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Contemporary Politics
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National bolshevism ‐ past and present

a
Tamas Krausz
a
Institute of Political History , Hungarian Academy of Sciences
Published online: 03 Apr 2008.

To cite this article: Tamas Krausz (1995) National bolshevism ‐ past and present, Contemporary Politics, 1:2, 114-120, DOI:
10.1080/13569779508449884

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 114

Comment

National Bolshevism - past and present

Tamas Krausz
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Institute of Political History, Hungarian Academy of Sciences

A fter the First World War and the 1917 revolution, the former Russian Empire,
which at the turn of the century had seemed to be modernizing so rapidly,
could not be integrated into the new world system. This isolation of the Soviet system,
and the emergence of a bi-polar world after the Second World War, fed optimistic
hopes that it would be possible to establish a 'socialist world system1 parallel to the
capitalist one. But this new 'world system' was unable to respond adequately to the
neo-liberal, neo-conservative challenges of the 1970s due to its inability to finance
the welfare projects of the state socialist system. By then, the international obligations
that resulted from its role as a world power and the need to support huge
bureaucracies had used up all its material and financial resources. Looked at from
another angle, there was such a huge gap between the promises of the legitimizing
socialist ideology and the reality of socio-economic decline that the Soviet system
could not survive.

Yet it appears that, despite die new modernization wave and all the promises from
the west, the former Soviet Union can still not be properly integrated into the world
system. This region has started its downward slide into the ranks of the diird world
which has led to massive political crisis and change. One particular feature of this
crisis is the development of nationalist parties and movements in die former Soviet
Union and eastern Europe. National bolshevism is one particular manifestation of
diis state of affairs, and is a phenomenon that has already been seen in a variety of
forms diroughout eastern Europe. In this article, I wish to sketch the main outlines
of die 'Russian version1.

Historical background .
Originally national bolshevism was meant to be die political strategy of a 'diird way1
between die monarchist counter-revolution and the communist revolution. It was
elaborated by Nikolai Ustrialov, minister of propaganda in Admiral Koltshak's
 Comment 115

government in Siberia in 1919. He interpreted the New Economic Policy (NEP)

launched in 1921 as the incarnation of this third way. Ustrialov and the intellectuals
" grouped around the magazine Smena Vekh tried to persuade Russian intellectuals in
the emigration to accept Soviet power from the point of view of an imperial state-
nationalism and a newly born class of national owners. For him, Bolshevism was a
popular movement to 'save Russia', and he considered communism to be a shell or
a facade on it. According to his idea, it would be possible to get rid of the international
revolutionary, communist shell and the real basis of national bolshevism would
become visible.
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Russian 'messianism' was entangled here with the myth of national capitalism, the
leading class of which was to have been recruited from the new members of the state
and party bureaucracy along with members of the peasant bourgeoisie. Their power
- according to Ustrialov - would have taken the form of a Caesaristic dictatorship
supported by the Red Army and the state bureaucracy. As he himself put it: Soviet
Russia was like a radish - red on the outside but white on the inside.

National bolshevism made a great impression on the old elite and the experts of the
old regime, creating a division within the White Guard emigration as early as 1921-
22. From the beginning of 1920, Ustrialov analyzed historical processes from the
perspective of die 'one and indivisible Russia' and in so doing remained loyal to his
old, 'monarchist' standpoint: 'Soviet Power will by all means strive toward die
unification of the provinces and the centre in the name of world revolution. Russian
patriots will fight for die same goal in die name of a great and unified Russia.' On the
other hand national bolshevism did not only define itself as the ideology of'transition'
but also - in die form of Ustrialovism, the 'right wing' of national bolshevism - as die
embodiment and ideology of Thermidor. National bolshevism was originally based
on die political and ideological hypothesis that under Soviet power, revolution must
rid itself of its internationalist-communist orientation and must of necessity turn
back to die 'ordinary market' system. Most of the various socialist movements, on
the other hand, considered NEP to be a kind of a treason - treason from the
perspective of die original communist ideals, since NEP was a policy designed to
reconstruct the market economy. As is well known, Lenin himself called this phase
'the partial restoration of capitalism'.

In diis sense, die historiography of national bolshevism is die historiography of a

search for an alternative to bolshevism and its identity as die political line of
international communism. National bolshevism had drawn the necessary conclusions
from the historic defeat of Russian liberalism and the Russian monarchy. Ustrialov
 116 Contemporary Politics

thought that communism would be defeated by the power of the state, the basis of
which had been laid by the Bolsheviks themselves. The destination of this
'Thermidor' - in accordance with the spirit of the age - could be the modern
Caesaristic absolutism which Ustrialov had considered to be one of the possibilities
of statist concentration of power since the middle of the 1920s: he emphasized the
analogy with the French Thermidor. He believed that in Soviet Russia, the most
important achievements of the French Revolution ('imperial' centralization, a unified
national market, a high degree of state organization, a world-power role and so on)
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would be defended by a specific 'Russian Thermidor' that he did not consider to be

counter-revolutionary but a 'mere evolution from Utopian communism to ordinary
statehood'. In his view, NEP was not only a renouncement of war communism but
the renouncement of communism in general. In this way, national bolshevism worked
as a kind of contemporary nationalist critique of early communism. Many
representatives of this trend stated that NEP only meant 'the economic exploitation
of Russia' by foreign capital. That is why they decried 'the national control' of
international capital.

After the defeat of national bolshevism in the second half of the 1920s, its heritage
was partially preserved in the Stalinist turn - towards Caesaristic dictatorship; the
ruins of this phenomenon can be seen quite clearly today in the collapse of the Soviet
Union.
National bolshevism has won new significance in die current process of political
change in Russia. The structural problems today and seventy years ago are
fundamentally similar. Both in the period of the 'long' twenties (1917-1933) and in
die nineties (after 1989), the course of history has been centred around the following
closely interconnected problems. Firstly, what will the structure of the accumulation
of capital be like, given die historical circumstances and within die well-known socio-
political balance of forces? Secondly, which social groups and institutions will
'decide' die character and 'concentration' of state power? And thirdly, how and in
which forms will die transfer of property occur?

'Yeltsinism', die latest stage of political development in Russia, cannot be understood

outside die tradition of national bolshevism. As a concentration of power, as a
'democratic coup d'etat' diat under die banner of'national democracy' fights bodi
'communism1 and 'fascism,1 Yeltsinism itself seems to be one of die variations of
national bolshevism. National bolshevism today is the product of historical
conditions which include a 'national renaissance' widiin dieframeworkof die change
of regimes - mainly as a result of a failed 'modernization'. The idea of this 'national
 Comment 117

renaissance' helps to disguise the fact that a battle is taking place for the
transformation of ownership, and to deflect attention from the power struggle among
the elites. By dissolving parliament in October 1993, Yeltsin was able to restore the
authority of state power, which he then used to strengthen the presidential system
in order to pave the way for the introduction of a modern Russian form of the primitive
accumulation of capital under the infamous so-called shock therapy. It was just as if
Ustrialov's modernizing national dictatorship had been resurrected. The different
tendencies of modern Russian nationalism are inseparable from this 'modernization
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experiment1. Understanding this implies the ability to free ourselves from delusions.

T h e world system and Russia

One of the most stubborn of these delusions is that of the 'union of communism and
fascism'. This is another popular interpretation which concludes that Russia is at a
crossroads, with one way leading to bourgeois democracy and the other to communo-
fascism. The roots of this delusion lie in political self-interest: this thesis comprises
the source of legitimacy for the so-called democrats who took power during the
Russian change of regimes. 'The danger of fascism' served as a slogan to justify the
dissolution of parliament and the introduction of the dictatorial presidential system.
The main ideologists of the democrats went as far as to urge a coalition with the
west against fascism.

In the meantime, a completely different danger has emerged. It is well known that
Russia has reached an historical nadir of a magnitude unheard of in recent memory:
the collapse of the economy and the traditional labour market, unbelievable levels
of inflation, ethnic separatism and national-religious wars, mass pauperization, and
the gap (heretofore unknown) between the social classes. On top of all this, there
has been a singular cultural decline, an Orthodox religious 'renaissance' and the
revival of long-forgotten forms of nationalism. All these symptoms are based on the
aborted modernization experiment that was originally introduced by perestroika.

Understandably enough, given the rapid decline of liberal values, many people,
particularly in the west, tend to describe the different formations of the new right as
simple fascism - mainly because they are afraid of die spontaneous and confused
anger of the masses. Yet die new nationalistic mass movements of die right did not
emerge first in Russia or eastern Europe. It is well-known that as die consequence of
a 'neo-conservative revolution' in western Europe in die 70s and 80s, millions of
people lost dieir jobs or became defenceless 'small entrepreneurs' through 'die
restructuring of die labour market1. Widi die traditional left (socialists, social-
democrats and communists) continuously losing strength, die west was receptive to
 118 Contemporary Politics

a new, power-hungry, populist-nationalist phenomenon, represented by Le Pen,

Haider, Berlusconi and so on. The racist, xenophobic character and the operating
structures of the new nationalist populism has provided the countries of the former
socialist bloc with a working 'model'. It is difficult to deny the connections between
the social consequences of neo-liberalism and the rise of nationalism. It is also
impossible to understand the Russian new right in the modern era without
accounting for the radical changes in connection with the core and semi-periphery.
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Punishment
In the east, mostly in the states of the former Soviet Union and in the Balkans, it has
become evident that all possibilities for 'joining Europe' are dead, which might be
considered as a kind of punishment for the failure to achieve the rapid modernization
which was hoped for earlier. Under the process of social disintegration and the
formation of a new class society, the anti-west nationalist movements have become
stronger. Russian nationalism in particular, of which national bolshevism is only
one facet, has developed significantly - the 'subproletarian' social basis of which has
been growing during the last few years. It is evident that these nationalist movements
all contain some similarities: for example, the demand for the reconstruction of the
empire, the provision of 'protection1 to anti-western sentiments and xenophobia -
mostly anti-semitism, social-demagoguery, anger because of alleged insults to national
dignity, and so on.

Looking more closely at Russian nationalism, it is clear that it is not homogeneous.

There are several varying forms of modern Russian nationalism which share a certain
amount of common ground but also have some significant differences:
1. Conservative, monarchist nationalism, the Great Russian chauvinism of the 'Black
Hundreds' (Pamyat).
2. The ultra-right, neo-fascist 'racist' nationalism which longs for a radical mass
movement for its 'national revolution'; but lacking deep roots and supporters, will
not be able to bring it about on its own (for example Barkashov and his party, and
some of the more extreme small neo-Nazi groups).

3. A nationalism basically anti-communist in nature, with a heterogeneous lumpen-

narodnik (populist) character that is willing to integrate some Soviet traditions (the
intellectuals around Dent and, after October 1993,Zai>fra newspapers).

4. Zhirinovsky, who relies on a combination of nationalism and liberalism and who

has served as the fascist 'enemy' for the liberals, is the child of Yeltsin's 'liberal
 Comment 1 Id

revolution1. Zhirinovsky personifies the typical populist politician when he

underlines Russia's 'national interests' and advocates the reconstruction of the
Russian Empire.

5. Yeltsin himself, with his official state nationalism, can now hardly be differentiated
from Zhirinovsky.

6. Soviet patriotism mixes with imperial populist nationalism in the ideological

vocabulary of Ziuganov, the communist leader, but obviously diere is an antagonism
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between the Russian nationalist movements based on private property and the
communist goal of renationalizing former state property. (This difference can only
be disguised by direct manipulation.)

7. And finally, national bolshevism, which tries to unite the losers of the capitalist
restoration under the banner of a radical left social revolution in order to regain
world power, 'unify all Russian lands' and attain social equality - against the old
nomenclature and the new Mafia-bourgeoisie.

T h e third way of national bolshevism

Contemporary national bolshevism appeals to a particular form of Russian
nationalism as a binder for its basic aims. The National Bolshevik Party, organized
by the famous former emigre writer Eduard Limonov, states in its founding document
that 'the Soviet Union was destroyed by the nomenclature with the help of the West.'

Unlike its original form, national bolshevism today integrates traditional leftist
demands and the state-paternalistic idea of state protection of the peripherized
masses. According to the founding document, the National Bolsheviks would not
give up the idea of a multi-party system. Some nationalistic tendencies prefer 'national
capitalism' to western capital - others, like Limonov's national bolsheviks, want a
second edition of 'Russified' state socialism, as can clearly be seen in their use of
Bolshevik symbols - although a bit recoloured.
The idea of reconstructing the Stalinist state keeps Limonov under the spell of Russian
state socialism. The special Russian nationalism of national bolshevism declares a
third way between 'party-bureaucratic communism and bourgeois predatory
democracy'. According to this analysis, the 'free market is antagonistic to the Russian
way of thinking'. This third way builds on 'the collectivistic, communal demands of
the Russian people'. Limonov's programme claims that there should be workers
self-management in the large factories, small factories and the processing industry
should become private property, while the energy and military sectors should remain
 120 Contemporary Politics

in the hands of the state. National bolshevism as a permutation of the new right, as
'unifying' the ideas of right and left, provides an alternative for the disillusioned
masses, unemployed workers and soldiers, officers, impoverished citizens and
peasants, and so on. On a populist basis the organization has integrated everything
that might result in a common understanding and unity on the basis of nationalism.

It was Iimonov who most consciously stated that the demolition of the Soviet Union
and the peripherization of Russia were mainly the fault of the ruling elite that had
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gained power after 1953 and remained in power after 1991 under the banner of
democracy. Thus national bolshevism does not consider the communist party to be
its 'natural' ally, since it remains in the hands of the old nomenclature who themselves
are 'guilty of plundering Russia, and it is called privatization'. Such an approach
might well be attractive to various groups of people, but as yet there are no visible
outlines of an organized mass movement.
It is difficult to foretell who will join the National Bolshevik Party and what role it
will play during the next political earthquake, but it is seems likely that even if the
party itself remains small, the ideas of national bolshevism will remain an indelible
spot on the troubled map of national populism in Russia.

Quotations are from The Programme of the National Bolshevik Party of Russia,
Moscow, 1993.