift of elements of the 51st Military
Police Battalion £run I11 mphibious Coqs back to Island Carmand control
-red goployment of wnbat forces of the 6th lmzine Division to handle

large nunkers of civilians. The 1st Military Police Battalion ultimately

supported the 6th m i n e Division; hwever, it was spread out providixg a

full m e of support £ran the Haguski Beaches to the m t c h peninsula
In this case the overall force ashore was inadequate for the volume of
civilians and aolcurrent missions. The poorly timed shift of task
organization was caused prjmrily by the absence of the 52d Military Police
Battalion. Whereas Island aarmand military gme?mwnt structure ashore was
growing, their dedicated military police support, the 52d Military Police

Battalion, would not achieve closure for sane time. Ultimately, q t i n g

.
needs w i t h i n the Garrim Forces impacted adversely upcol ccmbat forces.
Ute in the campaign, the Tenth Amy military police structure was
wholly inadequate as luiudnarm m m h r s of civilians were uncovered when other
missions had reached maturity in scope and caql&ty. The I11 Anq?hibious

Corps, faced with significant population density in their zone of action,

tasked the 15th &Brims to fonn a provisional military police detachment of
anpany size. Additicoldlly, the 1st Military mlice Battalion and the
Corps C-4 were required to support the Island amMnd in the handling of
civilians since missian requir-ts exceeded the capabilities of their
military police units.
In the outlying island operations, doctrinal military police
support at lower levels proved inadequate to handle civilians and traffic

m t m l sinailtaneously. Addititma1 support for these ccmbat forces was

obviously required. These units apporticmed forces alcolg doctrinallines
and had no pool of additional suppcat as at the corps-level.
Military police frrnctitmal doctrine was cansidered in 611 but two
areas: support for Tactical Air ~orcesand Island amMnd p r i m of w a r
inclosures. m e is no evidence in the U.S. Amy Forces, Pacific Ocean
Area plans, u.S. Tenth Amy plans, or U.S. Tenth Amy Garrisan Forces or
4

Island aarmand plans that either of these issues was properly cansidered.

100

 First, the requirement for Tacticdl Air Force andrespective

airfield protection was obviously critical to the achievenent of

operational abjectives stated in chapter one. Anticipated Japanese tactics
discussed in chapter three should have further highlighted this
requilrenent. Plarmers, as noted, prqmmm3 two aviation military police
canpauies into the Tactical Air Force force structure. Havever, the
absence of detailed airfield security plans, the mspxified size and
strucXure of the two aviation military police ampanies enployed, and the

failuxe to structure for further base developaent disregarded doctrine and

provide3 substandard support for mission.

As a result, plarmers did notprcgram sufficient structure or

pxprly anticipate the impact of these issues on other mission areas.

Three of the four military police battalions provided essential support to
both Radena and Yontan airfields during the capign. This clearly pointed
out the inadequacy of both security planning and the structure of the two
aviation military police canpanies assigned to these installations. GTI

each occasion, these qlaxmed security requirenents detracted £ran other

agoi.ng missions.

Next, the absence of a military police escort guard canparry also

reflected disparity between plans and dcctrinal prescripts. nS noted in
chapters three and four, the Island Carmand p l d to as- aperation of
the three corps prisoner of war incl-es once established ashore. The
concept of Amy-level or Island Carmand support for this missicm area
clearly inferred the doctrinal requirement for a military police escort
guard ccmpany. Havever, plarmers placed this responsibility with the
Island Carmand 51st Military Police Battalion by default.
 The 51st Military Police Battalion, as discussed in chapters three

and four, was tasked to provide a full range of military police support to
the Island Cormand. This left little assurance that prisoner of wa
operations wauld not directly caupete with other missim assigned to this
battalion. Even thngh planners anticipated large lnaobers of priscolers,
they failed to praperly m i d e r this estimate while develcping Island
.
CcmMnd structure. As a result, Island Cormand reduced prisoner inclosures
to one central inclosure w h i c h the 1st Platcon, 162d Military Police
Canpany, Prisoner of War Processing, guarded exclusively in the initial
stages of the operation. This unit a m t e d s-ity for this inclosure
twice m e durhg the onp3aign resulting each time in a tenporary halt to
prisoner of wax processing.
Both of these deficiencies adversely hpcted on other areas of
military police opesations by unnecessarily ccmpeting for limited assets.
This factor was either not recognized by planners or could not be addressed
due to exhausticm of military police assets available in the theater.
Available infonmticm was not specific enough to permit a determination of
the rcot cause. Additid unplanned missions included security of carmand
posts, carmanders, engineer sites, naval ccmstruction sites, and hospitals.
Sane of these missions caqlimentedother mission areas. Others of these,
such as the twenty m m security detail for the Island Connand

Generdl, were questionable uses of limited ~~npower.These unplanned

requirements detracted fran the priority required for traffic and civilian
operations; mission areas with dire3 k p c t on the tacticai situation.
Accepting this discussicm, military police structural pl- was

still genemlly tho- mi- the caqlex nature of mmerous missicm

areas and special organizaticms. It is absolutely crucial to note again

that these plarmers identified the need for m e additional battalion which
could not be provided in the Pacific Theater. In spite of inefficiencies
identified, a fifth battalion waild have provided Island Camtmd with
sufficimt assets to effectively support the W t h Army ccmbat forces vice

detracting £run than at points. Operaticms pointed out that this structure
succeeded in ammplishkg the mission except for three junctures in the
canpign: midway through the assault echelon ,
-
l m s civilian

handling in the north, and mass civilian handling south. The first was
attributable to the late arrival of d t s in the assault echelon. The
seam3 was due to the late arrival of garriscm forces and poorly timed

shifting of task organization within the assault echelon. Finally, the

third was due to support requirements which exceedd military police

capabilities at that point in the campaign. Pl- gaps failed to reveal
the inpJact that security and prisoner of war operations wauld have on the

overall structure, but especially the Tactical Air Forces and the Garrison
Forces. This last inadequacy points to the only real exmple where the
structure was incapable of accanplishing the mission.

Operational Effectiveness

Operational planning. as assessed in chapter four, reveals

dodrinal adherence in m t mission areas. Actual operations were
generally successful except for several specific pmblens. The first and,
possibly, m t important military police mission area was traffic control.
Traffic amtx-01 pl- was x d u c t e d by military police in spite of the
failwe of sane unit G-4 officers to produce traffic circulation plans
prior t o arrival ashore. While credit- the military police for pie,

these control plans did not anpliment t a f f i c circulatian plans produced

later. This issue was k e y a d the control of military police, but remined

a deficiency nevertheless.

Traffic operatims were successful except dur- two critical

junctwes in the d g n : £run Lt3 t o -11 and during the l a s t week of m y
A

and the f i r s t week of June. The first period covers the i n i t i a l asampticon

of control by the I11 Aqb&ious Corps Shore Eaxty of the north half of the

Hagushi beaches. The Caopanies of the 1st Military Police Battalion

designated t o the Corps Service Group had not landed and traffic

problems -ted an the beach. Gnce ashore these Marines quickly gained

control of traffic and successNly expanded north £run Hagushi a l l the way

t o the t@tobu peninsula. Initially this problem was due t o the late

arrival of this unit. Camrersely, this battalicon demplstrated high

canpetency as they quickly gained positive ccmtrol of a large and e q a d i n g

zone of acticon.

Next, ext- weather dur- the last week of m y and the f i r s t

week of Jime caused the loss of Routes 5 and 13. However, U. S. Amy

Forces, B c i f i c C e a n Areas, Selected Werver r-s criticized reactive

traffic ccmtrol i n the X X I V Corps zone. The report stated that proactive

control could have prevented the loss of these routes. In contrast, rigid,

i f not relentless joint traffic control was credited with the maintenance

of Route 1 and the ccmtinued sustainnent of both corps. It is clear that

the I11 Arclphibious Corps system of a one-way traffic circuit prior t o the

arrival of extxene weather ccmditims saved the principal w l y route i n

A

their zone. Ultimately, this was critical to the Tenth Amy's ability t o
sustain their canbat forces. Cmsidering the p a r nature and conditions of
these roads, overall traffic control operations were successful and of
operatima1 value to the Tenth Amy.
The next significant mission area involved the handling
of Okinawan civilians. This £unction also had significant hipact qmn
tactical forces. Military police operations relieved canbat forces of the
burden of civilian handliq, control, and ultimately any interference with
tactical operations or sustairrment. The m l m of civilians presented
military police with a canplex challenge which they met successfully except
in several situations. Those operatianal pmblens relating to structure
have already been discussed, howwer, there was one additicolal operaticma1
issue. The absence of a Tenth Amy policy for use of force with civilians
failed to satisfy criteria established in FM 19-5. This plarmi~~~
failure
may have resulted in unnecessary civilian casualties. The tactical
enviraranent was ccnplicated by the Japanese use of civilians as shields
during final attacks on American forces. It is not clear f m the
resources considered if a solution would have been drawn fron a well
defined policy on the use of force. It is clear that the a?zsenceof such a
policy left soldiers and Marims to their own personal j m t s Military
police involve~ntto stop trccps f m firing qmn civilians indicates that
judEprsent and resulting behavior was wstiCIMble to those present. It is
certainly questionable today. The need for such a policy was further
darnnstrated by exatples of military police accidentally killing civilians
in security operations. EVeu t h i g h training attgclpted to amid this

pmblan bli focusing on military police protection of civilians, legal and

articulate policy was certainly required as prescribed in doctrine.
 This issue provides the only real negative note for this mission
area. It sfaouldnot wershadav the accanplishwnt of appmxkately 3,000
military police who successfully collected, mxred, i n t d , and cared for
apprcocjlnately 300,000 civilian Okinawans. The s-le volume and associated
canplexity of such a task dervnstrates the overall success achieved in this
mission area.
.
Prisoner of w a r operations presented military police with fiarry of
the smne requirements as civilian handlirg, but w i t h only 3% of the volme.
m spite of this lesser populatim, the organizatiaal structure within the
Island amMnd proved inadquate. As a result, the Island Carmand central
inclamre failed to carry out the Tenth A m y policy for segregation of
p r i m ; only officers were segregated. This was the only deficiency
noted thm&xmt both operatianal assesawnts. These operations
successfully collected, mnred, held, protected, and pmessed over 10,000
p r i m of war. Ultimtely, this supportwas effective in spite of this
mirKr problem.
Failure to conduct detailed plaminy for separate security
missions created a plaminy void. m, security missions were not
properly coordinated with other £unctiaal ccmsideratians prior to the

canp?aign. This parallels those same security related deficiencies

identified in the structural evaluation. Urqlanned airfield security,
crmMnd post security, and other critical site security ccnpeted with other
mission areas for limited capabilities and focus. m h these .
missions were generally successful, their unplanned nature inpcted qxm
the quality of overall mission accanplislnnent. It is impossible to
A

&tennine what other problems might have been avoided had plaminy and
coordination properly occurred. It is also impossible to detMRine how
rrmch better or expansive other types of support might have been had

planning cccurred. It is clear that military police security operations

were credited with deterring and neutralizhq Japanese atteupts to disrupt
operations in the Anny and both Corps1 rear areas. This prablen was m e of
poor p1anni.q and not of operatianal execution.
Finally, detailed planning for law and order operationssuch as
straggler control, was also neglected. Although general policies,
prahibitions, responsibilities, and mrrective actionswere prescribed,
military police did not plan for posts and patrols prior to lading. This
p1anni.q may have been deliberately anitte3 since any significant need for
general enforcenent was not anticipated until later in the operation. In
contrast, pilferkg was clearly eqxxted to manifest itself in the
keachhead, yet specific military police plans were not available. ?+gain, a
planning failure did not render negative operatianal results. Law and
order operations as with security operations were successNly executed and
achieved successful results. This raises the question of haw detailed
planning should be prior to arrival in the area of operations.
The results of the Tenth Amy military police operations were

areas of adequate support. The Tenth Amy

-
generally very successful, however, canpetition anrmg mission areas for
limited military police assets occasicmally deprived inprtant mission
and specifically the Prmst
I-Br&al staff failed to continually prioritize these mission areas for

given t- in the operation. The absence of prioritization led to

seemingly randan focus and reaction amn=g various units. Further, the
Tenth Amy never exercised operational control of these forces at the
Army-level in order to focus the military police effort and achieve mutual

suppoa for critical mission areas. This would have provided a possible
solution for sane of the issues result- frun inadequate or unavailable

structure. Even thcniyh operational results were successful overall, mre

thorn@ plarming and focus of subrdinate military police support would
have resulted in better coordination, etxmany of force, and synergy of
L

capabilities tbroughaut the Tenth Army. These units indivitkally deserve

nu& credit for their accanplishments in the face of inexperience and a
challexqicg enviruriment. T h e y provided many examples of the best and m t
8uccessful military police operatias of their era.
Applenan, Roy E., Okinawa: The Last Battle, U. S. Amy in World W a r 11,
The W a r in the Pacific. 1948. Reprint. W a s h k g t o n , DC: Historical
D i v i s i o n , Department of the Army, 1993.

B e l o t e , J a m e s H. and W i l l i a m M., 25rphmn o f Steel: The B a t t l e f o r Okinawa.

New York: Ha.rper and Row, 1970.

D a v i d s a n , Orlando R., The madeyes: The S t o r y o f the 96th Infantry

Division. Nashville, 'IN: B a t t e r y Press, 1981.

Dyer, Geolge C., The CJU

IS to Ccolquer W a r : The S t o r y o f Mral
Richard Kelly !ltzrner, Washirigton, DC: U. S. Gavenrment h-intiq
O f f i c e , 1969.

Frank, Benis M., Okinawa: Capstme to Victory. New York: Ballantine, 1969.

Frank, Benis M. and Henry I. Shaw, Jr., V i c t o r y and Occupation: History

o f U. S. mine Corps Opratians in WarldWar II. Washirigton, DC:
Historical Branch, G-3 D i v i s i o n , Headquarters, U. S. Warine Corps,
1968.

am, I . T . M., Okinawa, 1945: The Gateway to J-. Garden city, NY:
Wleday, 1985.

Griess, Thams E., A t l a s o f the Seamd World War: Asia and the Pacific.
Wayne, NJ: Avery Publishiq Group, 1985.

HOugh, EYank O., The Island W a r . New York: Lippincott, 1947.

Huber, T h m s M., Japan's B a t t l e far Okinawa. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Cmht

Studies Institute. 1990.

Johnston, Richard W., Follcw Ms: The S t o r y o f the Secand X~WineD i v i s i o n

o f World W a r II. New York, NY: Randan House, 1948.

Love, Ek3mmd G., The Hceuglass: A History o f the 7 t h Infantry D i v i s i o n in

World W a r II. Nashville, TN: B a t t e r y Press, 1988.
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mdej, w. Victor, U. S. A
& and Mzine Carps G n i e r of Battle, P a c i f i c
Iheater of Gprations 1941-1945. V o l m I , Allentown, PA: Game
Publishing Canpany, 1984.

Manchester, William, Gzdbp, Dzhzess: A m i r o f the Pacific W a r . New

York, NY: Dell, 1980.

W l l a u , George, Ihe Old arced: A History of the First &C%rine Division in

wodd war II.nashingtan, DC: Infantry J d Press, 1949.

W l l a u , George, et al., M m r m ~ nValor: Mwine Divisions in Action.

WaShhgtan, DC: Infantry Journal Press, 1946.

Nichols, Jr., Olarles S., Major, lEM.2, and Henry I. Shaw, Jr.,Okinawa:
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Cb. : Publishers, 1966.

work,NY: Henry ~oltand chqxniy, 1946.

Pyle, Emie, Last Qmpter. ~ e ~

Sixth &BrineDivisian Associatian, Sixth Mzine Divisiau: Ihe S t r i k h g

Sixth, Riducah, W : Tunrer, 1987.

StoclaMn, J~IIESR., Ihe S i x t h m i n e Division. WashiqLcm, DC: Historical

Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters, U. S. K&ne Cbrps, 1946.

United States Army, Infantry Division, 77th. (Xlrs to IIold it High: 2 7 ~

History of the 77th Infantry Divisian in World W a r II.PJashiragton,
DC: Infantry J d Press, 1947.

Vagts, Alfred, Dr.,Lmding qperations: Strategy, Psycholqy, Tactics,

mlitics, Fran Antiquity to 1945. 1946. Reprint. mrcisbrag, PA:
Military Senrice Publishkq aanparrY, 1952

Van der Vat, Dan, Ihe Pacific C@gn: Ihe U. S. - J q a w s e Ndm.2 War
1941-1945. New York, NY: Simm and Schuster, 1992.

Werstein, Imkg, Okinawa: Ihe Last Ordeal. New York, NY: [n.p.l, 1968.

U.S. Army, Tenth Army, Action Reprt Ryukyus, 26 6 to 30 June 1945.

3 vols., Okinawa: 3 Sep 45.
 . !&ntative Operations Plan 1-45. Okinawa: 23 Feb 45.

. 1st Erigineer Special Brigade, Operations Plan "Icebeq". Okinawa:

4 Feb 45.

. The Share Party Concept (Draftj. En.p.1: 29 Nov 44.

. 1st Engineer Specid ~rigade,ProMst E ~ ~ h aBeach
l, Operations
and i n f o m a t i o n . Okinawa: 17 Jul 45.

. Corps, Action Report Ryukyus, 1 Apr-30 Jun 45.Okinawa: n.d.

. Iceberg, EO 45. Leyte: 8 Feb 45.

. Administrative Order 10. Leyte: 10 Feb 45.

. Administrative Orders 11-17. Okinawa: 8 wr-19 ~ u 4n5.

. Shore Party Instructions. Leyte: 10 Feb 45.
. 7th Infantry ~ivision,Operation Report, Ryukyus Canpaign.
Okinawa: 30 Jul 45.

. Field Order 30. Leyte: 5 Mar 45.

. Administrative Order-1. Leyte: 5 Mar 45.

. 27t2-1Infantry Division, m t a t i v e Operation Plans, Iebezy.
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. 77th Mantry Division, Operation Plan, I&q. Okhawa:

18 Feb 45.

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5 Mar 45.

. 51st Military Police Battalion,Action Repart, 10 Jan 1945-30

June 1945. Okinawa: 30 June 1945.

.52d Military Police Battalion,Action Report. Okinawa:

18 OCt 1945.

.519th Military Police Battalion,Action Report. Okinawa:

1 July 1945.
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. Office of the -, Report on Shore P a r t y Operations and

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. IslandCamEmd, Oper ation Plan AD. 1, -. [?I :

15 Feb 1
945.

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. Action Report Ryukyus Operation, Pppeedices Cozps Operation

O r d e ~ sand 6-3 Briodic q t s . Okinam: 1 Jul 45.

. Operation Plan AD 1-45. Okinawa: 23 Feb 45.

.1st Military Police B a t t a l i o n , Fleet Marine Force Facific,A€ter

Action Repcut f o r Phases I and 11 o f Okinawa Operation-Okinawa:
30 Apr 1945.

. Sqw~X-td Action Repart o f F i r s t Military IilZice Battalion,

F l e e t i%u9qe Farae, P a c i f i c f o r Fericd 22 April 1945 to 30 JLme 1945,
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. Adninistrative Plan 1-45. Guadalcmal: 10 Feb 45.

. 2d Marine Division, Action Report, Phase I, N-i Sbto.
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. Operation Plan AD 10. Saipan: 15 Feb 45.

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. Operatian Plan 1-45 (Alternate). Guadal-1: 3 t@r 45.

. ADM Plan dB 1-45. Guadalcanal: 8 Feb 45.

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Doctrinal Publications

fleet mine Force, Pacific,Staff Officers' Field Mmua.2 far Aphibiaus

Gperatinns. (Obsolete), Hawaii: 10 Sep 44.

Field 19-5, Military Fulice. (Obsolete), War Department: 14 J m 44.

Field Manual 27-10, Rules of Land W ~ ~ f J z Z ?(Obsolete),

. War Department:
h.d.1

Bnphibious Cpxations (Phib), Volme 19, Bq~lop~smt

of Military Blice.

(Obsolete), mrhe Corps Schools: 1945.

[?I, Cases & MteriaZs on Mlitary Gmenment. Civil Affairs mldirg 6

S t a m Area Presidio of Xmterey, California: 15 September 1945.

M y , J. K., "Thirty ThDuSand P r i m of War Over the Beach.*nMilitazy

Review: April 1945.

Jacobs, William H., "Military Gcmrmst at 0kinawa."- Corps Gazette:

November 1946.

m s , Lewis, "Japanese Civilians in acmbat Zcmes.nMdne Corps Gazette:

February 1945.

Miller, Bill, "Beachhead Govermnent. mine Corps Gazette: mvaber 1944.

of the Traffic Headquarters."Militazy

EYeSCOtt, Brainard E., l*Organizatian
Review: January 1945.

Prud'hamva, H. C., "Civil Affairs.* m i n e Cozps Gazette: m y 1944.

Samuelsen, Lewis N., "Handlicq hany Civilians."mrine Corps Gazette:

April 1945.

&amelsen, Lewis N., ' W 1 son the Bea~h.~I@tine Corps Gazette: August

1945.

Vernan, E. H., "Civil Affairs and Military Garenrment."Military Review:

June 1946.

Chqxlblished Material

Fix, Robert, G., BT, USA, lX?nth Anny in the Okinawa c%Wiign: An AMly~is
fmthe O p e r a t i d -ive. m, Thesis, U. S. Plmy Carmand
and General Staff College: 1992.

Chqxlblished Interviews by Author

Becker, Kenneth J., Col., E W R (Ret), Former Cammdhg Officer, A

Canparry, 1st Military Police Battalian, FMF Pacific, Duriq Operation
Iceberg. Interview by author, 28 October 1994,Los Altos, Ca. Tape
recording and transcript held by author.

Qvallaru, Salvatore, Fo2mer PFC, USkC, menber D Canparry, 1st Military

Police Battalion, FMF Pacific, Dur- Operatian Iceberg. Interview by
au*, 12 Novanber 1994, West Hanpstead, NY. Tape recording and
transmipt held by author.

N t z , Om, Former menber Militmy Police Canparry, 7th Service Reghat,

Duriq Operatian Iceberg. Interview by author,13 Novenber 1994, West
Lafayette, IN. Tape rearding and transcript held by author.

Krulac, Victor, H., Lt-Gen., USkC (Ret), Former G-3, 6th U e Division,
24 &arch 1945 to 30 June 1945. Interview by author.19 Octaber 1994,
San Diego. Tape reoxdiq and transcript held by author.

MX!rc&lin, James, H., Col., U D C R (Ret), Former Executive Officer, C

Canparry, 1st Military Police Battalion, R4F Pacific, Dur- Operatian
Iceberg. Interview by author, 22 October 1994, Wimberly, TX. Tape
r e a d i n g and transcript held by author.

W e r , Hans, H., Former PFC, U S C , maker 1st Military Police Battalian,

FMF Pacific, w i n g Operation Iceberg. Interview by author, 12
Novanber 1994, Philadelphia, PA. Transcript held by author.
Parks, Nelson, G., FoLmer PFC, USMC, manber 1st Military Police Battalian,
FMF Pacific, Eurhg -tian Iceberg. Interview by author,
23 October 1994, Sam City, FL. Tape recording and transcript held by
author.

sawyer, J&, P., 11, mnwr IstLt. U S C , Plat- Leader, 1st P1atccm.C
-, 1st Military Police ~attaliian,FMF Pacific, Durirq
-tian Iceberg. Interview by author, 22 October 1994, Vero Beach,
F'L. Tape recording and transcript held by author.
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